Hardening systemd unit

[marek22k]

Security has been improved from "9.6 UNSAFE 😨" to "2.1 OK 🙂".

systemd-analyze security tinc@ returns now:

  NAME                                                        DESCRIPTION                                                               EXPOSURE
✓ SystemCallFilter=~@swap                                     System call deny list defined for service, and @swap is included
✓ SystemCallFilter=~@resources                                System call deny list defined for service, and @resources is included
✓ SystemCallFilter=~@reboot                                   System call deny list defined for service, and @reboot is included
✓ SystemCallFilter=~@raw-io                                   System call deny list defined for service, and @raw-io is included
✓ SystemCallFilter=~@privileged                               System call deny list defined for service, and @privileged is included
✓ SystemCallFilter=~@obsolete                                 System call deny list defined for service, and @obsolete is included
✓ SystemCallFilter=~@mount                                    System call deny list defined for service, and @mount is included
✓ SystemCallFilter=~@module                                   System call deny list defined for service, and @module is included
✓ SystemCallFilter=~@debug                                    System call deny list defined for service, and @debug is included
✓ SystemCallFilter=~@cpu-emulation                            System call deny list defined for service, and @cpu-emulation is included
✓ SystemCallFilter=~@clock                                    System call deny list defined for service, and @clock is included
✗ RootDirectory=/RootImage=                                   Service runs within the host's root directory                                  0.1
  SupplementaryGroups=                                        Service runs as root, option does not matter
  RemoveIPC=                                                  Service runs as root, option does not apply
✗ User=/DynamicUser=                                          Service runs as root user                                                      0.4
✓ RestrictRealtime=                                           Service realtime scheduling access is restricted
✓ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_SYS_TIME                         Service processes cannot change the system clock
✓ NoNewPrivileges=                                            Service processes cannot acquire new privileges
✓ AmbientCapabilities=                                        Service process does not receive ambient capabilities
✗ PrivateDevices=                                             Service potentially has access to hardware devices                             0.2
✓ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_BPF                              Service may load BPF programs
✓ SystemCallArchitectures=                                    Service may execute system calls only with native ABI
✗ RestrictAddressFamilies=~AF_NETLINK                         Service may allocate netlink sockets                                           0.1
✗ RestrictAddressFamilies=~AF_(INET|INET6)                    Service may allocate Internet sockets                                          0.3
✓ ProtectSystem=                                              Service has strict read-only access to the OS file hierarchy
✓ ProtectProc=                                                Service has restricted access to process tree (/proc hidepid=)
✓ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_SYS_RAWIO                        Service has no raw I/O access
✓ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_SYS_PTRACE                       Service has no ptrace() debugging abilities
✓ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_SYS_(NICE|RESOURCE)              Service has no privileges to change resource use parameters
✓ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_NET_(BIND_SERVICE|BROADCAST|RAW) Service has no elevated networking privileges
✗ DeviceAllow=                                                Service has no device ACL                                                      0.2
✓ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_AUDIT_*                          Service has no audit subsystem access
✓ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_SYS_ADMIN                        Service has no administrator privileges
✓ PrivateTmp=                                                 Service has no access to other software's temporary files
✓ ProcSubset=                                                 Service has no access to non-process /proc files (/proc subset=)
✓ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_SYSLOG                           Service has no access to kernel logging
✓ ProtectHome=                                                Service has no access to home directories
✗ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_NET_ADMIN                        Service has network configuration privileges                                   0.2
✗ PrivateNetwork=                                             Service has access to the host's network                                       0.5
✗ PrivateUsers=                                               Service has access to other users                                              0.2
✓ KeyringMode=                                                Service doesn't share key material with other services
✓ Delegate=                                                   Service does not maintain its own delegated control group subtree
✗ IPAddressDeny=                                              Service does not define an IP address allow list                               0.2
✓ NotifyAccess=                                               Service child processes cannot alter service state
✓ ProtectClock=                                               Service cannot write to the hardware clock or system clock
✓ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_SYS_PACCT                        Service cannot use acct()
✓ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_KILL                             Service cannot send UNIX signals to arbitrary processes
✓ ProtectKernelLogs=                                          Service cannot read from or write to the kernel log ring buffer
✓ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_WAKE_ALARM                       Service cannot program timers that wake up the system
✓ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_(DAC_*|FOWNER|IPC_OWNER)         Service cannot override UNIX file/IPC permission checks
✓ ProtectControlGroups=                                       Service cannot modify the control group file system
✓ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE                  Service cannot mark files immutable
✓ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_IPC_LOCK                         Service cannot lock memory into RAM
✓ ProtectKernelModules=                                       Service cannot load or read kernel modules
✓ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_SYS_MODULE                       Service cannot load kernel modules
✓ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG                   Service cannot issue vhangup()
✓ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_SYS_BOOT                         Service cannot issue reboot()
✓ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_SYS_CHROOT                       Service cannot issue chroot()
✓ PrivateMounts=                                              Service cannot install system mounts
✓ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND                    Service cannot establish wake locks
✓ MemoryDenyWriteExecute=                                     Service cannot create writable executable memory mappings
✓ RestrictNamespaces=~user                                    Service cannot create user namespaces
✓ RestrictNamespaces=~pid                                     Service cannot create process namespaces
✓ RestrictNamespaces=~net                                     Service cannot create network namespaces
✓ RestrictNamespaces=~uts                                     Service cannot create hostname namespaces
✓ RestrictNamespaces=~mnt                                     Service cannot create file system namespaces
✓ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_LEASE                            Service cannot create file leases
✓ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_MKNOD                            Service cannot create device nodes
✓ RestrictNamespaces=~cgroup                                  Service cannot create cgroup namespaces
✓ RestrictNamespaces=~ipc                                     Service cannot create IPC namespaces
✓ ProtectHostname=                                            Service cannot change system host/domainname
✓ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_(CHOWN|FSETID|SETFCAP)           Service cannot change file ownership/access mode/capabilities
✓ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_SET(UID|GID|PCAP)                Service cannot change UID/GID identities/capabilities
✓ LockPersonality=                                            Service cannot change ABI personality
✓ ProtectKernelTunables=                                      Service cannot alter kernel tunables (/proc/sys, …)
✓ RestrictAddressFamilies=~AF_PACKET                          Service cannot allocate packet sockets
✓ RestrictAddressFamilies=~AF_UNIX                            Service cannot allocate local sockets
✓ RestrictAddressFamilies=~…                                  Service cannot allocate exotic sockets
✓ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_MAC_*                            Service cannot adjust SMACK MAC
✓ RestrictSUIDSGID=                                           SUID/SGID file creation by service is restricted
✗ UMask=                                                      Files created by service are world-readable by default                         0.1

→ Overall exposure level for [email protected]: 2.1 OK 🙂

I have successfully tested the change in both router and switch mode in a GNS3 lab between two peers (running tinc from debian stable). However, it would be great if someone else could test this as well.

[marek22k]

I have now also tested the whole thing briefly with Tinc 1.1 and after I corrected one thing, everything worked.
The only thing - which I can't solve via Systemd - is that you now have to specify the pid file manually to control the VPN daemon.
tinc -n test --pidfile=/var/run/tinc/test.pid [command]

The background to why this is the case:
By ProtectSystem=strict the (almost) whole file system becomes read-only, so also /var/run. Now you can also make certain directories write-read. However, if I would also allow write access to /var/run, Tinc could manipulate the files of other programs. For this reason, an extra directory /var/run/tinc (via RuntimeDirectory=tinc) is created for Tinc. I give this directory write access. However, since the normal Tinc daemon expects a different path, the pid file must be specified manually.

Another possibility would be to change the default path in the code itself.