Hubris: The Tragedy of War in the Twentieth Century.

The ancient Greeks defined hubris as the worst sin a leader, or nation, could commit. It was the attitude of supreme arrogance in which mortals in their folly would set themselves up against the gods. Its consequences were invariably severe. The Greeks also had a word for what usually followed hubris. That was called peripeteia, meaning a dramatic reversal offortune. In practice, it signified a falling from the grace of great height to unimaginable depth. (1)

I. Introduction

Sir Alistair Horne has written more than twenty books, largely on European history, particularly focused on 19th and 20th century France. (2) His book The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916 received the Hawthornden Prize (3). Subsequently, his book A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 received the Wolfson Prize. (4) His reputation as an historian makes him particularly qualified to engage in this current endeavor, though he acknowledges he has not previously written much about the Pacific and Japan. (5)

It is unsurprising Horne would reminisce on his long career, and new ideas would emerge:

   Having written, over the course of fifty-odd years, numerous books
   and articles on warfare in its various shapes, I sat down some time
   ago to reflect on what might be its common features that stand out
   over the ages. One that emerged preeminently was hubris: wars have
   generally been won or lost through excessive hubris on one side or
   the other. (6)

Horne's reflection created the genesis for this book as he "focused on those conflicts that affected future history powerfully in ways that transcended the actual war in which the conflict was set" and limited himself to the first half of the twentieth century. (7) However, he deliberately left out WWI. (8) This book examines six battles chosen based on their links to one another and to those of the combatants. (9) Aside from the failure of the combatants to learn from their predecessors' mistakes, a common thread is the racist distortions the hubristic entities have toward their foes. (10) Horne contends these actions lead to their peripeteia. (11)

Hubris is not easy to avoid as it arises out of success, and a triumphant victory makes anything seem possible. (12) Horne's goal is to show this is the moment when many calamitous decisions are made. (13) Due to its ubiquitous nature, it is critical that leaders and subordinates are able to recognize hubris because it is "one of the great renewable resources." (14) Aside from the pervasiveness of hubris, we must remain cognizant of the fact that military minds have repeatedly failed to learn from their predecessors' mistakes in war. (15) Since "only the dead have seen the end of war" (16) it is of paramount importance we learn from these mistakes as "those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." (17) Our branch is uniquely positioned to advise commanders, and learning from past mistakes makes us better stewards of our duties. While a commander "can" take some action, the analysis should not end there. We must remain vigilant students of history and astute to the intoxicating effect of hubris to provide counsel on whether they "should" take an action.

Though this is a thorough and engaging text, Horne's central premise of "hubris" remains unproven. The tragedy is that the book contains ample support for a possible premise of "intelligence" that Horne presented throughout, but unfortunately almost as an afterthought.

II. Hubris and Racial Distortions

This is a well-written book, which all DOD personnel should read. Any history fan will find it alluring. In spite of this high praise, it is not without issues. Namely, Horne failed to prove his thesis that "wars have generally been won or lost through excessive hubris ...." (18) He provides no overarching historical analysis to prove that fifty-one percent of the time his thesis is true. An attempt at such a feat would likely be impossible and result in a voluminous tome. Even when limiting his thesis to the battles in this book, Horne continually provides ample evidence highlighting outcomes resulting from intelligence, not hubris. Further, relying on hubris alone ignores geo-political (19) and economic (20) issues that contribute to war. Once the battles begin, relying on hubris alone ignores how technological differences (21) and the abilities of commanders affect those outcomes. It also ignores willpower, which may "count for more than foreknowledge." (22) Although Horne discusses intelligence, technology, command experience, and willpower, he does not address them in relation to his thesis. Thus, his theory would contend a military armed with sticks and longboats could defeat one with ironclads, assuming the latter was hubristic. Even individuals who lack historical perspective, but have common sense, would consider this foolish. Horne fails to qualify his theory with an "all things being equal" statement wherein the tipping factor is hubris. This would lend credence to his claim, as it is logical. His failure to do so leaves an unverifiable, if not patently wrong, theory.

Many entities positively reviewed this book. (23) These reviews generally focused on Horne's writing abilities or the historical takeaways. However, Max Boot's review in the New York Times is less than favorable. (24) Boot praises Horne as a "skilled writer" and concedes the book "makes for good reading," but is highly critical of the underlying theory. (25) Boot's qualms have some merit. He asserts Horne's theory is incorrect because skill or will are generally the deciding factors in war. (26) Ultimately, while the facts do not prove Horne's theory, they also fail to support Boot's contention. Specifically, the outcomes of the battles included in this book resulted from the quality of intelligence, not solely on skill or will. Further, they actually show the more "skilled" combatants regularly suffered defeat. (27) This correlation is what Horne asserts shows the impact of hubris on the battles. Thus, at least in these examples, skill is not the deciding factor.

Boot critiques Horne's failure to include other historical examples outside the stated parameters of the book. (28) However, Horne definitively states in the first three pages "I chose to limit myself to the first half of the twentieth century" and "[d]eliberately, the First World War is left out." (29) The reader is fully aware that Horne will not discuss any of the examples Boot mentions. Though the book failed to prove its theory, it does successfully show instances of hubris. When present, hubris appears to take one of three forms. The first is hubris of the nation, which was evident with Japan and France. The second is hubris of individuals, epitomized by Adolph Hitler and General Douglas MacArthur. Finally, Germany was a combination of the two.

Horne contends racist distortions are a telltale sign of hubris. (31) These assertions are a thread in his selections and are supported by fact. (32) The book is full of examples of racist undertones present in the various conquests. The Russians held contempt for the Japanese. (33) The Germans, following Hitler's doctrine for a war of extermination against Untermenschen (subhumans), provided no quarter to Russian soldiers or civilians in their push toward Moscow. (34) Similarly, Horne gives many examples of war crimes committed by the Japanese against the Chinese, based on a belief that they were "lesser." (35) In the United States following Pearl Harbor, the language of a "lesser" Japanese was widely prevalent. (36) This distortion of Asiatic people continued when Koreans were called "gooks." (37) Finally, France discounted the Vietnamese on a belief of European racial superiority over the Asiatic at Dien Bien Phu. (38)

There are two groups of racial distorters. The first is comprised of countries who discount their foes based on distortions; Russia, France, and the United States are in this category. (39) The second harbors feelings that the "lesser" nature of their opponents allows them to be massacred with no reverence to the law of armed conflict; German actions towards Russians and Japanese actions toward Chinese fall in this category. (40) Regardless of the group, Horne does an excellent job of providing historical facts to prove the view of racial distortions among them. Ultimately, it is impossible to deny the existence of this mindset in the various nations; however, the impact of the mindsets on the outcome of battle is more difficult to quantify. To that end, Horne provides many examples of how the mindset resulted in less preparation, over-reliance on sheer numbers, and a belief in one's superior technological advantage over the "lesser." While not necessarily true throughout all of history, there is sufficient evidence to support his sub-theory of racist distortion and its interplay with underperformance in combat by the entities holding those views for the six battles in this book.

III. The Role of Intelligence in the Outcomes

Hubris is as nebulous as the sky over the Pacific during the Battle of Midway; the inability to quantify hubris makes it impossible to prove empirically. It is surprising Horne relied solely on a thesis linked entirely to hubris, while ignoring the impact of intelligence, which he repeatedly referenced. He provided ample examples of intelligence in these battles upon which he could have tied a compelling analysis. It is not a great leap to say superior intelligence led, or at least contributed, to hubristic thought. Instead, examples hang as loose threads throughout the book and, rather than strongly combining, they cause the thesis to unravel. (41) His inclusion of substantial discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of intelligence leads one to theorize that intelligence is the most important factor in the outcome of these battles, not hubris. Every nation in this book that had an advantage in the area of intelligence emerged victorious. This is consistent with Sun Tzu's teachings. (42)

During the Russo-Japanese war, Horne says Japan had a "distinct advantage" over the Russians regarding intelligence and spying. (43) Specifically, the Japanese had a well-placed and informed network inside Russia, which paid dividends on both the land and sea. 44 Of critical importance, the network provided intelligence on the Russian fleet's movement. (45)

By the battle of Nomonhan, and continuing through WWII, the Japanese lost their intelligence advantage over the Russians. The Russians had Dr. Richard Sorge located in Tokyo, who provided them with a huge intelligence advantage. (46) Beyond an increase in the effectiveness of Russian intelligence, the Japanese had poor intelligence. (47) Sorge's expertise afforded insight on the limitations of Japan's objectives, which allowed the Russians to adjust troop concentrations. (48) Their advantage in intelligence extended throughout the Battle of Moscow. Based on Sorge's intelligence, Russia was able to take soldiers from the Japanese front and move them to Moscow as reinforcements. (49) This may have been the turning point. In fact, Horne credits Sorge for his leading role in Hitler's defeat at Moscow. (50)

Horne also discusses intelligence's role during Midway, the Korean War, and Dien Bien Phu. During Midway, Nimitz had a huge advantage in intelligence based largely on the cracking of the Japanese naval code. (51) This may be the reason for the United States' victory. (52) However, the Korean War highlighted lapses in our intelligence. Horne says "US intelligence had been caught asleep at the wheel" when over 250,000 Chinese Soldiers crossed the Yalu River. (53) Their participation in combat likely turned the war. Likewise, errors by French intelligence during Dien Bien Phu appear to have contributed to their defeat. Specifically, the French estimated "Giap's primitive supply system over tortuous jungle trails would be incapable of provisioning any force ... with more than twenty-five thousand shells for its guns." (54) They ultimately moved two hundred guns and shells without French knowledge. (55) At the ensuing artillery battle, the French were soundly defeated.

The facts establish intelligence as the deciding factor in the battles, not hubris. At a minimum, it is a contributing factor that warranted addressing within his thesis.

IV. Conclusion.

This is an incredibly well written book by a true scholar; Horne deserves praise for addressing new areas of history. Although he has not written much previously on Japan and the Pacific, he does an artful job of laying out the history of the rise of Japan from self-imposed isolation to it acquiring an empire in the shortest time in history. (56) The entire book is composed with the skill and aplomb expected of an historian of his caliber. His theory that "wars have generally been won or lost through excessive hubris on one side or the other" (57) is an intriguing concept. However, it lacks the required evidence to prove it as fact. That said, the lessons therein can be used to provide sage counsel to commanders during the military decision making process. (58) Further, it serves as a reminder that even great military minds failed to learn from history. (59) Therefore, while it fails to support its theory, it succeeds as a must-read book for military personnel across all ranks and branches.

Major John E. Swords *

* Judge Advocate, U.S. Army. Student, 65th Judge Advocate Officer Graduate Course, The Judge Advocate Gen.'s Legal Ctr. & Sch., U.S. Army, Charlottesville, VA.

(1) ALISTAIR HORNE, HUBRIS: THE TRAGEDY OF WAR IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2015).

(2) PENGUIN RANDOM HOUSE, https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/authors /13517/alistair-horne (last visited July 31, 2017).

(3) See generally The Hawthornden Prize, THE GLASGOW HERALD, June 1, 1961, at 23. (The Hawthornden Prize is one of Britain's leading literary awards, and is awarded for a work of imaginative literature by an author under 41 years of age that was published in the year before the award. It is limited to British authors.)

(4) See generally THE WOLFSON FOUNDATION, https://www.woolfson.org. uk/history-prize/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2016). (The Wolfson History Prizes are awarded annually for works produced in the UK to promote and encourage standards of excellence in the writing of history for the general public.)

(5) HORNE, supra note 1, at 4.

(6) Id.

(7) Id. at 1.

(8) Id. at 3. Horne believes "[t]he whole war began, and was caused by, various sublime practitioners of hubris in conflict with one another. Further, it would be difficult to identify any one battle that held calamitous consequences for the future. The whole war did that."

(9) Id. at 5.

(10) Id. at 5.

(11) Id. at 1.

(12) Id. at 6.

(13) Id. at 6.

(14) P.J. O'ROURKE, www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/p/pjorour447363. (last visited July 31, 2017).

(15) Horne, supra note 1, at 5.

(16) GEORGE SANTAYANA, SOLILOQUIES IN ENGLAND AND LATER SOLILOQUIES, 102 (1922).

(17) GEORGE SANTAYANA, REASON IN COMMON SENSE, 284 (1905).

(18) HORNE, supra note 1, at 1.

(19) See generally christopher clark, the sleepwalkers: how europe went to war in 1914, 402-03 (2013), (discussing how the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand ultimately led to WWI).

(20) See generally the TREATY OF VERSAILLES, www.history.com/topics/ world-war-i/treaty-of-versailles. (last visited July 31, 2017). (discussing how economic conditions in Germany following the Treaty led to Adolph Hitler's rise and WWII).

(21) HORNE, supra note 1, at 23 and 27. Japan had British-made ships in 1904, regarded as the best in the world. According to Horne: "Japan's total fleet ... were superior in quality and speed to their Russian counterparts."

(22) JOHN KEEGAN, INTELLIGENCE AND WAR: KNOWLEDGE OF THE ENEMY FROM NAPOLEON TO AL-QAEDA, 25 (2003).

(23) Richard Overy, Hubris: The Tragedy of War in the Twentieth Century by AlistairHorne, review: 'cautionary tales', THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.telegraph. co.uk/books/what-to-read/hubri s-the-tragedy of-war-in-the-twentieth-century-alistair-horne-review/; Nick Romeo, 'Hubris: The Tragedy of War in the Twentieth Century,' by Alistair Horne, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 8, 2015), www.bostonglobe.com/arts/books /2015/12/08/book-review-hubris-the-tragedy-war-twentieth-century-alistair -horne/JFCITLLMJ6gfpf UbGx8HgL/story.html.; Leon H. Wolf, Book

Review: Hubris by Alistair Horne, redstate (Nov. 21, 2015,), www.redstate.com/leon_h_wolf/2015/ 11/21/book-review-hubris-alistair-horne/.

(24) Max Boot, 'Hubris: The Tragedy of War in the Twentieth Century', by Alistair Horne, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/ books/review/hubris-the-tragedy-of-war-in-the-twentieth-century-byalistair-horne.html.

(25) Id.

(26) Id. Boot asserts, "[a]ren't a lot of wars won or lost simply because one side has superior skill or will--not necessarily because the other side is guilty of 'supreme arrogance'?"

(27) See horne, supra note 1. Russia was universally thought to be more skilled than the Japanese prior to Port Arthur. The Germans with blitzkrieg warfare were believed to be more skilled than the Russians. The Japanese were regarded as superior in the sea to the United States. The United States was believed to be far superior to the North Korean army, particularly after WWII. The French were regarded as far superior to the Vietnamese.

(28) Boot, supra note 27. Boot critiques Horne for not including other examples like WWI, Napoleon invading Russia in 1812, and Robert E. Lee's invasion of the Union culminating in the battle of Gettysburg in 1863.

(29) HORNE, supra note 1, at 1 and 3.

(30) Id. at 195. Horne does discuss Napoleon and Hitler's failure to learn from his mistakes.

(31) Id. at 344.

(32) Id. at 5. "A thread running all the way through my selection is a kind of racist distortion whereby one power persists in writing off its foes because of the color of their skin or the slant of their eyes, or the supposed backwardness of their culture."

(33) Id. at 38, 14, and 12. They were called "little yellow monkeys" and the Tsar dismissed them as "little yellow men from whom Europeans have nothing to fear," likely because they were one of "Kipling's lesser breeds."

(34) Id. at 210.

(35) Id. at 144. The biggest, and most atrocious, example is the Nanking Massacre where the Japanese slaughtered an estimated 250,000-300,000 Chinese men, women, and children.

(36) Id. at 243-44. They were looked at as "subhuman and repulsive," and even the Smithsonian Institution was not immune from such racist distortions by claiming, "Japanese skulls are 2000 years less developed than ours."

(37) Id. at 283.

(38) Id. at 316.

(39) See HORNE, supra note 1. As evidenced by Russia's unwillingness to view Japan as a threat before the attack on Port Arthur in spite of the the Sino-Japanese War; the United States' inability to take the Japanese or North Korean threats seriously before Pearl Harbor and the Korean War; and the French dismissal of the Vietnamese.

(40) Id. at 110, 144.

(41) See generally WEEZER, Undone--The Sweater Song, on WEEZER (Geffen Records 1994).

(42) SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 144 (1963). "Now the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy wherever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge."

(43) HORNE, supra note 1, at 40.

(44) Id.

(45) Id.

(46) Id. at 147.

(47) Id. at 152.

(48) Id. at 155.

(49) Id. at 227.

(50) Id. at 147.

(51) Id. at 256.

(52) R. EARNEST DUPUY AND TREVOR N. DUPUY, THE HARPER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILITARY HISTORY FROM 3500 B.C. TO THE PRESENT, 1255-1256 (1993). "Midway was one of the decisive battles of history. The loss of her fleet carrier force deprived Japan of the initiative; henceforward she was on the defensive.... Two basic factors led to the result; first and foremost, the American knowledge of the Japanese secret codes, which presented Nimitz with an accurate picture of Japanese intentions and dispositions."

(53) Horne, supra note 1, at 282 and 297. One specific example was the failure of aerial reconnaissance to see 250,000 Soldiers from the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (PVA) cross the Yalu River.

(54) Id. at 324.

(55) Id. at 326.

(56) Id. at 16-17, 246.

(57) Id. at 4.

(58) U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, DOCTRINE PUB. 5-0, THE OPERATIONS PROCESS (May 2012).

(59) See generally horne, supra note 1, at 343. The United States failed to learn from the Japanese attack on Port Arthur, or from France in Vietnam. Hitler failed to learn from Napoleon's errors in trying to take Moscow. MacArthur failed to learn from Hitler's error in expecting a quick war.

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Author:	Swords, John E.
Publication:	Army Lawyer
Article Type:	Book review
Date:	Aug 1, 2017
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