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Do Stronger Collective Property Rights Improve Household Welfare? Evidence from a Field Study in Fiji

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  • Lawson-Remer, Terra

Abstract

Extensive previous work has analyzed the functioning of collective ownership institutions, arguing that such institutions can better govern common pool resources under some conditions than private or state ownership. However, empirical research regarding the impact of stronger collective ownership rights on household welfare is limited. Exploiting a natural experiment, this article uses a unique dataset to examine the impact of collective fisheries ownership on household income and food consumption in Fiji. Strengthening collective ownership rights improves household welfare as indicated by food consumption, but does not increase monetary income. Income improvements are instead attributable to Nongovernmental organization (NGO) project support.

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  • Lawson-Remer, Terra, 2013. "Do Stronger Collective Property Rights Improve Household Welfare? Evidence from a Field Study in Fiji," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 207-225.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:43:y:2013:i:c:p:207-225
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.09.004
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    Cited by:

    1. Schons, Stella Zucchetti & Amacher, Gregory & Cobourn, Kelly & Arantes, Caroline, 2020. "Benefits of community fisheries management to individual households in the floodplains of the Amazon River in Brazil," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
    2. Peña, Ximena & Vélez, María Alejandra & Cárdenas, Juan Camilo & Perdomo, Natalia & Matajira, Camilo, 2017. "Collective Property Leads to Household Investments: Lessons From Land Titling in Afro-Colombian Communities," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 27-48.
    3. Joaquín Daniel Ramírez-Cabarcas, 2022. "Can collective property rights foster development? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in Colombia," Documentos CEDE 20327, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.

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