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- Arina Gorbatyuk & Adrián Kovács (2019): Patent notice (failure) in the era of Patent Monetization
The most commonly provided economic rationale for the patent system is that it incentivizes inventive effort that may not be carried out in its absence. ... Whereas the notice function is traditionally confined to the adequate disclosure of inventions, we propose that in light of the recent trend towards rapidly growing markets for patent monetization it should also encompass the adequate disclosure of the holders of rights to a patent. ... Based on a comparative analysis of the provisions of six of the most proficient patent offices worldwide, we illustrate that although current provisions warrant an adequate disclosure of the identity of the initial patent applicant(s), they provide the public with only limited opportunities to identify and track subsequent changes of ownership. Although most patent authorities require parties to file notice when the rights to a patent are assigned, provisions for strictly enforcing this requirement are absent. This allows for a lack of transparency concerning patent ownership, which may hamper rather than facilitate technology transactions.
RePEc:ete:msiper:638326 Save to MyIDEAS - Delcamp, Henry (2015): Are patent pools a way to help patent owners enforce their rights?
This paper explores empirically the interplay between patent pooling and litigations using data on 1564 United States patents belonging to eight modern I.C.T. pools and to a control database with patents having the same characteristics. First, our analysis makes it possible to highlight that pool patents are more litigated than non-pool patents presenting the same characteristics. Second, we underline that the difference in the likelihood to be involved in an infringement case, with the patent holder as plaintiff, is due to a pool effect per se, on top of the impact of the pool on the market size of the patent. ... We underscore that the patent inclusion in a pool, by reducing the uncertainty on the patent essentiality, facilitates dispute resolution by settlement. ... We emphasize and discuss such other factors that affect the incentives to litigate as the size of the firm and whether the patent holder is vertically integrated.
RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:41:y:2015:i:c:p:68-76 Save to MyIDEAS - Donald J Wright (2004): Optimal Global Patent Design
The optimal patent breadth and length is derived for an innovating and a non-innovating country in the presence of imitation. It is found that the innovating country chooses stronger patent protection than the non-innovating country. These patents are compared to the optimal global patent design and it is found they are too weak from a global perspective. Finally, it is shown that the innovating country is unambiguously better off, while the non-innovating country may be worse off with the optimal global patent design
RePEc:ecm:latm04:35 Save to MyIDEAS - Shanghai Patent Agency (1990): Supplementary protection function of utility models in China
The article explains the rules in Chinese Patent Law for applications for patents of invention and utility models and points out the advantages, when making an application for a patent of invention, of simultaneously making an application for a patent for a utility model.
RePEc:eee:worpat:v:12:y:1990:i:2:p:100-101 Save to MyIDEAS - Matthew Y Ma (2015): Fundamentals of Patenting and Licensing for Scientists and Engineers
This comprehensive book is the first of its kind to take scientists and engineers beyond simply getting a patent granted. Through the author's extensive technical background and experience in intellectual property licensing, it ties the many technical, legal and business aspects of patent enforcement to the innovation and patenting stage in the patent value chain, with the objective of helping inventors to create valuable patents that can be capitalized.
RePEc:wsi:wsbook:8734 Save to MyIDEAS - Gaétan de Rassenfosse & Bruno Van Pottelsberghe (2008): On the Price Elasticity of Demand for Patents
This paper investigates whether patent fee policies are a potential factor underlying the boom in patent applications observed in major patent offices. We provide the first panel-based evidence suggesting that fees affect the demand for patents in three major patent offices (EPO, USPTO and JPO), with a price elasticity of about -0.4 (similar to that of the residential demand for oil or water). The laxity of fee policies adopted by patent offices over the past 25 years therefore contributed, to a significant extent, to the rising propensity to patent observed since the mid-nineties. This is especially true at the European Patent Office, which has dramatically decreased its fees since the mid-1990s.
RePEc:eca:wpaper:2008_031 Save to MyIDEAS - van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno & de Rassenfosse, Gaétan (2008): On the price elasticity of demand for patents
This paper investigates whether patent fee policies are a potential factor underlying the boom in patent applications observed in major patent offices. We provide the first panel-based evidence suggesting that fees affect the demand for patents in three major patent offices (EPO, USPTO and JPO), with a price elasticity of about -0.4 (similar to that of the residential demand for oil or water). The laxity of fee policies adopted by patent offices over the past 25 years therefore contributed, to a significant extent, to the rising propensity to patent observed since the mid-nineties. This is especially true at the European Patent Office, which has dramatically decreased its fees since the mid-1990s.
RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7029 Save to MyIDEAS - Gaétan de Rassenfosse & Bruno Van Pottelsberghe (2008): On the price elasticity of demand for patents
This paper investigates whether patent fee policies are a potential factor underlying the boom in patent applications observed in major patent offices. We provide the first panel-based evidence suggesting that fees affect the demand for patents in three major patent offices (EPO, USPTO and JPO), with a price elasticity of about -0.4 (similar to that of the residential demand for oil or water). The laxity of fee policies adopted by patent offices over the past 25 years therefore contributed, to a significant extent, to the rising propensity to patent observed since the mid-nineties. This is especially true at the European Patent Office, which has dramatically decreased its fees since the mid-1990s.
RePEc:sol:wpaper:08-031 Save to MyIDEAS - Grazia Sveva Ascione & Laura Ciucci & Claudio Detotto & Valerio Sterzi (2022): Universities involvement in patent litigation: an analysis of the characteristics of US litigated patents
Some recent patent infringement litigations initiated by universities have resulted in multi-million dollar damages and have attracted public attention and stimulated research especially among law scholars. ... First, we show that, although it is still a quite rare phenomenon, patent litigation involving universities has been significantly growing in the last 2 decades. Second, we study the characteristics of university patents that have been litigated vis-à-vis non-litigated university patents. In this respect, we find that public universities and non-US universities are less inclined to litigate their patents compared to private and US universities. In addition, we also find that patent quality is an important determinant in the decision of university litigation.
RePEc:spr:scient:v:127:y:2022:i:12:d:10.1007_s11192-022-04500-9 Save to MyIDEAS - T. Scherngell & E. Jansenberger (2006): Patents, Patent Citations and the Geography of Knowledge Spillovers in Europe
The main focus in this chapter is on knowledge spillovers between high-technology firms in Europe, as captured by patent citations. ... The European coverage is given by patent applications at the European Patent Office that are assigned to hightechnology firms located in the EU-25 member states (except Cyprus and Malta), the two accession countries Bulgaria and Romania, and Norway and Switzerland. By following the paper trail left by citations between these high-technology patents, the contribution provides strong evidence for the localisation of knowledge spillovers at two different levels (country, region) in Europe even after controlling for the tendency of inventive activities in the high-technology sector to be geographically clustered.
RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-35981-4_11 Save to MyIDEAS