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vArmor is a cloud-native container sandbox system that enhances container security with Linux's LSM technology. It utilizes either AppArmor or BPF LSM as enforcers. It can be used to strengthen container isolation, reduce the kernel attack surface, and increase the difficulty and cost of container escape or lateral movement attacks. vArmor follows the Kubernetes Operator design pattern, allowing users to harden specific workloads by manipulating the CRD API. This approach enables sandboxing of containerized microservices from a perspective closely aligned with business needs. Particularly, vArmor includes multiple built-in rules that are ready to use out of the box.

You can leverage vArmor in the following scenarios to provide sandbox protection for containers within a Kubernetes cluster:

• In multi-tenant environments, hardware-virtualized container solutions cannot be employed due to factors such as cost and technical conditions.
• When there is a need to enhance the security of critical business containers, making it more difficult for attackers to escalate privileges, escape, or laterally move.
• When high-risk vulnerabilities are present, but immediate remediation is not possible due to the difficulty or lengthy process of patching. vArmor can be used to mitigate the risks (depending on the vulnerability type or exploitation vector) to block or increase the difficulty of exploitation.

vArmor achieves cloud-native container sandboxing through the following technologies:

• Leveraging Linux's AppArmor or BPF LSM to enforce mandatory access controls on container processes (files, programs, network egress, etc.).
• To minimize performance impact and increase usability, vArmor follows an Allow by Default security model, where only explicitly declared behaviors are blocked.
• You can enhance the security of containers in specific workloads by manipulating the CRD API (Custom Resources) using built-in and custom rules.
• The built-in rules include common strategies for hardening containers.

vArmor was created by the Elkeid Team of the endpoint security department at ByteDance. And the project is still in active development.

Note: To meet stringent isolation requirements, it is advisable to give priority to utilizing hardware-virtualized containers (e.g., Kata Containers) for compute isolation, in conjunction with network isolation provided by CNI's NetworkPolicy.

vArmor offers 5 types of built-in rules and custom interfaces to meet various protection requirements.

For more configuration options and detailed instructions, please refer to the usage instructions.

helm pull oci:https://elkeid-cn-beijing.cr.volces.com/varmor/varmor --version 0.5.4

helm install varmor varmor-0.5.4.tgz \
    --namespace varmor --create-namespace \
    --set image.registry="elkeid-cn-beijing.cr.volces.com"

# Create a VarmorPolicy object to enable the AlwaysAllow mode sandbox for Deployments that match the .spec.target.selector
kubectl create -f test/demo/disable-shell/policy-init.yaml

# View the status of VarmorPolicy & ArmorProfile object
kubectl get VarmorPolicy -n demo
kubectl get ArmorProfile -n demo

# Create the target Deployment object
kubectl create -f test/demo/1/deploy.yaml

# Retrieve the Pod name of the target Deployment object
POD_NAME=$(kubectl get Pods -n demo -l app=demo-1 -o name)

# Execute a command in container c1 to read the secret token
kubectl exec -n demo $POD_NAME -c c1 -- cat /run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token

# Update the VarmorPolicy object to prohibit the container c1 from reading the secret token.
kubectl apply -f test/demo/1/policy.yaml

# Execute a command in container c1 to read the secret token and verify that the reading behavior is prohibited.
kubectl exec -n demo $POD_NAME -c c1 -- cat /run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token

# Delete the VarmorPolicy and Deployment objects
kubectl delete -f test/demo/disable-shell/policy-init.yaml
kubectl create -f test/demo/1/deploy.yaml

helm uninstall varmor -n varmor

Please refer to this documentation.

The vArmor project is licensed under Apache 2.0, except for third party components which are subject to different license terms. Please refer to the code header information in the code files.

Your integration of vArmor into your own projects should require compliance with the Apache 2.0 License, as well as the other licenses applicable to the third party components included within vArmor.

The eBPF code is located at vArmor-ebpf and licensed under GPL-2.0.

vArmor use cilium/ebpf to manage and interact with the eBPF program.

vArmor references part of the code of kyverno developed by Nirmata.

Below is a demonstration of using vArmor to harden a Deployment and defend against CVE-2021-22555. (The exploit is modified from cve-2021-22555)

vArmor has joined 404Starlink