IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fea/wpaper/08_07.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Municipality secession, voter’s preference and persistence of power

Author

Listed:
  • Paulo Arvate
  • Vladimir Ponczek

Abstract

This paper attempts to evaluate municipality secession in terms of the median voter response on the executive local elections. Our results imply that incumbents in the new municipalities have a higher chance of reelection which suggests that the median voter approved the secession process. Moreover, that effect is enhanced because those parties that managed the municipality secession also had the probability of persistence in power (in more than one term) increased.

Suggested Citation

  • Paulo Arvate & Vladimir Ponczek, 2008. "Municipality secession, voter’s preference and persistence of power," Working Papers 08_07, Universidade de São Paulo, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade de Ribeirão Preto.
    • Handle: RePEc:fea:wpaper:08_07
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: ftp:https://cpq.fearp.usp.br:2300/textos_discussao/eco/wpe08_07.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2008
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brender, Adi & Drazen, Allan, 2005. "Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1271-1295, October.
    2. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    3. Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, 1997. "On the Number and Size of Nations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1027-1056.
    4. Vladimir Ponczek & Enlinson Mattos & Paulo Arvate, 2015. "Municipalities Secession and uncertainty on public goods provision," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(1), pages 198-203.
    5. Mattozzi, Andrea & Merlo, Antonio, 2008. "Political careers or career politicians?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 597-608, April.
    6. Brender, Adi, 2003. "The effect of fiscal performance on local government election results in Israel: 1989-1998," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 2187-2205, September.
    7. Sam Peltzman, 1992. "Voters as Fiscal Conservatives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 107(2), pages 327-361.
    8. Enikolopov, Ruben & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2007. "Decentralization and political institutions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(11-12), pages 2261-2290, December.
    9. Olivier Blanchard & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "Federalism With and Without Political Centralization: China Versus Russia," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 48(4), pages 1-8.
    10. Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A., 2005. "Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 385-472, Elsevier.
    11. Patrick Bolton & Gérard Roland, 1997. "The Breakup of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1057-1090.
    12. Brueckner, Jan K., 2006. "Fiscal federalism and economic growth," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(10-11), pages 2107-2120, November.
    13. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political economics and macroeconomic policy," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482, Elsevier.
    14. Arzaghi, Mohammad & Henderson, J. Vernon, 2005. "Why countries are fiscally decentralizing," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(7), pages 1157-1189, July.
    15. Douglass C. North, 1991. "Institutions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 97-112, Winter.
    16. Terza, Joseph V., 1998. "Estimating count data models with endogenous switching: Sample selection and endogenous treatment effects," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 129-154, May.
    17. Gramlich, Edward M & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1982. "Micro Estimates of Public Spending Demand Functions and Tests of the Tiebout and Median-Voter Hypotheses," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(3), pages 536-560, June.
    18. Adi Brender & Allan Drazen, 2005. "How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Cross-Section of Countries," NBER Working Papers 11862, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Dilip Mookherjee & Pranab K. Bardhan, 2000. "Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 135-139, May.
    20. Andrés Romeu & Marcos Vera-Hernández, 2005. "Counts with an endogenous binary regressor: A series expansion approach," Econometrics Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 8(1), pages 1-22, March.
    21. Joana Naritomi & Rodrigo R. Soares & Juliano J. Assunção, 2007. "Rent Seeking and the Unveiling of 'De Facto' Institutions: Development and Colonial Heritage within Brazil," NBER Working Papers 13545, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    22. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(5), pages 416-416.
    23. Cheikbossian, Guillaume, 2008. "Rent-seeking, spillovers and the benefits of decentralization," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 217-228, January.
    24. Tavares, José & Arvate, Paulo & Avelino, George, 2008. "Fiscal Conservatism in a New Democracy: 'Sophisticated' versus 'Naïve' Voters," CEPR Discussion Papers 6931, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    25. Anna Brink, 2004. "The break-up of municipalities: Voting behavior in local referenda," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 119-135, July.
    26. Rubinchik-Pessach, Anna, 2005. "Can decentralization be beneficial?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(7), pages 1231-1249, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ponczek, Vladimir & Mattos, Enlison, 2013. "Efeitos da Divisão Municipal na oferta de Bens Públicos e Indicadores Sociais," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 67(3), September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Vladimir Ponczek & Enlinson Mattos & Paulo Arvate, 2015. "Municipalities Secession and uncertainty on public goods provision," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(1), pages 198-203.
    2. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Santiago Lago-Peñas & Agnese Sacchi, 2017. "The Impact Of Fiscal Decentralization: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 1095-1129, September.
    3. Robert P. Inman, 2008. "Federalism's Values and the Value of Federalism," NBER Working Papers 13735, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Enikolopov, Ruben & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2007. "Decentralization and political institutions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(11-12), pages 2261-2290, December.
    5. Calin Arcalean & Gerhard Glomm & Ioana Schiopu & Jens Suedekum, 2010. "Public budget composition, fiscal (de)centralization, and welfare," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 43(3), pages 832-859, August.
    6. Andrea Filippetti & Agnese Sacchi, 2016. "Decentralization and economic growth reconsidered: The role of regional authority," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 34(8), pages 1793-1824, December.
    7. Jia, Junxue & Liang, Xuan & Ma, Guangrong, 2021. "Political hierarchy and regional economic development: Evidence from a spatial discontinuity in China," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    8. Koethenbuerger, Marko, 2008. "Revisiting the "Decentralization Theorem"--On the role of externalities," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 116-122, July.
    9. Thushyanthan Baskaran & Lars P. Feld & Jan Schnellenbach, 2014. "Fiscal Federalism, Decentralization and Economic Growth: Survey and Meta-Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series 4985, CESifo.
    10. Marcela Eslava, 2011. "The Political Economy Of Fiscal Deficits: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 645-673, September.
    11. Dilla, Diana, 2017. "Staatsverschuldung und Verschuldungsmentalität [Public Debt and Debt Mentality]," MPRA Paper 79432, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Aristovnik, Aleksander, 2012. "Fiscal decentralization in Eastern Europe: a twenty-year perspective," MPRA Paper 39316, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Hindriks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2009. "Decentralization and electoral accountability: Incentives, separation and voter welfare," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 385-397, September.
    14. Thierry Madiès & Grégoire Rota-Grasiozi & Jean-Pierre Tranchant & Cyril Trépier, 2018. "The economics of secession: a review of legal, theoretical, and empirical aspects," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, Springer;Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics, vol. 154(1), pages 1-18, December.
    15. Sonin, Konstantin, 2010. "Provincial protectionism," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 111-122, June.
    16. Barankay, Iwan & Lockwood, Ben, 2007. "Decentralization and the productive efficiency of government: Evidence from Swiss cantons," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(5-6), pages 1197-1218, June.
    17. Nadia Fiorino & Emma Galli & Fabio Padovano, 2013. "Do fiscal decentralization and government fragmentation affect corruption in different ways? Evidence from a panel data analysis," Chapters, in: Santiago Lago-Peñas & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (ed.), The Challenge of Local Government Size, chapter 5, pages 121-147, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    18. Arze del Granado, F. Javier & Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge & McNab, Robert M., 2012. "Decentralized Governance and Preferences for Public Goods," MPRA Paper 42459, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Marco Buti & Alessandro Turrini & Paul Noord & Pietro Biroli, 2009. "Defying the ‘Juncker curse’: can reformist governments be re-elected?," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 65-100, February.
    20. Gustavo Canavire-Bacarreza & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Bauyrzhan Yedgenov, 2017. "Reexamining the determinants of fiscal decentralization: what is the role of geography?," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(6), pages 1209-1249.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    municipality secession; reelection; voter’s preference and persistence of power;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fea:wpaper:08_07. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Bruno Vizona Liberato (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fruspbr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.