The political affiliation of central bankers and government debt: Evidence from Africa
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DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2023.02.016
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More about this item
Keywords
Political affiliation; Debt; Central bank governors; Ally; President; Government debt;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
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