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Technology Treaties and Climate Change

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  • Gersbach, Hans
  • Riekhof, Marie-Catherine

Abstract

We introduce an international technology treaty ("Tech Treaty") that couples the funding of research for a more advanced abatement technology with an international emissions permit market. While each country decides on domestic permit issuance, a fraction of these permits is auctioned by an international agency. Auction revenues scale up license revenues for the innovators of abatement technologies. We show that such a treaty increases innovations and decreases emissions under plausible conditions compared to an emissions trading system without additional technology agreement. Finally, we discuss how a Tech Treaty may inspire next steps in existing technology programs.

Suggested Citation

  • Gersbach, Hans & Riekhof, Marie-Catherine, 2019. "Technology Treaties and Climate Change," CEPR Discussion Papers 14033, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14033
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    Cited by:

    1. Gersbach, Hans & Riekhof, Marie-Catherine, 2021. "Permit markets, carbon prices and the creation of innovation clusters," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    2. Takashima, Nobuyuki, 2023. "Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with third-party organizations: Initial payment, technological development, and refunding," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 228(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Climate change mitigation - technology promotion - r&d - international emissions permit markets - international treaty - externalities;

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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