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Marital Division of Labor with Risk of Divorce: The Role of "Voice" Enforcement of Contracts

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  • Lommerud, Kjell Erik

Abstract

It is assumed that emotional ties can be relied on to enforce impli cit marital contracts by "voice." Therefore, in the present model, divorc e has economic consequences not only because the economies of scale from living together are destroyed but also because the scope for suc h "voice" enforcement is weakened. Moreover, perhaps surprisingly, the author finds that it is ambiguous how an increase in the probability of divorce influences predivorce allocation of time, even when preferences are assumed to be homothetic. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Lommerud, Kjell Erik, 1989. "Marital Division of Labor with Risk of Divorce: The Role of "Voice" Enforcement of Contracts," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 7(1), pages 113-127, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:7:y:1989:i:1:p:113-27
    DOI: 10.1086/298201
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    Cited by:

    1. Rainer, Helmut, 2007. "Should we write prenuptial contracts?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 337-363, February.
    2. Matthew J. Baker & Joyce P. Jacobsen, 2007. "Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender Division of Labor," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(4), pages 763-793.
    3. Donni, Olivier, 2014. "Over-investment in marriage-specific capital," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 34-43.
    4. Donni, Olivier & Molina, José Alberto, 2018. "Household Collective Models: Three Decades of Theoretical Contributions and Empirical Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 11915, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Helmuth Cremer & Pierre Pestieau & Kerstin Roeder, 2015. "United but (un)equal: human capital, probability of divorce, and the marriage contract," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 28(1), pages 195-217, January.
    6. Christina A. Houseworth & Barry R. Chiswick, 2020. "Divorce among European and Mexican Immigrants in the U.S," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 1-25, March.
    7. Rainer, Helmut, 2007. "Should we write prenuptial contracts?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 337-363, February.
    8. Matthias Fahn & Ray Rees, 2011. "Household Relational Contracts for Marriage, Fertility and Divorce," CESifo Working Paper Series 3655, CESifo.
    9. Telalagic, S., 2012. "Domestic Production as a Source of Marital Power: Theory and Evidence from Malawi," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1243, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    10. Volker Meier & Helmut Rainer, 2017. "Daddy months," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 30(3), pages 875-892, July.
    11. Lundberg, Shelly, 2005. "The Division of Labor by New Parents: Does Child Gender Matter?," IZA Discussion Papers 1787, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Laurens CHERCHYE & Thomas DEMUYNCK & Bram DE ROCK, 2010. "Noncooperative household consumption with caring," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven ces10.34, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
    13. Dan Anderberg & Helmut Rainer & Kerstin Roeder, 2016. "Family-Specific Investments and Divorce: A Theory of Dynamically Inconsistent Household Behavior," CESifo Working Paper Series 5996, CESifo.
    14. Ian Smith, 2003. "The Law and Economics of Marriage Contracts," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(2), pages 201-226, April.
    15. Libertad González & Berkay Özcan, 2013. "The Risk of Divorce and Household Saving Behavior," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 48(2), pages 404-434.
    16. Anderberg, Dan & Rainer, Helmut & Roeder, Kerstin, 2018. "Family-specific investments and divorce with dynamically inconsistent households: Marital contracts and policy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 199-225.
    17. Fahn, Matthias, 2011. "Three Essays on Commitment and Information Problems," Munich Dissertations in Economics 13750, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    18. John Douglas Skåtun, 2017. "Bargaining on your Spouse: Coasean and Non-Coasean Behaviour Within Marriage," Journal of Family and Economic Issues, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 263-278, June.
    19. Alessandro Cigno, 2014. "Is Marriage as Good as a Contract?," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 60(3), pages 599-612.

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