Books by Aaron Y Zelin
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2022
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a group previously linked to the Islamic State of Iraq and to al-Qaeda, has... more Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a group previously linked to the Islamic State of Iraq and to al-Qaeda, has evolved in ways that challenge accepted views of “jihadism.” Now ruling over territory in Syria’s northern Idlib and western Aleppo governorates, it functions more like a government than a nonstate actor, and HTS leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani is seeking the group’s removal from the U.S. State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. But HTS is hardly anodyne. The group still espouses extremist beliefs that glamorize terrorism abroad, and its fighters fire rockets into civilian areas controlled by the Assad regime. Moreover, HTS hosts other designated groups in its territory, including Jamaat Ansar al-Islam, Katibat Imam al-Bukhari, and Katibat al-Tawhid wal Jihad. In this thought-provoking Policy Focus, illustrated with photographs of HTS personalities and personnel, jihadism expert Aaron Y. Zelin digs deep into the group’s past before reckoning with the implications of Jawlani’s request. Whatever the U.S. decision, he suggests, political jihadism is here to stay.
Columbia University Press, 2020
Tunisia became one of the largest sources of foreign fighters for the Islamic State—even though t... more Tunisia became one of the largest sources of foreign fighters for the Islamic State—even though the country stands out as a democratic bright spot of the Arab uprisings and despite the fact that it had very little history of terrorist violence within its borders prior to 2011. In Your Sons Are at Your Service, Aaron Y. Zelin uncovers the longer history of Tunisian involvement in the jihadi movement and offers an in-depth examination of the reasons why so many Tunisians became drawn to jihadism following the 2011 revolution.
Zelin highlights the longer-term causes that affected jihadi recruitment in Tunisia, including the prior history of Tunisians joining jihadi organizations and playing key roles in far-flung parts of the world over the past four decades. He contends that the jihadi group Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia was able to take advantage of the universal prisoner amnesty, increased openness, and the lack of governmental policy toward it after the revolution. In turn, this provided space for greater recruitment and subsequent mobilization to fight abroad once the Tunisian government cracked down on the group in 2013. Zelin marshals cutting-edge empirical findings, extensive primary source research, and on-the-ground fieldwork, including a variety of documents in Arabic going as far back as the 1980s and interviews with Ansar al-Sharia members and Tunisian fighters returning from Syria. The first book on the history of the Tunisian jihadi movement, Your Sons Are at Your Service is a meticulously researched account that challenges simplified views of jihadism’s appeal and success.
Journal Articles by Aaron Y Zelin
Political Analysis, 2023
Who joins extremist movements? Answering this question is beset by methodological challenges as s... more Who joins extremist movements? Answering this question is beset by methodological challenges as survey techniques are infeasible and selective samples provide no counterfactual. Recruits can be assigned to contextual units, but this is vulnerable to problems of ecological inference. In this article, we elaborate a technique that combines survey and ecological approaches. The Bayesian hierarchical case–control design that we propose allows us to identify individual-level and contextual factors patterning the incidence of recruitment to extremism, while accounting for spatial autocorrelation, rare events, and contamination. We empirically validate our approach by matching a sample of Islamic State (ISIS) fighters from nine MENA countries with representative population surveys enumerated shortly before recruits joined the movement. High-status individuals in their early twenties with college education were more likely to join ISIS. There is more mixed evidence for relative deprivation. The accompanying extremeR package provides functionality for applied researchers to implement our approach.
Policy & Internet, 2023
Since 2019, researchers examining, archiving, and collecting extremist and terrorist materials on... more Since 2019, researchers examining, archiving, and collecting extremist and terrorist materials online have increasingly been taken offline. In part a consequence of the automation of content moderation by different technology companies and national governments calling for ever quicker takedowns. Based on an online survey of peers in the field, this research highlights that up to 60% of researchers surveyed have had either their accounts or content they have posted or stored online taken down from varying platforms. Beyond the quanti- tative data, this research also garnered qualitative answers about concerns individuals in the field had related to this problem set, namely, the lack of transparency on the part of the technology companies, hindering actual research and understanding of compli- cated and evolving issues related to different extremist and terrorist phenomena, undermining potential collabo- ration within the research field, and the potential of self‐ censorship online. An easy solution to this would be a whitelist, though there are inherent downsides related to this as well, especially between researchers at different levels in their careers, institutional affiliation or lack thereof, and inequalities between researchers from the West versus Global South. Either way, securitizing research in however form it evolves in the future will fundamentally hurt research.
Terrorism and Political Violence , 2021
This paper goes to the heart of this special issue by exploring the case of the web site, Jihadol... more This paper goes to the heart of this special issue by exploring the case of the web site, Jihadology, which the author founded and has managed for the past ten-plus years. It explores various issues including why such a site is necessary and/or useful, questions about dissemination and open access, lessons learned about responsibility and interaction with jihadis online, the evolution of the website that has the largest repository of jihadi content, interactions with governments and technology companies and how they viewed and dealt with the website. The paper also explores how the experience gained might help other researchers interested in creating primary source-first websites to assist in their research as well as to the benefit of others in the field. Therefore, this paper aims to shed light not only on this unique case, but also on the moral and ethical questions that have arisen through maintaining the Jihadology website for more than a decade in a time of changing online environments and more recent calls for censorship.
Perspectives on Terrorism, 2019
This article examines Katibat Uqba Bin Nafi, al-Qaeda/al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib’s official ... more This article examines Katibat Uqba Bin Nafi, al-Qaeda/al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib’s official branch in Tunisia. It sheds light on an unexplored case study on jihadi groups in recent times by investigating its history and forthcoming prospects. Moreover, it plans to use this article as an avenue to weigh in on the debate within jihadi studies on the future of al-Qaeda and if it can take advantage of the Islamic State’s misfortunes in Iraq and Syria as well as Libya. The latter of which has more direct impact on IS’s network in Tunisia. The article interrogates a number of Arabic primary sources that have yet to be surveyed from KUBN and AQIM that will help clarify these inquiries. It will identify shortcomings in KUBN’s capacities and highlight reasons why IS will likely remain a more attractive avenue for jihadi mobilization in Tunisia going forward. This is relevant since much of the debate on AQ’s status analyzes the topic from more of a macro level than looking at specific groups within its broader global network. This research will illustrate that while the consensus might be that AQ is primed to benefit from IS’s setbacks, in the case of Tunisia, unless conditions change locally, KUBN is unlikely to follow the same trend as other AQ branches or when evaluating AQ as a whole.
Perspectives on Terrorism, Aug 2015
This article seeks to examine, quantitatively and qualitatively, one week of official media relea... more This article seeks to examine, quantitatively and qualitatively, one week of official media releases of the Islamic State (IS). Due to the breadth of IS official media releases, this provides a snapshot upon which to better understand the different styles and messaging streams IS releases on a weekly basis. The article shows that IS produces much more material, and on a broader range of topics, than what gets reported in the mainstream media. Execution videos make up just a fraction of the overall output and are dwarfed by the number of IS productions on military affairs, governance, preaching, moral policing, and other themes. The analysis also shows that IS relies very heavily on visual as opposed to text-based propaganda, and that most of its military activities take place in Iraq, not Syria.
Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, May 2015
For more information about obtaining additional copies of this or other Hudson Institute publicat... more For more information about obtaining additional copies of this or other Hudson Institute publications, please visit Hudson's website at www.hudson.org/bookstore or call toll free: 1-888-554-1325.
The Journal of International Security Affairs, Dec 2013
International Journal for Arab Studies, Jul 2012
Thirty years ago former Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat was assassinated by Khālid al-Islāmbūlī... more Thirty years ago former Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat was assassinated by Khālid al-Islāmbūlī of Tanẓīm al-Jihad (The Jihad Organization), a group led by Muhammad c Abd as-Salām Farag. Farag's book al-Jihad al-Farīḍa al-Ghāʾiba (Jihad: The Neglected Duty) provided the ideological underpinning and justification for the assassination. His
Perspectives on Terrorism, Mar 2012
from closed membership online forums to mainstream social networking platforms. Using social netw... more from closed membership online forums to mainstream social networking platforms. Using social network analysis, we show that behind the apparent proliferation of such sources, YouTube account holders associated with incarnations of the British al-Muhajiroun collude to post propaganda and violent content. European groups commonly use American platforms and domain names registered with American companies. Seeking shelter under speech rights granted by the First Amendment, they evade European laws against incitement and hate speech.
Reports by Aaron Y Zelin
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2023
In April, Islamic State fighters in Mali seized villages surrounding the city of Menaka, marking ... more In April, Islamic State fighters in Mali seized villages surrounding the city of Menaka, marking the group’s first territorial conquest since losing its final Syrian foothold in 2019. The human cost of these advances has been steep. By May, at least 150,000 individuals had reportedly been displaced, and civilians have been subjected to targeted killings, kidnappings, and looting. The offensive occurred amid a string of regional of security setbacks: namely, France’s August 2022 military withdrawal (which followed the Malian junta’s expressed preference for Russia’s Wagner Group), the April 2023 dissolution of the UN mission in Mali, and the junta’s decision earlier this month to form a tripartite alliance with Burkina Faso and Niger, thereby undermining the French-led G5 Sahel framework designed to thwart jihadist actors in the region.
In this amply illustrated Policy Note, Aaron Zelin and Sarah Cahn explain that while the United States may have limited room for maneuver in Mali today, it can promote regional stability and U.S. national interests by pursuing further sanctions against local Islamic State officials and exploring constructive arrangements with nearby African states.
Washington institute for Near East Policy, 2023
This multimedia tool—easily the most comprehensive of its kind—provides a novel, accessible way t... more This multimedia tool—easily the most comprehensive of its kind—provides a novel, accessible way to understand the Islamic State’s global reach and activities. Beyond a traditional focus on attacks, find content from Islamic State media, designations, and legal cases.
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2021
For a lengthy period following the attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. national security prioriti... more For a lengthy period following the attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. national security priorities focused largely on counterterrorism. That emphasis has waned slightly in the past few years, with American rhetoric shifting toward Great Power competition, given an emboldened China and a revisionist Russia seeking to upset the current order. This rhetorical change has been mirrored in a reallocation of U.S. funding.
Whatever the current focus, counterterrorism and Great Power dynamics converge in one country in particular—Syria—site of the greatest counterterrorism threat to the U.S. homeland and Russia’s largest play to reassert its global influence. It is also the location of Washington’s greatest regional power challenge, deriving from Iran’s push for regional primacy. These dynamics are at play within Syria, involving a number of actors: the United States and Russia, Turkey and Russia, Turkey and the United States, Iran and the United States, and Iran and Israel, among others. In contrast to the position that casts counterterrorism and Great Power competition as either/or challenges, a closer look shows that they are instead related. Only by understanding this can policymakers hope to resolve the underlying problems in Syria, which has suffered over the past several years due in part to Washington’s neglect.
George Washington University, 2020
To understand how the Islamic State (IS) attempted to garner support and promote its interpretati... more To understand how the Islamic State (IS) attempted to garner support and promote its interpretation of Islam, this paper explores important background on dawa itself, the jihadi movement and dawa, how IS began to implement its use of dawa prior to the Caliphate announcement, and how this was propagated by IS in its official media productions. The paper concludes by exploring how dawa was administered on a daily basis, supported by internal IS administrative documents, providing a deeper understanding of IS and dawa and situating it more broadly in a historical perspective.
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2019
Even before the United States precipitously withdrew its troops from northern Syria in October 20... more Even before the United States precipitously withdrew its troops from northern Syria in October 2019, observers fretted over the situation at al-Hawl refugee camp. The camp is populated predominantly by women and children and has drawn attention for its unsanitary conditions, inadequate medical care, lack of education for children, and overcrowding. Added to this is a strong, although hard-to-quantify, strain of jihadism. Many inhabitants still profess loyalty to the Islamic State and have sought to impose a fundamentalist lifestyle on their fellow residents. In one especially grim incident, a woman is said to have killed her own granddaughter for removing her veil.
In this urgently important study, jihadism expert Aaron Zelin details the unsettling situation at al-Hawl, focusing on the period from the Islamic State’s relinquishment of territory in March 2019 until the recent U.S. pullout and ensuing Turkish incursion. As much as anything, the contents demonstrate a continued failure by international actors to manage the transition from fighting a jihadist group to rolling back its broader successes. Washington and its partners must take note.
CTC Sentinel, 2019
Tunisia’s National Counterterrorism Commission has
established an anti-money laundering and comba... more Tunisia’s National Counterterrorism Commission has
established an anti-money laundering and combating
the financing of terrorism regime to supplement its law
enforcement and military action against its local jihadi
movement. The move comes amid Tunisia’s efforts to
graduate from ongoing monitoring by the Financial Action
Task Force, which is expected in October. Tunisia’s efforts
go beyond what is technically required under international
standards, highlighting the seriousness with which it
seeks to operationalize this tool. Tunisia has created a
sanctions list of 107 terrorist individuals, organizations,
and associations as of mid-August 2019. This capacity,
still under development, may help alleviate pressure on
Tunisia’s judiciary and provide more transparency to civil
society, as well as deter financial support to local fighters
and foreign fighters abroad.
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018
Over the past few years, the influx of Tunisian fighters to Iraq and Syria has rendered Tunisia p... more Over the past few years, the influx of Tunisian fighters to Iraq and Syria has rendered Tunisia practically synonymous with a phenomenon that is still not well understood. This new Policy Note by jihadism expert Aaron Y. Zelin seeks to remedy this gap by quantifying the flow of Tunisian fighters, in particular the recruitment push within Tunisia from 2011 to 2013, and exploring the history of their networks in Iraq over the last decade.
This study examines the motives driving Tunisia's foreign fighters, the roles they have assumed with jihadi groups in Iraq and Syria, the reasons why many have returned to Tunisia from the battlefield, and the dilemma this poses to the Tunisian state in terms of security and human rights. A deeper understanding of Tunisia's foreign fighter phenomenon will help situate the trajectory of the jihadist movement both inside and outside the country, while suggesting ways to tackle this challenging issue.
Over the past eight years, al-Qaeda's fortunes have ebbed and flowed. Drones, uprisings, and a ch... more Over the past eight years, al-Qaeda's fortunes have ebbed and flowed. Drones, uprisings, and a challenge from the Islamic State have forced the core al-Qaeda organization—historically based in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region—and its various branches to adapt and migrate outward.
In this new Policy Focus, Washington Institute fellow Aaron Y. Zelin compiles case studies demonstrating how each part of al-Qaeda's network has evolved and survived the various challenges it has faced roughly since the Obama administration took office. Written by eminent scholars, practitioners, and government officials from the United States and abroad, the chapters are informed by a recent workshop in which the participants gave candid, off-the-record assessments of numerous key issues, including al-Qaeda's current strategic outlook, a close examination of its branch in Syria, its branches outside of Syria (AQAP, AQIM, al-Shabab, and AQIS), and its current financial situation.
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Books by Aaron Y Zelin
Zelin highlights the longer-term causes that affected jihadi recruitment in Tunisia, including the prior history of Tunisians joining jihadi organizations and playing key roles in far-flung parts of the world over the past four decades. He contends that the jihadi group Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia was able to take advantage of the universal prisoner amnesty, increased openness, and the lack of governmental policy toward it after the revolution. In turn, this provided space for greater recruitment and subsequent mobilization to fight abroad once the Tunisian government cracked down on the group in 2013. Zelin marshals cutting-edge empirical findings, extensive primary source research, and on-the-ground fieldwork, including a variety of documents in Arabic going as far back as the 1980s and interviews with Ansar al-Sharia members and Tunisian fighters returning from Syria. The first book on the history of the Tunisian jihadi movement, Your Sons Are at Your Service is a meticulously researched account that challenges simplified views of jihadism’s appeal and success.
Journal Articles by Aaron Y Zelin
Reports by Aaron Y Zelin
In this amply illustrated Policy Note, Aaron Zelin and Sarah Cahn explain that while the United States may have limited room for maneuver in Mali today, it can promote regional stability and U.S. national interests by pursuing further sanctions against local Islamic State officials and exploring constructive arrangements with nearby African states.
Whatever the current focus, counterterrorism and Great Power dynamics converge in one country in particular—Syria—site of the greatest counterterrorism threat to the U.S. homeland and Russia’s largest play to reassert its global influence. It is also the location of Washington’s greatest regional power challenge, deriving from Iran’s push for regional primacy. These dynamics are at play within Syria, involving a number of actors: the United States and Russia, Turkey and Russia, Turkey and the United States, Iran and the United States, and Iran and Israel, among others. In contrast to the position that casts counterterrorism and Great Power competition as either/or challenges, a closer look shows that they are instead related. Only by understanding this can policymakers hope to resolve the underlying problems in Syria, which has suffered over the past several years due in part to Washington’s neglect.
In this urgently important study, jihadism expert Aaron Zelin details the unsettling situation at al-Hawl, focusing on the period from the Islamic State’s relinquishment of territory in March 2019 until the recent U.S. pullout and ensuing Turkish incursion. As much as anything, the contents demonstrate a continued failure by international actors to manage the transition from fighting a jihadist group to rolling back its broader successes. Washington and its partners must take note.
established an anti-money laundering and combating
the financing of terrorism regime to supplement its law
enforcement and military action against its local jihadi
movement. The move comes amid Tunisia’s efforts to
graduate from ongoing monitoring by the Financial Action
Task Force, which is expected in October. Tunisia’s efforts
go beyond what is technically required under international
standards, highlighting the seriousness with which it
seeks to operationalize this tool. Tunisia has created a
sanctions list of 107 terrorist individuals, organizations,
and associations as of mid-August 2019. This capacity,
still under development, may help alleviate pressure on
Tunisia’s judiciary and provide more transparency to civil
society, as well as deter financial support to local fighters
and foreign fighters abroad.
This study examines the motives driving Tunisia's foreign fighters, the roles they have assumed with jihadi groups in Iraq and Syria, the reasons why many have returned to Tunisia from the battlefield, and the dilemma this poses to the Tunisian state in terms of security and human rights. A deeper understanding of Tunisia's foreign fighter phenomenon will help situate the trajectory of the jihadist movement both inside and outside the country, while suggesting ways to tackle this challenging issue.
In this new Policy Focus, Washington Institute fellow Aaron Y. Zelin compiles case studies demonstrating how each part of al-Qaeda's network has evolved and survived the various challenges it has faced roughly since the Obama administration took office. Written by eminent scholars, practitioners, and government officials from the United States and abroad, the chapters are informed by a recent workshop in which the participants gave candid, off-the-record assessments of numerous key issues, including al-Qaeda's current strategic outlook, a close examination of its branch in Syria, its branches outside of Syria (AQAP, AQIM, al-Shabab, and AQIS), and its current financial situation.
Zelin highlights the longer-term causes that affected jihadi recruitment in Tunisia, including the prior history of Tunisians joining jihadi organizations and playing key roles in far-flung parts of the world over the past four decades. He contends that the jihadi group Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia was able to take advantage of the universal prisoner amnesty, increased openness, and the lack of governmental policy toward it after the revolution. In turn, this provided space for greater recruitment and subsequent mobilization to fight abroad once the Tunisian government cracked down on the group in 2013. Zelin marshals cutting-edge empirical findings, extensive primary source research, and on-the-ground fieldwork, including a variety of documents in Arabic going as far back as the 1980s and interviews with Ansar al-Sharia members and Tunisian fighters returning from Syria. The first book on the history of the Tunisian jihadi movement, Your Sons Are at Your Service is a meticulously researched account that challenges simplified views of jihadism’s appeal and success.
In this amply illustrated Policy Note, Aaron Zelin and Sarah Cahn explain that while the United States may have limited room for maneuver in Mali today, it can promote regional stability and U.S. national interests by pursuing further sanctions against local Islamic State officials and exploring constructive arrangements with nearby African states.
Whatever the current focus, counterterrorism and Great Power dynamics converge in one country in particular—Syria—site of the greatest counterterrorism threat to the U.S. homeland and Russia’s largest play to reassert its global influence. It is also the location of Washington’s greatest regional power challenge, deriving from Iran’s push for regional primacy. These dynamics are at play within Syria, involving a number of actors: the United States and Russia, Turkey and Russia, Turkey and the United States, Iran and the United States, and Iran and Israel, among others. In contrast to the position that casts counterterrorism and Great Power competition as either/or challenges, a closer look shows that they are instead related. Only by understanding this can policymakers hope to resolve the underlying problems in Syria, which has suffered over the past several years due in part to Washington’s neglect.
In this urgently important study, jihadism expert Aaron Zelin details the unsettling situation at al-Hawl, focusing on the period from the Islamic State’s relinquishment of territory in March 2019 until the recent U.S. pullout and ensuing Turkish incursion. As much as anything, the contents demonstrate a continued failure by international actors to manage the transition from fighting a jihadist group to rolling back its broader successes. Washington and its partners must take note.
established an anti-money laundering and combating
the financing of terrorism regime to supplement its law
enforcement and military action against its local jihadi
movement. The move comes amid Tunisia’s efforts to
graduate from ongoing monitoring by the Financial Action
Task Force, which is expected in October. Tunisia’s efforts
go beyond what is technically required under international
standards, highlighting the seriousness with which it
seeks to operationalize this tool. Tunisia has created a
sanctions list of 107 terrorist individuals, organizations,
and associations as of mid-August 2019. This capacity,
still under development, may help alleviate pressure on
Tunisia’s judiciary and provide more transparency to civil
society, as well as deter financial support to local fighters
and foreign fighters abroad.
This study examines the motives driving Tunisia's foreign fighters, the roles they have assumed with jihadi groups in Iraq and Syria, the reasons why many have returned to Tunisia from the battlefield, and the dilemma this poses to the Tunisian state in terms of security and human rights. A deeper understanding of Tunisia's foreign fighter phenomenon will help situate the trajectory of the jihadist movement both inside and outside the country, while suggesting ways to tackle this challenging issue.
In this new Policy Focus, Washington Institute fellow Aaron Y. Zelin compiles case studies demonstrating how each part of al-Qaeda's network has evolved and survived the various challenges it has faced roughly since the Obama administration took office. Written by eminent scholars, practitioners, and government officials from the United States and abroad, the chapters are informed by a recent workshop in which the participants gave candid, off-the-record assessments of numerous key issues, including al-Qaeda's current strategic outlook, a close examination of its branch in Syria, its branches outside of Syria (AQAP, AQIM, al-Shabab, and AQIS), and its current financial situation.