Papers and book chapters by Luc Foisneau
Dictionnaire de la guerre et de la paix (éd. D. Durieux, J.B. Jeangène Vilmer, F. Ramel), 2017
La justification philosophique de l’autorité de l’État comme condition de la paix civile est le p... more La justification philosophique de l’autorité de l’État comme condition de la paix civile est le programme explicite de la philosophie politique de Hobbes. Ce programme fut mis en œuvre dans trois ouvrages, les Elements of Law (1640), le De cive (1642/1647) et le Leviathan (1651/1668), qui furent rédigés dans des contextes historiques marqués par la guerre – guerre civile latente, puis déclarée, entre le Parlement anglais et le roi Charles Ier entre 1640 et 1649, dont le récit est fait par Hobbes dans Behemoth (1679), guerre extérieure de l’Angleterre contre l’Espagne d’abord, puis contre les Pays-Bas, en marge de la guerre de Trente ans qui ensanglanta le continent européen entre 1618 et 1648. S’il est indéniable que la guerre civile anglaise a joué un rôle majeur dans l’élaboration de la pensée de Hobbes, les prémisses de cette guerre civile s’inscrivent elles-mêmes dans un contexte international, comme le prouve à l’évidence l’opposition parlementaire à la volonté royale d’étendre le Ship money, impôt qui servait traditionnellement à financer la flotte anglaise.
Luc Foisneau, 2019
There are different kinds of questions that can be raised by Hobbesian neocontractarianism. What ... more There are different kinds of questions that can be raised by Hobbesian neocontractarianism. What we do in chapter 14 is consider the type of use of Hobbes’s texts that has been made by David Gauthier, notably in Morals by Agreement. Beside game theoretical considerations, his approach relies on interpreting texts. Our hypothesis is that it is essential to interpreting Hobbes’s political philosophy to try and understand that there have been fruitful misinterpretations of it in XXth century philosophy. After considering a first misunderstanding at the foundation of Gauthier’s theory, that he finds in Robert Wolff’s Understanding Rawls, we’ll concentrate on his reading of Hobbes’s objection of the Foole. In order to try to help him answer this objection Gauthier suggests that Hobbes does “revise his conception of rationality”. Instead of requiring – contrary to the axiologically neutral interpretation of the state of nature – a disposition to act morally, Hobbes conceives, according to Gauthier, a political transformation of right reason resulting from the institution of the State. We press that, though that is a misinterpretation, by attributing to Hobbes an axiological neutrality that is not his, and to Rawls a theory of bargaining he never seriously considered, Gauthier has succeeded in setting out the problem of the origin of moral rules in a new way.
Questo articolo cerca di attirare l'attenzione sull'interesse della riflessione di Hobbes sul pos... more Questo articolo cerca di attirare l'attenzione sull'interesse della riflessione di Hobbes sul posto dell'uomo nel mondo animale. Poiché gli animali non hanno alcun ruolo né nella teoria della rappresentazione né in quella delle passioni, si è dato per scontato che il potere riguardasse solo i rapporti tra gli esseri umani. Si tratterà di correggere questa idea evidenziando come la capacità degli esseri umani di coordinare le loro azioni possa produrre un effetto di potere all'interno del mondo animale. This article seeks to draw attention to the relevance of Hobbes' reflection on the place of man in the animal world. Since animals play no role in the theory of representation and no more in the theory of passions, it was concluded that power only concerns the relationships between human beings. This idea will have to be corrected by highlighting how the ability of humans to coordinate their actions is likely to produce a power effect within the animal world.
Raisons politiques, 2014
La Théorie de la justice fait une place à la règle de majorité : cette règle étant à la fois une ... more La Théorie de la justice fait une place à la règle de majorité : cette règle étant à la fois une source de légitimité en régime démocratique et une source d’erreurs, Rawls lui fait l’honneur ambigu de justifier un devoir d’obéissance à des lois injustes. Il ne suffit pas, en effet, qu’une loi soit contraire à notre sens de la justice pour qu’aussitôt elle perde toute force d’obligation : nous avons aussi un « devoir de civilité » qui nous impose d’accepter, dans une certaine mesure, les défauts de nos institutions. Cette thèse pose une série de problèmes, dont nous partirons pour proposer une réflexion sur les relations entre théorie de la justice et gouvernement par la majorité.
Derechos Y Libertades Revista Del Instituto Bartolome De Las Casas, 2007
Fecha de recepción: 8-9-06 Fecha de aceptación: 25-9-06
The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes's Leviathan, 2007
British Journal for The History of Philosophy, 2011
Review of Gianni Paganini's Italian translation of Hobbes, De Motu.
Gianni Paganini (trans.), Mo... more Review of Gianni Paganini's Italian translation of Hobbes, De Motu.
Gianni Paganini (trans.), Moto, Luogo et Tempo di Thomas Hobbes. With an introduction by Gianni Paganini. Torino: UTET, 2010, pp. 708.
Hors Collection Sciences Humaines, Oct 1, 2001
... W. Molesworth, Londres, reprint Thoemmes, Bristol. Études. Barnouw J., [1992] « Le vocabulair... more ... W. Molesworth, Londres, reprint Thoemmes, Bristol. Études. Barnouw J., [1992] « Le vocabulaire du conatus », inZARKA YC (éd.), Hobbes et son vocabulaire, Paris, Vrin, p. 103-124. Bernhardt J., [1989], Hobbes, Paris, PUF. ...
Les fondements philosophiques de la tolérance. Tome 1, 2002
Leviathan After 350 Years, 2004
This paper locates the distinctiveness of Leviathan in its theory of justice. In the third of his... more This paper locates the distinctiveness of Leviathan in its theory of justice. In the third of his political treatises, Hobbes jettisons the Aristotelian theory of commutative and distributive justice and puts in its place an account in which the mechanism of the market comes into its own. In particular, the fairness of an exchange is no longer supposed to be a function of the values that things in the exchange have independently of a transaction, or a function of the worth of the parties to the exchange. Instead, the things have the values that the parties to the agreement agree they have, and fairness is determined by the willingness of self-interested parties to abide by the terms of their transactions. Not that absolutely anything goes if the parties to an exchange agree to it. Some things cannot intelligibly be given up by self-interested parties—their lives, for example; and an agreement or contract to give any of these things up must be null and void; but other things, including, controversially, the right to see to one’s own protection, can be given up and transferred, and indeed ought to be given up, according to Hobbes, for the sake of peace. The fact that the people act out of fear both when they enter into the transfer of right and when they subsequently abide by it does nothing to make the exchange unfair or unjust or unreasonable. On the contrary, the willingness to limit one’s freedom of practical judgement is a condition of the original contract—the one that makes all others, including all economic exchanges, possible. The original contract is the simultaneous transfer from the many to one or a few of the right of self-government in return for security. The market orientation of Hobbes’s theory of justice in Leviathan is a departure, argues the author, from the tort orientation of the theory in De Cive and The Elements of Law. One effect of the market orientation is to recalibrate the scale for measuring the worth of human beings. Worth is economic or political worth, not aristocratic descent, for example. Understood against the background of a ‘market’ theory, Hobbes’s much-discussed answer to the Foole can be seen in a new light. The paper also rests on the idea that there is an anti-Machiavellian aspect to Hobbes's argument against the Foole.
Etudes Philosophiques, 2006
... des arguments qui permettent de comprendre, dans les termes d'un langage théorique commu... more ... des arguments qui permettent de comprendre, dans les termes d'un langage théorique commun ... définition limitée du concept de justice peut être justifiée à l'intérieur du système ... comme « un élément nécessaire du système de valeur de n'importe quelle personne raisonnable ...
The Philosophers' Magazine, 2010
The philosopher of the Baroque time, whatever his inclination for physics of astronomy, is not co... more The philosopher of the Baroque time, whatever his inclination for physics of astronomy, is not comparable to our modern-day scientific expert: he remains a hybrid individual, uniting in a single person elements that can today appear heterogeneous. This paper is a survey of seventeenth-century French philosophy through the lens of a tentative characterization of what a French Baroque philosopher might look like.
In Praise of Ordinary People, 2000
Etudes Philosophiques, 2006
The Reception of Bodin, 2013
HUMANISTYKA I PRZYRODOZNAWSTWO INTERDYSCYPLINARNY ROCZNIK FILOZOFICZNO-NAUKOWY, 2013
GLOBAL JUSTICE AS GOOD GOVERNANCE: A CRITICAL APPROACH
A b s t r a c t The problem dealt with in... more GLOBAL JUSTICE AS GOOD GOVERNANCE: A CRITICAL APPROACH
A b s t r a c t The problem dealt with in this paper is twofold: 1. Although the partisans of good go-vernance presuppose without proving it that good governance and democracy sit well together, a historical perspective, however limited, allows us to show that this pre-supposition is dubious. 2. The claim to pursue global justice as an alternative to neo-liberal governance is indeed trapped in the conceptual framework designed by neo-liberalism. Although they pretend to the contrary, the kind of political legitimacy put forward by global justice movements is not fundamentally different from the kind of legitimacy put forward by neo-liberal governance theories. When applied to international institutions Global justice can therefore be considered as a form, however critical, of democratic go-vernance.
Abstract in Polish: Sprawiedliwoae globalna jako przyk³ad dobrego rz¹dzenia podejcie krytyczne S ³ o w a k l u c z o w e: rz¹dy, demokracja, neoliberalizm, sprawiedliwoae globalna. K e y w o r d s: governance, democracy, neo-liberalism, global justice. S t r e s z c z e n i e Problem opisywany w tym¿e artykule jest dwojaki: 1. Pomimo ¿e zwolennicy globalnej sprawiedliwoci przyjmuj¹ tezê choae jej nie udowadniaj¹ ¿e rz¹dzenie i demokracja id¹ w parze, historyczna perspektywa, choae ogra-niczona, pozwala nam wykazaae w¹tpliwoae tego za³o¿enia. 2. Teza, by d¹¿yae do spra-wiedliwoci globalnej jako alternatywy dla neoliberalnych rz¹dów, jest uwiêziona w ra-mach pojêciowych stworzonych w³anie przez neoliberalizm. Chocia¿ zwolennicy sprawiedli-woci globalnej twierdz¹ odwrotnie, to typ le-gitymizacji w³adzy przez nich przedstawiany zasadniczo nie ró¿ni siê od legitymizacji typo-wej dla neoliberalnych rz¹dów. Sprawiedliwoae globalna, zastosowana w miêdzynarodowych instytucjach, mo¿e wiêc byae postrzegana jako czasami krytyczna forma rz¹dów demo-kratycznych.
Spheres of Global Justice. Vol. 1, 2013
In the first part of this paper is presented the argument that human rights politics doesn’t take... more In the first part of this paper is presented the argument that human rights politics doesn’t take into account the claims of culture, and that, therefore, it cannot deal with the political dimension of minority claims, that is to say that a human rights politics is not really politics, but a moralizing and, to a certain extent, culture-blind approach to politics that can only amount to pragmatism. In the second part, it is shown why the strong claims made by the defenders of political self-determination can sometimes threaten human rights, either at home by allowing illiberal practices in the name of group autonomy or abroad in the name of an anti-interventionist foreign policy. The paper concludes with a few remarks in order to propose a revised version of human rights politics, which would not ignore cultural differences, but would deal with them in a universalistic way.
Philosophiques, 2000
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des ser... more Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents scientifiques depuis 1998.
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Papers and book chapters by Luc Foisneau
Gianni Paganini (trans.), Moto, Luogo et Tempo di Thomas Hobbes. With an introduction by Gianni Paganini. Torino: UTET, 2010, pp. 708.
A b s t r a c t The problem dealt with in this paper is twofold: 1. Although the partisans of good go-vernance presuppose without proving it that good governance and democracy sit well together, a historical perspective, however limited, allows us to show that this pre-supposition is dubious. 2. The claim to pursue global justice as an alternative to neo-liberal governance is indeed trapped in the conceptual framework designed by neo-liberalism. Although they pretend to the contrary, the kind of political legitimacy put forward by global justice movements is not fundamentally different from the kind of legitimacy put forward by neo-liberal governance theories. When applied to international institutions Global justice can therefore be considered as a form, however critical, of democratic go-vernance.
Abstract in Polish: Sprawiedliwoae globalna jako przyk³ad dobrego rz¹dzenia podejcie krytyczne S ³ o w a k l u c z o w e: rz¹dy, demokracja, neoliberalizm, sprawiedliwoae globalna. K e y w o r d s: governance, democracy, neo-liberalism, global justice. S t r e s z c z e n i e Problem opisywany w tym¿e artykule jest dwojaki: 1. Pomimo ¿e zwolennicy globalnej sprawiedliwoci przyjmuj¹ tezê choae jej nie udowadniaj¹ ¿e rz¹dzenie i demokracja id¹ w parze, historyczna perspektywa, choae ogra-niczona, pozwala nam wykazaae w¹tpliwoae tego za³o¿enia. 2. Teza, by d¹¿yae do spra-wiedliwoci globalnej jako alternatywy dla neoliberalnych rz¹dów, jest uwiêziona w ra-mach pojêciowych stworzonych w³anie przez neoliberalizm. Chocia¿ zwolennicy sprawiedli-woci globalnej twierdz¹ odwrotnie, to typ le-gitymizacji w³adzy przez nich przedstawiany zasadniczo nie ró¿ni siê od legitymizacji typo-wej dla neoliberalnych rz¹dów. Sprawiedliwoae globalna, zastosowana w miêdzynarodowych instytucjach, mo¿e wiêc byae postrzegana jako czasami krytyczna forma rz¹dów demo-kratycznych.
Gianni Paganini (trans.), Moto, Luogo et Tempo di Thomas Hobbes. With an introduction by Gianni Paganini. Torino: UTET, 2010, pp. 708.
A b s t r a c t The problem dealt with in this paper is twofold: 1. Although the partisans of good go-vernance presuppose without proving it that good governance and democracy sit well together, a historical perspective, however limited, allows us to show that this pre-supposition is dubious. 2. The claim to pursue global justice as an alternative to neo-liberal governance is indeed trapped in the conceptual framework designed by neo-liberalism. Although they pretend to the contrary, the kind of political legitimacy put forward by global justice movements is not fundamentally different from the kind of legitimacy put forward by neo-liberal governance theories. When applied to international institutions Global justice can therefore be considered as a form, however critical, of democratic go-vernance.
Abstract in Polish: Sprawiedliwoae globalna jako przyk³ad dobrego rz¹dzenia podejcie krytyczne S ³ o w a k l u c z o w e: rz¹dy, demokracja, neoliberalizm, sprawiedliwoae globalna. K e y w o r d s: governance, democracy, neo-liberalism, global justice. S t r e s z c z e n i e Problem opisywany w tym¿e artykule jest dwojaki: 1. Pomimo ¿e zwolennicy globalnej sprawiedliwoci przyjmuj¹ tezê choae jej nie udowadniaj¹ ¿e rz¹dzenie i demokracja id¹ w parze, historyczna perspektywa, choae ogra-niczona, pozwala nam wykazaae w¹tpliwoae tego za³o¿enia. 2. Teza, by d¹¿yae do spra-wiedliwoci globalnej jako alternatywy dla neoliberalnych rz¹dów, jest uwiêziona w ra-mach pojêciowych stworzonych w³anie przez neoliberalizm. Chocia¿ zwolennicy sprawiedli-woci globalnej twierdz¹ odwrotnie, to typ le-gitymizacji w³adzy przez nich przedstawiany zasadniczo nie ró¿ni siê od legitymizacji typo-wej dla neoliberalnych rz¹dów. Sprawiedliwoae globalna, zastosowana w miêdzynarodowych instytucjach, mo¿e wiêc byae postrzegana jako czasami krytyczna forma rz¹dów demo-kratycznych.
Un tel point de vue a trois conséquences principales : premièrement, l’État nous contraint d’obéir à ses lois indépendamment de notre conception de la vérité ; deuxièmement, nous ne sommes pas des êtres sociaux poursuivant le bien commun, mais des individus préoccupés avant tout de leur bonheur privé et, troisièmement, c’est le souverain, et lui seul, qui autorise en dernière instance l’expression publique du sentiment religieux.
À partir de ces idées de Hobbes, et de leur discussion contemporaine chez Mauss, Voegelin, Foucault et Rawls, Luc Foisneau nous aide à mieux comprendre pourquoi nos vies sont des vies inquiètes : c’est que l’état de nature n’est jamais loin sous les apparences de la vie civile et que l’État-Léviathan ne parvient à modérer nos disputes morales et religieuses que pour autant qu’il nous fait peur.
Contrairement aux théologiens médiévaux dont il s’inspire, Hobbes n’inscrit plus sa réflexion politique dans l’horizon du salut éternel, mais, selon Luc Foisneau, dans l’horizon de la mortalité humaine. Quelles sont les conséquences d’un tel changement de perspective ? Principalement une égalité naturelle entre les hommes : celle-ci anticipe de manière fulgurante la célèbre critique rousseauiste du droit du plus fort et nous met en demeure de penser autrement la constitution du politique, la toute-puissance de l’État protégeant les hommes de la peur qu’ils s’inspirent mutuellement. Plus largement, cet ouvrage montre en quoi la thèse d’une domination de Dieu par nature contribue à l’élaboration d’une anthropologie politique, au déploiement d’une théorie de la souveraineté et à une critique de la théologie politique.
Unlike many writings on global justice, Spheres of Global Justice does not content itself with describing the painful and advantageous effects of the globalization process as being ipso facto a global injustice or a just global order. Rather, this multidisciplinary collection of essays, from a pluralist inspiration, combines empirical analysis with theoretical approaches and ethical principles, paying close attention to two aspects of the effects of the globalization process. These aspects are the causal relationships that lead to such effects and the kinds of obligations, or of normative relationships between global rights and correlative duties, that applies to each specific individual case. This volume illustrates how diverse global obligations are, and how they can be, grounded in diverse relationships (identity, ability to provide help, causal responsibility, past injustices, protection of agency and promotion of independence, etc.). These essays also demonstrate that an ethical global approach has not only international or transnational, but also domestic, local and interpersonal dimensions.
Pour Arash Abizadeh, la philosophie morale de Hobbes repose sur deux conceptions complémentaires mais distinctes : l'une fait classiquement de la poursuite du bonheur la fin de la vie humaine ; l'autre, résolument moderne, se fonde sur ce que nous nous devons les uns aux autres. La technicité des théories éthiques contemporaines, qu'elles soient d'inspiration phénoménologique ou analytique, pourrait donner l'impression qu'il ne nous servirait plus à rien de nous tourner vers l'histoire de la philosophie morale : nos dilemmes moraux auraient trouvé leurs instruments d'analyse adéquats, et il n'y aurait plus rien à apprendre d'Aristote ou de Montaigne. La première vertu du livre d'Arash Abizadeh, professeur à l'université McGill de Montréal, est de contribuer à nous guérir de cette illusion en nous montrant que les apports conceptuels les plus récents de la théorie normative, mis au service de l'histoire de la philosophie morale, permettent de mesurer l'importance de cette dernière. Sa seconde vertu est d'appliquer cette méthodologie à Hobbes et de nous aider à comprendre en quoi cet auteur, dont la philosophie morale a été longtemps oubliée au profit de sa seule philosophie politique [1], propose une théorie morale adaptée à certains des aspects de notre monde contemporain. La thèse de l'ouvrage est, toutefois, que la morale du Léviathan possède deux dimensions, la recherche du bonheur individuel et le respect de nos obligations à autrui, et que ces deux dimensions sont, malgré une apparence du contraire, parfaitement compatibles.
Cet entretien a été réalisé par Luc Foisneau et Philippe Urfalino, à Paris, dans l’amphithéâtre Furet de l’EHESS, 105 boulevard Raspail, le 13 février 2018.
He was invited at EHESS on the 13th November 2017 for a one-day long discussion of the manuscript of his book, Why does Inequality Matter? (Oxford, 2018), and on the 14th November he participated in the CESPRA seminar on Normative political philosophy with a text on “Contractualism and justification”.
The interview was conducted by Luc Foisneau with the collaboration of Véronique Munoz-Dardé before the seminar given by Tim Scanlon at EHESS, 105 boulevard Raspail, in Paris. The transcription of the interview is due to Victor Mardellat (PhD candidate in philosophy, CESPRA) who added one specific question on contractualism.
Cet entretien a été réalisé par Luc Foisneau, à Paris, dans les locaux du Centre audiovisuel de l’EHESS, 96 boulevard Raspail, le 11 février 2019.
From Giovanni Botero’sDella Ragion di Stato (1589) right up to ScipioneChiaramonti (1635), reason of state refers to a variegated textual corpus that, besides the explicit reference to the exertion of force, sets up various codes of political conduct aimed at a broader conception of State preservation. This goal is not merely achieved through derogatory policies or extraordinary means, but it is chiefly pursued through ordinary government. In the context of the Counter-reformation, Italian reason of state linkedprincely rule with state administration and governance and ruler’s prudential reason was slowly backed up by a set of practical knowledges: city planning, statistics, political geography, demographics, accounting to name a few.
Thus, Italian reason of state tradition constitutes an autonomous and alternative path with respect to the group of theories, which, in certain European regions, gave rise to the experimentation of sovereignty. Nonetheless, in its very broad sense, it participated in the processes of the so-called modern political rationalization, in a way that is still to be fully investigated, and exercised its influence in various languages and European regions.
Ragion di Stato, Raison d’État, Razon de Estado, Staatsräson: from the end of the Sixteenth-century onwards this expression is in fact translated and adapted to particular regional situations. The differentlanguages and experiences ofEnglish royal (or parliamentary) absolute prerogative, of Germancameralism andpolizei,of French raison d’étatand police, the growing relevance of the “interests of state” in countries such as France, England, the Netherlands:these were allintertwined and concurred to shape the modern idea of the State.
The aim of the conference istwo-fold.
On the one side, it aims at analysing the different theories of reasonof state that were developed in EarlyModern and Modern Europe. We will thus focus on England, France, Germany and the Netherlands in order to highlight their respective specificities as well as their conceptual and historical proximities. We will then compare these experiences with the Italian tradition and contrast them with the contemporary theories of sovereignty in order to clarify their mutual influences and their political, juridical and philosophical backgrounds.
On the other side, the conferenceaims at investigating the relevance of different conceptions of “reason of state” for our contemporary democratic states and societies.In fact, any conception of reason of state seems to bear with itadistinction between moral or juridical normativity (the Right, the Law), the effectivity of ordinary political action, and the necessity to face political and social emergencies.However defined, reason of state is therefore “an art” for governing the State.The changing nature of the State in contemporary globalized democracies poses the question of investigating the changings in the reasons of (the) states.