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The Cost of Financial Frictions for Life Insurers

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  • Ralph S. J. Koijen
  • Motohiro Yogo

Abstract

During the financial crisis, life insurers sold long-term policies at deep discounts relative to actuarial value. The average markup was as low as ?19 percent for annuities and ?57 percent for life insurance. This extraordinary pricing behavior was due to financial and product market frictions, interacting with statutory reserve regulation that allowed life insurers to record far less than a dollar of reserve per dollar of future insurance liability. We identify the shadow cost of capital through exogenous variation in required reserves across different types of policies. The shadow cost was $0.96 per dollar of statutory capital for the average company in November 2008.

Suggested Citation

  • Ralph S. J. Koijen & Motohiro Yogo, 2014. "The Cost of Financial Frictions for Life Insurers," Staff Report 500, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmsr:500
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Capital regulation; Annuities; Leverage; Life insurance; Financial crisis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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