Iran Update, October 9, 2024

 

Iran Update, October 9, 2024

Carolyn Moorman, Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Katherine Wells, Siddhant Kishore, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, Grace Mappes, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Israeli leaders have continued deliberating over how to respond to the Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 1. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with the Israeli Security Cabinet to discuss potential Israeli responses on October 8 and will meet with the cabinet again for further discussion on October 10.[1] Anonymous Israeli officials told Axios that the Israeli response will be “significant and will likely include a combination of airstrikes on military targets in Iran and clandestine attacks like the one that killed Hamas Leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran.”[2] The officials appeared to make no mention of striking Iranian energy and nuclear sites.[3] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant similarly said that the Israeli response will be “deadly and surprising,” adding that Iran “won’t understand what happened and how.”[4] US President Joe Biden, US Vice President Kamala Harris, and Netanyahu held a phone call on October 9 to discuss further how to respond to the recent Iranian missile attack.[5]

Gallant has postponed his official visit to Washington, DC, to discuss the Israeli response with senior US officials.[6] Netanyahu ordered Gallant to delay the visit until after Biden and Netanyahu spoke on the phone and the Israeli Security Cabinet approved a response, according to an anonymous Israeli source speaking to the Washington Post.[7]

Lebanese Hezbollah is continuing to avoid decisive engagements with Israeli forces, as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) expands the breadth of its ground operations in southern Lebanon.[8] Israeli forces in southern Lebanon have observed that Hezbollah prefers to engage from a distance, using anti-tank missiles and rockets, as opposed to close-quarters combat in border villages.[9] Israeli sources have reported that Hezbollah forces will withdraw shortly after making contact with the IDF.[10] The IDF 36th Division commander similarly noted that some Hezbollah militants withdraw deeper into Lebanon while others flee outright.[11] The IDF has reported some isolated small-arms engagements with Hezbollah militants in buildings but that Hezbollah defenses in border villages primarily involve the widespread use of improvised explosive devices (IED) and mines.[12] The IDF has also noticed that, compared to Hamas fighters in the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah militants are more organized and are operating above ground with longer-range weapons systems.[13]

Some Iranian hardliners are indirectly lobbying Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to revoke his fatwa that prohibits the production and use of nuclear weapons. Thirty-nine parliamentarians wrote a letter to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) calling for the revision of Iranian "defense doctrine" and for the SNSC to “issue permission and provide facilities for the production of nuclear weapons.”[14] The SNSC lacks the authority to unilaterally override Khamenei’s fatwa, which the parliamentarians almost certainly realize. But the SNSC can recommend to Khamenei that he revoke his fatwa, which is likely the effect that the parliamentarians are trying to generate. One of the signatories is Mohammad Reza Sabaghian Bafghi, who has previously supported Iran producing a nuclear weapon.[15] Another signatory is Hassan Ali Akhlaghi Amiri, who is affiliated with ultraconservative the Paydari Front.[16] One of the most prominent leaders of the Paydari Front is Saeed Jalili, who is one of Khamenei’s representatives to the SNSC. Amiri told Iranian media that the names of the other signatories will be disclosed when the letter is published.[17] This letter is consistent with reports that senior Iranian officials have been debating in recent months whether to build a nuclear weapon.[18] That the parliamentarians who drafted and signed the letter felt comfortable doing so reflects the extent to which suggesting that Khamenei should revoke his fatwa has become normalized in regime discourse. These parliamentarians would have jeopardized their political careers if the drafting and signing of the letter angered Khamenei. That these parliamentarians did so suggests that they did not perceive this risk and that Khamenei may be receptive to their lobbying.

An Iranian outlet affiliated with former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohsen Rezaei claimed on October 8 that Russia provided Iran with an S-400 air defense system and a squadron of Su-35 fighter jets but provided no evidence for this claim.[19] No other Iranian or Western media outlet has reported this news at the time of this writing, and CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim. Iran has long sought to acquire advanced air defense systems and Su-35s from Russia, and CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia could supply Iran with advanced military equipment in return for Iran’s ongoing support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[20]

Russian illegal arms dealer and Ulyanovsk Oblast parliamentarian Viktor Bout reportedly helped broker a deal for Russia to sell arms worth $10 million to Yemen's Houthi rebels in August 2024 amid increasing reports of potential Russian arms transfers to the Houthis and deepening Russo-Iranian cooperation. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on October 7, citing a European security official and other sources familiar with the matter, that Bout assisted in negotiations for small arms sales worth $10 million when a Houthi delegation visited Moscow in August 2024.[21] The WSJ's sources stated that the first two deliveries would consist of mostly AK-74 assault rifles and that the Houthis also discussed the potential transfer of Kornet antitank missiles and anti-air weapons. The sources stated that they were unsure whether Bout negotiated the deal on behalf of the Kremlin or just with the Kremlin's tacit approval, and the WSJ noted that the transfer has not yet occurred and the source of the arms is still unclear.[22] The WSJ reported that these deliveries could begin as soon as October 2024 to Hudaydah Port under the guise of food supplies. Both Bout and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied the WSJ report.[23] Russia has reportedly been involved in Iranian-brokered "secret talks" to transfer Russian Yakhont (P-800 Oniks) anti-ship cruise missiles and other military equipment to the Houthis, but it is unclear whether these transfers have or will occur.[24] CTP-ISW continues to assess that Russia likely aims to leverage Iranian proxies to indirectly confront the West and shape Western decision making, particularly to deter the West from supporting Ukraine over fears of Russian escalation against the West, including escalating in a different theater.[25]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Israeli leaders have continued deliberating over how to respond to the Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah is continuing to avoid decisive engagements with Israeli forces, as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) expands the breadth of its ground operations in southern Lebanon.
• Iran: Some Iranian hardliners are indirectly lobbying Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to revoke his fatwa that prohibits the production and use of nuclear weapons.
• Russia: An Iranian outlet claimed that Russia provided Iran with an S-400 air defense system and a squadron of Su-35 fighter jets but provided no evidence for this claim.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Hamas and Fatah officials met in Cairo on October 9 to continue discussions on post-war governance of the Gaza Strip.[26] This is the first recorded meeting between Hamas and Fatah since they and other Palestinian political factions agreed on a vision for post-war governance of the Gaza Strip during “intra-Palestinian reconciliation” talks in Beijing in July 2024.[27] The factions signed a joint declaration during the talks that established the factions’ intentions to form “a temporary unity government” responsible for governing the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.[28] A Palestinian official familiar with the talks told Reuters on October 9 that the factions could try to form a committee to run the Gaza Strip and to help manage border crossings, if the factions cannot agree on a unity government.[29] The Palestinian official added that the “shape and exact responsibilities” of the proposed committee are not yet determined. Egyptian security officials separately told Reuters that Egypt has urged Hamas and Fatah to agree on the management of the Rafah border crossing.[30] Control over the Egypt-Gaza border has been one of the most significant obstacles in negotiations between Israel and Hamas over a ceasefire-hostage deal.[31]

The IDF Air Force struck over 45 Palestinian militia targets in the Gaza Strip on October 9, including Palestinian fighters, infrastructure, rocket launchers, observation posts, and weapons warehouses.[32]

The IDF 162nd, 252nd, and Gaza Divisions continued clearing operations in the Gaza Strip on October 9.[33] These divisions operated around Jabalia, the Netzarim Corridor, and the Philadelphi Corridor, respectively.[34] Israeli forces killed Palestinian fighters through airstrikes and ground combat, located weapons, including grenades and small arms, and destroyed rocket launchers and other militia infrastructure.[35]

The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and Palestinian Mujahadeen Brigades launched rockets targeting Israeli forces around the Netzarim Corridor on October 9.[36] The IDF 252nd Division is currently operating around the corridor.[37]

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson re-issued evacuation orders for Jabalia refugee camp, telling residents to travel to al Mawasi humanitarian zone in the southern Gaza Strip.[38] The spokesperson stated that the IDF had “temporarily stopped work” but would “resume again soon.”[39] A Palestinian journalist reported gunfire from Israeli vehicles and clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters in Jabalia camp on October 9.[40] Palestinian militias, including Hamas, conducted four attacks targeting Israeli armor and dismounted infantry in Jabalia camp on October 9.[41]

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fired a rocket targeting southern Israel on October 9.[42] The IDF intercepted the rocket.[43]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades conducted a stabbing attack in Hadera near Haifa on October 8.[44] An al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade fighter stabbed and injured six Israeli civilians before Israeli security forces killed him.[45] The fighter was a resident of Umm al Fahm—an Arab-majority city in northern Israel.[46]

Israel Border Police special forces killed five Palestinian fighters in Nablus on October 8.[47] Four of the fighters were from the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades.[48] Two of them were the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades local commanders for the Askar and Balata refugee camps. The fighters were traveling in a vehicle when Israeli forces interdicted the vehicle and opened fire upon it.[49] The IDF reported that the fighters presented an imminent threat to Israeli forces and were involved in planning attacks targeting Israeli civilians and forces.[50]

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 8.[51] PIJ and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms and detonated IEDs targeting Israeli forces in Aqaba, Tubas Governorate.[52] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades separately fired small arms at an IDF checkpoint around Mount Gerizim.[53]

Northern Israel and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

The IDF withdrew from Odaisseh and Kfar Kila in southeast Lebanon, according to Hezbollah-affiliated sources.[54] The IDF 98th Division began operating in this area on October 1.[55] The 98th Division has continued clearing operations along other sectors of the Israel-Lebanon border.[56]

The IDF 98th Division conducted clearing operations in several unspecified villages in southeastern Lebanon on October 9.[57] The IDF 35th and 89th brigades engaged Hezbollah militants at close-range and seized hundreds of munitions.[58] The forces seized some of the weapons from a seven-meter-deep underground warehouse in the center of an unspecified village.[59] Hezbollah attacked Israeli forces near the towns of Blida and Mays al Jabal with IEDs, mortars, and rockets.[60] Hezbollah-affiliated sources reported repeated engagements between Israeli forces and Hezbollah militants near Blida on October 9.[61]

The IDF 36th Division continued clearing Hezbollah infrastructure around Maroun al Ras and Yaroun on October 9.[62] The IDF 188th Armored Brigade destroyed munitions, tunnels, and warehouses and “significantly damaged the capabilities and combat means of the [Hezbollah] Radwan Force" in Lebanese border villages.[63] The 188th Armored Brigade also destroyed Hezbollah’s headquarters in Yaroun, west of Maroun al Ras.[64] The IDF Golani Brigade killed Hezbollah’s Maroun al Ras commander and pushed Hezbollah Radwan special operations forces away from northern Israeli towns.[65] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on October 5 showed Israeli armor grouped adjacent to an Irish UNFIL outpost in Maroun al Ras.[66] Irish UNFIL officials said that IDF armor and dismounted infantry moved northward from the post closer into Maroun al Ras on October 8.[67] The 36th Division has attacked over 500 Hezbollah sites in southern Lebanon since beginning ground operations there.[68]

The IDF engaged Hezbollah forces in southwestern Lebanon on October 9. Hezbollah-affiliated sources reported continuous engagements between Israeli forces and Hezbollah militants near Ras al Naqoura.[69] Hezbollah fired anti-tank guided missiles,[70]mortars, and rockets targeting Israeli forces trying to advance into Labbouneh.[71] Hezbollah similarly attacked Israeli forces near Ras al Naqoura with rocket fire.[72] The IDF 146th Division began operating in southwest Lebanon on October 8.[73]

Hezbollah has conducted at least 14 attacks into northern and central Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 8.[74] The IDF detected about 90 launches from Lebanon in a 30-minute period targeting the Upper Galilee, Western Galilee, and southern Golan Heights.[75] Hezbollah claimed that it fired rockets at Safed and an IDF base in the Golan Heights.[76] The IDF stated that Hezbollah launched about 40 rockets at Haifa area on October 8.[77] The IDF intercepted some of the rockets but identified several impacts in the area.[78] At least five people were injured by shrapnel around Haifa.[79] This follows Hezbollah launching 110 rockets at Haifa on October 8—the largest rocket barrage to ever target the city.[80] Hezbollah also fired a barrage of about 20 rockets targeting Israeli forces in Kiryat Shmona.[81] Israeli medics said that two Israeli civilians were killed in the attack.[82] The IDF Air Force struck the site from which Hezbollah launched the rockets.[83] Hezbollah continued to attack Israeli soldiers concentrated along the northern Israel-Lebanon border. Hezbollah fired mortars and rockets targeting Israeli troops in Avivim, Yiftah, Misgav Am, and Manara.[84]

Hezbollah published drone footage of civilian and military sites in northern Israel, including Haifa, on October 9 to inspire fear and demonstrate Hezbollah’s ability to target new locations.[85] The drone footage shows several civilian and military sites in Haifa, Nahariya, Kiryat Shmona, Safed, and the Golan Heights.[86] It is unclear when Hezbollah filmed this footage. Hezbollah previously published three other footage reels of critical Israeli sites in northern Israel in June and July 2024 as part of an effort to deter Israel from launching a major military offensive into Lebanon.[87] Now that Israeli forces are currently operating on the ground in southern Lebanon, these videos are meant to demonstrate Hezbollah’s readiness to target new sites in northern Israel while terrorizing Israeli civilians and military personnel. Hezbollah now regularly attacks sites near Haifa and more frequently uses medium-range rockets to target northern and central Israel, making these threats against these civilian and military targets more plausible to northern Israeli residents[88].

The IDF continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah capabilities and infrastructure in Lebanon. The IDF struck drone warehouses above and below ground and several rocket launchers across southern Lebanon on October 8 and 9.[89] The IDF Air Force has struck over 1,100 Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon since September 30, including launchers, observation posts, sniper positions, tunnel shafts, and weapons storage facilities.[90] The IDF stated that these airstrikes were part of “preparatory flights” ahead of ground operations.[91] Israeli ground forces have directed about 300 airstrikes since September 30 in order to support ground maneuvers.[92]

The IDF also struck several sites in Beirut’s southern suburb, Dahiyeh, on October 9, including Hezbollah intelligence headquarters and weapons production sites.[93] IDF Spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari said on October 9 that the IDF has conducted numerous airstrikes in Dahiyeh to attack “the heart of Hezbollah operations.”[94] Hagari said that Dahiyeh functions as a “de facto military base” and that the IDF has attacked senior Hezbollah leaders, precision-guided missiles, and weapons manufacturing facilities in the area.[95] The IDF frequently calls for residents of certain neighborhoods and buildings in Dahiyeh to evacuate ahead of Israeli airstrikes.[96]

This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on October 8 to 2:00pm ET on October 9. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed five attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 8. The claims include the following:

• Two drone attacks targeting unspecified “vital target[s]” in the Golan Heights[97]
• Two drone attacks targeting unspecified “vital target[s]” in northern Israel[98]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in southern Israel[99]

IDF 210th Division soldiers stationed in the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights have criticized the IDF for providing inadequate protection against Iranian-backed Iraqi militia drone attacks.[100] An unspecified IDF soldier told Israeli media that 210th Division soldiers stationed in the Golan Heights spent “long hours” in shelters almost every night over the past week because “the ability to intercept threats is low.”[101] An unspecified Israeli military source said that the IDF General Staff is aware of “gaps in protection in the area.”[102] These comments come amid an uptick in Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting Israel since September 2024.[103] They also follow an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia drone attack that killed two IDF Golani Brigade soldiers in the Golan Heights on October 3.[104]

Saudi media reported on October 9 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have begun evacuating their headquarters in Baghdad in anticipation of an Israeli attack, citing unspecified sources.[105] Iraqi officials and media have speculated in recent days that Israel could strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in response to recent militia attacks targeting Israel.[106]

Iraq and Russia are continuing to expand bilateral cooperation. Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council President Faiq Zaidan visited the Russian Supreme Court and met with Russian First Deputy Chief Justice Pyotr Serkov in Moscow on October 9.[107] Iraqi Media and Communications Commission Chairman Ali al Moayyad separately met with Russian Ambassador to Iraq Elbrus Kutrashev in Baghdad on October 9 to strengthen media cooperation and efforts to combat “false and misleading news.”[108] Moayyad and Kutrashev discussed joint investment opportunities in the fields of digital media and advanced broadcasting and communications technology.[109] Kutrashev has held a series of meetings with Iraqi officials, including senior security officials, since late January 2024.[110]

The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) site in Damascus on October 8.[111] The strike reportedly targeted a building that is 500 meters from the Iranian embassy in Damascus.[112] Israeli media reported that the IRGC and Hezbollah frequently use the building.[113] Israeli media also reported that the airstrike targeted a member of Hezbollah’s 4400 Unit, which is responsible for transferring weapons from Iran and the rest of the Axis of Resistance to Hezbollah.[114]

The IDF separately conducted an airstrike targeting a Syrian Arab Army (SAA) position in Quneitra in southern Syria on October 9, killing an SAA member and injuring another.[115] The IDF has conducted several airstrikes in Syria in the recent days as a part of Israeli efforts to prevent weapons transfers to Hezbollah.[116]

Iranian-backed militants conducted a rocket attack targeting US forces at Conoco Mission Support Site in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria, on October 9.[117] US air defenses intercepted projectiles, and no injuries were reported.[118] Local Syrian sources reported that US forces returned fire targeting rocket launch sites in Syrian-regime held territories in Deir ez Zor Province.[119]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi traveled to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, for an official visit on October 9[120] Araghchi met with his Saudi counterpart, Faisal bin Farhan, and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, to discuss efforts to “support the people of Palestine and Lebanon” and send humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip and Lebanon.[121] Araghchi may have discussed Iranian-backed efforts to reach a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon. Araghchi may have also warned Saudi Arabia against allowing Israel to use its airspace to attack Iran. An unspecified Iranian official told Reuters on October 9 that Iran has warned Gulf countries that “Tehran will respond accordingly” if they allow Israel to use their airspace or military bases to attack Iran.[122] Araghchi next traveled to Qatar after concluding his one-day visit to Saudi Arabia.[123]

The Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee held a meeting on October 6 to discuss “the level of preparedness of [regime] institutions against threats.”[124] Representatives from the Armed Forces General Staff, IRGC, Artesh, Law Enforcement Command, Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and the defense, foreign affairs, intelligence, and interior ministries attended the meeting.[125] The attendees discussed protecting “sensitive and vital” sites, increasing readiness to “deal with any enemy attack,” providing “psychological security” to the Iranian people, and “predicting worst-case scenarios.”[126] This meeting followed the Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 1 and reports that Israel is planning a “significant retaliation” against Iran.[127]

[1] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/09/biden-netanyahu-call-israel-attack-iran

[2] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/09/biden-netanyahu-call-israel-attack-iran

[3] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/09/biden-netanyahu-call-israel-attack-iran;

https://www.axios.com/2024/10/04/biden-opposition-israeli-strikes-iran-oil-facilities

[4] https://x.com/kann_news/status/1844057279961743690;

www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/gallant-when-israel-strikes-back-iran-wont-understand-what-happened-to-it

[5] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/09/biden-netanyahu-call-israel-iran-attack

[6] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/10/08/gallant-austin-israel-iran-netanyahu-biden/

[7] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/10/08/gallant-austin-israel-iran-netanyahu-biden/

[8] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1843539259598553140

[9] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15318

[10] https://x.com/israelradar_com/status/1842559548646670685?s=46&t=TMbDQtRFur-HDVAEVR7Byg

[11] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15318

[12] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15318 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1843921818283061530 ; www dot idf.il/238571

[13] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15277

[14] https://www.didbaniran dot ir/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-3/202763-%D9%86%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%BA%DB%8C%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%AF%DA%A9%D8%AA%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%86%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AF%DA%A9%D8%AA%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%AF%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%87%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%AD%DA%A9%D9%85-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%BA%DB%8C%DB%8C%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D9%86%D8%AF

[15] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/808149/

[16] khabaronline dot ir/news/1904966 ; https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/1905274 ; https://www.britannica.com/event/Iranian-presidential-election-of-2024

[17] https://www.didbaniran dot ir/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-3/202763-%D9%86%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%BA%DB%8C%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%AF%DA%A9%D8%AA%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%86%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AF%DA%A9%D8%AA%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%AF%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%87%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%AD%DA%A9%D9%85-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%BA%DB%8C%DB%8C%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D9%86%D8%AF

[18] https://www.aljazeera dot com/features/2024/8/21/khameneis-calculus-ran-supreme-leader-faces-a-bitter-choice-re-israel ; https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2023/jun/12/supreme-leader-nuclear-weapons-diplomacy

[19] https://www.tabnak dot ir/fa/news/1264427

[20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-6-2024

[21] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/putins-merchant-of-death-is-back-in-the-arms-business-this-time-selling-to-the-houthis-10b7f521

[22] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/putins-merchant-of-death-is-back-in-the-arms-business-this-time-selling-to-the-houthis-10b7f521

[23] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/putins-merchant-of-death-is-back-in-the-arms-business-this-time-selling-to-the-houthis-10b7f521

[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2024;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2024

[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2024

[26] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-fatah-leaders-hold-palestinian-unity-talks-cairo-2024-10-09/

[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-23-2024

[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-23-2024

[29] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-fatah-leaders-hold-palestinian-unity-talks-cairo-2024-10-09/

[30] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-fatah-leaders-hold-palestinian-unity-talks-cairo-2024-10-09/

[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-5-2024

[32] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1843921825358852381

[33] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1843921822372528591

[34] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-7-2024

[35] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1843921822372528591

[36] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7663

[37] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1842092426074132678 ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1832737575565398358

[38] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1843963477922136118

[39] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1843963477922136118

[40] https://t.me/hamza20300/299683 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/299871

[41] https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/20062/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84-368-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%BA%D9%84 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7658 ; https://t.me/abualiajel/428

[42] https://t.me/sarayaps/18655 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1843998291123716576

[43] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1843682616312246625

[44] https://t.me/spokesman_elaqsa/30 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/15303

[45] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/09/israel-lebanon-hezbollah-war-news-gaza/#link-SXEDFJNXHVHXTKRNECMGYHTXPY ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/15303

[46] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15304

[47] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/police-say-officers-kill-5-wanted-palestinian-suspects-during-operation-in-nablus/

[48] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7664

[49] https://x.com/kann_news/status/1844033294402506985

[50] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/police-say-officers-kill-5-wanted-palestinian-suspects-during-operation-in-nablus/

[51] https://t.me/sarayatubaas/399 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7655 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7656

[52] https://t.me/sarayatubaas/399 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7654

[53] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7652

[54] https://t.me/dahieh4all/41268

[55] https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-missile-attack-middle-east-10-02-24-intl-hnk#cm1rsa7ns001c3b6oefa8up2y ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1840981159968198785 ;

[56] www dot idf.il/238571 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate100824

[57] www dot idf.il/238571

[58] www dot idf.il/238571 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1843938534844940313

[59] www dot idf.il/238571 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1843938534844940313

[60] https://t.me/mmirleb/7717 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7722 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7720

[61] https://t.me/alichoeib1970/10862

[62] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15318

[63] ww dot idf.il/238633

[64] ww dot idf.il/238633

[65] www dot idf.il/238827

[66] https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2024/10/08/satellite-images-show-israeli-military-presence-near-un-base-in-lebanon/ ; https://x.com/orfialkov/status/1843398248188273054

[67] https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/unifil-statement-6-october-2024 ; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1k7gkd0r3zo

[68] www dot idf.il/238827

[69] https://t.me/alichoeib1970/10862

[70] www dot idf.il/238571 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1843938534844940313

[71] https://t.me/mmirleb/7721 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7718

[72] https://t.me/mmirleb/7730

[73] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1843539259598553140

[74] https://t.me/mmirleb/7714; https://t.me/mmirleb/7715; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1843877624332071118; https://t.me/moriahdoron/15306; https://t.me/mmirleb/7723; https://t.me/mmirleb/7725;

https://t.me/mmirleb/7726; https://t.me/mmirleb/7727; https://t.me/mmirleb/7728; https://t.me/mmirleb/7731; https://t.me/mmirleb/7734; https://t.me/mmirleb/7735; https://t.me/mmirleb/7737; https://t.me/mmirleb/7736; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1844040768773816527

[75] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1844024735862329737

[76] https://t.me/mmirleb/7734; https://t.me/mmirleb/7735; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/112904

[77] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1843963479868272776; https://t.me/moriahdoron/15307

[78] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1843963479868272776

[79] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1843966936641667561

[80] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-8-2024

[81] https://t.me/mmirleb/7725

[82] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1843980437989085524 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/15313

[83] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1844024735862329737

[84] https://t.me/mmirleb/7714; https://t.me/mmirleb/7715; https://t.me/mmirleb/7727; https://t.me/mmirleb/7728

[85] https://t.me/mmirleb/7742

[86] https://t.me/mmirleb/7742

[87] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-18-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-9-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-24-2024

[88] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-27-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-2-2024;

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-4-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-5-2024

[89] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1843972108063580510; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1844024735862329737

[90] www dot idf.il/238797

[91] www dot idf.il/238797

[92] www dot idf.il/238797

[93] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1843972099817513061

[94] https://x.com/IDF/status/1843962840337834381

[95] https://x.com/IDF/status/1843962840337834381

[96] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1843707381714170260/photo/1

[97] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1323 ;

https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1325

[98] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1317 ;

https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1321

[99] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1319

[100] https://news.walla.co dot il/item/3696488

[101] https://news.walla.co dot il/item/3696488

[102] https://news.walla.co dot il/item/3696488

[103] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-26-2024

[104] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/2-idf-soldiers-killed-24-wounded-in-iraq-drone-attack-on-golan-heights-base/

[105] https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/iraq/2024/10/09/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A3-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A ;

https://www.alhadath dot net/iraq/2024/10/09/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A3-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A

[106] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/security/502003/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82 ;

https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%91-%D9%82%D9%88%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A3%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%B6%D8%AF%D9%91%D9%87-%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9

[107] https://ina dot iq/eng/35412-chief-justice-zaidan-visits-the-russian-supreme-court.html

[108] https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=203351

[109] https://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=203351

[110] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-20-2024 ;

https://www.iswresearch.org/2024/06/iran-update-june-25-2024.html

[111] https://x.com/nourabohsn/status/1843734441484795928 ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/israeli-strike-in-syria-said-to-target-top-hezbollah-official-in-arms-smuggling-unit/

[112] https://x.com/nourabohsn/status/1843713010650755504

[113] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-823800#google_vignette

[114] https://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-strike-in-syria-said-to-target-top-hezbollah-official-in-arms-smuggling-unit/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-1-2024

[115] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1843941536121364687 ; https://x.com/SAMSyria0/status/1843959352111309037

[116] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-1-2024

[117] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1843741978682446018 ; https://euphratespost dot net/%d8%b6%d8%b1%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%b5%d8%a7%d8%b1%d9%88%d8%ae%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%aa%d9%8f%d8%af%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%87%d8%af%d8%a7%d9%81%d8%a7%d9%8b-%d9%82%d8%b1%d8%a8-%d9%85%d8%b7%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d8%af/

[118] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AE%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%84-%D9%83%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B0%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%B0%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9

[119] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AE%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%84-%D9%83%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B0%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%B0%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9 ; https://npasyria dot com/en/117434/

[120] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6252134 ;

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-foreign-minister-visit-saudi-arabia-regional-countries-2024-10-08/

[121] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/07/18/3174790 ;

https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/193302

[122] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gulf-states-must-not-let-airspace-be-used-against-iran-iranian-official-says-2024-10-08/

[123] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/222701/Iran-FM-Araghchi-goes-to-Qatar-after-Saudi-visit

[124] https://www.mashreghnews dot ir/news/1649899

[125] https://www.mashreghnews dot ir/news/1649899 ;

https://x.com/SaeedAzimi1772/status/1842960140821283150

[126] https://www.mashreghnews dot ir/news/1649899

[127] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/02/iran-israel-missile-attacks-response