USCHunt is a tool for detecting, characterizing and classifying upgradeable smart contracts (USCs) for Ethereum-based blockchains. It is an augmented version of Slither, with a completely overhauled upgradeable proxy detection mechanism (found in the Contract
class) as well as an all-new Slither detector.
This repository is made anonymously in support of the judging process for our paper submission to USENIX '23.
- Overhauled
Contract.is_upgradeable_proxy
method drastically reduces false positives by not only searching fordelegatecall
in the fallback function, but also extracting the target address variable and performing dataflow analysis (across multiple contracts when necessary) to locate the function that sets the implementation address. - New
proxy-patterns
detector class performs rigorous classification of proxy patterns according to the thorough taxonomy presented in the paper, using a customProxyFeatureExtraction
wrapper class for Contract objects in Slither. - A handmade collection of unique upgradeable proxies for testing, found in the
/tests/proxies/
directory.
The following tools/scripts located in the /study/scripts/
directory were used to aid our large scale analysis and evaluate its results.
- The shell script
sortbyversion.sh
can be used to prepare the dataset (see below) for large scale analysis by extracting thepragma solidity
compiler version from the source code and sorting the files accordingly, which is necessary to tellsolc-select
which version to use before running Slither. - The shell script
script.sh
is used for running the large scale analysis on the dataset, andtime-script.sh
outputs the running time of each run of USCHunt detection to a text file for analyzing the average run time of our tool. - Several custom Python scripts were used to fix common compilation errors, often caused by the source code flattening process performed during verification.
- A handful of custom Python scripts are used for retrieving both the current and previous implementation source code for a proxy. Because this relies on the contract being confirmed to be a proxy on Etherscan, we also provide
check_implementations.py
to perform this confirmation on all proxies for which an implementation could not be retrieved. - A Scrapy web scraper located in the
/contract_crawl/
directory, with the spider implemented in/contract_crawl/sipders/scrapy_spider.py
, can be used to scrape both the native balance (e.g., ETH for Ethereum) and total ERC-20 token balance of each proxy found in the dataset, and thecompute_total_value_upgradeable.py
script computes the total value held by those which USCHunt reported as upgradeable. - Several custom Python scripts are provided for retrieving the deploy dates of contracts in the dataset and graphing the number of deployed proxies over time.
proxy_stats.py
processes the results of the large scale analysis to count how many proxies have each of the features defined in our taxonomy.analyze_upgradeability_checks.py
processes the results of running Slither'sslither-check-upgradeability
tool, with our augmented upgradeability detection, on the upgradeable proxies detected in our initial analysis in order to count the number of storage layout clashes and function selector collisions detected.check_compatibility_checks.py
andcategorize_compatibility_checks.py
process the results of our large scale analysis to extract the checks performed in the upgrade function and classify them according to the categories listed in Table 8 of the paper.
Our study makes use of the tintinweb/smart-contract-sanctuary repository, which contains a constantly-updated collection of all publicly verified smart contract source code published to Etherscan or its sister sites. Furthermore, for contracts that are initially reported as proxies but for which upgradeability cannot be performed, we use the custom scripts provided to fetch the current implementation from the respective block explorer, as well as the previous implementation if one exists in order to detect storage layout clashes between the two implementations. We provide the subset of our dataset (already sorted by version) which were identified as proxies (upgradeable or not) in the /study/data/
directory for the sake of reproducing our results.
Slither is a Solidity static analysis framework written in Python 3. It runs a suite of vulnerability detectors, prints visual information about contract details, and provides an API to easily write custom analyses. Slither enables developers to find vulnerabilities, enhance their code comprehension, and quickly prototype custom analyses.
- Features
- Bugs and Optimizations Detection
- Printers
- Tools
- How to Install
- Getting Help
- FAQ
- Publications
- Detects vulnerable Solidity code with low false positives (see the list of trophies)
- Identifies where the error condition occurs in the source code
- Easily integrates into continuous integration and Truffle builds
- Built-in 'printers' quickly report crucial contract information
- Detector API to write custom analyses in Python
- Ability to analyze contracts written with Solidity >= 0.4
- Intermediate representation (SlithIR) enables simple, high-precision analyses
- Correctly parses 99.9% of all public Solidity code
- Average execution time of less than 1 second per contract
Run Slither on a Truffle/Embark/Dapp/Etherlime/Hardhat application:
slither .
Run Slither on a single file:
slither tests/uninitialized.sol
- For GitHub action integration, use slither-action.
- To generate a Markdown report, use
slither [target] --checklist
. - To generate a Markdown with GitHub source code highlighting, use
slither [target] --checklist --markdown-root https://github.com/ORG/REPO/blob/COMMIT/
(replaceORG
,REPO
,COMMIT
)
Use solc-select if your contracts require older versions of solc. For additional configuration, see the usage documentation.
Num | Detector | What it Detects | Impact | Confidence |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | abiencoderv2-array |
Storage abiencoderv2 array | High | High |
2 | arbitrary-send-erc20 |
transferFrom uses arbitrary from |
High | High |
3 | array-by-reference |
Modifying storage array by value | High | High |
4 | incorrect-shift |
The order of parameters in a shift instruction is incorrect. | High | High |
5 | multiple-constructors |
Multiple constructor schemes | High | High |
6 | name-reused |
Contract's name reused | High | High |
7 | protected-vars |
Detected unprotected variables | High | High |
8 | public-mappings-nested |
Public mappings with nested variables | High | High |
9 | rtlo |
Right-To-Left-Override control character is used | High | High |
10 | shadowing-state |
State variables shadowing | High | High |
11 | suicidal |
Functions allowing anyone to destruct the contract | High | High |
12 | uninitialized-state |
Uninitialized state variables | High | High |
13 | uninitialized-storage |
Uninitialized storage variables | High | High |
14 | unprotected-upgrade |
Unprotected upgradeable contract | High | High |
15 | arbitrary-send-erc20-permit |
transferFrom uses arbitrary from with permit | High | Medium |
16 | arbitrary-send-eth |
Functions that send Ether to arbitrary destinations | High | Medium |
17 | controlled-array-length |
Tainted array length assignment | High | Medium |
18 | controlled-delegatecall |
Controlled delegatecall destination | High | Medium |
19 | delegatecall-loop |
Payable functions using delegatecall inside a loop |
High | Medium |
20 | msg-value-loop |
msg.value inside a loop | High | Medium |
21 | reentrancy-eth |
Reentrancy vulnerabilities (theft of ethers) | High | Medium |
22 | storage-array |
Signed storage integer array compiler bug | High | Medium |
23 | unchecked-transfer |
Unchecked tokens transfer | High | Medium |
24 | weak-prng |
Weak PRNG | High | Medium |
25 | domain-separator-collision |
Detects ERC20 tokens that have a function whose signature collides with EIP-2612's DOMAIN_SEPARATOR() | Medium | High |
26 | enum-conversion |
Detect dangerous enum conversion | Medium | High |
27 | erc20-interface |
Incorrect ERC20 interfaces | Medium | High |
28 | erc721-interface |
Incorrect ERC721 interfaces | Medium | High |
29 | incorrect-equality |
Dangerous strict equalities | Medium | High |
30 | locked-ether |
Contracts that lock ether | Medium | High |
31 | mapping-deletion |
Deletion on mapping containing a structure | Medium | High |
32 | shadowing-abstract |
State variables shadowing from abstract contracts | Medium | High |
33 | tautology |
Tautology or contradiction | Medium | High |
34 | write-after-write |
Unused write | Medium | High |
35 | boolean-cst |
Misuse of Boolean constant | Medium | Medium |
36 | constant-function-asm |
Constant functions using assembly code | Medium | Medium |
37 | constant-function-state |
Constant functions changing the state | Medium | Medium |
38 | divide-before-multiply |
Imprecise arithmetic operations order | Medium | Medium |
39 | reentrancy-no-eth |
Reentrancy vulnerabilities (no theft of ethers) | Medium | Medium |
40 | reused-constructor |
Reused base constructor | Medium | Medium |
41 | tx-origin |
Dangerous usage of tx.origin |
Medium | Medium |
42 | unchecked-lowlevel |
Unchecked low-level calls | Medium | Medium |
43 | unchecked-send |
Unchecked send | Medium | Medium |
44 | uninitialized-local |
Uninitialized local variables | Medium | Medium |
45 | unused-return |
Unused return values | Medium | Medium |
46 | incorrect-modifier |
Modifiers that can return the default value | Low | High |
47 | shadowing-builtin |
Built-in symbol shadowing | Low | High |
48 | shadowing-local |
Local variables shadowing | Low | High |
49 | uninitialized-fptr-cst |
Uninitialized function pointer calls in constructors | Low | High |
50 | variable-scope |
Local variables used prior their declaration | Low | High |
51 | void-cst |
Constructor called not implemented | Low | High |
52 | calls-loop |
Multiple calls in a loop | Low | Medium |
53 | events-access |
Missing Events Access Control | Low | Medium |
54 | events-maths |
Missing Events Arithmetic | Low | Medium |
55 | incorrect-unary |
Dangerous unary expressions | Low | Medium |
56 | missing-zero-check |
Missing Zero Address Validation | Low | Medium |
57 | reentrancy-benign |
Benign reentrancy vulnerabilities | Low | Medium |
58 | reentrancy-events |
Reentrancy vulnerabilities leading to out-of-order Events | Low | Medium |
59 | timestamp |
Dangerous usage of block.timestamp |
Low | Medium |
60 | assembly |
Assembly usage | Informational | High |
61 | assert-state-change |
Assert state change | Informational | High |
62 | boolean-equal |
Comparison to boolean constant | Informational | High |
63 | deprecated-standards |
Deprecated Solidity Standards | Informational | High |
64 | erc20-indexed |
Un-indexed ERC20 event parameters | Informational | High |
65 | function-init-state |
Function initializing state variables | Informational | High |
66 | low-level-calls |
Low level calls | Informational | High |
67 | missing-inheritance |
Missing inheritance | Informational | High |
68 | naming-convention |
Conformity to Solidity naming conventions | Informational | High |
69 | pragma |
If different pragma directives are used | Informational | High |
70 | redundant-statements |
Redundant statements | Informational | High |
71 | solc-version |
Incorrect Solidity version | Informational | High |
72 | unimplemented-functions |
Unimplemented functions | Informational | High |
73 | unused-state |
Unused state variables | Informational | High |
74 | costly-loop |
Costly operations in a loop | Informational | Medium |
75 | dead-code |
Functions that are not used | Informational | Medium |
76 | reentrancy-unlimited-gas |
Reentrancy vulnerabilities through send and transfer | Informational | Medium |
77 | similar-names |
Variable names are too similar | Informational | Medium |
78 | too-many-digits |
Conformance to numeric notation best practices | Informational | Medium |
79 | constable-states |
State variables that could be declared constant | Optimization | High |
80 | external-function |
Public function that could be declared external | Optimization | High |
For more information, see
- The Detector Documentation for details on each detector
- The Detection Selection to run only selected detectors. By default, all the detectors are run.
- The Triage Mode to filter individual results
human-summary
: Print a human-readable summary of the contractsinheritance-graph
: Export the inheritance graph of each contract to a dot filecontract-summary
: Print a summary of the contracts
call-graph
: Export the call-graph of the contracts to a dot filecfg
: Export the CFG of each functionsfunction-summary
: Print a summary of the functionsvars-and-auth
: Print the state variables written and the authorization of the functionswhen-not-paused
: Print functions that do not usewhenNotPaused
modifier.
To run a printer, use --print
and a comma-separated list of printers.
See the Printer documentation for the complete lists.
slither-check-upgradeability
: Reviewdelegatecall
-based upgradeabilityslither-prop
: Automatic unit test and property generationslither-flat
: Flatten a codebaseslither-check-erc
: Check the ERC's conformanceslither-format
: Automatic patch generationslither-read-storage
: Read storage values from contracts
See the Tool documentation for additional tools.
Contact us to get help on building custom tools.
Slither requires Python 3.8+ and solc, the Solidity compiler.
pip3 install slither-analyzer
git clone https://github.com/crytic/slither.git && cd slither
python3 setup.py install
We recommend using a Python virtual environment, as detailed in the Developer Installation Instructions, if you prefer to install Slither via git.
Use the eth-security-toolbox
docker image. It includes all of our security tools and every major version of Solidity in a single image. /home/share
will be mounted to /share
in the container.
docker pull trailofbits/eth-security-toolbox
To share a directory in the container:
docker run -it -v /home/share:/share trailofbits/eth-security-toolbox
Feel free to stop by our Slack channel (#ethereum) for help using or extending Slither.
-
The Printer documentation describes the information Slither is capable of visualizing for each contract.
-
The Detector documentation describes how to write a new vulnerability analyses.
-
The API documentation describes the methods and objects available for custom analyses.
-
The SlithIR documentation describes the SlithIR intermediate representation.
How do I exclude mocks or tests?
- View our documentation on path filtering.
How do I fix "unknown file" or compilation issues?
- Because slither requires the solc AST, it must have all dependencies available.
If a contract has dependencies,
slither contract.sol
will fail. Instead, useslither .
in the parent directory ofcontracts/
(you should seecontracts/
when you runls
). If you have anode_modules/
folder, it must be in the same directory ascontracts/
. To verify that this issue is related to slither, run the compilation command for the framework you are using e.gnpx hardhat compile
. That must work successfully; otherwise, slither's compilation engine, crytic-compile, cannot generate the AST.
Slither is licensed and distributed under the AGPLv3 license. Contact us if you're looking for an exception to the terms.
- Slither: A Static Analysis Framework For Smart Contracts, Josselin Feist, Gustavo Grieco, Alex Groce - WETSEB '19
Title | Usage | Authors | Venue |
---|---|---|---|
ReJection: A AST-Based Reentrancy Vulnerability Detection Method | AST-based analysis built on top of Slither | Rui Ma, Zefeng Jian, Guangyuan Chen, Ke Ma, Yujia Chen | CTCIS 19 |
MPro: Combining Static and Symbolic Analysis forScalable Testing of Smart Contract | Leverage data dependency through Slither | William Zhang, Sebastian Banescu, Leodardo Pasos, Steven Stewart, Vijay Ganesh | ISSRE 2019 |
ETHPLOIT: From Fuzzing to Efficient Exploit Generation against Smart Contracts | Leverage data dependency through Slither | Qingzhao Zhang, Yizhuo Wang, Juanru Li, Siqi Ma | SANER 20 |
Verification of Ethereum Smart Contracts: A Model Checking Approach | Symbolic execution built on top of Slither’s CFG | Tam Bang, Hoang H Nguyen, Dung Nguyen, Toan Trieu, Tho Quan | IJMLC 20 |
Smart Contract Repair | Rely on Slither’s vulnerabilities detectors | Xiao Liang Yu, Omar Al-Bataineh, David Lo, Abhik Roychoudhury | TOSEM 20 |
Demystifying Loops in Smart Contracts | Leverage data dependency through Slither | Ben Mariano, Yanju Chen, Yu Feng, Shuvendu Lahiri, Isil Dillig | ASE 20 |
Trace-Based Dynamic Gas Estimation of Loops in Smart Contracts | Use Slither’s CFG to detect loops | Chunmiao Li, Shijie Nie, Yang Cao, Yijun Yu, Zhenjiang Hu | IEEE Open J. Comput. Soc. 1 (2020) |
SAILFISH: Vetting Smart Contract State-Inconsistency Bugs in Seconds | Rely on SlithIR to build a storage dependency graph | Priyanka Bose, Dipanjan Das, Yanju Chen, Yu Feng, Christopher Kruegel, and Giovanni Vigna | S&P 22 |
SolType: Refinement Types for Arithmetic Overflow in Solidity | Use Slither as frontend to build refinement type system | Bryan Tan, Benjamin Mariano, Shuvendu K. Lahiri, Isil Dillig, Yu Feng | POPL 22 |
Do Not Rug on Me: Leveraging Machine Learning Techniques for Automated Scam Detection | Use Slither to extract tokens' features (mintable, pausable, ..) | Mazorra, Bruno, Victor Adan, and Vanesa Daza | Mathematics 10.6 (2022) |
If you are using Slither on an academic work, consider applying to the Crytic $10k Research Prize.