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The Political Business Cycle after 25 Years

In: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Volume 15

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  • Allan Drazen

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  • Allan Drazen, 2001. "The Political Business Cycle after 25 Years," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Volume 15, pages 75-138, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:11055
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Waller, Christopher J & Walsh, Carl E, 1996. "Central-Bank Independence, Economic Behavior, and Optimal Term Lengths," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1139-1153, December.
    2. Tootell, Geoffrey M. B., 1999. "Whose monetary policy is it anyway?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 217-235, February.
    3. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March.
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