IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/ecpoli/v27y2012i70p275-317..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Capital access bonds: contingent capital with an option to convert
[‘Caught between Scylla and Charybdis? Regulating bank leverage when there is rent seeking and risk shifting’]

Author

Listed:
  • Patrick Bolton
  • Frédéric Samama

Abstract

This paper argues that there is a Coasean bargain available to banks, long-term investors, and bank regulators around a particular form of “contingent capital”. By purchasing rights to issue equity in crisis events at a pre-specified price from long-term investors, banks can ensure that they will have sufficient regulatory capital available when they need it most: in a crisis. By selling these rights (effectively, a form of crisis insurance) long-term investors can monetize their counter-cyclical investments strategies in banks and, thus, obtain an adequate return as long-term investors. Bank regulators, in turn, gain as they can thereby implement a more efficient (transparent and flexible) form of equity-capital regulation. The form of contingent capital we propose (capital access bond) reflects a balance between investors’ preferences, issuers’ constraints, and regulators’ objectives.— Patrick Bolton and Frédéric Samama

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick Bolton & Frédéric Samama, 2012. "Capital access bonds: contingent capital with an option to convert [‘Caught between Scylla and Charybdis? Regulating bank leverage when there is rent seeking and risk shifting’]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 27(70), pages 275-317.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecpoli:v:27:y:2012:i:70:p:275-317.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2012.00284.x
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lionel Melin & Ahyan Panjwani, 2024. "Optimal Design of Contingent Capital," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2024-051, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    2. Hilscher, Jens & Raviv, Alon, 2014. "Bank stability and market discipline: The effect of contingent capital on risk taking and default probability," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 542-560.
    3. Díaz, Fernando & Ramírez, Gabriel G. & Liu, Liuling, 2018. "Corporate bond clawbacks as contingent capital for banks," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 11-24.
    4. Prasad Krishnamurthy, 2014. "Rules, Standards, and Complexity in Capital Regulation," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(S2), pages 273-296.
    5. Martijn A. Boermans & Sweder van Wijnbergen, 2018. "Contingent convertible bonds: Who invests in European CoCos?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(4), pages 234-238, February.
    6. Giovanni Calice & Carlo Sala & Daniele Tantari, 2020. "Contingent Convertible Bonds in Financial Networks," Papers 2009.00062, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
    7. Jaworski, Piotr & Liberadzki, Kamil & Liberadzki, Marcin, 2017. "How does issuing contingent convertible bonds improve bank's solvency? A Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 162-168.
    8. Avdjiev, Stefan & Bogdanova, Bilyana & Bolton, Patrick & Jiang, Wei & Kartasheva, Anastasia, 2020. "CoCo issuance and bank fragility," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(3), pages 593-613.
    9. Delphine Boursicot & Geneviève Gauthier & Farhad Pourkalbassi, 2019. "Contingent Convertible Debt: The Impact on Equity Holders," Risks, MDPI, vol. 7(2), pages 1-35, April.
    10. Weidong Tian, 2018. "Callable Contingent Capital: Valuation and Default Risk," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(1), pages 112-130, January.
    11. Fernando Díaz & Gabriel Ramírez & Kenneth Daniels, 2013. "Corporate Bond Clawbacks as Contingent Capital," Working Papers 44, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.
    12. Philippe Oster, 2020. "Contingent Convertible bond literature review: making everything and nothing possible?," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(4), pages 343-381, December.
    13. Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 2012. "Macroeconomic Shocks and Banking Regulation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44, pages 237-254, December.
    14. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans & Müller, Jürg, 2015. "The macroeconomics of Modigliani–Miller," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1081-1113.
    15. White, Lucy & Walther, Ansgar, 2019. "Rules versus Discretion in Bank Resolution," CEPR Discussion Papers 14048, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Li, Shanshan & Gong, Di & Lu, Liping, 2024. "Bail-ins and market discipline: Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 93(PB), pages 51-68.
    17. Joanna Błach, 2020. "Barriers to Financial Innovation—Corporate Finance Perspective," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 13(11), pages 1-23, November.
    18. Attaoui, Sami & Poncet, Patrice, 2015. "Write-Down Bonds and Capital and Debt Structures," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 97-119.
    19. Martynova, Natalya & Perotti, Enrico, 2018. "Convertible bonds and bank risk-taking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 35(PB), pages 61-80.
    20. Liu, Liang-Chih & Dai, Tian-Shyr & Zhou, Lei, 2024. "On the design of bail-in-able bonds from the perspective of non-financial firms," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 89(PA), pages 1136-1155.
    21. Fatouh, Mahmoud & McMunn, Ayowande, 2019. "Shareholder risk-taking incentives in the presence of contingent capital," Bank of England working papers 775, Bank of England.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ecpoli:v:27:y:2012:i:70:p:275-317.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cebruuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.