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- Fu, Tingting & Ji, Yunan & Kamei, Kenju & Putterman, Louis (2017): Punishment can support cooperation even when punishable
Do opportunities to punish non-punishers help to stabilize cooperation? Or do opportunities to punish punishers harm cooperation and its benefits by deterring first order punishment and wasting resources? We compare treatments of a decision experiment without peer punishment and with one order of punishment to ones in which subjects can be punished for punishing or for failing to punish. Our treatments with higher-order punishment achieve as much improvement in cooperation as those with only one punishment stage. We see evidence of social norms in action, but no evidence of punishing failure to punish.
RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:154:y:2017:i:c:p:84-87 Save to MyIDEAS - Tingting Fu & Louis Putterman (2018): When is punishment harmful to cooperation? A note on antisocial and perverse punishment
Economists conducting laboratory experiments on cooperation and peer punishment find that a non-negligible minority of punishments is directed at cooperators rather than free riders. Such punishments have been categorized as ‘perverse’ or ‘antisocial,’ using definitions that partially overlap, but not entirely so. Which approach better identifies punishment that discourages cooperation? ... (Science 319(5868):1362–1367, 2008) and find that when subjects are uninformed about who punished them, the recipient’s contribution relative to the group average (whether it is ‘perverse’) is a better predictor of negative impact on contribution than is her contribution relative to the punisher’s (whether it is ‘antisocial’). Regression estimates nevertheless suggest that punished subjects attempt to take relative contribution of punisher into account even if only by conjecture.
RePEc:spr:jesaex:v:4:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s40881-018-0053-6 Save to MyIDEAS - Friehe, Tim & Hippel, Svenja & Schielke, Anne (2021): – The use of self-punishment and compensation and how it influences punishment
This paper analyzes experimental data to better understand self-punishment and compensation as potential means for making amends for having caused distributional harm and inefficiency. ... In our data, subjects infrequently self-punish, whereas they frequently offer compensation. Appeasement tactics are used particularly when the harmed party can punish the harm doer. Compensation is an informative signal for the harm doer’s benign intent, which does not similarly apply to self-punishment. Both self-punishment and compensation lower the punishment level imposed by the harmed party on the harm doer, whereas results regarding the probability of punishment are less clear.
RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:84:y:2021:i:c:s0167487021000180 Save to MyIDEAS - Kamei, Kenju (2014): Conditional punishment
We elicit human conditional punishment types by conducting experiments. We find that their punishment decisions to an individual are on average significantly positively proportional to other members’ punishment decisions to that individual.
RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:124:y:2014:i:2:p:199-202 Save to MyIDEAS - Kamei, Kenju (2014): Conditional Punishment
We elicit human conditional punishment types by conducting experiments. We find that their punishment decisions to an individual are on average significantly positively proportional to other members’ punishment decisions to that individual.
RePEc:pra:mprapa:54031 Save to MyIDEAS - Lewisch Peter & Ottone, Stefania & Ponzano, Ferruccio (2010): Free-riding on altruistic punishment? An experimental comparison of third-party-punishment in a stand-alone and in an in-group environment
This paper deals with the subject of third-party punishment. The paper compares, by means of an economic experiment, punishment by a third party (Stand-Alone case) with punishment by third parties (In-Group environment). This deliberate introduction of a second potential punisher is neither subtle nor marginal. Shifting punishment choices into this "enlarged environment" allows us to study, in a systematic way, the complex relationship between the punisher's expectations about her/his peer's punishment decisions and her/his own punishment choices. In particular, we aim to examine whether, on average, individual punishment is systematically lower in an In-Group environment compared with the Stand-Alone case.
RePEc:uca:ucapdv:139 Save to MyIDEAS - Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson (2004): Punishing the Innocent along with the Guilty: The Economics of Individual versus Group Punishment
Standard models of law enforcement involve the apprehension and punishment of a single suspect, but in many contexts, punishment is actually imposed on an entire group known to contain the offender. The advantages of .group punishment. are that the offender is punished with certainty and detection costs are saved. The disadvantage is that innocent individuals are punished. We compare individual and group punishment when social welfare depends on fairness, and when it depends on deterrence. We show that group punishment may dominate in the former case if the detection technology is ineffective but never in the latter case.
RePEc:uct:uconnp:2004-37 Save to MyIDEAS - Thöni, Christian (2011): Inequality Aversion and Antisocial Punishment
Antisocial punishment - punishment of pro-social cooperators - has shown to be detrimental for the efficiency of informal punishment mechanisms in public goods games. The motives behind antisocial punishment acts are not yet well understood. This article shows that inequality aversion predicts antisocial punishment in public goods games with punishment. ... With data from three studies on public goods games with punishment I evaluate the predictions. A majority of the observed antisocial punishment acts are not compatible with inequality aversion.
RePEc:usg:econwp:2011:11 Save to MyIDEAS - Sven Fischer & Kristoffel Grechenig & Nicolas Meier (2013): Cooperation under punishment: Imperfect information destroys it and centralizing punishment does not help
We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information and under a centralized and decentralized punishment regime. We nd that (1) centralization by itself does not improve cooperation and welfare compared to an informal, peer-to-peer punishment regime and (2) centralized punishment is equally sensitive to noise as decentralized punishment, that is, it leads to signi cantly lower cooperation and welfare (total pro ts). Our results shed critical light on the widespread conjecture that the centralization of punishment institutions is welfare increasing in itself.
RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2013_06 Save to MyIDEAS - Matthias Cinyabuguma & Talbot Page & Louis Putterman (2006): Can second-order punishment deter perverse punishment?
Recent experiments have shown that voluntary punishment of free riders can increase contributions, mitigating the free-rider problem. But frequently punishers punish high contributors, creating “perverse” incentives which can undermine the benefits of voluntary punishment. In our experiment, allowing punishment of punishing behaviors reduces punishment of high contributors, but gives rise to efficiency-reducing second-order “perverse” punishment.
RePEc:kap:expeco:v:9:y:2006:i:3:p:265-279 Save to MyIDEAS