Simultaneous Elections Report 2024

14 March 2024
Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS
S. No Chapters Page No.

1. Acknowledgements i-iii
2. Abbreviations iv
3. List of Tables and Figures v-viii
4. Executive Summary 1-8
5. Chapter-1: Introduction 9-24
6. Chapter-2: Constitution of High-Level Committee and
Meetings
25-43
7. Chapter-3: Consultation Process 44-116
8. Chapter-4: Benchmarking Best International Practices 117-122
9. Chapter-5: Simultaneous Elections in Local Bodies 123-134
10. Chapter-6: Challenges, Issues and Complexities 135-142
11. Chapter-7: Rationale of Simultaneous Elections 143-158
12. Chapter-8: Economic and Social Implications of
Simultaneous Elections
159-236
13. Chapter-9: Scheme for Implementing Simultaneous
Elections
237-258
14. Chapter-10: Constitutional and Legal Framework for
Simultaneous Elections
259-274
15. Chapter-11: Recommendations and Conclusion 275-281
HLC REPORT
Table of Contents
ANNEXURES
1. REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEES/COMMISSIONS & OTHER
BODIES
Page No.(s)
i. Indian Franchise Committee Report, 1932 2-626
ii. General Election, 1957 Report 627-807
iii. General Election, 1962 Report 808-1302
iv. Election Commission of India First Annual Report, 1983 1303-1454
v. 170th Report of Law Commission of India, 1999 1455-1558
vi. Report of National Commission to Review the Working of the
Constitution (NCRWC), 2002 1559-1590
th
vii. 255 Law Commission Report, 2015 1591-1859
th
viii. 79 Report of Parliamentary Standing Committee, 2015 1860-1900
ix. Working Paper of NITI Aayog, 2017 1901-1936
x. Law Commission of India Draft Report, 2018 1937-2107
xi. Atlas by Election Commission of India, 2019 2108-2215
2. CONSULTATIONS AND RESPONSES
Page No.(s)
i. Invitations and Public Notice 2216-2388
ii. Political Parties 2390-2575
iii. Experts 2576-2786
iv. Important Emails 2787-2949
v. Postal Feedback 2951-3411
vi. State Election Commissions 3412-3551
vii. Election Commission of India 3552-3573
viii. Input of Hon’ble Justice Dipak Misra, 3574-3609
Former Chief Justice of India
ix. Input of Hon’ble Justice Hemant Gupta, IIAC Chairperson 3610-3617
x. Press Information Bureau 3618-3654
3. CONSTITUTION OF INDIA AND OTHER RELEVANT LAWS
Page No.(s)
i. Constitution of India 3656-4059
ii. Representation of People Act, 1950 4060-4084
iii. Representation of People Act, 1951 4085-4150
iv. Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business
in Lok Sabha 4151-4414
v. Republic Act No. 7056 (Philippines) 4415-4420
vi. Parliamentary Debates 4421-4459
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Table of Contents
4. IMPORTANT JUDGMENTS
Page No.(s)
i. In re, Berubari Union (I) (AIR 1960 SC 845) 4460-4484
ii. State of West Bengal v. Union of India 4486-4544
(1964 SCR (1) 371)
iii. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala 4545-5551
(1973 4 SCC 225)
iv. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain 5552-5880
(AIR 1975 SC 2299)
v. State of Karnataka v. Union of India 5881-6041
(1978 SCR (2) 1)
vi. Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (AIR 1993 SC 412) 6042-6127
vii. S.R Bommai and Ors v. Union of India 6128-6484
(1994 AIR 1918)
viii. H.S Jain v. Union of India ((1997) 1 UPLBEC 594) 6485-6573
ix. Jindal Stainless Steel v. State of Haryana 6574-7354
(2003 Supp (4) SCR 154)
x. Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India (AIR 2006 SC 3127) 7355-7478
xi. M Nagraj v. Union of India (AIR 2007 SC 71) 7480-7524
xii. S. Subramaniam Balaji v. Govt of Tamil Nadu
((2013) 9 SCC 659) 7525-7607
xiii. PUCL v. Union of India ((2013) 10 SCC 1) 7608-7658
xiv. Union of India v. Sri Harharan @ Murugan
((2014) 4 SCC 242) 7659-7922
xv. Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association
and another v. UOI ((2016) 5 SCC 1) 7923-8964
xvi. Rajendra N Shah v. Union of India
(2021 SCCOnline SC 474) 8965-9097
xvii. Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. The Chief Minister
And Ors. (AIRONLINE 2021 SC 240) 9098-9202
5. PANCHAYAT AND MUNICIPAL LAWS
Page No.(s)
(i) Andaman & Nicobar Islands 9203-9545
(ii) Andhra Pradesh 9546-9712
(iii) Arunachal Pradesh 9713-9901
(iv) Assam 9902-10109
(v) Bihar 10110-10442
(vi) Chhattisgarh 10443-10621
(vii) Daman & Diu; Dadra & Nagar Haveli 10622-10799
(viii) Goa 10800-11108
(ix) Gujarat 11109-11402
(x) Haryana 11403-11725
(xi) Himachal Pradesh 11726-12010
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Table of Contents
(xii) Jammu & Kashmir 12011-12278

(xiii) Ladakh 12279-12299
(xiv) Jharkhand 12300-12755
(xv) Karnataka 12756-13248
(xvi) Kerala 13249-13444
(xvii) Lakshadweep 13445-13472
(xviii) Madhya Pradesh 13473-13722
(xix) Maharashtra 13723-14167
(xx) Manipur 14168-14301
(xxi) Odisha 14302-14593
(xxii) Puducherry 14594-15135
(xxiii) Punjab 15136-15374
(xxiv) Rajasthan 15375-15627
(xxv) Sikkim 15628-15895
(xxvi) Tamil Nadu 15896-16465
(xxvii) Telangana 16466-17009
(xxviii) Tripura 17010-17255
(xxix) Uttarakhand 17256-17431
(xxx) Uttar Pradesh 17432-17891
(xxxi) West Bengal 17892-18345
VOLUME WISE: CONTENT DETAILS

VOLUME NO. DETAILS OF CONTENTS
Volume 1-3 Reports of the Committees/Commissions &
other Bodies
Volume 4 & 5 Consultations and Responses
Volume 6 Constitution of India and other relevant
Laws
Volume 7-11 Important Judgments
Volume 12-21 Panchayat and Municipal Laws
HLC REPORT
Acknowledgements
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Making a report on a subject, which impacts We are happy to highlight specially the names
life of every citizen and on which opinions are of the following for their special contributions:-
strongly expressed on either side, is like a tight
rope walk and an onerous task. For proper I) Experts
appreciation of the diverse opinion on the The Committee owes special thanks to the
subject, it was important to capture the following experts:
viewpoints of all stakeholders, irrespective of Hon’ble Justice Dipak Misra, Hon’ble Justice
their personal views. The Committee had the Ranjan Gogoi, Hon’ble Justice S. A. Bobde,
privilege of meeting and interacting with Hon’ble Justice U. U. Lalit, Former Chief
leaders of several political parties, representing Justices of India; Hon’ble Justice Hemant
different spectrums from across the country. Gupta, Former Judge, Supreme Court of India;
All of them presented their considered views on Hon’ble Justice Ajit Prakash Shah, Hon’ble
the subject which benefitted and enriched the Justice Gorla Rohini, Hon’ble Justice Rajendra
Committee in making this Report. The Menon, Hon’ble Justice Dhirubhai Naranbhai
Committee sincerely acknowledges their Patel, Former Chief Justices of Delhi High
contribution. Court; Hon’ble Justice Pradeep Nandrajog,
In any functional and living democracy, the Hon’ble Justice Ramesh Deokinandan
citizen is the final arbiter. The Committee Dhanuka, Former Chief Justices of Bombay
therefore solicited views of the citizens living High Court; Hon’ble Justice Sanjib Banerjee,
in the entire geographical expanse of this vast Hon’ble Justice Munishwar Nath Bhandari,
country, to ensure that every voice counts. We Former Chief Justices of Madras High Court;
acknowledge the contribution of those who Hon’ble Justice Prakash Shrivastava, Hon’ble
expressed their views on the subject. Justice G.C. Gupta, Former Chief Justices of
As mandated in its Terms of Reference (TOR), Calcutta High Court; Hon’ble Justice Dilip
the Committee had to refer to constitutional Babasaheb Bhosale, Hon’ble Justice Sanjay
provisions, laws relating to elections, several Yadav, Former Chief Justices of Allahabad
expert committee reports, several judicial High Court; Hon’ble Justice Ritu Raj Awasthi,
pronouncements, international precedence, Chairman,Law Commission of India; Shri R
among other documents of relevance in the Venkatramani, Attorney General of India, Shri
course of making of this Report. This Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India; Shri
necessitated consultation and having expert A. K Joti, Shri O. P. Rawat, Shri Sunil Arora,
opinion from subject matter experts, authorities Shri Sushil Chandra, Former Chief Election
on Constitution, legal luminaries, former Commissioners; Shri Sanjay Prasad, State
judges of Supreme and High courts, former Election Commissioner Gujarat; Shri B.
Election Commissioners, economists et al. The Basavaraaju, State Election Commissioner
Committee would like to particularly thank all Karnataka; Shri U.P.S. Madan, State Election
the former Chief Justices of India, Chief Commissioner Maharashtra; Shri V.
Justices of various High Courts, former Chief Palanikumar, State Election Commissioner
Election Commissioners of India, the State Tamil Nadu; Shri Madhukar Gupta, State
Election Commissioners, former State Election Election Commissioner Rajasthan; Shri Anil
Commissioners, members of the Bar Council of Kumar Khachi, State Election Commissioner
India, members of the apex industry bodies and Himachal Pradesh; Shri Sanjay Srivastava,
business representatives, who gave their Former State Election Commissioner, NCT of
invaluable suggestions. Delhi and Chandigarh; Dr. Dalip Singh, Former
State Election Commissioner Haryana.
HLC REPORT
i
Acknowledgements
V) Business and Industry Bodies

II) Economists The Associated Chambers of Commerce and
Dr. Surjit S. Bhalla, Dr. Deepak Mishra, Prof Industry of India (ASSOCHAM),
Chetan Ghate, Prof Indira Rajaraman, Dr. Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), The
Poonam Gupta, Dr. Prachi Mishra, Dr. Rakesh Federation of Indian Chambers of
Mohan, Dr. Shamika Ravi, Mr. Sanjiv Puri and Commerce & Industry (FICCI)
Mr. Sohan Mukherjee.
III) Political Parties VI) Secretarial, Logistical and

Aam Aadmi Party, Indian National Congress, Administrative support
All-Jharkhand Students Union Party (AJSU), Dr. Rajiv Mani, Secretary, Legislative
All India Majilis-E-Ittehadul Muslimeen, All Department besides providing valuable Legal
India Trinamool Congress, All India United inputs extended fullest cooperation and
Democratic Front, All India Anna Dravida facilitated the HLC in making this task feasible.
Munnetra Kazhagam, Apna Dal (Soneylal), He was ably supported in this by Shri Diwakar
Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), Bahujan Samaj Singh, Joint Secretary and Legislative Counsel
Party, Bhartiya Janata Party, Biju Janata Dal,
Communist Party of India (CPI), Communist Shri Prashant Lokhande, Joint Secretary,
Party of India (M), Communist Party of India Ministry of Home Affairs made special
(Marxist-Leninist) Liberation, Dravida contribution by enlightening the Committee
Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), Democratic with important suggestions and viewpoints.
Progressive Azad Party, Gorkha National
Liberation Front (GNLF), Hindustani Awam Smt. Haimanti Bhattacharya, Director,
Morcha, Indian Makkal Kalvi Munnetra Department of Legal Affairs provided
Kazhagam, Indigenous People’s Front of leadership and guidance and served as a
Tripura (IPFT), Jan Surajya Shakti Party , catalytic force that aligned the whole team with
Janata Dal (United), Lok Janashakti Party(R), the objectives of the Committee.
Maharashtra Gomantak Party, Marumalarchi
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK), Mizo Shri Amrik Singh, Private Secretary to the
National Front, Naga Peoples’ Front, National Chairman of HLC ensured smooth
People’s Party (NPP), Nationalist Congress coordination and ironed out all kinks.
Party, Nationalist Democratic Progressive
Party, Nirbal Indian Shoshit Hamara Aam Dal The other members of the team that deserve a
(Nishad Party) Pattali Makkal Katchi, mention are:
Rashtriya Lok Janata Dal, Puthiya Needhi
Katchi Republican Party of India (Athawale) Ms. Om Lata Rawat, Shri Dipendra Kanwar,
(RPI(Atwl)), Social Democratic Party of India, Shri Kamal Singh, Shri Gautam Mukhiya, Shri
Samajwadi Party, Shiromani Akali Dal, Shiv Ravi Kumar and other office staff in the Office
Sena, Sikkim Krantikari Morcha, Tamil of the Secretary, HLC-
Maanila Congress, Suheldev Bharatiya Samaj Shri Amit Kumar, Shri Dushyant Tomar, Shri
Party, United Kisan Vikas Party, United Pawan Kumar Sharma, Shri Vikas Kumar
People’s Party Liberal, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Yadav, Shri S Mahesh Babu, Shri Girdhar
Katchi. Gopal Verma, Ms. Ranjani Raman, Shri Mohit
Dalal, Ms. Devika Gulati, Shri Sushil Kumar,
IV) Legal Organisations Ms. Aparna Sharma and Shri Navdeep
Bar Council of India, Akhil Bharatiya Parashar.
Adhivakta Parishad
HLC REPORT
ii
Acknowledgements
VII) Research and Drafting Team backbone and made the working of the
The Committee is grateful to Ms. Tara Nair for Committee fast, secure, reliable and
her extraordinary editorial assistance. collaborative using the latest ICT tools.
In the team, special mention needs to be made Special thanks to Senior Technical Director of
of Shri Anshuman Tiwari, Shri Vijay Mishra, NIC, Smt. N. Rema, Shri Rahul Kumar and
Shri Shashank Singh, Ms. Avantika Tiwari, Shri Ravi Dubey for the development of the
Ms. Ritika Chaturvedi, Ms. Urvashi Srivastava, website of HLC, video conferencing and
Ms. Parnika Agnihotri, Ms. Aakshi Goel, Shri enabling smart dashboard.
Aditya Gaur, Ms. Anamika Bhardwaj, Ms.
Divya Roy, Ms. Hitika Dutta, Ms. Komal XI) Official Language Team
Gupta, Ms. Monika Bhakta, Ms. Priyadarshini, Special thanks to Ms. Asha Nivedi, Shri Amit
Ms. Seerat, Shri Shantam Saini, Shri Sharvin Kumar, Shri Pawan Kumar Sharma, Shri Vikas
Vats, Ms. Soumya Mani, and Shri Syed Kumar Yadav, Shri Dushyant Tomar and Shri
Mohammad Haris. Sumit for providing Hindi translation of the
Report.
This erudite and professional team assisted the
Committee in synthesizing voluminous XII) Photography and Design
research materials making an eclectic Report Deepika Chauhan (Coordination of
possible without any flaws. Photography), Rashmi Saxena , Shri Jotirmoy
Roy (Designing) and Shri Ishwar Singh
VIII) Feedback Analysis Team (Photography ).
Shri Kapil Yadav, Shri S. Dhanraj, Shri
Rakesh, Shri Prakash Chander, Shri Geet XIII) Research and Policy Development
Varma, Shri Sagar Arora, Ms. M Deepika The Committtee also acknowledges having
Priyadarshini, Ms. K Lalita, Ms. M S Neena drawn inputs from the following reports and
Gupta, Shri Yadvedra Pratap Singh, Shri Ayush documents:
Mishra, Ms. Garima Bagoria, Shri Gaurav First Annual Report 1983, Election
Verma, Shri Ramesh, Shri Nand Kishor, Shri Commission of India; General Election Report,
Umesh Kumar Saini, Shri Akash. 1957; General Election report, 1962; Atlas by
Election Commission of India, 2019; 170th
IX) Recording Minutes, Content vetting, Report of Law Commission of India, 1999;
Media and Communications 255th Law Commission of India Report, 2015;
Shri Amlanjyoti Majumdar for meticulously Draft Report by Law Commission of India,
recording the entire proceedings of the 2018; Report of National Commission to
deliberations of HLC and the consultations Review the Working of the Constitution
with all stakeholders, reading through the final (NCRWC), 2002; 79th Parliamentary Standing
material, monitoring media reports from across Committee Report, 2015; Working Paper by
the country and ensuring appropriate and NITI Aayog, 2017.
authentic coverage by the media. The other
members of the team comprised of Shri Sanjiv As noted above, this Report is the result of
Baruah, Ms. Akshita Gupta, Ms. Yashasvi and collaboration among many individuals and
Ms. Tarannum. Dr. Arun Kumar Singh, Asst. institutions. The Committee thanks all for not
Director (PIB) extended full cooperation. only contributing towards the resolution of
intricate issues but also illuminating the way
forward for the new paradigm of governance.
X) Information and Communications
Technology (ICT) Team
Shri Gautam Mukhiya, Shri Ravi Kumar and
Shri Anshuman Tiwari provided the ICT
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iii
Abbreviations
ABBREVIATIONS
AC Assembly Constituency
ASSOCHAM Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industries of India
BCI Bar Council of India
BLO Booth Level Officer
BU Ballot Unit
CEC Chief Election Commissioner
CEO Chief Electoral Officer
CII Confederation of Indian Industry
CU Control Unit
DEO District Election Officer
ECI Election commission of India
ERMS Electoral Roll Management System
ERs Electoral Rolls
ERO Electoral Roll Officer
E-Roll Electoral Roll
EPIC Elector's Photo Identity Card
EVM Electronic Voting machine
FICCI Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry
HLC High Level Committee
IVR Interactive voice response
INR Indian National Rupee
MCC Model Code of Conduct
ONOE One Nation One Election
PS Polling Station
PC Parliamentary Constituency
SEC State Election Commissioner
SVEEP Systematic Voters' Education and Electoral Participation
UTs Union Territories
VVPAT Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail
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iv
List of tables and figures
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
LIST OF TABLES
Name of Table Page No.
Table 1.1 Depicting the dissolution of State Legislative Assembly in 1957 11
Table 1.2 Decade wise Number of Elections (Source: ECI) 14
Table 1.3 Parties in Favour 20
Table 1.4 Parties Not in Favour 21
Table:2.1 Details of consultation with stakeholder’s meeting 34
Table-3.1 : List of Responses from Political Parties 46
Table-3.2 : List of Responses from Former Chief Justices of India 71
Table:3.3 List of responses from Former Chief Justices of major High 75
Court
Table:3.4 List of responses from Former chief election commissioners 85
Table:3.5 List of responses from State Election Commissioners/ Former 88
State Election Commissioners
Table:3.6 List of responses from BCI/ASSOCHAM/FICCI/CII 95
Table 5.1 Total numbers of Rural Wards in India 127
Table 5.2 Total Urban Wards in India 128
Table-7.1: List of various elections held from 2019-2023. 146
Table 8.1. Simultaneous and non-simultaneous elections in Indian states 226
(1982-2023
Table 8.2. Summary of National results 227
Table 8.3. States’ Real Growth rates in both types of elections 227
Table 8.4a. National results robust to different samples 228
Table 8.4b. National results robust to different cut-off for simultaneous 228
elections
Table 8. 5. States results robust to various specifications 229
Table 8.6. Real GDSP Growth Rate and Electoral Cycles 230
Table 8. 7. States’ Gross Fiscal Deficit in both types of elections 231
Table 8. 8. Fiscal Deficit and Electoral Cycles 231
Table 8. 9. Capital-to-current ratio changes in both types of elections 232
Table 9.1: Year wise Elections (1951-2023) 238
Table 9.2: Representing upcoming elections of State Legislative 244
Assemblies
Table 9.3: Number of House of the People premature dissolution 250
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v
LIST OF FIGURES
Name of Figure Page No.
Fig. 2.1- First HLC Meeting at Jodhpur Officers Hostel, New Delhi 29
Fig. 3.1: Members of Aam Aadmi Party submitting memorandum to 50
Chairman HLC.
Fig. 3.2: President of BJP submitting memorandum to Chairman HLC. 52
Fig. 3.3: Members of CPI(M) with Chairman and other members of 52
HLC
Fig. 3.4: Members of All India Trinamool Congress with members of 54
HLC
Fig. 3.5: President of AIMIM submitting a memorandum to Chairman 55
HLC.
Fig.3.6: President of Apna Dal (Soneylal) submitting a memorandum 56
to Chairman HLC
Fig. 3.7: General Secretary of CPI submitting a memorandum to 57
Chairman HLC.
Fig. 3.8: DMK leader Shri P. Wilson submitting a memorandum to 58
Chairman HLC
Fig. 3.9: Delegation from JD(U) submitting a memorandum to 59
Chairman HLC
Fig. 3.10: Delegation from Samajwadi Party with Chairman HLC and 61
other members
Fig. 3.11: Delegation from Shiv Sena Party (Shinde Group) with 62
Chairman HLC
Fig. 3.12: Republican Party of India leader, Shri Ram Das Athawale 64
submitting a memorandum to the Chairman HLC
Fig. 3.13: Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi, submitting a memorandum 65
to the Chairman HLC
Fig. 3.14: HAM leader, Dr. Santosh Suman with the Chairman HLC 66
Fig. 3.15: MGP leader, Shri Pandurang with the Chairman HLC 67
Fig. 3.16: NCP (Ajit Pawar faction) leaders submitting memorandum 68
to the Chairman HLC.
Fig. 3.17: Representatives from Rashtriya Lok Janshakti Party meeting 69
Chairman HLC.
Fig. 3.18: Delegation from RLJD submitting memorandum to the 69
Chairman HLC
Fig. 3.19: Justice Dipak Misra, Former CJI with the Chairman HLC 72
Fig. 3.20: Justice Ranjan Gogoi, Former CJI with the Chairman HLC 73
Fig. 3.21: Justice S.A. Bobde, Former CJI with the Chairman HLC. 73
Fig. 3.22: Justice U.U. Lalit, Former CJI with the Chairman HLC 74
Fig. 3.23: Justice Hemant Gupta, Former Justice of Supreme Court 75
with the Chairman HLC
Fig. 3.24: Justice Ajit Prakash Shah, Former Chief Justice Delhi High 77
Court
Fig. 3.25: Justice G Rohini, Former Chief Justice Delhi High Court 78
with the Chairman HLC.
Fig. 3.26: Justice Dilip Bhosale, Former Chief Justice Allahabad High 78
Court with the Chairman HLC
Fig. 3.27: Justice Rajendra Menon, Former Chief Justice Delhi High 79
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vi
Fig. 3.28: Justice P Nandrajog, Former Chief Justice Bombay High 80

Court with the Chairman HLC.
Fig. 3.29: Justice Dhirubhai Naranbhai Patel, Former Chief Justice 81
Delhi High Court with the Chairman HLC.
Fig. 3.30: Justice S Banerjee, Former Chief Justice Madras High 82
Fig. 3.31: Justice Prakash Shrivastava, Former Chief Justice Calcutta 83
High Court with the Chairman HLC.
Fig. 3.32: Justice M N Bhandari, Former Chief Justice Madras High 84
Fig. 3.33: Justice Ramesh D Dhanuka, Former Chief Justice Bombay 84
High Court with the Chairman HLC.
Fig. 3.34: Shri O P Rawat with the Chairman HLC 86
Fig. 3.35: Shri Sunil Arora with the Chairman HLC. 87
Fig. 3.36: Shri Sushil Chandra with the Chairman HLC 88
Fig. 3.37: Shri Sanjay Prasad with the Chairman and members of 89
HLC
Fig. 3.38: Shri Dr. B Basavaraaju with the Chairman and members of 90
HLC.
Fig. 3.39: Shri U.P.S. Madan with the Chairman and members of HLC 91
Fig. 3.40: Shri Madhukar Gupta with the Chairman and members of 93
HLC.
Fig. 3.41: Shri Sanjay Srivastava and Dr. Dalip Singh with the 95
Chairman and members of HLC
Fig. 3.42: Shri Manan Kumar Mishra with the Chairman of HLC 97
Fig. 3.43: Delegation of FICCI with the Chairman and members of 98
HLC
Fig. 3.44: Delegation of CII with the Chairman and members of HLC. 99
Fig. 3.45: Consultation with Akhil Bharatiya Adhivakta Parishad 101
Fig 5.1 Structure of Local Governance 126
Figure 8.1. Economic Mechanisms 206
Figure 8.2. Timeline of Simultaneous Elections 207
Figure 8.3. Simultaneous Elections as a treatment 208
Figure 8.4. A Simple Difference-in-Difference Approach 209
Figure 8.5. Andhra Pradesh - 1983, 1985, 1989, 1994 assembly polls 210
Figure 8.6a. Chhattisgarh GSDP Growth rate over past elections 212
Figure 8.6b. Bihar GSDP Growth rate over past elections. 213
Figure 8.6c. Andhra Pradesh GSDP Growth rate over past elections 214
Figure 8.6d. Haryana GSDP Growth rate over past elections 215
Figure 8.7. Selection of states 216
Figure 8.8. National Growth rate in both types of elections 217
Figure 8.9. Timeline of inflation in India 218
Figure 8.10. Consumer Price Inflation (annual %) under both types of 219
elections
Figure 8.11a. Number of State Assembly Elections 220
Figure 8.11b. Frequency of elections: Comparison between Periods of 221
Simultaneous and Non-Simultaneous Elections
Figure 8.12. Gross Fiscal Deficit of the Centre under both types of 222
elections
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vii
Figure 8.13. Gross Fixed Capital Formation under both types of 223
elections
Figure 8. 14. Primary enrolment rate (as % of population) under both 224
types of elections
Figure 8. 15. Crime Rates before and after elections (National Crime 225
Records Bureau)
Figure 9.1: Scheme for implementation of Simultaneous Elections 249
Figure 9.3 Instances of hung House 251
Figure 9.2: Instances of No Confidence Motion in House of the Peoples 252
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viii
Executive Summary
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. For an aspirational India, that is Bharat, governance based on the principles

of democracy is paramount. The system of elections is a central pillar of
democratic governments. Since independence, our country has witnessed
more than 400 elections for the House of the People and the State
Legislative Assemblies. The Election Commission of India has set
admirable standards for holding fair and free elections in the country, which
is recognised universally both within the country and abroad. While the
conduct of elections has been beyond reproach, the optimality of the design
of its framework calls for an objective assessment from time to time. The
accumulated experience of witnessing over 400 elections in more than
seven decades, serves as a credible basis.
2. Political parties and their leaders, businesses, workers, academia,

governments and all conscientious electors have highlighted the bane of
frequent and intermittent elections. Not surprisingly, a few countries have
realised the significance of simultaneous elections for social, political, and
economic stability and growth. They have developed ingenious legal and
administrative frameworks to avoid separate elections for different tiers of
government. Their systems merit careful examination to understand their
relevance to the contemporary Indian political system. In the initial decades,
conscious efforts were successfully made by authorities in India to hold
simultaneous elections. In the course of time, the system of simultaneous
elections was disrupted. The causes of disruption require deeper study. This
examination needs to be carried out with the widest possible participation
of all stakeholders, capturing not only the concerns of the citizens but also
the wisdom of experts. The constitution of the High Level Committee on
Simultaneous Elections (popularly known as One Nation, One Election)
HLC REPORT
1
Executive Summary
through the Gazette notification of 2nd September 2023 by the Government

of India, sets the foundation for such examination.
3. The Committee, after its constitution, worked on this subject for 191 days.
Its members included eminent persons from diverse backgrounds with
specialisation and long experience in law, political science, administration,
public finance, and economics. The Committee decided to invite
suggestions, viewpoints and comments from registered political parties.
Experts on law such as Former Chief Justices of India and Former Chief
Justices of major High Courts, Former Chief Election Commissioners of
India, and State Election Commissioners were invited for interaction in
person with the Committee. Expert bodies like the Law Commission of
India and the Election Commission of India were also invited by the
Committee. A public notice was issued in the newspapers and social media
to invite suggestions and comments from citizens and organisations. Other
stakeholders such as the Bar Council of India and apex business
organizations like the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), Federation of
Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), Associated
Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM) were also
given opportunities to place their points of view. Eminent economists of
the country also interacted with the Committee.
4. Although the last date was fixed for the submission of responses and hearing
of stakeholders, the Committee extended the time limit and continued to
receive responses and hear stakeholders until the very end. The response
from political parties, individuals, and organisations was overwhelming.
The analysis of the feedback received through email, the website of the High
Level Committee, and by post revealed that 80% of the 21,558 responses
were in favour of simultaneous elections. The responses came from all
corners of the country, including Lakshadweep, Andaman and Nicobar,
HLC REPORT
2
Executive Summary
Nagaland, Dadra, and Nagar Haveli. The highest responses were received
from Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Kerala, West Bengal, Gujarat,
and Uttar Pradesh.
5. Responses were also received from 47 political parties. Barring 15 political

parties, the remaining 32 political parties not only favoured the system of
simultaneous elections, but also advocated its adoption for saving scarce
resources, protecting social harmony, and stimulating economic
development. Those who opposed simultaneous elections raised
apprehensions that its adoption could violate the basic structure of the
Constitution, be anti-democratic and anti-federal, marginalise regional
parties, encourage the dominance of national parties, and result in a
presidential form of government.
6. In order to address the issues involved in the transition in the system of

elections, an in-depth research and analysis was undertaken by the
Committee. The Committee carefully considered all the constitutional and
legal objections that some stakeholders raised against the adoption of
simultaneous elections. Similarly, it examined not only the direct
administrative and logistical cost associated with frequent elections but its
wider implications on economic growth, investment decisions and
opportunity cost of deferred economic decisions and disruptions to overall
social cohesion. On examination of the constitutional and legal issues
associated with simultaneous elections, the Committee suggested an
alternative enabling framework to make simultaneous elections tenable. The
Committee studied the relevant legal literature on elections, both in India
and abroad. It looked at the findings of expert bodies, such as the Law
Commission of India, the National Commission to Review the Working of
the Constitution, the Department-related Parliamentary Standing
Committee on Law and Justice, Niti Aayog and the Election Commission
HLC REPORT
3
Executive Summary
of India. The Committee noted that all the reports favour simultaneous
elections and presented several arguments for the same.
7. Four Former Chief Justices of India, as well as a Former Judge of the

Supreme Court, were invited for consultation and supported simultaneous
elections. Similarly, most of the Former Chief Justices of High Courts,
Former Chief Election Commissioners, State Election Commissioners, and
the Bar Council of India invited for consultation, supported simultaneous
elections. They were unanimous in the opinion that separate elections cause
a waste of resources, result in policy paralysis, and inflict a huge socio-
economic burden on the nation, besides developing fatigue amongst voters.
They also highlighted the numerous advantages of simultaneous elections
and pointed out that there are several countries in the world that have set up
legal frameworks for simultaneous elections for different tiers of
government. In the case of India, they observed that from the 1960s
onwards, the emergency provision contained in Article 356 was used to
dissolve State Legislative Assemblies before the expiry of their tenure. In
addition, there are circumstances such as a hung house, no-confidence
motions, and other such events that result in pre-mature dissolution of the
House. As a result, in the course of time, elections to the House of the People
and State Legislative Assemblies became progressively asymmetric.
Therefore, they stressed on the restoration of the system of simultaneous
elections. Experts were of the opinion that amendments would need to be
made to the Constitution and other related laws to achieve this end. They
unambiguously emphasised that such amendments to restore simultaneous
elections will not be anti-democratic, or anti-federal, violate the basic
structure of the Constitution, or will result in a presidential form of
government. Similarly, with regard to concerns arising about the dominance
of national parties including the ruling party over regional parties, the
experts concluded that such apprehensions were misplaced. They were also
HLC REPORT
4
Executive Summary
of the view that the Indian electorate is sagacious enough to differentiate

between national and regional issues, as also between national and regional
parties.
8. Based on the suggestions received from political parties, experts, and other
stakeholders, the Committee was of the unanimous view that simultaneous
elections will bring fundamental transformation in the electoral process and
overall governance. It will result in optimising scarce resources and also
encourage voters to participate in the electoral process in larger numbers.
Disruptions to governance and policy paralysis resulting from the
application of the Model Code of Conduct and its adverse impact on
economic growth will be mitigated. As pointed out by apex business
organisations, simultaneous elections will also help them maintain their
production cycle, as the incidence of workers leaving for their
constituencies to cast their votes will be reduced. Workers, in particular
migrant workers, will avoid wage losses and minimise travel costs.
9. Considering its overriding advantages, the Committee is of the unanimous

opinion that there should be simultaneous elections in the country.
Accordingly, necessary amendments to the Constitution and other relevant
laws may be brought by the government. They can be elucidated as follows:
“Article 82A
1. The President of India may by notification issued on the date of the first
sitting of the House of the People after a general election, bring into
force the provision of this Article, and that date of the notification shall
be called the Appointed date.
2. Notwithstanding anything contained in Art. 83 and 172, all the

Legislative Assemblies constituted in any general election held after the
appointed date shall come to an end on the expiry of the full term of the
House of the People.
HLC REPORT
5
Executive Summary
3. Notwithstanding anything contained in this constitution or any law for

the time being in force, and after the expiry of the full term referred to
in sub article (1), the Election Commission shall conduct General
elections to the House of the People and the Legislative Assemblies
simultaneously and the provisions of Part XV of the constitution shall
apply to these elections mutatis mutandis with such modifications as may
become necessary and which the Election commission may by Order
specify.
Explanation: The expression “simultaneous elections” shall mean general

elections held for constituting the House of the People and all the
Legislative Assemblies together.
Article 324A
1. Notwithstanding anything contained in Art. 243E and 243U, Parliament

may by law make provision for ensuring that the elections to
Municipalities and Panchayats are held simultaneously with the
General Elections, and for this purpose, make provisions as may be
necessary including provisions for determination of the term of the
Municipalities and Panchayats sooner than the expiry of five years from
the date appointed for their first meeting, and for limiting the term of
such Municipalities and Panchayats constituted under a mid-term
election to the unexpired period of their term until the next general
elections.
10.The amendments should provide for designating an ‘Appointed date’ (being

the day of the first meeting of the newly constituted House of the People)
after which the conduct of elections to the State Legislative Assemblies (for
the constitution of the State Legislative Assemblies) will take place. The
tenure of all such Houses will expire with the tenure of the House of the
People. For the constitution of the new Houses, the Election Commission
HLC REPORT
6
Executive Summary
of India will conduct simultaneous elections for the House of the People and
the State Legislative Assemblies together. Where any State Legislative
Assembly is dissolved on account of no-confidence motion, a hung House,
or any other event, fresh elections will be held for such new House with its
tenure ending with that of the House of the People.
11.The Committee further examined the laws related to elections for

Municipalities and Panchayats in States, to examine the modalities of
synchronising elections to local bodies with those to the House of the People
and State Legislative Assemblies. It went through all the memoranda and
papers submitted by experts on the subject.
12.The most important factor is that frequent elections create an atmosphere of

uncertainty. This uncertainty slows down the government machinery,
months before each election. The political parties are prompted to take
decisions keeping in mind the impending elections. When elections are held
repeatedly, then quite often half of the time of five years is spent in
electioneering.
13.The Committee unanimously opined that, in the first step, simultaneous

elections to the House of the People and the State Legislative Assemblies be
held. In the second step, the elections to Municipalities and Panchayats will
be synchronized with House of People and State Legislative Assemblies in
such a way that Municipalities and Panchayats elections are held within
hundred days of the holding of elections of the House of the People and the
State Legislative Assemblies.
14.The Committee found that mostly the electoral rolls are prepared by the
State Election Commissions after taking them from the Chief Election
Commissioner. In some cases, the electoral rolls are prepared by the State
Election Commissions on their own. At times, these preparations lead to
duplication of work and in a few cases errors in the list. The Committee
HLC REPORT
7
Executive Summary
recognises the significance of a Single Electoral Roll and Single Elector’s

Photo Identity Card (EPIC) for elections to all three tiers of government to
safeguard the rights of voters, and avoid duplication of work by the Election
Commission of India and State Election Commissions. For this purpose,
there is a need to harmonise the actions of the two Constitutional bodies.
The Committee, therefore, recommends that Article 325 of the Constitution
of India be suitably amended, to enable the preparation of a Single Electoral
Roll and Single Elector’s Photo Identity Card by the Election Commission
of India, in consultation with State Election Commissions.
15.In regard to the logistical arrangements for the conduct of simultaneous

elections, the Election Commission of India has submitted detailed
requirements of equipment such as EVM, VVPAT, polling personnel,
security forces, election materials, etc. They have also submitted an estimate
of the expenditure for simultaneous elections. This may require updation in
light of decisions taken for the timing of the simultaneous elections.
Accordingly, the Committee recommends that for the purpose of logistical
arrangements, the Election Commission of India and the State Election
Commissions may carry out an appropriate exercise to prepare a suitable
plan and estimate for the conduct of simultaneous elections to the House of
People, State Assemblies and Local Bodies.
16.Certainty is important for decisions central to good governance which leads

to faster development. On the other hand, uncertainty invariably leads to
policy paralysis. The recommendations of HLC which inter alia include
synchronisation of elections in all the three tiers of government namely, the
House of the People, the State Legislative Assemblies, Municipalities and
the Panchayats, serve to forge an improved architecture of the governance.
Their implementation would be in consonance with the quest of an
aspirational India.
HLC REPORT
8
Introduction
CHAPTER- I
INTRODUCTION
1. The High Level Committee (hereinafter also referred as “Committee”) has

been entrusted to address the wide-ranging Terms of Reference by
examination of the legality, efficacy and modality of simultaneous
elections. The task of reforms in election laws for setting the stage for
simultaneous elections will require clarity in the notion of ‘simultaneous
elections’. There should be unanimity and unambiguity in the
understanding of the expression ‘simultaneous elections’. Hence, the term
‘simultaneous elections’ requires elaboration. The expression
‘simultaneous elections’ shall mean general elections held for constituting
the House of the People, all the State Legislative Assemblies, and Local
Bodies together. Simultaneous elections are also referred to as One Nation,
One Election (ONOE). Hereinafter, the Report will refer to it as
Simultaneous Elections. Simultaneous elections would not mean that
voting across the country for the House of the People, all State Legislative
Assemblies, and all Local Bodies would take place on a single day. In a
country as large as India, it is not possible to have that. Pragmatism requires
elections to be held in phases.
2. The law of elections in India is unique. It is the product of a historical

process of the gradual establishment of institutions of governance that, to
begin with, were authoritarian but became participatory by degrees in the
course of the freedom movement. The Franchise Committee Report of
1932,1 took active consideration of franchise issues. It suggested that the
franchise for the Assembly should be the same as for the provincial councils
1
Report of the Indian Franchise Committee, Volume I (Calcutta: Government of India,
Central Publication Branch, 1932).
HLC REPORT
9
Introduction
as it involved the preparation of only one electoral roll. The report also states
that “the present practice is to hold the provincial and assembly elections
on the same day.”2 The Franchise Committee Report of 1932, therefore,
offers a historical background for the concept of simultaneous elections,
echoing the current discourse in India. The stress on the preparation of a
single electoral roll mirrors the contemporary call for a “common electoral
roll.” Moreover, the simultaneous conduct of provincial and assembly
elections, as practiced then, underscores the efficiency and coherence
achievable through synchronized electoral cycles.
3. The seeds of democracy were sown when voting rights were given to the
people of India to constitute provincial government by direct elections in
February 1937. One decade later, when India became free, the framers of
the Constitution laid down elaborate provisions for the conduct of elections
for the formation of governments both in the Union and the States. The
Parliament was authorised to make laws to pave the way for the
representation of the people in government through elections. Since the
House of the People and the State Legislative Assemblies were established
by the Constitution at the same point in time, the formation of these bodies
was done by elections held at the same time.
4. It becomes pertinent to note that the first General elections under the new
Constitution were held between October 1951 and May 1952, featuring a
three-tiered process electing the President and Vice-President, members of
the Lower Houses at the Centre and in the States, and members of the Upper
Houses. The second General elections to the House of the People and the
State Legislative Assemblies were completed on time by March 1957. In
order to conduct simultaneous elections for the two tiers of government,
namely the House of the People and the State Legislative Assemblies, the
2
Id at 161.
HLC REPORT
10
Introduction
dissolution of State Assemblies was necessitated to synchronise their terms

with the election to the House of the People. The Report on the Second
General Elections in India, 19573 states:
"If the House of the People and the different State Legislative Assemblies
were all allowed to complete their respective terms in full, the General
elections to reconstitute them would have had to be held at different points
of time. In such a case, it would not have been possible to hold
simultaneous country-wide general elections, both for the House of the
People and the State Legislative Assemblies.... It was therefore, decided
that the second general elections should be completed before the end of
March, 1957, and that the existing Houses of Legislature should be
dissolved prematurely, whenever necessary, in order that the newly
elected Houses might meet soon after the general elections were over."4
In pursuance of this decision, the following State Legislative Assemblies
were dissolved before their normal terms were complete:
Table 1.1 Depicting the dissolution of State Legislative Assembly in 1957
Name of the Legislative Date of normal Date on which dissolved
Assembly expiry of term
Bihar 12-5-1957 2-4-1957
Bombay 3-5-1957 4-4-1957
Madras 3-5-1957 31-3-1957
Mysore 18-6-1957 1-4-1957
Punjab 3-5-1957 31-3-1957
Uttar Pradesh 19-5-1957 13-3-1957
West Bengal 18-6-1957 5-4-1957
5. In order to dissolve the Houses, a consensual approach in consultation with

all political parties, the Central Government and the State Governments was
adopted by the Election Commission of India.
3
Report on the Second General elections in India, 1957 (Volume I, General, Election
Commission of India).
4
Id at 123, 124.
HLC REPORT
11
Introduction
“The Commission called a conference of the All-India Political Parties in

New Delhi on the 13th November, 1956, in order to elicit their views as to
the most convenient period in February-March, 1957, for holding the poll
for the general elections. The Commission also consulted the Central
Government and the State Governments and invited their opinion as to the
particular fortnight after the 31st January which would be most convenient
for holding the poll. Detailed information regarding fairs, melas, religious
festivals etc., were also collected so that the polling programme might not
clash with them as far as practicable.
The representatives of the political parties expressed themselves
unanimously—
i. that the poll should be held continuously without any long break;
ii. that it should be completed within 15 days, if possible; and
iii.that the Holi festival which was to take place on the 15th and 16th
March, 1957, should, in no case, fall within the period of the poll.
The consensus of opinion among the State Governments was largely in

favour of the poll being taken in the first fortnight of March.”5
6. Similarly, Election Commission of India in its Report on General Elections,
1962 emphasizes, “it is obviously desirable that this duplication of efforts
and expense should, if possible be avoided.” 6 It must be noted that the
concurrent character of elections offered convenience both to the voters and
the authorities responsible for the conduct of elections. Political parties and
their candidates also benefited. Electors needed to go to the polling station
only once to elect both the members of the House of the People and the State
Legislative Assemblies. The election authorities were required to deploy
polling personnel, build polling stations, divert security forces and make
5
Id at 110.
6
Report on the third General Election in India, 1962, pg 44. Refer to Annexure 1(iii).
HLC REPORT
12
Introduction
other allied arrangements only once. Political parties and candidates could
also save resources since their campaign to reach out to the voters was
required to be undertaken only once.
7. With the passage of years, the concurrent nature of elections was lost. This
was because the tenure of the House of the People and the State Legislative
Assemblies was not for a fixed length of time but a maximum duration of
five years. Resultantly, elected bodies could be dissolved before the expiry
of their maximum duration of five years. As elected bodies were dissolved
before the expiry of five years, elections to those elected bodies became
asynchronous. This began to cast a burden on the voters, political parties
and their leaders, and the election authorities in terms of time, energy and
money. This malady caught the attention of political parties and their
leaders, media, election authorities, government and the citizens.
8. Table 1.2 presents the decadal frequency of elections conducted for the
House of the People and the State Legislative Assemblies. The table shows
that in the first decade, i.e., 1951-1960, when the practice of conducting
simultaneous elections prevailed, there were two elections in a decade. The
cycle of simultaneous elections was disrupted in the next decade, i.e., 1961-
1970, when five States (Bihar, Kerala, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal)
had three elections in a decade. The scenario further deteriorated in the next
decade, i.e., 1971-1980, when fourteen States went through elections thrice.
In one State, namely Odisha, elections were conducted four times during
the same decade. The spurt in the frequency of elections witnessed in the
1970s softened in subsequent decades (1981-1990, 1991-2000, 2001-2010,
2011-2020).
In the decade 1981-1990, five States had three elections; in 1991-2000,
two States went through elections thrice. There were four elections to the
House of the People. Not only did the frequency of elections rise, the
simultaneity of elections was also lost.
HLC REPORT
13
Introduction
Table 1.2 Decade wise Number of Elections (Source: ECI)
HLC REPORT
14
Introduction
9. The concept of simultaneous elections has been featured in many reports

and studies, essentially implying a return to the previous practice of
conducting elections concurrently. In its inaugural Annual Report in 1983,
the Election Commission of India 7 advocated the idea of conducting
simultaneous elections for both the House of the People and the State
Legislative Assemblies. This recommendation was based on several
compelling reasons as elucidated below:
a) Considerable savings on the colossal avoidable administrative and other

expenditure incurred on account of holding of separate general elections,
(Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies).
b) Substantial economy through revision of electoral rolls for the House of
the People and the State Legislative Assemblies simultaneously instead
of undertaking them on a countrywide basis twice over in two different
operations.
c) For the conduct of elections, civilian personnel running into about
twenty-five lakh officers and staff and a few lakh police personnel are
deployed every time for about two to three months, seriously affecting
their normal duties.
d) During elections, whether for the Lok Sabha or the assemblies, the entire
administrative set up throughout the country slows down considerably
and all other normal functions and activities of the Government,
including developmental work, are pushed to the background. These
create a lot of hardships and sufferings to the common man. The situation
continues for about two months during the conduct of every general
election (Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies).
e) Whereas changes in the administrative set up including transfers that
become necessary in the normal course are not permitted under the broad
7
Election Commission of India, First Annual Report (April, 1984).
HLC REPORT
15
Introduction
guidelines issued by the Election Commission, there are considerable

pressures prior to the issue of the notification calling for a general
election to make wholesale changes, particularly at the district level.
f) On account of the de-linking of the general elections to the House of the
People from that of the State Legislative Assemblies, there is a
duplication of the expenditure incurred by the candidates contesting
elections and political parties, which results in the pumping in of
considerable resources that indirectly affects money supply in the
economy. Further, by such delinking, the candidates for parliamentary
elections need more money and resources to fight the election
singlehanded over a wide area without the backing and co-operation of
companion candidates of the assembly segments. This also, it is
suspected, tends to lead to difficulties for candidates to keep within the
ceiling for election expenses.
10. The dismantling of the temporary but complicated superstructure raised for
the purpose of election by the accretion of huge personnel is required to be
done at the earliest and smoothly, and normal conditions should be restored
quickly. In this respect, simultaneous elections would also be highly
desirable. Having regard to the above considerations, the Elections
Commission of India is of the firm view that the stage has come for evolving
a system by convention, if it is not possible or feasible to bring about
legislation, under which General elections to the House of the People and
State Legislative Assemblies are held simultaneously.
11. The Law Commission of India studied the various issues involved in the
conduct of elections and recommended in its reports of 1999, 2015 and 2018
(draft) the adoption of the practice of simultaneous elections to free citizens,
political parties and government authorities from the encumbrance of
asynchronous elections. In its 170th Report in 1999, the Law Commission
HLC REPORT
16
Introduction
of India pointed out that the practice of holding simultaneous elections for
the House of the People and State Legislative Assemblies, which was
prevalent before 1967, faced disruptions due to various factors. These
included the frequent application of Article 356 of the Constitution and the
dissolution of State Legislative Assemblies by the Governor based on the
Chief Minister’s recommendation, among others. The Commission
acknowledged that while it was true that not all situations leading to the
invocation of Article 356 could be predicted entirely (especially considering
the reduced scope after the Supreme Court’s decision in S.R. Bommai v.
Union of India 8 ), the norm should be simultaneous elections. The
Commission suggested that holding separate elections for State Legislative
Assemblies should be an exception rather than the rule. According to the
Commission, the general rule should be to conduct elections once every five
years for the House of the People and all State Legislative Assemblies. The
Law Commission Report (Draft), 2018,9 again underlined the importance
and benefits of simultaneous elections. It observed that by no stretch of
imagination would the holding of simultaneous elections adversely interfere
with the basic structure of the Constitution.
12. In 2002, the National Commission to Review the Working of the

Constitution10 recognised the bane of separate elections and urged for the
restoration of simultaneous elections.
13. The Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on

Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice made a thorough study of
the issues involved in holding of elections in 2015 and recommended that
8
AIR 1994 SC 1918
9
Draft Report of Law Commission of India, 2018 published on 31st August 2018.
Available at
https://legalaffairs.gov.in/sites/default/files/simultaneous_elections/LCI_2018_DRAFT_R
EPORT.pdf
10
NCRWC Report (2002) available at: https://lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/ncrwcreport.htm
HLC REPORT
17
Introduction
simultaneous elections will be necessary to enable India to move on to the

path of high economic development. The Committee, in its report on the
‘Feasibility of holding simultaneous elections to the House of the People
(Lok Sabha) and State Legislative Assemblies,’ acknowledged several
reasons supporting the idea of conducting elections simultaneously. It can
be elucidated as follows:11
a) The massive expenditure that is currently incurred for the conduct of

separate elections: It would reduce the massive expenditure incurred for
the conduct of separate elections every year. Presently, the cost of
holding elections for Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies of
States and UTs has been pegged at INR 4500 crore by the ECI.
b) The policy paralysis that results from the imposition of the Model Code
of Conduct (MCC) during election time: The imposition of MCC puts on
hold the entire development programme and activities of the Union and
State governments in a poll bound State. It even affects normal
governance. Frequent elections lead to the imposition of MCC over
prolonged periods of time. This often leads to policy paralysis and
governance deficit.
c) Impact on delivery of essential services: Holding of political rallies
disrupts road traffic and also leads to noise pollution. If simultaneous
elections are held, this period of disruption would be limited to a certain
pre-determined period of time.
d) Burden on crucial manpower that is deployed during election time: An
illustration can be given of the 14th Lok Sabha Elections. The elections
were held along with State assembly elections in Odisha, Andhra
Pradesh, Sikkim and 27 Arunachal Pradesh. The elections were spread
11
Ibid.
HLC REPORT
18
Introduction
over nine phases, and 1077 in situ companies and 1349 mobile
companies of the Central Armed Police Force (CAPF) were deployed.
14. In January 2017, NITI Aayog formulated a working paper titled "Analysis
of Simultaneous Elections: The What, Why and How,"12 exploring the
prospect of holding concurrent elections for the House of the People and
State Legislative Assemblies. The document examined current
Constitutional provisions and the financial and logistical considerations
associated with simultaneous elections and formulated a framework for the
implementation of such synchronized electoral processes. The desirability
of conducting simultaneous elections is underscored on various grounds, as
indicated in these reports. They highlight that such an approach would
address diverse issues. Firstly, it is noted that simultaneous elections would
ensure that national parties address regional issues, and conversely, regional
parties would focus on national concerns. This alignment is seen as a means
to integrate regional parties into mainstream politics, facilitating their
growth and contributing to a more inclusive representation of the
heterogeneous needs of the nation. The report undertook an elaborate
analysis and suggested the shift to simultaneous elections like in the initial
decades.
15. In 2019, an all-party meeting was held in Delhi, which was attended by 19
political parties to discuss critical reforms in governance. One of the
subjects of discussion included simultaneous elections. Sixteen political
parties favoured the holding of simultaneous elections with only three
political parties opposing it.
12
Government of India, “Analysis of Simultaneous Elections: The “What”, “Why” and
“How”” (NITI Aayog, 2017).
HLC REPORT
19
Introduction
Details are given in the following two tables:

Table 1.3 Parties in Favour
SL. NO. MEMBERS PRESENT (Smt./Shri) PARTY
1. Rajnath Singh, J.P Nadda, Sudhakar Reddy Bharatiya Janata Party
2. Sharad Pawar Nationalist Congress Party
3. Nitish Kumar Janata Dal United
4. Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy Yuvajana Sramika Rythu

Congress
5. Naveen Patnaik Biju Janata Dal
6. K.T. Rama Rao Bharat Rashtra Samithi
7. Ram Vilas Paswan Lok Janshakti Party
8. Sardar Sukhbir Singh Badal Shiromani Akali Dal
9. Ashish Singh Patel Apna Dal
10. Sudesh Mahto All Jharkhand Students Union
11. Prem Singh Tamang Sikkim Krantikari Morcha
12. Chingwang Konyak National Democratic

Progressive Party
13. Conrad Sangma National People’s Party
14. Mehbooba Mufti People’s Democratic Party
15. Hanuman Beniwal Rashtriya Loktantrik Party
16. Ramdas Athawale Republican Party of India
HLC REPORT
20
Introduction
Table 1.4 Parties Not in Favour
SL. NO. MEMBERS PRESENT(Smt/Shri) POLITICAL PARTY
1. Sitaram Yechury Communist Party of India (Marxist)
2. Kshiti Goswami Revolutionary Socialist Party
All India Majlis-E-Ittehadul

3. Asaduddin Owaisi
Muslimeen.
16. The law of elections in India reveals the classic dictum in jurisprudence:
“law needs to keep pace with social, political, and economic changes and
be responsive to the emerging needs and novel aspirations of the
community.” The initial design of the constitutional provisions related to
elections was appropriate so long as all elected bodies, namely the House
of the People and State Legislative Assemblies, ended their tenure together
and needed to be formed simultaneously. This design, however, has not
been able to prevent the loss of the concurrent character of elections due to
the premature dissolution of various elected bodies from time to time.
Consequently, the elections paradigm in India has shifted from two
elections in ten years to several elections every year, which are attended
with avoidable socio-economic costs for voters, government, election
authorities, political parties, candidates, workers, and businesses. The
election law that was good in the initial phase of Indian democracy is now
yielding perverse outcomes and calls for the attention of the law makers.
17. In this context, the Supreme Court's observation in the case of Tamil Nadu
Education Department Ministerial and General Subordinate Services
Association & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.13 is pertinent. The Court,
addressing the matter of teachers' seniority, stated:
13
AIR 1980 SC 379.
HLC REPORT
21
Introduction
“The wisdom of yesterday may obsolesce into the folly of today, even
as the science of old may sour into the superstition now, and vice-
versa .... Once the principle is found to be rational, the fact that a few
freak instances of hardship may arise on either side cannot be a
ground to invalidate the order or the policy.”
18. The transition from separate to simultaneous elections represents a
significant and seemingly drastic change. However, it is reflective of a
14
deeper reality that "change is the only constant." This timeless
philosophical idea, attributed to Lord Buddha and also to the Greek
philosopher Heraclitus, encapsulates the inevitability of transformation
even within democratic systems.
19. The function of law is to spur human motivation and guide actions for the
betterment of society. To this end, it furnishes the design of institutions,
empowers individuals and groups, and creates a web of obligations and
duties that form the bedrock of orderly social relationships. The law
guarantees rights and freedom so that individuals may achieve their full
potential. It also imposes duties so that transactions in human relationships
are just and fair and creates a machinery for sanctions should there be failure
in the performance of duties. This imparts certainty and predictability in
relationships among individuals and groups and gives shape to the structure
of the society and moulds its culture.
20. As we examine the need for reforms in election laws, a variety of questions
and issues come to the fore. A key concern naturally is whether citizens
should continue to bear the burden of frequent elections, or whether election
laws should be adapted to suit the new circumstances and free the citizens
14
Heraclitus, “Fragments” Edited by G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven (Cambridge University
Press, 2004).
HLC REPORT
22
Introduction
from this avoidable burden. This constitutes the core of the agenda that the
present report aims to address.
21. The report comprises of the main report and Annexures in 21 Volumes. The
main report examines the issue of holding simultaneous elections to the
House of the People, State Legislative Assemblies, and Local Bodies and
consists of eleven chapters. The first Chapter outlines the organization of
the work, the processes and procedures followed by the Committee, its
recommendations, and the conclusions reached by the Committee. Chapter
II deals with the constitution of the High Level Committee, its genesis, its
terms of reference, and the meetings convened by the Committee. Chapter
III is an outline of the consultation procedures, which also summarizes the
views of multiple stakeholders and domain luminaries. These include
former Chief Justices of India and various High Courts, former Chief
Election Commissioners, the Bar Council of India, political parties, and
other important stakeholders, including representatives from trade and
industry. Chapter IV is an outline of best international practices. Chapter V
specifically deals with the issues and complexities of elections to local
bodies. Chapter VI and VII are the heart of the report, dealing with the
challenges, issues, and complexities, and the rationale for simultaneous
elections, respectively, and presenting the issues raised and suggestions
made by multiple stakeholders. Chapter VIII deals with the financial and
social implications of simultaneous elections. Chapter IX outlines the
schemes for implementing simultaneous elections, while Chapter X deals
with its Constitutional and legal framework. Chapters VI to X must be read
as an integrated piece since they are sequenced to understand the broad
framework, the complexities, and the alternative framework to conduct
simultaneous elections. Chapter XI broadly summarises the
HLC REPORT
23
Introduction
recommendations of the Committee on the terms of reference and concludes

with an outline of the proposed course of action.
22. The Chapters of the Report include inputs and insights from wide-ranging
consultations. The report not only identifies the complexities and challenges
associated with simultaneous elections, but also offers a roadmap for
addressing them, emphasising the need for a cohesive approach. As India
continues its journey toward electoral reform, this report serves as a
foundational document, providing valuable insights and recommendations
to guide policymakers and stakeholders, in shaping the future of India's
electoral ecosystem.
HLC REPORT
24
High Level Committee composition and meetings
CHAPTER- II
HIGH LEVEL COMMITTEE COMPOSITION AND MEETINGS
I. GENESIS OF THE HIGH LEVEL COMMITTEE
1. The notion of holding simultaneous elections has been engaging the

attention of policymakers, political parties and their leaders, academicians
and the media over the years. Legislators and Administrators alike have
been stymied in the discharge of their duties by diversion of their energy
necessitated by the exigencies of frequent elections. On the other hand, the
compulsion to vote several times disenchants electors, resulting in lower
voter turnout. Over the years, efforts have been made by different political
parties and other stakeholders to bring to the fore the public importance of
simultaneous elections. In its Annual Report (1983), the Election
Commission of India enumerates seven ‘weighty reasons’ for holding
simultaneous elections to the House of the People and State Legislative
Assemblies including disruption of work in government, wasteful
expenditures by political parties, avoidable duplication of revision of
electoral rolls for the House of the People and the State Legislative
Assemblies.
2. Several expert bodies like the Law Commission of India (170th Report of
1999, 255th Report of 2015, Draft Report 2018), the National Commission
to Review the Working of the Constitution, 2002, the Parliamentary
Standing Committee Report1 in 2015, and NITI Aayog2 in its working paper
in 2017 advocated holding simultaneous elections as it would qualitatively
1
79th Report of Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel,
Public Grievances, Law and Justice on Feasibility of Holding Simultaneous Elections to
the House of People (Lok Sabha) and State Legislative Assemblies, 2015.
2
Bibek Debroy and Kishore Desai Analysis of Simultaneous Elections: The “What”,
“Why” and “How” NITI Aayog (2017).
HLC REPORT
25
improve the architecture of governance and enable elected representatives

to fulfill their obligations and discharge their accountability to the
electorate.
3. Considering the significance of the synchronisation of elections to the

House of the People, State Legislative Assemblies and Local Bodies, a High
Level Committee was set up by the Government of India on 2nd September
2023 to examine the matter.
II. TERMS OF REFERENCE
4. The Terms of Reference of the High Level Committee are as follows:
a. Examine and make recommendation for holding simultaneous

elections to the House of the People (Lok Sabha), State Legislative
Assemblies, Municipalities and Panchayats, keeping in view the
existing framework under the Constitution of India and other statutory
provisions, and for that purpose, examine and recommend specific
amendments to the Constitution, the Representation of the People Act,
1950, the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the rules made
thereunder and any other law or rules that would require amendments
for the purpose of holding simultaneous elections;
b. Examine and recommend, if the amendments to the Constitution would
require ratification by States;
c. Analyse and recommend possible solution in a scenario of
simultaneous elections emerging out of hung House, adoption of no-
confidence motion, or defection or any such other event;
d. Suggest a framework for synchronisation of elections and specifically,
suggest the phases and time frame within which simultaneous elections
may be held if they cannot be held in one go and also suggest any
HLC REPORT
26
amendments to the Constitution and other laws in this regard and

propose such rules as may be required in such circumstances;
e. Recommend necessary safeguards for ensuring the continuity of the
cycle of simultaneous elections and recommend necessary
amendments to the Constitution, so that the cycle of simultaneous
elections is not disturbed;
f. Examine the logistics and manpower required, including EVMs,
VVPATs, etc., for holding such simultaneous elections;
g. Examine and recommend the modalities of use of a single electoral roll
and electoral identity cards for identification of voters in elections to
the House of the People (Lok Sabha), State Legislative Assemblies,
Municipalities and Panchayats.
III. COMPOSITION OF HIGH LEVEL COMMITTEE
The composition of High Level Committee3 is as follows-
Shri Ram Nath Kovind,

1 Chairman
Former President of India
Shri Amit Shah,

2 Minister of Home Affairs and Minister of Member
Cooperation, Government of India
Shri Adhir Ranjan Chowdhury,

3 Leader of Single Largest Party in Opposition, Member (Resigned)
Lok Sabha
3
One Nation, One Election, https://onoe.gov.in/onoe-gazette-notification
HLC REPORT
27
Shri Ghulam Nabi Azad,

4 Member
Former Leader of Opposition in Rajya Sabha
Shri N.K. Singh,

5 Member
Former Chairman, 15th Finance Commission
Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap,

6 Member
Former Secretary General, Lok Sabha
Shri Harish Salve,

7. Member
Senior Advocate
Shri Sanjay Kothari,

8. Member
Former Chief Vigilance Commissioner
Shri Arjun Ram Meghwal,

Special
9. Minister of State (Independent Charge)
Invitee
Ministry of Law and Justice
Secretary,
10. Dr. Niten Chandra
HLC
HLC REPORT
28
5. After the Gazette Notification of 2nd September 2023, Shri Adhir Ranjan
Chowdhury resigned from the High Level Committee. The High Level
Committee noted his resignation in the second meeting of the Committee
on 25th October 2023.
IV. MEETINGS OF HIGH LEVEL COMMITTEE
6. The High Level Committee on simultaneous elections under the

Chairmanship of Shri Ram Nath Kovind, former President of India,
convened its first meeting on 23rd September 2023. In the meeting it was
decided that, it would seek suggestions, viewpoints, and comments from
National, State, and other political parties having at least one member in the
House of the People (Lok Sabha). It was also decided to invite the Law
Commission of India to make a presentation based on their analysis on
simultaneous elections. It was also decided to have an interactive website
for the Committee.
Figure 2.1: First HLC Meeting at Jodhpur Officer’s Hostel, New Delhi
7. The second meeting of the High Level Committee was held on 25th October
2023. A presentation was made by the Law Commission of India on the
options available, for a credible mechanism for conducting simultaneous
HLC REPORT
29
elections. During the meeting, the website of the High Level Committee
was launched by the Chairman followed by a discussion amongst the
Members of the Committee on the features of the website.
8. In its meeting on 29th December 2023, the Committee discussed the

feedback received from different political parties. Given the modest
response from political parties, it was, decided that a reminder may be sent
to them seeking an early response to the Committee’s request.
9. It was also decided to solicit the views of eminent Judges like former Chief
Justices of the Supreme Court and High Courts. It was decided that letters
may be sent to the last five retired Chief Justices of the Supreme Court and
High Courts. In the case of High Courts, it was decided to invite judges from
five major High Courts, namely the High Court of Madras, Bombay,
Allahabad, Calcutta, and Delhi.
10. It was decided to invite suggestions from five recently retired Chief
Election Commissioners of India, the Chairman of the Bar Council of India,
and apex business organisations like CII, FICCI, and ASSOCHAM.
11. The Committee empowered the Chairman to hold interactions with the
Judges, former Chief Election Commissioners of India, and the Chairman
of the Bar Council of India.
12. It was also decided to seek feedback on simultaneous elections from
citizens through a public notice in all major National and State newspapers.
13. Following the decision of the Committee, on 1st January 2024, a second
reminder was sent to political parties to submit their views by 18th January
2024. Similarly, on 5th January 2024, letters were sent to eminent former
Judges, former Chief Election Commissioners of India, the Chairman, Bar
Council of India, and apex business organisations. On 5th January 2024, a
public notice inviting suggestions of the citizens on simultaneous elections
HLC REPORT
30
through email, website, and post was published in 105 major dailies in 16
languages covering all States and Union Territories.
14. In its meeting on 21st January 2024, the Secretary of the Committee
apprised the members about the responses received from political parties,
eminent former Judges, former CECs, business organizations, and citizens.
Members were also informed that consultations with eminent former Judges
and other stakeholders had commenced. The suggestions made by the
Election Commission of India on holding simultaneous elections were
placed before the Committee. It was decided that in view of the continuing
response to the public notice from the citizens, suggestions received after
the closing date may also be taken on record.
15. Shri N.K. Singh, member of the High level Committee submitted a paper
titled “Macroeconomic impact of harmonizing electoral cycle- Evidence in
India” co-authored by him for the consideration of the Committee.
16. In its meeting on 27th January 2024, a presentation was made on the
findings of the research paper co-authored by Shri N.K. Singh, a member
of the Committee, and Dr. Prachi Mishra. The paper indicated that
simultaneous elections would precipitate higher economic growth as it
would lead to higher public investment and reduce wasteful expenditure on
freebies. The Committee also decided that the research paper may be
discussed with noted economists.
17.On 2nd February 2024, the Committee interacted with a delegation from the
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) comprising Shri R. Dinesh,
President, Shri Sanjiv Puri, President Designate, Shri Chandrajit Banerjee,
Director General, Shri Marut Sengupta, Deputy Director General, Ms.
Amita Sarkar, Deputy Director General, Shri Binoy Job, Executive director,
and Shri G. Srivastava, Chief of Economic Strategy and Project
Coordination. The representatives of CII in their presentation highlighted
HLC REPORT
31
the manifold difficulties arising from separate and frequent elections due to
stoppage of work, workforce proceeding on leave for casting vote, and
disruptions in the enforcement of contracts. They also submitted a
memorandum titled “One Nation, One Election (ONOE) Case for Economic
Efficiency” to the Chairman of the Committee wherein they stressed that
simultaneous elections will bring greater economic growth and stability and
mitigate uncertainty for attracting larger investment.
18. On 6th February 2024, a delegation of Federation of Indian Chamber of

Commerce and Industry (FICCI) comprising Dr. Anish Shah, President,
Shri Harshvardhan Agarwal, Senior Vice President, Shri Anant Goenka,
Vice President, Shri S.K. Pathak, Secretary General, Ms. Jyoti Vij,
Additional Director General and Shri Anshuman Khanna, Assistant
Secretary General made a presentation before the Committee. They also
supported the holding of simultaneous elections. They pointed out that
multiple elections at various levels adversely impact the ease of doing
business and slow down the decision-making process. In the memorandum
which they submitted following their presentation, they emphasised that the
saving in expenditure by the government coupled with the enhanced quality
of public outlays improves growth and livelihood generation.
19. On 10th February 2024, Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap, Member of the High level
Committee presented a note on issues pertaining to simultaneous elections
for the consideration of the Committee.
20. On 14th February 2024, eminent economists, namely, Prof. Chetan Ghate,
Director, Institute of Economic Growth (IEG), Dr. Deepak Mishra, Director
& Chief Executive, Indian Council for Research on International Economic
Relations (ICRIER), Prof. Indira Rajaraman, Non-Resident Honorary
Distinguished Fellow, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research
(IGIDR), Dr. Poonam Gupta, Director General, National Council of
HLC REPORT
32
Applied Economic Research (NCAER), Dr. Rakesh Mohan, President

Emeritus & Distinguished Fellow, Centre for Social and Economic Progress
(CSEP), Shri Sanjiv Puri, President-Designate, CII and; Chairman and
Managing Director, ITC Limited. Dr. Shamika Ravi, Member, Economic
Advisory Council to the Prime Minister, and Dr. Surjit S. Bhalla, Former
Executive Director, IMF for India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka,
apprised the members of the Committee about the socio-economic
advantages of simultaneous elections.
21.In addition to the above meetings, a series of interactions was held by the
Chairman of the High Level Committee with eminent Former Chief Justices
of the Supreme Court of India namely Justice Dipak Misra , Justice Ranjan
Gogoi, Justice Sharad Arvind Bobde and Justice U. U. Lalit; Justice
Hemant Gupta, Former Judge of Supreme Court; Former Chief Justices of
High Courts namely Justice Sanjay Yadav, Justice Girish Chandra Gupta,
Justice Ramesh D. Dhanuka, Justice G. Rohini, Justice Munishwar Nath
Bhandari, Justice Rajendra Menon, Justice Dilip Bhosle, Justice Sanjib
Banerjee, Justice Pradeep Nandrajog, Justice Prakash Shrivastava, Justice
Ajit Prakash Shah; Former Chief Election Commissioners namely Shri
Sushil Chandra, Shri O.P. Rawat, Shri A.K. Joti, Shri Sunil Arora; State
Election Commissioners, namely Shri Madhukar Gupta, Shri Sanjay
Srivastava, IAS(Retd.), Dr Dalip Singh, IAS (Retd.), Shri Dr. B.
Basavaraaju, Shri U.P.S. Madan, Shri Sanjay Prasad; Shri Manan Kumar
Mishra, Chairman, Bar Council of India, and ASSOCHAM to solicit their
views and suggestions on simultaneous elections.
22.From 21st February, 2024 till 10th March, 2024, ten High Level Committee
meetings were held for deliberations on the draft of the Report on
Simultaneous elections. On 10th March, 2024, the last HLC meeting was
held and the Report was finalised.
HLC REPORT
33
Table 2.1 Details of consultation with stakeholder’s meeting
CONSULTATION WITH
MEETING
S. NO MEMBERS PRESENT POLITICAL PARTIES AND
DATE
EXPERTS
1. Shri Ram Nath Kovind
(Chairman)
2. Shri Amit Shah
3. Shri Arjun Ram Meghwal
4. Shri Ghulam Nabi Azad
1. September 23,
5. Shri N. K. Singh High Level Committee Meeting
2023
6. Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap
7. Shri Sanjay Kothari
8. Shri Harish Salve (virtually)
(Secretary, HLC)
(Chairman)
2. Shri Amit Shah The Law Commission of India
3. Shri Arjun Ram Meghwal,
4. Shri Ghulam Nabi Azad 1 Justice Ritu Raj Awasthi
October 25, 5. Shri N. K. Singh (Chairperson)
2.
2023 6. Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap 2 Prof. (Dr.) Anand Paliwal
7. Shri Sanjay Kothari (Member)
8. Shri Harish Salve 3 Shri Khetrabasi Biswal
(virtually) (Member Secretary)
(Secretary, HLC)
(Chairman)
2. Shri Amit Shah
December 29, 4. Shri Ghulam Nabi Azad High Level Committee Meeting
3.
2023 5. Shri N. K. Singh
(Secretary, HLC)
1. Shri Ram Nath Kovind Former Chief Justice, Madras
January 17,
4. (Chairman) High Court
2024
(5:30 PM) Justice M. N. Bhandari
(Secretary, HLC)
January 18, Former Chief Justice, Delhi High
(Chairman)
5. 2024 Court
(12:30 PM) Justice G.Rohini
(Secretary, HLC)
January 18, Former Chief Election
6. 2024 Commissioner
(Chairman)
(01:00 PM) Shri Sushil Chandra
HLC REPORT
34
CONSULTATION WITH
MEETING
DATE
EXPERTS
(Secretary, HLC)
1. Shri Ram Nath Kovind Former Chief Election
January 19,
7. (Chairman) Commissioner
2024
(5:00 PM) Shri O. P. Rawat
(Secretary, HLC)
(Chairman)
January 21, 3. Shri Ghulam Nabi Azad
8. 2024 4. Shri N. K. Singh High Level Committee Meeting
(12:30 PM) 5. Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap
(Secretary, HLC)
1. Shri Ram Nath Kovind Former Chief Justice, Allahabad
January 24,
(Chairman) High Court
9. 2024
2. Dr. Niten Chandra Justice Dilip Babasaheb Bhosale
(12:00 PM)
(Secretary, HLC)
January 24, Former Chief Justice, Delhi High
(Chairman)
10. 2024 Court
(2:00 PM) Justice Rajendra Menon
(Secretary, HLC)
January 24, ASSOCHAM
(Chairman)
11. 2024
(2:30 PM) Shri Ajay Singh, President
(Secretary, HLC)
Rashtriya Lok Janshakti Party
1. Shri Pashupati Kumar

Paras, Union Minister for
January 25, Food Processing Industries,
(Chairman)
12. 2024 President RLJP
(11:30 AM) 2. Shri Prince Raj, MP
(Secretary, HLC)
3. Shri Sanjay Sarraf,
Spokesperson RLJP
4. Shri Ramji Singh, General
Secretary, RLJP
Maharashtrawadi Gomantak
1. Shri Ram Nath Kovind Party
January 27,
(Chairman)
13. 2024
2. Dr. Niten Chandra Shri Pandurang alias Deepak
(2:00 PM)
(Secretary, HLC) Dhavalikar, Goa President
HLC REPORT
35
CONSULTATION WITH
MEETING
DATE
EXPERTS
1. Shri Ram Nath Kovind Former Chief Justice of India

January 27,
(Chairman)
14. 2024
2. Dr. Niten Chandra Justice U.U. Lalit
(3:00 PM)
(Secretary, HLC)

(Chairman)
2. Shri Harish Salve
(Secretary, HLC)
(Chairman)
Former Chief Justice Madras
January 27, High Court
16. 2024
5. Shri N. K. Singh
(5:00 PM) Justice Sanjib Banerjee
(Secretary, HLC)
(Chairman)
3. Shri Ghulam Nabi Azad Bar Council of India
January 27,
17. 2024
5. Shri N. K. Singh Shri Manan Kumar Mishra,
(5:30 PM)
6. Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap Chairman
(Secretary, HLC)
(Chairman)
2024 4. Shri Arjun Ram Meghwal Presentation by Shri N. K. Singh,
18.
5. Shri N. K. Singh Member (HLC)
(Secretary, HLC)
January 30, 1. Shri Ram Nath Kovind Former Chief Justice, Bombay
19.
2024 (Chairman) High Court
HLC REPORT
36
CONSULTATION WITH
MEETING
DATE
EXPERTS
(2:30 PM) 2. Dr. Niten Chandra Justice Pradeep Nandrajog
(Secretary, HLC)
January 31, NCP (Ajit Pawar, Faction)
(Chairman)
20. 2024 1. Shri Praful Patel
(3:30 PM) 2. Shri Sunil Dattatray Tatkare
(Secretary, HLC)
Rashtriya Lok Janata Dal
1. Shri Ram Nath Kovind 1. Shri Upendra Kushwaha,
January 31,
(Chairman) National President, Lok Dal
21. 2024
2. Dr. Niten Chandra 2. Shri Prashant Pankaj
(3:30 PM)
(Secretary, HLC) 3. Shri Bimlendu Shekar
Singh
1. Shri Ram Nath Kovind Former Chief Justice, Calcutta
February 1,
22. 2024
2. Dr. Niten Chandra Justice Prakash Shrivastava
(4:30 PM)
(Secretary, HLC)
Shiv Sena party (Eknath
Sambhaji Shinde)
February 1, 1. Shri Rahul Shewale, MP
(Chairman)
23. 2024 2. Shri Rajendra Gavit, MP
(4:30 PM) 3. Shri Shrirang Barne, MP
(Secretary, HLC)
4. Shri Ashish Kulkarni
5. Shri Kedar Joshi.
1. Shri Ram Nath Kovind Former Chief Justice, Bombay
February 1,
24. 2024
(5:00 PM) Justice R.D. Dhanuka
(Secretary, HLC)
1. Shri Ram Nath Kovind Former Chief Justice, Delhi High
February 1,
(Chairman) Court
25. 2024
2. Dr. Niten Chandra Justice Ajit Prakash Shah
(5:30 PM)
(Secretary, HLC)
1. Shri Ram Nath Kovind Hindustani Awam Morcha
(Chairman) (Secular)
February 2,
26. 2. Shri N. K. Singh
2024 Dr. Santosh Kumar Suman,
(11:00 AM) Minister Bihar Government- cum-
National President
(Secretary, HLC)
Confederation of Indian Industry
(CII)
1. Shri Chandrajit Banerjee,
February 2, Director General
27. 1. Shri Ram Nath Kovind
2024 2. Shri R Dinesh, President,
(Chairman)
(11:30 AM) 3. Shri Sanjiv Puri, President
2. Shri N. K. Singh
Designate
4. Shri Marut Sen Gupta, Deputy
Director General,
HLC REPORT
37
CONSULTATION WITH
MEETING
DATE
EXPERTS
5. Dr. Niten Chandra 5. Ms Amita Sarkar, Deputy
(Secretary, HLC) Director General
6. Shri Binoy Job, Executive
Director
7. Shri G Srivastava, Chief of
Economic Strategy and Project
Co-ordination
Federation of Indian Chamber of
Commerce and Industry (FICCI)
1. Dr. Anish Shah, President
2. Shri Harsh Vardhan Agarwal,
Senior Vice President
(Chairman)
February 6, 3. Shri Anant Goenka, Vice
28. 2024 President
3. Shri N. K. Singh
(11:30 AM) 4. Shri S.K. Pathak, Secretary
General
5. Ms. Jyoti Vij, Additional
Director General
6. Shri Anshuman Khanna,
Assistant Secretary General
TMC Party
(Chairman)
February 6, 1. Shri Sudip Bandopadhyay,
29. 2024 Member of Parliament
3. Shri N. K. Singh
(2:00 PM) 2. Shri Kalyan Bandopadhyay,
Member of Parliament
CPI(M)
(Chairman)
February 6, 1. Shri Sitaram Yechury, General
30. 2024 Secretary
3. Shri N. K. Singh
(2:45 PM) 2. Shri Nilotpal Basu
3. Shri Muralidharan
Samajwadi Party
(Chairman)
February 6,
31. 2. Shri Ghulam Nabi Azad
2024 1. Shri K. K. Shrivastava
3. Shri N. K. Singh
(3:30 PM) 2. Shri Harishchandra Singh
Yadav
February 7, (Chairman) CPI
32. 2024 2. Shri Ghulam Nabi Azad
(4:00 PM) 3. Shri N. K. Singh Shri D. Raja, General Secretary
1. Shri Ram Nath Kovind 1. Shri R Venkatramani, Attorney
February 7,
(Chairman) General of India
33. 2024
2. Shri Ghulam Nabi Azad 2. Shri Tushar Mehta, Solicitor
(5:00 PM)
3. Shri N. K. Singh General of India.
HLC REPORT
38
CONSULTATION WITH
MEETING
DATE
EXPERTS
1. Shri Ram Nath Kovind Former Chief Election
February 8, Commissioner
(Chairman)
34. 2024
2. Shri N. K. Singh Shri Sunil Arora
(3:30 PM)
February 8, Former Chief Justice of India
(Chairman)
35. 2024
2. Shri N. K. Singh Justice Ranjan Gogoi
(4:30 PM)
Republican Party of India
February 8, Shri Ram Das Athawale, MoS
(Chairman)
36. 2024 Social Justice and Empowerment
2. Shri N. K. Singh
(5:15 PM) and President, Republican Party of
India (Athawale)
Aam Aadmi Party
February 8, 1. Shri Pankaj Kumar Gupta,
(Chairman)
37. 2024 National Secretary
2. Shri N. K. Singh
(6:00 PM) 2. Secretary Shri Jasmine Shah,
Senior Leader
February 9, (Chairman) Rajasthan State Election
38. 2024 2. Shri N. K. Singh Commissioner
(11:45 AM) 3. Shri Sanjay Kothari Shri Madhukar Gupta (IAS)
1. Shri Ram Nath Kovind Former SEC NCT Delhi &
(Chairman) Chandigarh UT
February 9,
2. Shri N. K. Singh
39. 2024
3. Shri Sanjay Kothari Shri Sanjay Srivastava, IAS(Retd)
(2:00 PM)

(Chairman)
February 9, Former SEC, Haryana
2. Shri N. K. Singh
40. 2024
(2:00 PM) Dr Dalip Singh, IAS(Retd)
DMK Party
February 10,
(Chairman)
41. 2024 Shri P. Wilson, Member of
2. Shri N. K. Singh
(3:00 PM) Parliament
February 10,
1. Shri Ram Nath Kovind Apna Dal (Soneylal)
42. 2024
(Chairman) Smt. Anupriya Patel, President
(4:00 PM)
HLC REPORT
39
CONSULTATION WITH
MEETING
DATE
EXPERTS
February 10, (Chairman)
(4:00 PM) 3. Shri Sanjay Kothari
4. Dr Subhash C. Kashyap
1. Shri Ram Nath Kovind State Election Commissioner
February 12, (Chairman) (Maharashtra)
44. 2024 2. Shri N. K. Singh Shri U.P. S. Madan
February 12, 1. Shri Ram Nath Kovind State Election Commissioner

2024 (Chairman)
45. (Karnataka)
2. Shri N. K. Singh
(3:30 PM) 3. Shri Sanjay Kothari Shri B. Basavaraaju, IAS (Retd.)
1. Prof. Chetan Ghate, Director,
Institute of Economic Growth
(IEG),
2. Dr. Deepak Mishra, Director &
Chief Executive, Indian Council
for Research on International
Economic Relations (ICRIER),
3. Prof. Indira Rajaraman, Non-
Resident Honorary Distinguished
Fellow, Indira Gandhi Institute of
Development Research (IGIDR),
1. Shri Ram Nath Kovind 4. Dr. Poonam Gupta, Director
(Chairman) General, National Council of
February 14, 2. Shri N. K. Singh Applied Economic Research
46. 2024 3. Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap (NCAER),
(11:30 AM) 4. Shri Sanjay Kothari 5. Dr. Rakesh Mohan, President
5. Dr. Rajiv Mani Emeritus & Distinguished Fellow,
Centre for Social and Economic
Progress (CSEP).,
6. Shri. Sanjiv Puri, President -
Designate, CII; Chairman and
Managing Director, ITC Limited,
7. Dr. Shamika Ravi, Member,
Economic Advisory Council to
the Prime Minister,
8. Dr. Surjit S. Bhalla, Former
Executive Director, IMF for India,
Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Sri
Lanka.
HLC REPORT
40
CONSULTATION WITH
MEETING
DATE
EXPERTS
February 14, All India Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul-
(Chairman)
47. 2024 Muslimeen
2. Shri N. K. Singh
(2:30 PM) Shri Asaduddin Owaisi, President
State Election Commissioner,
February 14, (Chairman)
Gujarat
48. 2024 2. Shri N. K. Singh
Shri Sanjay Prasad
(Chairman)
February 17, JDU Party
2. Shri N. K. Singh
49. 2024 1. Shri Lallan Singh
(4:00 PM) 2. Shri Sanjay Jha
(Secretary, HLC)
Akhil Bhartiya Adhivakta
1. Shri Ram Nath Kovind Parishad
(Chairman) 1. Shri. Shreehari Borikar
February 17,
50. 2. Shri N. K. Singh 2. Dr. Seema Singh
2024
3. Shri Sanjay Kothari 3. Adv. Jivesh Tiwari
(4:30 PM)
Dr. Niten Chandra 4. Adv. Bhaskar Gautam
(Secretary, HLC) 5. Adv. Apoorva Singh
6. Shri. Pankaj Jamtani
(Chairman)
2. Shri Amit Shah
February 19, 3. Shri N. K. Singh
51. 2024 HLC Meeting
(Secretary, HLC)
1. Shri Ram Nath Kovind Former Delhi High Court Judge
(Chairman)
February 19, 2. Shri N. K. Singh Justice D. N. Patel
52. 2024 3. Shri Sanjay Kothari
(5:30 PM) 4. Dr. Niten Chandra
(Secretary, HLC)

February 19, (Chairman) Justice S. A. Bobde
53. 2024 2. Dr. Niten Chandra
(Secretary, HLC)
54. February 19, 1. Shri Ram Nath Kovind Former Chief Justice of India
2024 (Chairman)
HLC REPORT
41
CONSULTATION WITH
MEETING
DATE
EXPERTS
(6:30 PM) 2. Dr. Niten Chandra Justice Dipak Mishra
(Secretary, HLC)
1. Shri Ram Nath Kovind Bharatiya Janata Party

(Chairman) 1. Shri J.P. Nadda, President
February 20,
55. 2. Shri N. K. Singh 2. Shri Bhupender Yadav, National
2024
3. Shri Sanjay Kothari General Secretary
(6:30 PM)
4. Dr. Niten Chandra 3. Shri Om Pathak, National
(Secretary, HLC) Executive
(Chairman)
2. Shri Amit Shah
February 21, 3. Shri Ghulam Nabi Azad High Level Committee Meeting
56. 2024 4. Shri N. K. Singh
(Secretary, HLC)
February 24,
(Chairman)
57. 2024
2. Dr. Niten Chandra Justice Sharad Arvind Bobde
(6:30 PM) (Secretary, HLC)
(Chairman)
2. Shri Arjun Ram Meghwal High Level Committee Meeting
February 24, 3. Shri N. K. Singh
58. 2024 4. Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap
(5:00 PM) 5. Shri Harish Salve
(Secretary, HLC)
(Chairman)
2. Shri Gulam Nabi Azad
February 26, 3. Shri N. K. Singh High Level Committee Meeting
59. 2024 4. Shri Harish Salve
(Secretary, HLC)
1. Shri Ram Nath Kovind Former Judge, Supreme Court
February 27,
60. (Chairman)
2024
2. Dr. Niten Chandra Justice Hemant Gupta
(10:30 AM)
(Secretary, HLC)
61. February 27, 1. Shri Ram Nath Kovind
2024 (Chairman)
HLC REPORT
42
CONSULTATION WITH
MEETING
DATE
EXPERTS
(11:00 AM) 2. Shri N. K. Singh High Level Committee Meeting
(Secretary, HLC)
(Chairman)
February 28, 2. Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap
(10:30 AM) 4. Shri Sanjay Kothari
(Secretary, HLC)
(Chairman)
February 29, 2. Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap
(10:30 AM) 4. Shri Sanjay Kothari
(Secretary, HLC)
(Chairman)
March 04, 3. Shri N. K. Singh
64.
2024 4. Shri Sanjay Kothari High Level Committee Meeting
(11:00 AM) 5. Dr. Niten Chandra
(Secretary, HLC)
(Chairman)
March 10, 2. Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap
(11:00AM) 4. Shri Sanjay Kothari
(Secretary, HLC)
HLC REPORT
43
Consultation Process
CHAPTER- III
CONSULTATION PROCESS
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The implementation of simultaneous elections (popularly known as One

Nation, One Election) would produce far-reaching social, economic, and
political ramifications. Being cognisant of this and keeping with its Terms
of Reference, the High Level Committee deemed it essential to adopt a broad
based consultative approach by inviting suggestions and holding personal
interactions with all stakeholders. As a first step, the High Level Committee
from its first meeting onward, held on 23rd September, 2023 decided:
(a) to hold consultations with major national and state political parties having
at least one member in the House of the People;
(b) to hold consultations with the Law Commission of India;
(c) as citizens are at the center of any democratic system, the Committee
decided to invite their suggestions through a public notice;
(d) experts like eminent Former Chief Justices of India, Former Chief Justices
of High Courts, Former Chief Election Commissioners of India and State
Election Commissioners, Bar Council of India, and stakeholders such as
apex business organisations like ASSOCHAM, FICCI, and CII were also
reached out.
2. The Committee was of the firm view that such consultations would not only
shed light on the diverse nature of issues involved but also offer opportunities
to political parties, experts, citizens, and other stakeholders to place their
suggestions, viewpoints, and comments for the consideration of the
Committee.
HLC REPORT
44
3. The Committee also deemed it imperative that in the best democratic tradition,
its recommendations be arrived at through a participatory and transparent
process, providing ample opportunity to all concerned. The consultation
process embraced a multifaceted approach, encompassing not only the
solicitation of written responses but also the facilitation of interaction in
person by the Committee with individuals and key stakeholders. To achieve
this, active engagement was sought from the following groups:
a. Political parties: Engagement with political parties commenced with

sending letters on 18th October 2023, to forty-six National, State, and other
political parties having at least one member in the House of the People.
The political parties were requested to send their suggestions, viewpoints,
and comments on the modalities for holding simultaneous elections. Some
political parties sent their views in response to the public notice published
on 05.01.2024.
b. Citizens: In order to engage with the citizens, the Committee decided to

publish a public notice in 105 newspapers in 16 languages, covering all
States and Union territories. In the public notice, suggestions, viewpoints,
and comments were sought from all regarding the modalities of
simultaneous elections through the website of the Committee, its official
email, and by post.
c. Experts and other Stakeholders: Suggestions were also sought from,

and interactions held with, subject-matter experts such as Former Chief
Justices of the Supreme Court and High Courts, Former Chief Election
Commissioners of India, State Election Commissioners, Bar Council of
India, eminent economists and apex business organisations.
HLC REPORT
45
II. INTERACTION WITH POLITICAL PARTIES
4. The table given below provides an overview of the responses received from
various political parties regarding the proposal for simultaneous elections. 47
Political parties provided feedback, with 32 agreeing and 15 indicating
disagreement with simultaneous elections. 15 Political parties did not respond
despite request for suggestions and reminders given to them.
Table-3.1: List of Responses from Political parties
TOTAL RESPONSES
INTERACTION IN
S.NO TOTAL FEEDBACK YES NO
PERSON
1. 62 47 32 15 18
RESPONSES FROM 46 POLITICAL PARTIES HAVING AT LEAST ONE

REPRESENTATION IN THE HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE
Date Of
S.No. Name of Political Parties Favour/Against Meeting Date
Suggestions
NATIONAL PARTIES
1. Aam Aadmi Party 18.01.2024 Against 08.02.2024
2. Bahujan Samaj Party 14.12.2023 Against
3. Bharatiya Janata Party 20.02.2024 Favour 20.02.2024
4. Communist Party of India 06.02.2024
07.12.2023 Against
(Marxist) CPI (M)
5. Indian National Congress 17.01.2024 Against
6. National People’s Party 28.01.2024 Favour
STATE PARTIES
1. All India United
18.12.2023 Against
Democratic Front
2. All India Trinamool 06.02.2024
11.01.2024 Against
Congress
3. All India Anna Dravida
13.01.2024 Favour
Munnetra Kazhagam
4. All India Majilis-E- 14.02.2024
15.01.2024 Against
Ittehadul Muslimeen
5. All Jharkhand Student 30.01.2024 Favour
Union (AJSU)
6. Apna Dal (Soney Lal) 22.01.2024 Favour 10.02.2024
HLC REPORT
46

Date Of
Suggestions
7. ASOM Gana Parishad 28.01.2024 Favour
8. Biju Janata Dal 24.01.2024 Favour
9. Bharat Rashtra Samiti Not Responded
10. Communist Party of India 10.01.2024 Against

07.02.2024
(CPI)
11. Dravida Munnetra 10.02.2024
16.01.2024 Against
Kazhagam (DMK)
12. Indian Union Muslim Not Responded
League
13. Jammu And Kashmir
Not Responded
National Conference
14. Janata Dal (Secular) Not Responded
15. 17.02.2024 Favour 17.02.2024

Janata Dal (United)
16. Jharkhand Mukti Morcha Not Responded
17. Kerala Congress (M) Not Responded
18. Lok Jan Shakti Party (R) 15.01.2024 Favour

19. Mizo National Front 21.02.2024 Favour
20. Naga People's Front

12.01.2024 Against
(NPF)
21. Nationalist Congress Party Not Responded
22. Nationalist Democratic 22.01.2024 Favour

Progressive Party
23. Not Responded
Rashtriya Janata Dal
24. Rashtriya Loktantrik Party Not Responded
25. Revolutionary Socialist Not Responded

Party
26. Samajwadi Party 11.01.2024 Against 06.02.2024
27. Shiv Sena 24.01.2024 Favour 01.02.2024
28. Sikkim Krantikari Morcha 18.11.2023 Favour
HLC REPORT
47

Date Of
Suggestions
29. Shiromani Akali Dal 15.01.2024 Favour
30. Sikkim Democratic Front Not Responded
31. Telugu Desam Party Not Responded
32. United People’s Party

27.01.2024 Favour
Liberal
Yuvajana Sramika Rythu Not Responded
33. Congress Party
REGISTERED UNRECOGNISED PARTIES

Marumalarchi Dravida
1. Munnetra Kazhagam 13.01.2024 Against
(MDMK)
2. Pattali Makkal Katchi 17.01.2024 Favour
3. Rashtriya Lok Dal Not Responded
Republican Party of India 08.02.2024
4. 08.02.2024 Favour
(Athawale) (RPI(Atwl))
Shiromani Akali Dal
5. Not Responded
(Simranjit Singh Mann)
Tamil Maanila Congress
6. 08.01.2024 Favour
(M)
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 20.02.2024
7. 20.02.2024 Against
Katchi
RESPONSES FROM ADDITIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES TO PUBLIC NOTICE

PUBLISHED ON 05.01.2024
Name Of Political Date Of Meeting
S. No. Yes/No
Parties Suggestions Date
1. Communist Party of
India (Marxist- 08.01.2024 Against
Leninist) Liberation
2. Rashtriya Lok Janata
27.01.2024 Favour 31.01.2024
Dal
3. Social Democratic
10.01.2024 Against
Party of India
4. United Kisan Vikas
06.02.2024 Favour
Party
5. Bharatiya Samaj Party 24.01.2024 Favour
HLC REPORT
48
RESPONSES FROM ADDITIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES TO PUBLIC NOTICE

PUBLISHED ON 05.01.2024
Name Of Political Date Of Meeting
S. No. Yes/No
Parties Suggestions Date
6. Gorakha National 30.01.2024 Favour
Liberal Front
7. Hindustani Aavam 26.01.2024 Favour 02.02.2024
Morcha
8. Indian Makkal Kalvi 29.01.2024 Favour
Munnetra Kazhagam
9. Indigenous People’s 30.01.2024 Favour
Front of Tripura
10. Jan Surajay Shakti 29.01.2024 Favour
11. Rashtriya Lok Jan 25.01.2024
24.01.2024 Favour
Shakti Party
12. Maharashtrawadi 24.01.2024 Favour 27.01.2024
Gomantak Party
13. Nishad Party 22.01.2024 Favour
14. Puthia Nidhi Katchi 09.02.2024 Favour
15. Rashtrawadi Congress 30.01.2024 Favour 31.01.2024
Party (Ajit Pawar)
16. Democratic Progressive 25.02.2024 Favour
Azad Party
III. NATIONAL PARTIES
5. Aam Aadmi Party
Aam Aadmi Party, in their letter dated 18th January 2024, and interaction in
person with the High Level Committee on 8th February 2024, opposed the idea
of One Nation, One Election asserting that the implementation of simultaneous
elections would undermine democracy, the basic structure of the Constitution,
and the federal polity of the country. It argued that the proposal would
“institutionalise a Presidential form of government which cannot be dislodged
by a vote of no-confidence.”
HLC REPORT
49
Fig. 3.1: Members of Aam Aadmi Party submitting memorandum to Chairman

HLC.
6. Indian National Congress
The Indian National Congress (All-India Congress Committee), in their letter

dated 17th January 2024, opposed the idea of One Nation, One Election and
contended that implementing simultaneous elections would result in “substantial
changes to the basic structure of the Constitution”. They asserted that it would
go against the “guarantees of federalism” and “subvert the parliamentary
democracy.” They further stated that “argument that cost of conducting elections
are extremely high seems baseless” and “felt that people will be willing to
consider this small amount as the cost of free and fair elections to uphold
democracy”. Further, they stated that “there is no place for the concept of
simultaneous elections in a country that has adopted a Parliamentary system of
government”. The High Level Committee requested for interaction in person.
However, the party did not respond.
7. Bahujan Samaj Party
The Bahujan Samaj Party, in their letter dated 14th December 2023, expressed
their viewpoint on holding simultaneous elections, suggesting that the High
HLC REPORT
50
Level Committee should provide a working framework for the same. While they
did not explicitly oppose simultaneous elections, they highlighted concerns
regarding the large territorial extent and population of the country, which could
make implementation challenging. They emphasised the need to strengthen,
optimise, and ensure responsiveness in the existing electoral system before
embarking upon massive changes. They underscored that the real solution to the
current challenges lies in conducting free and fair elections in accordance with
the Constitution and the will of the people and promoting adherence to the rule
of law among all stakeholders. The High Level Committee requested for
interaction in person. However, there was no response.
8. Bharatiya Janata Party
Bharatiya Janata Party, in their letter dated 20th February 2024, and interaction
in person with the High Level Committee supported the concept of simultaneous
elections and emphasised that simultaneous elections “worked seamlessly
between 1952 to 1967” and highlighted the subsequent recommendations from
the Election Commission of India (ECI) and other reports. The primary concerns
raised include the significant loss of up to 800 days in five years due to the
imposition of Model Code of Conduct, adversely affecting developmental work
and governance efficiency. They emphasised the economic burden of frequent
elections, with States facing the Model Code of Conduct 3-4 times in five years
and the diversion of security forces from crucial internal security duties. The
Party proposed a unified electoral system with one voter ID card for all three
tiers of government. They underscored that one election for all bodies is in the
national interest for economic, administrative, and democratic reasons.
Supporting their case, the Party provided an example from Maharashtra, where
307 days were lost to the Model Code of Conduct in a specific year.
HLC REPORT
51
Fig. 3.2: President of BJP submitting memorandum to Chairman HLC.
9. Communist Party of India (Marxist)
Communist Party of India (Marxist), in their letter dated 7th December 2023,
objected “to the manner in which the concept of simultaneous elections is being
sought to be imposed.” They stressed that the concept of holding simultaneous
elections is “fundamentally anti-democratic and strikes at the root of the
parliamentary democratic system as ordained in the Constitution.” The members
of the Party also came for interaction in person with the HLC on 6th February
2024.
Fig. 3.3: Members of CPI(M) with Chairman and other members of HLC.
HLC REPORT
52
10. National People’s Party (NPP)
The National People's Party (NPP), in their letter dated 28th January 2024, agreed
in principle with holding simultaneous elections to the House of the People and
State Legislative Assemblies. The NPP urged the High Level Committee for a
separate consultative meeting for regional parties in the North-East Region.
IV. STATE PARTIES
11. All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, in their letter dated 13th January
2024, supported One Nation, One Election. They enumerated the advantages of
simultaneous elections like avoidance of disruption of normal public life due to
imposition of the Model Code of Conduct, and administrative convenience.
However, they stated that “if simultaneous elections are to be implemented for
reducing expenditure and concentrated use of resources during elections, it
would be necessary for a definitive period to be put in place for getting necessary
infrastructure.”
12. All India Trinamool Congress
All India Trinamool Congress, in their letter dated 11th January 2024,
disapproved of the concept of holding simultaneous elections and questioned the
“constitutional and structural implications of One Nation, One Election.” They
stated that this would be against the federal structure of the Indian Constitution
and will go against the “basic electoral principles.” They also contended that
forcing Vidhan Sabha to go for premature elections just for the sake of
contemporaneity will be unconstitutional and ultimately lead to suppression of
state issues. The party also had an interaction in person with High Level
Committee on 6th February 2024.
HLC REPORT
53
Fig. 3.4: Members of All India Trinamool Congress with members of HLC.
13.All Jharkhand Students Union Party (AJSU)
All Jharkhand Students Union Party, in their letter dated 30th January 2024,
supported the holding of simultaneous elections. They stated that they have held
elaborate deliberations with members of the regional and national office bearers
of the Party and have undertaken a thorough study of relevant materials
pertaining to simultaneous elections. They highlighted that simultaneous
elections will reduce cost, improve governance, and minimise the disruptive
effect on everyday life on account of the frequent application of the Model Code
of Conduct (MCC) due to elections.
14.All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM)
All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen, in their letter dated 15th January 2024,
and a meeting in person on 14th February 2024, opposed the idea of One Nation,
One Election questioning the constitutional permissibility of incorporating such
a “fundamental change.” The Party emphasised that elections are not mere
formalities, and voters should not be treated as rubber stamps. They argued that
electoral democracy is the pillar on which India's constitutional edifice stands,
HLC REPORT
54
and elections cannot be subject to weak considerations such as administrative

convenience or economic viability.
Fig. 3.5: President of AIMIM submitting a memorandum to Chairman HLC.
15. All India United Democratic Front
All India United Democratic Front, in their letter dated 18th December 2023,
expressed their view against One Nation, One Election stating that regional
parties will face an “organizational crisis to choose between regional and
national interest and have to fight for their existence.” The High Level
Committee requested for interaction in person. However, there was no response.
16. Apna Dal (Soney Lal)
Apna Dal (Soney Lal), in their letter dated 22nd January 2024, and interaction in
person with the High Level Committee on 10th February 2024, expressed support
for simultaneous elections on the premise of (i) difficulties faced by political
parties in contesting frequent elections and (ii) the repeated application of the
Model Code of Conduct hindering development activities. The party further
suggested learning from the good practices of simultaneous elections of other
countries like Indonesia, South Africa, and Sweden. Similar endeavours for
HLC REPORT
55
conducting simultaneous elections for the House of the People and State
Legislative Assemblies would help in realising the aspirations of modern India.
Fig.3.6: President of Apna Dal (Soneylal) submitting a memorandum to Chairman HLC.
17.Asom Gana Parishad (AGP)
Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), in their letter dated 28th January 2024, supported
simultaneous elections as it is not an alien idea for India. AGP emphasised the
feasibility of simultaneous elections, refuting claims of impracticality and
constitutional contradictions. They highlighted the challenges posed by frequent
elections, stressing the negative impact on governance and financial strain on
government agencies.
HLC REPORT
56
18. Biju Janata Dal
Biju Janata Dal (BJD), in their letter dated 24th January 2024, regarding
simultaneous elections, conveyed the Party’s longstanding support for the idea,
emphasising the fiscal strain and delays in governance caused by holding
multiple elections at various levels and periods. BJD contended that adopting the
concept of the simultaneous elections would alleviate these difficulties, resulting
in improved coordination and execution of development programmes while
reinforcing cooperative federalism. Inspired by the possible benefits, BJD
exhorted the High Level Committee to “take it to its logical conclusion.”
19. Communist Party of India
The Communist Party of India, in their letter dated 10th January 2024, and
interaction in person on 7th February 2024, stated that they do not approve of
holding simultaneous elections. They expressed their concerns regarding the
same and stated that the proposal for simultaneous elections “is restrictive for
democracy and state rights.” They further highlighted that holding simultaneous
elections is an “attempt at curtailing diversity of opinion by imposing uniformity
and pushing the country towards one party rule”.
Fig. 3.7: General Secretary of CPI submitting a memorandum to Chairman HLC.
HLC REPORT
57
20.Dravid Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK)
Dravid Munnetra Kazhagam, in their letter dated 16th January 2024, and
interaction in person on 10th February 2024, conveyed their opposition to the
idea of One Nation, One Election and suggested that holding simultaneous
elections would require premature dissolution of State Legislative Assemblies,
which is unconstitutional. The Party in the letter also stressed that the
“constitution of the High Level Committee by the union government is illegal”
and raised questions on the jurisdiction of the same.
Fig. 3.8: DMK leader Shri P. Wilson submitting a memorandum to Chairman HLC.
21.Janata Dal (United)
A delegation from Janata Dal (United) met the Chairman and members of the
High Level Committee on 17th February 2024. The Party extended its support to
the concept of simultaneous elections and emphasised that it would lead to cost
saving, policy continuity, and focused governance. They also asserted that
simultaneous elections would streamline the election process. The Party
however suggested that the Local Body elections should not be included with
the House of the People and State Legislative Assembly polls, because in
different States these elections are held under different laws. During the Local
Body elections development work does not come to a halt because the Model
HLC REPORT
58
Code of Conduct is imposed only in a district-specific manner. The Party

suggested that instead of holding Local Body elections with the House of the
People and State Legislative Assemblies, these elections could be held together
for the entire country.
Fig. 3.9: Delegation from JD(U) submitting a memorandum to Chairman HLC.
22.Lok Janshakti Party (R)

Lok Janshakti Party (R), in their letter dated 15th January 2024, supported
simultaneous elections as a “transformative proposal” as it would “set a new
milestone in strengthening the democratic process”. The letter advocated that
simultaneous elections would promote free and fair elections, transparency,
accountability, and a reduction in election expenditures. They believe it would
lead to greater stability, national unity, and lower budgetary burden.
23.Mizo National Front
Mizo National Front, in their letter dated 21st February 2024, supported the idea
and proposal of One Nation, One Election.
HLC REPORT
59
24.Naga Peoples’ Front
Naga People's Front, in their letter dated 12th January 2024, has voiced
opposition to One Nation, One Election, stating that it would “invariably defeat
the spirit of federal structure.” It was also stressed that a national agenda would
overshadow regional and local issues, leading to an eclipse of regional parties.
They objected to the overhaul of the Constitution of India, which will be required
for the implementation of the simultaneous elections. The High Level
Committee requested for interaction in person. However, there was no response.
25.Nationalist Democratic Progressive Party (NDPP)
National Democratic Progressive Party (NDPP), in their letter dated 22nd January
2024, affirmed that One Nation, One Election minimises the imposition of the
Model Code of Conduct, enabling continuous development programs without
disrupting Union and State government activities.
26.Samajwadi Party
Samajwadi Party, in their letter dated 11th January 2024, and interaction in
person on 6th February 2024, stressed that holding simultaneous elections to the
House of the People and State Legislative Assemblies would lead to domination
of national over regional issues. They also observed that if simultaneous
elections are implemented, state-level parties will not be able to compete with
National parties in electoral strategy and expenditure leading to increased
discord between National and State level parties. It may be noted that earlier the
Party had supported simultaneous elections.
HLC REPORT
60
Fig. 3.10: Delegation from Samajwadi Party with Chairman HLC and other members.
27.Shiv Sena Party
The Shiv Sena Party, in their letter dated 24th January 2024, expressed its “full
support” for the concept of simultaneous elections. They highlighted the adverse
impact of frequent elections on the economy and development, advocating for
synchronised elections across all States. The letter emphasised the financial
burden, administrative paralysis, and deployment challenges during elections,
stating that simultaneous elections would address these issues, leading to
focused governance. In their interaction in person with the Chairman on 1st
February 2024, the members of the Party while reiterating the Party's support for
the implementation of simultaneous elections pointed out that elections to the
Local Bodies entail a complex procedure and should not be synchronised with
State Legislative Assembly and the House of the People elections.
HLC REPORT
61
Fig. 3.11: Delegation from Shiv Sena Party with Chairman HLC.
28. Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD)
Shiromani Akali Dal, in their letter dated 15th January 2024, supported the
holding of simultaneous elections on the grounds that it would save expenditure
of the Government, political parties, and candidates.
29. Sikkim Krantikari Morcha
Sikkim Krantikari Morcha, in their letter dated 18th November 2023, expressed
their “unwavering support” for One Nation, One Election. They explained that
elections would help optimise resource allocation, reduce financial burden,
better utilise limited resources, and reduce prolonged deployment of security
forces, which disrupts everyday life.
30. United People’s Party Liberal
The United People’s Party Liberal, in their letter dated 27th January 2024
supported the concept of One Nation, One Election.
HLC REPORT
62
V. REGISTERED UNRECOGNISED PARTIES
31. Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK)
Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK), in their letter dated 13th

January 2024, stated that they are not in favour of One Nation, One Election and
based their argument on constitutional grounds. They did not negate the merits
of holding simultaneous elections namely, reduced election cost and focus of the
government on governance, but stated that there is no concrete evidence for the
same. The High Level Committee requested for interaction in person. However,
there was no response.
32.Pattali Makkal Katchi
Pattali Makkal Katchi, in their letter dated 17th January 2024, supported the
concept of One Nation, One Election since this was already in vogue in the initial
years after independence. They stated that it may prevent frequent interruptions
to development projects because of elections, and reduce huge expenditures on
them. A proportional representation system should be introduced to give stability
to the elected bodies. Elections to State Legislative Assemblies and Local Bodies
should be held together, two and a half years after elections to the House of the
People take place.
33.Republican Party of India (Athawale)
Shri Ram Das Athawale, Minister of State for Social Justice and Empowerment
and President of the Republican Party of India (Athawale) met with the High
Level Committee on 8th February 2024. During the meeting, Shri Athawale
expressed his Party's support for the concept of One Nation, One Election. He
highlighted that the idea of simultaneous elections was conceived by Baba Saheb
Ambedkar, and as a democratic and secular party, the Republican Party of India
stands in favour of holding simultaneous elections. Additionally, Shri Athawale
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pointed out that frequent elections pose challenges for the public, diverting the
attention of political parties from governance to electoral activities.
Fig. 3.12: Republican Party of India leader, Shri Ram Das Athawale submitting a
memorandum to the Chairman HLC.
34.Tamil Maanila Congress
Tamil Maanila Congress, in their letter dated 8th January 2024, supported the
concept of One Nation, One Election. They emphasised that development work
is halted due to the application of the Model Code of Conduct (MCC).
35.Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi, met in person with High Level Committee on

20th February 2024, and opposed simultaneous elections. The Party asserted that
the concept of simultaneous elections is against the spirit of the Constitution,
erodes the federal structure and would introduce a “Presidential form of
government through the back door”.
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Fig. 3.13: Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi, submitting a memorandum to the Chairman

HLC.
VI. OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES RESPONSE TO PUBLIC NOTICE
36.Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF)
Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) Central Committee, in their letter

dated 30th January 2024, expressed their support for the concept of One Nation,
One Election. GNLF provided a historical context by pointing out that
simultaneous elections were held until 1967 and refuted claims of constitutional
violation.
37. Hindustani Awam Morcha
Hindustani Awam Morcha, through their letter dated 26th January 2024 and in
person interaction with HLC on 2nd February 2024, supported the concept of One
Nation, One Election. The Party highlighted the importance of suitable
amendments and suggested a consensus-building process among political
parties. They also said that including Local Body elections with the House of the
People and State Legislative Assembly polls is also possible and there will be no
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logistical issues. Dr. Santosh Suman, National Chairperson of Hindustani Awam

Morcha further reiterated the same when he met the Chairman of High Level
Committee and emphasised that the tradition of simultaneous elections, which
had been disrupted, needed to be restored.
Fig. 3.14: HAM leader, Dr. Santosh Suman with the Chairman HLC.
38. Indian Makkal Kalvi Munnetra Kazhagam
Indian Makkal Kalvi Munnetra Kazhagam, in their letter dated 29th January
2024, to the Chairman of the High Level Committee, expressed support for
simultaneous elections.
39. Indigenous People’s Front of Tripura (IPFT)
Indigenous People’s Front of Tripura (IPFT), in their letter dated 30th January
2024, supported the concept of simultaneous elections. They agreed with the
idea of holding elections to both House of the People and State Legislative
Assemblies simultaneously.
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40. Jan Surajya Shakti Party
Jan Surajya Shakti Party supported the concept of simultaneous elections. They
emphasised the need for legal amendments, citing historical instances, and
addressing challenges due to frequent polls.
41. Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party
The Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party of Goa, in their letter dated 24th January
2024, supported the concept of One Nation, One Election. The support was
further emphasised by Shri Pandurang alias Deepak Dhavalikar, President of the
party in his interaction in person with the Chairman of the High Level Committee
on 27th January 2024.
Fig. 3.15: MGP leader, Shri Pandurang with the Chairman HLC.
42.Nirbal Indian Shoshit Hamara Aam Dal (Nishad Party)
Nirbal Indian Shoshit Hamara Aam Dal (Nishad Party), in their letter dated 22nd
January 2024, supported the concept of simultaneous elections.
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43.Nationalist Congress Party
The Nationalist Congress Party, in their letter dated 30th January 2024, and in
person interaction with High Level Committee on 31st January 2024, supported
the idea of One Nation, One Election and described it as a transformative reform
reflecting the aspirations of modern India. They refuted concerns about national
party dominance, asserting that voters can differentiate between local and
national issues.
Fig. 3.16: NCP leaders submitting memorandum to the Chairman HLC.
44.Puthiya Needhi Katchi
Puthiya Needhi Katchi, in their letter dated 9th February 2024, expressed support
for the One Nation, One Election concept.
45.Rashtriya Lok Janshakti Party
The Rashtriya Lok Janshakti Party, in their letter dated 24th January 2024, and in
personal interaction with High Level Committee on 25th January 2024, supported
the concept of simultaneous elections. They emphasised that there is a heavy
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financial burden due to frequent elections and also proposed creating a single
electoral list.
Fig. 3.17: Representatives from Rashtriya Lok Janshakti Party meeting Chairman HLC.
46.Rashtriya Lok Janta Dal
Rashtriya Lok Janata Dal, in their letter dated 27th January 2024, supported the
concept of One Nation, One Election. They highlighted the prevalence of
simultaneous elections until 1967 and dismissed the objection regarding its
unconstitutionality.
Fig. 3.18: Delegation from RLJD submitting memorandum to the Chairman HLC.
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Shri Upendra Kushwaha, National President of the Party also had an interaction
in person with Shri Ram Nath Kovind, Chairman of the High Level Committee,
on 31st January 2024.
47. Suheldev Bharatiya Samaj Party
The party expressed support for the concept of the One Nation, One Election.
48.United Kisan Vikas Party
The United Kisan Vikas Party, in their letter dated 6th February 2024 supported
One Nation, One Election.
49.Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation
The Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation, in their letter dated

8th January 2024, opposed the concept of One Nation, One Election. They
asserted that simultaneous elections are against the basic structure of the
Constitution and would lead to one-party dominance.
50.Democratic Progressive Azad Party
The Democratic Progressive Azad Party, in their letter dated 28th February 2024,
supported the idea of simultaneous elections as frequent elections adversely
affect the growth and development of the country due to the imposition of the
Model Code of Conduct.
51.Social Democratic Party of India
Social Democratic Party of India, in their letter dated 10th January 2024, opposed
One Nation, One Election. They stated that implementing simultaneous elections
is unnecessary, impracticable, and “does not square with the concept of
federalism”.
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VII RESPONSES FROM THE FORMER CHIEF JUSTICES OF THE

SUPREME COURT AND HIGH COURTS
52.The Table 3.2 summarises consultations with the last four Chief Justices of
the Supreme Court of India regarding the proposal for simultaneous elections.
All four former Chief Justices— Justice Dipak Misra, Justice Ranjan Gogoi,
Justice Sharad Arvind Bobde and Justice U.U. Lalit participated in person
consultations and provided written responses, all of which were in favour of
the Simultaneous Elections. This demonstrates unanimous support among
these Former Chief Justices of India for simultaneous elections in India.
Table-3.2 : List of responses from Former Chief Justices of India

Former Chief Justices of India
Sl. Physical Written
Name of Justice Favour/ Against
No. Consultation Response
Former Chief Justice
of India,
1. Yes Yes Favour
Shri Justice Dipak
Misra
of India,
2. Yes Yes Favour
Shri Justice Ranjan
Gogoi
of India,
3. Yes Yes Favours
Shri Justice Sharad
Arvind Bobde
4. of India, Yes Yes Favour
Justice U. U. Lalit
53.Justice Dipak Misra, Former Chief Justice of India
On 19th February 2024, Justice Dipak Misra interacted with the Chairman of the
Committee. In his letter dated 28th February 2024, he emphasised that the
arguments of simultaneous elections being against the basic structure or
federalism or anti-democratic are misplaced. The Parliament is empowered to
make appropriate amendments to the Constitution to enable the syncronising of
elections for the House of the People and the State Legislative Assemblies. He
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highlighted the “doctrine of expansion” and the “doctrine of reduction” in regard

to the eventualities of extension and dissolution of the House before the expiry
of its term. He also stressed that India, being quasi-federal, simultaneous
elections for the House of the People and State Legislative Assemblies are not
anti-federal.
He further stated that “synchronising elections at the National and State levels
could lead to greater administrative efficiency by reducing the frequency of
elections and associated costs. This efficiency could benefit both the Central
Government and State Governments, enable streamlining the electoral process
and allow elected representatives to focus more on governance. Adoption of One
Nation, One Election in India is likely to brook well with the spirit of the
Constitution and also with the principles of collaborative federalism.”
Fig. 3.19: Justice Dipak Misra, Former CJI with the Chairman HLC.
54. Justice Ranjan Gogoi, Former Chief Justice of India
In a consultation and subsequent letter on 8th February 2024, Justice Gogoi

supported simultaneous elections, citing advantages like cost efficiency,
administrative simplification, increased voter engagement, and decreased
influence of money and muscle power. He also proposed the requirement of
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constitutional amendments and implementation strategies like consensus-

building, establishment of an appropriate legislative framework, and enhanced
voter awareness campaigns.
Fig. 3.20: Justice Ranjan Gogoi, Former CJI with the Chairman HLC.
55.Justice S.A. Bobde, Former Chief Justice of India
On 19th February 2024, Justice S.A. Bobde met and interacted with the Chairman
of the Committee, Shri Ram Nath Kovind. He gave his considered views on the
subject during the meeting and emphasised that the arguments of simultaneous
elections being against the basic structure or federalism or anti-democratic are
misplaced.
Fig. 3.21: Justice S.A. Bobde, Former CJI with the Chairman HLC.
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56.Justice U.U Lalit, Former Chief Justice of India
In a consultation on 27th January 2024, Justice U.U. Lalit supported simultaneous

elections, citing their potential to enhance the electoral process, uphold
democratic principles, and reduce public expenditure. He noted that frequent
elections often disrupt decision making and developmental work due to the
recurrent imposition of the Model Code of Conduct.
Fig. 3.22: Justice U.U. Lalit, Former CJI with the Chairman HLC.
57.Justice Hemant Gupta, Former Judge Supreme Court of India
In his letter dated 26th February 2024, Justice Hemant Gupta, former Judge of
Supreme Court stated that he fully supported the concept and initiative of
simultaneous elections. He highlighted several advantages of simultaneous
elections such as cost reduction, better governance, more voter turnout, and
avoidance of diversion of security forces from their core responsibilities to
elections. He emphasised that the Election Commission of India should be given
logistical support for the conduct of simultaneous elections. To make
simultaneous elections successful, mobilisation of public support, awareness,
and education campaigns on simultaneous elections should be organised. He also
proposed possible phasing of the simultaneous elections.
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Fig. 3.23: Justice Hemant Gupta, Former Judge of Supreme Court with the Chairman
HLC.
The Table 3.3 below presents responses from Former Chief Justices of major
High Courts in India regarding simultaneous elections. Among the Former Chief
Justices, most of them expressed favour for simultaneous elections, both through
physical consultations and written responses. The majority of Former Chief
Justices supported simultaneous elections, highlighting their potential benefits,
while a smaller number raised concerns or objections.
Table:3.3 List of responses from Former Chief Justices of major High Courts
Former Chief Justices of High Courts

SL. INTERACTION WRITTEN FAVOUR/
NAME OF JUSTICE
NO. IN PERSON RESPONSE AGAINST
Former Chief Justice of
Delhi High Court, Justice
1. Yes Yes Against
Ajit Prakash Shah

2. Delhi High Court, Justice Yes Yes Favour
Gorla Rohini
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Former Chief Justices of High Courts

SL. INTERACTION WRITTEN FAVOUR/
NAME OF JUSTICE
NO. IN PERSON RESPONSE AGAINST
Allahabad High Court,
3. Yes No Favour
Justice Dilip Babasaheb
Bhosale
Calcutta High Court,
4. No Yes Against
Justice Girish Chandra
Gupta
Rajendra Menon
6. Bombay High Court, Yes Yes Favour
Justice Pradeep Nandrajog
Dhirubhai Naranbhai Patel
8. Madras High Court, Yes No Against
Justice Sanjib Banerjee
9. Allahabad High Court, No Yes Favour
Justice Sanjay Yadav
Calcutta High Court,
10. Yes No Favour
Justice Prakash
Shrivastava
Madras High Court,
11. Yes No Favour
Justice Munishwar Nath
Bhandari
Bombay High Court,
12 Yes Yes Favour
Justice Ramesh
Deokinandan Dhanuka
58.Justice Ajit Prakash Shah, Former Chief Justice, Delhi High Court
Justice Shah in his interaction on 1st February 2024, opposed the concept of
simultaneous elections. Justice Shah highlighted that simultaneous elections
curb democratic expression along with concerns about distorted voting patterns
and State level political alterations. Additionally, he said that simultaneous
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elections hinder political accountability, as fixed terms offer representatives

unwarranted stability without performance scrutiny, challenging democratic
principles.
Fig. 3.24: Justice Ajit Prakash Shah, Former Chief Justice Delhi High Court
59. Justice G. Rohini, Former Chief Justice, Delhi High Court
In a consultation on 18th January 2024, Justice G Rohini advocated for

simultaneous elections, proposing fixed-date elections every five years as the
“imposition of the Model Code of Conduct puts on hold the entire development
activities of the government.” However, she suggested that it would be
impossible and impractical to synchronise the third-tier election schedules with
those of the House of the People and State Legislative Assembly elections due
to the large numbers of Local Bodies.
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Fig. 3.25: Justice G Rohini, Former Chief Justice Delhi High Court with the
Chairman HLC.
60.Justice Dilip Bhosale, Former Chief Justice, Allahabad High Court
Through a personal interaction on 24th January 2024, Justice Bhosale supported

simultaneous elections but noted implementation hurdles. He affirmed that
holding simultaneous elections would control spending on freebies. He further
said that policy should be framed to ensure that local body elections are not held
along party lines.
Fig. 3.26: Justice Dilip Bhosale, Former Chief Justice Allahabad High Court
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Justice Bhosale suggested that a one-time curtailment of the tenure of some State
Legislative Assemblies or increase of some will not be undemocratic and would
only be ‘part of the reasonable process’ for synchronising election cycles in the
country.
61.Justice G.C Gupta, Former Chief Justice, Calcutta High Court
In the email dated 14th January 2024, Justice Gupta opposed simultaneous
elections. He said that the idea of simultaneous elections is not conducive to the
principles of democracy.
62.Justice Rajendra Menon, Former Chief Justice, Delhi High Court
In a consultation on 24th January 2024, Justice Menon supported simultaneous

elections and enumerated its benefits, like cost saving, policy continuity, and
increased voter turnout. He was cognisant of the critics' concerns about
constitutional challenges and logistical issues, proposing solutions like
constitutional amendments and pilot programs. To address challenges, he
suggested strategies such as seeking political consensus and voter education,
emphasising the importance of continuous review mechanisms.
Fig. 3.27: Justice Rajendra Menon, Former Chief Justice Delhi High Court with the
Chairman HLC.
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63.Justice Pradeep Nandrajog, Former Chief Justice of Bombay High

Court
Justice Nandrajog, in a letter and consultation on 29th and 30th January 2024,
respectively, supported simultaneous elections, citing the significant extra
expenditure incurred by separate elections to House of the People and State
Legislative Assemblies and the logistical challenges they pose. He emphasised
the prolonged security force deployment, administrative disruptions and
advocated streamlining resources. He suggested amendments to Articles 85(1),
174(2), and 83(2) to facilitate implementation.
Fig. 3.28: Justice P Nandrajog, Former Chief Justice Bombay High Court with the
Chairman HLC.
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64.Justice Dhirubhai Naranbhai Patel, Former Chief Justice, Delhi High

Court
In a consultation on 19th February 2024, Justice Dhirubhai Naranbhai Patel

supported the concept of simultaneous elections while citing that it is widely
prevalent in several other countries like Sweden, Belgium, South Africa, and
Nepal. He highlighted that imposition of the Model Code of Conduct leads to
the “suspension of developmental projects and other government activities”. He
asserted that the way forward would involve a delicate balance between the
efficiency gains of simultaneous elections and the foundational principles of
federalism, democratic integrity, and political plurality.
Fig. 3.29: Justice Dhirubhai Naranbhai Patel, Former Chief Justice Delhi High
65.Justice Sanjib Banerjee, Former Chief Justice, Madras High Court
In a consultation on 27th January 2024, Justice Banerjee opposed simultaneous

elections due to concerns that it would undermine India's federal structure and
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be prejudicial to regional issues. He cited empirical data showing frequent

midterm state elections, emphasising the importance of allowing people to
exercise their choices. He suggested state funding of elections as a more effective
reform to tackle corruption and inefficiency.
Fig. 3.30: Justice S Banerjee, Former Chief Justice Madras High Court with the Chairman
HLC.
66.Justice Sanjay Yadav, Allahabad High Court
Justice Yadav vide letter dated 14th January 2024, supported simultaneous
elections and suggested creating a legal framework for their permanent
implementation. He recommended common electoral rolls and the use of both
EVMs and VVPATs. However, he noted that cooperation among political parties
is essential for the success of the One Nation, One Election. To address logistical
challenges, he proposed improved training, monitoring, and transportation for
election personnel, along with revamping the voting procedure.
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67.Justice Prakash Shrivastava, Former Chief Justice, Calcutta High Court
Justice Shrivastava, in his interaction on 1st February, 2024, supported the

concept of simultaneous elections. He cited the prevalence of simultaneous
elections in the past and emphasised its potential for stability and reduced
expenses. Justice Shrivastava suggested maintaining synchronised elections
once implemented and resolving incidental issues through broader consensus,
affirming its benefits for the country.
Fig. 3.31: Justice Prakash Shrivastava, Former Chief Justice Calcutta High Court with
the Chairman HLC.
68.Justice Munishwar Nath Bhandari, Former Chief Justice, Madras High

Court
In a consultation on 17th January 2024, Justice Bhandari, in a meeting with the

Chairman of the Committee, stressed the negative impact of frequent elections
on resources and governance and supported the adoption of One Nation, One
Election. He proposed constitutional and statutory amendments to ensure that
simultaneous elections do not fall into disarray. Additionally, he suggested that
in the event of an incumbent government losing power, the incoming
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government should serve only for the remainder of the outgoing government's
term, thereby ensuring continuous simultaneous elections.
Fig. 3.32: Justice M N Bhandari, Former Chief Justice Madras High Court with the
Chairman HLC.
69. Justice Ramesh D. Dhanuka, Former Chief Justice, Bombay High Court
In a consultation on 01st February 2024, Justice Dhanuka supported simultaneous

elections, proposing constitutional amendments and changes to electoral laws.
He cautioned against overshadowing regional parties and raised concerns about
reduced political accountability without frequent state elections and the
consequent political pressures.
Fig. 3.33: Justice Ramesh D Dhanuka, Former Chief Justice Bombay High Court
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VIII INTERACTION WITH FORMER CHIEF ELECTION

COMMISSIONERS
The Table 3.4 represents the responses obtained from Former Chief Election
Commissioners regarding simultaneous elections. All four Former Chief
Election Commissioners, who were consulted both physically and through
written responses, expressed favour for simultaneous elections.
Table 3.4 : List of responses from Former Chief Election Commissioners

Former Chief Election Commissioners
NAME OF
SL. FORMER CHIEF INTERACTION WRITTEN FAVOUR/
NO. ELECTION IN PERSON RESPONSE AGAINST
COMMISSIONER
Shri Achal Kumar
1. Yes Yes Favour
Joti
2. Shri O P Rawat Yes Yes Favour
3. Shri Sunil Arora Yes Yes Favour
4. Shri Sushil Chandra Yes Yes Favour
70.Shri Achal Kumar Joti, Former Chief Election Commissioner
Shri Joti has extended his positive response through email regarding the holding
of simultaneous elections.
71.Shri O.P Rawat, Former Chief Election Commissioner
In a consultation on 19th January 2024, Shri Rawat expressed support for

simultaneous elections, initially through email and later in interaction with the
Chairman of the Committee, offering suggestions. While endorsing
simultaneous elections to the House of the People and State Legislative
Assemblies, Shri Rawat cautioned against including Local Body Elections due
to logistical challenges and potential resistance from states, emphasising the
need for review after a few years. He highlighted concerns such as insufficient
Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) availability, resistance from states, increased
violence in Local Body elections, and differing delimitation practices. He
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proposed staggering elections, or a gap between them, to optimise resource

deployment and suggested continuity of State Election Commissions for local
body elections.
Fig. 3.34: Shri O P Rawat with the Chairman HLC.
72.Shri Sunil Arora, Former Chief Election Commissioner
Shri Arora voiced his endorsement for the One Nation, One Election concept
during an interaction on 8th February 2024, emphasising on his suggestions
conveyed through his letter dated 3rd February 2024. He argued that historical
precedent, constitutional principles, and the need for efficiency support the idea.
Shri Arora referred to the S. R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) judgment,
emphasising stability and adherence to constitutional norms. He advocated for
empowering the Election Commission of India for implementing the policy,
suggesting a Committee headed by the Chief Election Commissioner or a former
one, supported by relevant government officials, to oversee its execution and
decision making process.
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Fig. 3.35: Shri Sunil Arora with the Chairman HLC.
73.Shri Sushil Chandra, Former Chief Election Commissioner
In a consultation on 18th January 2024, Shri Chandra expressed strong support

for holding simultaneous elections, both in a written letter and subsequently
during an interaction with the Chairman of the High Level Committee. He
proposed various suggestions, emphasising the need to synchronise the elections
of all three bodies to ensure governance and development continuity, aligning
with the Constitution's intent. Shri Chandra recommended abolishing the State
Election Commission and empowering the Election Commission of India (ECI)
for Panchayat elections, alongside unifying the National Electoral Roll through
Aadhar linkage. Additionally, he proposed extending State Legislative
Assemblies tenures and consolidating bye-elections within a year. He suggested
introducing a constructive vote of no-confidence and establishing EVM
warehouses at state and district levels for election management efficiency.
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Fig. 3.36: Shri Sushil Chandra with the Chairman HLC.
IX INTERACTION WITH STATE ELECTION COMMISSIONERS
The Table 3.5 outlines the responses gathered from State Election
Commissioners and Former State Election Commissioners regarding
simultaneous elections. Invitations were sent from 6th to 8th February 2024 to
the State Election Commissioners. Of the eight Commissioners consulted, seven
expressed favour for the proposal, representing a majority consensus. However,
one Commissioner opposed the idea. Overall, the majority of Commissioners,
spanning various states, supported the notion of simultaneous elections, which
highlights a significant level of endorsement for this initiative.
Table 3.5: List of responses from State Election Commissioners/ Former State Election
Commissioners
Name of State Election
Sl.
Commissioner/ Former State State Favour/Against
No.
Election Commissioner
1. Shri Sanjay Prasad Gujarat Favour
Shri B. Basavaraaju
2 Karnataka Favour
IAS (Retd.)
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Shri U.P.S. Madan

3 Maharashtra Favour
IAS (Retd.)
4 Shri V. Palanikumar Tamil Nadu Against
5. Sh. Madhukar Gupta IAS (Retd.) Rajasthan Favour
Shri Anil Kumar Khachi IAS
6. Himachal Pradesh Favour
(Retd)
Shri Sanjay Srivastava, IAS (Retd) NCT of Delhi and
7. Favour
(Former) Chandigarh
Dr. Dalip Singh, IAS (Retd.)
8. Haryana Favour
(Former)
74.Shri Sanjay Prasad, State Election Commissioner, Gujarat
In a consultation on 14th February 2024, Shri Sanjay Prasad, the State Election
Commissioner of Gujarat, raised several key points during his interactions
regarding the challenges of conducting simultaneous elections. He highlighted
issues such as delimitation concerns, the need for a common electoral roll, and
logistical challenges related to polling stations, including space limitations and
resource allocation. He emphasised the strain on human resources and
infrastructure, especially regarding the deployment of Electronic Voting
Machines (EVMs) and security personnel. Additionally, Shri Prasad noted the
importance of voter orientation and adaptation to the increased number of
candidates, as well as the necessity for efficient mechanisms for candidate
canvassing and law enforcement to maintain order during the election process.
Fig. 3.37: Shri Sanjay Prasad with the Chairman and members of HLC.
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75.Shri Dr. B. Basavaraaju, State Election Commissioner, Karnataka
In a consultation on 12th February 2024, Shri Dr. B. Basavaraaju, the State Election
Commissioner of Karnataka, highlighted several points during his interaction. He
supported the implementation of One Nation, One Election citing benefits such as
a common electoral roll, prevention of repeated enforcement of the Model Code
of Conduct, and efficient utilisation of resources by the Election Commission of
India (ECI) and State Election Commissions (SECs). He also addressed challenges
and proposed solutions, including the removal of the Taluk Panchayat tier,
delimitation reforms, adoption of OBC reservation practices, and necessary
amendments to ensure alignment with legislative terms for Panchayats and
Municipalities. Furthermore, he suggested using a single electoral roll for all
elections and advocated for amendments to relevant laws to facilitate this process.
He also recommended revising Panchayat constituency population thresholds,
transitioning to single-member constituencies, and using single-choice Electronic
Voting Machines (EVMs) to streamline the electoral process.
Fig. 3.38: Shri Dr. B Basavaraaju with the Chairman and members of HLC.
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76.Shri U.P.S. Madan, State Election Commissioner, Maharashtra
In a consultation on 12th February 2024, Shri U.P.S. Madan, the State Election
Commissioner of Maharashtra, identified potential challenges and provided
suggestions for conducting simultaneous elections. He categorised the
challenges into legal, logistical, and other issues, emphasising the complexities
arising from two separate bodies overseeing elections and the logistical demands
of such a process. To address these challenges, he proposed measures like
implementing a unified electoral law, preparing a single voter list, allocating the
same polling booths for all levels of elections, and instituting indirect elections
for all chairpersons. Additionally, he recommended conducting a census before
any changes in ward allocations, transitioning to single-member wards, and
utilising ballot boxes in rural areas until sufficient Electronic Voting Machines
(EVMs) are available. He also suggested transferring responsibility of
conducting elections to all three levels of elections to the Election Commission
of India (ECI) and abolishing the institution of State Election Commissioners in
favour of Regional Commissioners as provided under Article 324(4).
Fig. 3.39: Shri U.P.S. Madan with the Chairman and members of HLC.
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77.Shri V. Palanikumar, State Election Commissioner, Tamil Nadu
Through the letter dated 12th February 2024, the State Election Commissioner of
Tamil Nadu informed, that they recently underscored several critical challenges
affecting the electoral landscape within the state. One primary concern
emphasised was the pervasive dominance of national issues over local
considerations during elections. The Commissioner expressed apprehension that
this trend could potentially dilute the focus on region-specific challenges and
diminish the efficacy of local governance. Furthermore, the Commissioner
highlighted the acute issue of a shortage in electoral manpower, emphasising the
imperative of bolstering staff to ensure the seamless and efficient execution of
elections. In addition, there was a call for specific constitutional amendments to
address evolving complexities within the electoral process, aiming to enhance
its resilience and adaptability. Another crucial aspect raised was the need for
periodic delimitation of local wards every ten years, as the existing demarcations
were deemed outdated. This proposal sought to ensure that electoral boundaries
accurately reflected demographic shifts, guaranteeing more equitable
representation and reinforcing the foundational principles of democratic
governance within Tamil Nadu.
78.Shri Madhukar Gupta, State Election Commissioner, Rajasthan.
In a consultation on 9th February 2024, Shri Madhukar Gupta, the State Election
Commissioner of Rajasthan, provided several suggestions regarding the
synchronisation of Local Body elections with elections to the House of the
People and State Legislative Assemblies. He highlighted the variance in the
number of votes cast by voters across different states, emphasising the need for
uniformity in electoral processes. He also advocated for enhanced coordination
between State Election Commissions (SECs) and the Election Commission (EC)
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to streamline operations and improve efficiency. He proposed empowering SECs

to function as Chief Electoral Officers (CEOs) for elections to the House of the
People and State Legislative Assemblies to facilitate better coordination.
However, Shri Gupta cautioned against the potential introduction of party
politics at the village level if Local Body elections are held.
Fig. 3.40: Shri Madhukar Gupta with the Chairman and members of HLC.
79.Shri Anil Kumar Khachi, State Election Commissioner, Himachal

Pradesh
Through the letter dated 23th February 2024, the State Election Commissioner of
Himachal Pradesh, gave his comments regarding the proposed implementation
of simultaneous elections to local bodies and the House of the People and State
Legislative Assemblies. The Commissioner underscored constitutional
distinctions between the State Election Commission and the Election
Commission of India, emphasising challenges in coordinating elections handled
by these independent bodies. Potential conflicts with constitutional amendments,
particularly the 73rd and 74th Amendments, are highlighted, as they empower
local self-governance. The integration of voters' lists across various
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93
administrative units, coupled with disparities in voting methods between

Panchayat and national/state elections, poses logistical challenges and may cause
voter confusion. Additionally, the Commissioner pointed out the discrepancies
in election phases, suggesting that simultaneous elections could necessitate
reevaluation, impacting manpower and logistics. These intricacies emphasise the
need for meticulous consideration before implementing a simultaneous election
framework, recognising the nuanced nature of India's diverse electoral system.
80.Shri. Sanjay Srivastava, Former State Election Commissioner, NCT of

Delhi and UT of Chandigarh and Dr. Dalip Singh, Former State Election
Commissioner, Haryana
In a consultation on 9th February 2024, Shri Sanjay Srivastava, former State

Election Commissioner of NCT Delhi & Chandigarh UT, and Dr. Dalip Singh,
Former State Election Commissioner of Haryana, interacted with the Chairman
of the Committee. They emphasised that the election process, including logistics,
voter numbers, Model Code of Conduct (MCC), voters' lists, and Electronic
Voting Machines (EVMs), remains consistent across Local Body elections
(LBEs) and national elections. Thus, they argued that LBEs are equally as
significant as national elections. They noted that synchronising LBEs with
elections to the House of the People and State Legislative Assemblies is feasible
but requires logistical adjustments such as additional EVMs, synchronising
voters’ lists, and delimiting wards and constituencies in advance. They proposed
adding a column to the Election Commission of India's (ECI) rolls indicating
voters' respective wards to streamline the process. They highlighted the
practicality of this approach, as the machinery used by the ECI and State Election
Commissions (SECs) for electoral roll preparation is the same. They outlined
additional arrangements required for simultaneous elections, including increased
polling booths, reduced voters per booth, and simultaneous declaration of
election results to prevent voter influence. Finally, they recommended that while
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the ECI continues to conduct elections to the House of the People and State
Legislative Assemblies in a simultaneous manner, SECs should continue to
oversee LBEs.
Fig. 3.41: Shri Sanjay Srivastava and Dr. Dalip Singh with the Chairman and members of
HLC.
X INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER STAKEHOLDERS
Consultations with stakeholders included business associations like CII, FICCI,

ASSOCHAM; legal bodies like Bar Council of India. Invitations were sent on
2nd January 2024, to the apex business bodies. In addition to the wide-ranging
consultation via letters, in-person interactions were also held with the High Level
Committee on the modalities of holding simultaneous elections.
Table: 3.6 List of responses from BCI/ASSOCHAM/FICCI/CII

BCI/ASSOCHAM/FICCI/CII
NAME OF INTERACTION WRITTEN
SL. NO. FAVOUR/ AGAINST
INSTITUTION IN PERSON RESPONSE
1. Shri Manan Yes Yes Favour
Kumar Mishra
(Chairman, BCI)
2. Shri Ajay Singh Yes Yes Favour
(President,
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BCI/ASSOCHAM/FICCI/CII
NAME OF INTERACTION WRITTEN
SL. NO. FAVOUR/ AGAINST
INSTITUTION IN PERSON RESPONSE
CMD,
ASSOCHAM)
3. Shri Anish Shah Yes Yes Favour
(President,
FICCI)
4. Shri R. Dinesh Yes Yes Favour
(President, CII)
5. Akhil Bharatiya Yes Yes Favour
Adhivakta
Parishad
81.Shri Manan Kumar Mishra, Chairman Bar Council of India.
In a consultation on 27th January 2024, Shri Mishra, representing the legal

fraternity, supported the concept of One Nation, One Election advocating for
necessary legal and administrative changes, including amendments to the
Constitution and relevant laws. He emphasised empowering the Election
Commission of India for efficient management and stressed the importance of
administrative readiness and public awareness campaigns for the same. The
advantages of simultaneous elections, as highlighted by Shri Mishra, include
cost and administrative efficiency, continuous governance, voter convenience,
decentralisation of power, greater policy focus, and reduced security concerns.
Proposals to address challenges include regulating political discourse to focus
on regional issues, encouraging alliances based on regional interests, and
implementing a phased approach with pilot projects and staggered terms for
States.
He suggested allowing flexibility for States to adapt, emphasising State level
autonomy and the importance of State specific policies. Other proposals involve
addressing regional concerns during national campaigns, strengthening the role
of the Upper House, implementing oversight mechanisms, empowering local
governments, and establishing a mechanism for addressing federal imbalances.
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Fig. 3.42: Shri Manan Kumar Mishra with the Chairman of HLC.
82. Shri Ajay Singh, President, ASSOCHAM
In a consultation on 24th January, 2024, Shri Ajay Singh expressed support for
simultaneous elections, citing potential benefits for financial and capital
markets. Legal challenges include the need to amend the Constitution and
Representation of the People Act, 1951. The merits highlighted encompass
positive impacts on financial markets, the manufacturing sector, working capital,
and liquidity. Additionally, it could lead to focused governance, reduced election
costs, an end to horse trading, fewer freebies, and improved state finances.
83. Shri Anish Shah, President, FICCI
In a consultation on 6th February 2024, a six-member delegation met with the

Chairman and members of the High Level Committee on One Nation, One
Election, presenting arguments in favour of simultaneous elections. They
highlighted the negative impact of multiple elections on the Ease of Doing
Business and decision-making processes, advocating for stable government
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tenures to facilitate long-term planning and investment. At length, they pointed

out the disruption in the production systems, enhanced cost of travel uncertainty
in their ability to meet firm order lines including export and other incalculable
ways on account of large migratory workers who are integral to their production
process.
Proposing a mechanism for simultaneous elections, they suggested minimising
the Model Code of Conduct period and holding elections in two cycles spaced
two and a-half years apart, aiming for stable governance if necessary. They also
recommended measures to facilitate universal participation in elections,
including a single universal electoral roll updated through Aadhaar-based
mechanisms, and prioritising government spending for economic growth and
employability over political incentives. Overall, their proposals for simultaneous
elections were aimed to optimise governance efficiency, enhance democratic
participation, and promote sustainable economic development.
Fig. 3.43: Delegation of FICCI with the Chairman and members of HLC.
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84.Shri R. Dinesh, President, CII
A delegation of seven members from CII met with the Chairman and members
of HLC on 2nd February 2024, comprising top officials like the Director General
and President, endorsing the policy of One Nation, One Election. They raised
concerns about the challenges posed by asynchronous elections, including delays
in infrastructure projects and constraints on government staff capacity during
election cycles. Simultaneous elections, they argued, would mitigate these
issues, halving costs associated with delays and fostering stability in policy
implementation by allowing governments to focus on governance rather than
election duties. Moreover, asynchronous elections disrupt policy-making and
administration, leading to higher levels of uncertainty and economic
inefficiencies. Simultaneous elections offer a solution by minimising production
loss on election days and reducing overall expenditure while maximising
governance effectiveness. Proposed mechanisms for implementation include
conducting elections in a single stage every five years or in two stages with a
gap of at least 2.5 years between them, optimising the electoral process, and
enhancing governance continuity.
Fig. 3.44: Delegation of CII with the Chairman and members of HLC.
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85.Akhil Bharatiya Adhivakta Parishad
In a consultation on 17th February 2024, a delegation from Akhil Bharatiya

Adhivakta Parishad, comprising Prof. (Dr.) Seema Singh, National Vice
President Shri Shreehari Borikar, Organising Secretary, Adv. Jivesh Tiwari,
Delhi State, General Secretary, Adv. Bhaskar Gautam, Supreme Court Unit
Member, Adv. Apoorva Singh, Think Tank Member, and Shri. Pankaj Jamtani,
Think Tank Member interacted with the Committee members on 17th February
2024. The submission from Akhil Bharatiya Adhivakta Parishad underscores the
advantages of simultaneous elections, presenting a comprehensive argument.
The highlighted benefits include enhanced governance efficiency, reduced
expenditure, timesaving, and the mitigation of disruptions to normal life caused
by the imposition of the Model Code of Conduct. Additionally, the submission
emphasises the potential to minimise caste and religious politics, contributing to
a more streamlined democratic process. Drawing on a global perspective, the
submission delves into the practices of simultaneous elections in countries such
as Brazil, South Africa, Belgium, Argentina, Canada, the United States, and
Sweden. This comparative analysis serves to underscore the feasibility and
effectiveness of the proposed system. Furthermore, the submission engages in a
detailed examination of legal provisions, offering a thorough analysis of the
existing legal framework and its compatibility with the implementation of
simultaneous elections. In essence, the submission provides a well-rounded
perspective, combining practical advantages, international precedents, and legal
considerations to advocate for the adoption of simultaneous elections in India.
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Fig. 3.45: Consultation with Akhil Bharatiya Adhivakta Parishad
XI CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF ONOE
By: Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap
86.That ONOE is anti-democratic is based on misunderstanding and lack of

conceptual clarity of basics of democracy. Much depends on what we
consider democratic. Democracy literally means rule by the people. It has
been variously defined and has many variants — innovative, cooperative,
executive, emergent, responsible, parliamentary, populist, legislative,
competitive, fiscal, restructured, reluctant or quasi-federalism, classical,
protective, developmental, deliberative, guided, basic, representative and
even people's. Mention is also made of federation without federalism. We
have adopted for ourselves the representative system which means rule by
elected representatives of the people.
87.As for the Law Commission recommendation on Constructive Vote of No-

Confidence, it was suggested to the Commission as concomitant to another
suggestion regarding election of the Leader of the House (PM/CM) by the
House itself. The election of PM/CM by the entire house will be definitely
more democratic than the present system in which the President/Governor
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has to determine whom to call to form the government. It will solve several
other problems of instability due to changing loyalties of legislators.
88.Constructive Vote of No-Confidence implies that the motion which expresses

lack of confidence in the then government also names the alternative Leader
of the new government. That again would be more democratic and will solve
the problem of any gap between the two governments. This also completely
reinforces the idea of continued Executive Responsibility and Accountability
to the Legislature. And, this would require no amendment of the Constitution
and can be done by changing the Rules of the Houses regarding admissibility
of No-Confidence motions. Election of the Chancellor of the Federal
Republic of Germany is provided in the Basic Law in article 63 and
Constructive Vote of No-Confidence motion in Article 67. There has been no
occasion when change of Government has caused by the dissolution of the
House as a result of no-confidence motion. These suggestions would be
particularly useful in a situation when no party or pre-election alliance of
parties secures a clear majority of seats in the House of the People or in any
of the State Assemblies and the largest single party is unable to promise a
stable government, the President or Governor as the case may be, should ask
the House to elect its leader just as it elects its Speaker The person so elected
may be appointed the Prime Minister/Chief Minister. This can be done by the
President/Governor sending a message to the House under the existing
Article 86(2)/175(2).
89.When the simple question is that of determining the majority, the safest and
the simplest course would be to hold an election on the floor of the House. It
would also not be necessary then to seek a vote of confidence as, in effect, it
would have been obtained in advance of appointment through the process of
election by the House itself. This would require neither an amendment of the
Constitution nor of any law.
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90.That ONOE is unconstitutional is factually incorrect. There is enough

evidence to show that the Constitution- makers envisaged only simultaneous
elections for House of the People and State Legislative Assemblies. Also,
they provided for their terms to be same (5 years) so that they could be a co-
terminus (vide article 83 and 172). The first four General elections for State
Legislative Assemblies and House of the People were held almost
simultaneously under the same Constitution. They could not be held as being
unconstitutional. Mid-term elections were largely forced only after 1967 as a
by- product of large-scale defections and frequent toppling of governments.
91.That ONOE decision has been taken in a premeditated and pre decided
manner is not correct. It has been under consideration and has been subjected
to discussion with political parties and in public for decades the Election
Commission, the Law Commission, the Niti Aayog and above all the
Standing Committee of Parliament have considered the question and its
implications. The Government of India headed by Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee
decided to organise nation-wide debate on the theme of Electoral Reforms
for a resurgent India. A 13-member National Committee on Electoral
Reforms was set up. The National Committee organised several seminars
with representatives of political parties all over the country. The then Vice-
President Shri B.S. Shekhawat supported the idea of simultaneous elections
and the then Deputy Prime Minister Shri L. K. Advani said the proposal was
under “active consideration.” The National Commission to Review the
Working of the Constitution (NCRWC) appointed by the President also
recommended (2002) inter alia that in order to save human and other
resources, Assembly and House of the People elections, to the extent
possible, should be held simultaneously. The spirit of the recommendation
was that simultaneous elections should be accepted as the goal to be aimed at
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but that it may not be feasible to bring about the change at one point of time
with a hammer.
92.The questions that arise and need to be examined are:
(i) Whether the Constitution and the election law permit simultaneous
elections to the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies.
(ii) What are the precise contents of the proposal.
(iii) Does it seek to revive through the backdoor the earlier wish of having
fixed terms for members and Houses of legislatures and outlawing
dissolution of any House before completing its full term.
(iv) What are the likely benefits of and dangers from the proposed
simultaneous elections. Among the arguments that were being advanced
against the proposal of simultaneous elections, the strangest was the one that
it would be violative of the basic features of the Constitution and hence
unconstitutional. It was forgotten that violation of the Constitution was not
permissible even before the basic features doctrine. And, who under the sun
knew what precisely were all the basic features of the Constitution and what
parts of the Constitution did not constitute basic law of the land? Even the
judges disagreed on the lists. In any case, where did any judge ever declare
that holding separate polls for the Lok Sabha and state assemblies was part
of the basic features of the Constitution? In fact, it was not even mentioned
anywhere in the Constitution.
93.Under the Representation of the People Act, elections to a House can be held
anytime within six months preceding the date of the scheduled dissolution on
completion of the five-year term. It may be stated quite categorically that if
premature dissolution of the Houses of legislatures can be prevented,
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elections to the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies can again be synchronised
within a span of a few years. And these would be constitutional and valid.
94.The question is whether Constitution amendment is necessary or

simultaneous elections can be brought about under the existing Constitution
itself? So far as the letter of the Constitution is concerned, the position is as
follows:
A) Articles 83 and 172 provide that "unless sooner dissolved" the term of
Lok Sabha and each Legislative Assembly shall be five years.
B) Articles 85 and 174 provide that the President/Governor may from time
to time dissolve the Lok Sabha/Legislative Assembly.
C) Articles 163, (2) & (3) make it clear that the Governor can do so without
the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers and the question cannot be
raised “in any court”.
D) While Article 74 regarding the power of the President was amended to

provide that the President shall exercise his powers in accordance with the
advice of the Council of Ministers, Article 163 applying to the Council of
Ministers at the State level was not so amended and the Governor could act
on its own, i.e. his discretion could not be questioned “in any court.”
95.One is aware of the judgments of the Supreme Court in this regard but the
basic question is whether the Constitution is supreme and the supremacy of
the Supreme Court is confined to the sphere of courts or those who take oath
by the Constitution are not able to protect it?
96.That simultaneous elections are anti-federal is based on the assumption that

the Constitution of India is federal. All the amendments for use of the words
federal or federation were positively defeated in the Constituent Assembly as
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unacceptable. A classic Federation, literally and historically is the result of

an agreement. It is when two or more sovereign States resolve to surrender a
part of their sovereignty and join hands to constitute a new Union, a federal
polity is born. It is a Union without the constituting units losing their own
identities. In fact, in a classic federation, the federal government enjoys only
those powers that are by agreement surrender to it by the units. However,
there are also instances of some large countries where an existing unitary
system may decide to share powers with the units under an agreed system of
devolution or distribution of powers, for the sake of administrative
convenience or to meet linguistic or ethnic demands. Canada and India are
examples of such polities. But, in every case of federalism-classical or
otherwise the Constitution occupies the supreme position. It is written and
relatively rigid, that is, not easily amendable; there are at least two levels at
which government functions. In other words, two separate governments-
federal and state-coexist, and as the arbiter of any disputes between the
federation and the units as also between the units themselves, the highest
judiciary—federal court or Supreme Court enjoys great authority and
prestige.
97.India's Constitution has been variously described as quasi-federal, federal

with a strong unitary or pro centre bias, federal in structure but unitary in
spirit, federal in normal times but with possibilities of being converted into a
purely unitary one during Emergency, etc. The fact is that it is difficult to put
our Constitution in any strict mould of a federal or unitary type; it has features
of both. It cannot be considered unitary because it provides, for example, for
distribution of executive and legislative powers between the Union and the
States and provisions affecting the powers of the States or Union State
relations cannot be amended without ratification by the States.
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98.Averse to tyranny of models, Indian Constitution makers decided to call India

as a Union of States. We are one nation and one people; citizenship is that of
India and there is no double citizenship as in the United States.
99.Supreme value under the Constitution is unity and integrity of the nation.
Under articles 2, 3 and 4 of our Constitution the Union Parliament can by
Law passed by simple majority can change the area, boundary etc. of any
State and can even right of the State from the map of India as it has done in
the past. A Constitution which can do so can hardly be called 'federal.’
Residuary powers vest in the Union. It is not that some independent States
came together to form the Union but as Dr. B.R. Ambedkar said in the
Constituent Assembly, the Constitution divided the nation into States for
merely for "administrative convenience.”
100. But one cannot disagree with Supreme Court declaring in S.R. Bommai v.
Union of India that the States have a separate constitutional existence and
have an important role to play in the political, social, educational, and cultural
life of the people. The Constitution does provide for allocation of distinct
spheres of Legislative and Executive powers between the Union and the
States.
101. Seventh Schedule of the Constitution List II— State List, item 5 reads
"Local government, that is to say, the constitution and powers of Municipal
Corporations, improvement trusts, districts boards, mining settlement
authorities and other local authorities for the purpose of local self-
government or village administration. " That would mean that our suggesting
simultaneous elections for local bodies— Panchayats and Nagar Palikas—
with House of the People and State Legislative Assembly elections would be
considered invasion in the State sphere. Of course, that can be done by
Parliament by a Constitutional Amendment, but it is suggested that it would
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be better not to do so at present. This can be done later along with considering
other electoral reforms including the bottom- up approach of the Gandhian
Constitution.
102. The voters list can be the same for all House of the People, State Legislative
Assembly and Local Government institutions since citizenship is, in any
case is in the Union List (item 17 list one of Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution.)
103. That constitutional amendments to articles 83, 85, 172, 174, 243E, 234K,
234U, 234ZA, 356 and to Schedules V, VI, VII and IX are objected to on the
assumption that such recommendations are being made by the HLC. This is
premature, to say the least.
104. Already covered in para 90 of this Chapter.
105. That simultaneous elections are against the regional and smaller parties and
would prevent or overshadow regional issues and interest is imaginary.
Opposite hypothesis can equally well be argued. When simultaneous
elections are held it is likely that local and regional Interests may overshadow
the national interests depending upon the wave effect in the region. That India
is full of diversities is an existential reality. In India's traditionally multi-
religious, multi-racial, multi- lingual plural society united by a common
history, civilisational identity and territory, ethnicity may cut across the
dividing lines in fact, the vast majority of its citizens have multiple identities.
The same person may belong to different groups depending upon the
distinguishing criterion of religion, language, community, etc. Since society
thus gets divided both horizontally and vertically, there are hardly any
monoliths left. Every religion has its sects, languages and dialects, and castes
and subcastes. Members of almost every religious group would be divided by
language, region and caste just as members of every linguistic group may be
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divided by religion, region, caste, etc. Almost every Indian has identities in
terms of his religion, caste, language, state/region etc. Under the special
variant of Indian pluralism, the majority- minority syndrome does not apply
to ethnic groups. Thus, Indian diversities lead to strengthening the unity of
India.
106. So far as saving in expenditure is concerned the estimates have to be made

by the government agencies. One thing that can be said is that the expenditure
incurred by the candidates, companies and parties is far more than that of the
government and that is unaccounted and unaudited. It also generates and in
effect necessitates black economy.
107. As for the requirement of manpower and machines the estimates have again
to be made by the Election Commission and the Government agencies.
108. To say that the simultaneous elections would lead to Presidential form of
government is academic and depends on what we mean by Presidential form.
India’s Constitution is unique in many ways. It is a combination of
Presidential and Parliamentary forms of Government. So far as the letter of
the Constitution is concerned, we already have a President who is supreme
commander of the forces and in whom all the executive power of the Union
vests. We have a Council of Ministers to advise and the President is bound to
follow the advice.
109. So far as extension/curtailment of the terms of the Houses being against the
people's mandate is concerned it is true that the Constitution has it exists is
against the extension of the Houses of Legislatures except during emergency
but so far as curtailment is concerned the Constitution provides that "unless
dissolved earlier" their term would be five years. It is suggested that the
existing position in it may not be changed or altered but efforts made for
holding simultaneous elections for the House of the People and State
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Legislative Assembly over a period of five years, i.e. by 2029 and thereafter
simultaneous elections for House of the People and State Legislative
Assemblies would be a reality and thereafter the question of the local
elections would also be taken up.
110. Objections to Constructive Vote of No-Confidence and election of the

leader of the Houses (PM/CM) are already covered under para 87 of this
Chapter
111. To say that election for remainder of the tenure is against the Constitution
is not correct. Since the term of House of the People and State Assemblies
"unless sooner dissolved" is five years. If a seat falls vacant at present, bye
election is held for remainder of the term. The suggestion is that with the
provision of the Constructive Vote of No-Confidence and election of PM/CM
by the House of the People/State Assembly in the most unlikely event of
premature dissolution of the House, the bye election of all the members
should be for the remainder of the term thereby retaining the cycle of
112. Apart from the above 12 points, in fact, the problem is more systemic and
practical. Too many people have a vested interest in having separate elections
going round the year. The people feel that they become relevant only when
elections are round the corner. The businessmen and industrialists feel that
the election time is the one when things can be done—contracts, sanctions
and permissions extracted—by paying a price to candidates and parties in
power. They are interested in getting their things done promptly and do not
mind paying for it the money that the parties and candidates need for fighting
electoral battles. For that the remedy is to be formed in other systemic reforms
in the electoral process and political parties. There are cases where the parties
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and candidates collect more money than the spend and whether they win or
lose the election, they end up being richer.
VIEWS OF HLC ON THE COMMENTS OF DR. SUBHASH C.

KASHYAP
113. The Committee broadly agrees with the views of the Dr. Subhash C.
Kashyap. In respect of no confidence motion and the proposal of constructive
vote of no confidence of Dr. Kashyap, the Committee is of the considered
opinion that the prevailing Parliamentary practice in this regard is appropriate
and does not require any change. Making a motion of no confidence by the
Members of the Parliament is not only their right, but also their responsibility.
The Committee would not like to dilute this feature of the Indian
Parliamentary system.
XII RESPONSES RECEIVED FROM THE CITIZENS
114. On 5th January 2024, through a public notice in newspapers across the
country, public suggestions were invited by 15th January 2024, through
various channels viz postal submissions, emails to the official email of HLC
[email protected], [email protected] and the website onoe.gov.in. However, the
suggestions continued to be received and accepted beyond the deadline,
highlighting the commitment of the Committee to the principles of inclusive
and interactive engagement.
i. Responses received through the Website (onoe.gov.in)
115. As of 28th February 2024, the website feedback analysis on simultaneous

elections garnered 5,232 responses. 3,837 supported the idea, while 1,395
opposed it, signaling considerable endorsement for One Nation, One
Election.
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NO:1395
YES 3837
:
YES NO
ii. Responses Received through Post
116. In a public consultation, 154 postal responses were received on the One
Nation, One Election proposal in India. Of these, 109 favoured the idea, and
45 opposed it, reflecting active engagement and diverse democratic opinions.
NO: 45
YES: 109
YES NO
117. One hundred and nine supporters, expressing their approval through
postal suggestions, present a compelling vision for the future of Indian
elections. Their enthusiastic and analytically detailed support advocates for a
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112
fundamental shift in the electoral paradigm, viewing One Nation, One

Election not just as a logistical change but a meaningful reform. Their vision
includes an integrated election management system for efficiency, staggered
voting for governance stability, citizen advisory councils for democratic
engagement, proposals for mobile voting units and extensive voter education
campaigns to enhance accessibility. These advocates delve into the
constitutional and legislative fabric, proposing amendments with a keen
awareness of procedural sanctity and phased implementation, signifying a
mature understanding of reform as a visionary yet pragmatic process.
iii. Those not in favour
118. Fourty-five postal submissions against the proposal provide a reflective

and critical examination. This group, while smaller, enriches the democratic
dialogue by focusing on concerns about the federal structure, skepticism
regarding cost savings, and advocating for the retention of the ballot paper
system. These voices highlight logistical and practical challenges,
emphasising the importance of local issues and the potential overshadowing
of regional political dynamics by national narratives in the context of altering
the electoral calendar.
iv. Responses Received through e-mails:
119. On 5th January 2024, a notice in various newspapers invited suggestions

via [email protected], resulting in a massive response of 16,172 opinions on the
concept of One Nation, One Election from the general public, eminent
personalities, and political parties. In fact, 83% (13,396) of the public raised
their voices in favour of simultaneous elections whereas 17% (2,776) were
against simultaneous elections. Till the 28th February 2024, emails were
received. A few email responses are given below-
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113
120. Shri M. Thambi Durai (Member of Parliament, Rajya Sabha and

Former Union Minister of Law and Justice)
He supported the concept of One Nation, One Election in India and suggested
that simultaneous elections should be held in late February or early March,
ensuring favourable weather conditions, and avoiding exam seasons. He further
proposed that term of State Legislative Assemblies could be extended by a year
with Parliament's approval or under the President's Rule until simultaneous
elections. States going to polls in 2024 could align with General elections, and
those within a year after 2024 could be preponed.
121. Shri Vinod Dhall (Former Chairman, Competition Commission of

India)
He asserted that to realise the objective of One Nation, One Election, it's crucial
to reduce electioneering time and enhance governance. He pointed out that
holding elections at different times in various states can divert governance efforts
as party workers get involved in campaigning for candidates. Frequent and
unorganised rallies disrupt local governance, diverting candidates and
campaigners from their responsibilities to organise events, and hindering their
focus on essential work. Aligning election schedules can mitigate these issues and
prioritise governance over extended election periods.
122. Shri Nrusingha Charan Lenka, (Section Officer, Commerce &

Transport Department, Government of Odisha)
Shri Nrusingha supported the concept of One Nation, One Election for several
reasons. Firstly, it promises the cost and human resource savings associated with
separate elections. Secondly, the repetitive imposition of the Model Code of
Conduct during various elections often leads to policy paralysis and a
governance deficit, which simultaneous elections could alleviate. Thirdly,
implementing simultaneous elections could minimise disruptions in normal
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114
public life. Lastly, Shri Nrusingha suggested that aligning regional policies with
national agendas through simultaneous elections would be beneficial.
123. Citizen (A Non-Profit Organisation)

Citizen, a non-profit organisation, suggested initiating One Nation, One Election
from 2024. With respect to hung Assemblies, they suggested that if supplementary
elections result in a hung situation, the largest coalition or party can establish a
minority government with limited legislative control for the remaining term of the
State Legislative Assembly. If this coalition voluntarily abdicates its mandate,
President's Rule could be imposed.
124. Shri Parimal Wagh (Advocate)
Shri Parimal Wagh raised several concerns for the implementation of One Nation
One Election. He drew attention to the challenges faced by the UK in
implementing fixed terms, emphasising the need for flexibility in electoral
systems for the functionality and health of parliamentary democracies. He
highlighted the dilemma of a Union or State leader resigning and calling for mid-
term elections, testing the practicality of the concept of simultaneous elections.
Shri Wagh questioned the proposal's aim to cut election costs, suggesting that
India's GDP of 3.7 trillion USD makes financial concerns manageable. Finally,
he delved into the constitutional complexities of adjusting State Legislative
Assembly terms for synchronisation, emphasising the delicate task of reforming
electoral processes while upholding established norms.
XIII CONCLUSION
125. Extensive consultations and interaction in person by the Committee with

a diverse array of stakeholders, including political parties, eminent retired
Judges, former Chief Election Commissioners, State Election
Commissioners, and prominent organisations such as the Bar Council of
India and apex business bodies like FICCI, CII, and ASSOCHAM, were
HLC REPORT
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undertaken to gather a wide range of perspectives on the feasibility and

implications of holding simultaneous elections in India. These consultations
aimed to incorporate a variety of opinions and suggestions from experts and
representatives of different sectors to ensure a comprehensive understanding
of the potential challenges and benefits associated with this proposed
electoral reform. Additionally, engaging with citizens across the country
through various channels facilitated the inclusion of grassroot perspectives
and public sentiment in the decision-making process. By fostering dialogue
and soliciting input from diverse stakeholders, the consultations sought to
foster consensus building and informed decision-making regarding the
implementation of simultaneous elections, ultimately striving to enhance the
democratic process and governance efficiency in India.
126. Given the wide-ranging engagement and overwhelming support for

holding simultaneous elections, this Committee is of the considered view that
its recommendations will contribute to improved governance, transparency,
inclusivity, enhanced ease and confidence of the voters, and further the
democratic foundation of our developmental process.
127. In seeking inputs from diverse stakeholders and the elaborate consultative
process the Committee actively sought to build a consensus and establish a
transparent informed decision-making process.
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Benchmarking Best International Practices
CHAPTER – IV
BENCHMARKING BEST INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES
I. INTRODUCTION
1. In this chapter, a comparative analysis of other countries has been drawn

while dealing with the issue of simultaneous elections. The aim is to study
and adopt the best international practices to ensure fairness and
transparency in elections.
II. SOUTH AFRICA
2. The House of Assembly or the Lower House and Provincial Councils are
elected by first-past-the-post voting in single-member electoral divisions.
The electoral system for the National and Provincial Assemblies is based
on “party-list proportional representation”, which means that parties are
represented in the proportion of electoral support to them1. Every five years’
elections are held for provincial and Municipal Councils. During provincial
elections, parties provide a list of candidates to the Independent Electoral
Commission (IEC), which then distributes seats accordingly. The National
Assembly consists of 400 seats, while the number of seats in each Provincial
Legislature varies, based on population size. Municipal Council elections
use a mixed-member system that combines voting in areas with party list
selections. This ensures representation for all parties, resulting in a diverse
legislative body.
3. During elections, voters cast their ballots for both the National Assembly
and Provincial Legislatures simultaneously. However, Municipal elections
are held separately from provincial ones in a five-year cycle.
1
Law Commission Draft Report, 2018, Page no.31, Refer to Annexure 1 (x)
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4. On 29th May, 20242 South Africa will hold its general elections to elect a
new National Assembly as well as the Provincial Legislature for each
province.
III. SWEDEN
5. Sweden follows the proportional electoral system, which means that
political parties are assigned a number of seats in the elected assembly based
on their share of votes. They have a system where elections for the
Parliament (Riksdag), County Councils and Municipal Councils all take
place at the same time. These elections occur every four years on the second
Sunday of September whereas elections to the Municipal Assemblies occur
on the second Sunday of September, once every five years3.
IV. BELGIUM
6. In Belgium, one can vote in five different types of elections:
a) European elections, for choosing representatives to the European

Parliament;
b) federal elections, for the Federal Parliament;
c) regional elections, for the legislative bodies of the federated regions, e.g.;
• the Flemish Parliament,

• the Walloon Parliament,
• the Parliament of the Brussels Capital Region,
• the Parliament of the German-speaking Community;
d) Provincial elections, for the Provincial Council; and
2
“South Africa to hold general election on May 29” Aljazeera, February 20, 2024,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/20/south-africa-to-hold-general-election-on-may-
29
3
Law Commission Draft Report, 2018. Page no.31, Refer to Annexure 1 (x)
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e) Municipal elections, for the Municipal Council4.
7. It is pertinent to mention that voting is mandatory in Belgium.
8. Elections for the Federal Parliament are normally held every five years,
coinciding with the European Union (and consequently also regional)
elections. There have been two instances of simultaneous federal and
regional elections in Belgium in 1999 and 2014.
V. GERMANY
9. The German Constitution was adopted in 1949. The system prevalent in

Germany is that the Bundestag (i.e. Lower House), Landtags (State
Assembly) and local elections occur simultaneously. They follow
proportional representation and cannot simply remove the Chancellor with
a vote of no-confidence. The “constructive vote of no-confidence” puts an
embargo on ousting the Chancellor, as the opponents must not only disagree
with his or her governance but also agree on a replacement.5
10.The German Parliament can propose a resolution to remove the government

only if it names a successor. The electoral system seems complex, but it
gives Germany a stable government and prevents uncertainty.
11.Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap, a member of HLC, supported the German Model

of a Constructive Vote of no-confidence in addition to the procedure for the
appointment of Chancellor made by the Bundestag. He also explained the
process that is followed in Japan. In Japan, the Prime Minister is firstly
appointed by the National Diet and thereafter accepted by the Emperor. He
advocated adoption of a model similar to German/ Japanese model. This, in
his view, will also be beneficial to India.
4
Law Commission Draft Report, 2018, Page no. 31-32, Refer to Annexure 1 (x).
5
Law Commission Draft Report, 2018, Page no. 32-33, Refer to Annexure 1 (x).
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VI. INDONESIA
12.The Constitutional Court of Indonesia, while reviewing Law No. 42 Year

2008 concerning Presidential elections, held that Article 3 Paragraph 5,
Article 12 Paragraphs 1 and 2, and Article 112 of the Presidential Election
Law are unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court held that Indonesia will
hold the Presidential elections and Legislative elections, concurrently
starting 2019, on the ground that Law No.42 of 2008 was contrary to the
6
constitutional provision. Thereafter, Indonesia has been conducting
simultaneous elections, a system where the President, Vice President, and
members of both national and regional legislative bodies are elected on the
same day.
13. Voters cast a secret ballot and dip their fingers in indelible ink to prevent
duplicate voting. Political parties need 4% of votes to qualify for the
National Parliament. A Presidential candidate needs more than 50% of votes
cast overall and at least 20% of votes in more than half the country's
provinces to win.7
14. On 14th February, 2024, Indonesia successfully conducted simultaneous

elections. It is being termed as the world’s largest single day elections since
nearly 200 million people voted across all five levels i.e. President, Vice
President, Members of Parliament, Members of Regional Assemblies and
Municipal elections.8
6
Law Commission Draft Report, 2018. Page no.32, Refer to Annexure 1 (x).
7
Kanupriya Kapoor, “Indonesia election 2024: How the electoral system works” Reuters,
February 12, 2024, available at <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/how-
indonesia-holds-worlds-biggest-single-day-election-2024-02-07/ > (last visited on 20-02-
2024)
8
Ananda Teresia and Stanley Widianto , Reuters, February 15 2024, available at
<https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesia-votes-new-president-under-
shadow-influential-incumbent-2024-02-13/ > (Last visited on 22-02-2024)
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VII. PHILIPPINES
15.The Philippines has a Presidential form of government. It follows a system

of simultaneous elections, by virtue of an Act passed in 1992, called the
Republic Act No. 7056, that paved the way for synchronised and
simultaneous national and local elections beginning in 1995.
16.Simultaneous elections are held for national and local officials every three
years, with specific provisions on term limits, election periods, nomination
processes, and the role of the Commission on Elections.
17.Section 3 of the Act provides that the term of President, Vice President, and
Senators will be six years, that of the twenty-four Senators elected in May
1992, the first twelve with the highest number of votes will serve for six
years, and that the remaining twelve will serve for three years. Members of
the House of Representatives and all elective provincial, city, and Municipal
officials once elected will serve for a term of three years.9
18.Section 4 provides for full synchronisation of elections for President and

Vice President on the second Monday of May and on the same day every
six years thereafter. For the senators, all members of the House of
9
The Philippines Republic Act 7056, 1992, Section 3. Term of Office. The President, the
Vice President, and the Senators shall have a term of office of six (6) years beginning at
noon on the 30th day of June next following their elections: Provided, however, That, of the
twenty-four (24) Senators to be elected on the second Monday of May, 1992 the first twelve
(12) obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six (6) years and the remaining
twelve (12), for three (3) years. The members of the House of Representatives and all
elective provincial, city, and municipal officials shall serve for a term of three (3) years
which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of June next following their elections: Provided,
however, That in view of the many difficult if not insurmountable problems to a full and
immediate synchronization of all elections on the second Monday of May, 1992, all
incumbent provincial, city, and municipal officials shall hold over beyond the 30th day of
June, 1992 and serve their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. The tenure
of the newly elected local officials shall start at noon of November 30, 1992.
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Representatives and Municipal Officials, elections are held on the second

Monday of May and on the same day every three years thereafter.10
VIII. CONCLUSION
19.The study on implementing simultaneous elections in India11 highlighted

that holding simultaneous elections would reduce voter fatigue arising from
frequent elections year after year.
20.Consultations received from experts12 have also cited that one of the major
benefits of holding simultaneous elections would be increased voter turnout.
21.While it is good to learn from International best practices, considering the

mammoth size and diversity of our country and unique election process,
High Level Committee has attempted to develop a robust model of its own.
10
The Philippines Republic Act 7056, 1992, Section 4. Full Synchronization of Election.
(a) The regular elections for the President and Vice President of the Philippines shall be held
on the second Monday of May 1992, and on the same day for every period of six (6) years
thereafter.
(b) The regular election of twelve (12) Senators, all Members of the House of
Representatives, and the elective provincial, city, and municipal officials shall be held on
the second Monday of May, 1995, and on the same day for every period of three (3) years
thereafter
11
A. Shaji George, “One Nation, One Election: An Analysis of the Pros and Cons of
Implementing Simultaneous Elections in India” 02 Partners Universal International
Research Journal 49 (2023).
12
Refer Chapter 3 Consultation Process
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Simultaneous Elections in Local Bodies
CHAPTER – V
SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS IN LOCAL BODIES
1. Historically, the Royal Commission on Decentralisation (1909) suggested

that Local self-governance be overseen by the Provincial Government.
These proposals were carried out by the Secretary of State for India, Edwin
Montagu, and the then-Governor General of India, Lord Chelmsford in
1919, which resulted in Local Self-Government becoming a subject under
the control of provincial Governments. The 1919 model was incorporated
to an extent in the Government of India Act of 1935, enabling provinces to
administer Local Government without establishing a unified legal structure
or status.
2. Consequent to the divergence of opinions among the members of the

Constituent Assembly, the issue of Local Self-Government was placed in
the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP). As a result, Article 40 was
added in the Directive Principles of State Policy which provides that “the
State shall take steps to organise village Panchayats and endow them with
such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function
as units of self-Government.” States were empowered to legislate on these
issues, through Entry 5 in List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution:
“Local Government, that is to say, the constitution and powers of

municipal corporations, improvement trusts, district boards, mining
settlement authorities and other Local authorities for the purpose of
Local self-Government or village administration.”
3. As Mahatma Gandhi once said, “The independence of India should mean

the independence of the whole of India…Independence must begin at the
bottom. Thus, every village will be a republic. It follows, therefore, that
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every village must be self-sustained and capable of managing its affairs. In

this structure composed of innumerable villages, there will be ever
widening, ever-ascending circles. Life will be a pyramid with the apex
sustained by the bottom”.
4. There were a number of committees appointed by the Government of India

to study the implementation of Local Self-Government at the rural level.
The Balwant Rai Mehta Committee, established in 1957 to analyse and
make recommendations to improve the National Extension Service and
Community Development Programmes, it recommended for establishing a
three-tier Panchayati Raj system across the country.
5. The Ashok Mehta Committee was appointed in 1977 to suggest measures

to revive and strengthen the declining Panchayati Raj system in India. The
main recommendation of the committee was that the three-tier system of
Panchayati Raj should be replaced by the 2-tier system: Zilla Parishad at the
district level, and below it, the Mandal Panchayat consisting of a group of
villages covering a population of 15,000 to 20,000.1
6. In the mid-1980s, the Union Government formed a committee to prepare a

Concept Paper on Panchayati Raj Institutions popularly known as the L. M.
Singhvi Committee, whose findings were published in June 1986. This
Committee proposed that the Panchayati Raj Institutions be constitutionally
recognised, safeguarded, and conserved by the addition of a new chapter to
the Constitution as the third tier of Government. The L.M. Singhvi
Committee specifically recommended providing more financial resources
and constitutional status to the Panchayats to strengthen them.
1
Govt. of India, Department of Rural Development, Report of the Committee on
Panchayati Raj Institutions (Ashok Mehta Committee),Ministry of Agriculture and
Irrigation, New Delhi, 1978.
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7. In the year 1992, on the recommendation of this Committee, local self-

government was accorded constitutional status. By virtue of the 73rd and
74th Amendments to the Constitution, the Panchayats at the village,
intermediate, and district levels, as well as Municipalities in urban areas,
were established. The 73rd Amendment Act was passed by the Indian
Parliament in 1992; it is also known as the Panchayati Raj Act. This
amendment aimed to decentralise power and decision-making from the
Central and State Governments to the Local Panchayats and empower them
to undertake development works in their respective areas. The 74th
Constitutional Amendment Act of 1992 aimed to create an institutional
framework for democracy at the grassroots level. The act gives
constitutional status to Urban Local Bodies and provides a framework for
decentralising obligations and duties to Municipal bodies.2
I. STRUCTURE AND FRAMEWORK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

BODIES.
8. India is a Federal Republic with three tiers of Governance at National, State

and Local levels. In addition to the state-specific Local Government laws,
Local Government is recognised and protected by the 73rd and 74th
Constitutional Amendments. At the federal and state levels, the Ministries
of Housing and Urban Affairs, Panchayati Raj, and Rural Development
oversee Local governance. Municipal corporations for cities, Municipalities
for bigger towns, and town Panchayats for smaller towns are examples of
Urban Local Bodies. State-level law controls both Local and Urban
Governance and establishes the authority for Local Governments to raise
taxes.
2
Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, 1992, Constitution (Seventy-Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1992.
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9. India's Local Governments may be essentially divided into two groups:

Rural and Urban. These have been entrusted with the responsibility for local
planning, development and administration of rural and urban areas
respectively. Urban Local Bodies (Municipalities) are the Local Bodies
constituted for local planning, development, and administration in urban
areas; Rural Local Bodies (Panchayats) are constituted for local planning,
development, and administration in rural areas.
The total number of urban and rural wards in India is shown in the table
below. As may be seen, there are significant number of wards in a majority
of states.
Fig 5.1 Structure of Local Governance
CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT
STATE GOVERNMENT
RURAL URBAN
LOCAL LOCAL
BODIES BODIES
DISTRICT MUNICIPAL MUNICIPAL NAGAR

INTERMEDIATE VILLAGE
PANCHAYAT CORPORATION COUNCIL PANCHAYAT
PANCHAYAT PANCHAYAT
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126
Table 5.1 Total numbers of Rural Wards in India3
NO. OF GRAM NO. OF RURAL

S. NO. STATES/UTs
PANCHAYATS WARDS
1. Andhra Pradesh 21,491 2,17,578
2. Arunachal Pradesh 2,108 8,436
3. Assam 2,201 -
4. Bihar 8,058 1,15,876
5. Chhattisgarh 11,664 -
6. Goa 189 -
7. Gujarat 14,017 1,24,982
8. Haryana 6,225 62,027
9. Himachal Pradesh 669 -
10. Jharkhand 4,345 53,479
11. Karnataka 6,008 95,081
12. Kerala 941 15,962
13. Madhya Pradesh 23,012 -
14. Maharashtra 27,782 95,987
15. Manipur 161 -
16. Meghalaya 6,814 -
17. Mizoram - -
18. Nagaland 1,293 -
19. NCT Delhi - -
20. Odisha 6,798 92,027
21. Puducherry 196 575
22. Punjab 13,237 83,983
23. Rajasthan 11,320 1,09,229
24. Sikkim 199 1,282
3
Ministry of Panchayati Raj, https://panchayat.gov.in/
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25. Tamil Nadu 12,618 40,879

26. Telangana 12,769 1,53,543
27. Tripura 589 589
28. Uttarakhand 755 50,214
29. Uttar Pradesh 58,189 7,32,643
30. West Bengal 3,342 -
TOTAL 2,56,990 20,54,372
Table 5.2 Total Urban Wards in India.

NO. OF NO. OF
S. NO. STATES/UTs
MUNICIPALITIES URBAN WARDS
1. Andhra Pradesh 79 929
2. Arunachal Pradesh 1 30
3. Assam 29 977
4. Bihar 141 3,320
5. Chhattisgarh 168 3213
6. Goa 13 195
7. Gujarat 156 1,210
8. Haryana 87 789
9. Himachal Pradesh 54 446
10. Jharkhand 50 749
11. Karnataka 316 6,713
12. Kerala 92 3,078
13. Madhya Pradesh 432 7,585
14. Maharashtra 248 6,139
15. Manipur 28 28
16. Meghalaya 6 27
17. Mizoram 2 1,338
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18. Nagaland 3 39
19. NCT Delhi 8 272
20. Odisha 34 981
21. Puducherry 5 116
22. Punjab 98 1,735
23. Rajasthan 213 8,160
24. Sikkim 8 26
25. Tamil Nadu 146 3,843
26. Telangana 129 2,946
27. Tripura 13 51
28. Uttarakhand 13 893
29. Uttar Pradesh 728 22,332
30. West Bengal 108 2,276
TOTAL 3,408 80,436
These tables indicate that there are 10 states with more than 10,000 gram
Panchayats and 11 States with more than 100 Municipalities.
II. SALIENT FEATURES OF PANCHAYAT AND

MUNICIPALITIES ACTS
10.The Panchayat and Municipalities Acts encompass various key features

pertaining to the establishment and constitution of Local Bodies, including
Zila Parishads and Municipal Corporations. These Acts incorporate
provisions for the reservation of seats and offices to ensure adequate
representation of marginalised communities such as Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes, Backward Classes, and Women. They outline procedures
for the election of members, councillors, and chairpersons and provide
guidelines for meetings, quorum requirements, and procedures.
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129
11.These Acts address the preparation of electoral rolls, qualifications, and

disqualifications of candidates, including those arising from convictions or
corrupt practices, and provisions for resignation, removal, and fresh
elections in case of vacancies. They mandate the declaration of assets and
liabilities by members and define electoral offences.
12.These Acts delineate the functions, duties, and powers of rural and urban
authorities, and provide for the conversion of Municipalities into
Panchayats and the amalgamation or division of Panchayats. They also
cover aspects related to taxation, finance, inquiries into the affairs of Local
Bodies by the State Government, and provisions for other offences and
penalties.
13.These Acts empower the formulation of rules, regulations, and bye-laws to

govern the functioning of Local Bodies and ensure effective administration
and governance at the grassroots level.
III. THE PROCESS OF ELECTION IN LOCAL BODIES4
14.The process of conducting the elections to Local Bodies is different from

that of elections to the House of People and State Assembly. The process as
put forward by State Election Commissions is given below:
a) The SECs are empowered to conduct elections to all Local Bodies in the
State(s) with almost identical autonomy and powers as provided to ECI.
b) The field machinery used for the conduct of elections is the same as in
case of ECI (Collectors / Dy. Collectors / Tahsildars / Teachers etc.)
4
As discussed by Karnataka State Election Commission during HLC consultation process.
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130
c) Articles 243K and 243ZA of the Constitution of India mandates elections

to all Local Bodies in a phased manner over a period of 5 years.5
d) In case a body is dissolved before its term of 5 years, the next election is
for the remainder of the period.6
15.Most SECs use electoral data from the electoral roll prepared by the Election
Commission of India, to prepare the voter list for local body elections and
some SECs prepare their own voter list. In the current legal scenario, the
SECs are appointed for each state by the Governor. Each state also has its
own legal provisions governing the appointment, and powers of SECs, and
for the conduct of elections. Legal provisions regarding the conduct of
elections are prescribed in various Acts of the State.
IV. CONDUCTING SIMULTANEOUS ELECTION OF LOCAL

BODIES
A. Logistical Requirements
16.The Election Commission of India in its Strategic Plan Book provides that
“The magnitude and complexity of the Indian election can be estimated
5
243K. Elections to the Panchayats. — (1) The superintendence, direction and control of
the preparation of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to the Panchayats shall
be vested in a State Election Commission consisting of a State Election Commissioner to be
appointed by the Governor.
243ZA. Elections to the Municipalities. —(1) The superintendence, direction and control of
the preparation of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to the Municipalities
shall be vested in the State Election
Commission referred to in article 243K.(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the
Legislature of a
State may, by law, make provision with respect to all matters relating to, or in connection
with, elections to the Municipalities.
6
ibid
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131
from the fact that the Indian elections are not only the largest exercise in
logistics in the world… or that of all the European nations put together”.7
17.The requirements for smooth conduct of simultaneous elections include

security personnel, polling officials, Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs),
Controlling Units, Balloting Units, VVPATs, digital cameras, video
cameras, storage rooms and transportation facilities. Simultaneous elections
would clearly open possibilities for resource optimisation. In such a case,
while the requirements of some resources would increase significantly –
possibly double or more, - that of others may not see a similar proportionate
increase.
18.Most States use EVMs for all Local Bodies while others use ballot box for
certain Local Bodies. It is pertinent to note here that the logistical
requirement data shared by the Election Commission of India is only with
respect to the situation where simultaneous elections are conducted to the
House of the People and State Legislative Assemblies.
B. Awareness Amongst Voters.

19.In a diverse and vast country like India, conducting simultaneous elections
at the local body level poses a unique set of challenges. Local body elections
play a crucial role in shaping the governance and development of our
communities, making it essential for every eligible voter to exercise their
right to vote. One of the key challenges is ensuring voter awareness and
participation in these elections. Voter awareness campaigns can focus,
among other things, on promoting voter turnout, especially among
marginalised communities and underrepresented groups.
20.By addressing barriers to voting such as lack of awareness, transportation

issues, or voter apathy, these campaigns can help ensure that every eligible
7
Election Commission of India, Strategic Plan Book 2016-25.
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132
voter could cast their vote and have their voices heard. Hence, voter
awareness at the local body level is essential for the successful conduct of
simultaneous elections in India.
V. THE NEED TO HOLD SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS FOR

LOCAL BODIES
21.There are several reasons, such as the suspension of development

programmes and welfare measures due to frequent imposition of the Model
Code of Conduct, massive spending by the government and various interest
groups on repeated elections, commitment of government personnel and
security forces for long periods, that point to the need to hold simultaneous
elections in the country.8 The Committee has examined the laws related to
elections to Municipalities and Panchayats in the States in order to examine
the modalities of synchronising elections to Local Bodies with those to the
House of People and State Legislative Assemblies.
22.In conclusion, it may be emphasised that there is a decisive rationale

coupled with overwhelming support for synchronising election in Local
Bodies with the House of the People and State Legislative Assemblies. It is
suggested that in the first step, simultaneous elections to the House of the
People and the State Legislative Assemblies be held. In the second step, the
elections to Municipalities and Panchayats will be synchronised with House
of the People and State Legislative Assemblies in such a way that
Municipalities and Panchayat elections are held within hundred days of the
holding of elections of the House of the People and the State Legislative
Assemblies.
8
Government of India, “Analysis of Simultaneous Elections: The “What”, “Why” and
“How”” (NITI Aayog, 2017).
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133
VI. THE NEED FOR SINGLE ELECTORAL ROLL AND SINGLE

ELECTORS PHOTO IDENTIY CARD
23.Single Electoral Roll and Single Electors Photo Identity Card would need
to be made by the Election Commission of India in consultation with the
SECs. For this purpose, all necessary logistical arrangements must be made
by the ECI and the SECs. Details of the recommendation on Single Electoral
Roll and Single Electors Photo Identity Card have been stipulated in
Chapter IX of this Report.
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134
Challenges, Issues and Complexities
CHAPTER – VI
CHALLENGES, ISSUES AND COMPLEXITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The synchronising of elections for different representative bodies in the

world's largest democracy poses considerable complexities. It is necessary
to analyse the constitutional, administrative and political aspects
associated with the idea of simultaneous elections and also address the
concerns raised by the stakeholders so that all these are considered before
recommendations are made. In this chapter, the concerns raised by various
stakeholders are highlighted and examined. Analysis of responses received
by the HLC which are not in favour of holding simultaneous elections, are
broadly classified in para hereinafter:
II. UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND AGAINST THE DOCTRINE OF

BASIC STRUCTURE
2. It is contended that the introduction of simultaneous elections is against

the basic structure of the Constitution since the requirement for premature
dissolution of State Legislative Assemblies, which comprises elected
representatives, would be against the will of the people.
3. The Constitution provides that duration of both the House of the People
and State Legislative Assembly will be for five years “unless dissolved
sooner”. Thus the criticism is that as the Constitution mandates fixed terms
for Parliament and the State Legislative Assemblies, altering these terms
would violate the Constitution’s basic structure. It is also contended that
the extension and curtailment of the Assemblies in a phased manner would
be an assault on the rights of the States and the rights of citizens who elect
their representatives.
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135
4. In the first instance, two points need to be made. Firstly, the will of the
people manifested at every general election is to constitute a House
[whether House of the People or the Legislative Assembly] that can
provide good governance for five years. Sometimes, the electoral process
based on first past the post system of elections fails to provide stable
majorities and sometimes the political instability despite numbers creates
a situation in which the House has to be dissolved sooner than five years.
The synchronicity in the elections is disturbed when the elected houses are
unable to fulfil the mandate to govern for five years before being dissolved.
5. Secondly, the founding fathers carefully drafted Art. 83 and 172 by

providing that the term shall be five years and no longer – not fixing it at
five years or making it a minimum of five years.
6. Art. 368 confers upon Parliament with the power to amend the
Constitution. The procedure requires a vote of two-thirds of the members
present and voting [as against a simple majority needed for enacting
legislation] and ratification by the States where the amendments concern
provisions of the Constitution that would affect the rights of the States.
7. In Kesavananda Bharati & Ors. v. State of Kerala1 the Supreme Court

held that the power to amend is plenary, and the only limitation to this
power is that the basic structure of the Constitution cannot be altered. The
basic structure has been understood as representing certain fundamental
features of the Constitution, such as the trilogy of rights [articles 14, 19
and 21], certain other fundamental freedoms in Part III, the balance
between Part III and Part IV, secularism and federalism. Free and fair
elections are also a fundamental feature of democracy. The most important
constitutional virtue is the rule of law, and a free and independent judiciary
1
AIR 1973 SC 1461
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to protect the citizens’ rights as well as the arbiter of federal disputes

between the Union and the States.
8. The criticisms levelled against simultaneous elections do not impinge upon

citizens’ rights under Part III or the rule of law or any other features such
as a free and independent judiciary. The two elements referred to are
whether it affects free and fair elections, and whether it is incompatible
with federalism.
III. AGAINST DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES.
9. The suggestion that simultaneous elections would somehow impair the

fairness of the electoral process has to be rejected. On the contrary, a
simultaneous election process, in present times where every election, even
at the level of some Local Bodies, attracts national attention, would ensure
the best utilisation of time and resources of those involved in the electoral
process, leaving those elected to power free to govern for the next five
years without again getting drawn to multiple elections. It is obvious that
it would also reduce the role of financial resources, which is one of the
biggest concerns when it comes to free and fair elections.
10.Elections to the House of People and State Legislative Assembly were

simultaneous in the initial decades in India. However, in course of time,
dissolution of the Houses before the expiry of tenure both in the case of
the House of the People and State Legislative Assembly (Under Article 83
and 172 of the Constitution of India) and imposition of President’s Rule
under Art 356 disrupted the cycle. The Election in the States and the Centre
fell out of step. The endeavours of authorities in the early decades to keep
simultaneous elections in a synchronised manner. However, because of
several instances of pre-mature dissolution of Houses, even the authorities
could not maintain simultaneous elections.
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11.If each elected house had lasted for five years elections would have
inevitably continued to be simultaneous even without any amendments to
the existing provisions. It is not suggested that in such an event, the
Election Commission should have contrary to its constitutional mandate to
conduct timely elections, delayed elections to some States by months if not
years to de-synchronise elections. Thus, the argument that simultaneous
elections detract from free and fair elections simply cannot be right.
12.The concept of simultaneous elections in no way infringes upon the right

of citizens, to select their representatives. It ensures that the government
remains continually responsive to the legislative body, reflecting the
people's will.2
13.Simultaneous elections would reduce the disruption in governance as

governments would not be driven by populist measures.3
14.The concept of simultaneous elections in no way affects the governance

mechanism, it only provides a way to better manage the whole election
process. Moreover, the suggested scheme neither deprives individuals of
the right to vote or participate in elections, nor does it dismantle the
established system of regular, open, and equitable elections.
IV. UNDERMINES FEDERALISM
15.The basis for India's federal structure was established by the Government
of India Act, 1935, which outlined the division of legislative powers
between the Union and the States. This framework was later incorporated
into the Constitution of India through three lists outlined in the Seventh
2
Law Commission of India, 2018 Draft Report. Annexure 1(x).
3
79th Report of Parliamentary Standing Committee on “Feasibility of Holding
Simultaneous Elections to the House of People (Lok Sabha) and State Legislative
Assemblies”.
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Schedule. Indian federalism is not based on geographical considerations

but instead relies on systematic and structural principles that interconnect
various provisions of the Constitution. Simultaneous elections do not
impinge upon federalism.
16.Federalism as a constitutional concept [beyond its colloquial meaning

which is indefinite and uncertain] means the existence of two or more units
of governance one of which is Federal and the other regional. The latter
could be called States or Provinces. A unitary structure is where all
legislative powers are concentrated in one law making entity [as in the
United Kingdom] and any other forms of local government are subject to
the laws so enacted. In a federal structure, the power to enact laws is shared
between the Union [Federal law making body] and the States or Provinces.
There are as many models of this sharing of power as there are federal
structures of government.
17.In the Constituent Assembly Debates, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar highlighted

the character of Indian Federalism as follows:
“The Drafting Committee wanted to make it clear that though India was
to be a federation, the federation was not the result of an agreement by
the States to join in a federation and that the Federation not being the
result of an agreement, no State has the right to secede from it. The
federation is a Union because it is indestructible. Though the country
and the people may be divided into different States for convenience of
administration, the country is one integral whole, its people a single
people living under a single imperium derived from a single source.”
18.Dr. Ambedkar, during the presentation of the draft of Article 277A in the
Constituent Assembly, asserted that despite granting the Centre the
authority to supersede the provinces, our Constitution maintains a federal
character. He further explained that:
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“When we say that the Constitution is a Federal Constitution it means

this, that the provinces are as sovereign in the field which is left to them
by the Constitution as the Centre is in the field which is assigned to it”.
19.The relationship between the Federal Government and the States or

Provinces can range from dual sovereignty [as in the United States] to a
model as in India, where there is clearly a bias in favour of the Union.
Thus, the Lists are divided in a manner that the residuary power vests in
the Union4, the States’ legislative power is subject to encroachment by
Parliamentary Legislation 5 , and the power to amend the Constitution
[except some defined parts] vests in Parliament and does not require a
ratification by the States.
20.The superintendence and control over elections to the House of the People
and Legislative Assemblies is vested in the Election Commission, and Art.
327 confers power upon Parliament to make provision for elections for the
House of the People and the Legislative Assembly, while the States can
legislate in relation to elections to their Legislative Assembly to the extent
it is not covered by parliamentary legislation.
21.In the Union Territories, elected governments are established under a law
made by Parliament.
22. None of these principles are in any manner affected [much less infringed]
by creating the rule of a full term and an unexpired term for the constitution
of both the House of the People and the State Legislative Assemblies.
4
Entry 97 of List I
5
Art. 246(1) and (3).
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V. INABILITY TO DEAL WITH HUNG

PARLIAMENT/ASSEMBLY
23.One of the contentions put forward by political parties was that no

provisions have been made to solve the problem of hung
parliament/assembly in case simultaneous elections are held. It refers to a
scenario in which a solitary political party or a coalition formed before the
election lacks a sufficient number of elected members to attain a majority
in the legislative House or Assembly.
24. The Sarkaria Commission addressed the issue of a hung Assembly and
proposed a guideline to address the challenge. The Commission
recommended a standardised approach for the Governor in selecting a
Chief Minister when no party commands an absolute majority in the
Legislative Assembly. The suggested order of preference is as follows: (i)
A pre-election alliance of parties; (ii) The largest single party claiming to
form the government with the support of others, including independents;
(iii) A post-election coalition where all parties in the coalition participate
in the government; (iv) A post-election alliance where some parties in the
alliance form the government, and others support it from outside. This
recommendation found agreement in 2007 when the Punchhi Commission
broadly supported this approach.
25. Constitutional provisions dealing with such issues involve a delicate

balance between the cardinal rule that in a Westminster form of
government, the leader of the House and the elected executive must at all
times enjoy the confidence of the House, and the need for certainty and
stability in fractured polities. We also have to recognise that the
Constitution is ultimately premised on good governance and principled
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politics and probity in public life. If those elected to office are unable to
discharge their constitutional dharma, the Constitution cannot be blamed.
VI. CONCLUSION
26. The constitutional framework provides for enough safeguards to foster a

resilient and vibrant democracy. As we navigate the constitutional
landscape, it becomes amply clear that the holding of simultaneous
elections in no way compromises the federal structure and democratic
values.
27.These discussions highlight that simultaneous elections serve as a

testament to the evolving nature of constitutional governance, which
requires a vigilant and participatory citizenry. The rationale for holding of
simultaneous elections have been dealt in the next chapter.
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Rationale for Simultaneous Elections
CHAPTER – VII
RATIONALE FOR SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Driven by the imperative to enhance efficiency in governance and
streamlining the electoral processes, the concept of simultaneous elections
for Union and State Legislatures along with the synchronisation of the
elections of Local Bodies (Urban and Rural) has drawn significant attention
in the current Indian political landscape. Presently, the electoral calendar in
India is marked by a staggered pattern, wherein the electoral machinery is
busy throughout the year in some states or the other. This pattern of frequent
elections poses a multitude of challenges and also hampers the focus on
good governance at both the Central and State levels.
2. The rationale for simultaneous elections emanates from various factors,

each contributing to the overarching objective of enhancing the efficiency,
effectiveness, and integrity of the electoral process. The holding of
simultaneous elections is conducive to achieving of administrative
convenience and better utilisation of the resources involved. In a populous
and diverse country like India, the conduct of multiple elections across
different levels entails a significant mobilisation of resources.
Synchronising the electoral cycles of the House of the People and State
Legislative Assemblies simultaneously offers a pragmatic solution to
streamline the electoral calendar, facilitates administrative convenience and
optimises the use of financial and human resources.
3. On the subject of simultaneous elections, several expert bodies have

conducted studies and prepared reports in the last few decades. The Report
of this High Level Committee, however, stands on a different footing.
Unlike earlier bodies, the Committee collected views, suggestions, and
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comments through its website, letters, and newspaper advertisements.

Inputs were received from a variety of sources including citizens, business
organizations, and experts, such as Former Chief Justices of India and Chief
Justices of High courts, Former Chief Election Commissioners, State
Election Commissioners, and Economists. It also carried out in-depth
research and analysis with a team of professionals. Evidence-based rigorous
economic analysis has been done on the direct and indirect costs of holding
elections and their impact on the national economy, including gross
domestic product and inflation. A detailed assessment has been made of the
best practices relating to simultaneous elections in other countries. Free
opportunity of hearing was given to all the stakeholders of every hue to
submit their point of view. The time limit was extended liberally to enable
the full participation of all stakeholders. The Committee had the advantage
of having amongst its members, eminent political leaders, legal luminaries,
economists, and administrators. The composition of the Committee, the
methodology and process adopted by the Committee in conducting its study,
and the openness with which views, suggestions, and comments were
solicited from everyone using print and electronic media lend to this Report
on simultaneous elections, not only utility for the government but also a
unique coherence and cogency which distinguishes it from all other earlier
reports on this subject. For fulfilling the aspirations of our country and
several other nations closely watching the developments in India, this
Report will decidedly serve as a guide, simple and sublime.
4. Elections, by their very nature, lead to incurring of substantial cost in terms

of manpower involvement, infrastructure to be created, and logistics to be
arranged. The holding of elections for representative bodies at different
levels aggravates pressure on finances, straining the resources of the
exchequer. Holding simultaneous elections presents an opportunity to
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rationalise such avoidable expenditures and channel scarce resources for

developmental activities. Aligning the timelines for national and state level
elections will also boost the scale and scope of the entire economy and the
savings so made can be reinvested inter alia for public purposes and citizen
centric welfare programmes.
5. Furthermore, the holding of simultaneous elections has the inherent

potential to enhance voter participation and facilitating its proactive
engagement in the electoral process. The phenomenon of 'voter fatigue,'
characterised by apathy and disinterest among voters due to the recurrence
of elections, presents a significant challenge in ensuring their participation.
Simultaneous elections offer a solution by consolidating multiple elections
into a coincidental cycle of event, reducing the burden on voters and
revitalising their enthusiasm for participation in the election process. The
synchronised conduct of elections fosters a sense of civic cohesion and
national unity, as citizens across the country participate in the festival of
democracy collectively, reinforcing the bonds of citizenship and fraternity.
6. Beyond the realm of administrative convenience and financial prudence,

simultaneous elections have far-reaching implications for the broader
contours of democratic governance and political stability. Moreover, such
elections mitigate the disruptions to development caused by frequent
electoral cycles, thereby enabling elected representatives to focus on their
legislative duties. This continuity in governance ensures stability and
predictability in the political landscape, instilling confidence among
investors, stakeholders, and the citizenry at large.
The succeeding paragraphs of this chapter highlight in detail the rationale

for holding simultaneous elections.
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II. PROMOTES CONSISTENCY AND STABILITY IN

GOVERNANCE
7. In this context, it is pertinent to invite attention to the observation made by

the Supreme Court in Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. The Chief Minister And
Ors1. The court observed-
“169. The time fleets, generations grow, society changes, values and needs
also change by time. There can be no denial that law should change with the
changing time and changing needs of the society.”
8. There is an election at any given time during the year in at least one part of
the country. The biggest casualties of this are development and governance
and the delay in policy-making owing to the imposition of the Model Code
of Conduct being in force for a prolonged period. In a span of five years
(2019-2023), the country went through one General election and thirty
elections for the various State Legislative Assemblies.
Table-7.1: List of various elections held from 2019-2023

Sl. No. Elections Year
General Elections to constitute the House of
1. 2019
the People
2. Sikkim 2019
3. Odisha 2019
4. Andhra Pradesh 2019
5. Arunachal Pradesh 2019
6. Maharashtra 2019
7. Haryana 2019
8. Jharkhand 2019
9. Delhi 2020
10. Bihar 2020
1
AIRONLINE 2021 SC 240; Refer to Annexure 4 (xvii).
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11. West Bengal 2021

12. Tamil Nadu 2021
13. Puducherry 2021
14. Kerala 2021
15. Assam 2021
16. Uttarakhand 2022
17. Uttar Pradesh 2022
18. Punjab 2022
19. Manipur 2022
20. Goa 2022
21. Himachal Pradesh 2022
22. Gujarat 2022
23. Karnataka 2023
24. Meghalaya 2023
25. Nagaland 2023
26. Tripura 2023
27. Mizoram 2023
28. Chhattisgarh 2023
29. Madhya Pradesh 2023
30. Rajasthan 2023
31. Telangana 2023
9. Therefore, it can be seen that every year the country conducts elections for
four to five States Legislative Assemblies.
10.Due to the ongoing cycle of elections occurring in various parts of the

country, political parties, their leaders, legislators, and both State and
Central Governments tend to devote their time and resources towards the
upcoming elections, rather than focusing on matters of governance.
Therefore, the adoption of simultaneous elections would shift the
government’s attention to developmental activities and the implementation
of policies aimed at promoting the welfare of the masses.
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11.As stated in the previous chapter, simultaneous elections in no way dilute

the idea of democracy or the basic structure of the Constitution. It supports
coordination between the governments at the Centre and the States and
facilitates enhanced cooperation between the two for the benefit of the
people at large.
12.In 1999, the Law Commission of India2, also proposed significant reforms
to stabilise Indian governance, and one of the central recommendations
advocated synchronised elections to the House of the People and the State
Legislative Assemblies with a view to streamline the electoral process and
create a more stable political environment. The report observed that,
frequent staggered elections disrupted policy continuity, fragmented
political focus, and imposed excessive costs on the Nation. By
synchronising elections, the report envisioned a more stable political
landscape, allowing governments to prioritise governance over
campaigning.
13.With quite a few States going to polls every year, the functioning of the
government is often constrained. The resulting flux in governance induces
uncertainty and instability as governments grapple with the challenges of
electoral politics and pre/post-election coalition dynamics.
14.The holding of simultaneous elections offers a viable solution to address the

dual challenges of promoting efficiency in governance and reducing
electoral expenditure. By synchronising the electoral cycles of the Union
and State Legislatures, simultaneous elections harmonise the exercise of
seeking the mandate of the people for governance at both levels, fostering
coherence and continuity in policy formulation and implementation. This
2
Refer to Annexure No. 1 (ii).
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alignment of electoral calendars enables governments to pursue their policy

agenda with greater certainty and clarity.
III. PREVENTION OF POLICY PARALYSIS DUE TO

SEQUENTIAL IMPOSITION OF THE MODEL CODE OF
CONDUCT
15.The implementation of the Model Code of Conduct (MCC), which serves

as a set of guidelines to ensure fair and free elections and monitors the
conduct of political parties and governments, also affects the pace of the
developmental programmes and related activities in States undergoing
elections. It also halts the routine administrative initiatives until the
elections conclude. The imposition of the MCC would entail that the
government shall not “(a) announce any financial grants in any form or
promises thereof; or (b) (except civil servants) lay foundation stones etc. of
projects or schemes of any kind; or (c) make any promise of construction of
roads, provision of drinking water facilities etc. or (d) make any ad-hoc
appointments in Government, Public Undertakings etc. which may have the
effect of influencing the voters in favor of the party in power.”
16.Frequent elections result in the prolonged enforcement of the Model Code

of Conduct, resulting in policy paralysis and governance deficit. Aside from
routine administrative tasks, the implementation of other welfare schemes
and progress of government projects are compromised until the MCC is
lifted. At times, vital schemes get affected by ongoing elections even though
the MCC is not in operation in the entire State or the country. The
Government(s) may also defer taking decisions on critical and crucial
projects which have to be undertaken in a time-bound manner, thereby
slowing down the pace of such projects.
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17.It is commonly asserted that even though the Model Code of Conduct
officially takes effect only upon the announcement of elections, political
dispensation in power often initiates their electoral preparations well in
advance. If elections were to occur once every five years, public
representatives would not be burdened frequently with devising strategies
for electoral battles.3
IV. MITIGATING THE DIVERSION OF GOVERNMENT

MACHINERY AND RESOURCES OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
18.The enormity of the issue of election-related deployment can be gauged

from an illustration of the Election Commission of India, which is part of
the Law Commission Draft Report (2018). During the elections to the 17th
Lok Sabha (House of the People) in 2019, the ECI enlisted the services of
approximately 70 lakh personnel to serve as polling officials, overseeing the
election process at 12,03,800 polling stations nationwide. This equates to
an average of around 6 personnel per polling station.4
19.Polling booths are frequently located in schools, whether they are

government-run or private institutions. The staff and teaching personnel of
these schools are required to undertake election related duties, diverting
them from discharging their primary responsibility of providing education.
Not only are schools closed on the days of the poll, but they are also closed
in advance for preparatory measures. A similar phenomenon is seen in the
case of employees of Central and State Governments, as well as Public
Sector Undertakings (PSUs), who are assigned election related duties.
These officials are further required to undergo training related to election
3
Refer to Annexure 1(x).
4
ECI Letter dtd. 17 March 2023. Refer to Annexure 2 (vii).
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procedures, etc. which also diverts them from their routine responsibilities.
The occurrence of frequent elections compounds the above situation.
20.It is seen that substantial government machinery, officials, teachers, civilian

personnel and other staff of public institutions are involved in the smooth
conduct of elections. This entails the diversion of their attention from their
core responsibilities. Simultaneous elections would ensure that such
machinery and resources are deployed less frequently.
V. REGIONAL PARTIES’ CONTINUED RELEVANCE

21. Besides the National parties, India has a significant presence of regional
parties, and they are in power in many States. When regional parties
effectively highlight local concerns to the electorate, voters would not be
swayed by only national issues in the event simultaneous elections are held.
22.According to the response of the President of the Maharashtra Gomantak

Party, Goa conducting elections simultaneously might enhance grassroots
democracy by limiting the opportunity for external campaigners, thereby
encouraging a heightened focus on local issues.5
23.In an article published by Center for Study of Developing Societies (CSDS)

and Association of Democratic Reforms (ADR), states that:6
“If we consider elections from the 1989 general election onwards, there
have been 31 instances of holding simultaneous elections for State
Assemblies and the Lok Sabha in different States: Andhra Pradesh (1989,
1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014), Odisha (2004, 2009 and 2014), Karnataka
5
Submission made to the HLC by Shri Pandurang alias Deepak Dhavalikar, President of
the Maharashtra Gomantak Party Goa.
6
Available at https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/The-case-against-simultaneous-
polls/article15000825.ece.
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(1989, 1999 and 2004), Sikkim (2009 and 2014), Tamil Nadu (1989, 1991
and 1996), Maharashtra (1999), Assam (1991 and 1996), Haryana (1991
and 1996), Kerala (1989, 1991 and 1996), Uttar Pradesh (1989 and
1991), West Bengal (1991 and 1996), Arunachal Pradesh (2009 and
2014) and Telangana (2014). When simultaneous elections for the
Assembly and the Lok Sabha were held in these States, in 24 elections the
major political parties polled almost a similar proportion of votes both
for the Assembly and the Lok Sabha, while only in seven instances was the
choice of voters somewhat different. It was noticed thrice in Tamil Nadu
(1989, 1991 and 1996) when the votes polled by the Congress and the All
India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam were different for the Assembly
and Lok Sabha. The other similar examples are from Arunachal Pradesh
during the 2004 and 2014 elections (when the Bharatiya Janata Party
polled more votes for its Lok Sabha candidates compared to those for its
Assembly candidates), in Haryana during the 1996 elections and in
Andhra Pradesh in 2014. During the same period, when in many States
the Assembly and Lok Sabha elections were held at different times, the
electoral outcome (votes polled by different parties) of the two elections
has been different.”
24.It is important to note that in a mature democratic system like India, the
outcome of elections to the State Legislative Assemblies or the House of
the People (Lok Sabha) elections, whether conducted simultaneously or
separately, is influenced by a variety of factors, not solely by the timing of
the elections. Instances abound where voters have consistently supported
the same political parties in both State and National elections, even when
not held simultaneously. There are also cases where voters have chosen
regional parties for State elections, diverging from broader national trends
favoring specific parties. These examples highlight that voters possess the
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ability to evaluate their best interests and vote for candidates or parties of
their choice.7
25.The Niti Aayog report further stated that during the 2014 General elections,
there was a notable tilt in favour of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
nationally. The data from the Election Commission of India (ECI) reveals
an interesting contrast in the case of Odisha. Contrary to the prevailing
national trend, the Biju Janata Dal (BJD), a regional party, actually
increased its vote share from 37.23% in 2009 to 44.77% in the 2014 Lok
Sabha Elections. In 2014, for instance, during the General elections to the
House of the People in Delhi, there was a strong wave in favour of a specific
party, resulting in that party winning all seven seats. However, shortly
afterwards, in the 2015 election to the Delhi Legislature, there was a
significant reversal, and the State Party secured a sweeping victory. This
indicates that voters had a clear distinction between their preferences for the
Central Government and the party best suited to address their local issues.
VI. ENHANCEMENT OF VOTER TURNOUT AND DIMINISHING

VOTER FATIGUE
26.According to a study conducted by Prof. Csaba Nikolenyi,8 of Concordia

University, Qubec, Canada, it has been found that the current practice of
holding separate elections in India is discouraging the greater participation
of the electorate in the democratic process. The multiplicity of elections has
led people to selectively choose the elections in which they want to
participate, resulting in lesser voter turnout in the remaining elections. The
7
Bibek Debroy and Kishore Desai, “Analysis of Simultaneous Elections: The “What”,
“Why” and “How” A Discussion Paper” Niti Aayog (2017).
8
Study by Csaba Nikolenyi, “Concurrent Elections and Voter Turnout: The Effect of
Delinking of State Elections on Electoral Participation in India’s Parliamentary Polls, 1971-
2004.”
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phenomenon of voter fatigue witnessed during the staggered elections has

considerably affected the uniformity in voting percentages.
27.The study suggests that holding simultaneous elections for both the national
and state levels would increase voter turnout. In this scenario, the electorate
would only need to visit the polling booth once to cast their votes for all
such elections, which are conducted simultaneously. The continuous cycle
of elections negatively impacts voting behaviour, leading to a decline in
voter participation. Simultaneous elections present an effective solution to
rejuvenate voter involvement in various elections. Considering these
factors, simultaneous elections serve as an effective measure to reduce the
deployment of public resources, address significant malpractices in the
current election system, and shift the focus towards good governance.
28.In a research undertaken by Shackel and Dandoy, it has been demonstrated

that simultaneous elections significantly impact the voter turnout. 9 They
attribute this effect to increased stakes for political agents, focused
campaigns addressing diverse issues at multiple levels, and heightened
press coverage for all tiers of elections making electoral campaigning more
accessible for both contestants and voters.
29.Reflecting on past elections in various Indian States, data suggests that

simultaneous elections have increased voter turnout. For instance, in 1999,
Karnataka, Maharashtra, and Andhra Pradesh experienced a nearly 11.5%
surge in voter turnout. In 1977, simultaneous elections in Kerala held along
with national elections led to an almost 20% increase in voter participation.
Similarly, empirical data reveals that simultaneous elections in northeastern
States alongside national elections saw an increased voter turnout by 21%
9
Arjan H. Schakel & Régis Dandoy, Electoral Cycles and Turnout in Multilevel Electoral
Systems, West European Politics, 37:3, 605-623 (2014).
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in Arunachal Pradesh and 17% in Assam. This evidence reflects the positive
impact of simultaneous elections on voter turnout, even in geographically
remote areas, reinforcing its significance.10
VII. ENHANCED OPPORTUNITIES FOR POLITICAL WORKERS

IN ELECTIONS
30.The elections being conducted simultaneously entails a more equitable

allocation of political opportunities and responsibilities within political
parties. Currently, it is not uncommon for certain leaders within a party to
dominate the electoral landscape, contesting elections at multiple levels and
monopolising key positions. However, in the scenario of simultaneous
elections, there arises greater scope for diversification and inclusivity
amongst political workers representing various parties.
31.With simultaneous elections, the pressure on a candidate to contest multiple

elections is alleviated, thereby creating space for other party members to
actively contest the elections. This shift towards a more inclusive approach
to candidate selection ensures that a broader spectrum of party workers and
leaders are afforded opportunities to represent their constituency. To
highlight the point, we may consider a scenario where a senior party leader
traditionally contests both State Legislative Assembly and elections to the
House of the People, leaving little room for other party members to contest.
However, in case of simultaneous elections, where the entire electoral cycle
is synchronised, the party leadership has the freedom to field different
candidates for different elections. This opens up avenues for new faces and
voices within the party to engage with the electorate.
32.In essence, the prospect of simultaneous elections heralds a paradigm shift

in the distribution of political opportunities within parties, ushering in
10
Ibid
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diversity of candidates to participate in the democratic electoral process. By

enhancing the pool of candidates and promoting diversity, simultaneous
elections pave the way for a more representative and dynamic political
landscape, reflective of the diverse aspirations and interests of the
electorate.
VIII. FOCUS ON GOVERNANCE

33.A crucial concern revolves around the ongoing cycle of elections occurring
in different parts of the country. Political parties, including those in power
at both the national and state levels, often focus more on election-related
activities to ensure the victory of their respective parties. This preoccupation
with elections diverts the attention of lawmakers from essential matters of
good governance and development, shifting their focus toward campaign
efforts. If elections were less frequent or synchronised, parties would be
better positioned to dedicate their time and efforts to meet the needs and
requirements of the electorate.11 This approach could lead to a substantial
reduction in instances of hate speeches, conflict, and other law and order
problems associated with heightened electoral activities and aggressive
campaigning.
IX. REDUCED FINANCIAL BURDEN

34.The rationale for simultaneous elections, inter alia, emanates from its far
reaching economic and social multipliers. This includes issues like its
impact on rates of economic growth, on fiscal deficit, quality of public
expenditure (capital vs. revenue) and mitigating uncertainties with adverse
impacts on investments.
35.The synchronisation of election cycles of the Union and the State

Legislature secures coherence and continuity of policy, which frequent
11
Report on Simultaneous Election, Law Commission of India (2018).
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elections inevitably thwart. The policy and implementation paralysis with

the frequent imposition of the Model Code of Conduct has both quantifiable
and non-quantifiable consequences. It impairs policy decisions, retards on-
going welfare and government projects, and has other disruptive social
consequences. These include:
(i) A lack of staff and teaching personnel to impart education, which

over time affects the quality of educational outcomes.
(ii) The frequent deployment of law and order machinery, including
paramilitary forces, has an adverse impact on crime rates, which
retards investor confidence.
(iii) There is anecdotal evidence that, through voter fatigue, it also
influences their participation in the democratic process and on voter
turnouts.
(iv) Frequent campaigning based on identity politics spurs passions and
other divisive social forces.
(v) Given the very high percentage of migrant workers, productive
systems both in manufacturing and the service sectors are affected
as the migrant workers avail leave to cast their vote.
(vi) As pointed out by the representatives from the Federation of Indian
Chambers of Commerce and Industries (FICCI) and Confederation
of Indian Industries (CII), frequent elections create uncertainty for
both business and investors communities.
36.The cost associated with holding an election separately for the House of the
People and the State Legislative Assemblies, therefore, go far beyond
quantifiable facts on election expenditure. These have been extensively
covered in Chapter VIII of this Report.
X CONCLUSION
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37.The holding of simultaneous elections for Union and State Legislatures

along with the synchronisation of the elections of Local Bodies represents
a transformative reform aimed at reinvigorating India's democratic
governance. By aligning electoral cycles and rationalising electoral
expenditures, simultaneous elections offer a pathway to enhance efficiency,
political stability, and fiscal sustainability. Simultaneous elections offer a
robust and multi-pronged solution to overcome challenges and strengthen
the electoral process comprehensively and aid in overall prosperity.
38.Simultaneous elections may usher in an electoral architecture which

augments the efficiency, effectiveness, and inclusivity in our democratic
process. It further addresses the challenges of administrative complexity,
financial strain, and voter disengagement. As the nation embarks on the path
toward electoral reform and innovation, the concept of simultaneous
elections emerges as a beacon of hope and progress, signaling a
transformative journey toward a more vibrant, resilient, and participatory
democracy.
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Economic and Social Implications of simultaneous elections
CHAPTER – VIII
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS
1. A research paper entitled, ‘Macroeconomic Impact of Harmonizing

Electoral Cycles’, was presented by Dr. Prachi Mishra, Chief of Systemic
Issues Division, and Shri N. K. Singh, Member of the High Level
Committee, on the economic and social consequences of simultaneous
elections, in relation to frequent intermittent elections. The findings in the
paper suggest relatively higher economic growth, lower inflation, higher
investments, and improved quality of expenditure following periods of
synchronized elections, as compared to those that were not synchronised.
The comparison in the study is between time periods of one or two years
before and after synchronised and asynchronised cycles. In addition, there
could be multiple costs to society that are intangible. For instance, the
manner in which uncertainty stymies decision making, delays execution of
projects and brings a paralysis with repetitive election cycles.
2. The key assumption underlying the mechanisms laid out in Figure 8. 11 in

the study is that non-simultaneous election cycles can be assumed to be
associated with more frequent and larger number of elections, compared to
synchronized election cycles. Figure 8.11a2 of the study shows us that India
experienced, on average six elections per year from 1952-2023. This figure
only illustrates the phenomenon of perennial elections. If local elections
were to be included, the number of elections per year would multiply
manifold.
1
Refer figure 8.1 of Technical Appendix of Chapter VIII
2
Refer figure 8.11a of Technical Appendix of Chapter VIII
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Economic and Social implications of simultaneous elections
3. One potential concern is that that the ruling regime may strategically time
elections and that election outcomes may be predictable. The occurrence of
non-simultaneous elections in 1971, for example, could be correlated with
the geo-political crises of the 1970s. Or, when economic conditions are
better, governments could be more likely to call for elections in anticipation
of a more favourable outcome. Similarly, for the state-level analysis, there
could be concerns that the imposition of Article 356 and the dissolution of
state assemblies could reflect deliberate actions by governments to time the
assembly elections to coincide with the House of the People elections.
While the incidence of Article 356 itself appears to have declined over time,
yet the approach adopted in the study includes an adequate set of
counterfactuals presented in Table 8.33, where outcomes are compared for
given states around simultaneous and non-simultaneous elections.
Therefore, the comparisons are not across, rather within states, and less
likely to be contaminated by selection issues or by predictability of
elections.
4. Our framework addresses such concerns in several ways. First, taking

differences between post- and pre- filters out any linear time trends that
would affect our outcome variables. This accounts, for example, for
structural changes that took place across decades. Second, the state-level
analysis with pooled episodes across all states allows to purge the effects of
any time-varying shocks that affected the country. For example, accounting
for these allows us to not attribute the low growth from oil shocks or low
global growth to simultaneous elections. Notably, our framework accounts
for time-trends in differences too i.e., if there were structural changes or big
3
Refer table 8.3 of Technical Appendix of Chapter VIII
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shocks that could even affect the pre-post difference in outcomes rather than
just the level changes, the method is able to purge such effects.
I. GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) GROWTH
5. Comparing changes in real national GDP growth before and after episodes
of simultaneous and non-simultaneous elections (Figure 8.84), the estimates
suggest that on average, real GDP growth is higher following episodes of
simultaneous elections, while we find a decrease post the non-simultaneous
episodes. The magnitudes suggest approximately 1.5 percentage points
(hereinafter referred as p.p.) higher post-pre difference in real national
growth during simultaneous elections as compared to non-simultaneous
elections.
6. To put the magnitudes in perspective, a 1.5 percent of GDP is equal to INR

(Indian Rupee) (4.5 lakh crores in Financial Year 2024, half of the public
spending on health, and one third of that on education. Publicly reported
estimates of conducting national and state elections, beyond the official
costs of conducting elections, range from INR 4-7 lakh crores, which are
close in orders of magnitude to our growth estimates.
7. For illustration, take the case of Tamil Nadu, which had four simultaneous
election episodes before 1998, and none thereafter. The average growth
rates for the state were, in fact, 1 p.p. lower during the simultaneous election
period, compared to the non-simultaneous one (averages of 6.1% and 7%
over 1980-1998 and 1999-2023 respectively). Our results, however, reflect
the treatment effects of elections (of both types), which are obtained by
comparing pre- and post-differences and not just pre-and post-levels of
growth, across the two types of events. For example, growth rates in Tamil
4
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Nadu declined by 4.1 p.p. around a simultaneous episode of 1996, while

they declined by 5.4 p.p. or almost 30% more around the non-simultaneous
episode of 2001 i.e., growth rates rose relatively in Tamil Nadu around
simultaneous election episodes.
8. While we conduct several robustness tests, account for time trends, and
differences across states, we prefer to interpret the findings as a first attempt
in the literature to quantify the evolution of macroeconomic outcomes
around synchronized vs asynchronized election events rather than a strictly
causal interpretation with external validity in any other context or period.
II. INFLATION
9. The early decades of independence were associated with higher inflation,

due to exogenous factors, e.g., the oil shock of the 1970s (Figure 8.95). To
avoid this affecting the analysis, we exclude oil shock years and focus on
1962, 1967, and 1984-85 as simultaneous episodes.
10.On average, the Consumer Price Index (hereinafter referred as CPI) annual
inflation rate was lower for simultaneous episodes (Figure 8.106) than non-
simultaneous ones during the pre-election period. The inflation rates
generally drop around both types of election cycles, but more so around
simultaneous episodes. The magnitude suggests a difference-in-difference
estimate of 1.1 p.p.; a larger fall in inflation of around one percentage point
during simultaneous elections compared to non-simultaneous elections.
11.One potential concern could be related to high base effects driving the
response of inflation around simultaneous episodes. In fact, after correcting
for oil shocks, inflation levels, if anything, are slightly lower on average
before simultaneous elections, therefore the greater fall in the inflation rate
5
6
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post synchronized episodes is less likely to contaminate with base effects.

Another concern could be that the consumer price index inflation is driven
by specific sectors like food and energy, which could be affected by both
domestic (e.g., monsoon) and global (e.g., geopolitical) factors. The
difference-in-methodology, however, precisely addresses such concerns by
filtering out time trends, and by taking long-term averages across episodes,
so that the effects are less likely to be contaminated by specific events, or
by time trends in domestic or global variables.
III. FISCAL DEFICIT
12.Fiscal deficit at the Centre rises at a larger rate after simultaneous elections
compared to non-simultaneous elections (Figure 8.127 ). On average, the
two-year difference-in-differences (hereinafter referred as DiD2) is 1.28
p.p. of GDP higher fiscal deficit following simultaneous elections compared
to non-simultaneous elections.
13.This exercise is also repeated at the state level in Table 8.78. On average,
the 1-year pre-post difference in fiscal deficit (hereinafter referred as DiD1)
is estimated at 1.68 p.p of GDP higher for simultaneous election episodes,
and the 2-year difference (DiD2) is estimated at 2.29 p.p of GDP. Both
DiD1 and DiD2 estimates for each state is positive.
14.Taken together, the results in Tables 8.79 and 8.810 are broadly in line with
the national-level analysis; suggestive of relatively larger increases in
spending by state governments post elections, or relatively lower spending
pre-elections, for simultaneous election episodes. One potential explanation
could be that the higher the number of elections, greater the degree of
7
8
9
Id.
10
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freebies and pre-election promises which would raise government spending.

Higher public spending post elections is also consistent with the evidence
for relatively higher growth rates post simultaneous election episodes
relative to non-simultaneous elections.
15.Needless to say, the propensity of undertaking revenue expenditure, or

freebies has consequences. There are moral hazard issues by way of
intergenerational risks and choices. In other words, frequent election cycles
only accentuate adverse intergenerational choices as compared to
governments which do so once in five years. This is a moral question
because elections are not an end in themselves, but a means to improving
the life quality of the people and moral intergenerational choices that
optimize the use of resources without affecting the growth potential of
future generations.
IV. GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE PRIORITIES
16.Examining the within-state differences in the priority of spending for

governments in either type of election, and then taking the weighted average
of the state differences; the findings in Table 8.911 suggest that, on average,
the pre-post difference in the capital-to-current spending ratio is estimated
to be higher by 17.67 p.p for simultaneous elections compared to non-
simultaneous election episodes.
17.Not only do these findings suggest relatively higher public spending post
simultaneous election episodes but spending that is also skewed toward
capital compared to revenue; consistent with the evidence for higher
growth.
11
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18.This effort could encourage the Centre and State governments to be more
conscious of logistic costs on the environment, which would make more
optimal choices of moving societies away from economic activity based on
fossil fuel to renewable choices.
V. INVESTMENT DECISIONS
19.More frequent elections can directly disrupt activity, but also indirectly
affect the economy through greater uncertainty causing spillovers for
private investment, and for the broader economy. Migrant workers, both in
circular and linear migration are at risk due to the disruption of normal
economic activity and the costs burdened by them. The direct bearing on
the economy manifests itself through the frequent disruption of production
systems. The interruption of services owing to ‘perrenial elections’ detracts
paramedics and health workers as well, in some cities up to half the health
staff are assigned election duty. The significant increase in the total number
of days under the model code of conduct can directly reduce public
expenditures and investment.
20.To explore the evolution of investments around elections, we look at the

total Gross Fixed Capital Formation (hereinafter referred as GFCF) as a
fraction of GDP at the national level around simultaneous and non-
simultaneous election episodes. We find that simultaneous elections are
associated with higher post-pre difference in investment compared to non-
simultaneous elections (Figure 8.1312). On average, the pre-post difference
in the ratio of national GFCF to GDP is estimated at about half a percentage
point higher for simultaneous election episodes compared to non-
12
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simultaneous ones, consistent with lesser interruptions in economic activity

and lower uncertainty.
VI. IMPACT OF MIGRANT WORKERS
21.According to the 2011 census, migrant workers, both intra and inter-state,
may now exceed 450 million people. Their travel cost to cast their votes
multiple times in 5 years is a decisive financial burden on them. In addition,
when migrants travel long distances, production activities in which they are
engaged gets disrupted with uncertainty on the likely date of their return.
Such repetitive disruptions have significant cost as well as uncertainty in
their ability to meet contractual commitments both domestic and foreign.
22.The impact of migrant workers is an important factor for the rationale of

moving to a synchronized system of elections.
VII. EDUCATION ENROLMENT
23.Another mechanism through which electoral cycles can affect economic

growth and development is through their impact on educational inputs and
outcomes. The impact on education would be predictable if elections were
held once in five years. Asynchronous elections could have an impact four
times of that due to the increased frequency of disruption.
24.We use national primary (classes 1-5) enrolment as a proportion of the total
population as a proxy for broader educational outcomes and find that non-
simultaneous elections are associated with about half a percentage point
drop in primary enrolment, compared to the simultaneous election episodes
(Figure 8.1413).
VIII. SECURITY AND CRIME
13
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25.If large percentages of paramilitary or police forces are deployed on

election-related activities, does the overall situation of security deteriorate
adversely around elections?
26.Indeed, with the available historical data going back, while both types of
elections are associated with higher crime rates on average, we find a
smaller increase in crime rates associated with simultaneous election
episodes compared to non-simultaneous episodes (DiD1 = - 4.04 incidences
and DiD2 = -6.315 incidences per 100,000 population), see Figure 8.15.14
IX. MODEL CODE OF CONDUCT
27.When an election is announced, a “Model Code of Conduct” (MCC) is

imposed by the Election Commission of India to regulate political parties
and candidates before elections. The MCC is imposed a month before the
start of the election dates, until the results of an election are announced. This
places many rules on daily activities, besides the protocol followed by
political parties.
28.With elections occurring across different levels of government in any given

year, the number of lost days significantly increases. Non-simultaneous
elections would need to impose MCC four times in 5 years, as compared to
once in five years. Anecdotally, for instance, in Maharashtra, if the days
spent on election campaigning and voting were to be added together it could
amount to about 300 days in an average year in some states. Nonetheless,
the MCC affects the governance architecture in a significant way, severely
disrupting it if elections are held asynchronously. In effect, it substantially
dilutes the continuity of governance through the engagement of
14
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policymakers and the disruption in the decision-making process repetitively

four times, instead of one.
X. IDENTITY POLITICS
29.In all democracies it is well known that the heat of the election campaign
often ignites emotions and passions, which are embedded in identities.
Divisive emotional issues like caste, class, incomes, race are often the fuel
for election campaigning.
30.While once in five years this would be understandable, but if elections are
held frequently then these divisive forces, based on forms of identity
politics, disrupt the social fabric. It embeds the seeds of disharmony and
builds passions for actions, retributions, or commotions, which spill over
beyond the period of elections themselves. In non-synchronized elections,
this period is only compounded and could affect the cohesiveness of the
social fabric. These consequences have far reaching effects on society. It
impacts growth adversely in multiple ways which cannot be readily
quantified.
XI. CONSULTATIONS
31.After the initial discussions, the HLC invited some leading economists to
comment on this paper for enabling changes and modifications, which were
considered necessary. These consultations were held on the 14th of
February, 2024, in which the following economists participated:
1) Prof. Chetan Ghate, Director, Institute of Economic Growth (IEG)
2) Dr. Deepak Mishra, Director & Chief Executive, Indian Council for
Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER)
3) Prof. Indira Rajaraman, Non-Resident Honorary Distinguished

Fellow, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR)
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4) Prof. Pami Dua, Senior Professor & Director, Delhi School of

Economics
5) Dr. Poonam Gupta, Director General, National Council of Applied

Economic Research (NCAER)
6) Dr. Rakesh Mohan, President Emeritus & Distinguished Fellow,

Centre for Social and Economic Progress (CSEP)
7) Dr. Shamika Ravi, Member, Economic Advisory Council to the Prime

Minister
8) Dr. Surjit S. Bhalla, Former Executive Director, IMF for India,

Bangladesh, Bhutan and Sri Lanka.
Based on their views, the authors have sought to restructure their initial draft
and the technical paper enclosed with this chapter seeks to take into account
their views, comments and suggestions to the extent possible.
XII. CONCLUSION
32.The detailed granular analytical paper contained in the appendix brings out
in quantitative terms some of these issues through careful economic
analysis. As mentioned earlier, there are consequences for simultaneous vs
non-simultaneous elections. Some of these consequences are quantifiable,
but a large part cannot be quantified like the impact of uncertainty, the
disruption of a harmonious social fabric, its impact on potential investors
and circumscribing the governance structure in detracting policymakers
over multiple times from their basic functioning of governance. In short, the
governance of India, which is based on predictability and certainty of action
by the elected representatives of House of the People in the State Legislative
Assemblies, becomes malleable and politically diluted, when elections are
not synchronized.
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33.The study presented in the appendix brings out evidence for higher average
real GDP growth at both levels of government, and lower inflation post-
elections than before an election, during simultaneous elections compared
to non-simultaneous election episodes.
34.The findings suggest relatively higher public spending post simultaneous

election episodes, spending that is skewed toward capital compared to
revenue, and higher overall investment. These can be explained by direct
channels such as a fewer number of days subject to election related
restrictions, but also due to indirect channels operating through lower
uncertainty, with spillovers from public to private investment, and to the
broader economy too.
35.Teacher absenteeism due to election duties and use of schools for various
election related activities could explain relatively poorer educational
outcomes we observe around asynchronized cycles; and greater deployment
of police and para-military forces for election duties are in line with the
evidence for relatively higher crime rates post asynchronized elections.
36.The study comes with two important caveats. First, the paper abstracts from
any implementation and political considerations; or larger issues for society,
in comparing simultaneous versus non-simultaneous elections. This study,
instead, centers on the economic implications. Second, given data
constraints, we barely touched upon the topic. There is a plethora of effects
of holding frequent elections which are non-quantifiable. Such effects could
include delays in reform momentum, the effects on economic and
investment outlook, opportunity costs of monetary and non-monetary
resources employed by political parties in their campaigns to lure voters,
and the prevalence of black money and corruption in funding for elections.
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If anything, the estimates presented in this paper could be interpreted as

lower bounds for the true costs of recurring elections.
37.Overall, for India to transition into an advanced economy (“Viksit Bharat

@2047”), political economy and electoral cycles will be crucial, like for any
other country. Analysis in the study presented in the appendix suggests that
the occurrence of perennial elections, or asynchronized election cycles can
be associated with relatively lower economic growth, likely through greater
disruption of economic activity, but possibly also through higher
uncertainty, with implications for investment, health, education, and
security. India can learn from her own historical experience; this paper
illustrates the importance of incorporating the effects on the macro economy
for the debate on reforms in political and electoral system.
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Technical Appendix: Economic and Social implications of simultaneous elections
TECHNICAL APPENDIX OF CHAPTER VIII

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS
Macroeconomic impact of harmonizing electoral cycles.

Evidence from India
N.K. Singh
Prachi Mishra
Abstract
This paper examines the macroeconomic implications of harmonizing electoral
cycles in India. We employ India’s own historical experience when national
and state elections were held simultaneously. Using the variation between
cases of synchronous and non-synchronous elections nationally and within
states, our findings suggest comparatively high economic growth at both the
national and state levels, and relatively lower inflation following episodes of
synchronized elections compared to periods of non-synchronized election
cycles. The findings are consistent with relatively higher post-election
government expenditure that may be skewed towards capital compared to
revenue spending, higher overall investment, and likely better outcomes in
areas including education, health, and governance following historical
episodes of simultaneous elections. Potential mechanisms for these findings
could include direct channels such as lesser disruption in economic activity
but, possibly more importantly, indirect channels operating through lower
uncertainty. Overall, the results imply that the synchronicity of election cycles
can have far reaching economic effects, beyond simply looking at the
administrative costs and logistics of conducting elections.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of "One Nation, One Election" refers to the idea of synchronizing
elections at all levels of governments in a country. This idea of simultaneous
elections is not new to India’s own history. Simultaneous elections for the
national and state assemblies were, in fact, the norm in India till 1967. The
timing of four electoral cycles during 1951-52, 1957, 1962 and 1967 were
harmonized at the national and state levels. The cycle of concurrent elections
was, however, discontinued after the dissolution of several state assemblies in
1968 and 1969 by invoking Article 356 of the Constitution, when all the state
machineries were taken under the central government’s jurisdiction. Since
then, partly due to variation in the tenures of different assemblies, the country
has witnessed elections almost every year.
Several Parliamentary democracies outside India, though comparatively small

in relation to India, follow harmonized electoral cycles. Examples include
South Africa, Sweden, and Belgium. In South Africa, for example, elections
occur every five years, and include elections to multiple levels of government,
including the national and provincial assemblies, as well as municipal councils.
In Sweden, on the other hand, county and municipal councils hold elections
concurrently with general elections every four years while municipal
assemblies are elected every five years. In Belgium, federal elections take
place every five years and coincide with European elections. Even in a large
federation like the United States, the timings are synchronized for election of
the President and the Congress as well as for elections at local levels. While
the United States is a Presidential form of democracy, the example is still
relevant from the perspective of the potential economic effects from
harmonizing election cycles, which is the focus of this study.
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What we do in this paper is to use India’s own historical experience and

documents stylized facts on the evolution of macroeconomic variables at the
national and state levels. Following a large body of literature on political
business cycles, we focus on two outcomes: real GDP growth, and consumer
price index inflation. We also explore several intermediate mechanisms that
can be pathways to these ultimate outcomes (Figure 1). The empirical
methodology exploits variation between cases of synchronous and non-
synchronous elections nationally and within states, and accounts for global and
country-specific time trends as well as differences across states. Notably, the
framework relies on differences in outcomes across simultaneous and non-
simultaneous election events, and on averaging across several episodes.
Overall, the findings in the paper suggest that the synchronicity of election
cycles can have far reaching economic implications, beyond simply looking at
the administrative costs and logistics of conducting elections.
Specifically, there is evidence that real GDP growth at both the national and
state levels were higher following simultaneous election episodes compared to
non-simultaneous episodes while inflation was lower. These effects are
economically important. On the pathway to these ultimate outcomes, we find
both level and composition effects for government spending. First, on average,
we find that fiscal deficit and public spending are higher, and second, public
spending tends to be skewed towards capital relative to revenue following
simultaneous election episodes. We also find overall investment to be
relatively higher and some suggestive evidence for comparatively better social
and governance outcomes around synchronized episodes. The results remain
broadly similar across different time horizons, units of analysis (national vs
state -level), alternative definitions of simultaneous and non-simultaneous
elections, samples and specifications. Taken together, the different pieces of
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evidence appear consistent, and suggests that simultaneity of elections can be

macro critical. The results can be explained by both direct channels – non-
simultaneous elections imply more days under the Model Code of Conduct
(MCC), teacher absenteeism, use of public schools, use of police and
paramilitary forces – and indirect channels operating through increased
uncertainty.
There has been strong debate in India recently on the merits and demerits of
synchronising elections. One the one hand, arguments in favour of
synchronous electoral cycles hinge on costs, including administrative and
logistic costs, that could be avoided or reduced through simultaneous elections.
In comparison, non-simultaneous election cycles are considered synonymous
with more frequent and, hence, greater numbers of polls and, as often
expressed in general parlance, results in the country being in “perennial
election mode”, and political parties and leaders being in “permanent
campaign” mode. Indeed, in India, since 1986, there has not been a single year
when a state assembly election did not occur.
The challengers of the idea of harmonizing election cycles, on the other hand,
have focused on the official costs of conducting elections, and argue that these
are miniscule. Even ignoring the opportunity costs of resources employed in
elections, there is also disagreement on the orders of magnitude of the most
explicit costs.,
Beyond this debate, which has focused primarily on the costs of administering
elections, the reality is that there are myriad ways in which the synchronicity
of electoral cycles can have implications for the macro economy. These
channels can be direct or not so direct. The most direct channel is through the
MCC, which puts restrictions on activities including on public projects. Debroy
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and Desai (2017) have shown that in the year 2014, governance and
developmental activities due to the imposition of the MCC remained largely
suspended for about 7 months, i.e., for about 58 per cent of one fiscal year
cycle: 3 months across the country and 4 months across four state elections (a
quarter and a third of a fiscal year cycle respectively). The number of days
under the MCC, therefore, can have direct effects on public investment, fiscal
deficit, and on the expenditure priorities of the government.
There can be other direct channels with deeper social consequences, e.g.,
through the effects on human capital. Teachers’ election duties can take time
off from teaching, and the use of public schools for electoral activities such as
polling and counting can all have effects on educational outcomes. Similarly,
the deployment of police and paramilitary forces for election duties can take
them away from their regular jobs, with a direct effect on crime and security.
In addition to the most direct channels, there is also one big indirect one –
which is through the effects of constant elections on uncertainty. Perennial
elections increase uncertainty for all economic agents that can directly affect
choices and decisions and bear on macroeconomic outcomes like economic
growth and inflation, or indirectly through intermediate channels such as
investment.
There can be other indirect mechanisms too. Political parties, including

ministers and leaders, being in ‘permanent campaign’ mode both in terms of
rallies and people-to-people contact, can act as a bottleneck to policy making
by crowding out their time and focus from policy making and execution, and
can delay or stall reform processes. The number of days under the MCC can
also directly lead to delays in decision making. Leaders being occupied with
campaigns and elections can reduce their attention on broader governance
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issues too. Further, there can be significant monetary and non-monetary

resources employed by political parties in electoral campaigns. Political
parties, in fact, are unrestricted by expenditure ceilings and can resort to
extravagant campaigning, with stronger pressures for fulfilling poll promises
in the new age of information and social media. In addition, there can be a host
of other issues. Internal migrants who comprise more than one-third of India’s
population may need to travel to their home states to cast their votes – the more
frequent the elections, the higher will be their travel expenses and losses
incurred from the days out of work. Overall, this myriad of direct and indirect
mechanisms can be far more substantial than official expenditures by the
government in conducting elections. From an economic perspective, the
resources employed in electoral cycles can be associated with significant
opportunity costs, all with implications for the macro economy.
Apart from implications for the macro economy, there can also be
consequences for society. Frequent elections could lead to recurrent polarizing
campaigns to win elections, and social media can intensify some of the effects.
There could be broader socio-political dimensions too (see, for example, Wani
and Dar (2024)). This paper barely scratches the surface and considers some
of the quantifiable macroeconomic implications of synchronizing election
cycles.
The paper is related to several strands of the literature on international political

economy. The “political business cycle” theory goes back to Nordhaus (1975)
and MacRae (1977), and highlights the “opportunistic motivation” of
policymakers. According to this model, politicians stimulate aggregate
demand before elections in order to create fast growth and reduce
unemployment; and the inflationary consequences of this policy are eliminated
by a post-electoral contraction. While there are a number of clear electoral
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effects on macroeconomic variables (Drazen, 2000), the empirical literature

generated by the Nordhaus’ paper, however, has yielded mixed results at best
(Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini, 1992). On the other hand, a "partisan theory” of
macroeconomic policy, which goes back to Hibbs (1977), emphasizes
policymakers’ partisan motivations and suggests different macroeconomic
outcomes across political parties and administrations. This paper contributes
to the literature by establishing heterogeneity in macroeconomic outcomes
depending on synchronicity of electoral cycles within a country, which can be
particularly relevant for large federations. To our knowledge, this is the first
paper to exploit differences across simultaneous and non-simultaneous
elections in a large federation.
This paper also relates to a rapidly growing literature in finance on corporate

decision making under uncertainty, with elections as key uncertainty-inducing
events (see Campello and Kankanhalli, 2022 for a review). Julio and Yook
(2012), for example, using a sample of 248 national elections in 48 countries
held between 1980 and 2005, show that firms in election countries reduce their
investment in election years relative to non-election years. Similarly, Jens
(2017) shows similar dynamics of reduced investment around US
gubernatorial elections. More recently, Nguyen and Sila (2024) use multiple
sources of big data on US firms’ job postings and employment flows to study
how firms adjust the volume and nature of their hiring decisions in response to
election uncertainty. Our paper highlights the role of higher uncertainty too –
in our case, as a key mechanism for relatively poorer outcomes around non-
simultaneous elections compared to simultaneous elections.
Finally, the paper also contributes to the political economy literature in India.
The paper is closely related to, and builds on Debroy and Desai (2017), who
study simultaneous and non-simultaneous elections and delve into operational
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and implementation issues in detail. More recently, Agney and Thomas (2023),
and Kumar and Yugank (2019) examine the “one-nation, one-election”
proposal from a political and an implementation perspective. Kumar and
Yugank (2019), for example, use electoral data to argue that a careful re-
engineering of the proposal could make it workable and palatable. Importantly,
Debroy and Desai note that “it is difficult to “quantify” the gains from
simultaneous elections." This is where the current study offers a first
contribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the empirical
methodology. Section III presents the findings, and Section IV digs into the
potential mechanisms. Section V concludes.
II. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
This section describes the empirical methodology; sub-section II.1 presents the
strategy for analysing macro-economic outcomes at the national level while
sub-section II.2 focuses on state level outcomes. Annex 1 describes data
sources in detail.
II.1 National Analysis
In India, simultaneous elections for the Lok Sabha (lower house of Parliament)
and the Vidhan Sabha (lower house of the state assembly) were held for the
following years: 1951-52, 1957,1962, and 1967. Macroeconomic data,
however, are not easily available through publicly available sources before the
1960s, limiting the scope of the analysis. To circumvent such data issues, we
also include in our analysis election cycles where 40 per cent or more of the
states had their lower house elections in the year of national elections and
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include these in the categorization of “simultaneous” electoral cycles. Based

on the modified definition, five election cycles are defined to be simultaneous,
and include the following years: 1962, 1967, 1977, 1980 and 1984-85 (Figure
2).
The methodology uses a simple event study, combined with a double

difference approach, comparing outcomes pre- and post-, around simultaneous
and non-simultaneous election cycles. Simultaneous election years are
assumed to be “treatment” years, while the other years are assumed to be the
“control” group in the analysis. We employ two horizons to compare the pre-
and post- periods: the first one takes the simple difference between one-year
before and one year after the election cycles (call it DiD1) while the second
approach computes differences for the average values between 2 years before
and after the election years (call it DiD2). Notably, the outcomes around
different episodes are aggregated over long periods of simultaneous and non-
simultaneous cycles. The estimates, therefore, can be interpreted as capturing
more persistent effects, while averaging out the more volatile components (see
e.g., Altavilla, Giannone, and Modugno, (2017)).
More specifically, we define DiD1 and DiD2 for the purposes of this analysis
as follows:
 DiD1 – We take the difference in outcomes in the year before the election
from the year after the election for each election cycle. Then, taking the
grouped averages of these differences for treatment (simultaneous) and
control (non-simultaneous) groups, we find the differences between these
differences. This gives us the 1-year difference-in-differences (DiD1)
between simultaneous and non-simultaneous elections.
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 DiD2 – Here we take the average of the values 1 year and 2 years after the
election and subtract it from the average of the values 1 year and 2 years
before the election. Taking the average of these values separately for the
treatment and control group, we find the difference between them. Hence,
we get the 2-year difference-in-differences (DiD2) between simultaneous
and non-simultaneous elections.
Notably, the framework differs from a standard DiD setting (with one
exogenous time event, and two units – treated and control). In our framework,
we compare the same unit (India in the national level analysis, or a given state
in the state level analysis described below) when it is treated (say, 1967) and
when it is in control (say, 1971). So, the comparison is between the same unit
under different event windows, as the unit is treated at t and in control at t+4.
Therefore, we cannot conduct a typical parallel trend analysis. Importantly,
taking differences between post- and pre-election filters out any time trends
that would affect our outcome variables. Given that the timing of elections may
not be totally exogenous, we prefer to interpret the findings as the evolution of
macroeconomic outcomes and associations rather than a strictly causal
analysis.
Figure 3 reports the treated and control groups, and Figure 4 describes the
methodology. The analysis includes fiscal years from 1960 until 2023. In total,
15 general election cycles are included in the sample, with four of them being
treated and 11 elections in the control group. The key macroeconomic
outcomes we analyse include annual GDP growth and inflation.
II.2. State Level Analysis

II.2.1. Defining Simultaneous Elections for States
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Next, we move to the analysis at the state level. Here we define simultaneous
election cycles for specific states. For a given state, if the assembly election
happens to fall in the same year as the national elections of the lower house,
that state election is defined to be a simultaneous election for the state. To
illustrate the empirical approach, we use the state of Andhra Pradesh as an
example. Figure 5 reports the four assembly elections in the state between 1983
and 1994. Only two of the four states elections, however, coincided with
national elections, and were held in 1985 and 1989. Note that 1985 is also a
year when many other Vidhan Sabha elections took place as given in the
multiple (orange) shaded areas. For our purposes though, the fact that in 1985,
Andhra Pradesh’s Vidhan Sabha or state election coincided with the Lok Sabha
or national election, is the criteria employed for classifying 1985 as a
simultaneous cycle for Andhra Pradesh.
II.2.2. Within States
To explore the evolution of macroeconomic outcomes at the state level, we

utilize variations in two dimensions: within and across states. First, we utilize
the “within-state” variation. Here, we focus on election cycles for a particular
state and compare the outcomes for simultaneous and non-simultaneous
election episodes for the same state. This provides a good counterfactual as we
compare the same state across episodes, and not any other state with vastly
different characteristics.
II.2.3. In search of counterfactuals
The number of simultaneous elections varies across states, with some never
having an episode of simultaneous election occurring in their history (e.g.,
Chhattisgarh, Figure 6a), or too rarely (e.g., Bihar, Figure 6b), or with too many
episodes (e.g., Andhra Pradesh, Figure 6c). States that have had enough of both
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simultaneous and non-simultaneous elections include Haryana, Uttar Pradesh,

Odisha, Karnataka, Jharkhand, and Tamil Nadu. The latter group of states
allows sufficient variation and reasonable counterfactuals, which we can utilize
to study the evolution of macro-economic outcomes, using a double-difference
approach both across states and over time (see, for example, Figure 6d for the
case of Haryana, Table 1, and Figure 7 for a selection of states with plausible
counterfactuals).
As discussed above in the methodology for analysis at the national level, the
framework used in this study differs from a typical DiD setting and is a
modified version of the latter. The typical DiD setting includes two units
(treatment, control), one exogenous event, and two periods (before, after). This
framework compares two units (treatment and control) during the same event
window. Our analysis differs in that it is a comparison between the same unit
(say, Andhra Pradesh) when it is treated (say, 1989) and when it is in control
(say, 1994). So, the comparison is between the same unit under different event
windows, as our unit is treated at t and in control at t+5. Strictly speaking, in
our framework, we cannot not test for parallel trends between our units, or in
other words, we cannot use unit (state) fixed effects because we compare the
same state (or the same unit) across two distinct events. The before-after
differencing, however, takes care of any time trends that would affect our
outcome variables.
Notably, if we assume that that the assignment of the treatment group, i.e., a
simultaneous election occurring in a state, is random or, in other words, there
is a random likelihood of a state assembly election coinciding with the year of
a general election at the Centre, then we can draw causal implications from the
study. That said, we prefer to interpret the findings as the evolution of
macroeconomic outcomes and associations rather than a strictly causal
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interpretation.
II.2.4. Within and across States
The second approach compares the difference in outcomes across simultaneous

and non-simultaneous episodes by pooling all the episodes, which allows the
inclusion of both state and year fixed effects. In fact, two-way fixed effects
OLS regressions have been established in the literature to be equivalent to a
generalized Difference-in-Difference (DiD) approach (Woolridge (2021), and
Fredriksson and Oliveira (2019)). The advantage of this approach is that it
allows us to include all states and episodes and, at the same time, control for
heterogeneity across states. Importantly, it also allows some power to gauge
confidence bands around the estimates.
The estimated equation is specified as follows:
∆𝑦𝑠,𝑒 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝜋𝑡 + 𝛽𝐷𝑒,𝑠 + 𝛾𝑍𝑠,𝑒 + 𝜀𝑠,𝑒 (1)
𝑒 = 𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑑𝑒, 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑜𝑟 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑜𝑢𝑠

𝑠 = 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
∆𝑦𝑠,𝑒 = 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠,
𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑒
𝑛 = 1, 2
𝐷𝑒,𝑠 = 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠.
𝛼𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜋𝑡 denote state and time fixed effects respectively.
𝛼𝑠 controls for any time-invariant heterogeneity across states, 𝜋𝑡 controls for

any global or India-specific shocks, e.g.,, changes in oil prices, or global
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growth. The coefficient of interest is 𝛽, which captures the average difference

in the evolution of outcomes between simultaneous and non-simultaneous
elections for the same state.
The regressions are weighted by the economic size of the state in the initial
period (to avoid any endogeneity concerns). The weighted regressions also
address the issues of data quality, especially for smaller states. Standard errors
are clustered at the state level to address any possible correlation in residuals.
III. RESULTS
This section presents the results for the evolution of macroeconomic outcomes
using the methodology described in Section II. Sub-section III.1 presents
results from national level analysis while III.2 reports findings on state level
outcomes.
III.1. National level results: Evolution of growth and inflation
We start by comparing changes in real GDP growth before and after episodes
of simultaneous and non-simultaneous elections. Figure 8 reports the findings
for real GDP growth. The left panel in Figure 8 shows the evolution of growth
around simultaneous elections, while the right panel reports the evolution
around non-simultaneous elections. 0 is the year of election, -1 and -2 implies
1 and 2 years before, while +1 and +2 implies 1 and 2 years after. The height
of the bar in the left panel corresponding to a value of -1 on the x-axis, for
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example, is calculated by taking the growth one year before an episode and
taking a simple average across all simultaneous election episodes.
The red line in both the panels represents the two-year averages before and
after the episodes. We see a rise in the magnitude, indicated by the red line, of
0.63 percentage points in the left panel, and a fall of 0.92 percentage points in
the right panel. Taking the difference, we obtain 1.55 percentage points. The
corresponding figures for one-year differences are +1.47 p.p. and -0.01 p.p.
respectively, with a difference of 1.49 p.p. over the 1-year horizon.
What do these estimates mean? The estimates suggest that on average, real
GDP growth is higher following episodes of simultaneous elections, while we
find a decrease post the non-simultaneous episodes. The magnitudes suggest
approximately 1.5 percentage points higher post-pre difference in growth as
compared to non-simultaneous elections. To put the magnitudes in perspective,
1.5 per cent of GDP is equal to INR 4.5 lakh crore in FY 2024, half the public
spending on health, and one third that on education. Publicly reported estimates
of conducting national and state elections, beyond the official costs of
conducting elections, range from INR 3-7 lakh crore, which are close in order
of magnitude to our growth estimates (Kumar, 2023, and Rao, 2023).
Finally, we explore the evolution of Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation

around election episodes. The early decades of independence were associated
with higher inflation due to exogenous factors, e.g., the oil shock of the 1970s
(Figure 9). The period of simultaneous elections largely overlaps with this
period and could bias our analysis of the evolution of inflation. Hence, to
correct for exogenous shocks, as a simple exercise, the oil shock years are
excluded from our analysis, and we treat only the election cycles of 1962, 1967
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and 1984-85 as simultaneous episodes. We drop from our sample the election
cycles constituting years that Alesina and Sachs (1988) consider as oil shocks.
Figure 10 reports the results on inflation. On average, the CPI inflation rate
was lower during simultaneous election episodes in the pre-election period
compared to the non-simultaneous ones. While the inflation rates tend to fall
around both simultaneous and non-simultaneous episodes, they tend to fall
more around simultaneous episodes. The magnitudes suggest a difference-in-
difference estimate of 1.1 percentage points or a larger fall in inflation of
around one percentage point around simultaneous elections compared to non-
One potential concern could be related to high base effects driving the response
of inflation around simultaneous episodes. In fact, after correcting for oil
shocks, inflation levels, if anything, are slightly lower on average before
simultaneous elections; therefore, the greater fall in the inflation rate post
synchronized episodes is less likely to be contaminated with base effects.
Another concern could be that the consumer price index inflation is driven by
specific sectors like food and energy, which could be affected by both domestic
(e.g., monsoon) and global (e.g., geopolitical) factors. The difference-in-
difference methodology, however, addresses such concerns by filtering out
time trends, and by taking long-term averages across episodes so that the
effects are less likely to be contaminated by specific events or by time trends
in domestic or global variables.
Overall, the national level analysis suggests relatively higher economic growth
and lower inflation following periods of simultaneous elections compared to
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periods of non-simultaneous elections. Notably, the results are broadly similar

between different time horizons (see Table 2 for a summary of the findings).
III.2. State-level results
We start by analysing real GDP growth at the state level, or growth in real
GSDP. For each state in the sample, we compute differences between pre- and
post for simultaneous and non-simultaneous election episodes (“within-state”
approach). As reported in Figure 6 and discussed above, we select a sample of
six states, which experienced a similar number of both types of election
episodes. We use an initial period level of real GDP in 1980-81 as weights to
aggregate across states. The sample of states accounted for 35% of the nation’s
real GDP in 1981. We find that the average 1-year pre-post growth DiD is
estimated at 1.30 percentage points (Table 3), which is close to our national
growth result of around 1.5 p.p. of GDP. The 2-year differences, however, are
much smaller and closer to zero, though Odisha, Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka
still report relatively higher economic growth around simultaneous elections
even with 2-year differences. We suspect the differences in findings over 1-
year and 2-year horizon could be indicative of noise in the data, which we can
address when we pool all episodes, thereby averaging out some of the volatility
in the data for particular states.
III.3. Robustness tests
We conduct several robustness checks for the results reported above.

First, as discussed above, the years 1984-85 were peculiar years with Lok
Sabha elections split across two years in unusual circumstances. For
robustness, we repeat the empirical analysis, not including 1984-85 as a
simultaneous episode. The findings reported in Table 4a remain broadly robust
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even if 1984-95 is excluded.
Second, in the analysis presented above, we included election cycles where 40

per cent or more of the states had their assembly elections in the year of
national elections in the categorization of “simultaneous” electoral cycles.
Here, we conduct robustness to alternative cut offs. Table 4b reports the results
with 50 per cent as the cut off, which excludes the 1980 election cycle from
the treatment group. As shown in Table 4b, our main findings remain
qualitatively similar.
Third, as discussed in Footnote 3, Jharkhand was created in 2000 out of the

southern and eastern districts of Bihar; therefore, we might be underestimating
the number of simultaneous elections in Jharkhand. Therefore, we include
elections in Bihar between 1981 and 2000, and add to the count of Jharkhand's
elections from 2000 to 2023. Doing so yields qualitatively similar results – a
1-year growth DiD of 1.14 percentage points (Table 5).
Finally, we drop Jharkhand and include Kerala in the sample. Kerala’s GSDP
was remarkably similar to Jharkhand in 1981, and by including Kerala, our
sample includes a state that was slightly skewed toward non-simultaneous
elections. Again, the estimates are qualitatively similar – 1-year growth DiD at
0.76 percentage points of GDP (Table 5).
III.4. Results from empirical model with pooled episodes
Finally, we report results from pooling all episodes, utilizing both within and
across state variation. The results from estimating Equation (1) are reported in
Table 6. The analysis includes 31 states and over 200 election cycles. For a
given state, if the assembly election happens to fall in the same year as the
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national elections of the lower house, that state election is defined to be a

simultaneous election for the state. The dependent variables in Columns (1)
and (2) are the difference in the real GSDP growth rate between the average of
(+1, +2) and (-2, -1) years after and before the election episode (t=0). The
dependent variables in Columns (3) and (4) are the difference in the real GSDP
growth rate between (+1) and (-1) years after and before the election episode
(t=0). Columns (1) and (3) include year fixed effects, while Columns (2) and
(4) include both state and year fixed effects. The regressions are weighted by
the states’ GSDP in 1981. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
The estimated coefficient on the dummy for simultaneous election episodes is

positive in all the specifications and statistically distinguishable from zero over
the 2-year horizons. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient in Column 2
suggest that on average, economic growth is relatively higher by 2.4
percentage points post-simultaneous elections compared to non-simultaneous
elections. Importantly, the magnitude of the estimates in Column 1 (without
controlling for heterogeneity across states as an adequate benchmark) is
comparable to the national level results reported in Figure 8.
Overall, our main finding for a larger post-pre difference in GSDP growth for
simultaneous elections compared to non-simultaneous election episodes
remain robust to controlling for heterogeneity across states as well as for any
global and country-wide shocks.
III.5. Endogeneity concerns
One potential concern is that that the ruling regime may strategically time
elections and that election outcomes may be predictable. The occurrence of
non-simultaneous elections in 1971, for example, could be correlated with the
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geo-political crises of the 1970s. Or, when economic conditions are better,
governments may be more likely to call for elections in anticipation of a more
favourable outcome. Similarly, for the state level analysis, there could be
concerns that the imposition of Article 356 and the dissolution of state
assemblies could reflect deliberate actions by governments to time the
assembly elections to coincide with the Lok Sabha elections. Data, however,
suggest that the imposition of Article 356, in fact, has declined dramatically
over time (see Footnote 7). In our selected sample of six states with adequate
counterfactuals, there have been only 16 instances of the imposition of Article
356 since January 1982, or barely 3 per cent of year-months. Notably, the
direction of the bias in our estimates is likely against finding any results. The
economy grew faster over time; if anything, the period of simultaneous
elections is likely to be associated with less favourable macroeconomic
outcomes.
That said, our framework addresses endogeneity concerns in several ways.

First, taking differences between post- and pre- filters out any linear time
trends that would affect our outcome variables. This accounts, for example, for
structural changes that took place across decades. Second, the state level
analysis with pooled episodes across all states allows the purging of the effects
of any time-varying shocks that affected the country. For example, accounting
for time dummies allows us to not attribute the low growth from oil shocks or
low global growth to simultaneous elections. Notably, our framework accounts
for time-trends in differences too, i.e., if there were structural changes or big
shocks that could even affect the pre-post difference in outcomes rather than
just the level changes, the method is able to purge such effects.
Third, we estimate a regression at the state-year level of the occurrence of

simultaneous election episodes (Dummy=1 if a simultaneous election occurred
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for the state-year, and zero otherwise) on economic growth, and find
statistically and economically insignificant effects of economic growth on
occurrence of simultaneous elections, i.e., little evidence for the hypothesis that
the timing of simultaneous elections could be endogenous to economic
conditions.
Fourth, while the incidence of Article 356 itself appears to have declined over
time, yet in our approach with the adequate set of counterfactuals presented in
Table 3, we fix a state and compare outcomes around simultaneous and non-
simultaneous elections. Therefore, the comparisons are not across but within
states, and less likely to be contaminated by selection issues. For illustration,
take the case of Tamil Nadu, which had four simultaneous election episodes
before 1998, and none thereafter. The average growth rates for the state were,
in fact, 1 percentage point lower during the simultaneous election period
compared to the non-simultaneous one (averages of 6.1% and 7% over 1980-
1998 and 1999-2023 respectively). Our results, however, reflect the treatment
effects of elections (of both types), which are obtained by comparing pre- and
post-differences and not just pre-and post-levels of growth, across the two types
of events. For example, growth rates in Tamil Nadu declined by 4.1 p.p. around
a simultaneous episode of 1996, while they declined by 5.4 p.p. or almost 30%
more around the non-simultaneous episode of 2001 i.e., growth rates rose
relatively in Tamil Nadu around simultaneous election episodes.
Fifth, in the pooled approach, state fixed effects account for any unobserved
time-invariant differences across states; in other words, we are again
comparing the same state over time.
Sixth and finally, it is important to note that our methodology relies on

differences in outcomes across simultaneous and non-simultaneous election
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events, and on averaging across several episodes. While the central

government could possibly influence the holding of one election cycle of a
state at any given time, it is implausible to assume that the Centre can
endogenize the count of both types of elections, and that too in an even way
(recall that the selection of states in Table 3 rests on the assumption of an even
count of simultaneous and non-simultaneous episodes). In addition, our results
are obtained by averaging across several episodes, making them less
susceptible to be driven by specific events or states.
IV. POTENTIAL MECHANISMS
The findings in Section III suggest that periods of simultaneous elections in

India were associated with higher economic growth and lower inflation
compared to periods of non-simultaneous elections. What could possibly drive
these findings? In the introduction, we discussed the potential channels through
which synchronicity of elections could affect ultimate outcomes. In this
section, we make an attempt to quantify some of the mechanisms through
which the occurrence of simultaneous elections could differentially affect the
economy compared to non-simultaneous ones (Figure 1).
The key assumption underlying the mechanisms laid out in Figure 1 is that
non-simultaneous election cycles can be assumed to be associated with more
frequent and a larger number of elections compared to synchronized election
cycles. Indeed, as shown in Figure 11a, historically, elections have been all-
pervasive in India. On average, India experienced six elections per year over
1952-2023. The figure clearly illustrates the phenomenon of “perennial
elections”. If one were to include local elections, this number would multiply
manifold.
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What is relevant for this paper, however, is whether the frequency of elections
varied between simultaneous and non-simultaneous episodes? In order to
answer this question, we divide the period from 1952-2023 into two sub-
periods: 1952-1985, which covers the time span of simultaneous elections, and
1986-2023, or the period of non-simultaneous elections. Figure 11b plots the
frequency of state assembly elections that occurred during the two sub-
samples. While three of more state assembly elections occurred only in 44%
of years in the simultaneous election period, these occurred in 84% of the years
in the non-simultaneous sub-sample. In contrast, while no assembly elections
occurred in one-third of the years in the simultaneous election sub-sample,
there is not a single year in the non-simultaneous period when state elections
did not happen. In other words, frequent elections have become way more
prevalent in the era of non-simultaneous elections.
IV.1. Fiscal deficit
As argued above, more frequent elections can directly disrupt economic

activity. For example, when an election is announced at the national or at the
state-level, a “Model Code of Conduct” (MCC), or a set of rules is imposed,
which includes among others, restrictions on the government to lay any new
ground for projects or public initiatives. More specifically, the MCC is a set of
guidelines issued by the Election Commission of India to regulate political
parties and candidates before elections. For elections at all levels, the MCC
kicks in from a month before the start of the election dates and remains in force
until the day the results are announced. This puts many regulations on usual
activities, besides the protocol to be followed by political parties. The number
of days lost due to the code of conduct kicking in can potentially affect decision
making at all levels, including those related to public spending. Furthermore,
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asynchronized electoral cycles, with a larger number of elections happening

across different levels of government in any given year, can significantly
increase the total number of days under the model code of conduct, directly
reducing public expenditures, including public investment.
We start exploring this mechanism by looking at the fiscal deficit. Figure 12

reports the evolution of the central government’s gross fiscal deficit as a
fraction of GDP. We find fiscal deficit to be higher after simultaneous elections
compared to before, and this difference outpaces that in the case of non-
simultaneous elections. On average, the 2-year difference-in-differences
(DiD2) is a higher fiscal deficit of 1.28 percentage points of GDP following
simultaneous elections, compared to non-simultaneous episodes.
At the outset, the result that simultaneous elections may be associated with
higher fiscal deficit, and possibly higher public expenditure, may appear
counterintuitive, as conventional wisdom would suggest that more frequent
elections for non-simultaneous episodes should be associated with higher
spending and deficits, while we find otherwise. Indeed, when we compare the
levels as indicated by the height of the bars, particularly, in the run up to the
elections (-2 and -1), these are larger for non-simultaneous episodes. What we
find, however, suggests that governments tend to spend relatively more after
as compared to before the elections around simultaneous election episodes, or
they tend to spend relatively less before. One potential explanation for this
result could be that the higher the number of elections, the greater the degree
of freebies and pre-election promises, which would raise government spending
before the episode for non-simultaneous elections. The observed rise in
government expenditure only after the episode for simultaneous elections
would be consistent with a story of streamlining and higher efficiency in the
electoral process.
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We repeat the state level analysis too, with the fiscal deficit as the outcome
variable. The “within state” results are reported in Table 7. On average, the 1-
year pre-post difference in fiscal deficit (DiD1) is estimated at 1.68 percentage
points of GDP higher for simultaneous election episodes; and the 2-year
difference (DiD2) is estimated at 2.29 p.p. of GDP. Both the DiD1 and DiD2
estimates for each state is positive. Further, we also estimate the specification
in Equation (1) pooling all the episodes, with the change in fiscal deficit to
GDP as the dependent variable. The results are reported in Table 8. The
estimated coefficient on the dummy for simultaneous election episodes is
negative in all the specifications, though these are statistically
indistinguishable from zero.
Taken together, we interpret the results in Tables 7 and 8 to be broadly in line

with the national-level analysis and suggestive of relatively larger increases in
spending by state governments post elections, or relatively lower pre-election
spending for simultaneous election episodes. Higher public spending post
elections is also consistent with the evidence for relatively higher growth rates
post simultaneous election episodes relative to non-simultaneous ones.
IV.2. Government expenditure priorities
How does higher government spending post simultaneous elections relate to

the expenditure priorities of the government? Are priorities skewed towards
greater capital expenditure with better multipliers, or towards revenue
expenditure (reflected partly in giveaways and freebies around elections)
around synchronized electoral cycles? This sub-section explores patterns of
the ratio of capital-to-revenue spending in each type of election.
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We look at within-state differences in the spending priority of governments in

either type of election. Then we take a weighted average of the state
differences for our sample of states with adequate counterfactuals. We weigh
them by the state incomes at the starting point of our period of analysis, i.e.,
1982 GSDP, to take care of endogeneity concerns. The findings suggest that,
on average, the pre-post difference in the capital-to-current spending ratio is
estimated to be higher by 17.67 percentage points for simultaneous election
compared to non-simultaneous elections episodes (Table 9). In other words,
not only do the findings suggest relatively higher public spending post
simultaneous election episodes but spending that is also skewed towards
capital compared to revenue – again consistent with the evidence for relatively
higher growth post simultaneous elections.
IV.3. Investment decisions
More frequent elections can directly disrupt activity but also indirectly affect
the economy through greater uncertainty. Both these channels are likely to
have implications for investment in the economy. As argued above,
asynchronized electoral cycles, with a larger number of elections happening
across different levels of government in any given year, can significantly
increase the total number of days under the model code of conduct, directly
reducing public expenditures and, in particular, investment. Even more
importantly, the resulting uncertainties could also have spillovers for private
investment and the broader economy.
To explore the evolution of investments around elections, we look at the total

Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) as a fraction of GDP around
simultaneous and non-simultaneous election episodes. We find that
simultaneous elections are associated with higher post-pre difference in
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investment compared to non-simultaneous elections (Figure 13). On average,

the pre-post difference in the ratio of GFCF to GDP is estimated at about half
a percentage point higher for simultaneous election episodes compared to non-
simultaneous ones, which is consistent with lesser interruptions in economic
activity and lower uncertainty.
IV.4. Education enrolment
Another mechanism through which electoral cycles can affect economic

growth and development is through its impact on educational inputs and
outcomes. For example, teachers employed in public schools often have to do
election duties at the time of polling at all levels of government. Further,
election activities such as polling or counting of votes often take place in public
schools. Therefore, teacher absenteeism as a result of election duties can be a
direct channel of transmission from number of elections to educational
outcomes. We use primary (classes 1-5) enrolment as a proportion of the total
population as a proxy for broader educational outcomes and find that non-
simultaneous elections are associated with about half a percentage point lower
primary enrolment compared to the simultaneous election episodes (Figure
14).
IV.5. Security and crime
Finally, we consider another channel, which is through the effects on security

and crime rates around elections. For example, if large proportions of the
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paramilitary or police forces are deployed on election-related activities, does

the overall situation of security deteriorate adversely around elections?
In order to dig into this mechanism, we use data on crime rates reported by the
National Crime Record Bureau (NCRB). The greater the frequency of
elections, for example, in asynchronized cycles, the more the deployment of
paramilitary forces, and the greater the deterioration in the overall security
situation around these cycles compared to synchronized election episodes.
Indeed, with the available historical data going back to 1960, while both types
of elections are associated with higher crime rates on average, we find a smaller
increase in crime rates associated with simultaneous election episodes
compared to non-simultaneous episodes (DiD1 = -4.04 incidences and DiD2 =
-6.315 incidences per ‘100,000 population), see Figure 15.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper analysed the effects of simultaneous election episodes in India on

a host of macroeconomic variables. We conducted our analysis at both the
national and state levels. Around simultaneous election episodes, there is
evidence of higher average real GDP growth at both levels of government and
lower inflation compared to non-simultaneous election episodes.
We investigated potential mechanisms to explain the results. The findings

suggest relatively higher public spending post simultaneous election episodes,
spending that is skewed towards capital compared to revenue, and higher
overall investment. These mechanisms are consistent with the evidence for
relatively higher growth post simultaneous elections. These can be explained
by direct channels such as the fewer number of days subject to election related
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restrictions, but also due to indirect channels operating through lower

uncertainty, with spillovers from public to private investment and the broader
economy. Finally, teacher absenteeism because of election duties and use of
schools for various election related activities could explain the relatively
poorer educational outcomes we observe around asynchronized cycles and
greater deployment of police and para-military forces for election duties are
in line with the evidence of relatively higher crime rates post asynchronized
elections.
Our study comes with three important caveats. First, the paper abstracts from
any implementation and political considerations or issues for society in
comparing simultaneous versus non-simultaneous elections. This study,
instead, centres on the economic implications. Second, given data constraints,
we barely touched upon the topic. There can be a plethora of effects of holding
frequent elections that are non-quantifiable. Such effects could include delays
in reform momentum, the effects on economic and investment outlook,
opportunity costs of monetary and non-monetary resources employed by
political parties in their campaigns to lure voters, and the prevalence of black
money and corruption in election funding. If anything, the estimates presented
in this paper could be interpreted as lower bounds for the true costs of
recurring elections. Third, while we conduct several robustness tests, account
for time trends and differences across states, we prefer to interpret the findings
as a first attempt in the literature to quantify the evolution of macroeconomic
outcomes around synchronized vs asynchronized election events rather than a
strictly causal interpretation with external validity in any other context or
period.
Overall, for India to transition into an advanced economy (“Viksit Bharat

@2047”), political economy and electoral cycles will be crucial, just as it
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would be for any other country. The analysis in this paper suggests that the
occurrence of perennial elections or asynchronized election cycles can be
associated with relatively lower economic growth, likely through greater
disruption of economic activity, but possibly also through higher uncertainty,
with implications for investment, health, education, and security. India can
learn from her own historical experience; taken together, the evidence
presented in this paper illustrates the importance of incorporating the effects of
elections on the macro economy in the debate on reforms in political and
electoral systems.
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Figure 8.1. Economic Mechanisms
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Figure 8.2. Timeline of Simultaneous Elections
Notes. States with simultaneous elections are those states that had an election
in the same year as the general election. The denominator is the total number
of states that existed at the time of the general election year. The 1984 Lok
Sabha election cycle was split between 1984 and 1985; hence, we label it as
1984-85. Source. Election Commission of India.
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Figure 8.3. Simultaneous Elections as a treatment
Notes. This figure shows the treatment group and control group: treatment, if
the proportion of states having an assembly election (in the year of the general
election) to the total states present is greater than 40% and control, if less than
40%. In the sample period of 1961 to 2023, five years are in the treatment
group, which we will call national simultaneous elections: 1962, 1967, 1971,
1977 & 1984. The 1984 Lok Sabha election cycle was split between 1984 and
1985; hence, we label it as 1984-85. We have five election cycles in the
treatment group and 10 election cycles in the control group.
Source. Election Commission of India.
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Figure 8.4. A Simple Difference-in-Difference Approach
Notes. This figure presents an example of our approach used.

(1 year) - Difference between year after (+1 Yr) and year before (-1 Yr)
(2 years) - Differences between the average of two years after and two years
before.
Averages of these are separately calculated for simultaneous and non-
simultaneous election cycles.
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Figure 8.5. Andhra Pradesh - 1983, 1985, 1989, 1994 assembly polls
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Notes. In this figure, Andhra Pradesh is used as an example to illustrate what

“simultaneous” election means for a state. Its four assembly elections spanning
from 1983 to 1994 are shown along with all the other (shaded) states that had
assembly elections in the same year. Only two of the four elections shown here
(in orange) happened along with the general elections, 1985 and 1989,
respectively.
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Figure 8.6a. Chhattisgarh GSDP Growth rate over past elections
Notes. This plot shows that Chhattisgarh never had an assembly election in the
year of the general election.
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Figure 8.6b. Bihar GSDP Growth rate over past elections.
Notes. This plot shows that Bihar had very few assembly elections in the same
year as the general election.
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Figure 8.6c. Andhra Pradesh GSDP Growth rate over past elections
Notes. This plot shows that Andhra Pradesh had many assembly elections in
the same year as the general election.
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Figure 8.6d. Haryana GSDP Growth rate over past elections
Notes. This plot shows that Haryana had adequate counterfactuals of both
simultaneous and non-simultaneous elections in its history.
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Figure 8.7. Selection of states
Notes. Figure 7 reports the difference between the total number of

simultaneous elections and the total number of non-simultaneous elections that
happened in a state’s history. Those states with almost an equal number of both
types of election are selected to have comparable counterfactuals for our
analysis. We do not include Telangana and Jammu and Kashmir due to too few
elections. The sample period is 1982 to 2023.
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Figure 8.8. National Growth rate in both types of elections
Notes. This chart depicts the evolution of real GDP growth rate at the national level for simultaneous and non-simultaneous
election cycles. The sample period is 1961 to 2023.
Source: RBI DBIE Table 222: Select Macro-Economic Aggregates – Growth and Investment Rates (At Constant Prices).
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Figure 8.9. Timeline of inflation in India
Notes. The chart plots the national Consumer Price Index (CPI) for the years
1960 to 1980 to highlight the OPEC Oil Crisis of 1973.
Source- (Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) - India International Monetary
Fund, International Financial Statistics)
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Figure 8.10. Consumer Price Inflation (annual %) under both types of elections
Notes. The chart depicts the evolution of CPI at the national level for simultaneous and non-simultaneous election cycles.
The sample period is 1960 to 2023. To mitigate the exogenous effect of the 1973 oil crisis, only the 1962, 1967 and 1984-
85 elections are part of our study.
Source: (Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) - India International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics)
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Figure 8.11a. Number of State Assembly Elections
The chart shows the number of Vidhan Sabha Elections held in one calendar
year.
Notes: Andaman & Nicobar Island is excluded due to lack of data.
Source: Election Commission of India
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Figure 8.11b. Frequency of elections: Comparison between Periods of

Simultaneous and Non-Simultaneous Elections
Notes: We divide the period from 1952-2023 into two sub-periods: 1952-1985,
which covers the time span of simultaneous elections; and 1986-2023, or the
period of non-simultaneous elections. The figure reports the frequency of state
assembly in the sub-periods.
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Figure 8.12. Gross Fiscal Deficit of the Centre under both types of elections
Notes. This chart depicts the evolution of gross fiscal deficit at the national level for simultaneous and non-simultaneous
election cycles. The sample period is 1971 to 2023.
Source: RBI DBIE Table 232: Select Fiscal Indicators of the Central Government (As Percentage of GDP)
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Figure 8.13. Gross Fixed Capital Formation under both types of elections
Notes. The chart depicts the evolution of GFCF at the national level for simultaneous and non-simultaneous election cycles. The sample period
is 1960 to 2023.
Source: Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy: Table 1: Macro-Economic Aggregates (Base Year: 2011-12 At Current Prices) and Table
4: Components of Gross Domestic Product, respectively
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Figure 8. 14. Primary enrolment rate (as % of population) under both types of elections
Notes. The chart depicts the evolution of gross primary (classes 1-5) enrolment (as a proportion of the total population) at
the national level for simultaneous and non-simultaneous election cycles. The sample period is 1982 to 2023.
Source: Indiastat
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Figure 8. 15. Crime Rates before and after elections (National Crime Records Bureau)
Notes. The sample period is 1981 to 2021. Crime rate is calculated as crime incidence per one lakh of population under the Indian Penal Code
(IPC).
Source: National Crime Records Bureau’s (NCRB) Annual Publication
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Table 8.1. Simultaneous and non-simultaneous elections in Indian states

(1982-2023)
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Table 8.2. Summary of National results
Table 8.3. States’ Real Growth rates in both types of elections
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Table 8.4a. National results robust to different samples
Table 4b. National results robust to different cut-off for simultaneous

elections
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Table 8. 5. States results robust to various specifications
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Table 8.6. Real GDSP Growth Rate and Electoral Cycles
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Table 8. 7. States’ Gross Fiscal Deficit in both types of elections
Table 8. 8. Fiscal Deficit and Electoral Cycles
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Table 8. 9. Capital-to-current ratio changes in both types of elections

(1990-2023)
Annexure 8.1 Data Sources

We obtain information on several macroeconomic and fiscal variables from the
Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy; for real GDP growth, we use
Table 222: Select Macro-Economic Aggregates – Growth and Investment
Rates (At Constant Prices). The gross fiscal deficit for the Centre as a
percentage of GDP is obtained from Table 232: Select Fiscal Indicators of the
Central Government (as percentage to GDP). Gross fixed capital formation at
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current prices and gross domestic product at market prices are sourced from
Table 1: Macro-Economic Aggregates (Base Year: 2011-12 at Current Prices)
and Table 4: Components of Gross Domestic Product, respectively. For
inflation numbers, we use annual consumer price inflation data obtained from
the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and data files.
Data on primary (classes 1 to 5) enrolment, GSDP and fiscal deficit for the
states going back to 1982 is obtained from Indiastat. For fiscal expenditure
priorities of the states, we look at revenue and capital expenditure of the states
from FY 1990-91 to FY 2022-23(BE). We collected this data from different
editions of the Handbook of Statistics on Indian States between 2016 and 2023.
We obtained revenue expenditure by adding numbers from the tables on State-
Wise Interest Payments and State-Wise Pension, and capital expenditure by
adding the tables on State-Wise Capital Expenditure and State-Wise Capital
Outlay, for each state and year.
National data on growth rate, inflation, gross fixed capital formation and
primary enrolment span from 1960-2023. The gross fiscal deficit of the Centre
is available from 1971 to 2023. State data on revenue and capital expenditure
runs from 1991 to 2023.
For statistics on crime, we take the help of the table on IPC Crimes over the
years 1981-2021, from the National Crime Records Bureau’s (NCRB) annual
publication.
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Annexure 8. 2. Difference-in-difference with continuous treatment
We adapt the methodology of difference-in-difference with continuous

treatment in Callaway, Goodman-Bacon and Sant’Anna (2024) to our setting.
More specifically, in step 1, we estimate the following equation:
Step 1
𝐽
∆𝑦𝑒 = 𝛼0 + ∑𝑗=1 𝛽𝑗 {𝐷𝑒 = 𝑑𝑗 } + 𝜀𝑒
(A1)
The dependent variable is the two-year pre-post differences in real national

GDP for each Lok Sabha election cycle. The treatment doses are the different
counts of Vidhan Sabha elections associated with each Lok Sabha episode.
Given the lack of an untreated unit as every Lok Sabha election has been held
simultaneously with at least one Vidhan Sabha election, we take the lowest
count of Vidhan Sabha election, which is three in the 1971 and 1991 Lok Sabha
elections as our omitted or untreated category in the regression. The results
from estimating Equation (1) are reported in Annex Table 1. The estimated
coefficients on the treatment doses are all positive and statistically significant
at conventional levels.
Step 2
In Step 2, we plot a non-parametric fit for the average treatment of the treated
effects against the treatment dose. Annex Figure 1 shows that the effects
increase (at a decreasing rate) with the number of states with assembly
elections coinciding with the national elections.
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Overall, the results presented in the annex vindicate those presented in the main
text with discrete treatment.
Annexure Table 8.1. Difference-in-difference results with continuous

treatment
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Annexure Figure 1. Quadratic Fit of the Average Treatment of the Treated

Effects vs Treatment Doses
Notes. The figure above shows a quadratic fit of our regression coefficients. At each point,
the values on the y-axis can be interpreted as the average effect on the two-year pre-post
difference in the national growth rate, ATT(d|d), for each group of Lok Sabha elections that
had a particular number of state elections held simultaneously, given in the x-axis. Lok
Sabha elections are grouped by the number of simultaneous state elections d. A line
connecting any two discrete points on the curve would give us the average causal response
on the two-year growth rate for the increase in number of states having simultaneous
elections with the Lok Sabha.
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Scheme for implementing Simultaneous Elections
CHAPTER – IX
SCHEME FOR IMPLEMENTING SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS
I. HISTORICAL ROOTS OF ELECTIONS
1. The constitution of the House of the People and the State Legislative
Assemblies, their tenure, and the conduct of elections are dealt with some
detail in various Articles of the Constitution.
2. Election Commission of India and State Election Commission(s) are vested

with the power to superintend, control, and direct elections to the House of
the People and State Legislative Assemblies and Municipalities and
Panchayats respectively.
3. The first General elections of independent India were held between 1951 to
1952 for a total of 489 seats. These elections for the House of the People
and State Legislative Assemblies were held simultaneously. The State of
Andhra Pradesh was created in 1953 by carving out areas from Madras, and
had a Legislative Assembly with 190 seats. The first State Legislative
Assembly elections in Andhra Pradesh were held in February 1955.
4. The second General elections were held in 1957. In 1957, the term of the
seven State Legislative Assemblies (Bihar, Bombay, Madras, Mysore,
Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal) did not come to an end with the
term of the House of the People. All the State Legislative Assemblies were
dissolved so that elections could be held simultaneously. 1
The
Reorganisation of States Act, 1956 was passed in 1956. One year later,
second General elections were held in 1957.
5. The third elections for the House of the People were synchronised with the
elections for the twelve State Legislative Assemblies (Refer to Table 9.1)
1
Report on the Second General elections in India, 1957 p. 123 and 124 (Volume I, General,
Election Commission of India); Infra Chapter I, p. 5; Refer to Annexure 1(iii).
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Table 9.1: Year wise Elections (1951-2023)2
HOUSE OF
YEAR THE PEOPLE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS
ELECTIONS
Assam, Bihar, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya
October-
1951 Pradesh, Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, West
February 1952
Bengal
1955 Andhra Pradesh
Andhra Pradesh3, Assam, Bihar, Karnataka, Kerala,
February-June
1957 Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar
1957
Pradesh, West Bengal
1960 Kerala
1961 Odisha
Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Jammu and
1962 February 1962 Kashmir, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra,
Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal
1964 Nagaland, Puducherry
1965 Kerala
Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Bihar, Tamil
Nadu, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Gujarat, Rajasthan,
1967 February 1967 Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, Kerala, Assam, Punjab,
Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh,
Manipur, Tripura, Goa
1968 Haryana
Nagaland, Punjab, Puducherry, Uttar Pradesh, West
1969
Bengal, Bihar
1970 Kerala
1971 March 1971 Odisha, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal
Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Delhi, Goa, Gujarat,
Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir,
1972 Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Manipur,
Meghalaya, Mizoram, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tripura, West
Bengal
1974 Manipur, Nagaland, Odisha, Puducherry, Uttar Pradesh
1975 Gujarat
2
Election Commission of India, available at: https://eci.gov.in/.
3
The 1957 Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly election were conducted in the newly
added region of Telangana alone.
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HOUSE OF
ELECTIONS
Bihar, Delhi, Goa, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu
and Kashmir, Kerala4, Madhya Pradesh, Nagaland,
1977 March 1977
Odisha, Punjab, Puducherry, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu,
Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal
Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Karnataka
1978
Maharashtra, Meghalaya, Mizoram
1979 Mizoram, Sikkim
Arunachal Pradesh, Bihar, Goa, Gujarat, Kerala, Madhya
1980 January 1980 Pradesh, Maharashtra, Manipur, Odisha, Punjab,
Puducherry, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh
Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Nagaland, West
1982
Bengal
Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Delhi, Jammu and Kashmir,
1983
Karnataka, Meghalaya, Tripura
Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Manipur, Mizoram, Tamil
1984 December 1984
Nadu
September-
Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Himachal
December 1985
Pradesh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra,
1985 (Phase of eighth
Odisha, Punjab, Puducherry, Rajasthan, Sikkim, Uttar
House of the
Pradesh
People election5)
Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, Nagaland,
1987
Mizoram, West Bengal
1988 Meghalaya, Tripura
Andhra Pradesh, Goa, Karnataka, Mizoram, Nagaland,
1989 November 1989
Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh
Arunachal Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh,
1990 Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Manipur, Odisha,
Puducherry, Rajasthan
Assam, Haryana, Kerala, Puducherry, Tamil Nadu, Uttar
1991 May-June 1991
Pradesh, West Bengal
1992 February 1992 Punjab
4
Kerala Legislative Assembly, which was elected in 1970, completed its term by 1975, but
it was extended on three occasions during the Emergency. The election of 1977 was the first
general election after the withdrawal of Emergency imposed on 26 June 1975
5 th
8 House of the People elections to the constituencies of Assam and Punjab were delayed
and conducted on 25.09.1985 and 19.12.1985 due to then ongoing insurgency in the States.
HLC REPORT
239
HOUSE OF
ELECTIONS
Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Meghalaya,
1993
Mizoram, Nagaland, Rajasthan, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh
1994 Andhra Pradesh, Goa, Karnataka, Sikkim
Arunachal Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Maharashtra,
1995
Manipur, Odisha
Assam, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala,
1996 April-May 1996
Puducherry, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal
1997 Punjab
Delhi, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh,
1998 February 1998
Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Rajasthan, Tripura
September- Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Karnataka,
1999
October 1999 Maharashtra, Sikkim
2000 Bihar, Haryana, Manipur, Odisha
2001 Assam, Kerala, Puducherry, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal
Goa, Gujarat, Jammu and Kashmir, Manipur, Punjab,
2002
Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand
Chhattisgarh, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh,
2003
Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Karnataka,
2004 April-May 2004
Maharashtra, Odisha, Sikkim
2005 Bihar, Haryana, Jharkhand
Goa, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Punjab, Uttar
2007
Pradesh, Uttarakhand
Chhattisgarh, Delhi, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka,
2008 Madhya Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland,
Rajasthan, Tripura
Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Haryana,
2009 April-May 2009
Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Odisha, Sikkim
2010 Bihar
2012
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HOUSE OF
ELECTIONS
Chhattisgarh, Delhi, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh,
2013
Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Haryana, Jammu
2014 April-May 2014
and Kashmir, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Odisha, Sikkim
2015 Bihar, Delhi
2017
Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Meghalaya,
2018
Mizoram, Nagaland, Rajasthan, Telangana, Tripura
Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Haryana,
2019 April-May 2019
Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Odisha, Sikkim
2020 Bihar, Delhi
2022
Karnataka, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Tripura, Mizoram,
2023
Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Telangana
Source: Election Commission of India6
6. In 1960, the State Legislative Assembly of Kerala7 was dissolved due to

imposition of President’s rule under Article 356. Fresh State Assembly
elections were held in the year 1960. This put the elections to the Legislative
Assembly of the State of Kerala out of synchronisation with the cycle of
simultaneous elections.8
7. In 1964, the State of Nagaland was formed and in 1963, Puducherry was
established as a Union territory. With their formation, the very first elections
6
Election Commission of India, available at: https://eci.gov.in/
7
Election Commission of India, “Kerala 1960 - Kerala - Election Commission of India”
Election Commission of India, https://old.eci.gov.in/files/file/3748-kerala-1960/
8
Id.
HLC REPORT
241
to their State Legislative Assemblies were held in 1964. Their incorporation

led to another disruption of the election cycle as their next elections were
held after a term of five years in 1969.
8. Elections to the fourth House of the People held in 1967 were the last of the
simultaneous elections that were conducted together with the State
Legislative Assemblies. Due to the premature dissolution of some of the
State Legislative Assemblies in 1968 (Haryana) and 1969 (Nagaland,
Punjab and Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Bihar), the tenures of the State
Legislative Assemblies and the House of the People were not synchronised
and thus simultaneous elections were not possible.
9. In 1970, the House of the People was dissolved prematurely and fresh
elections were held in 1971. Thus, the first, second, and third House of the
People enjoyed full five-year terms which enabled the conduct of
simultaneous elections of the House of the People and the State Legislative
Assemblies.
10. The term of the fifth House of the People was extended from 1976 to 1977
under Article 352 of the Constitution. Its entire term extended up to 5 years
and 10 months. During the tenure of the Fifth House of the People (1971-
1977), the elections to multiple State Legislative Assemblies were held in
1972 (Refer to Table 9.1 above), 1974 (Manipur, Nagaland, Odisha,
Puducherry, Uttar Pradesh) and 1975 (Gujarat).
11. The sixth term of House of the People (1977-1980) was consequent to the
first election to the House after the Emergency. In 1977, the elections were
conducted to seventeen State Legislative Assemblies were conducted (Refer
to Table 9.1 above). Subsequently, the elections to State Legislative
Assemblies of Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Karnataka,
Maharashtra, Meghalaya and Mizoram were conducted. In 1979, the
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elections to the State Legislative Assemblies of the Mizoram and Sikkim

were conducted.
12. The seventh House of the People (1980-1984) had a term of four years. In
1980, the elections of the fourteen State Legislative Assemblies were held.
(Refer to Table 9.1 above) Thereafter, in 1982, the elections to the State
Legislative Assemblies of Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Nagaland,
and West Bengal were conducted. In 1983, the seven States (Andhra
Pradesh, Assam, Delhi, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, Meghalaya and
Tripura) underwent State Legislative elections.
13. The tenure of the eighth House of the People was from 1984-1989. During
this term, more than twenty-seven State Legislative Assemblies elections
were conducted. (Refer to Table 9.1 above)
14. The ninth House of the People (1989-1991) had a term of 1 year and 3
months. There was a hung House for the first time with no party getting a
majority. In 1989 and 1990, elections to eight and ten State Legislative
Assemblies were conducted respectively.
15. Elections to the tenth House of the People were conducted in 1991 and the
House served its full term till 1996. The elections of multiple State
Legislative Assemblies happened during this full term. (Refer to Table 9.1
above)
16. Elections for the eleventh House of the People (1996-1998) resulted in a
hung House and two years of political instability. In 1996, elections to eight
State Legislative Assemblies were conducted (Refer to Table 9.1 above). In
1997, the elections for the State Legislative Assembly of Punjab were
conducted.
17. The twelfth House of the People (1998-1999) served for a term of one year
and one month. In 1998, the elections to the State Legislative Assemblies of
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Delhi, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram,

Nagaland, Rajasthan and Tripura were conducted.
18. The thirteenth House of the People (1999-2004) completed its entire tenure.
During this tenure, the elections to the State Legislative Assemblies have
been held for more than thirty times. (Refer to Table 9.1 above)
19. The fourteenth House of the People (2004-2009) and Fifteenth House of
the People (2009-2014) completed its tenure. Thereafter the Sixteenth
House of the People (2014-2019) also completed its tenure and Seventeenth
House of the People (2019-2024) is currently running without any
disruption. The elections to the State Legislative Assemblies during these
full terms can be referred to Table 9.1 mentioned above.
II. DETAILS OF THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS TO THE STATE

LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES
20. The dissolution of the tenure of the State Legislative Assemblies and the
House of the People to the multiple State Legislative Assemblies in the year
2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, and 2029 is provided below. (Please refer to
the Table 9.2).
Table 9.2: Representing upcoming elections of State Legislative Assemblies
SL.
STATES TERM ENDS
NO.
2024
1 Arunachal Pradesh 02 June 2024
2 Sikkim 02 June 2024
3 Andhra Pradesh 11 June 2024
4 Odisha 24 June 2024
5 Haryana 03 Nov 2024
6 Maharashtra 26 Nov 2024
2025
7 Jharkhand 05 Jan 2025
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244
8 Delhi 23 Feb 2025

9 Bihar 22 Nov 2025
2026
10 West Bengal 07 May 2026
11 Tamil Nadu 10 May 2026
12 Assam 20 May 2026
13 Kerala 23 May 2026
14 Puducherry 15 June 2026
2027
15 Manipur 13 March 2027
16 Goa 14 March 2027
17 Punjab 16 March 2027
18 Uttarakhand 28 March 2027
19 Uttar Pradesh 22 May 2027
20 Gujarat 19 Dec 2027
2028
21 Himachal Pradesh 01 Jan 2028
22 Meghalaya 05 March 2028
23 Nagaland 19 March 2028
24 Tripura 23 March 2028
25 Karnataka 21 May 2028
26 Telangana 08 December 2028
27 Mizoram 11 December 2028
28 Madhya Pradesh 17 December 2028
29 Chhattisgarh 18 December 2028
30 Rajasthan 19 December 2028
21. As per the Election Commission of India, six States are due to have
elections in 2024. Starting with Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Andhra
Pradesh, and Odisha in June 2024 and followed by Haryana and
Maharashtra in November 2024.
22. The year 2025 will witness the elections to two State Legislative
Assemblies and one Union territory. The two States are Jharkhand and
Bihar, and Delhi is the Union territory with elections due in 2025.
23. There are four States and one Union territory with elections due in the year
HLC REPORT
245
2026. These States include West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Assam, Kerala and
Union territory of Puducherry.
24. The year 2027 will witness elections to a group of six States, namely
Manipur, Goa, Punjab, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat.
25. Finally, in 2028, the remaining 10 States will undergo State Legislative
Assembly elections. These States are Himachal Pradesh, Meghalaya,
Nagaland, Tripura, Karnataka, Telangana, Mizoram, Madhya Pradesh,
Chhattisgarh and Rajasthan.
III. SCHEME FOR CONDUCTING SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS
26. The Committee recommends that the system of simultaneous elections of

the House of the People and State Legislative Assemblies, along with the
elections to the Panchayats and Municipalities, should be synchronised by
adopting appropriate constitutional changes, and these should be put in
place in two steps. It is suggested that in the first step, simultaneous
elections to the House of the People and the State Legislative Assemblies
be held. In the second step, the elections to Municipalities and Panchayats
will be synchronised in such a way that those are held within hundred days
of holding elections to the House of the People and the State Legislative
Assemblies. The elections to Local Bodies will have larger requirements of
equipment, manpower and other resources.
27. The Constitution would have to be amended to introduce the concepts of a

“full term” and an “unexpired period” (where the House of the Assembly is
dissolved sooner than the expiry of its “full term”), and provisions made so
that the elections held where the House or an Assembly is dissolved sooner
than its “full term” would be considered to be a “mid-term” election. The
election held after the expiry of five years would be considered a “General
election”.
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28. The below mentioned terminologies shall be understood in the same

meaning as provided hereunder. The definitions of these terminologies will
be made effective by amending the Constitution.9
a. The expression “simultaneous elections” shall mean General elections

held for constituting the House of the People and all the State Legislative
Assemblies together.
b. Full term: Five years from the date appointed for the first meeting of the
House of the People or Legislative Assembly at the end of which House
shall stand dissolve, which period of five years shall be hereafter referred
to as the full term.
c. General Election: An election held after the expiry of the full term shall
be referred to as the General election.
d. Mid-term Election: The elections for constituting a House for its
unexpired term shall be referred to as a mid-term election.
e. Unexpired term: Where the House of the People or Legislative Assembly
is dissolved sooner than upon the expiry of its full term, then the period
between its date of dissolution and the period of five years from the date
appointed for its first meeting, shall be referred to as its unexpired term.
29. The scheme broadly would be that once a synchronisation is achieved (as
explained below) between the terms of the House of the People and the State
Legislative Assemblies, by holding a General election simultaneously for
the House of the People and all the State Legislative Assemblies, then this
synchronisation would be maintained by holding a simultaneous General
election every five years. If, however, the House of the People or a State
Legislative Assembly is dissolved sooner than its period of five years from
the date appointed for its first meeting, a mid-term election would be held
for reconstituting the House or the State Legislative Assembly as the case
9
Refer to Chapter X.
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247
may be, but the term of the House or the State Legislative Assembly so
constituted in a mid-term election, would be for the remaining unexpired
period of its term. In this manner at the end of five years, the House of the
People and all the State Legislative Assemblies would reach the end of their
tenure at the same time, and be ready for a General election held
simultaneously.
30. In order to synchronise all these elections, a one-time transitory measure

would be necessary. The Government would have to decide when the
arrangements are in place for holding simultaneous elections. After the
General elections, when the House of the People is constituted, the President
would by notification issued on the same date as the date of the first sitting
of the house, bring into force the provisions for transition, and this date
would be called the “Appointed date”.
31. Once the transition provisions are brought into play, the tenure of all State
Legislative Assemblies constituted in any election after the “Appointed
date” would come to an end on the expiry of the full term of the House of
the People, irrespective of when an Assembly was constituted. This would
result in the House of the People and all the State Legislative Assemblies
being ready for a simultaneous election at the end of this term. Thereafter,
the amendments proposed to the tenure of the House of the People and the
State Legislative assemblies will make sure that the synchronisation is
maintained.
32. In the event of an extraordinary circumstance, when the simultaneous

elections to any State Legislative Assembly cannot be conducted at the time
of the General elections, the Election Commission of India may make a
recommendation to the President, to declare by an Order that the election to
that Legislative Assembly may be conducted at a later date. However, the
term of such Legislative Assembly, so constituted, shall end on the same
HLC REPORT
248
date as the end of the full term of the House of the People constituted after
the General Election.
33. For attaining the first step of simultaneous elections, a Constitutional

Amendment Bill will be introduced amending Article 83 (Duration of
Houses of Parliament), and Article 172 (Duration of State Legislatures), and
insertion of Article 82A will be made. For this Amendment, ratification by
the States is not required.10
Figure 9.1: Scheme for implementation of simultaneous elections
SIMULTANEOUS
ELECTIONS OF HOUSE OF
THE PEOPLE AND STATE
2ND STEP
1ST STEP LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES (Within 100 days
(After the declared "Appointed of the 1st Step)
date")
MUNICIPALITIES AND
HOUSE OF THE STATE LEGISLATIVE PANCHAYATS
ASSEMBLIES (Elections to be conducted with
PEOPLE the House of the People and the
(Term of Assembly will expire
(As per the declared with the end of full term of the State Legislative Assemblies
schedule) House of the People within 100 days after the first
step)
HUNG HOUSE/ NO HUNG HOUSE/NO

CONFIDENCE CONFIDENCE MOTION/
MOTION/ OTHER OTHER REASONS
REASONS (Tenure of State Legislative
(Tenure of new House of the Assembly shall be coterminous
People shall be for unexpired with the expiry of full term of
term of the House) House of the People tenure)
10
Refer to Chapter X.
HLC REPORT
249
34. In the second step, the elections to Municipalities and Panchayats will also
be synchronised with House of the People and State Legislative Assemblies
in such a way that Municipalities and Panchayat elections are held within
35. In order to implement the same, another Constitutional Amendment Bill

will be introduced in which insertion of Article 324A and amendment to
Article 325 of the Constitution will be made. The insertion of Article 324A
will ensure that elections to Municipalities and Panchayats are held
simultaneously with the General elections. In case the term of the
Municipalities and Panchayats expires sooner than the expiry of five years
from the date appointed from their first meeting, the term of such
Municipalities and Panchayats constituted under a mid-term election, will
be to the unexpired period of their term until the next General elections.
IV. CONTINUITY OF SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS
36. The process of simultaneous elections could be disrupted due to premature

dissolution of the House of the People or the State Legislative Assemblies
and passing of no-confidence motion. There have been multiple instances
of premature dissolution of the House of the People in the past. The table
mentioned below provides the statistics of the premature dissolution of the
House of the People. (Please refer to Table 9.3)
Table 9.3: Number of House of the People premature dissolution
NO. OF GENERAL ELECTIONS

DECADE DISSOLUTION
TO HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE
1951-1960 2 0
1961-1970 2 0
1971-1980 3 1
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250
1981-1990 3 1
1991-2000 4 2
2001-2010 2 0
2011-2020 2 0
2021-2023 0 0
37. Figure 9.2 mentioned below represents the instances of the No-confidence
motion in the House of the People including the initiation of the no-
confidence motion.
Figure 9.2- Instances of No Confidence Motion in House of the Peoples
14
12
12
10
8
6
6
4
4 3
2 1 1 1
0
0
38. Furthermore, there have been seven instances of House of the People, hung
House. The below-mentioned figure provides a graphical representation of
the instances of the hung House of Parliament.
HLC REPORT
251
Figure 9.3: Instances of hung House

4.5
4
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
2
1.5
1 1
1
0.5
0 0 0
0
1951-1960 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010 2011-2020
Recommendations for the Hung House/no-confidence motion/or any other

such event
39. Considering the events that can disrupt the simultaneity of the State
Legislative Assembly elections and the House of the People elections such
as Hung House, no-confidence motions or any other such event, the
following mechanism is proposed:
a. For House of the People: The period of five years from the date
appointed for its first meeting would be the full term of the House of the
People. Where the House of the People is dissolved sooner than the
expiry of its full term, fresh elections will be conducted and the next
House of the People constituted pursuant to elections occasioned by such
dissolution, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for such period as is
equal to the unexpired term of the immediately preceding House of the
People and the expiration of this period shall operate as a dissolution of
the House.
b. For State Legislative Assemblies: The period of five years from the
date appointed for its first meeting would be the full term of the
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252
Legislative Assembly. Where the Legislative Assembly is dissolved

sooner than the expiry of its full term, fresh elections will be held and a
new Legislative Assembly is constituted pursuant to elections occasioned
by such dissolution, then such new Legislative Assembly, unless sooner
dissolved, shall come to an end with the expiry of full term of the House
of the People.
c. For Municipalities and Panchayats: Mid-term elections to

Municipalities and Panchayats to the unexpired period of their term until
the next General elections.
40. For the purpose of making this proposed suggestion effective, a

Constitution Amendment Bill shall be introduced in the Parliament
amending Article 83 (Duration of Houses of Parliament) and Article 172
(Duration of State Legislatures) of the Constitution. This Constitution
Amendment will not need ratification by the States. Another Constitution
Amendment Bill will be introduced for insertion of Article 324A for
elections to Municipalities and Panchayats, passed with ratification by the
states.
41. Similar amendments will be required to be made in Section 5 (Duration of

Legislative Assembly) of the Government of National Capital Territory of
Delhi Act, 1991 for the Legislative Assembly of Delhi and Section 5
(Duration of Legislative Assembly) of the Government of Union Territories
Act, 1963 for the Legislative Assembly of Puducherry. Furthermore, similar
amendment will also be required in Section 17 (Duration of Legislative
Assembly) of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019.
V. LOGISTICS AND RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
42. In the present system of the electoral cycle, the Election Commission of
India is entrusted with conducting elections, either to a group of State
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253
Assemblies or to the House of the People along with a few Assemblies every
other year.
Recommendations on Logistics
43. The Election Commission of India is entrusted with the responsibility of

conducting the elections for the House of the People and the State
Legislative Assemblies.
44. The Committee recommends that for making logistical arrangements for
the conduct of simultaneous elections to the House of the People and State
Legislative Assemblies, the Election Commission of India may draw a plan
and estimate in advance for the procurement of equipment, such as EVMs
and VVPATs, deployment of polling personnel and security forces, and
make other necessary arrangements.
45. Similarly, for the elections to Municipalities and Panchayats, State Election
Commission(s), in consultation with the Election Commission of India, may
draw a plan and estimate in advance for the procurement of equipment, such
as EVMs and VVPATs, deployment of polling personnel and security
forces, and make other necessary arrangements.
VI. SINGLE ELECTORAL ROLL
Historical Background
46. The introduction of elections based on electoral rolls in India commenced

with the Indian Councils Act of 1909, evolving through subsequent
legislative reforms in 1919 and 1935, albeit with limited eligibility criteria.
Upon gaining independence in 1947, the Constituent Assembly resolved to
adopt a universal adult franchise for elections to the House of the People
and State Legislative Assemblies under the Constitution of India.
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254
47. The process of preparing the first electoral rolls under this principle began
in 1947, predating the enactment of the Representation of the People Act in
1950 and the establishment of the Election Commission of India. Draft rolls
were published by March 1951, followed by the resolution of claims and
objections by October 2, 1951. The Representation of the People Act of
1950, enacted in accordance with Article 327 of the Constitution, facilitated
the delimitation of constituencies and the preparation of Electoral Rolls.
Upon completion of the constituency delimitation exercise, the final rolls
were organised constituency-wise and published nationwide on November
15, 1951.
Envisioning the future of electoral reforms according to Dr. Ambedkar
48. Prior to independence, the administration of Provincial Elections was part

of the Provincial List. However, Dr. B.R Ambedkar, Chairman of the
Drafting Committee, took a critical stance on this approach, expressing
reservations about the potential pitfalls associated with granting States the
autonomy to oversee elections. He underscored the apprehensions that
allowing States to manage elections might lead to manipulations in the voter
list, leading to disfranchisement.
49. In light of this apprehension, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar strongly advocated for a
revaluation of the distribution of powers. He argued for the transfer of the
authority to conduct both General and State Legislature elections from the
State List to the Union List, emphasizing the need for a centralised approach
to mitigate the identified risks and uphold the democratic principles of free
and fair elections.
50. Thus, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar envisioned the necessity of uniformity in the
electoral process and further advocated for the Union to be responsible for
conducting elections in India.
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Types of Electoral Rolls in India currently
51. The supervision and conduct of elections in our country is entrusted to two
constitutional authorities — the Election Commission of India (ECI) and
the State Election Commissions (SECs).
52. Election Commission of India: It was set up in 1950, the EC is charged

with the responsibility of conducting polls to:
1. the offices of the President and Vice-President of India,
2. to the Parliament, the State Legislative Assemblies, and the Legislative

Councils.
53. State Election Commissions: The SECs, on the other hand, supervise
Municipal and Panchayat elections. They are free to prepare their own
electoral rolls for Local Body elections, and this exercise does not have to
be coordinated with the ECI.
54. It is learnt that some State laws allow the SEC (State Election Commission)
to borrow and use the Election Commission of India's voter rolls for the
Local Body elections.
55. In others, the State Election Commission uses the EC’s voters list as the
basis for the preparation and revision of rolls for Municipalities and
Panchayats elections. Few States have their own electoral rolls and do not
adopt EC's roll for local body polls.
Multiple Electoral Rolls: Multiplicity and its challenges
56. Dr. B.R Ambedkar, Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the

Constitution on the issue of Electoral Roll said:
“No person who is entitled to be brought into the electoral rolls on the
grounds which we have already mentioned in our Constitution, namely,
an adult of 21 years of age, should be excluded merely as a result of the
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256
prejudice of a local Government, or the whim of an officer. That would

cut at every root of democratic Government”
57. The administrative burden of maintaining multiple rolls is another

significant hurdle. This intricate system demands additional manpower,
resources, and infrastructure, straining the resources of election authorities,
particularly in a vast and diverse country like India. This complexity also
breeds confusion and inconsistencies, especially in areas with overlapping
boundaries or unclear jurisdictions, disrupting the smooth conduct of
elections.
58. The introduction of a Single Electoral Roll and Single Elector’s Photo
Identity Card (EPIC) can prove to be a viable solution to this challenge of
multiple electoral rolls.
Benefits of the Single Electoral Roll
59. A ‘Single Electoral Roll’ will streamline resources by consolidating voter

information into a single database and minimizing redundancy and
duplication across multiple agencies. It will increase the coordination
between the Election Commission of India and State Election Commissions
and ensure seamless collaboration and information exchange. By aligning
their efforts, these agencies can streamline processes, minimize delays, and
enhance overall effectiveness in managing electoral rolls. Furthermore, the
‘Single Electoral Roll’ will help in development of single repository,
prevent duplication, streamline registration process, improve accuracy and
make the process efficient.
Recommendations on Single Electoral roll and Single Elector’s Photo

Identity Card (EPIC)
60. It is recommended that for the purpose of having a Single Electoral Roll
and Single Elector’s Photo Identity Card (EPIC) for elections, an
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257
amendment shall be made to Article 325 (No person to be ineligible for

inclusion in, or to claim to be included in a special, electoral roll on grounds
of religion, race, caste or sex). The amendment will enable that a Single
Electoral Roll and Single Elector’s Photo Identity Card shall be made by
the Election Commission of India in consultation with the State Election
Commissions established in the States. The Electoral Roll and Elector’s
Photo Identity Card prepared under this shall substitute any Electoral Roll
and Elector’s Photo Identity Card prepared earlier by either the Election
Commission of India under Art 325 or the State Election Commissions
under Art. 243K and Art. 243ZA.
61. Since these amendments touch upon State subjects (Entry 5) of Schedule
VII, Part IX and Part IX A of the Constitution of India, ratification by not
less than half of the States will be required under Article 368(2) of the
Constitution of India.
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258
Constitutional and legal framework for simultaneous elections
CHAPTER – X
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS
1. The Constitution of India envisages provisions for the constitution of the

House of the People and the State Legislative Assemblies. Chapter II of Part
V of the Constitution makes provisions for the composition of the House of
the People, the duration of both the Houses of the Parliament, the
qualifications of membership of Parliament and of the sessions of
Parliament including its prorogation and dissolution.
2. Similar provisions are made in Chapter III of Part VI in relation to the State
Legislature, and for the most, these provisions mirror the provisions of
Chapter II of Part V.
3. Elections are dealt with in Part XV which provides for the establishment of
the Election Commission, entrusted with the functions of superintendence,
direction, and control of the preparation of the electoral rolls and the
conduct of all elections to Parliament and the Legislature of every State, as
well as to the offices of the President and Vice President. Article 327
empowers Parliament to provide by law with respect to all matters relating
to or in connection with the elections to either the House of Parliament or
to the House (or either House) of the Legislature of State including
preparation of electoral rolls delimitation of constituencies et cetera.
4. The State Legislative Assembly can make provision for matters relating to
elections to the House (or either House) of the Legislature of the State
insofar as provision in that behalf has not been made by Parliament.
5. Article 368 of the Constitution confers upon the Parliament the power to
amend the Constitution as well as sets out the procedure for such
HLC REPORT
259
amendments. The only limitation on this power is that Parliament cannot

alter the basic structure of the Constitution.
6. The amendments proposed seek to alter only the tenure of the House of the
People and the State Legislative Assemblies. The Constitution recognises
two principles. The first is that the duration of any House or Assembly shall
not exceed five years. Article 83 and Article 172 provide that the term “shall
continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no
longer…”. The Second principle is that the period of five years is not
sacrosanct, but the President may dissolve the House of the People or the
State Legislative Assembly sooner, although the power has to be exercised,
like all constitutional powers, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the
Constitution. For the most, it is the inability of a government to enjoy the
confidence for the period of five years that results in a premature dissolution
of the House.
7. No amendment is necessary which would extend this term beyond five

years. The only change is that in the event of a mid-term dissolutions, the
term of the reconstituted legislature shall be for a period lesser than five
years and for the remaining unexpired period of the original term of five
years. While all the consequences of a mid-term dissolution would follow
as though it is a dissolution after the full term, only the term of the
reconstituted legislature would be curtailed.
8. This change in the tenure does not in any manner affect the basic structure
of the Constitution.
9. The federal structure is also in no manner impaired, for the same rules would
apply to the House of the People as they apply to the State Legislative
Assemblies. Mid-term dissolutions would have the same consequences for
both.
HLC REPORT
260
10. The transitory provision for paving the way for simultaneous elections is a
one-time measure, and also not violative of the basic structure or the
principles of federalism.
I. RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS
11. The existing Constitutional and other provisions related to elections for the
House of the People, State Legislative Assemblies, Panchayats and
Municipalities are given below: -
Constitutional Provisions
12. Article 83(2) and 172(1) provide for the maximum duration of the House of
the People and State Legislative Assemblies, respectively. These articles
provide that unless sooner dissolved, Assemblies shall continue for five
years from the date of their first meeting and no longer. The term of the
House can be extended for a limited period only if a proclamation of
emergency is in operation.
13. Part VIII, comprising Articles 239 to 242, deals with ‘The Union
Territories’. Article 239-A stipulates the creation of local Legislatures or
Council of Ministers or both for certain Union Territories with special
reference to the Union Territory of Puducherry. Article 239- AA is a special
provision with respect to the National Capital Territory of Delhi (“NCT of
Delhi”), which provides for the governance of the NCT of Delhi.
14. Section 5 of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi Act,
1991 (GNCTD, 1991) provides the “Duration of the Legislative Assembly”
of Delhi. It states inter alia “Legislative Assembly (the Union territory),
unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for five years from the date
appointed for its first meeting and no longer and the expiration of the said
period of five years shall operate as a dissolution of the Assembly…”. The
same clause is provided in Section 5 of The Government of Union
HLC REPORT
261
Territories Act, 1963 (GUT Act, 1963) and Section 17 of Jammu and
Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019.
15. Part IX, containing Articles 243 to 243-O, and Part IXA, containing Article
243P to 243ZG, deal with Panchayats and Municipalities respectively, the
local bodies. Article 243 K envisages the provision regarding the State
Election Commission having control of the preparation of the Electoral roll
for Panchayats. Article 243 ZA envisages the provision regarding the State
Election Commission having control of the preparation of the Electoral roll
for Municipalities.
16. Part XV, containing Articles 324 to 329, deals with the conduct of elections.
Article 324 vests the superintendence, direction and control of elections in
the Election Commission of India. Article 327 confers power upon
Parliament to make provisions with respect to elections to Legislatures, both
at the Centre and in the States. Article 328 enables the Legislature of a State,
to enact laws with respect to all the matters relating to elections to the
Legislatures of the States, provided the Parliament has not made any such
legislation.
HLC REPORT
262
The Representation of the People Act, 1951
17. Sections 141 and 152 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, deal
with notification for general election to the House of the People and the
18. Part IX, comprising Sections 147 to 151A, deals with bye-elections to the
House of the People and State Legislative Assemblies.
Rule 198 of House of the People Business Rules, 20143
19. Rule 198 prescribes the admissibility and procedure with regard to a motion
of no-confidence to be introduced in the House of the People. Apart from
the above-mentioned rule, there are specific Procedural Rules in various
States & Union Territories with respect to the no-confidence motion and
1
14. Notification for general election to the House of the People.—(1) A general election shall be held for
the purpose of constituting a new House of the People on the expiration of the duration of the existing House
or on its dissolution.
(2) For the said purpose the President shall, by one or more notifications published in the Gazette of India on
such date or dates as may be recommended by the Election Commission call upon all Parliamentary
constituencies to elect members in accordance with the provisions of this Act and of the rules and orders made
thereunder:
Provided that where a general election is held otherwise than on the dissolution of the existing House of the
People, no such notification shall be issued at any time earlier than six months prior to the date on which the
duration of that House would expire under the provisions of clause (2) of article 83.
2
15. Notification for general election to a State Legislative Assembly.—(1) A general election shall be held
for the purpose of constituting a new Legislative Assembly on the expiration of the duration of the existing
Assembly or on its dissolution.
(2) For the said purpose, the Governor or Administrator, as the case may be, shall by one or more notifications
published in the Official Gazette of the State on such date or dates as may be recommended by the Election
Commission, call upon all Assembly constituencies in the State to elect members in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and of the rules and orders made thereunder:
Provided that where a general election is held otherwise than on the dissolution of the existing Legislative
Assembly, no such notification shall be issued at any time earlier than six months prior to the date on which
the duration of that Assembly would expire under the provisions of clause (1) of article 172 or under the
provisions of section 5 of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 (20 of 1963), as the case may be.
3
Refer to Annexure 3 (iv).
HLC REPORT
263
other procedures to be followed in Legislative Assembly of that particular

State or Union Territory.
II. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AND

LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ENABLING SIMULTANEOUS
ELECTIONS
20. The Terms of Reference (ToR) (a) (c) (d) and (e) of High Level Committee
(HLC) which are relevant for this part are as follows:
21. ToR (a) examine and make recommendations for holding simultaneous
elections to the House of the People (House of the People), State Legislative
Assemblies, Municipalities and Panchayats, keeping in view the existing
framework under the Constitution of India and other statutory provisions,
and for that purpose, examine and recommend specific amendments to the
Constitution, the Representation of the People Act, 1950, the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the rules made thereunder and
any other law or rules which would require amendments for the purpose of
holding simultaneous elections;
22. ToR (c) analyse and recommend possible solutions in a scenario of
simultaneous elections emerging out of hung House, adoption of no-
23. ToR (d) suggest a framework for synchronisation of elections and
specifically, suggest the phases and time frame within which simultaneous
elections may be held if they cannot be held in one go and also suggest any
amendments to the Constitution and other laws in this regard and propose
such rules that may be required in such circumstances;
24. ToR (e) recommends necessary safeguards for ensuring the continuity of
the cycle of simultaneous elections and recommend necessary amendments
to the Constitution, so that the cycle of simultaneous elections is not
disturbed
HLC REPORT
264
The proposed amendments for the conduct of simultaneous elections may

be contained in following Bills-
It is proposed, that amendment bills may be introduced in the Parliament for

enabling the implementation of Simultaneous Elections. One will be the
Constitutional Amendment Bill and another will be consequential amendments
in the statutes of Union Territories having Legislative Assemblies.
Proposed Constitutional Amendment Bills
25. The First Constitutional Amendment Bill may contain amendments/

insertions under the following provisions: -
Article 82A; Duration of House of People under Article 83(2), Article 83(3),
Article 83(4); duration of State Legislature Assembly under Article 172(3),
Article 172(4), Article 172(5) and Article 327;
This aforementioned bill does not require ratification by the half of the States.
26. The Second Constitutional Amendment Bill may contain amendments

under the following provisions: -
The Amendment to the provisions of the Constitution of India relating to

preparation of the electoral roll by the Election Commission of India in
consultation with the State Election Commission(s) for the elections to the local
bodies (in Article 325).
The Amendment to the provision in order to have simultaneous elections for

Municipalities, Panchayat along with general elections of the House of the
People and the State Legislature (Article 324A).
Under Article 368(2) of the Constitution of India, ratification by not less than
half of the states will be required to carry out amendments to the Second
HLC REPORT
265
Constitutional Amendment Bill to the Constitution of India as these matters are

related to State affairs.
Proposed consequential amendments in the Statutes of Union Territories

having Legislative Assemblies.
27. For amendments under the following provisions: -

Duration of the Legislative Assembly of National Capital Territory of Delhi
(NCTD) under Section 5 of Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi
Act, 1991 (NCTD, 1991);

For the State Assembly of Puducherry, the amendments regarding the duration
of the Legislative Assembly of Union Territory under Sections 5 of The
Government of Union Territories Act, 1963;

For the State Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir, the amendments regarding the
duration of Legislative Assembly of Union Territory under Section 17 of the
Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019
These three bills do not require ratification by the half of the States.
III. DISTINCT AMENDMENTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

AND OTHER STATUTES
ARTICLES OF
CONSTITUTION/
S. No. AMENDMENT PROPOSED
PROVISIONS OF
RELEVANT STATUTES
Article 83(2)
1. 1. The Five-year period would hereinafter be referred as the full term.
Duration of the House of the
People
2 Article 83(3) 2. Where the House of People is dissolved sooner than the expiry of
its full term, the period between its date of dissolution and five
HLC REPORT
266
ARTICLES OF
CONSTITUTION/
PROVISIONS OF
RELEVANT STATUTES
years from the date appointed for its first meeting shall be referred
to as its unexpired term.
3. Notwithstanding anything in Article 83(2), where the House of the

People is dissolved sooner than the expiry of its full term, the next
House of the People constituted pursuant to elections occasioned
by such dissolution, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for
such period as is equal to the unexpired term of the immediately
preceding the House of the People and expiration of the term shall
operate as a dissolution of the House.
Explanation:
3 Article 83(4)
1. The House of the People constituted in sub-article (4) shall not be
a continuation of the previous House of the People. All the
consequences of dissolution shall apply to the House of the People
referred to in sub-article (3).
2. The election for constituting the House of the People for its
unexpired term shall be referred to as a mid-term election, and the
election held after the expiry of the full term shall be referred to as
the General election.
Article 172 (1)

4. 1. Five- year term would hereinafter refer to as full-term.
Duration of the State
Legislature
2. Where the State Legislative Assembly is dissolved sooner than

upon the expiry of its full term, then the period between its date of
5. Article 172(3)
dissolution and the period of five years from the date appointed for
its first meeting shall be referred to as its unexpired term.
Notwithstanding anything contained in Art. 172(1), where the

State Legislative Assembly is dissolved sooner than the expiry of
its full term, and a new State Legislative Assembly is constituted
pursuant to elections occasioned by such dissolution, then such
new State Legislative Assembly unless sooner dissolved, shall
continue for such period as is equal to the unexpired term of the
6. Article 172(4) immediately preceding State Legislative Assembly and the
expiration of this period shall operate as a dissolution of the
Assembly.
Explanation: The State Legislative Assembly constituted as

referred to in sub article (4) shall not be a continuation of the
previous State Legislative Assembly and all the consequences of
dissolution shall apply to the State Legislative Assembly referred
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267
ARTICLES OF
CONSTITUTION/
PROVISIONS OF
RELEVANT STATUTES
to in sub-article (3).
The President of India may by notification issued on the date of

the first sitting of the House of the People after a general election,
7. Article 82A (1)
bring into force the provision of this Article, and that date of the
notification shall be called the Appointed date.
Notwithstanding anything in Art. 83 and 172, all the State

Legislative Assemblies constituted in any general election held
8. Article 82A (2)
after the Appointed date shall come to an end on the expiry of the
full term of House of the People.
Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution or any law for the

time being in force, and after the expiry of the full term referred
to in sub Article (1), the Election Commission shall conduct
General elections to the House of the People and the Legislative
Assemblies simultaneously and the provisions of Part XV of the
Constitution shall apply to these elections mutatis mutandis with
9. Article 82A (3)
such modifications as may become necessary and which the
Election Commission may by Order specify.
Explanation: The expression “simultaneous elections” shall mean

general elections held for constituting the House of the People and
all the Legislative Assemblies together.
If the Election Commission is of the opinion that the elections to

any Legislative Assembly cannot be conducted at the time of the
10. Article 82A (4) General Election, it may make a recommendation to the President,
to declare by an Order, that the election to that Legislative
Assembly may be conducted at a later date.
Where the elections to a State Legislative Assembly is deferred

under sub-article (3), then notwithstanding anything contained in
11. Article 82A (5) Art. 172, the full term of the Legislative Assembly shall end on
same date as the end of the full term of the House of the People
constituted in the General Election.
Notwithstanding anything in Art. 243E and 243U, Parliament may

by law make provision for ensuring that the elections to
Municipalities and Panchayats are held simultaneously with the
12. Article 324A General Elections, and for this purpose, make provisions as may
be necessary including provisions for determination of the term of
the Municipalities and Panchayats sooner than the expiry of five
years from the date appointed for their first meeting, and for
limiting the term of such Municipalities and Panchayats
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268
ARTICLES OF
CONSTITUTION/
PROVISIONS OF
RELEVANT STATUTES
constituted under a mid-term election to the unexpired period of

their term until the next general elections.
1. Notwithstanding anything in sub-article (1), on and from the date

notified by the President, there shall be Single Electoral Roll for
every territorial constituency for election in the House of the
People, Legislature of a State or to a Municipality or a Panchayat.
13. Article 325(2)
No person shall be ineligible for inclusion in any such roll or claim
to be included in any special electoral roll for any such
constituency on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or any of
them.
On and from the date of the notification referred to in sub-article

(2) above, notwithstanding anything contained in Articles 243K
and 243ZA and Article 324, the electoral rolls referred to in sub-
article (2) shall be made by the Election Commission in
14. Article 325(3) consultation with the State Election Commissions established in
the States. The electoral roll prepared under this sub-article shall
substitute any electoral roll prepared earlier by either the Election
Commission under Art 325 or the State Election Commissions
under Art. 243K and Art. 243ZA.
After the words “delimitation of constituencies” the words

15. Article 327
“conduct of simultaneous elections” to be added.
1. In order to achieve the simultaneous elections, the Government of

India shall prescribe an Appointed date (as given under the Serial
number 7 of Table number 1). The General Elections held after the
Appointed date will be simultaneous with the elections of the State
Section 5 of The
Legislative Assemblies. For the same, an amendment to Section 5
Government of National
of The Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi Act,
Capital Territory of Delhi
Act, 1991 (GNCTD, 1991) 1991 (GNCTD, 1991) shall enable the following:
16.
The Duration of the 2. “Legislative Assembly, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for
five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no
Legislative Assembly of
longer and the expiration of the said period of five years shall
NCTD
come to end with the expiration of the full term of the House of the
People”

Section 5 of The
Government of Union
Territories Act, 1963
17. Appointed date will be simultaneous with the elections of the State
(GUT Act, 1963)
Legislative Assemblies. For the same, an amendment to Section 5
Duration of the Legislative of The Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 (GUT Act,
Assemblies of Union 1963) shall enable the following:
HLC REPORT
269
ARTICLES OF
CONSTITUTION/
PROVISIONS OF
RELEVANT STATUTES
Territories “Legislative Assembly, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for

People”

Appointed date will be simultaneous with the elections of the State
Legislative Assemblies. For the same, an amendment to Section
Section 17 of Jammu and 17 of Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 shall
18. Kashmir Reorganisation enable the following:
Act, 2019
“Legislative Assembly, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for
People”
30. In consonance with ToR (a), which provides that the Committee shall
examine and make recommendations for holding simultaneous elections to
the House of the People, State Legislative Assemblies, Municipalities and
Panchayats, the Committee recommends that in the first step, simultaneous
elections to the House of the People and the State Legislative Assemblies
be held. In the second step, the elections to Municipalities and Panchayats
will be synchronised with House of the People and State Legislative
Assemblies in such a way that Municipalities and Panchayat elections are
held within hundred days of the holding of elections of the House of the
People and the State Legislative Assemblies.
31. ToR (g) provides that HLC shall, “examine and recommend the modalities
of use of a single electoral roll and electoral identity cards for identification
of voters in elections to the House of the People (House of the people), State
Legislative Assemblies, Municipalities and Panchayats”. In order to have a
HLC REPORT
270
Single Electoral Roll, an amendment to Article 325 is required, which will

prescribe that an Single Electoral Roll and Single Elector’s Photo Identity
Card be made by the Election Commission of India in consultation with the
State Election Commissions and that Electoral Roll and Elector’s Photo
Identity Card shall substitute any electoral roll and elector’s identity card
prepared earlier by either the Election Commission under Art 325 or the
State Election Commissions under Art. 243K and Art. 243ZA. In order to
implement this amendment as per Article 368 (2), ratification by not less
than half of the States would be required.
Proposed Amendments in the case of Hung Parliament/Assembly
32. A situation that may arise and is required to be dealt with is that of the Hung
Parliament/Assembly. It is a situation wherein a single political party or a
pre-poll alliance does not have enough elected members to secure an overall
majority in the House/Assembly.
33. The convention over the decades requires the President [or the Governor]
to explore the formation of a Government by inviting the different political
parties to form a government, if necessary, by collaborating under a
common minimum program. Constitutional values assume that those in
public life would rise to the occasion when the need arises in order to ensure
that the country or the State as the case may be, have an elected Government
in place.
34. This problem arises because of a fundamental principle of Westminster

democracy: a government in office must enjoy the confidence of the House.
Any strait-jacket formula that compromises this principle would be
unacceptable.
HLC REPORT
271
35. The concept of a shorter term in the event of a mid-term election as proposed
may be a deterrent to destabilise Governments before the completion of
their term of five years.
IV. RATIFICATION BY THE STATES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL

AMENDMENT REGARDING SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS
36. This chapter is in accordance with the given ToR (b), which states that:
“examine and recommend, if the amendments to the Constitution would

require ratification by the States”
37. Article 368 lays down the procedure for amendment of the Constitution.
The proviso to Article 368(2) enlists certain provisions of the Constitution,
which, if amended, will also require ratification by not less than one-half of
the States. This proviso was introduced with a view to give effect to the
federal principles. Its scope is confined to the limits prescribed therein and
is not to be construed to take away the power conferred by the main part of
Article 368(2).
38. The limitations referred to hereinabove are of two types, i.e., substantive
and procedural. Substantive limitation prohibits any kind of amendment,
which may alter the basic structure of the Constitution. However, the
procedural limitation deals with the manner in which the amendment is to
be carried out, if permissible in law, e.g., ratification of the amendment by
39. Entry 72, List I of Seventh Schedule empowers the Parliament to make laws
regarding elections to Parliament and Legislatures of States.
40. Article 328 of the Constitution of India enables the States to make laws with
respect to all matters related to or in connection with the elections to the
Assemblies. This power is subject to the provisions of the Constitution and
HLC REPORT
272
to the laws made by the Parliament, if any, in this regard. The elections to
the House of the People and the State Legislative Assemblies are held by
the Election Commission of India under the Constitution of India, The
Representation of People Act, 1950, The Representation of People Act,
1951, and the rules and orders made thereunder. Therefore, the amendments
required for simultaneous elections to the House of the People and the State
Legislative Assemblies do not fall under the purview of the proviso to
Article 368(2) and hence, do not warrant a ratification by the States.
Ratification from the States due to amendments in Articles 325 and Article
324A of the Constitution of India
41. In terms of Article 324, the power is vested in the Election Commission of
India for the preparation of electoral roll for the conduct of elections to the
House of the People and the State Legislative Assembly. Article 325
provides that there shall be Single Electoral Roll for the territorial
constituency for election to the House of the People and State Legislative
Assembly. The power given in Article 324 is pari materia with the power
vested in the State Election Commission under Article 243K and 243 ZA.
The words “superintendence, direction, and control” are of wide amplitude.
These words are enough to include all powers necessary for the smooth and
effective conduct of elections by the State Election Commission.
42. In order to have a Single Electoral Roll and Single Eelctor’s Photo Identity
Card, an amendment shall be made to Article 325. This amendment shall
have an overriding effect over Articles 243K, and 243ZA. It will facilitate
that the Election Commission of India should prepare the electoral roll “in
consultation with” the State Election Commission(s), which will substitute
any electoral roll prepared earlier by either the Election Commission under
Art 325 or the State Election Commissions under Art. 243K and Art.
243ZA.
HLC REPORT
273
43. Part IX and IXA were introduced by the 73rd and 74th Constitutional
Amendment Acts, after the ratification by half of the States. This was
required due to proviso (c) of Article 368 (2) as amendment was touching
upon Entry 5 of List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution of India.
Similarly, introduction of amendments to Article 325 puts an overriding
effect to Article 243K and 243ZA which are the provisions under Part IX
and IX A. Furthermore, every State has their own provisions for the
electoral roll in their respective State laws related to Panchayat and
Municipality. Introduction of Single Electoral Roll and Single Elector’s
Identity Card will put an overriding effect upon the provisions of State laws
also. Therefore, in order to enforce the Amendment in Article 325 for Single
Electoral Roll and Single Elector’s Photo Identity Card, ratification by half
of the States is required.
44. The insertion of new Article 324A will facilitate the simultaneous elections
of the Panchayats and Municipalities with the General Elections of the
House of the People and the State Legislative Assemblies. To give effect
the aforesaid amendment, a Constitutional Amendment Bill needs to be
passed with the ratification by not less than half of the States since this
amendments touch upon the subjects of the State.
HLC REPORT
274
Recommendations and Conclusion
CHAPTER-XI
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
TOR – I
(a) Examine and make recommendations for holding simultaneous

elections to the House of the People (Lok Sabha), State Legislative
Assemblies, Municipalities and Panchayats, keeping in view the existing
framework under the Constitution of India and other statutory provisions,
and for that purpose, examine and recommend specific amendments to the
Constitution, the Representation of the People Act, 1950, the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the rules made thereunder and
any other law or rules which would require amendments for the purpose
of holding simultaneous elections;
Recommendation
1. After examination of all relevant evidences, including the macroeconomic

analysis, the Committee finds that the loss of simultaneity in elections after
the first two decades of India’s independence has had a baneful effect on
the economy, polity and society. Initially, two elections were held every ten
years. Now, several elections are being held every year. This casts a huge
burden on the Government, businesses, workers, Courts, political parties,
candidates contesting elections, and civil society at large. The Committee,
therefore, recommends that the Government must develop a legally tenable
mechanism in order to restore the cycle of simultaneous elections.
2. The Committee recommends that in the first step, simultaneous elections to

the House of the People and the State Legislative Assemblies be held. In the
second step, the elections to Municipalities and Panchayats will be
synchronized with the House of the People and State Legislative Assemblies
HLC REPORT
275
in such a way that elections to Municipalities and Panchayats are held

within a hundred days of the holding of elections of the House of the People
and the State Legislative Assemblies.
3. For the purpose of synchronisation of elections to the House of the People

and State Legislative Assemblies, the Committee recommends that the
President of India may, by notification, issued on the date of the first sitting
of the House of the People after a General election, bring into force the
provision of this Article, and that date of the notification shall be called the
Appointed date.
4. And the tenure of all State Legislative Assemblies, constituted by elections

to the State Legislative Assemblies after the Appointed date and before the
expiry of the full term of the House of the People, shall be only for the
period ending up to the subsequent General elections to the House of the
People.
Thereafter, all General elections to the House of the People and all State
Legislative Assemblies shall be held together simultaneously.
5. For this purpose, the Committee also recommends that an Implementation

Group may be constituted which shall look into the execution of the
recommendations given by the Committee.
TOR-2
(b) Examine and recommend, if the amendments to the Constitution

would require ratification by the States;
Recommendation
6. The Committee recommends introduction of Article 324A for enabling

simultaneous elections in Panchayats and Municipalities with the General
HLC REPORT
276
elections of the House of the People and the State Legislative Assemblies
and amendment in Article 325 for enabling Single Electoral Roll and Single
Elector’s Photo Identity Card, which shall be prepared by the Election
Commission of India in consultation with the State Election Commission(s)
and the same will substitute any other electoral roll prepared by Election
Commission of India under Article 325 or State Election Commission(s)
under Articles 243K and 243ZA of the Constitution of India. Since these
amendments touch upon State subjects (Entry 5) of Schedule VII, Part IX,
and Part IX A of the Constitution of India, ratification by the States will be
required under Article 368(2) of the Constitution of India. However,
implementing step one, which is simultaneous elections to House of the
People and State Legislative Assemblies, does not necessitate ratification
by the States.
TOR – 3
(c) Analyse and recommend possible solutions in a scenario of

simultaneous elections emerging out of a hung House, adoption of no-
Recommendation
7. The Committee recommends that in the event of a hung House, no-

confidence motion, or any such event, fresh elections may be held to
constitute the new House.
Where fresh elections are held for the House of the People, the tenure of the
House of the People will be only for the unexpired term of the immediately
preceding full term of the House of the People and the expiration of this
period shall operate as a dissolution of the House.
HLC REPORT
277
Where fresh elections are held for the State Legislative Assemblies, then
such new Legislative Assembly unless sooner dissolved, shall continue upto
the end of the full term of the House of the People.
A Constitution Amendment Bill will have to be introduced in the Parliament

amending Article 83 (Duration of Houses of Parliament) and Article 172
(Duration of State Legislatures). This Constitutional Amendment will not
need ratification by the States.
TOR - 4
(d) Suggest a framework for synchronisation of elections and specifically,

suggest the phases and time frame within which simultaneous elections
may be held if they cannot be held in one go and also suggest any
amendments to the Constitution and other laws in this regard and propose
such rules that may be required in such circumstances;
Recommendation
8. The Committee recommends that in the first stage, simultaneous elections

to the House of the People and the State Legislative Assemblies be held. In
the second stage, the elections to Municipalities and Panchayats will be
synchronized with House of People and State Legislative Assemblies in
such a way that Municipalities and Panchayat elections are held within
TOR 5
(e) Recommend necessary safeguards for ensuring the continuity of the

cycle of simultaneous elections and recommend necessary amendments to
HLC REPORT
278
the Constitution, so that the cycle of simultaneous elections is not

disturbed;
Recommendation
9. The Committee recommends that in the event of a hung House, no-

confidence motion, or any such event, fresh elections may be held to
constitute the new House.
Where fresh elections are held for the House of the People, the tenure of the
House of the People will be only for the unexpired term of the immediately
preceding full term of the House of the People and the expiration of this
period shall operate as a dissolution of the House.
Where fresh elections are held for the State Legislative Assemblies, then
such new Legislative Assemblies unless sooner dissolved, shall continue up
to the end of the full term of the House of the People.
A Constitution Amendment Bill would need to be introduced in the

Parliament amending Article 83 (Duration of Houses of Parliament) and
Article 172 (Duration of State Legislatures). This Constitutional
Amendment will not need ratification by the States.
TOR - 6
(f) Examine the logistics and manpower required, including EVMs,

VVPATs, etc., for holding such simultaneous elections;
Recommendation
10. The Committee recommends that for making logistical arrangements for the
conduct of simultaneous elections to the House of the People and State
Legislative Assemblies, the Election Commission of India may draw a plan
HLC REPORT
279
and estimate in advance for the procurement of equipment, such as EVMs

and VVPATs, deployment of polling personnel and security forces, and
make other necessary arrangements.
Similarly, for the elections to Municipalities and Panchayats, State Election

Commission(s), in consultation with the Election Commission of India, may
draw a plan and estimate in advance for the procurement of equipment, such
as EVMs and VVPATs, deployment of polling personnel and security
forces, and make other necessary arrangements.
TOR 7
(g) Examine and recommend the modalities of use of a single electoral roll
and electoral identity cards for identification of voters in elections to the
House of the People (Lok Sabha), State Legislative Assemblies,
Municipalities, and Panchayats.
Recommendation
11. The Committee recommends that for the purpose of having a Single
Electoral Roll and Single Elector’s Photo Identity Card for elections for the
House of the People, the State Legislative Assemblies, the Municipalities,
and the Panchayats, Article 325 may be suitably amended to the effect that
the Election Commission of India shall make the Electoral Roll and
Elector’s Photo Identity Card in consultation with the State Election
Commission(s). The Electoral Roll and Elector’s Photo Identity Card
prepared under this shall substitute any Electoral Roll and Elector’s Photo
Identity Card prepared earlier by either the Election Commission under Art
325 or the State Election Commissions under Art. 243K and Art. 243ZA of
the Constitution. This amendment will require ratification by the States.
HLC REPORT
280
CONCLUSION
The recommendations of the Committee depict a rationale embedded in the

principles laid down by the Supreme Court of India in Kesavananda Bharati v.
State of Kerala1,
“Every Constitution is expected to endure for a long time. Therefore, it must

necessarily be elastic. It is not possible to place the society in a straitjacket.
The society grows, its requirements change. The Constitution and the laws
may have to be changed to suit those needs. No single generation can bind
the course of the generation to come.
Hence every Constitution, wisely drawn up, provides for its own
amendment.”
We can do no better than to recall what Swami Vivekananda had said,
“Society is an organism which obeys the immutable law of progress; and

change, judicious and cautious change, is necessary for the well-being, and
indeed the preservation of the social system.”2
Upon all-inclusive deliberations the Committee concludes that its

recommendations will significantly enhance transparency, inclusivity, ease and
confidence of the voters. Overwhelming support for holding simultaneous
elections will spur development process and social cohesion, deepen the
foundations of our democratic rubric, and realise the aspirations of India, that
is Bharat.
1
(1973 4 SCC 225), para 634, Refer to Annexure 4(iii).
2
Swami Vivekananda on the Sea-Voyage Movement, The Bengalee, May 18, 1895.
HLC REPORT
281
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14 March 2024

S. No Chapters Page No.

(xii) Jammu & Kashmir 12011-12278

VOLUME WISE: CONTENT DETAILS

V) Business and Industry Bodies

III) Political Parties VI) Secretarial, Logistical and

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Fig. 3.28: Justice P Nandrajog, Former Chief Justice Bombay High 80

1. For an aspirational India, that is Bharat, governance based on the principles

2. Political parties and their leaders, businesses, workers, academia,

through the Gazette notification of 2nd September 2023 by the Government

5. Responses were also received from 47 political parties. Barring 15 political

6. In order to address the issues involved in the transition in the system of

7. Four Former Chief Justices of India, as well as a Former Judge of the

of the view that the Indian electorate is sagacious enough to differentiate

9. Considering its overriding advantages, the Committee is of the unanimous

2. Notwithstanding anything contained in Art. 83 and 172, all the

3. Notwithstanding anything contained in this constitution or any law for

Explanation: The expression “simultaneous elections” shall mean general

1. Notwithstanding anything contained in Art. 243E and 243U, Parliament

10.The amendments should provide for designating an ‘Appointed date’ (being

11.The Committee further examined the laws related to elections for

12.The most important factor is that frequent elections create an atmosphere of

13.The Committee unanimously opined that, in the first step, simultaneous

recognises the significance of a Single Electoral Roll and Single Elector’s

15.In regard to the logistical arrangements for the conduct of simultaneous

16.Certainty is important for decisions central to good governance which leads

1. The High Level Committee (hereinafter also referred as “Committee”) has

2. The law of elections in India is unique. It is the product of a historical

dissolution of State Assemblies was necessitated to synchronise their terms

5. In order to dissolve the Houses, a consensual approach in consultation with

“The Commission called a conference of the All-India Political Parties in

ii. that it should be completed within 15 days, if possible; and

The consensus of opinion among the State Governments was largely in

Table 1.2 Decade wise Number of Elections (Source: ECI)

9. The concept of simultaneous elections has been featured in many reports

a) Considerable savings on the colossal avoidable administrative and other

guidelines issued by the Election Commission, there are considerable

12. In 2002, the National Commission to Review the Working of the

13. The Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on

simultaneous elections will be necessary to enable India to move on to the

a) The massive expenditure that is currently incurred for the conduct of

Details are given in the following two tables:

SL. NO. MEMBERS PRESENT (Smt./Shri) PARTY

1. Rajnath Singh, J.P Nadda, Sudhakar Reddy Bharatiya Janata Party

2. Sharad Pawar Nationalist Congress Party

3. Nitish Kumar Janata Dal United

4. Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy Yuvajana Sramika Rythu

6. K.T. Rama Rao Bharat Rashtra Samithi

7. Ram Vilas Paswan Lok Janshakti Party

8. Sardar Sukhbir Singh Badal Shiromani Akali Dal

9. Ashish Singh Patel Apna Dal

10. Sudesh Mahto All Jharkhand Students Union

11. Prem Singh Tamang Sikkim Krantikari Morcha

12. Chingwang Konyak National Democratic

14. Mehbooba Mufti People’s Democratic Party

15. Hanuman Beniwal Rashtriya Loktantrik Party

16. Ramdas Athawale Republican Party of India

Table 1.4 Parties Not in Favour