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Jean-Jacques Laffont: A Look Back

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  • Eric Maskin

    (School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study)

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  • Eric Maskin, 2004. "Jean-Jacques Laffont: A Look Back," Economics Working Papers 0043, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:ads:wpaper:0043
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1999. "Separation of Regulators Against Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 232-262, Summer.
    2. Dale W. Jorgenson & Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1974. "Efficient Estimation of Nonlinear Simultaneous Equations with Additive Disturbances," NBER Chapters, in: Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, Volume 3, number 4, pages 615-640, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Ossard, Herve & Vuong, Quang, 1995. "Econometrics of First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(4), pages 953-980, July.
    4. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1991. "The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(4), pages 1089-1127.
    5. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 2001. "Competition in Telecommunications," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262621509, December.
    6. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Meleu, Mathieu, 1999. "A Positive Theory of Privatisation for Sub-Saharan Africa," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 8(0), pages 30-67, December.
    7. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Pollution permits and compliance strategies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1-2), pages 85-125, October.
    8. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 1-37, Spring.
    9. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    10. Baron, David P. & Besanko, David, 1984. "Regulation and information in a continuing relationship," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 267-302.
    11. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    12. Laffont, J.-J., 1999. "Political Economy, Information and Incentives," Papers 99.516, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
    13. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Maskin, Eric S, 1990. "The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Insider Trading on the Stock Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 70-93, February.
    14. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1999. "Political economy, information and incentives1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 649-669, April.
    15. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 38-56, Spring.
    16. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "On the revelation of preferences for public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 79-93, August.
    17. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Procurement and Renegotiation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 235-259, April.
    18. Jeon, Doh-Shin & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1999. "The Efficient Mechanism for Downsizing the Public Sector," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 13(1), pages 67-88, January.
    19. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
    20. M. B. Bouissou & J. J. Laffont & Q. H. Vuong, 1986. "Disequilibrium Econometrics on Micro Data," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(1), pages 113-124.
    21. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1998. "Regulation of a Risk Averse Firm," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 149-173, November.
    22. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1979. "Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1137-1144, September.
    23. Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 329-369, December.
    24. repec:bla:scandj:v:81:y:1979:i:2:p:227-37 is not listed on IDEAS
    25. Gourieroux, C & Laffont, J-J & Monfort, A, 1980. "Disequilibrium Econometrics in Simultaneous Equations Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(1), pages 75-96, January.
    26. Laffont, Jean-Jacques M, 1985. "On the Welfare Analysis of Rational Expectations Equilibria with Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 1-29, January.
    27. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1997. "Collusion under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 875-912, July.
    28. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1153-1175, September.
    29. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Maskin, Eric, 1980. "A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(6), pages 1507-1520, September.
    30. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 2000. "Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 309-342, March.
    31. Jerry Green & Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1979. "On Coalition Incentive Compatibility," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(2), pages 243-254.
    32. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
    33. Helpman, Elhanan & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1975. "On moral hazard in general equilibrium theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 8-23, February.
    34. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & N'Guessan, Tchetche, 1999. "Competition and corruption in an agency relationship," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 271-295, December.
    35. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-1257, November.
    36. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
    37. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Moreaux, Michel, 1983. "The Nonexistence of a Free Entry Cournot Equilibrium in Labor-Managed Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(2), pages 455-462, March.
    38. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Robert, Jacques, 1996. "Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 181-186, August.
    39. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2001. "Incentives and Political Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199248681.
    40. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1978. "Satisfactory mechanisms for environments with consumption lower bounds," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 359-375, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. McFadden, Daniel, 2012. "Economic juries and public project provision," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 166(1), pages 116-126.
    2. Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2009. "Toward a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Jean-Jacques Laffont's Lead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 729-770, September.
    3. Antonio Estache & L. Wren-Lewis, 2008. "Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Laffont's Lead," Working Papers ECARES 2008_018, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

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