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The Influence of Vertical Integration and Property Rights on Network Access Charges in the German Electricity Market / Der Einfluss von vertikaler Integration und Struktur der Verfügungsrechten auf die Netznutzungsentgelte im deutschen Strom markt

Author

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  • Crowitsch Christian

    (University of Lueneburg, Institute for Economics, D-21332 Lueneburg, Phone: ++49/+4131/78 23 03, ++49/ +4131/78 202, Fax: ++49/+41 31/782026, Germany)

  • Wein Thomas

    (Thomas Wein, University of Lueneburg, Institute for Economics, D-21332 Lueneburg, Phone: ++49/+4131/78 23 03, ++49/ +4131/78 202, Fax: ++49/+41 31/782026, Germany)

Abstract

After the deregulation of the German electricity markets, network access charges are based on contractual arrangements between energy producers and industrial consumers. As the electricity networks are incontestable natural monopolies, the operators are able to set (monopolistic) charges at their own discretion, restricted only by possible cartel office interferences. Estimations show a relation between network access charges and operator’s economic independence as well as level of vertical integration: on the low voltage level for an annual consumption of 1700 kW/h, vertically integrated firms set significantly lower access charges than vertically separated suppliers, whereas incorporated network operators charge significantly higher charges.

Suggested Citation

  • Crowitsch Christian & Wein Thomas, 2004. "The Influence of Vertical Integration and Property Rights on Network Access Charges in the German Electricity Market / Der Einfluss von vertikaler Integration und Struktur der Verfügungsrechten auf di," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 224(6), pages 673-695, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:224:y:2004:i:6:p:673-695
    DOI: 10.1515/jbnst-2004-0604
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brunekreeft, G., 2002. "Regulatory Threat in Vertically Related Markets; The Case of German Electricity," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0228, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    2. Amihai Glazer & Henry McMillan, 1992. "Pricing by the Firm Under Regulatory Threat," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 107(3), pages 1089-1099.
    3. Gert Brunekreeft, 2002. "Regulatory threat in vertically related markets; The case of German electricity," Working Papers EP10, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
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