The Funds Concentration Effect and Discriminatory Bailout
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Cited by:
- Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2010.
"Banks without parachutes: Competitive effects of government bail-out policies,"
Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 156-168, September.
- Hendrik Hakenes & Isabel Schnabel, 2004. "Banks without Parachutes – Competitive Effects of Government Bail-out Policies," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2004_12, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2004. "Banks without parachutes : competitive effects of government bail-out policies," Papers 04-53, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
- Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2004. "Banks without Parachutes - Competitive Effects of Government Bail-out Policies," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 8, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2004. "Banks without Parachutes -- Competitive Effects of Government Bail-out Policies," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-53, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
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Keywords
financial intermediation; macroeconomic risk; banking regulation; discriminatory bailout; funds concentration; aggregate liquidity; consistent expectations;All these keywords.
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