Skip to content

salTermine/360-final-project

Folders and files

NameName
Last commit message
Last commit date

Latest commit

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Repository files navigation

360-final-project

Brett Porcelli: Colin Monteil-anatra: Salvatore Termine: 109528463

We will implement a simplified dual-sandboxing architecture based on PIP. Similar to PIP, we will exploit OS access controls to enforce sandboxing of untrusted programs: Untrusted programs will be run with a userid that has limited-to-no access to the filesystem. Untrusted processes will be forced to access files through a trusted helper process, which will redirect or restrict requests as needed to protect the integrity of the system. The inner sandbox (based on OS access controls) will be as described in section 2.1 of the PIP paper; however, we should explore possible simplifications, e.g. using one untrusted userid, or creating an untrusted userid for each application instead of each existing user. The transparency library (UL) and benign library (BL) will be implemented using user-level system call interposition as described in sections 2.2 to 3.2 of the paper, with some exceptions: All attempts by untrusted programs to write to benign files will be blocked, not just those targeted at code, configuration or preference files (similar to one-way isolation). Unfortunately we will still have a lot of filesystem fragmentation, but we avoid the complexity of distinguishing code, configuration, and preference files from input files.

Benign programs will always be run in "isolation mode." We can attempt to support limited interaction between untrusted and trusted programs if we have time to spare after the basic implementation is complete. Users will be required to invoke untrusted executables using a command line utility like uudo (described in section 3.1). Again, we can attempt to support automatic invocation of untrusted programs with uudo if time allows.

IF we can accomplish all of the above, we can try to implement support for commit operations. This would eliminate at least some of the inconvenience caused by filesystem fragmentation. To avoid dealing with consistency criteria described at length in the Alcatraz paper, I suggest that we force the admin to enable mandatory file locks.

About

No description, website, or topics provided.

Resources

Stars

Watchers

Forks

Releases

No releases published

Packages

No packages published