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The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent

Author

Listed:
  • Christoph Diehl

    (Bielefeld University
    Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)

  • Christoph Kuzmics

    (University of Graz)

Abstract

Chakraborty and Harbaugh (Am Econ Rev 100(5):2361–2382, 2010) prove the existence of influential cheap talk equilibria in one sender one receiver games when the state is multidimensional and the preferences of the sender are state independent. We show that influential equilibria do not survive the introduction of any small degree of Harsanyi-uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty about the sender’s preferences in the spirit of Harsanyi (Int J Game Theory 2(1):1–23, 1973).

Suggested Citation

  • Christoph Diehl & Christoph Kuzmics, 2021. "The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 911-925, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:50:y:2021:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-021-00774-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00774-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Alistair Barton, 2024. "Robust Communication Between Parties with Nearly Independent Preferences," Papers 2403.13983, arXiv.org.
    2. Jan-Henrik Steg & Elshan Garashli & Michael Greinecker & Christoph Kuzmics, 2023. "Robust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives," Papers 2309.04193, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
    3. Xiaoxiao Hu & Haoran Lei, 2022. "The optimality of (stochastic) veto delegation," Papers 2208.14829, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
    4. Itai Arieli & Ronen Gradwohl & Rann Smorodinsky, 2023. "Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk," Papers 2302.00281, arXiv.org.
    5. Xiaoxiao Hu & Haoran Lei, 2023. "Information transmission in monopolistic credence goods markets," Papers 2303.13295, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cheap talk; Communication; Information transmission; Robustness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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