TM1209 - Respondent

INLR AND R U G G L E P A R T N E R S 1 S T I N T E R N A T I O N A L O N L I N E M O O T C O U R T C O M P E T I T I O N 2021
TEAM CODE: TM1209
1ST INTERNATIONAL ONLINE MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2021, RUGGLE PARTNERS &
INLR
I N T HE H ON ’ BLE S UPREME C OURT OF I NDRAYUGA
W.P. No. ______ / 2018.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of Indrayuga)
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR & ANR.

……. Petitioner
versus
UNION OF INDRAYUGA & ORS. ……

Respondent
As Submitted to The Chief Justice & other Companion Judges of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indrayuga
-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

-M E M O R I A L AND P L E A D I NGS ON B E HAL F OF T HE RESPONDENT-
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TOPIC PAGE NO.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS iii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES v
STATEMENT OF JUSRISDICTION viii
STATEMENT OF FACTS ix
ISSUES RAISED x
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS xi-xii
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 13-28
1. Whether or not section 377 of the Indrayugan penal code be declared as 13-18
violative of the constitution and thus void?
1.1 That Article 14 has not been violated 13
1.2 That Article 15 has not been violated 15
1.3 There has been no violation of A. 21 16
1.4 There is no violation of A. 19(1)(a) 18
2. Whether or not right to sexuality, right to sexual autonomy and right to 19-22
choose a sexual partner is a part of article 21 of the Constitution of
Indrayuga?
2.1 Right to Choose a Sexual Partner is not a part of Article 21 20
2.2. Right of sexual Autonomy not a fundamental right under Article 21. 21
3. Whether or not right to marry a person of the same sex should be held a 23-28
part of article 21 of the Constitution of Indrayuga?
PRAYER xxix
L IST O F A BBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATIONS FULL FORM

¶ Paragraph
¶¶ Paragraphs
& And
Admn. Administration
AIR All India Report
ALJ Administrative Law Judge
Anr Another

Art. Article
BOM Bombay
BOMLR Bombay Law Report
CC Civil Case
Crl. Criminal
DLT Delhi Law Times
MP Madhya Pradesh
Mad. Madras
No. Number
Ors. Others
SA Special Assessment
SC Supreme Court
SCALE Supreme Court Almanac
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Report
UN United Nation
UNAIDS United Nation Programme on HIV & AIDS
UOI Union of India
v./vs Versus
WP Writ Petition
ZACC Constitution Court of South Africa

I N D E X O F A UT HO RIT IE S
STATUTE
1. Indian Penal Code, 1860.

2. The Indian Constitution, 1950.
CASES
1. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27.
2. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of Indrayuga 1984 AIR 802.
3. Bidhannagar (Salt Lake) Welfare Assn v Central Valuation Board and Ors, AIR 2007 SC
2276
4. B.K. Parthasarathi vs Government of A.P. And Others, 2000 (1) ALD 199.
5. Calvin Francis v. Orissa 1992 (2) Crimes 455.
6. Consumer Education and Research Centre and Ors. v Union of Indrayugan and Ors., AIR
1995 SC 922.
7. Commissioner of Central Excise Jamshedpur v. Dabur (India) Ltd., (2005) 3 SCC 646.
8. Devadasan v Union of Indrayuga, AIR 1964 SC 179.
9. Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 1378.
10. Jagmohan Singh v. State of UP (1973) 1 SCC 20.
11. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, 2018 (12) SCALE 1.
12. Kharak Singh v. State of UP and others, (1964) 1 SCR 332.
13. K.Nagraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1985 SC 551.
14. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
15. Laxmi Khandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 873.
16. Pashim Banga Khet Mazdoor sanity v. State of West Bengal & Anr, 1989 (4) SCC 286.
17. Madan Mohan Singh & Ors v rajni Kant & Anr., criminal appeal no. 6466.
18. Mafatlal Industries Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors1997(89) ELT247(SC).

19. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 AIR 597.

20. Mihir alias Bhikari Charan Sahu v. State, Cri LJ 488.
21. Mr. X v. Hospital Z, (1998) 8 SCC 296.
22. MS Bhut educational trust v State of Gujarat, AIR 2000 Guj 160.
23. Navtej Singh Johar vs Union of India AIR 2018 SC 4321.
24. Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2010 Cri LJ 94.
25. Ram Krishna Dalmia v SR Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538.
26. Re: Special Courts Bill, 1978 (1979) 1 SCC 380.
27. Ritesh Sinha vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 2003 of 2012.
28. Saurabh Chaudri and others v. Union of Indrayuga and others (2003) 11 SCC 146.
29. State v. V. C. Shukla, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1382.
30. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. McDowell & Co., (1996) 3 SCC 709.
31. State of Kerala v. PUCL, Kerala State Unit, (2009) 8 SCC 46.
32. The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75.
33. Subash Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1991) 1 SCC 598.
34. Sunil Batra v Delhi AdministrationAIR 1978 SC 1675.
35. Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation, (2014) 1 SCC 1.
36. Thiru Muruga Finance v State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2000 Mad 137.
37. Thomas John v. Joseph Thomas AIR (2000) KER 408.
38. Union of Indrayuga & ors v Hiramoy Sen & ors, (2008) 1 SCC 630.
CONVENTIONS
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.
2. Human Rights Convention, 1953.
3. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),1976.
4. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (OHCHR), 1976.
5. United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS, 2019.
BOOKS
1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th Ed., 1990).

2. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (Bryan A. Garner ed., 9th, 2009).

3. Daniel Weinstock, Natural Law and Public Reason in Kant’s Political Philosophy, 26
CAN. J. PHIL., 403 (1996).
4. Gregory M. Herek, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in the United States: A
Social Science Perspective, 61(6) Amer. Psycho. 607-621 (2006).
5. MP JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1168 (13th ed. 2021).
6. Levin Michael, Why Homosexuality is Abnormal, 67(2), SOCIO-BIOLOGY AND
PHILOSOPHY (1984), 261.
7. Steven Smith, What is “Right” in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right?, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
3, 15 (1989).
8. WHARTON’S CONCISE DICTIONARY OF LAW (16th ed 2013).
REPORTS
1. National AIDS Control Organisation, Annual Report 2011-12, page 9
2. UN Report on Global AIDS Epidemic, 2008, pp 47-50.
3. National AIDS Control Organisation, Annual Report 2014-15.
4. Ram Ahuja, Society in Indrayuga, 114, (1st Ed. 1999).
S T A T E M E NT O F J URIS DICT IO N

IT IS MOST HUMBLY SUBMITTED THAT THE PETITIONER HAS APPROACHED THIS HON’BLE
SUPREME COURT OF INDRAYUGAN UNDER ART. 321 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDRAYUGA.
ART. 32 FALLS UNDER PART III OF THE INDRAYUGAN CONSTITUTION WHICH INCLUDES
THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE INDRAYUGAN CITIZENS. IT ALLOWS ALL THE INDIAN
CITIZENS TO MOVE TO THE COUNTRY'S APEX COURT IN CASE OF VIOLATION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.
THE RESPONDENT MOST HUMBLY AND RESPECTFULLY SUBMITS BEFORE THE JURISDICTION
OF THE PRESENT COURT AND ACCEPTS THAT IT HAS THE POWER AND AUTHORITY TO PRESIDE
OVER THE PRESENT CASE.
THE PRESENT MEMORANDUM SETS FORTH THE FACTS, CONTENTIONS AND ARGUMENTS AND
RELIEF SOUGHT IN THE PRESENT CASE.
S T AT E M E NT O F F ACT S
1
Article 32 further reads as follows:
Remedies for enforcement of Rights conferred by Part III
(1) The right to move the supreme court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights
conferred by this part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have the power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the
nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be
appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this part.
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the supreme court by clauses (1) and (2), parliament may by
law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers
exercisable by the supreme court under clause (2).
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this
Constitution

PROLOGUE
Indrayuga is one of the developing countries situated in South Asia, with population of more than
1 billion. It has a Quasi-federal nature of Government and is the largest democracy in the world.
It has the lengthiest written Constitution. The Constitution of Indrayuga declares Indrayuga as a
sovereign socialist secular democratic republic. Part III of the Constitution provides for certain
elementary and fundamental rights to the people of Indrayuga, wherein, the State owes certain
responsibilities towards all its citizens with restrictions. All these responsibilities are enshrined in
Part IV of the Indrayugan Constitution under the title Directive Principles of State Policy.
MERITS OF RESPONDENT
The Petitioner is Navtej Singh Johar, a dancer by profession and identified as a part of the LGBT
community. The petition is seeking a declaration of right to sexuality, right to sexual autonomy,
right to choose a sexual partner, and right to marry a person of the same sex to be part of the right
to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and further to declare Section 377
of the Indrayugan Penal Code to be unconstitutional as it violates Art. 14, 15 and 19 of the
Constitution.
The constitutional validity of Sec 377 is based on “constitutional concept of dignity”. Same-sex
relations do not halter with the right to privacy as such acts would not only increase the
prevalence of HIV/AIDS in society but would also be detrimental to the institution of marriage. It
would also lead to the violation Art. 25 of the Constitution granting freedom of Conscience and
Propagation of Religion.
The section does not criminalise particular people or identity or orientation. It merely identifies
certain acts which if committed would constitute an offence and talks about a particular mode of
sexual activity, independent of the sex of people or sexual orientation and thus, cannot be
considered as a violation of any fundamental right as claimed.
I SSUES R AISED

ISSUE 1:
WHETHER OR NOT SEC 377 OF THE INDRAYUGAN PENAL CODE BE DECLARED AS VIOLATIVE
OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THUS VOID?
ISSUE 2:
WHETHER OR NOT RIGHT TO SEXUALITY, RIGHT TO SEXUAL AUTONOMY AND RIGHT TO

CHOOSE A SEXUAL PARTNER IS A PART OF ART. 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDRAYUGA?
ISSUE 3:
WHETHER OR NOT RIGHT TO MARRY A PERSON OF THE SAME SEX SHOULD BE HELD A PART
OF ART. 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDRAYUGA?
S UMMARY O F A RGUMENTS
ISSUE 1: WHETHER OR NOT SEC 377 OF THE INDRAYUGAN PENAL CODE BE DECLARED AS
VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THUS VOID?

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the impugned provision, S. 377 of IPC is
not violative of any Constitutional provisions or fundamental rights and thus, has no ground to be
struck down. The provision is gender neutral in application and is not a class legislation. In
arguendo, the class created is applicable on all persons. The State also has a legitimate interest in
protecting the public health, morality and conduct and an inherent institution of marriage.
Further, the right of privacy conflicting with right to health tantamount to upholding right to
health. In arguendo, privacy is not absolute and is subject to valid procedure laid down by law.
ISSUE 2: WHETHER OR NOT RIGHT TO SEXUALITY, RIGHT TO SEXUAL AUTONOMY AND

RIGHT TO CHOOSE A SEXUAL PARTNER IS A PART OF ART. 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDRAYUGA?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that It is contended that Section 377 is
constitutionally valid it does not violate any Fundamental Rights of the citizens. The
classification of sexual acts based on whether they are in consonance with the ordinary course of
nature or not is founded on an intelligible differentia and there is rational nexus between such
classification and objective sought by the legislation. Further, Section 377 is not arbitrary as mere
possibility of abuse of power does not render a legislation arbitrary. The state has compelling and
legitimate interest in the form of maintaining public health, decency, and morality by enforcing
the provisions of Section 377. Secondly, it is contended that Section 377 does not violate one’s
Freedom of speech and expression u/a 19 as Article 19(2) permits imposition of restrictions in
the interest of decency and morality. Lastly, Section 377 does not violate Article 21 as it qualifies
the test of substantive due process and is in the interest of public health. It is also contended that
Right to Privacy u/a 21 is not absolute and it may be curtailed by following due process,
rendering Section 377 constitutional. It is contended that Section 377 does not violate Article 21
of the Constitution of Indrayuga as it qualifies the test of substantive due process, it does not
violate one’s Right to Privacy, and it is in the interest of public health.
ISSUE 3: WHETHER OR NOT RIGHT TO MARRY A PERSON OF THE SAME SEX SHOULD BE
HELD A PART OF ART. 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDRAYUGA?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that Same sex marriages are not
fundamental rights envisaged under Article 21. Right to marry has always been couched in

heterosexual yolk between a man and a woman for the purpose of procreating a family. Marriage
as a union is governed by personal laws which are not amenable to fundamental rights and cannot
be adjudicated upon by the judiciary. Furthermore, state has a legitimate and inherent interest in
the institution of marriage and child procreation. Additionally, same sex relations are punishable
by law, and hence inherently illegal. Ergo, same sex marriages are not fundamental rights
housed under right to marry in Article 21.

ARGUMENTS & PLEADINGS ADVANCED
W.P. No. ______ / 2018.
ISSUE 1: WHETHER OR NOT SEC 377 OF THE INDRAYUGAN PENAL CODE BE DECLARED AS
VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THUS VOID?
1. It is submitted that the fundamental rights of the petitioner have not been violated by Section 377
of Indrayugan Penal Code [hereinafter referred to as “IPC”] since it is not violative or ultra
vires of [i] right to equality envisaged under Art. 14, [ii] right against discrimination provided
under Art. 15, and [iii] right to life and liberty extending to right to privacy housed under Art.
21. It must be further noted that law has been imposed by a competent authority.
2. It is submitted that a law made by the Parliament or the Legislature can be struck down by courts
on two grounds alone, viz., (1) lack of legislative competence and (2) violation of any of the
fundamental rights guaranteed or of any other constitutional provision.2 Ergo, there are no
grounds declare the impugned provision as unconstitutional.
1.1 That Article 14 has not been violated

3. It is humbly submitted that S. 377 of IPC is not violative for the reasons that (i) the classification
is founded on an intelligible differentia, (ii) there is rational nexus between classification and
objective sought, and (iii) possibility of abuse of power does not render a legislation arbitrary.3
i. Intelligible differentia
4. It is submitted that the classification is to be based on substantial distinction, which distinguishes
persons or things grouped together in the class from others left out of it. 4 The impugned
provision penalises and classifies acts contrary to ordinary course of nature and includes sexual
acts between adult and child; persons of same sex and gender; bestiality and any sexual contact
other than peno-vaginal contact.5
2
State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. McDowell & Co., (1996) 3 SCC 709.
3
The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75; State v. V. C. Shukla, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1382.
4
Laxmi Khandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 873.
5
Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2010 Cri LJ 94.

5. It is further contended that given the following interpretation, the application of this provision is
gender-neutral and covers voluntary acts of carnal intercourse against the order of nature
irrespective of the gender of the person committing the act. It does not criminalise a particular
people or identity or orientation. It merely identifies certain acts which if committed would
constitute an offence and merely talks about a particular mode of sexual activity, independent of
the sex of people or sexual orientation.6
6. Mere differentiation and inequality of treatment does not per se amount to discrimination and
before considering inequality of treatment, the objective of the legislation is to be considered. 7
The class creation being State prerogative has created a class of sexual acts and not sexual
orientation and gender identity. Where a class is created of acts and not persons, the same does
not fall under the ambit of A. 14 and ipso facto not a class legislation.
7. The Hon’ble SC in Jagmohan Singh v. State of UP8 expressed grave concerns over
superimposing and transplanting western morality and standards to judge social and intellectual
set up of the State. Carnal intercourse counterproductive to reproduction has no reasonable and
desired outcome i.e., progeny (the purpose of intercourse) and is altruistic abnormal.9
ii. Rational nexus between classification and objective sought

8. It is submitted that the objective behind S. 377 is to curb cases of allegation of child sexual abuse
and for complementing lacunae in the rape laws. The state looks to uphold public morality and
decency and it is a compelling state interest in this matter. This can be traced back to the
jurisprudential philosophies of Kant. Immanuel Kant’s political philosophy aligns with the belief
that government is necessary to protect individual autonomy and personhood. 10 “Kant’s requirement
is that legislators ask themselves whether the policies they are proposing could be accepted by
people, without their acceptance having the effect of subverting their autonomy.” 11 In absence of the
provision, there cannot be a redressal to the non-consensual carnal intercourse and lacunae in rape
laws for minors and women.
6
Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation (2014) 1 SCC 1; Mihir alias Bhikari Chauhan Sahu v. State, 1992 Cri
LJ 488; Re: Special Courts Bill, 1978 (1979) 1 SCC 380.
7
Thiru Muruga Finance v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2000 Mad 137.
8
(1973) 1 SCC 20.
9
Levin Michael, Why Homosexuality is Abnormal , 67(2), SOCIO-BIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY (1984), 261.
10
See Steven Smith, What is “Right” in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right?, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 3, 15 (1989).
11
See Daniel Weinstock, Natural Law and Public Reason in Kant’s Political Philosophy, 26 CAN. J. PHIL., 403
(1996).

iii. The impugned provision is not arbitrary

9. It is submitted that the legislature, as a body, cannot be accused of having passed a law for an
extraneous purpose.12 Transferred malice is unknown in the field of legislation. 13 S. 377 is not
arbitrary, it lays out penal provisions in case of unnatural offence, which is reasonable to protect the
victim of the offence. The possibility of abuse of power by executive officials who are responsible
for § 377’s implementation cannot be a valid ground to contest its constitutionality 14 since the ill-
treatment of homosexuals is neither mandated by the section nor condoned by it.
1.4 That Article 15 has not been violated

10. It is humbly submitted that there has been no violation of A. 15 since (i) it is not disproportionate
and discriminatory in its impact and (ii) there is compelling state interest involved.
i. It is not disproportionate or discriminatory

11. It is humbly submitted that ill-treatment is not condoned or prerequisite of the provision and is
applicable on all genders and sexual orientations 15 and thus, mere misuse cannot be the grounds to
challenge the vires of the provision. A. 15 prohibits discrimination on grounds of race, religion, sex,
caste or creed. In consonance, S. 377 is applicable on all persons irrespective of gender identity,
sexual orientation or any other class of persons mentioned under A. 15. In Mafatlal Industries Ltd.
and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors16 a Bench of Nine Judges observed that mere possibility of abuse
of a provision by those in charge of administering it cannot be a ground for holding a provision
procedurally or substantively unreasonable.
ii. There is legitimate and compelling state interest

12. It is humbly submitted that carnal intercourses subject the populus to exigencies of public health
and can cause spread of deadly diseases such as HIV/AIDS. Health is an important facet of the
right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and it is an obligation of the State to
12
K.Nagraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1985 SC 551.
13
State of Kerala v. PUCL, Kerala State Unit, (2009) 8 SCC 46.
14
Commissioner of Central Excise Jamshedpur v. Dabur (India) Ltd., (2005) 3 SCC 646; Sushil Kumar Sharma v.
Union of India and Ors. (2005) 6 SCC 281.
15
Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation, (2014) 1 SCC 1.
16
1997(89)ELT247(SC).

ensure good health to the citizens. As the Supreme Court has observed in Vincent: 17
“Maintenance and improvement of public health have to rank high as these are indispensable to
the very physical existence of the community and on the betterment of these depends the
building of the society of which the Constitution makers envisaged. Attending to public health is,
in our opinion, therefore, is of high priority – perhaps the one at the top.”
13. The Supreme Court in Paschim Banga 18 further notes that “it is the constitutional obligation of
the state to provide adequate medical services to the people. Whatever is necessary for this
purpose has to be done.” Pursuant to this goal of public health, it is paramount duty of state to
impose such provision to curb the spread of diseases.
14. It is further submitted that state has a inherent interest in the domain of marriage. Arguably the
most important state interest in marriage is the effect that marriage and divorce have on children
and parental rights. Under Sec. 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1855 and Sec. 11 of Indian
Divorce Act, 1869 a wife can apply for divorce if the husband has been guilty of
sodomy/bestiality. S. 377 if IPC arguably plays a crucial role in reprieve for a woman in relation
with a sodomite and can also redress marital rape (anal intercourse). Ergo, it affects the domain
of marriage and therefore cannot be done away with.
1.5 There has been no violation of A. 21
15. It is humbly submitted that as one of the basic Human Rights and an essential component of
right to life envisaged by Article 21, the right of privacy is not treated as absolute and is subject
to such action as may be lawfully taken for the prevention of Crime or disorder or protection of
health or morals or protection of rights and freedoms of others.19
16. It is humbly submitted that where there is a clash between two fundamental rights, namely Right
to Health20 and Right to Privacy21 which are given under Article 21 of the Constitution, the right
which would advance the public morality or public interest, would alone be enforced through the
process of Court.22
17. In this context, in the year 1989 (the Lucy R. D’Souze Case), a petition challenging Section 53(1)
(vii) of the Goa, Daman and Diu Public Health Act, 1985, which empowered the Government to
17
1987 AIR 990, 1987 SCR (2) 468
18
Pashim Banga Khet Mazdoor sanity v. State of West Bengal & Anr, 1989 (4) SCC 286.
19
Mr. X v. Hospital Z 1998 SUPP (1) SCR 723 ( Para 28)
20
Subash Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1991) 1 SCC 598
21
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, 2018 (12) SCALE 1
22
Mr. X v. Hospital Z, (1998) 8 SCC 296

isolate persons found to be positive for AIDS, was argued before the Bombay High Court. It was
contended by the Petitioner that the impugned provision violated fundamental rights protected
under Article 19. However, the Court, rejecting the argument, held that,
“Isolation, undoubtedly, has several serious consequences. It is an invasion upon the liberty of a
person. It can affect a person very adversely in many matters including economic. It can also
lead to social ostracization. But in matters like this individual rights has to be balanced the
public interest. In fact, liberty of an individual and public health are not opposed to each other
but are well in accord. Even if there is a conflict between the right of an individual and public
interest, the former must yield to the latter.”
18. It is submitted that the Court’s analysis must inform itself of whether the reasons adduced by the
State are sufficient to justify the infringement. Notably, the state possesses a wide margin of
appreciation in determining threats of public interests and developing an adequate response.
Indeed, this margin also extends to the rules prescribed to achieve a balance between the
competing interests and human rights.
23
19. Hospital Z , while interpreting right to privacy with regard sexual intimacy under A. 21
observed that it is “legally permissible, of two healthy bodies of opposite sexes” emblematizing
the privacy afforded in case of sexual intimacy is extended only sacrament of marriage between
opposite sexes. Ergo, this satisfies the dual test enunciated by the Supreme Court in two
landmark judgments viz. Puttuswamy I24 and Puttuswamy II25. In the Ritesh Sinha Judgement26,
the Supreme Court held that the fundamental right to privacy “must bow down to compelling
public interest”. Subject to the satisfaction of certain tests and benchmarks, a person’s privacy
interests can be overridden by competing state and individual interests.27
1.4 There is no violation of A. 19(1)(a)
20. It is submitted that the impugned provisions does not violate A. 19(1)(a) since A. 19(2) provides
a reasonable ground to impose restrictions on one’s Freedom of Speech and Expression and
allows state to impose restrictions on grounds of public order, decency, morality or any other
ground. The 42nd Law Commission Report had recommended the retention of Section 377
23
(1998) 8 SCC 296.
24
Justice K S Puttaswamy (Retd.), And Anr. v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
25
26
Ritesh Sinha vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 2003 of 2012, Para 24.
27

because the societal disapproval thereof is strong. Indian society considers homosexuality to be
repugnant, immoral and contrary to the cultural norms of the country. 28 The dissenting opinion
in Lawrence v. Texas 29given by J. Scalia and J. Thomas stated that promotion of majoritarian
sexual morality was a legitimate state interest.
In light of the reasonings and arguments afforded, contended and authorities cited, the
Respondent urges the Hon’ble Court to dismiss the petition in limine considering the
provision’s relevance and importance.
ISSUE 2: WHETHER OR NOT RIGHT TO SEXUALITY, RIGHT TO SEXUAL AUTONOMY AND

RIGHT TO CHOOSE A SEXUAL PARTNER IS A PART OF ART. 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDRAYUGA?
21. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Article 21 provides that the
right to life and liberty is subject to procedure prescribed by law. 30 The requirement of
substantive due process has been read into the Constitution of Indica through a combined
reading of Articles 14, 21 and 19 and it has been held as a test required to be satisfied while
28
Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation, (2014) 1 SCC 1.
29
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
30
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27.

judging the constitutionality of a statute.31The due process requirement was laid down by the
Supreme Court in the celebrated case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India32 which states that
apart from the prescription of some kind of procedure for curtailment of one’s right , the
procedure must be just and reasonable. Further, it must satisfy the requirements of other
provisions of the Constitution, like Articles 14 and 19. Section 4 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure Act, 1973 provides “All offences under the Indrayugan PenalCode (45 of 1860) shall
be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions
hereinafter contained.” Thus, the CrPC prescribes a fair procedure before any person committing
an offence u/s 377 IPC can be punished. Further, courts have come forward and held that “In
order to attract culpability u/s 377, it has to be established that: The accused had carnal
intercourse with man, woman or animal, such intercourse was against the order of nature, the act
of the accused was done voluntarily, and there was penetration.” 33 No uniform test can be culled
out to classify acts as “carnal intercourse against the order of nature” 34 and yet a reasonable, just
and fair procedure has been established for the implementation of Section 377. Further, as has
already been discussed, Section 377 does not violate Article 14 or 19 which is a requirement
under the test laid out in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India.35 Thus, it is contended that Section
377 follows a substantive due process that is reasonable and non-arbitrary and is thus not
violative of one’s Right to life and liberty.
22. The Constitution does not grant in specific and express terms any right to privacy as such. 36It has
merely been culled by the Supreme Court from Art. 21 and several other provisions of the
Constitution read with the Directive Principles of State Policy. 37The scope of the Right of
Privacy, as also the permissible limits upon its exercise, have been laid down in the case of
Kharak Singh v. State of UP and others38 which held “Our Constitution does not in terms confer
any like constitutional guarantee.” In Mr. X v. Hospital Z,39 it was held that Right to Privacy is
not absolute and is subject to such action as may be lawfully taken for the prevention of crime or
31
Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation, (2014) 1 SCC 1
32
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 AIR 597
33
Calvin Francis v. Orissa 1992 (2) Crimes 455.
34
Mihir alias Bhikari Charan Sahu v. State, Cri LJ 488
35
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 AIR 597
36
MP JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1168 (13th ed. 2021).
37
Ibid.
38
Kharak Singh v. State of UP and others, (1964) 1 SCR 332.
39
Mr. X v. Hospital Z,(1998) 8 SCC 296

disorder or protection of health or morals or protection of rights and freedoms of others. Nor
does it include the right to commit any offence as defined u/s 377 or any other section. Thus,
Right to Privacy is not absolute.
2.1 Right to Choose a Sexual Partner is not a part of Article 21
23. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that there is no fundamental right to
same-sex marriage. The non-violation of constitution by Section 377 of the Indrayugan Penal
Code, the petitioners cannot claim a fundamental right for same-sex marriage being recognized
under the laws of the country. The Centre informed that contrary to popular opinion in the case
of Navtej Singh Johar vs Union of India40, the Supreme Court had not legalised homosexuality.
24. Family issues are far beyond mere recognition and registration of marriage between persons
belonging to the same gender. Living together as partners and having sexual relationship by
same-sex individuals is not comparable with the Indrayung family unit concept of a husband, a
wife and children, which necessarily presuppose a biological man as a 'husband', a biological
woman as a 'wife' and the children born out of the union between the two. By and large, the
institution of marriage has a sanctity attached to it and in major parts of the country, it is
regarded as a sacrament. In our country, despite statutory recognition of the relationship of
marriage between a biological man and a biological woman, marriage necessarily depends upon
age-old customs, rituals, practices, cultural ethos, and societal values.
2.2. Right of sexual Autonomy not a fundamental right under Article 21
25. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that Section 377 of Indrayugan Penal
Code criminalises the acts of LGBTQ community. It disproportionately impacts them solely on
the basis of their sexual orientation. The provision does not runs counter with the constitution
under Article 21. There is constitutional tenet that can be said to be underlying theme of Indian
Constitution, it is that of ‘inclusiveness’. Indrayugan Constitution reflects the value deeply
ingrained in the society, nurtured over several generations. The inclusiveness that Indrayugan
society traditionally displayed literally, in every aspect of life, is manifest in recognizing a role
society for everyone. National Aids Control Organisation (NACO) states that the groups
identified to be at greater risk of acquiring and transmitting HIV infections due to a high level of
risky behaviour and insufficient capacity of power for decision making to protect themselves
from infection, generally described as ‘High Risk Groups’ (HRG), broadly include men who
40
AIR 2018 SC 4321; W. P. (Crl.) No. 76 of 2016; D. No. 14961/2016

have sex with men (MSM)41 , among others. HIV/AIDS is transmitted through the route of sex
and specifically that of sex by men-with-men. Out of the estimated 5 million people living with
HIV in Asia in 2007, 3,80,000 were those who had been newly affected. This significant
increase was attributed, amongst others, to “unprotected sex” in which unprotected anal sex
between men in stated to be a potential significant factor.42 Anal intercourse between two
homosexuals is a high risk activity, which exposes both the participating individuals to the risk
of HIV/AIDS, and this becomes even grave in case of a male bisexual having intercourse with a
female partner who may not even be aware of the activity of her partner and is yet exposes to
high risk of HIV/AIDS.43
26. The strategy for preventing further transmission of infection includes reinforcing the traditional
Indian moral values of abstinence, delayed sexual debut till marriage and fidelity among youth
and other impressionable groups of population.44
27. Article 21 guarantees right to life and personal liberty which encompasses right to privacy but
right to privacy is not absolute and is subject to restrictions based on public interest. 45 It is
subject to restriction by the state to promote compelling interest of the state 46. It is contended
that compelling state interest has already been proved.
28. A right to privacy was implicit in the due process clause of the Article 21 of the Constitution of
Indrayugan. This right did not extend to private, consensual sexual conduct, at least insofar as it
involved homosexual sex. The legal question as to whether the constitution confers "a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy”47 that the counsel opine this question
in the negative, stating that "to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is 'deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty is, at best,
facetious." And if petitioner’s submission is limited to the voluntary sexual conduct between
consenting adults, it would be difficult, except by fiat, to limit the claimed right to homosexual
conduct while leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes even
though they are committed in the home. To hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow
protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching.
41
National AIDS Control Organisation, Annual Report 2011-12, page 9
42
UN Report on Global AIDS Epidemic, 2008, pp 47-50.
43
National AIDS Control Organisation, Annual Report 2014-15.
44
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.7455 OF 2001, Reply Affidavit on Behalf of Respondents 4 and 5
45
Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 1378.
46
B.K. Parthasarathi vs Government of A.P. And Others, 2000 (1) ALD 199.
47
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).

29. The Constitution does not confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.
None of the fundamental rights announced in this Court's prior cases involving family
relationships, marriage, or procreation bear any resemblance to the right asserted in this case.
And any claim that those cases stand for the proposition that any kind of private sexual conduct
between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription is unsupportable.
There should be great resistance to expand the reach of the due process clauses to cover new
fundamental rights. Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily would take upon itself further authority
to govern the country without constitutional authority. The claimed right in this case falls far
short of overcoming this resistance. Sodomy laws should not be invalidated on the asserted basis
that majority belief that sodomy is immoral is an inadequate rationale to support the laws.
Respondent urges the Hon’ble Court to declare that Right to Sexuality, Right to Choose sexual
partner and Right to Sexual Autonomy does not fall under the ambit of Article 21.
ISSUE 3: WHETHER OR NOT RIGHT TO MARRY A PERSON OF THE SAME SEX

SHOULD BE HELD A PART OF A. 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDRAYUGA?
30. It is humbly submitted that right to marry a person of same sex is not a fundamental right under
A. 21 since [i] right to marry is afforded to heterosexual partners alone, [ii] state has a legitimate
inherent interest in the institution of marriage, and [iii] same sex relations are penalised under S.
377 of Indrayug Penal Code and thus causes illegality.
3.1. That right to marry a person of same sex is not a fundamental right
31. It is humbly submitted that marriages and weddings have a strong religious and cultural
significance as well as social importance. Marriage is considered to be a sacrament and the
religious ceremonies are an essential part of the marriage. 48 Christians, Muslims and Hindus have
48
B.N. Sampath, Hindu Marriage as a Samskara: A resolvable conundrum, 3(3) J. Ind. L. Inst. 319-331 (1991).

different laws in relation to marriage, succession etc. The Hindu Marriage Act that governs
Hindus, Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists states that a marriage may be solemnised between any two
Hindus.49 It also specifically provides that the bridegroom should have attained the age of twenty
one and the bride eighteen. 50 The Christian Marriage Act provides that the age of the man shall
be twenty one and the age of the woman eighteen. 51 Since Muslim marriages are not governed by
a statute, there is no statutory definition of ‘marriage’, but they are normally considered to be a
contract for the purpose of procreation. 52 Thus, all Indian personal laws appear to envisage
marriage as only a heterosexual union.
i. State has legitimate interest to define marriage
32. It is humbly submitted the Supreme Court of America in Windsor53 has reasoned that the state
historically had this power of defining marriage and should continue having it so that it can
protect its interest in domestic relations within the state and holding “The definition of marriage
is the foundation of the State’s broader authority to regulate the subject of domestic relations
with respect to the “[p]rotection of offspring, property interests, and the enforcement of marital
responsibilities.”” while quoting Williams v. North Carolina54. Ergo, in Windsor55, the Supreme
Court explained that the State has an interest in defining marriage as a way to regulate its
interests regarding children, property, and marital responsibilities.
ii. Personal laws cannot be challenged under Part III of Constitution
33. The Hon’ble Court in State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali 56 has observed that since the issues
related to personal law fall under item 5 in the concurrent List III, it is competent only for the
State or the Legislature to legislate upon them. The Court further observed that the framers of the
Constitution did not intend to include personal laws within the expression “laws in force” since
they did not want them to be challenged with respect to fundamental rights. Considering this
view, the constitutional validity of the practices of marriage, divorce and maintenance in personal
law cannot be challenged.57
49
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, S. 5.
50
Id.
51
Christian Marriage Act, 1872, S. 60
52
Siddharth Narrain & Birsha Ohdedar, A legal perspective on Same-Sex Marriage and other Queer relationships in
India, Orinam, https://orinam.net/resources-for/law-and-enforcement/ same-sex-marriage-in-india/.
53
133 S. Ct. at 2691.
54
317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942).
55
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013).
56
AIR 1952 Bom. 84.
57
Art. 136, Constitution of India, 1950.

34. Therefore, it is humbly submitted by the Petitioner that the foundational source of personal law
are their respective scriptures. They do not derive their validity from any legislative authority.
Ergo, marital laws are not amenable to fundamental rights being distinct from “customs and
usage” under A. 13.
iii. Personal laws cannot be re-written for the purposes of social reform
35. It is submitted that social reform is to be brought gradually in the community keeping in view
that such community is ready for the reform. The exception to the Freedom of Religion as
provided in Article 25(2) enabling the state to make laws for “social welfare and reform” cannot
enable the legislature to “reform” a religion out of its existence or identity.58
36. Further, in the case of X v. Hospital Z 59, the Supreme Court of India while interpreting marriage
as part of ‘right to privacy’ under article 21 of the Constitution, observed that “marriage is the
sacred union, legally permissible, of two healthy bodies of opposite sexes.” The judgment shows
the traditional concept of the marriage as constituting heterosexual union. One of the grounds
under which the Hindu marriage may be annulled or declared nullity is the failure of
consummation owing to the impotence of the respondent. The standard for potency is
penetration. Heterosexual penetration is the standard that legitimizes marriage with
consummation as the corporeal yoke linking law and marriage to be invariably instantiated
through vera copula or the true consummation of bodies in heterosexual penetration. 60 Such
dictums and prerequisites cannot be attained in same sex marriages and thus, justiciable to be
excluded from right to marry under A. 21.
37. In State v. Heffelman61, the Court establishes that when a statute is plain and unambiguous, the
court must give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed, rather than determine what
the law should or should not be. The legislative intent is clear and unambiguous by the usage of
pronouns “He” and “She” and terms like “husband”, “wife”, “bride”, and “groom” indicates
towards a heterosexual union.
3.2. State has inherent interest in the institution of Marriage
58
Sardar Sydena Taher Saifuddin Sahed v. State of Bombay, AIR 1962 SC 853.
59
(1998) 8 SCC 296.
60
Srimati Basu, The Trouble with Marriage: Feminists Confront Law and Violence in India 74 (University of
California Press, 2015).
61
256 Kan. 384, 886 P.2d 823 (1994).

38. It is humbly submitted that in DeBoer v. Snyder62 expressed the belief that “[o]ne starts from the
premise that governments got into the business of defining marriage, and remain in the business
of defining marriage, not to regulate love but to regulate sex, most especially the intended and
unintended effects of male-female intercourse.”
39. It is humbly submitted that after divorce, a state must protect parental rights, due to the fact that it
has interest in protecting and maximizing child welfare through a system ensuring visitation and
child support.63 Marital relationship affects more state interests than just child welfare. It affects
the state’s interests in property, taxation, and healthcare, and it accommodates for the differing
benefits and sacrifices that people make when they build a life with one another. One of the
prominent cases where state interest in regulating marital relations was articulated clearly
is Pennoyer v. Neff, where the court observed that the state has “absolute right to prescribe the
conditions upon which the marriage relation between its citizens shall be created and the causes
for which it may be dissolved.”64 State interest in regulating marriage was closely associated with
the societal empathy about marriage as the appropriate institution for the procreation and rearing
of children.65
40. Arguably the most important state interest in marriage is the effect that marriage and divorce
have on children and parental rights. “In virtually every comparison done to date, children in
two-biological parent, marital homes (the ‘nuclear family’) fare better than other children, along
almost every index.”66
i. Courts cannot supplant its own interpretation over the text of scriptures
41. It is humbly submitted that Court has on making occasions refrained from making
pronouncements to interpret religious scriptures. It has been held that Articles 25 and 26 protect
the essential part of religion and that when a question arises as to what constitutes essential part
62
772 F.3d 388, 404 (6th Cir. 2014).
63
Maggie Gallagher, Rites, Rights, and Social Institutions: Why and How Should the Law Support Marriage?, 18
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 225, 225 (2004) (citing Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)).
64
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); Simms v. Simms, 175 US 162 (1899).
65
In Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1043 9th Cir. 1982 (male couples sought recognition of their marriage, but
it was refused on the ground that homosexual couples can never procreate). See L.D. Borten, “Sex, Procreation, and
the State Interest in Marriage” 102(4) Columbia Law Review 1091 (2002); W.C. Duncan, “The State Interests in
Marriage” 2(1) Ave Maria Law Review 155 (2004).
66
Kimberly A. Yuracko, Does Marriage Make People Good or Do Good People Marry, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
889 (2005) (citing Robin Fretwell Wilson, Evaluating Marriage: Does Marriage Matter to the Nurturing of
Children?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 847, 851–52 (2005) (“[This research was based on studies] in two types of
married and unmarried households: those in which the child is a biological child of both adults and those in which
the child is the biological child of only one.”)).

of religion, the same should primarily be ascertained with reference to the Doctrines of that
religion itself.67
42. In Aga Mohamad Jaffer Bindanim v. Koolsoom Beebee & Ors.68 the Court held that it would be
wrong for the Court on a point of this kind to attempt to put their own construction on the Koran
in opposition to the express ruling of commentators of such great antiquity and high authority.69
I.3. Same sex relations (carnal intercourse) are punishable under S. 377 of IPC
43. It is humbly submitted that S. 377 which punishes unnatural intercourse “against the order of
nature” and is punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment which may extend up to
ten years and is a cognizable and non-bailable offence.70 Ergo, where such a union would result
into illegality, such unions cannot be recognized under A. 21 due to the presence of “due
procedure established by law”.
44. It is submitted that the due process requirement was laid down by the Supreme Court in the
celebrated case of Maneka Gandhi v Union of India71 which states that apart from the
prescription of some kind of procedure for curtailment of one’s right, the procedure must be just
and reasonable. It is not an absolute right, and is subject to some restraints evolved by the
judiciary.
45. Mere discrimination or inequality of treatment does not amount to discrimination within the
ambit of Article 14.72 For an act not to violate Article 14, there must not be any substantive
unreasonableness73 in it, it should not be manifestly arbitrary,74 and it should fulfil the following
two conditions: (a) intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped
together from other left out in the group.75 This is done by examining the purpose and policy of
the act, which can be ascertained from its title, preamble76 and provisions.77 (b) rational nexus78
67
The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur
Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282.
68
(1898) ILR 25 Cal. 9.
69
Baker Ali Khan v. Anjuman Ara Begum, 30 I.A. 94. See also, Baqar Ali v. Anjuman (1902) 25 All. 236.
70
Fazal Rab Choudhary v. State of Bihar, 1983 Cr. L.J 632 (S.C.); Childline India Foundation v. Allan John Waters,
2011 2 Cri. L.J. 2305 (S.C.).
71
Supra note 4
72
D.D. BASU, SHORTER CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 62, (13th ed., vol. 1, 2001).
73
Bidhannagar (Salt Lake) Welfare Assn. v. Central Valuation Board and Ors., AIR 2007 SC 2276.
74
Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Bombay Environmental Action Group, AIR 2006 SC 1489.
75
Pathumma v. State of Kerala, AIR 1979 SC 771.
76
Kausha PN v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 1457.
77
P. B. Roy v. Union of India, AIR 1972 SC 908.
78
Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of W.B, AIR 1953 SC 404.

that connects the object sought to be achieved by the act with the intelligible differentia
ascertained in (a).79 All of the aforementioned arguments have already been substantiated in the
Issue I dealing with the constitutional viability of S. 377 of IPC.
46. Right to life further includes the right to lead a healthy life so as to enjoy all faculties of human
body in their prime conditions.80 The plea for de-criminalization of same-sex relationships would
lead to an increase in the sexual diseases and would in itself constitute a violation of Art. 21 by
allowing an unnatural course of sex in the name of pleasure.
47. The State has a duty under Directive principles of State Policy, particularly clauses (e ) and (f) of
Article 39 and Articles 41 and 42 for the protection of the health and strength of men and women
to and of children to develop in a healthy manner. Art. 21 derives its life breadth from the
directives.81 Adoptive children to gay parents or children born through IVF, might miss
opportunities of “normalcy” and also their biological mother or father in the process. In addition,
the Hon’ble Court in Lily Thomas and Ors. v. Union of India 82 held that the court has no power to
give directions for enforcement of Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV of the
Constitution which included Art. 44.
48. To be a part of Art. 21, it needs to be fundamental and a basic requirement such that without
which the existence of life would be in peril. 83 The non-allowance of a marriage does not affect
the rights to marry or the right to marry of one’s choice. It is for the public interest that it restricts
relations with same sex partners. It places a boundary which is not fundamental to life.
49. Marriage Laws in Indrayuga are not discriminatory in nature. Special Marriage Act was
formulated with the objective to provide a special form of marriage in certain cases for inter caste
marriages and inter-religion marriages. It is a secular legislation that facilitates marriages
between people of different religions or those who do not wish to be bound by their personal
laws. Instead of a religious ceremony, a Marriage Officer registers the marriage. 84 The object of
the broad legislation in the context can be understood from Section 4(c) of the Act. It states
conditions relating to solemnization of any two persons if the male has completed age of twenty-
79
Hanif v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731.
80
Sunil batra v Delhi Administration, AIR 1978 SC 1675
81
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India, 1984 AIR 802
82
(2000) 6 SCC 224.
83
Ramlila Maidan Incident v Home Secretary, Union of India
84
Thomas John v. Joseph Thomas AIR (2000) KER 408

one years and the age of female is eighteen years, clearly notifying the genders for the required
union. There is no mention regarding same-sex marriages.
50. Art. 21 does not place an absolute embargo in the deprivation of life or personal liberty. If such a
deprivation is according to the procedure established by law which is fair, just and reasonable, as
in this case, then it is not considered a violation. Its deprivation cannot be extended matters
which have an insidious effect on public moral or public order.85
Respondent urges the Hon’ble Court to declare that Right to marry a person of same sex is not
a fundamental right under Article 21 as it is against public order and affect the livelihood
ceiling under Right to Life.
85
M J Shivani v State of Karnataka & Ors

P RAYER
WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF ARGUMENTS ADVANCED AND AUTHORITIES CITED, THE
RESPONDENT HUMBLY SUBMITS THAT THIS HON’BLE COURT MAY BE PLEASED TO ADJUDGE AND
DECLARE THAT:
1. HOLD THE PETITION NOT MAINTAINABLE;

2. DECLARE SECTION 377 OF INDRAYUGA PENAL CODE IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND ERGO, VALID;
3. DECLARE THE RIGHT TO SEXUALITY, RIGHT TO SEXUAL AUTONOMY, AND RIGHT TO
CHOOSE A SEXUAL PARTNER IS NOT A PART OF A. 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDRAYUGA;
4. DECLARE RIGHT TO MARRY A PERSON OF THE SAME SEX IS NOT PART OF A. 21 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDRAYUGA.
AND/ OR
PASS ANY OTHER ORDER, DIRECTION, OR RELIEF THAT IT MAY DEEM FIT IN THE BEST INTERESTS
OF JUSTICE, FAIRNESS, EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE. FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS, THE
SHALL FOREVER PRAY.
SD/-
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT


TM1209 - Respondent

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

TM1209 - Respondent

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

TM1209 - Respondent

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

INLR AND R U G G L E P A R T N E R S 1 S T I N T E R N A T I O N A L O N L I N E M O O T C O U R T C O M P E T I T I O N 2021

TEAM CODE: TM1209

I N T HE H ON ’ BLE S UPREME C OURT OF I NDRAYUGA

W.P. No. ______ / 2018.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of Indrayuga)

NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR & ANR.

UNION OF INDRAYUGA & ORS. ……

As Submitted to The Chief Justice & other Companion Judges of the

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

-M E M O R I A L AND P L E A D I NGS ON B E HAL F OF T HE RESPONDENT-

TOPIC PAGE NO.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS iii

ABBREVIATIONS FULL FORM

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

1. Indian Penal Code, 1860.

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

19. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 AIR 597.

1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th Ed., 1990).

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

WHETHER OR NOT RIGHT TO SEXUALITY, RIGHT TO SEXUAL AUTONOMY AND RIGHT TO

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

ISSUE 2: WHETHER OR NOT RIGHT TO SEXUALITY, RIGHT TO SEXUAL AUTONOMY AND

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

ARGUMENTS & PLEADINGS ADVANCED

W.P. No. ______ / 2018.

1.1 That Article 14 has not been violated

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

ii. Rational nexus between classification and objective sought

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

iii. The impugned provision is not arbitrary

1.4 That Article 15 has not been violated

i. It is not disproportionate or discriminatory

ii. There is legitimate and compelling state interest

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

ISSUE 2: WHETHER OR NOT RIGHT TO SEXUALITY, RIGHT TO SEXUAL AUTONOMY AND

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

ISSUE 3: WHETHER OR NOT RIGHT TO MARRY A PERSON OF THE SAME SEX

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

3.2. State has inherent interest in the institution of Marriage

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT- 2

WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF ARGUMENTS ADVANCED AND AUTHORITIES CITED, THE

1. HOLD THE PETITION NOT MAINTAINABLE;

CONSTITUTION AND ERGO, VALID;

3. DECLARE THE RIGHT TO SEXUALITY, RIGHT TO SEXUAL AUTONOMY, AND RIGHT TO

CHOOSE A SEXUAL PARTNER IS NOT A PART OF A. 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF