A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism - Hans-Hermann Hoppe

A Theory of
Socialism and
Capitalism
Economics, Politics,
and Ethics
Hans-Hermann Hoppe
Department of Economics
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Hoppe, Hans-Hermann.
A theory of socialism and capitalism : economics, politics, and
ethics / by Hans-Hermann Hoppe.
p. cm.
Includes index.
ISBN 0-89838-279-3
1. Socialism. 2. Capitalism. 3. Property 4. Comparative
economics. 5. Comparative government. I. Title.
HX73.H67 1988
3O6'.3»dcl9 88-14066
CIP
Copyright © 1989 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or other-
wise, without the prior written permission of the publisher, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 101
Philip Drive, Assinippi Park, Norwell, Massachusetts 02061.
Printed in the United States of America

Contents
About the Author vii
Acknowledgments ix
1 Introduction 1
2 Property, Contract, Aggression, Capitalism, Socialism 7
3 Socialism Russian Style 19
4 Socialism Social-Democratic Style 39
5 The Socialism of Conservatism 65
6 The Socialism of Social Engineering and the

Foundations of Economic Analysis 95
7 The Ethical Justification of Capitalism and

Why Socialism is Morally Indefensible 127
8 The Socio-Psychological Foundations of Socialism
or the Theory of the State 145
9 Capitalist Production and the Problem of Monopoly 167
10 Capitalist Production and the Problem of Public Goods . . . .187
Notes 211
References 259
Index 273
About the Author
Hans-Hermann Hoppe was born on September 2,1949, in Peine, West

Germany. He attended the Universitatet des Saarlandes, Saarbruecken, the
Goethe-Universitaet, Frankfurt/M., and the University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor, for studies in Philosophy, Sociology, History, and Economics. He
earned his Ph.D. (Philosophy, 1974) and his "Habilitation" (Sociology and
Economics, 1981), both from the Goethe-Universitaet, Frankfurt/M.
He taught at several German universities as well as at the Johns Hop-

kins University Bologna Center for Advanced International Studies, Bolog-
na, Italy. He is presently a Professor of Economics at the University of
Nevada, Las Vegas and a Senior Fellow of the Ludwig von Mises Institute.
Hoppe is the author of Handeln und Erkennen (Bern 1976); Kritik der
kausalwissenschaftlichen Sozialforschung (Opladen 1983); Eigentum,
Anarchie und Staat (Opladen 1987) and numerous articles on philosophy,
economics and the social sciences.
Acknowledgements
Three Institutions assisted me while I wrote this treatise. As a Heisen-

berg Scholar I enjoyed the most generous financial support from the Ger-
man Science Foundation (DFG) from 1982 through 1986. The present study
is the most recent work I completed during this period. Additional support
came from the Johns Hopkins University Bologna Center for Advanced In-
ternational Studies, where I spent the academic year 1984-1985 as a Visit-
ing Professor. The lectures delivered there provided the core of what is
presented here. Finally, during the academic year 1985/86, when my re-
search took on its present form and which I spent in New York City, I received
the most unbureaucratic and cordial help from the Center for Libertarian
Studies.
My wife Margaret gave unflagging emotional support for my work. She

also took on the task, often enough against my stubborn resistance, of edit-
ing my writing in a foreign language.
My deepest gratitude is to my teacher and friend Murray N. Rothbard.

To his scholarly and personal example I owe more than I can properly ex-
press. He read an earlier draft of the study and provided me with invaluable
comments. Innumerous discussions with him were a never ending source
of inspiration and his enthusiasm was a constant encouragement.
To these people and institutions I owe a sincere "thank you."

A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism
1
INTRODUCTION
A he following study on the economics, politics and morals of socialism

and capitalism is a systematic treatise on political theory. Interdisciplinary
in scope, it will discuss the central problems of political economy and politi-
cal philosophy: how to organize society so as to promote the production
of wealth and eradicate poverty, and how to arrange it so as to make it a
just social order.
But in doing this I will also constantly touch upon and illuminate social
and political problems in the narrower, more common sense of these terms.
In fact, it is one of the major goals of this treatise to develop and explain the
conceptual and argumentative tools, economic and moral, needed to
analyze and evaluate any kind of empirical social or political system, to un-
derstand or appraise any process of social change, and to explain or inter-
pret similarities as well as differences in the social structure of any two or
more different societies.
At the end of the treatise it should be clear that only by means of a theory,
economic or moral, which is not itself derived from experience but rather
starts from a logically incontestable statement (which is something very dif-
ferent from an "arbitrarily postulated axiom") and proceeds in a purely
deductive way (perhaps using some explicitly introduced empirical and em-
pirically testable assumption, in addition) to results which are themselves
logically unassailable (and thus require no empirical testing whatsoever),
will it become possible to organize or interpret an otherwise chaotic, over-
ly complex array of unconnected, isolated facts or opinions about social
reality to form a true, coherent economic or moral conceptual system.
Hopefully it will be demonstrated that without such a theory, political
economy and philosophy can be considered nothing other than groping in

A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism:
Economics, Politics, and Ethics
the dark, producing, at best, arbitrary opinions on what might have caused
this or that, or what is better or worse than something else: opinions, that
is, whose opposites can generally be defended as easily as the original posi-
tions themselves (which is to say that they cannot be defended in any strict
sense at all!).
Specifically, a theory of property and property rights will be developed.

It will be demonstrated that socialism, by no means an invention of
nineteenth century Marxism but much older, must be conceptualized as an
institutionalized interference with or aggression against private property and
private property claims. Capitalism, on the other hand, is a social system
based on the explicit recognition of private property and of nonaggressive,
contractual exchanges between private property owners. Implied in this
remark, as will become clear in the course of this treatise, is the belief that
there must then exist varying types and degrees of socialism and capitalism,
i.e., varying degrees to which private property rights are respected or ig-
nored. Societies are not simply capitalist or socialist. Indeed, all existing
societies are socialist to some extent. (Even the United States, certainly a
society that is relatively more capitalist than most others, is, as will become
apparent, amazingly socialist and has gradually become more so overtime.)
One goal then, is to demonstrate that the overall degree of socialism,
i.e., the overall degree of interference with property rights that exists in a
given country, explains its overall wealth. The more socialist a country, the
more hampered will be the process of production of new and the upkeep of
old, existing wealth, and the poorer the country will remain or become. 1 The
fact that the United States is, by and large, richer than Western Europe, and
West Germany much richer than East Germany can be explained by their
lesser degree of socialism, as can the fact that Switzerland is more
prosperous than Austria, or that England, in the nineteenth century the
richest country in the world, has now fallen to what is aptly called an under-
INTRODUCTION
developing country.
But the concern here will not be exclusively with the overall wealth ef-
fects, nor with the economic side of the problem alone. For one thing, in
analyzing different types of socialism for which there exist real, historical ex-
amples (examples which, to be sure, very often are not called socialism, but
are given a more appealing name 2 ), it is important to explain why, and in
what way, every intervention anywhere, big or small, here or there, produces
a particular disruptive effect on the social structure which a superficial,
theoretically untrained observer, blinded by an immediate "positive" conse-
quence of a particular intervention, might not perceive. Yet this negative ef-
fect nonetheless exists, and with some delay will cause problems at a
different place in the social fabric more numerous or severe than the ones
originally solved by the initial act of intervening. Thus, for instance, highly
visible positive effects of socialist policies such as "cheap food prices," "low
rents," "free" this and "free" that, are not just positive things hanging in mid-
air, unconnected to everything else, but rather are phenomena that have to
be paid for somehow: by less and lower quality food, by housing shortages,
decay and slums, by queuing up and corruption, and, further, by lower living
standards, reduced capital-formation, and/or increased capital consump-
tion. And a much less conspicuous but almost always "positively" men-
tioned fact-a greater feeling of solidarity among the people, the greater
value attached to things like family, relatives, or friends, which is found to
exist between, for instance, the East Germans as compared to their more
"individualistic," egoistic West/German counterparts-is again not a simple,
isolated, unanalyzable fact. Such feelings are the result of a social system
of constant shortages and of continually repressed opportunities to improve
one's situation by one's own means. In East Germany, in order to ac-
complish the most simple routine tasks, such as a house repair which in
other countries requires no more than a telephone call, you simply must rely
more heavily on "personal" relations (as compared to impersonal business
relations); and where someone's "public" life is under constant observation
by "society," you simply have to go private.
Analyzed in some detail are the particular disruptive effects that are
produced: (1) by a traditional Marxist policy of nationalizing or socializing
the means of production, or rather, by the expropriation of private owners
of means of production; (2) by a revisionist, social-democratic policy of
egalitarian income redistribution; (3) by a conservatively minded policy of
attempting to preserve the status quo through economic and behavioral
regulations and price controls; and (4) by a technocratically minded sys-
tem of pragmatic, piecemeal social and economic engineering and inter-
vention.
These policy types, which will be analyzed sequentially, are not com-
pletely homogeneous and mutually exclusive. Each one can be carried
through to varying degrees, there are different ways of doing things under
each of these categories of policy and the different policy schemes can be
combined to a certain extent. In fact, every given society is a mixture of all
of them as it is the result of diverse political forces which have varied at dif-
ferent times in strength and influence. The reason for analyzing them
separately (apart from the obvious one that not all problems can be dis-
cussed at once) is that they constitute policy schemes associated with clear-
ly distinguishable social groups, movements, parties, etc., and that each
policy scheme affects overall wealth in a somewhat different way.
And socialism will by no means be analyzed solely from an economic

point of view. Of course, socialism, especially its Marxist or so-called "scien-
tific" brand, has always pretended to be an economically superior organiza-
tion of society (apart from all of its other alleged qualities) compared to the
so-called "anarchy of production" of capitalism3. But socialism does not
INTRODUCTION
collapse once it is demonstrated that in fact the opposite is true and it brings
impoverishment, not wealth. Certainly, socialism loses much of its attrac-
tiveness for most people once this is understood. However, it is definitely
not at its argumentative end so long as it can claim-whatever its economic
performance may be-that it represents a higher morality, that it is more just,
that it has an ethically superior foundation.
Hopefully however, by a close analysis of the theory of property implicit

in the different versions of socialism, this treatise will make clear that noth-
ing could be farther from the truth. It will be demonstrated that the proper-
ty theory implicit in socialism does not normally pass even the first decisive
test (the necessary if not sufficient condition) required of rules of human
conduct which claim to be morally justified or justifiable. This test, as for-
mulated in the so-called golden rule or, similarly, in the Kantian categorical
imperative, requires that in order to be just, a rule must be a general one
applicable to every single person in the same way. The rule cannot specify
different rights or obligations for different categories of people (one for the
red- headed, and one for others, or one for women and a different one for
men), as such a "particularistic" rule, naturally, could never, not even in prin-
ciple, be accepted as a fair rule by everyone. Particularistic rules, however,
of the type "I can hit you, but you are not allowed to hit me," are, as will be-
come clear in the course of this treatise, at the very base of all practiced
forms of socialism. Not only economically but in the field of morals, too,
socialism turns out to be an ill-conceived system of social organization.
Again, in spite of its bad public reputation, it is capitalism, a social system
based squarely on the recognition of private property and of contractual
relations between owners of private property, that wins outright. It will be
demonstrated that the property theory implicit in capitalism not only passes
the first test of "universalization" but it turns out to be the logical precondi-
tion (die Bedingung der Moeglichkeit) of any kind of argumentative jus-
tification: Whoever argues in favor of anything, and in particular in favor of

certain norms as being fair, must, implicitly at least, presuppose the validity
of the property norms implicit in capitalism. To deny their validity as norms
of universal acceptability and argue in favor of socialism is thus self-con-
tradictory.
The reconstruction of the morals of private property and its ethical jus-
tification then leads to a reevaluation of socialism and, as it turns out, the in-
stitution of the state, depending as it does for its very existence on taxation
and forced membership (citizenship), as the very incorporation of socialist
ideas on property. Without any solid economic or moral reasons for their
existence, socialism and the state are then reduced to and will be explained
as phenomena of merely socio-psychological relevance.
Led by such considerations, the discussion finally returns to economics.

The concluding chapters deal with the constructive task of explaining the
workings of a pure capitalist social order as the morally and economically
required alternative to socialism. More specifically, they will be devoted to
an analysis of how a social system based on a private property ethics would
come to grips with the problem of monopoly and the production of so-called
"public goods," and in particular with the production of security, i.e., of
police and judicial services. It will be argued that, contrary to much that has
been written in the economics literature on monopoly and public goods,
neither problem exists or, if they did exist, would still not suffice in any mean-
ingful sense to prove any economic deficiency in a pure market system.
Rather, a capitalist order always, without exception and necessarily so,
provides in the most efficient way for the most urgent wants of voluntary
consumers, including the areas of police and the courts. With this construc-
tive task completed, the argument will have been brought full circle, and the
demolition of the intellectual credibility of socialism, morally and economi-
cally, should be complete.
2
PROPERTY, CONTRACT, AGGRESSION,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM
O e f o r e advancing to the more exciting field of analyzing diverse policy

schemes from the standpoint of economic theory and political philosophy,
it is essential to introduce and explain the basic concepts used throughout
the following study. Indeed, the concepts explained in this chapter-the con-
cepts of property, contract, aggression, capitalism and socialism-are so
basic, so fundamental, that one cannot even avoid making use of them, if
at times only implicitly. Unfortunately, though, the very fact that in analyz-
ing any kind of human action and/or any kind of interpersonal relationship
one must make use of these concepts does not imply that everyone has a
precise understanding of them. It seems instead to be the other way around.
Because the concept of property, for instance, is so basic that everyone
seems to have some immediate understanding of it, most people never think
about it carefully and can, as a consequence, produce at best a very vague
definition. But starting from imprecisely stated or assumed definitions and
building a complex network of thought upon them can lead only to intellec-
tual disaster. For the original imprecisions and loopholes will then pervade
and distort everything derived from them. To avoid this the concept of
property must first be clarified.
Next to the concept of action, property is the most basic category in the
social sciences. As a matter of fact, all other concepts to be introduced in
this chapter-aggression, contract, capitalism and socialism-are definable
in terms of property: aggression being aggression against property, con-
tract being a nonaggressive relationship between property owners,
socialism being an institutionalized policy of aggression against property,
and capitalism being an institutionalized policy of the recognition of proper-
ty and contractual ism.
Let us start with an elucidation of the precondition necessary for the

concept of property to emerge. 1 For a concept of property to arise, there
must be a scarcity of goods. Should there be no scarcity, and should all
goods be so-called "free goods" whose use by any one person for any one
purpose would not in any way exclude (or interfere with or restrict) its use
by any other person or for any other purpose, then there would be no need
for property. If, let us say, due to some paradisiac superabundance of
bananas, my present consumption of bananas does not in any way reduce
my own future supply (possible consumption) of bananas, nor the present
or the future supply of bananas for any other person, then the assignment
of property rights, here with respect to bananas, would be superfluous. To
develop the concept of property, it is necessary for goods to be scarce, so
that conflicts over the use of these goods can possibly arise. It is the func-
tion of property rights to avoid such possible clashes over the use of scarce
resources by assigning rights of exclusive ownership. Property is thus a
normative concept: a concept designed to make a conflict-free interaction
possible by stipulating mutually binding rules of conduct (norms) regarding
scarce resources.2 It does not need much comment to see that there is in-
deed scarcity of goods, of all sorts of goods, everywhere, and the need for
property rights is thus evident. As a matter of fact, even if we were to as-
sume that we lived in the Garden of Eden, where there was a superabun-
dance of everything needed not only to sustain one's life but to indulge in
every possible comfort by simply stretching out one's hand, the concept of
property would necessarily have to evolve. For even under these "ideal" cir-
cumstances, every person's physical body would still be a scarce resource
and thus the need for the establishment of property rules, i.e., rules regard-
ing people's bodies, would exist. One is not used to thinking of one's own
body in terms of a scarce good, but in imagining the most ideal situation
one could ever hope for, the Garden of Eden, it becomes possible to real-
PROPERTY, CONTRACT, AGGRESSION, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM 9
ize that one's body is indeed the prototype of a scarce good for the use of
which property rights, i.e., rights of exclusive ownership, somehow have to
be established, in order to avoid clashes.
As a matter of fact, as long as a person acts, 3 i.e., as long as a person

intentionally tries to change a state of affairs that is subjectively perceived
and evaluated as less satisfactory into a state that appears more rewarding,
this action necessarily involves a choice regarding the use of this person's
body. And choosing, preferring one thing or state over another, evidently
implies that not everything, not all possible pleasures or satisfactions, can
be had at one and the same time, but rather that something considered less
valuable must be given up in order to attain something else considered to
be more valuable.4 Thus choosing always implies the incurrence of costs:
foregoing possible enjoyments because the means needed to attain them
are scarce and are bound up in some alternative use which promises returns
valued more highly than the opportunities forfeited.5 Even in the Garden of
Eden I could not simultaneously eat an apple, smoke a cigarette, have a
drink, climb up a tree, read a book, build a house, play with my cat, drive a
car, etc. I would have to make choices and could do things only sequen-
tially. And this would be so because there is only one body that I can use
to do these things and enjoy the satisfaction derived from doing them. I do
not have a superabundance of bodies which would allow me to enjoy all
possible satisfactions simultaneously, in one single bliss. And I would be
restrained by scarcity in another respect as well: as long as this scarce
resource "body" is not indestructible and is not equipped with eternal health
and energy, but rather is an organism with only a limited life span, time is
scarce, too. The time used up in pursuing goal A reduces the time left to
pursue other goals. And the longer it takes to reach a desired result, the
higher the costs involved in waiting will be, and the higher the expected satis-
faction must be in order to justify these costs.
10 A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism:
Thus, because of the scarcity of body and time, even in the Garden of
Eden property regulations would have to be established. Without them, and
assuming now that more than one person exists, that their range of action
overlaps, and that there is no preestablished harmony and synchronization
of interests among these persons, conflicts over the use of one's own body
would be unavoidable. I might, for instance, want to use my body to enjoy
drinking a cup of tea, while someone else might want to start a love affair
with it, thus preventing me from having my tea and also reducing the time
left to pursue my own goals by means of this body. In order to avoid such
possible clashes, rules of exclusive ownership must be formulated. In fact,
so long as there is action, there is a necessity for the establ ishment of proper-
ty norms.
To keep things simple and free of distracting details let us continue to

assume, for another stretch of analysis, that we indeed inhabit a Garden of
Eden, where exclusively one's body, its standing room, and time are scarce
resources. What can the prototype of a scarce good, a person's body, tell
us about property and its conceptual derivatives?
While even in a world with only one type of scarce resource all sorts of
norms regulating exclusive ownership with respect to scarce means are
conceivable in principle (for example, a rule such as "On Mondays I deter-
mine to which uses our bodies can be put, on Tuesdays you determine their
use," etc.), it is certain that not all of them would in fact have the same chance
of being proposed and accepted. It then seems to be best to start one's
analysis with the property norm, which would most likely be accepted by
the inhabitants of Eden as the "natural position" regarding the assignment
of rights of exclusive ownership in bodies. To be sure, at this stage of the
argument we are not yet concerned with ethics, with the problem of the
moral justification of norms. Thus, while it can well be admitted from the
very outset that I am indeed going to argue later on that the natural position
is the only morally defendable one, and while I am also convinced that it is
the natural one because it is morally defendable, at this stage, natural does
not imply any moral connotation. It is simply meant to be a socio-
psychological category used to indicate that this position would probably
find the most support in public opinion. Indeed, its naturalness is reflected
by the very fact that in talking about bodies, it is almost impossible to avoid
using possessive (possession-indicating) expressions as well. A body is
normally referred to as a specific person's body: my body, yours, his, etc.
(and, incidentally, the same is done whenever one speaks of actions!); and
one does not have the slightest problem distinguishing what is mine, yours,
etc.; clearly, in doing so, one is assigning property-titles and distinguishing
between proper owners of scarce resources.
What, then, is the natural position regarding property implicit in one's

natural way of speaking about bodies? Every person has the exclusive right
of ownership of his body within the boundaries of its surface. Every person
can put his body to those uses that he thinks best for his immediate or long-
run interest, well-being, or satisfaction, as long as he does not interfere with
another person's rights to control the use of his/her respective body. This
"ownership" of one's own body implies one's right to invite (agree to) another
person's doing something with (to) one's own body: my right to do with my
body whatever I want, that is, includes the right to ask and let someone else
use my body, love it, examine it, inject medicines or drugs into it, change its
physical appearance and even beat, damage, or kill it, if that should be what
I like and agree to. Interpersonal relationships of this sort are and will be
called contractual exchanges. They are characterized by the fact that an
agreement on the use of scarce resources is reached, which is based on
mutual respect and recognition of each and all of the exchanging partners'
domain of exclusive control over their respective bodies. By definition, such
contractual exchanges, while not necessarily advantageous for each and all
of the exchanging partners in retrospect (I might not like my looks after-

wards, even though the surgeon did exactly what I told him to do to my
face), are always, and necessarily so, mutually advantageous for every par-
ticipant ex ante, otherwise the exchange simply would not take place.
If, on the other hand, an action is performed that uninvitedly invades or

changes the physical integrity of another person's body and puts this body
to a use that is not to this very person's own liking, this action, according to
the natural position regarding property, is called aggression.7 It would be
aggression if a person tried to satisfy his sexual or sadistic desires by raping
or beating another person's body without having this person's explicit con-
sent. And it would be aggression as well, if a person were physically stopped
from performing certain actions with his body which might not be to some-
one else's liking, such as wearing pink socks or curly hair, or getting drunk
everyday, or first sleeping and then philosophizing instead of doing it the
other way around, but which, if indeed performed, would not in itself cause
a change in the physical integrity of any other person's body. 8 By defini-
tion, then, an aggressive act always and necessarily implies that a person,
by performing it, increases his/her satisfaction at the expense of a decrease
in the satisfaction of another person.
What is the underlying rationale of this natural position regarding proper-

ty? At the bottom of the natural property theory lies the idea of basing the
assignment of an exclusive ownership right on the existence of an objec-
tive, intersubjectively ascertainable link between owner and the property
owned and, mutatis mutandis, of calling all property claims that can only in-
voke purely subjective evidence in their favor aggressive. While I can cite
in favor of my property claim regarding my body the objective fact that I was
the body's first occupant-its first user-anyone else who claims to have the
right to control this body can cite nothing of the sort. No one could call my
body a product of his will, as I could claim it to be the product of mine; such
a claim to the right to determine the use of the scarce resource "my body"
would be a claim of nonusers, of nonproducers, and would be based ex-
clusively on subjective opinion, i.e., on a merely verbal declaration that
things should be this or that way. Of course, such verbal claims could (and
very likely always will) point to certain facts, too ("I am bigger, I am smarter,
I am poorer or I am very special, etc.!"), and could thereby try to legitimize
themselves. But facts such as these do not (and cannot) establish any ob-
jective link between a given scarce resource and any particular person(s).
Everyone's ownership of every particular resource can equally well be es-
tablished or excluded on such grounds. It is such property claims, derived
from thin air, with purely verbal links between owners and things owned,
which, according to the natural theory of property, are called aggressive.
As compared with this, my property claim regarding my body can point to
a determinate natural link; and it can do so because my body has been
produced, and everything produced (as contrasted with things "given"),
logically, has a determinate connection with some definite individual
producer(s); it has been produced by me. To avoid any misunderstanding,
'to produce" is not to say "to create out of nothing" (after all, my body is also
a naturally given thing); it means to change a naturally given thing accord-
ing to a plan, to transform nature. It is also not to say 'to transform each
and every part of it" (after all, my body has lots of parts with respect to which
I never did anything!); it means instead to transform a thing within (includ-
ing/excluding) borders, or, even more precisely, to produce borderlines for
things. And finally, "to produce" also is not to say that the process of produc-
tion must go on indefinitely (after all, I am sleeping sometimes, and my body
is certainly not a product of my actions right then!), it simply means that it
was produced in the past and can be recognized as such. It is such proper-
ty claims, then, which can be derived from past, embordering productive ef-
forts and which can be tied to specific individuals as producers, which are
called "natural" or "nonaggressive."9
The ideas of capitalism and socialism should be almost clear at this

point. But before leaving the Garden of Eden once and for all, a look at the
consequences of the introduction of elements of aggressively founded
ownership into paradise should be taken, as this will help elucidate, purely
and simply, the central economic and social problem of every type of real
socialism, i.e., of socialism in a world of all-around scarcity, the detailed
analysis of which then is the concern of the following chapters.
Even in the land of milk and honey, people evidently could choose dif-
ferent lifestyles, set different goals for themselves, have different standards
as to what kind of personality they want to develop and what achievements
to strive for. True, one would not need to work in order to make a living as
there would be a superabundance of everything. But, put drastically, one
could still choose to become a drunk or a philosopher, which is to say, more
technically, one could choose to put one's body to uses that would be more
or less immediately rewarding from the point of view of the acting person,
or one could put one's body to such uses which would only bear fruit in a
more or less distant future. Decisions of the afore-mentioned type might be
called "consumption decisions." Decisions, on the other hand, to put one's
body to a use that only pays later, i.e., choices induced by some reward or
satisfaction anticipated in a more or less distant future requiring the actor to
overcome disutility of waiting (time is scarce!), might be called "investment"
decisions-decisions, that is, to invest in "human capital," in the capital em-
bodied in one's own physical body. 10 Now assume that aggressively
founded ownership is introduced. Whereas before every person was the
exclusive owner of his body and could decide on his own whether to be-
come a drunk or a philosopher, now a system is established in which a
person's right to determine how to use his body is curtailed or completely
eliminated, and instead, this right is partly or fully delegated to another per-
son who is not naturally linked to the respective body as its producer. What
would be the consequence of this? The abolition of private ownership of
one's body can be far-reaching: the nonproducers can have the right to
determine all of the uses of "my" body all of the time, or their right to do so
can be restricted with respect to time and/or domains, and these restrictions
again can be flexible (with the nonproducers having the right to change the
restrictive definitions according to their own taste) or fixed once and for all,
and so the effects can, of course, be more or less drastic! But whatever the
degree, socialization of ownership always, and necessarily so, produces
two types of effects. The first effect, "economic" in the narrower sense of
the term, is a reduction in the amount of investment in human capital as
defined above. The natural owner of a body cannot help but make decisions
regarding that body as long as he does not commit suicide and decides to
stay alive, however restricted his ownership rights might be. But since he
can no longer decide on his own, undisturbed by others, to what uses to
put his body, the value attached to it by him is now lower; the want satisfac-
tion, the psychic income, that is to say, which he can derive from his body
by putting it to certain uses is reduced because the range of options avail-
able to him has been limited. But then, with every action necessarily imply-
ing costs (as explained above), and with a given inclination to overcome
costs in exchange for expected rewards or profits, the natural owner is faced
with a situation in which the costs of action must be reduced in order to
bring them back in line with the reduced expected income. In the Garden
of Eden, there is only one way left to do this: by shortening the waiting time,
reducing the disutility of waiting, and choosing a course of action that
promises earlier returns. Thus, the introduction of aggressively founded
ownership leads to a tendency to reduce investment decisions and favors
consumption decisions. Put drastically, it leads to a tendency to turn
philosophers into drunks. This tendency is permanent and more
pronounced when the threat of intervention with the natural owner's rights
is permanent, and it is less so to the degree that the threat is restricted to
certain times or domains. In any case, though, the rate of investment in
human capital is lower than it would be with the right of exclusive control of
natural owners over their bodies being untouched and absolute.
The second effect might be called social. The introduction of elements

of aggressively founded ownership implies a change in the social structure,
a change in the composition of society with respect to personality or charac-
ter types. Abandoning the natural theory of property evidently implies a
redistribution of income. The psychic income of persons in their capacity
as users of their "own" natural body, as persons expressing themselves in
this body and deriving satisfaction from doing so, is reduced at the expense
of an increase in the psychic income of persons in their capacity as invaders
of other peoples' bodies. It has become relatively more difficult and costly
to derive satisfaction from using one's body without invading that of others,
and relatively less difficult and costly to gain satisfaction by using other
peoples' bodies for one's own purposes. This fact alone does not imply any
social change, but once a single empirical assumption is made, it does: As-
suming that the desire to gain satisfaction at the expense of a loss in satis-
faction available to others by instrumentalizing another person's body exists
as a human desire, that it may not be instilled in everybody and to the same
extent, but that it exists in some people sometimes to some degree and so
conceivably can be suppressed or encouraged and favored by some given
institutional arrangement, consequences are imminent. And surely, this as-
sumption is true. Then, the redistribution of chances for income acquisition
must result in more people using aggression to gain personal satisfaction
and/or more people becoming more aggressive, i.e., shifting increasingly
from nonaggressive to aggressive roles, and slowly changing their per-
sonality as a consequence of this; and this change in the character struc-
ture, in the moral composition of society, in turn leads to another reduction
in the level of investment in human capital.
In short, with these two effects we have already pinpointed the most fun-
damental reasons for socialism's being an economically inferior system of
property arrangements. Indeed, both effects will reappear again and again
in the course of the following analyses of socialist policy schemes. All that
is left now is to explain the natural theory of property as regards the real
world of all around scarcity, for this is the point of departure for all forms of
real socialism.
Notwithstanding some evident differences between bodies and all other

scarce resources, all conceptual distinctions can be made and applied again
without difficulties: Unlike bodies, which are never "unowned" but always
have a natural owner, all other scarce resources can indeed be unowned.
This is the case as long as they remain in their natural state, unused by
anyone. They only become someone's property once they are treated as
scarce means, that is, as soon as they are occupied in some objective bor-
ders and put to some specific use by someone. This act of acquiring pre-
viously unowned resources is called "original appropriation."11 Once
unowned resources are appropriated it becomes an aggression to unin-
vitedly change their physical characteristics or to restrict the owner's range
of uses to which he can put these resources, as long as a particular use
does not affect the physical characteristics of anyone else's property-just
as in the case of bodies. Only in the course of a contractual relationship,
i.e., when the natural owner of a scarce means explicitly agrees, is it pos-
sible for someone else to utilize and change previously acquired things. And
only if the original or previous owner deliberately transfers his property title
to someone else, either in exchange for something or as a free gift, can this
other person himself become the owner of such things. Unlike bodies,
though, which for the same "natural" reason can never be unowned and also
can never be parted with by the natural owner completely but only be "lent
out" as long as the owners' agreement lasts, naturally all other scarce resour-
ces can be "alienated" and a property title for them can be relinquished once
and for all. 12
A social system based on this natural position regarding the assignment

of property rights is, and will from now on be called pure capitalist. And
since its ideas can also be discerned as the dominating ideas of private law,
i.e., of the norms regulating relations between private persons, it might also
be termed a pure private law system. 13 This system is based on the idea
that to be nonaggressive, claims to property must be backed by the "objec-
tive" fact of an act of original appropriation, of previous ownership, or by a
mutually beneficial contractual relationship. This relationship can either be
a deliberate cooperation between property owners or the deliberate trans-
fer of property titles from one owner to another. If this system is altered and
instead a policy is instituted that assigns rights of exclusive control over
scarce means, however partial, to persons or groups of persons that can
point neither to an act of previous usership of the things concerned, nor to
a contractual relation with some previous user- owner, then this will be called
(partial) socialism.
It will be the task of the next four chapters to explain how different ways
of deviating from a pure capitalist system, different ways of redistributing
property titles away from natural owners of things (i.e., from people who
have put some particular resources to a specific use and so are naturally
linked to them, and onto people who have not yet done anything with the
resources but who have simply made a verbal, declarative claim regarding
them) lowers investment and increases consumption, and in addition
causes a change in the composition of the population by favoring non-
productive over productive people.
3
SOCIALISM RUSSIAN STYLE
W e have defined socialism as an institutionalized policy of redistribution

of property titles. More precisely, it is a transfer of property titles from people
who have actually put scarce means to some use or who have acquired
them contractually from persons who have done so previously onto persons
who have neither done anything with the things in question nor acquired
them contractually. For a highly unrealistic world--the Garden of Eden--I
then pointed out the socio-economic consequences of such a system of as-
signing property rights were then pointed out: a reduction of investment in
human capital and increased incentives for the evolution of nonproductive
personality types.
I now want to enlarge and concretize this analysis of socialism and its
socio-economic impact by looking at different though equally typical ver-
sions of socialism. In this chapter I will concentrate on the analysis of what
most people have come to view as "socialism par excellence" (if not the only
type of socialism there is), this probably being the most appropriate start-
ing point for any discussion of socialism. This "socialism par excellence" is
a social system in which the means of production, that is, the scarce resour-
ces used to produce consumption goods, are "nationalized" or "socialized."
Indeed, while Karl Marx, and like him most of our contemporary intel-
lectuals of the left, was almost exclusively concerned with the analysis of
the economic and social defects of capitalism, and in all of his writings made
only a few general and vague remarks about the constructive problem of
the organization of the process of production under socialism, capitalism's
allegedly superior alternative, there can be no doubt that this is what he con-
sidered the cornerstone of a socialist policy and the key to a better and more
prosperous future.1 Accordingly, socialization of the means of production
has been advocated by all socialists of orthodox Marxist persuasion ever

since. It is not only what the communist parties of the West officially have
in store for us, though they become increasingly reluctant to say so in order
to seize power. In all of the Western socialist and social-democratic parties
a more or less numerous, outspoken, and eloquent minority of some in-
fluence also exists, which arduously supports such a scheme and proposes
socialization, if not of all means of production, then at least of those of big
industry and big business. Most importantly, smaller or bigger sectors of
nationalized industries have become part of social reality even in the so-
called "most capitalist" countries; and of course an almost complete
socialization of the means of production has been tried out in the Soviet
Union and later in all of the Soviet-dominated countries of Eastern Europe,
as well as in a number of other countries all over the world. The following
analysis should thus enable us to understand the economic and social
problems of societies, insofar as they are characterized by nationalized
means of production. And in particular, it should help us to understand the
central problems that plague Russia and its satellites, as these countries
have carried a policy of socialization so far that it can justly be said to be
their dominant structural feature. It is because of this fact that the type of
socialism under investigation is called "Russian" style.2
As regards the motivational forces pushing socialization schemes, they

are avowedly egalitarian. Once you allow private property in the means of
production, you allow differences. If I own resource A, then you do not own
it, and our relationship to this resource is thus different. By abolishing private
ownership everyone's position vis a vis means of production is equalized
with one stroke, or so it seems. Everyone becomes co-owner of everything,
reflecting everyone's equal standing as human beings. And the economic
rationale of such a scheme is that it is supposedly more efficient. To the un-
trained observer unfamiliar with the action-coordinating function of prices,
SOCIALISM RUSSIAN STYLE 21
capitalism as based on private ownership of means of production simply

appears chaotic. It seems to be a wasteful system characterized by
duplicating efforts, ruinous competition, and the absence of concerted,
coordinated action. As Marxists call it depreciatively, it is an "anarchy of
production." Only when collective ownership is substituted for private does
it seemingly become possible to eliminate this waste by implementing a
single, comprehensive, coordinated production plan.
More important, though, than motivation and promises is what a

socialization of means of production really amounts to. 3 The property rules
that are adopted under a socialization policy and which constitute the basic
legal principles of countries like Russia are characterized by two com-
plementary features. First, nobody owns the socialized means of produc-
tion; they are "socially" owned, which is to say precisely: no person, or no
group of persons, or all taken together is allowed to either acquire them or
sell them and keep the receipts from their sale privately. Their use is deter-
mined by people not in the role of an owner but of a caretaker of things. And
secondly, no person or group of persons or all taken together is allowed to
engage newly in private investment and create new private means of produc-
tion. They can neither invest by transforming the existing, nonproductively
used resources into productive ones, by original saving, by pooling resour-
ces with other people, nor by a mixture of these techniques. Investment can
only be done by caretakers of things, never for private profit, always on be-
half of the community of caretakers with whom the possible profits from in-
vestments would have to be shared.4
What does it mean to have such a caretaker economy? What, in par-

ticular, does it imply to change from an economy built on the natural theory
of property to a socialized one? In passing, two observations should be
made, which will already throw some light on the above-mentioned socialist
promises of equality and efficiency. Declaring everybody a co-owner of
everything solves the problem of differences in ownership only nominally.

It does not solve the real underlying problem: differences in the power to
control. In an economy based on private ownership, the owner determines
what should be done with the means of production. In a socialized economy
this can no longer happen, as there is no such owner. Nonetheless, the
problem of determining what should be done with the means of production
still exists and must be solved somehow, provided there is no prestabilized
and presynchronized harmony of interests among all of the people (in which
case no problems whatsoever would exist anymore), but rather some de-
gree of disagreement. Only one view as to what should be done can in fact
prevail and others must mutatis mutandis be excluded. But then again there
must be inequalities between people: someone's or some groups' opinion
must win over that of others. The difference between a private property
economy and a socialized one is only how whose will prevails in cases of
disagreement is to be determined. In capitalism there must be somebody
who controls, and others who do not, and hence real differences among
people exist, but the issue of whose opinion prevails is resolved by original
appropriation and contract. In socialism, too, real differences between con-
trollers and noncontrollers must, of necessity, exist; only in the case of
socialism, the position of those whose opinion wins is not determined by
previous usership or contract, but by political means.5 This difference is
certainly a highly important one, and our discussion will return to it later in
this chapter and again in later chapters, but here it suffices to say that-con-
trary to socialism's egalitarian promises-it is not a difference between a non-
egalitarian and an egalitarian system as regards power of control.
The second observation is intimately connected with the first and con-
cerns socialism's allegedly superior coordinating capabilities. Again closer
Inspection reveals that the difference is merely illusory, created only by
semantics: to say that an economy of private owners is supplanted by a na-

tionalized one creates the impression that instead of a multitude of decision-

making units, all of a sudden there is only one such unit. In fact, nothing
has changed at all. There are as many individuals with as many different in-
terests as before. Just as much as capitalism then, socialism has to find a
solution to the problem of determining how to coordinate the uses of dif-
ferent means of production, given the fact of differing views among people
on how this should be accomplished. The difference between capitalism
and socialism is again one of how coordination is achieved, and not between
chaos and coordination, as the socialist semantic insinuates. Instead of
simply letting individuals do what they want, capitalism coordinates actions
by constraining people to respect previous user-ownership. Socialism, on
the other hand, instead of letting people do whatever pleases them, coor-
dinates individual plans by superimposing on one person's or group of
persons' plan that of another disagreeing person or group regardless of
prior ownership and mutual exchange agreements.6 It hardly deserves
comment that this difference, too, is of the utmost importance. But it is not,
as Marxist socialism would like us to believe, a difference between social
planning and no planning at all; on the contrary, as soon as the coordinat-
ing mechanisms of socialism and capitalism are brought into the open and
reconstructed, socialism's claim to greater efficiency immediately begins to
lose much of its credibility, and the opposite thesis appears to be more con-
vincing.
How well-founded this thesis indeed is, and exactly why it is that
capitalism's, and not socialism's, coordinating mechanism proves to be
economically superior will become clear when one turns away from ap-
parent differences and concentrates on real ones instead, and looks at the
redistribution of property titles, and hence of income, which is implied in
giving up capitalism in favor of a caretaker economy, as characterized
above. From the standpoint of the natural theory of property--the founda-

tion of capitalism--the adoption of the basic principles of a caretaker

economy means that property titles are redistributed away from actual
producers and users of means of production, and away from those who
have acquired these means by mutual consent from previous users, to a
community of caretakers in which, at the very best, every person remains
the caretaker of the things he previously owned. But even in this case each
previous user and each contractor would be hurt, as he could no longer sell
the means of production and keep the receipt from the sale privately, nor
could he privately appropriate the profit from using them the way they are
used, and hence the value of the means of production for him would fall.
Mutatis mutandis, every nonuser and noncontractor of these means of
production would be favored by being promoted to the rank of caretaker of
them, with at least partial say over resources which he had previously neither
used nor contracted to use, and his income would rise.
In addition to this redistributive scheme there is another one, implied by
the prohibition of newly created private capital or by the degree of hamper-
ing (dependent as it is on the size of the socialized part of the economy)
under which this process must now take place: a redistribution away from
people who have forgone possible consumption and instead saved up funds
in order to employ them productively, i.e., for the purpose of producing fu-
ture consumption goods, and who now can no longer do so or who now
have fewer options available, toward nonsavers, who in adopting the
redistribution scheme, gain a say, however partial, over the saver's funds.
The socio-economic consequences of a policy of socialization are es-

sentially implied in these formulations. But before taking a more detailed
look at them, it might be worthwhile to review and clarify the central features
of the real world in which this socialization scheme would purportedly take
place. It should be recalled that one is dealing with a changing world; that
man, in addition, can learn with respect to this world and so does not neces-
sarily know today what he will know at a later point in time; that there is a
scarcity of a multitude of goods and that accordingly man is pressed by a
multitude of needs, not all of which he can satisfy at the same time and/or
without sacrificing the satisfaction of other needs; because of this, man must
choose and order his needs in a scale of preferences according to the rank
of urgency that they have for him; also, more specifically, that neither the
process of original appropriation of resources perceived as scarce, nor the
process of production of new and the upkeep of old means of production,
nor the process of contracting, is costless for man; that all of these activities
cost at the very least time, which could be spent otherwise, e.g., for leisure
activities; and in addition one should not forget that one is dealing with a
world characterized by the division of labor, which is to say that one is not
talking about a world of self-sufficient producers, but one in which produc-
tion is carried out for a market of independent consumers.
With this in mind, then, what are the effects of socializing the means of
production? To begin with, what are the "economic" consequences, in the
colloquial sense of the term? There are three intimately related effects.7
First~and this is the immediate general effect of all types of socialism-there
is a relative drop in the rate of investment, the rate of capital formation. Since
"socialization" favors the nonuser, the nonproducer, and the noncontractor
of means of production and, mutatis mutandis, raises the costs for users,
producers, and contractors, there will be fewer people acting in the latter
roles. There will be less original appropriation of natural resources whose
scarcity is realized, there will be less production of new and less upkeep of
old factors of production, and there will be less contracting. For all of these
activities involve costs and the costs of performing them have been raised,
and there are alternative courses of action, such as leisure-consumption ac-
tivities, which at the same time have become relatively less costly, and thus
more open and available to actors. Along the same line, because everyone's
investment outlets have dried up as it is no longer permissible to convert

private savings into private investment, or because the outlets have been
limited to the extent to which the economy is socialized, there will therefore
be less saving and more consuming, less work and more leisure. After all,
you can not become a capitalist any longer, or your possibility of becoming
one has been restricted, and so there is at least one reason less to save!
Needless to say, the result of this will be a reduced output of exchangeable
goods and a lowering of the living standard in terms of such goods. And
since these lowered living standards are forced upon people and are not
the natural choice of consumers who deliberately change their relative
evaluation of leisure and exchangeable goods as the result of work, i.e.,
since it is experienced as an unwanted impoverishment, a tendency will
evolve to compensate for such losses by going underground, by moonlight-
ing and creating black markets.
Secondly, a policy of the socialization of means of production will result

in a wasteful use of such means, i.e., in use which at best satisfies second-
rate needs and at worst, satisfies no needs at all but exclusively increases
costs.8 The reason for this is the existence and unavoidability of change!
Once it is admitted that there can be change in consumer demand, change
in technological knowledge, and change in the natural environment in which
the process of production has to take place-and all of this indeed takes
place constantly and unceasingly-then it must also be admitted that there
is a constant and never-ending need to reorganize and reshuffle the whole
structure of social production. There is always a need to withdraw old in-
vestments from some lines of production and, together with new ones, pour
them into other lines, thus making certain productive establishments, cer-
tain branches, or even certain sectors of the economy shrink and others ex-
pand. Now assume-and this is precisely what is done under a socialization
scheme-that it is either completely illegal or extremely difficult to sell the
collectively owned means of production into private hands. This process of

reorganizing the structure of production will then-even if it does not stop al-
together--at least be seriously hampered! The reason is basically a simple
one, but still of the utmost importance. Because the means of production
either cannot be sold, or selling them is made very difficult for the selling
caretaker or the private buyer or both, no market prices for the means of
production exist, or the formation of such prices is hindered and made more
costly. But then the caretaker-producer of the socialized means of produc-
tion can no longer correctly establish the actual monetary costs involved in
using the resources or in making any changes in the production structure.
Nor can he compare these costs with his expected monetary income from
sales. In not being permitted to take any offers from other private individuals
who might see an alternative way of using some given means of production,
or in being restricted from taking such offers, the caretaker simply does not
know what he is missing, what the foregone opportunities are, and is not
able to correctly assess the monetary costs of withholding the resources.
He cannot discover whether his way of using them or changing their use is
worth the result in terms of monetary returns, or whether the costs involved
are actually higher than the returns and so cause an absolute drop in the
value of the output of consumer goods. Nor can he establish whether his
way of producing for consumer demand is indeed the most efficient way (as
compared with conceivable alternative ways) of satisfying the most urgent
consumer needs, or if less urgent needs are being satisfied at the expense
of neglecting more urgent ones, thus causing at least a relative drop in the
value of the goods produced. Without being able to resort unrestrictedly to
the means of economic calculation, there is simply no way of knowing. Of
course one could go ahead and try to do one's best. That might even be
successful sometimes, though one would have no way of assuring oneself
that it is. But, in any case, the larger the consumer market is which one has
to serve, and the more the knowledge regarding preferences of different

groups of consumers, special circumstances of historical time and
geographical space, and possibilities of technology is dispersed among dif-
ferent individuals, the more likely it is that one will go wrong. A misalloca-
tion of means of production, with wastes and shortages as the two sides of
the same coin, must ensue. In hampering and of course even more so, in
making it outright illegal for private entrepreneurs to bid away means of
production from caretakers, a system of socialized production prevents op-
portunities for improvement from being taken up to the full extent they are
perceived. Again, it hardly needs to be pointed out that this, too, contributes
to impoverishment.9
Thirdly, socializing the means of production causes relative impoverish-

ment, i.e., a drop in the general standard of living, by leading to an over-
utilization of the given factors of production. The reason for this, again, lies
in the peculiar position of a caretaker as compared with that of a private
owner. A private owner who has the right to sell the factors of production
and keep the money receipts privately will, because of this, try to avoid any
increase in production which occurs at the expense of the value of the capi-
tal employed. His objective is to maximize the value of the products
produced plus that of the resources used in producing them because he
owns both of them. Thus he will stop producing when the value of the mar-
ginal product produced is lower than the depreciation of the capital used to
produce it. Accordingly, he will, for instance, reduce the depreciation costs
involved in producing, and instead engage in increased conservation, if he
anticipates future price rises for the products produced and vice versa. The
situation of the caretaker, i.e., the incentive structure which he is facing, is
quite different in this respect. Because he cannot sell the means of produc-
tion, his incentive to not produce, and thereby utilize the capital employed,
at the expense of an excessive reduction in capital value is, if not complete-
ly gone, then at least relatively reduced. True, since the caretaker in a so-
cialized economy also cannot privately appropriate the receipts from the
sale of products, but must hand them ove/ to the community of caretakers
at large to be used at their discretion, his incentive to produce and sell
products at all is relatively weakened as well. It is precisely this fact that ex-
plains the lower rate of capital formation. But as long as the caretaker works
and produces at all, his interest in gaining an income evidently exists, even
if it cannot be used for purposes of private capital formation, but only for
private consumption and/or the creation of private, nonproductively used
wealth. The caretaker's inability to sell the means of production, then, im-
plies that the incentive to increase his private income at the expense of capi-
tal value is raised. Accordingly, to the extent that he sees his income
dependent on the output of products produced (the salary paid to him by
the community of caretakers might be dependent on this!), his incentive will
be raised to increase this output at the expense of capital. Furthermore,
since the actual caretaker, insofar as he is not identical with the community
of caretakers, can never be completely and permanently supervised and
thus can derive income from using the means of production for private pur-
poses (i.e., the production of privately used, non- or black-marketed goods)
he will be encouraged to increase this output at the expense of capital value
to the extent that he sees his income dependent on such private produc-
tion. In any case, capital consumption and overuse of existing capital will
occur; and increased capital consumption once more implies relative im-
poverishment, since the production of future exchange goods will, as a con-
sequence, be reduced.
While implied in this analysis of the threefold economic consequences

of socializing the means of production-reduced investment, misallocation,
and overutilization, all of which lead to reduced living standards-in order to
reach a full understanding of Russian-type societies it is interesting and in-
deed important to point out specifically that the above analysis also applies
to the productive factor of labor. With respect to labor, too, socialization im-
plies lowered investment, misallocation, and overutilization. First, since the
owners of labor factors can no longer become self-employed, or since the
opportunity to do so is restricted, on the whole there will be less investment
in human capital. Second, since the owners of labor factors can no longer
sell their labor services to the highest bidder (for to the extent to which the
economy is socialized, separate bidders having independent control over
specific complementary factors of production, including the money needed
to pay labor, and who take up opportunities and risks independently, on
their own account, are no longer allowed to exist!) the monetary cost of
using a given labor factor, or of combining it with complementary factors,
can no longer be established, and hence all sorts of misallocations of labor
will ensue. And third, since the owners of labor factors in a socialized
economy own at best only part of the proceeds from their labor while the
remainder belongs to the community of caretakers, there will be an in-
creased incentive for these caretakers to supplement their private income
at the expense of losses in the capital value embodied in the laborers, so
that an overutilization of labor will result.10
Last, but certainly not least, a policy of the socialization of the means of
production affects the character structure of society, the importance of
which can hardly be exaggerated. As has been pointed out repeatedly,
adopting Russian-type socialism instead of capitalism based on the natural
theory of property implies giving a relative advantage to nonusers, non-
producers, and noncontractors as regards property titles of the means of
production and the income that can be derived from using of these means.
If people have an interest in stabilizing and, if possible, increasing their in-
come and they can shift relatively easily from the role of a user- producer or
contractor into that of a nonuser, nonproducer, or noncontractor-assump-
tions, to be sure, whose validity can hardly be disputed-then, responding

to the shift in the incentive structure affected by socialization, people will in-
creasingly engage in nonproductive and noncontractual activities and, as
time goes on, their personalities will be changed. A former ability to per-
ceive and to anticipate situations of scarcity, to take up productive oppor-
tunities, to be aware of technological possibilities, to anticipate changes in
demand, to develop marketing strategies and to detect chances for mutual-
ly advantageous exchanges, in short: the ability to initiate, to work and to
respond to other people's needs, will be diminished, if not completely extin-
guished. People will have become different persons, with different skills,
who, should the policy suddenly be changed and capitalism reintroduced,
could not go back to their former selves immediately and rekindle their old
productive spirit, even if they wanted to. They will simply have forgotten
how to do it and will have to relearn, slowly, with high psychic costs involved,
just as it involved high costs for them to suppress their productive skills in
the first place. But this is only half the picture of the social consequences
of socialization. It can be completed by recalling the above findings regard-
ing capitalism's and socialism's apparent differences. This will bring out the
other side of the personality change caused by socializing, complementing
the just mentioned loss in productive capacity. The fact must be recalled
that socialism, too, must solve the problem of who is to control and coor-
dinate various means of production. Contrary to capitalism's solution to this
problem, though, in socialism the assignment of different positions in the
production structure to different people is a political matter, i.e., a matter
accomplished irrespective of considerations of previous user-ownership
and the existence of contractual, mutually agreeable exchange, but rather
by superimposing one person's will upon that of another (disagreeing) one.
Evidently, a person's position in the production structure has an immediate
effect on his income, be it in terms of exchangeable goods, psychic income,
status, and the like. Accordingly, as people want to improve their income
and want to move into more highly evaluated positions in the hierarchy of
caretakers, they increasingly have to use their political talents. It becomes
irrelevant, or is at least of reduced importance, to be a more efficient
producer or contractor in order to rise in the hierarchy of income recipients.
Instead, it is increasingly important to have the peculiar skills of a politician,
i.e., a person who through persuasion, demagoguery and intrigue, through
promises, bribes, and threats, manages to assemble public support for his
own position. Depending on the intensity of the desire for higher incomes,
people will have to spend less time developing their productive skills and
more time cultivating political talents. And since different people have dif-
fering degrees of productive and political talents, different people will rise to
the top now, so that one finds increasing numbers of politicians everywhere
in the hierarchical order of caretakers. All the way to the very top there will
be people incompetent to do the job they are supposed to do. It is no
hindrance in a caretaker's career for him to be dumb, indolent, inefficient,
and uncaring, as long as he commands superior political skills, and accord-
ingly people like this will be taking care of the means of production
everywhere.11
A look at Russia and other East-bloc countries in which a policy of
socialization of means of production has been carried out to a considerable
degree can help illustrate the truth of the above conclusions. Even a super-
ficial acquaintance with these countries suffices to see the validity of the first
and main conclusion. The general standard of living in the East-bloc
countries, though admittedly different from country to country (a difference
that itself would have to be explained by the degree of strictness with which
the socialization scheme was and presently is carried through in practice),
is clearly much lower than that in the so-called capitalist countries of the
West. (This is true even though the degree to which Western countries are
socialized, though differing from country to country, is itself quite con-

siderable and normally very much underestimated as will become clear in
later chapters.) Though the theory does not and cannot make a precise
prediction of how drastic the impoverishment effect of a socialization policy
will be, except that it will be a noticeable one, it is certainly worth mention-
ing that when almost complete socialization was first put into effect in im-
mediate post-World War I Russia, this experience cost literally millions of
lives, and it required a marked change in policy, the New Economic Policy
(NEP), merely a few years later in 1921, reintroducing elements of private
ownership, to moderate these disastrous effects to levels that would prove
tolerable. 12 Indeed, repeated changes in policy made Russia go through a
similar experience more than once. Similar, though somewhat less drastic,
results from a policy of socialization were experienced in all of the East
European countries after World War II. There, too, moderate privatization
of small farming, the crafts, or small businesses had to be permitted
repeatedly in order to prevent outright economic breakdowns. 13 Nonethe-
less, in spite of such reforms, which incidentally prove the point that con-
trary to socialist propaganda it is private and not social ownership that
improves economic performance, and in spite of the fact that moonlighting,
illegal productive activities, bartering, and black market trade are ubiquitous
phenomena in all of these countries, just as the theory would lead one to
expect, and that this underground economy takes up part of the slack and
helps to improve things, the standard of living in the East-bloc countries is
lamentably low. All sorts of basic consumer goods are entirely lacking, in
far too short supply or of extremely poor quality.14
The case of West and East Germany is particularly instructive. Here,

history provides us with an example that comes as close to that of a con-
trolled social experiment as one could probably hope to get. A quite
homogeneous population, with very much the same history, culture, charac-
ter structure, work ethics, divided after Hitler-Germany's defeat in World War
II. In West Germany, more because of lucky circumstances than the pres-
sure of public opinion, a remarkably free market economy was adopted, the
previous system of all-around price controls abolished in one stroke, and
almost complete freedom of movement, trade, and occupation intro-
duced. 15 In East Germany, on the other hand, under Soviet Russian
dominance, socialization of the means of production, i.e., an expropriation
of the previous private owners, was implemented. Two different institution-
al frameworks, two different incentive structures have thus been applied to
the same population. The difference in the results is impressive.16 While
both countries do well in their respective blocs, West Germany has the
highest standard of living among the major West-European nations and East
Germany prides itself in being the most well-off country in the East bloc, the
standard of living in the West is so much higher and has become relatively
more so over time, that despite the transfer of considerable amounts of
money from West to East by government as well as private citizens and in-
creasingly socialist policies in the West, the visitor going from West to East
is simply stunned as he enters an almost completely different, impoverished
world. As a matter of fact, while all of the East-European countries are
plagued by the emigration problem of people wanting to leave for the more
prosperous capitalist West with its increased opportunities, and while they
all have gradually established tighter border controls, thus turning these
countries into sort of gigantic prisoner camps in order to prevent this out-
flow, the case of Germany is a most striking one. With language differen-
ces, traditionally the most severe natural barrier for emigrants, nonexistent,
the difference in living standards between the two Germanys proved to be
so great and emigration from East to West took on such proportions, that
in 1961 the socialist regime in East Germany, in a last desperate step, final-
ly had to close its borders to the West completely. To keep the population
in, it had to build a system the likes of which the world had never seen of
walls, barbed wire, electrified fences, mine fields, automatic shooting
devices, watchtowers, etc., almost 900 miles long, for the sole purpose of
preventing its people from running away from the consequences of Russian-
type socialism.
Besides exemplifying the main point, the case of the two Germanys, be-
cause of its experimental-like character, proves particularly helpful in il-
lustrating the truth of the rest of the theoretically derived conclusions.
Looking at comparable social positions, almost nowhere in West Germany
will one find people working as little, as slowly, or as negligently (while the
working hours, higher in the East, are of course regulated!) as their East
German counterparts. Not, to be sure, because of any alleged differences
in mentality or work ethics, as those are very much the same historically,
but because the incentive to work is considerably reduced by a policy
scheme that effectively closes all or most outlets for private investment. Ef-
fective work in East Germany is most likely to be found in the underground
economy. And in response to the various disincentives to work, and in par-
ticular to work in the "officially" controlled economy, there is also a tenden-
cy among East Germans to withdraw from public life and to stress the
importance of privacy, the family, relatives, and personal friends and con-
nections, significantly exceeding what is seen in the West. 17
There is also ample evidence of misallocation, just as the theory would

lead one to expect. While the phenomenon of productive factors that are
not used (at least not continuously) but are simply inactive because com-
plementary factors are lacking can of course be observed in the West, in the
East (and again, in the German case certainly not because of differences in
organizational talents) it is observed everywhere as a permanent feature of
life. And while it is normally quite difficult in the West, and requires special
entrepreneurial talent to point out changes in the use of certain means of
production that would result in an overall improvement in the output of con-

sumer goods, this is relatively easy in the East-bloc countries. Almost
everyone working in East Germany knows many ways to put the means of
production to more urgent uses than ones that are currently being used,
where they are evidently wasted and cause shortages of other, more heavi-
ly demanded goods. But since they are not able to bid them away and must
instead go through tedious political procedures to initiate any changes,
nothing much can be or indeed is done.
Experience also corroborates what has been said about the other side
of the coin: the overutilization of publicly owned means of production. In
West Germany such public goods also exist, and as would be expected,
they are in relatively bad shape. But in East Germany, and no differently or
in fact even worse in the other Soviet-dominated countries, where all factors
of production are socially owned, insufficiently maintained, deteriorating,
unrepaired, rusting, even simply vandalized production factors, machinery,
and buildings are truly rampant. Further, the ecology crisis is much more
dramatic in the East, in spite of the relatively underdeveloped state of the
general economy, than in the West-and all this is not, as the case of Ger-
many proves clearly enough, because there are differences in people's
"natural" inclination to care and to be careful.
Finally, as regards the theoretically predicted changes in the social and

personality structure, complaints about superiors are, of course, quite a
common phenomenon everywhere. But in the countries of Russian-type
socialism, where the assignment of positions in the hierarchy of caretakers
is and must be entirely a political affair, such complaints about downright
incompetent, unqualified, and ridiculous superiors are, even if not more
loudly voiced, most frequent, most severe, and best-founded, and decent
people are most often driven to despair or cynicism as a consequence. And
since a few people from East Germany still go to West Germany at an age
where they are still members of the labor force, some as escapees but more
frequently because a sort of ransom has been paid for them, sufficient
material also exists to illustrate the conclusion that in the long run a social-
ized economy will reduce people's productive capacities. Among those
going to the West there is a significant number who led quite normal produc-
tive lives in the East but who, despite the absence of any linguistic and cul-
tural barriers, prove to be incapable of, or have the greatest difficulties,
adapting to Western society with its increased demand for productive and
competitive skills and spirits.
4
SOCIALISM SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC STYLE
A n the last chapter I analyzed the orthodox marxist version of socialism-

socialism Russian-style, as it was called-and explained its effects on the
process of production and the social moral structure. I went on to point out
that the theoretically foreseen consequences of relative impoverishment
proved to be so powerful that in fact a policy of socializing the means of
production could never actually be carried through to its logical end: the
socialization of all production factors, without causing an immediate
economic disaster. Indeed, sooner or later all actual realizations of Marxist
socialism have had to reintroduce elements of private ownership in the
means of production in order to overcome or prevent manifest bankruptcy.
Even moderate "market" socialism, however, cannot prevent a relative im-
poverishment of the population, if the idea of socialized production is not
abandoned entirely, once and for all.
Much more so than any theoretical argument, it has been the disap-
pointing experience with Russian-type socialism which has led to a constant
decline in the popularity of orthodox Marxist socialism and has spurred the
emergence and development of modern social-democratic socialism, which
will be the concern of this chapter. Both types of socialism, to be sure, derive
from the same ideological sources.1 Both are egalitarian in motivation, at
least in theory,2 and both have essentially the same ultimate goal: the
abolishment of capitalism as a social system based on private ownership
and the establishment of a new society, characterized by brotherly solidarity
and the eradication of scarcity; a society in which everyone is paid "accord-
ing to his needs." From the very beginnings of the socialist movement in
the mid-nineteenth century, though, there have been conflicting ideas on
the methods best suited for achieving these goals. While generally there
was agreement on the necessity of socializing the means of production,

there were always diverging opinions on how to proceed. On the one hand,
within the socialist movement there were the advocates of a revolutionary
course of action. They propagated the violent overthrow of the existing
governments, the complete expropriation of all capitalists in one stroke, and
the temporary (i.e., until scarcity would indeed, as promised, be eradicated)
dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., of those who were not capitalists but who
had to sell their labor services, in order to stabilize the new order. On the
other hand there were the reformists who advocated a gradualist approach.
They reasoned that with the enlargement of the franchise, and ultimately
with a system of universal suffrage, socialism's victory could be attained
through democratic, parliamentary action. This would be so because
capitalism, according to common socialist doctrine, would bring about a
tendency towards the proletarization of society, i.e., a tendency for fewer
people to be self-employed and more to become employees instead. And
in accordance with common socialist beliefs, this tendency would in turn
produce an increasingly uniform proletarian class consciousness which
then would lead to a swelling voter turnout for the socialist party. And, so
they reasoned, as this strategy was much more in line with public opinion
(more appealing to the mostly peacefully-minded workers and at the same
time less frightening to the capitalists), by adopting it, socialism's ultimate
success would only become more assured.
Both of these forces co-existed within the socialist movement, though

their relationship was at times quite strained, until the Bolshevik Revolution
of October, 1917 in Russia. In practice, the socialist movement generally
took the reformist path, while in the field of ideological debate the
revolutionaries dominated. 3 The Russian events changed this. With Lenin
in the lead, for the first time the revolutionary socialists realized their program
and the socialist movement as a whole had to take a stand vis a vis the Rus-
SOCIALISM SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC STYLE 41
sian experiment. As a consequence, the socialist movement split into two

branches with two separate parties: a communist party either more or less
in favor of the Russian events, and a socialist or social-democratic party with
reservations, or against them. Still, the split was not over the issue of
socialization; both were in favor of that. It was an open split over the issue
of revolutionary vs. democratic parliamentary change. Faced with the ac-
tual experience of the Russian revolution--the violence, the bloodshed, the
practice of uncontrolled expropriation, the fact that thousands of new
leaders, very often of questionable reputation or simply shady, inferior
characters, were being swept to the political helm-the social democrats, in
their attempt to gain public support, felt they had to abandon their revolu-
tionary image and become, not only in practice but in theory as well, a
decidedly reformist, democratic party. And even some of the communist
parties of the West, dedicated as they were to a theory of revolutionary
change, but just as much in need of public support, felt they had to find
some fault, at least, with the peculiar Bolshevik way of implementing the
revolution. They, too, increasingly thought it necessary to play the refor-
mist, democratic game, if only in practice.
However, this was only the first step in the transformation of the socialist
movement effected by the experience of the Russian revolution. The next
step, as indicated, was forced upon It by the dim experience with Soviet
Russia's economic performance. Regardless of their differing views on the
desirability of revolutionary changes and equally unfamiliar with or unable
or unwilling to grasp abstract economic reasoning, socialists and com-
munists alike could still, during a sort of honeymoon period which they felt
the new experiment deserved, entertain the most illusory hopes about the
economic achievements of a policy of socialization. But this period could
not last forever, and the facts had to be faced and the results evaluated after
some time had elapsed. For every decently neutral observer of things, and
later for every alert visitor and traveler, It became evident that socialism Rus-
sian-style did not mean more but rather less wealth and that it was a sys-
tem above all, that in having to allow even small niches of private capital
formation, had in fact already admitted its own economic inferiority, if only
implicitly. As this experience became more widely known, and in particular
when after World War II the Soviet experiment was repeated in the East
European countries, producing the very same dim results and thus disprov-
ing the thesis that the Soviet mess was only due to a special Asian mentality
of the people, in their race for public support the socialist, i.e., the social-
democratic and communist, parties of the West were forced to modify their
programs further. The communists now saw various flaws in the Russian
implementation of the socialization program as well, and increasingly toyed
with the idea of more decentralized planning and decision-making and of
partial socialization, i.e., socialization only of major firms and industries, al-
though they never entirely abandoned the idea of socialized production.4
The socialist or social-democratic parties, on the other hand, less sym-
pathetic from the beginning towards the Russian model of socialism and
through their decidedly reformist-democratic policy already inclined to ac-
cept compromises such as partial socialization, had to make a further adap-
tive move. These parties, in response to the Russian and East European
experiences, increasingly gave up the notion of socialized production al-
together and instead put more and more emphasis on the idea of income
taxation and equalization, and, in another move, on equalization of oppor-
tunity, as being the true cornerstones of socialism.
While this shift from Russian-type socialism towards a social-
democratic one took place, and still is taking place in all Western societies,
it was not equally strong everywhere. Roughly speaking and only looking
at Europe, the displacement of the old by the new kind of socialism has been
more pronounced, the more immediate and direct the experience with Rus-
sian-type socialism for the population in which the socialist and/or com-
munist parties had to find supporters and voters. Of all the major countries,
in West Germany, where the contact with this type of socialism is the most
direct, where millions of people still have ample opportunities to see with
their own eyes the mischief that has been done to the people in East Ger-
many, this displacement was the most complete. Here, in 1959, the social
democrats adopted (or rather were forced by public opinion to adopt) a new
party program in which all obvious traces of a Marxist past were con-
spicuously absent, that rather explicitly mentioned the importance of private
ownership and markets, that talked about socialization only as a mere pos-
sibility, and that instead heavily stressed the importance of redistributive
measures. Here, the protagonists of a policy of socialization of the means
of production within the social-democratic party have been considerably
outnumbered ever since; and here the communist parties, even when they
are only in favor of peaceful and partial socialization, have been reduced to
insignificance.5 In countries further removed from the iron curtain, like
France, Italy, Spain, and also Great Britain, this change has been less
dramatic. Nonetheless, it is safe to say that today only social-democratic
socialism, as represented most typically by the German social-democrats,
can claim widespread popularity in the West. As a matter of fact, due part-
ly to the influence of the Socialist International-the association of socialist
and social-democratic parties-social-democratic socialism can now be said
to be one of the most widespread ideologies of our age, increasingly shap-
ing the political programs and actual policies not only of explicitly socialist
parties, and to a lesser degree those of the western communists, but also
of groups and parties who would not even in their most far-fetched dreams
call themselves socialists, like the east coast "liberal" Democrats in the
United States.6 And in the field of international politics the ideas of social-
democratic socialism, in particular of a redistributive approach towards the
so-called North-South conflict, have almost become something like the of-
ficial position among all "well-informed" and "well-intentioned" men; a con-
sensus extending far beyond those who think of themselves as socialists.7
What are the central features of socialism social-democratic-style?

There are basically two characteristics. First, in positive contradistinction to
the traditional Marxist-style socialism, social-democratic socialism does not
outlaw private ownership in the means of production and it even accepts
the idea of all means of production being privately owned-with the excep-
tion only of education, traffic and communication, central banking, and the
police and courts. In principle, everyone has the right to privately ap-
propriate and own means of production, to sell, buy, or newly produce them,
to give them away as a present, or to rent them out to someone else under
a contractual arrangement. But secondly, no owner of means of produc-
tion rightfully owns all of the income that can be derived from the usage of
his means of production and no owner is left to decide how much of the total
income from production to allocate to consumption and investment. In-
stead, part of the income from production rightfully belongs to society, has
to be handed over to it, and is then, according to ideas of egalitarianism or
distributive justice, redistributed to its individual members. Furthermore,
though the respective income-shares that go to the producer and to society
might be fixed at any given point in time, the share that rightfully belongs to
the producer is in principle flexible and the determination of its size, as well
as that of society's share, is not up to the producer, but rightfully belongs
to society.8
Seen from the point of view of the natural theory of property-the theory
underlying capitalism~the adoption of these rules implies that the rights of
the natural owner have been aggressively invaded. According to this theory
of property, it should be recalled, the user-owner of the means of produc-
tion can do whatever he wants with them; and whatever the outcome of his
usage, it is his own private income, which he can use again as he pleases,
as long as he does not change the physical integrity of someone else's
property and exclusively relies on contractual exchanges. From the
standpoint of the natural theory of property, there are not two separate
processes-the production of income and then, after income is produced,
its distribution. There is only one process: in producing income it is
automatically distributed; the producer is the owner. As compared with this,
socialism social-democratic style advocates the partial expropriation of the
natural owner by redistributing part of the income from production to people
who, whatever their merits otherwise, definitely did not produce the income
in question and definitely did not have any contractual claims to it, and who,
in addition, have the right to determine unilaterally, i.e., without having to
wait for the affected producer's consent, how far this partial expropriation
can go.
It should be clear from this description that, contrary to the impression
which socialism social-democratic style is intended to generate among the
public, the difference between both types of socialism is not of a categori-

cal nature. Rather, it is only a matter of degree. Certainly, the first men-
tioned rule seems to inaugurate a fundamental difference in that it allows
private ownership. But then the second rule in principle allows the ex-
propriation of all of the producer's income from production and thus reduces
his ownership right to a purely nominal one. Of course, social-democratic
socialism does not have to go as far as reducing private ownership to one
in name only. And admittedly, as the income-share that the producer is
forced to hand over to society can in fact be quite moderate, this, in prac-
tice, can make a tremendous difference as regards economic performance.
But still, it must be realized that from the standpoint of the nonproducing fel-
lowmen, the degree of expropriation of private producers' income is a mat-
ter of expediency, which suffices to reduce the difference between both

types of socialism-Russian and social-democratic style-once and for all to

a difference only of degree. It should be apparent what this important fact
implies for a producer. It means that however low the presently fixed de-
gree of expropriation might be, his productive efforts take place under the
ever-present threat that in the future the income-share which must be
handed over to society will be raised unilaterally. It does not need much
comment to see how this increases the risk, or the cost of producing, and
hence lowers the rate of investment.
With this statement a first step in the analysis that follows has already
been taken. What are the economic, in the colloquial sense of the term, con-
sequences of adopting a system of social-democratic socialism? After what
has just been said, it is probably no longer altogether surprising to hear that
at least as regards the general direction of the effects, they are quite similar
to those of traditional Marxist-type socialism. Still, to the extent that social-
democratic socialism settles for partial expropriation and the redistribution
of producer incomes, some of the impoverishment effects that result from
a policy of fully socializing means of production can be circumvented. Since
these resources can still be bought and sold, the problem most typical of a
caretaker economy-that no market prices for means of production exist and
hence neither monetary calculation nor accounting are possible, with ensu-
ing misallocations and the waste of scarce resources in usages that are at
best of only secondary importance-is avoided. In addition, the problem of
overutilization is at least reduced. Also, since private investment and capi-
tal formation is still possible to the extent that some portion of income from
production is left with the producer to use at his discretion, under socialism
social-democratic style there is a relatively higher incentive to work, to save,
and to invest.
Nonetheless, by no means can all impoverishment effects be avoided.

Socialism social-democratic style, however good it might look in com-
parison with Russian-type socialism, still necessarily leads to a reduction in

investment and thus in future wealth as compared with that under
capitalism.9 By taking part of the income from production away from the
owner-producer, however small that part may be, and giving it to people
who did not produce the income in question, the costs of production (which
are never zero, as producing, appropriating, contractings always imply at
least the use of time, which could be used otherwise, for leisure, consump-
tion, or underground work, for instance) rise, and, mutatis mutandis, the
costs of nonproducing and/or underground production fall, however slight-
ly. As a consequence there will be relatively less production and investment,
even though, for reasons to be discussed shortly, the absolute level of
production and wealth might still rise. There will be relatively more leisure,
more consumption, and more moonlighting, and hence, all in all, relative im-
poverishment. And this tendency will be more pronounced the higher the
income from production that is redistributed, and the more imminent the
likelihood that it will be raised in the future by unilateral, noncontractual
societal decision.
For a long time by far the most popular idea for implementing the general
policy goal of social-democratic socialism was to redistribute monetary in-
come by means of income taxation or a general sales tax levied on
producers. A look at this particular technique shall further clarify our point
and avoid some frequently encountered misunderstandings and miscon-
ceptions about the general effect of relative impoverishment. What is the
economic effect of introducing income or sales taxation where there has
been none before, or of raising an existing level of taxation to a new height? 10
In answering this, I will further ignore the complications that result from the
different possible ways of redistributing tax money to different individuals or
groups of individuals-these shall be discussed later in this chapter. Here
we will only take into account the general fact, true by definition for all
redistributive systems, that any redistribution of tax money is a transfer from

monetary income producers and contractual money recipients to people in
their capacity as nonproducers and nonrecipients of contractual money in-
comes. Introducing or raising taxation thus implies that monetary income
flowing from production is reduced for the producer and increased for
people in their roles as nonproducers and noncontractors. This changes
the relative costs of production for monetary return versus nonproduction
and production for nonmonetary returns. Accordingly, insofar as this
change is perceived by people, they will increasingly resort to leisurely con-
sumption and/or production for the purpose of barter, simultaneously reduc-
ing their productive efforts undertaken for monetary rewards. In any case,
the output of goods to be purchased with money will fall, which is to say the
purchasing power of money decreases, and hence the general standard of
living will decline.
Against this reasoning it is sometimes argued that it has been frequent-

ly observed empirically that a rise in the level of taxation was actually ac-
companied by a rise (not a fall) in the gross national product (GNP), and
that the above reasoning, however plausible, must thus be considered em-
pirically invalid. This alleged counter-argument exhibits a simple
misunderstanding: a confusion between absolute and relative reduction. In
the above analysis the conclusion is reached that the effect of higher taxes
is a relative reduction in production for monetary returns; a reduction, that
is, as compared with the level of production that would have been attained
had the degree of taxation not been altered. It does not say or imply any-
thing with respect to the absolute level of output produced. As a matter of
fact, absolute growth of GNP is not only compatible with our analysis but
can be seen as a perfectly normal phenomenon to the extent that advances
in productivity are possible and actually take place. If it has become pos-
sible, through improvement in the technology of production, to produce a
higher output with an identical input (in terms of costs), or a physically iden-
tical output with a reduced input, then the coincidence of increased taxa-
tion and increased output is anything but surprising. But, to be sure, this
does not at all affect the validity of what has been stated about relative im-
poverishment resulting from taxation.
Another objection that enjoys some popularity is that raising taxes leads
to a reduction in monetary income, and that this reduction raises the mar-
ginal utility of money as compared with other forms of income (like leisure)
and thus, instead of lowering it, actually helps to increase the tendency to
work for monetary return. This observation, to be sure, is perfectly true. But
it is a misconception to believe that it does anything to invalidate the rela-
tive impoverishment thesis. First of all, in order to get the full picture it should
be noted that through taxation, not only the monetary income for some
people (the producers) is reduced but simultaneously monetary income for
other people (nonproducers) is increased, and for these people the mar-
ginal utility of money and hence their inclination to work for monetary return
would be reduced. But this is by no means all that need be said, as this
might still leave the impression that taxation simply does not affect the out-
put of exchangeable goods at ail-since it will reduce the marginal utility of
money income for some and increase it for others, with both effects cancell-
ing each other out. But this impression would be wrong. As a matter of fact,
this would be a denial of what has been assumed at the outset: that a tax
hike, i.e., a higher monetary contribution forced upon disapproving income
producers, has actually taken place and has been perceived as such-and
would hence involve a logical contradiction. Intuitively, the flaw in the belief
that taxation is "neutral" as regards output becomes apparent as soon as
the argument is carried to its ultimate extreme. It would then amount to the
statement that even complete expropriation of all of the producers'
monetary income and the transfer of it to a group of nonproducers would
not make any difference, since the increased laziness of the nonproducers
resulting from this redistribution would be fully compensated by an in-
creased workaholism on the part of the producers (which is certainly ab-
surd). What is overlooked in this sort of reasoning is that the introduction
of taxation or the rise in any given level of taxation does not only imply favor-
ing nonproducers at the expense of producers, it also simultaneously chan-
ges, for producers and nonproducers of monetary income alike, the cost
attached to different methods of achieving an (increasing) monetary in-
come. For it is now relatively less costly to attain additional monetary in-
come through nonproductive means, i.e., not through actually producing
more goods but by participating in the process of noncontractual acquisi-
tions of goods already produced. Even if producers are indeed more intent
upon attaining additional money as a consequence of a higher tax, they will
increasingly do so not by intensifying their productive efforts but rather
through exploitative methods. This explains why taxation is not, and never
can be, neutral. With (increased) taxation a different legal incentive struc-
ture is institutionalized: one that changes the relative costs of production
for monetary income versus nonproduction, including nonproduction for
leisurely purposes and nonproduction for monetary return, and also versus
production for nonmonetary return (barter). And if such a different incen-
tive structure is applied to one and the same population, then, and neces-
sarily so, a decrease in the output of goods produced for monetary return
must result.11
While income and sales taxation are the most common techniques, they
do not exhaust social-democratic socialism's repertoire of redistribute
methods. No matter how the taxes are redistributed to the individuals com-
posing a given society, no matter, for instance, to what extent monetary in-
come is equalized, since these individuals can and do lead different lifestyles
and since they allocate different portions of the monetary income assigned
to them to consumption or to the formation of nonproductively used private

wealth, sooner or later significant differences between people will again
emerge, if not with respect to their monetary income, then with respect to
private wealth. And not surprisingly, these differences will steadily become
more pronounced if a purely contractual inheritance law exists. Hence, so-
cial-democratic socialism, motivated as it is by egalitarian zeal, includes
private wealth in its policy schemes and imposes a tax on it, too, and in par-
ticular imposes an inheritance tax in order to satisfy the popular outcry over
"unearned riches" falling upon heirs.
Economically, these measures immediately reduce the amount of

private wealth formation. As the enjoyment of private wealth is made rela-
tively more costly by the tax, less wealth will be newly created, increased
consumption will ensue-including that of existing stocks of nonproductive-
ly used riches-and the overall standard of living, which of course also
depends on the comforts derived from private wealth, will sink.
Similar conclusions about impoverishment effects are reached when

the third major field of tax policies-that of "natural assets"--is analyzed. For
reasons to be discussed below, this field, next to the two traditional fields of
monetary income and private wealth taxation, has gained more prominence
over time under the heading of opportunity equalization. It did not take
much to discover that a person's position in life does not depend exclusive-
ly on monetary income or the wealth of nonproductively used goods. There
are other things that are important in life and which bring additional income,
even though it may not be in the form of money or other exchange goods:
a nice family, an education, health, good looks, etc. I will call these nonex-
changeable goods from which (psychic) income can be derived "natural as-
sets." Redistribute socialism, led by egalitarian ideals, is also irritated by
existing differences in such assets, and tries, if not to eradicate, then at least
to moderate them. But these assets, being nonexchangeable goods, can-
not be easily expropriated and the proceeds then redistributed. It is also

not very practical, to say the least, to achieve this goal by directly reducing
the nonmonetary income from natural assets of higher income people to the
level of lower income people by, for instance, ruining the health of the heal-
thy and so making them equal to the sick, or by smashing the good-look-
ing people's faces to make them look like their less fortunate bad-looking
fellows. 12 Thus, the common method social-democratic socialism advo-
cates in order to create "equality of opportunity" is taxation of natural assets.
Those people who are thought to receive a relatively higher nonmonetary
income from some asset, like health, are subject to an additional tax, to be
paid in money. This tax is then redistributed to those people whose respec-
tive income is relatively low to help compensate them for this fact. An ad-
ditional tax, for instance, is levied on the healthy to help the unhealthy pay
their doctor bills, or on the good-looking to help the ugly pay for plastic
surgery or to buy themselves a drink so that they can forget about their lot.
The economic consequences of such redistributive schemes should be
clear. Insofar as the psychic income, represented by health, for instance,
requires some productive, time and cost-consuming effort, and as people
can, in principle, shift from productive roles into nonproductive ones, or
channel their productive efforts into different, non- or less heavily taxed lines
of nonexchangeable or exchangeable goods production, they will do so be-
cause of the increased costs involved in the production of personal health.
The overall production of the wealth in question will fall, the general stand-
ard of health, that is, will be reduced. And even with truly natural assets, like
intelligence, about which people can admittedly do little or nothing, conse-
quences of the same kind will result, though only with a time lag of one
generation. Realizing that it has become relatively more costly to be intel-
ligent and less so to be nonintelligent, and wanting as much income (of all
sorts) as possible for one's offspring, the incentive for intelligent people to
produce offspring has been lowered and for nonintelligent ones raised.
Given the laws of genetics, the result will be a population that is all in all less
intelligent. And besides, in any case of taxation of natural assets, true for
the example of health as well as for that of intelligence, because monetary
income is taxed, a tendency similar to the one resulting from income taxa-
tion will set in, i.e., a tendency to reduce one's efforts for monetary return
and instead increasingly engage in productive activity for nonmonetary
return or in all sorts of nonproductive enterprises. And, of course, all this
once again reduces the general standard of living.
But this is still not all that has to be said about the consequences of
socialism social-democratic-style, as it will also have remote yet nonethe-
less highly important effects on the social-moral structure of society, which
will become visible when one considers the long-term effects of introducing
redistributive policies. It probably no longer comes as a surprise that in this
regard, too, the difference between Russian-type socialism and socialism
social-democratic style, while highly interesting in some details, is not of a
principal kind.
As should be recalled, the effect of the former on the formation of per-

sonality types was twofold, reducing the incentive to develop productive
skills, and favoring at the same time the development of political talents.
This precisely is also the overall consequence of social-democratic
socialism. As social-democratic socialism favors nonproductive roles as
well as productive ones that escape public notice and so cannot be reached
by taxation, the character of the population changes accordingly. This
process might be slow, but as long as the peculiar incentive structure es-
tablished by redistributive policies lasts, it is constantly operative. Less in-
vestment in the development and improvement of one's productive skills will
take place and, as a consequence, people will become increasingly unable
to secure their income on their own, by producing or contracting. And as
the degree of taxation rises and the circle of taxed income widens, people
will increasingly develop personalities as inconspicuous, as uniform, and as
mediocre as is possible--at least as far as public appearance is concerned.
At the same time, as a person's income simultaneously becomes depend-
ent on politics, i.e., on society's decision on how to redistribute taxes (which
is reached, to be sure, not by contracting, but rather by superimposing one
person's will on another's recalcitrant one!), the more dependent it be-
comes, the more people will have to politicalize, i.e., the more time and ener-
gy they will have to invest in the development of their special talents for
achieving personal advantages at the expense (i.e., in a noncontractual way)
of others or of preventing such exploitation from occurring.
The difference between both types of socialism lies (only) in the follow-
ing: under Russian-type socialism society's control over the means of
production, and hence over the income produced with them, is complete,
and so far there seems to be no more room to engage in political debate
about the proper degree of politicalization of society. The issue is settled-
just as it is settled at the other end of the spectrum, under pure capitalism,
where there is no room for politics at all and all relations are exclusively con-
tractual. Under social-democratic socialism, on the other hand, social con-
trol over income produced privately is actually only partial, and increased
or full control exists only as society's not yet actualized right, making only
for a potential threat hanging over the heads of private producers. But living
with the threat of being fully taxed rather than actually being so taxed ex-
plains an interesting feature of social-democratic socialism as regards the
general development toward increasingly politicalized characters. It ex-
plains why under a system of social-democratic socialism the sort of
politicalization is different from that under Russian-type socialism. Under
the latter, time and effort is spent nonproductively, discussing how to dis-
tribute the socially owned income; under the former, to be sure, this is also
done, but time and effort are also used for political quarrels over the issue
of how large or small the socially administered income-shares should ac-
tually be. Under a system of socialized means of production where this issue
is settled once and for all, there is then relatively more withdrawal from public
life, resignation, and cynicism to be observed. Social-democratic socialism,
on the other hand, where the question is still open, and where producers
and nonproducers alike can still entertain some hope of improving their posi-
tion by decreasing or increasing taxation, has less of such privatization and,
instead, more often has people actively engaged in political agitation either
in favor of increasing society's control of privately produced incomes, or
against it. 13
With the general similarity as well as this specific difference between

both types of socialism explained, the task remains of presenting a brief
analysis of some modifying forces influencing the general development
toward unproductive politicalized personalities. These are effected by dif-
fering approaches to the desirable pattern of income distribution. Russian
and social-democratic socialism alike are faced with the question of how to
distribute income that happens to be socially controlled. For Russian-type
socialism it is a matter of what salaries to pay to individuals who have been
assigned to various positions in the caretaker economy. For redistributive
socialism it is the question of how much tax to allocate to whom. While there
are in principle innumerable ways to do this, the egalitarian philosophy of
both kinds of socialism effectively reduces the available options to three
general types. 14 The first one is the method of more or less equalizing
everybody's monetary income (and possibly also private, nonproductively
used wealth). Teachers, doctors, construction workers and miners, factory
managers and cleaning ladies all earn pretty much the same salary, or the
difference between them is at least considerably reduced. 15 It does not
need much comment to realize that this approach reduces the incentive to
work most drastically, for It no longer makes much difference-salary-wise-

-if one works diligently all day or fools around most of the time. Hence, dis-
utility of labor being a fact of life, people will increasingly fool around, with
the average income that everyone seems to be guaranteed constantly fall-
ing, in relative terms. Thus, this approach relatively strengthens the tenden-
cy toward withdrawal, disillusionment, cynicism, and mutatis mutandis,
contributes to a relative reduction in the general atmosphere of political iza-
tion. The second approach has the more moderate aim of guaranteeing a
minimum income which, though normally somehow linked to average in-
come, falls well below it. 16 This, too, reduces the incentive to work, since,
to the extent that they are only marginal income producers with incomes
from production only slightly above the minimum, people will now be more
inclined to reduce or even stop their work, enjoy leisure instead, and settle
for the minimum income. Thus more people than otherwise will fall below
the minimum line, or more people than otherwise will keep or acquire those
characteristics on whose existence payment of minimum salaries is bound,
and as a consequence, again, the average income to which the minimum
salary is linked will fall below the level that it otherwise would have reached.
But, of course, the incentive to work is reduced to a smaller degree under
the second than the first scheme. On the other hand, the second approach
will lead to a relatively higher degree of active politicalization (and less of
resigned withdrawal), because, unlike average income, which can be objec-
tively ascertained, the level at which the minimum income is fixed is a com-
pletely subjective, arbitrary affair, which is thus particularly prone to
becoming a permanent political issue.
Undoubtedly, the highest degree of active political ization is reached

when the third distributional approach is chosen. Its goal, gaining more and
more prominence for social democracy, is to achieve equality of oppor-
tunity.17 The idea is to create, through redistributional measures, a situa-
tion in which everyone's chance of achieving any possible (income) posi-

tion in life is equal-very much as in a lottery where each ticket has the same
chance of being a winner or a loser-and, in addition, to have a corrective
mechanism which helps rectify situations of "undeserved bad luck"
(whatever that may be) which might occur in the course of the ongoing game
of chance. Taken literally, of course, this idea is absurd: there is no way of
equalizing the opportunity of someone living in the Alps and someone resid-
ing at the seaside. In addition, it seems quite clear that the idea of a correc-
tive mechanism is simply incompatible with the lottery idea. Yet it is
precisely this high degree of vagueness and confusion which contributes to
the popular appeal of this concept. What constitutes an opportunity, what
makes an opportunity different or the same, worse or better, how much and
what kind of compensation is needed to equalize opportunities which ad-
mittedly cannot be equalized in physical terms (as in the Alps-seaside ex-
ample), what is undeserved bad luck and what a rectification, are all
completely subjective matters. They are dependent on subjective evalua-
tions, changing as they do, and there is then-if one indeed applies the
equality of opportunity concept- an unlimited reservoir of all sorts of dis-
tributional demands, for all sorts of reasons and for all sorts of people. This
is so, in particular, because equalizing opportunity is compatible with
demands for differences in monetary income or private wealth. A and B
might have the same income and might both be equally rich, but A might
be black, or a woman, or have bad eyesight, or be a resident of Texas, or
may have ten children, or no husband, or be over 65, whereas B might be
none of these but something else, and hence A might argue that his oppor-
tunities to attain everything possible in life are different, or rather worse, than
B's, and that he should somehow be compensated for this, thus making
their monetary incomes, which were the same before, now different. And
B, of course, could argue in exactly the same way by simply reversing the
implied evaluation of opportunities. As a consequence, an unheard of de-

gree of politicalization will ensue. Everything seems fair now, and producers
and nonproducers alike, the former for defensive and the latter for aggres-
sive purposes, will be driven into spending more and more time in the role
of raising, destroying, and countering distributional demands. And to be
sure, this activity, like the engagement in leisurely activities, is not only non-
productive but in clear contrast to the role of enjoying leisure, implies spend-
ing time for the very purpose of actually disrupting the undisturbed
enjoyment of wealth produced, as well as its new production.
But not only is increased political ization stimulated (above and beyond
the level implied by socialism generally) by promoting the idea of equaliz-
ing opportunity. There is once more, and this is perhaps one of the most
interesting features of new social-democratic-socialism as compared with
its traditional Marxist form, a new and different character to the kind of
politicalization implied by it. Under any policy of distribution, there must be
people who support and promote it. And normally, though not exclusively
so, this is done by those who profit most from it. Thus, under a system of
income and wealth-equalization and also under that of a minimum income
policy, it is mainly the "have-nots" who are the supporters of the politicaliza-
tion of social life. Given the fact that on the average they happen to be those
with relatively lower intellectual, in particular verbal capabilities, this makes
for politics which appears to lack much intellectual sophistication, to say the
least. Put more bluntly, politics tends to be outright dull, dumb, and appall-
ing, even to a considerable number of the have-nots themselves. On the
other hand, in adopting the idea of equalizing opportunity, differences in
monetary income and wealth are not only allowed to exist but even become
quite pronounced, provided that this is justifiable by some underlying dis-
crepancies in the opportunity structure for which the former differences help
compensate. Now in this sort of politics the haves can participate, too. As
a matter of fact, being the ones who on the average command superior ver-
bal skills, and the task of defining opportunities as better or worse being es-
sentially one of persuasive rhetorical powers, this is exactly their sort of
game. Thus the haves will now become the dominant force in sustaining
the process of politicalization. Increasingly it will be people from their ranks
that move to the top of the socialist party organization, and accordingly the
appearance and rhetoric of socialist politics will take on a different shape,
becoming more and more intellectualized, changing its appeal and attract-
ing a new class of supporters.
With this I have reached the stage in the analysis of social-democratic

socialism where only a few remarks and observations are needed which will
help illustrate the validity of the above theoretical considerations. Though
it does not at all affect the validity of the conclusions reached above, depend-
ing as they do exclusively on the truth of the premises and the correctness
of the deductions, there unfortunately exists no nearly perfect, quasi-ex-
perimental case to illustrate the workings of social-democratic socialism as
compared with capitalism, as there was in the case of East and West Ger-
many regarding Russian-type socialism. Illustrating the point would involve
a comparison of manifestly different societies where the ceteris are clearly
not paribus, and thus it would no longer be possible to neatly match certain
causes with certain effects. Often, experiments in social-democratic
socialism simply have not lasted long enough, or have been interrupted
repeatedly by policies that could not definitely be classified as social-
democratic socialism. Or else from the very beginning, they have been
mixed with such different-and even inconsistent-policies as a result of
political compromising, that in reality different causes and effects are so en-
tangled that no striking illustrative evidence can be produced for any thesis
of some degree of specificity. The task of disentangling causes and effects
then becomes a genuinely theoretical one again, lacking the peculiar per-
suasiveness that characterizes experimentally produced evidence.
Nonetheless some evidence exists, if only of a more dubious quality.

First, on the level of highly global observations, the general thesis about
relative impoverishment brought about by redistribute socialism is il-
lustrated by the fact that the standard of living is relatively higher and has
become more so over time in the United States of America than in Western
Europe, or, more specifically, than in the countries of the European Com-
munity (EC). Both regions are roughly comparable with respect to popula-
tion size, ethnic and cultural diversity, tradition and heritage, and also with
respect to natural endowments, but the United States is comparatively more
capitalist and Europe more socialist. Every neutral observer will hardly fail
to notice this point, as indicated also by such global measures as state ex-
penditure as percent of GNP, which is roughly 35 percent in the United
States as compared to about 50 percent or more in Western Europe. It also
fits into the picture that the European countries (in particular Great Britain)
exhibited more impressive rates of economic growth in the nineteenth cen-
tury, which has been described repeatedly by historians as the period of
classical liberalism, than in the twentieth, which, in contrast, has been
termed that of socialism and statism. In the same way the validity of the
theory is illustrated by the fact that Western Europe has been increasingly
surpassed in rates of economic growth by some of the Pacific countries,
such as Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia; and that the latter, in
adopting a relatively more capitalist course, have meanwhile achieved a
much higher standard of living than socialistically inclined countries which
started at about the same time with roughly the same basis of economic
development, such as India.
Coming then to more specific observations, there are the recent ex-
periences of Portugal, where in 1974 the autocratic Salazar regime of con-
servative socialism (on this type of socialism see the following chapter),
which had kept Portugal one of the poorest countries in Europe, was sup-
planted in an upheaval by redistributive socialism (with elements of
nationalization) and where since then the standard of living has fallen even
further, literally turning the country into a third world region. There is also
the socialist experiment of Mitterand's France, which produced an im-
mediate deterioration of the economic situation, so noticeable-most con-
spicuous being a drastic rise in unemployment and repeated currency
devaluations-that after less than two years, sharply reduced public support
for the government forced a reversal in policy, which was almost comic in
that it amounted to a complete denial of what only a few weeks before had
been advocated as its dearest convictions.
The most instructive case, though, might again be provided by Germany

and, this time, West Germany. 18 From 1949 to 1966 a liberal-conservative
government which showed a remarkable commitment to the principles of a
market economy existed, even though from the very beginning there was a
considerable degree of conservative-socialist elements mixed in and these
elements gained more importance over time. In any case, of all the major
European nations, during this period West Germany was, in relative terms,
definitely the most capitalist country, and the result of this was that it be-
came Europe's most prosperous society, with growth rates that surpassed
those of all its neighbors. Until 1961, millions of German refugees, and after-
wards millions of foreign workers from southern European countries be-
came integrated into its expanding economy, and unemployment and
inflation were almost unknown. Then, after a brief transition period, from
1969 to 1982 (almost an equal time span) a social-democratically led
socialist-liberal government took over. It raised taxes and social security
contributions considerably, increased the number of public employees,
poured additional tax funds into existing social programs and created new
ones, and significantly increased spending on all sorts of so-called "public
goods, " thereby allegedly equalizing opportunities and enhancing the over-
all "quality of life." By resorting to a Keynesian policy of deficit spending
and unanticipated inflation, the effects of raising the socially guaranteed min-
imum provisions for nonproducers at the expense of more heavily taxed
producers could be delayed for a few years (the motto of the economic
policy of former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was "rather 5%
inflation than 5% unemployment"). They were only to become more dras-
tic somewhat later, however, as unanticipated inflation and credit expansion
had created and prolonged the over- or rather malinvestment typical of a
boom. As a result, not only was there much more than 5 percent inflation,
but unemployment also rose steadily and approached 10 percent; the
growth of GNP became slower and slower until it actually fell in absolute
terms during the last few years of the period. Instead of being an expand-
ing economy, the absolute number of people employed decreased; more
and more pressure was generated on foreign workers to leave the country
and the immigration barriers were simultaneously raised to ever higher
levels. All of this happened while the importance of the underground
economy grew steadily.
But these were only the more evident effects of a narrowly defined
economic kind. There were other effects of a different sort, which were ac-
tually of more lasting importance. With the new socialist-liberal government
the idea of equalizing opportunity came to the ideological forefront. And as
has been predicted theoretically, it was in particular the official spreading of
the idea mehr Demokratie wagen ("risk more Democracy")--init'ally one of
the most popular slogans of the new (Willy Brandt) era-that led to a degree
of politicalization unheard of before. All sorts of demands were raised in the
name of equality of opportunity; and there was hardly any sphere of life,
from childhood to old age, from leisure to work conditions, that was not ex-
amined intensely for possible differences that it offered to different people
with regard to opportunities defined as relevant. Not surprisingly, such op-

portunities and such differences were found constantly,19 and, according-
ly, the realm of politics seemed to expand almost daily. 'There is no question
that is not a political one" could be heard more and more often. In order to
stay ahead of this development the parties in power had to change, too. In
particular the Social Democrats, traditionally a blue-collar workers' party,
had to develop a new image. With the idea of equalizing opportunity gain-
ing ground, it increasingly became, as could be predicted, the party of the
(verbal) intelligentsia, of social scientists and of teachers. And this "new"
party, almost as if to prove the point that a process of polidealization will be
sustained mainly by those who can profit from its distributional schemes
and that the job of defining opportunities is essentially arbitrary and a mat-
ter of rhetorical power, then made it one of its central concerns to channel
the most diverse political energies set in motion into the field of equalizing,
above all, educational opportunities. In particular, they "equalized" the op-
portunities for a high school and university education, by offering the respec-
tive services not only free of charge but by literally paying large groups of
students to take advantage of them. This not only increased the demand
for educators, teachers, and social scientists, whose payment naturally had
to come from taxes. It also amounted, somewhat ironically for a socialist
party which argued that equalizing educational opportunities would imply
an income transfer from the rich to the poor, in effect to a subsidy paid to
the more intelligent at the expense of a complementary income reduction
for the less intelligent, and, to the extent that there are higher numbers of in-
telligent people among the middle and upper social classes than among the
lower, a subsidy to the haves paid by the have-nots.20 As a result of this
process of politicalization led by increased numbers of tax-paid educators
gaining influence over increased numbers of students, there emerged (as
could be predicted) a change in the mentality of the people. It was increas-
ingly considered completely normal to satisfy all sorts of demands through

political means, and to claim all sorts of alleged rights against other sup-
posedly better-situated people and their property; and for a whole genera-
tion of people raised during this period, it became less and less natural to
think of improving one's lot by productive effort or by contracting. Thus,
when the actual economic crisis, necessitated by the redistributionist policy,
arose, the people were less equipped than ever to overcome it, because
over time the same policy had weakened precisely those skills and talents
which were now most urgently required. Revealingly enough, when the
socialist-liberal government was ousted in 1982, mainly because of its ob-
viously miserable economic performance, it was still the prevalent opinion
that the crisis should be resolved not by eliminating the causes, i.e., the swol-
len minimum provisions for nonproducers or noncontractors, but rather by
another redistributive measure: by forcibly equalizing the available work-
time for employed and unemployed people. And in line with this spirit the
new conservative-liberal government in fact did no more than slow down
the rate of growth of taxation.
5
THE SOCIALISM OF CONSERVATISM
A n the two preceding chapters the forms of socialism most commonly

known and identified as such, and that are indeed derived from basically the
same ideological sources were discussed: socialism Russian-style, as most
conspicuously represented by the communist countries of the East bloc;
and social-democratic socialism, with its most typical representatives in the
socialist and social-democratic parties of Western Europe, and to a lesser
extent in the "liberals" of the United States. The property rules underlying
their policy schemes were analyzed, and the idea presented that one can
apply the property principles of Russian or social-democratic socialism in
varying degrees: one can socialize all means of production or just a few,
and one can tax away and redistribute almost all income, and almost all
types of income, or one can do this with just a small portion of only a few
types of income. But, as was demonstrated by theoretical means and, less
stringently, through some illustrative empirical evidence, as long as one ad-
heres to these principles at all and does not once and for all abandon the
notion of ownership rights belonging to nonproducers (nonusers) and non-
contractors, relative impoverishment must be the result.
This chapter will show that the same is true of conservatism, because
it, too, is a form of socialism. Conservatism also produces impoverishment,
and all the more so, the more resolutely it is applied. But before going into
a systematic and detailed economic analysis of the peculiar ways in which
conservatism produces this effect, it would be appropriate to take a short
look at history, in order to better understand why conservatism indeed is
socialism, and how it is related to the two egalitarian forms of socialism dis-
cussed previously.
Roughly speaking, before the eighteenth century in Europe and

throughout the world, a social system of "feudalism" or "absolutism," which

was in fact feudalism on a grander scale, existed.1 In abstract terms, the
social order of feudalism was characterized by a regional overlord who
claimed ownership of some territory, including all of its resources and
goods, and quite often also of all of the men placed upon it, without having
originally appropriated them himself through use or work, and without
having a contractual claim to them. On the contrary, the territory, or better,
the various parts of it and the goods standing on it, had been actively oc-
cupied, used, and produced by different people before (the "natural
owners"). The ownership claims of the feudal lords were thus derived from
thin air. Hence, the practice, based on these alleged ownership rights, of
renting land and other production factors out to the natural owners in return
for goods and services unilaterally fixed by the overlord, had to be enforced
against the will of these natural owners, by brutal force and armed violence,
with the help of a noble caste of military men who were rewarded by the
overlord for their services by being allowed to participate and share in his
exploitative methods and proceeds. For the common man subject to this
order, life meant tyranny, exploitation, economic stagnation, poverty, star-
vation, and despair.2
As might be expected, there was resistance to this system. Interesting-

ly enough though (from a present-day perspective), it was not the peasant
population who suffered most from the existing order, but the merchants
and traders who became the leading opponents of the feudal system.
Buying at a lower price in one place and traveling and selling at a higher
price in a different place, as they did, made their subordination to any one
feudal lord relatively weak. They were essentially a class of "international"
men, crossing the borders of various feudal territories constantly. As such,
in order to do business they required a stable, internationally valid legal sys-
tem: a system of rules, valid regardless of time and place, defining proper-
THE SOCIALISM OF CONSERVATISM 67
ty and contract, which would facilitate the evolution of the institutions of

credit, banking and insurance essential to any large-scale trading business.
Naturally, this caused friction between the merchants and the feudal lords
as representatives of various arbitrary, regional, legal systems. The mer-
chants became feudal ism's outcasts, permanently threatened and harassed
by the noble military caste attempting to bring them under their control.3
In order to escape this threat the merchants were forced to organize

themselves and help establish small fortified trading places at the very frin-
ges of the centers of feudal power. As places of partial exterritoriality and
at least partial freedom, they soon attracted growing numbers of the
peasantry running away from feudal exploitation and economic misery, and
they grew into small towns, fostering the development of crafts and produc-
tive enterprises which could not have emerged in the surroundings of ex-
ploitation and legal instability characteristic of the feudal order itself. This
process was more pronounced where the feudal powers were relatively
weak and where power was dispersed among a great number of often very
minor, rival feudal lords. It was in the cities of northern Italy, the cities of the
Hanseatic league, and those of Flanders that the spirit of capitalism first blos-
somed, and commerce and production reached their highest levels.4
But this partial emancipation from the restrictions and the stagnation of
feudalism was only temporary, and was followed by reaction and decline.
This was due in part to internal weaknesses in the movement of the new
merchant class itself. Still too much ingrained in the minds of men was the
feudal way of thinking in terms of different ranks assigned to people, of sub-
ordination and power, and of order having to be imposed upon men through
coercion. Hence, in the newly emerging commercial centers a new set of
noncontractual regulations and restrictions-now of "bourgeois" origin-was
soon established, guilds that restrained free competition were formed, and
a new merchant oligarchy arose. 5 More important, though, for this reaction-
ary process was yet another fact. In their endeavor to free themselves from
the exploitative interventions of the various feudal lords, the merchants had
to look for natural allies. Understandably enough, they found such allies
among those from the class of feudal lords who, though comparatively more
powerful than their noble fellows, had the centers of their power at a rela-
tively greater distance from the commercial towns seeking assistance. In
aligning themselves with the merchant class, they sought to extend their
power beyond its present range at the expense of other, minor lords.6 In
order to achieve this goal they first granted certain exemptions from the "nor-
mal" obligations falling upon the subjects of feudal rule to the rising urban
centers, thus assuring their existence as places of partial freedom, and of-
fered protection from the neighboring feudal powers. But as soon as the
coalition had succeeded in its joint attempt to weaken the local lords and
the merchant towns' "foreign" feudal ally had thereby become established
as a real power outside of its own traditional territory, it moved ahead and
established itself as a feudal super power, i.e., as a monarchy, with a king
who superimposed his own exploitative rules onto those of the already ex-
isting feudal system. Absolutism had been born; and as this was nothing
but feudalism on a larger scale, economic decline again set in, the towns
disintegrated, and stagnation and misery returned.7
It was not until the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, then,
that feudalism came under truly heavy attack. This time the attack was more
severe, because it was no longer simply the attempt of practical men-the
merchants-to secure spheres of relative freedom in order to do their prac-
tical business. It was increasingly an ideological battle fought against
feudalism. Intellectual reflection on the causes of the rise and decline of
commerce and industry that had been experienced, and a more intensive
study of Roman and in particular of Natural Law, which had both been redis-
covered in the course of the merchants' struggle to develop an internation-

al merchant law and justify it against the competing claims of feudal law,
had led to a sounder understanding of the concept of liberty, and of liberty
as a prerequisite to economic prosperity.8 As these ideas, culminating in
such works as J. Locke's 'Two Treatises on Government," 1688, and A.
Smith's "Wealth of Nations," 1776, spread and occupied the minds of a
steadily expanding circle of people, the old order lost its legitimacy. The old
way of thinking in terms of feudal bonds gradually gave way to the idea of
a contractual society. Finally, as outward expressions of this changed state
of affairs in public opinion, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England, the
American Revolution of 1776, and the French Revolution of 1789 came
along; and nothing was the same after these revolutions had occurred. They
proved, once and for all, that the old order was not invincible, and they
sparked new hope for further progress on the road toward freedom and
prosperity.
Liberalism, as the ideological movement that had brought about these

earth-shattering events came to be called, emerged from these revolutions
stronger than ever and became for somewhat more than half a century the
dominating ideological force in Western Europe. It was the party of freedom
and of private property acquired through occupation and contract, assign-
ing to the state merely the role of enforcer of these natural rules.9 With rem-
nants of the feudal system still in effect everywhere, however shaken in their
ideological foundation, it was the party representing an increasingly liberal-
ized, deregulated, contractualized society, internally and externally, i.e.,
regarding domestic as well as foreign affairs and relations. And as under
the pressure of liberal ideas the European societies became increasingly
free of feudal restrictions, it also became the party of the Industrial Revolu-
tion, which was caused and stimulated by this very process of liberalization.
Economic development set in at a pace never before experienced by
mankind. Industry and commerce flourished, and capital formation and ac-
cumulation reached new heights. While the standard of living did not rise
immediately for everyone, it became possible to support a growing number
of people-people, that is, who only a few years before, under feudalism,
would have died of starvation because of the lack of economic wealth, and
who could now survive. In addition, with population growth leveling off
below the growth rate of capital, now everyone could realistically entertain
the hope of rising living standards being just around the corner. 10
It is against this background of history (somewhat streamlined, of

course, as it has just been presented) that the phenomenon of conservatism
as a form of socialism and its relation to the two versions of socialism
originating in Marxism must be seen and understood. All forms of socialism
are ideological responses to the challenge posed by the advance of
liberalism; but their stand taken against liberalism and feudalism-the old
order that liberalism had helped to destroy-differs considerably. The ad-
vance of liberalism had stimulated social change at a pace, to an extent, and
in variations unheard of before. The liberalization of society meant that in-
creasingly only those people could keep a given social position once ac-
quired who could do so by producing most efficiently for the most urgent
wants of voluntary consumers with as little cost as possible, and by relying
exclusively on contractual relationships with respect to the hiring of factors
of production and, in particular, of labor. Empires upheld solely by force
were crumbling under this pressure. And as consumer demand to which
the production structure now increasingly had to adapt (and not vice versa)
was changing constantly, and the upspring of new enterprises became in-
creasingly less regulated (insofar as it was the result of original appropria-
tion and/or contract), no one's relative position in the hierarchy of income
and wealth was secure anymore. Instead, upward and downward social
mobility increased significantly, for neither particular factor-owners nor
owners of particular labor services were any longer immune to respective
changes in demand. They were no longer guaranteed stable prices or a

stable income. 11
Old Marxist and new social-democratic socialism are the egalitarian,

progressive answers to this challenge of change, uncertainty, and mobility.
Like liberalism, they hail the destruction of feudalism and the advance of
capitalism. They realize that it was capitalism that freed people from ex-
ploitative feudal bonds and produced enormous improvements in the
economy; and they understand that capitalism, and the development of the
productive forces brought about by it, was a necessary and positive evolu-
tionary step on the way toward socialism. Socialism, as they conceive it,
shares the same goals with liberalism: freedom and prosperity. But
socialism supposedly improves on the achievements of liberalism by sup-
planting capitalism-the anarchy of production of private competitors which
causes the just-mentioned change, mobility, uncertainty, and unrest in the
social fabric-at its highest stage of development by a rationally planned and
coordinated economy which prevents insecurities derived from this change
from being felt at an individual level. Unfortunately, of course, as the last
two chapters have sufficiently demonstrated, this is a rather confused idea.
It is precisely by making individuals insensitive to change through redistribu-
tional measures that the incentive to adapt quickly to any future change is
taken away, and hence the value, in terms of consumer evaluations, of the
output produced will fall. And it is precisely because one plan is substituted
for many seemingly uncoordinated ones that individual freedom is reduced
and, mutatis mutandis, government by one man over another increased.
Conservatism, on the other hand, is the anti-egalitarian, reactionary
answer to the dynamic changes set in motion by a liberalized society: It is
anti-liberal and, rather than recognizing the achievements of liberalism,
tends to idealize and glorify the old system of feudalism as orderly and
stable. 12 As a postrevolutionary phenomenon, it does not necessarily and

outrightly advocate a return to the prerevolutionary status quo ante and ac-
cepts certain changes, however regretfully, as irreversible. But it is hardly
ruffled when old feudal powers that had lost all or parts of their estates to
the natural owners in the course of the liberalization process are restored to
their old position, and it definitely and openly propagates the conservation
of the status quo, i.e., the given highly unequal distribution of property,
wealth, and income. Its idea is to stop or slow down the permanent chan-
ges and mobility processes brought about by liberalism and capitalism as
completely as possible and, instead, to recreate an orderly and stable so-
cial system in which everyone remains securely in the position that the past
had assigned to him. 13
In order to do so, conservatism must, and indeed does, advocate the

legitimacy of noncontractual means in the acquisition and retention of
property and income derived from it, since it was precisely the exclusive
reliance on contractual relations that caused the very permanence of chan-
ges in the relative distribution of income and wealth. Just as feudalism al-
lowed the acquisition and upholding of property and wealth by force, so
conservatism ignores whether or not people have acquired or retain their
given income-and wealth-position through original appropriation and con-
tract. Instead, conservatism deems it appropriate and legitimate for a class
of once-established owners to have the right to stop any social change that
it considers a threat to their relative position in the social hierarchy of income
and wealth, even if the various individual owner-users of various production
factors did not contract into any such agreement. Conservatism, then, must
be addressed as the ideological heir of feudalism. And as feudalism must
be described as aristocratic socialism (which should be clear enough from
its above characterization), so must conservatism be considered as the
socialism of the bourgeois establishment. Liberalism, to which both the
egalitarian and the conservative versions of socialism are ideological
responses, reached the height of its influence around the mid-nineteenth

century. Probably its very last glorious achievements were the repeal of the
Corn Laws in England in 1846, accomplished by R. Cobden, J. Bright and
the anti-corn law league, and the 1848 revolutions of continental Europe.
Then, because of internal weaknesses and inconsistencies in the ideology
of liberalism,14 the diversions and the divisiveness which the various nation
states' imperialist adventures had brought about, and last but not least be-
cause of the appeal that the different versions of socialism with their various
promises of security and stability had and still have for the public's
widespread distaste for dynamic change and mobility,15 liberalism's decline
set in. Socialism increasingly supplanted it as a dominating ideological
force, thereby reversing the process of liberalization and once again impos-
ing more and more noncontractual elements on society.16 At different times
and places, different types of socialism found support in public opinion to
varying degrees, so that today traces of all of them can be found to coexist
in different degrees everywhere and to compound their respective im-
poverishment effects on the process of production, the upkeep of wealth
and the formation of character. But it is the influence of conservative
socialism, in particular, that must be stressed, especially because it is very
often overlooked or underestimated. If today the societies of Western
Europe can be described as socialist, this is due much more to the influence
of the socialism of conservatism than to that of egalitarian ideas. It is the
peculiar way in which conservatism exerts its influence, though, that ex-
plains why this is often not recognized. Conservatism not only shapes the
social structure by enacting policy; especially in societies like the European
ones where the feudal past has never been completely shaken off but where
a great number of feudal remnants survived even the peak of liberalism. An
ideology such as conservatism also exerts its influence, very inconspicuous-
ly, by simply maintaining the status quo and letting things continue to be
done according to age-old traditions. What then are the specifically con-
servative elements in present-day societies, and how do they produce rela-
tive impoverishment? With this question, we turn to the systematic analysis
of conservatism and its economic and socio-economic effects. An abstract
characterization of the property rules underlying conservatism and a
description of these rules in terms of the natural theory of property shall
again be the starting point. There are two such rules. First, conservative
socialism, like social-democratic socialism, does not outlaw private proper-
ty. Quite to the contrary: everything»all factors of production and all of the
nonproductively used wealth-can in principle be privately owned, sold,
bought, rented out, with the exception again only of such areas as educa-
tion, traffic and communication, central banking, and security production.
But then secondly, no owner owns all of his property and all of the income
that can be derived from its utilization. Rather, part of this belongs to the
society of present owners and income recipients, and society has the right
to allocate present and future produced income and wealth to its individual
members in such a way that the old, relative distribution of income and
wealth is preserved. And it is also society's right to determine how large or
small the income and wealth-share that is so administered should be, and
what exactly is needed to preserve a given income and wealth-distribution.17
From the perspective of the natural theory of property, the property ar-
rangement of conservatism again implies an aggression against the rights
of natural owners. Natural owners of things can do whatever they wish with
them, as long as they do not uninvitedly change the physical integrity of

someone else's property. This implies, In particular, their right to change
their property or to put it to different uses in order to adapt to anticipated
changes in demand and so preserve or possibly enhance its value; and it
also gives them the right to reap privately the benefits of increased proper-
ty values that stem from unanticipated changes in demand-from changes,

that is, that were lucky for them, but which they did not foresee or effectuate.
But at the same time, since according to the principles of the natural theory
of property every natural owner is only protected against physical invasion
and the noncontractual acquisition and transfer of property titles, it also im-
plies that everyone constantly and permanently runs the risk that through
changes in demand or actions which other owners perform with their proper-
ty, property values will fall below their given level. According to this theory,
however, no one owns the value of his property and hence no one, at any
time, has the right to preserve and restore his property values. As compared
with this, conservatism aims precisely at such a preservation or restoration
of values and their relative distribution. But this is only possible, of course,
if a redistribution in the assignment of property titles takes place. Since no
one's property values depend exclusively on one's own actions performed
with one's own property, but also, and inescapably so, on other peoples'
actions performed with scarce means under their own control (and beyond
that of another's), in order to preserve given property values someone-
some single person or some group of persons-would have to rightfully own
all scarce means (far beyond those that are actually controlled or used by
this person or group of persons). Furthermore, this group must literally own
all persons' bodies, since the use that a person makes of his body can also
influence (increase or decrease) existing property values. Thus, in order to
realize the goal of conservatism, a redistribution of property titles must occur
away from people as user-owners of scarce resources onto people who,
whatever their merits as past producers, did not presently use or contrac-
tually acquire those things whose utilization had led to the change in the
given distribution of values.
With this understood, the first conclusion regarding the general
economic effect of conservatism lies at hand: with the natural owners of
things fully or partially expropriated to the advantage of nonusers, non-

producers and noncontractors, conservatism eliminates or reduces the

former's incentive to do something about the value of existing property and
to adapt to changes in demand. The incentives to be aware of and to an-
ticipate changes in demand, to quickly adjust existing property and to use
it in a manner consistent with such changed circumstances, to increase
productive efforts, and to save and invest are reduced, as the possible gains
from such behavior can no longer be privately appropriated but will be so-
cialized. Mutatis mutandis, the incentive is increased to do nothing in order
to avoid the permanent risk of one's property values falling below their
present level, as the possible losses from such behavior no longer have to
be privately appropriated, but will also be socialized. Thus, since all these
activities--the avoidance of risk, awareness, adaptability, work, and saving-
-are costly and require the use of time and possibly other scarce resources
which at the same time could be used in alternative ways (for leisure and
consumption, for instance), there will be fewer of the former activities and
more of the latter, and as a consequence the general standard of living will
fall. Hence, one would have to conclude that the conservative goal of
preserving existing values and existing distributions of values among dif-
ferent individuals can only be accomplished at the expense of a general,
relative drop in the overall value of newly produced and old, maintained
goods, i.e., reduced social wealth.
It has probably become apparent by now that from the point of view of
economic analysis, there is a striking similarity between the socialism of con-
servatism and social-democratic socialism. Both forms of socialism involve
a redistribution of property titles away from producers/contractors onto non-
prod ucers/noncontractors, and both thereby separate the processes of
producing and contracting from that of the actual acquisition of income and
wealth. In doing this, both make the acquisition of income and wealth a
political affair-an affair, that is, in the course of which one (group of) per-
son(s) imposes its will regarding the use of scarce means onto the will of
other, recalcitrant people; both versions of socialism, though in principle
claiming full ownership of all of the income and wealth produced on behalf
of nonproducers, allow their programs to be implemented in a gradual
fashion and carried through to varying degrees; and both, as a consequence
of all this, must, to the extent that the respective policy is indeed enacted,
lead to relative impoverishment.
The difference between conservatism and what has been termed social-
democratic socialism lies exclusively in the fact that they appeal to different
people or to different sentiments in the same people in that they prefer a dif-
ferent way in which the income and wealth extracted noncontractual^ from
producers is then redistributed to nonproducers. Redistributive socialism
assigns income and wealth to nonproducers regardless of their past
achievements as owners of wealth and income recipients, or even tries to
eradicate existing differences. Conservatism, on the other hand, allocates
income to nonproducers in accordance with their past, unequal income and
wealth-position and aims at stabilizing the existing income distribution and
existing income differentials.18 The difference is thus merely one of social-
psychology: in favoring different patterns of distribution, they grant
privileges to different groups of nonproducers. Redistributive socialism par-
ticularly favors the have-nots among nonproducers, and especially disad-
vantages the haves among the producers; and, accordingly, it tends to find
its supporters mostly among the former and its enemies among the latter.
Conservatism grants special advantages to the haves among the group of
nonproducers and particularly damages the interests of the have-nots
among productive people; and so it tends to find its supporters mainly in
the ranks of the former and spreads despair, hopelessness, and resentment
among the latter group of people.
But although it is true that both systems of socialism are very much alike
from an economic point of view, the difference between them with respect
to their socio-psychological basis still has an impact on their respective
economics. To be sure, this impact does not affect the general impoverish-
ment effects resulting from the expropriation of producers (as explained
above), which they both have in common. Instead, it influences the choices
that social-democratic socialism on the one hand and conservatism on the
other make among the specific instruments or techniques available for
reaching their respective distributional goals. Social-democratic
socialism's favorite technique is that of taxation, as described and analyzed
in the preceding chapter. Conservatism can use this instrument, too, of
course; and indeed it must make use of it to some extent, if only to finance
the enforcement of its policies. But taxation is not its preferred technique,
and the explanation for this is to be found in the social-psychology of con-
servatism. Dedicated to the preservation of a status quo of unequal posi-
tions of income, wealth, and status, taxation is simply too progressive an
instrument for reaching conservative goals. To resort to taxation means that
one lets changes in the distribution of wealth and income happen first, and
only then, after they have come into existence, does one rectify things again
and restore the old order. However, to proceed in this way not only causes
bad feelings, particularly among those who through their own efforts have
actually improved their relative position first and are then cut back again.
But also, by letting progress occur and then trying to undo it, conservatism
weakens its own justification, i.e., its reasoning that a given distribution of
income and wealth is legitimate because it is the one which has always been
in effect. Hence, conservatism prefers that changes do not occur in the first
place, and it prefers to use policy measures that promise to do just this, or
rather, promise to help make such changes less apparent.
There are three such general types of policy measures: price- controls,
regulations, and behavior controls, all of which, to be sure, are socialistic
measures, as is taxation, but all of which, interestingly enough, have general-

ly been as neglected in attempts to assess the overall degree of socialism
in different societies, as the importance of taxation in this regard has been
overrated. 19 I will discuss these specific conservative policy schemes in
turn.
Any change in (relative) prices evidently causes changes in the relative

position of the people supplying the respective goods or services. Hence,
in order to fix their position it would seem that all that need be done is fix
prices-this is the conservative rationale for introducing price controls. To
check the validity of this conclusion the economic effects of price-fixings
need to be examined. 20 To begin with, it is assumed that a selective price
control for one product or one group of products has been enacted and that
the current market price has been decreed as the price above or below
which the product may not to be sold. Now, as long as the fixed price is
identical to the market price, the price control will simply be ineffective. The
peculiar effects of price-fixing can only come about once this identity no
longer exists. And as any price-fixing does not eliminate the causes that
would have brought about price changes, but simply decrees that no atten-
tion be paid to them, this occurs as soon as there are any changes in
demand, for whatever reason, for the product in question. If the demand in-
creases (and prices, not being controlled, would go up as well) then the
fixed price turns into an effective maximum price, i.e., a price above which
it is illegal to sell. If the demand decreases (and prices, without controls,
would fall), then the fixed price becomes an effective minimum price, i.e., a
price below which it becomes illegal to sell. 21
The consequence of imposing of a maximum price is an excess demand

for the goods supplied. Not everyone willing to buy at the fixed price can
do so. And this shortage will last as long as prices are not allowed to rise
with the increased demand, and hence, no possibility exists for the
producers (who assumedly had already been producing up to the point at

which marginal costs, i.e., the cost of producing the last unit of the product
concerned, equaled marginal revenue) to direct additional resources into
the specific line of production, thus increasing output without incurring los-
ses. Queues, rationing, favoritism, under-the-table payments, and black
markets will become permanent features of life. And the shortages and other
side effects which they bring along will even increase, as excess demand
for the price-controlled goods will spill over to all other noncontrolled goods
(in particular, of course, to substitutes), increase their (relative) prices, and
thereby create an additional incentive to shift resources from controlled into
noncontrolled lines of production.
Imposing a minimum price, i.e., a price above the potential market price
below which sales become illegal, mutatis mutandis produces an excess of
supply over demand. There will be a surplus of goods produced that simp-
ly cannot find buyers. And again: this surplus will continue as long as prices
are not allowed to drop along with the reduced demand for the product in
question. Milk and wine lakes, butter and grain mountains, to cite just a few
examples, will develop and grow; and as the storage bins fill up it will be-
come necessary to repeatedly destroy the surplus production (or, as an al-
ternative, to pay the producers not to produce the surplus anymore).
Surplus production will even become aggravated as the artificially high price
attracts an even higher investment of resources in this particular field, which
then will be lacking in other production lines where there is actually a greater
need for them (in terms of consumer demand), and where, as a conse-
quence, product prices will rise.
Maximum or minimum prices-in either case price controls will result in
relative impoverishment. In any event they will lead to a situation in which
there are too many (in terms of consumer demand) resources bound up in
production lines of reduced importance and not enough are available in lines
of increased relevance. Production factors can no longer be allocated so

that the most urgent wants are satisfied first, the next urgent ones second,
etc., or, more precisely, so that the production of any one product is not ex-
tended above (or reduced below) the level at which the utility of the mar-
ginal product falls below (or remains above) the marginal utility of any other
product. Rather, the imposition of price controls means that less urgent
wants are satisfied at the expense of reduced satisfaction of more urgent
wants. And this is to say nothing else than that the standard of living will be
reduced. That people waste their time scrambling for goods because they
are in artificially low supply or that goods are thrown away because they are
held in artificially high supply are only the two most conspicuous symptoms
of this reduced social wealth.
But this is not all. The preceding analysis also reveals that conservatism
cannot even reach its goal of distributional stability by means of partial price
control. With only partially controlled prices, disruptions in the existing in-
come and wealth position still must occur, as producers in uncontrolled lines
of production, or in lines of production with minimum product prices are
favored at the expense of those in controlled lines, or lines with maximum
product prices. Hence there will continue to be an incentive for individual
producers to shift from one line of production into a different, more profitable
one, with the consequence that differences in the entrepreneurial alertness
and ability to foresee and implement such profitable shifts will arise and
result in disruptions of the established order. Conservatism then, if it is in-
deed uncompromising in its commitment to the preservation of the status
quo, is driven to constantly enlargening the circle of goods subject to price
controls and actually cannot stop short of complete price controls or price-
freezing. 22 Only if the prices of all goods and services, of capital and of con-
sumer goods alike, are frozen at some given level, and the production
process is thus completely separated from demand-instead of disconnect-
ing production and demand at only a few points or sectors as under partial
price control-does it seem possible to preserve an existing distributional
order in full. Not surprisingly, though, the price that has to be paid for such
full-blown conservatism is even higher than that of only partial price con-
trols. 23 With all-around price control, private ownership of means of produc-
tion is in fact abolished. There can still be private owners in name, but the
right to determine the use of their property and to engage in any contrac-
tual exchange that is deemed beneficial is lost completely. The immediate
consequence of this silent expropriation of producers then will be a reduc-
tion in saving and investing and, mutatis mutandis, an increase in consump-
tion. As one can no longer charge for the fruits of one's labor what the
market will bear, there is simply less of a reason to work. And in addition,
as prices are fixed-independent of the value that consumers attach to the
products in question-there is also less of a reason to be concerned about
the quality of the particular type of work or product that one still happens to
perform or produce, and hence the quality of each and every product will
fall.
But even more important than this is the impoverishment that results
from the allocations! chaos created by universal price controls. While all
product prices, including those of all cost factors and, in particular, of labor
are frozen, the demand for the various products still changes constantly.
Without price controls, prices would follow the direction of this change and
thereby create an incentive to constantly move out of less valued lines of
production into more valued ones. Under universal price controls this
mechanism is completely destroyed. Should the demand for a product in-
crease, a shortage will develop as prices are not allowed to rise, and hence,
because the profitability of producing the particular product has not been
altered, no additional production factors will be attracted. As a conse-
quence, excess demand, left unsatisfied, will spill over to other products, in-
creasing the demand for them above the level that otherwise would have
been established. But here again, prices are not allowed to rise with the in-
creased demand, and again a shortage will develop. And so the process of
shifting demand from most urgently wanted products to products of secon-
dary importance, and from there to products of still lesser relevance, since
again not everyone's attempt to buy at the controlled price can be satisfied,
must go on and on. Finally, since there are no alternatives available and the
paper money that people still have to spend has a lower intrinsic value than
even the least valuable product available for sale, excess demand will spill
over to products for which demand had originally declined. Hence, even in
those lines of production where a surplus had emerged as the consequence
of declining demand but where prices had not been allowed to fall accord-
ingly, sales again will pick up as a consequence of unsatisfied demand else-
where in the economy; in spite of the artificially high fixed price surpluses
will become saleable; and, with profitability thus restored, an outflow of capi-
tal will be prevented even here.
The imposition of all-around price controls means that the system of
production has become completely independent of the preferences of con-
sumers for whose satisfaction production is actually undertaken. The
producers can produce anything and the consumers have no choice but to
buy it, whatever it is. Accordingly, any change in the production structure
that is made or ordered to be made without the help offered by freely float-
ing prices is nothing but a groping in the dark, replacing one arbitrary array
of goods offered by another equally arbitrary one. There is simply no con-
nection anymore between the production structure and the structure of
demand. On the level of consumer experience this means, as has been
described by G. Reisman,"... flooding people with shirts, while making them
go barefoot, or inundating them with shoes while making them go shirtless;
of giving them enormous quantities of writing paper, but no pens or ink, or

vice versa;... indeed of giving them any absurd combination of goods." But,
of course,"... merely giving consumers unbalanced combinations of goods
is itself equivalent to a major decline in production, for it represents just as
much of a loss in human well-being."24 The standard of living does not simp-
ly depend on some total physical output of production; it depends much
more on the proper distribution or proportioning of the various specific
production factors in producing a well-balanced composition of a variety of
consumer goods. Universal price controls, as the 'ultima ratio1 of conser-
vatism, prevent such a well-proportioned composition from being brought
about. Order and stability are only seemingly created; in truth they are a
means of creating allocations chaos and arbitrariness, and thereby drasti-
cally reduce the general standard of living.
In addition, and this leads to the discussion of the second specifically

conservative policy instrument, i.e., regulations, even if prices are control-
led all-around this can only safeguard an existing order of income and wealth
distribution if it is unrealistically assumed that products as well as their
producers are "stationary." Changes in the existing order cannot be ruled
out, though, if there are new and different products produced, new tech-
nologies for producing products are developed, or additional producers
spring up. All of this would lead to disruptions in the existing order, as the
old products, technologies, and producers, subject as they are to price con-
trols, would then have to compete with new and different products and ser-
vices (which, since they are new, cannot have been price-controlled), and
they would probably lose some of their established income-share to the new-
comers in the course of this competition. To compensate for such disrup-
tions, conservatism could once again make use of the instrument of taxation,
and indeed to some extent it does. But to let innovations occur first without
hindrance and to then tax the gains away from the innovators and restore
the old order is, as was explained, too progressive an instrument for a policy
of conservatism. Conservatism prefers regulations as a means of prevent-

ing or slowing down innovations and the social changes that they bring
about.
The most drastic way of regulating the system of production would be

simply to outlaw any innovation. Such a policy, it should be noted, has its
adherents among those who complain about others' consumerism, i.e.,
about the fact that today there are already "all too many" goods and services
on the market, and who wish to freeze or even reduce this present diversity;
and also, for slightly different reasons, among those who want to freeze
present production technology out of the fear that technological innova-
tions, as labor- saving devices, would "destroy" (existing) jobs. Nonethe-
less, an outright prohibition of all innovative change has hardly ever been
seriously attempted-perhaps with the recent exception of the Pol Pot
regime-because of a lack of support in public opinion which could not be
convinced that such a policy would not be extremely costly in terms of wel-
fare losses. Quite popular, though, has been an only slightly more moderate
approach: While no change is ruled out in principle, any innovation must
be officially approved (approved, that is, by people other than the innovator
himself) before it can be implemented. This way, conservatism argues, it is
assured that innovations are indeed socially acceptable, that progress is
gradual, that it can be introduced simultaneously by all producers, and that
everyone can share in its advantages. Compulsory, i.e., government-en-
forced, cartels are the most popular means for achieving this effect. By re-
quiring all producers, or all producers of one industry, to become members
of one supervisory organization-the cartel-it becomes possible to avoid the
all-too-visible excess supply brought about by minimum price controls-
through the imposition of production quotas. Moreover, the disruptions
caused by any innovative measure can then be centrally monitored and
moderated. But while this approach has been gaining ground constantly in
Europe and to a somewhat lesser degree in the United States, and while
certain sectors of the economy are indeed already subject to very similar
controls, the most popular and most frequently used conservative-socialist
regulatory instrument is still that of establishing predefined standards for
predefined categories of products or producers to which all innovations
must conform. These regulations lay down the kind of qualifications a per-
son must fulfill (other than the "normal" ones of being the rightful owner of
things and of not damaging the physical integrity of other peoples' proper-
ty through one's own actions) in order to have the right to establish himself
as a producer of some sort; or they stipulate the kinds of tests (as regards,
for instance, materials, appearance, or measurements) a product of a given
type must undergo before being newly allowed on the market; or they
prescribe definite checks that any technological improvement must pass in
order to become a newly approbated method of production. With such
regulatory means innovations can neither be completely ruled out, nor can
it be altogether avoided that some changes might even be quite surprising.
But as the predefined standards to which changes have to conform must of
necessity be "conservative," i.e., formulated in terms of existing products,
producers, or technologies, they serve the purpose of conservatism in that
they will indeed at least slow down the speed of innovative changes and the
range of possible surprises.
In any case, ail these types of regulations, the first mentioned ones more
and the latter less, will lead to a reduction in the general standard of living.25
An innovation, to be sure, can only be successful, and thus allow the in-
novator to disrupt the existing order of income and wealth distribution, if it
is indeed more highly valued by the consumers than the competing old
products. The imposition of regulations, however, implies a redistribution
of property titles away from the innovators and onto the established
producers, products, and technologies. Hence, in fully or partially socializ-

ing possible income and wealth gains stemming from innovative changes
in the process of production and mutatis mutandis by fully or partially
socializing the possible losses from not innovating, the process of innova-
tion will be slowed down, there will be fewer innovators and innovations, and
instead, a strengthened tendency will emerge to settle for the way things
are. This means nothing else than that the process of increasing consumer
satisfaction by producing more highly evaluated goods and services in more
efficient, cost-saving ways is brought to a standstill, or is at least hampered.
Thus, even if in a somewhat different way than price controls, regulations
will make the production structure fall out of line with demand, too. And
while this might help safeguard an existing distribution of wealth, it must
once again be paid for by a general decline in the overall wealth that is in-
corporated in this very same production structure.
Finally, the third specifically conservative policy instrument is behavioral

controls. Price controls and regulations freeze the supply side of an
economic system and thereby separate it from demand. But this does not
preclude changes in demand from coming into existence; it only makes the
supply side irresponsive to it. And so it can still happen that discrepancies
not only emerge, but that they also become appallingly apparent as such.
Behavioral controls are policy measures designed to control the demand
side. They aim at the prevention or retardation of changes in demand in
order to make the irresponsiveness of the supply side less visible, thereby
completing the task of conservatism: the preservation of an existing order
from disruptive changes of any kind.
Price controls and regulations on one side, and behavioral controls on

the other are thus the two complementary parts of a conservative policy.
And of these two complementary sides of conservatism, it might well be ar-
gued that it is the side of behavioral controls that is the most distinctive fea-
ture of a conservative policy. Though the different forms of socialism favor
different categories of nonproductive and noninnovative people at the ex-

pense of different categories of potential producers and innovators, just as
much as any other variant of socialism conservatism tends to produce less
productive, less innovative people, forcing them to increase consumption
or channel their productive and innovative energies into black markets. But
of all the forms of socialism, it is only conservatism which as part of its
program interferes directly with consumption and noncommercial exchan-
ges. (All other forms, to be sure, have their effect on consumption, too, in-
sofar as they lead to a reduction in the standard of living; but unlike
conservatism, they leave the consumer pretty much alone with whatever is
left for him to consume.) Conservatism not only cripples the development
of one's productive talents; under the name "paternalism" it also wants to
freeze the behavior of people in their roles as isolated consumers or as ex-
change partners in noncommercial forms of exchanges, thereby stifling or
suppressing one's talent to develop a consumer lifestyle that best satisfies
one's recreational needs, too.
Any change in the pattern of consumer behavior has its economic side
effects. (If I let my hair grow longer this affects the barbers and the scissors
industry; if more people divorce this affects lawyers and the housing market;
if I start smoking marijuana this has consequences not only for the use of
agricultural land but also for the ice cream industry, etc.; and above all, all
such behavior disequilibrates the existing value system of whoever happens
to feel affected by it.) Any change could thus appear to be a disruptive ele-
ment vis a vis a conservative production structure, conservatism, in prin-
ciple, would have to consider all actions-the whole lifestyle of people in their
roles as individual consumers or noncommercial exchangers as proper ob-
jects of behavioral controls. Full-blown conservatism would amount to the
establishment of a social system in which everything except the traditional
way of behaving (which is explicitly allowed) is outlawed. In practice, con-
servatism could never go quite this far, as there are costs connected with
controls and as it would normally have to reckon with rising resistance in
the public opinion. "Normal" conservatism, then, is characterized instead
by smaller or greater numbers of specific laws and prohibitions which out-
law and punish various forms of nonaggressive behavior of isolated con-
sumers, or of people engaging in noncommercial exchanges-of actions,
that is to say, which if indeed performed, would neither change the physical
integrity of anyone else's property, nor violate anyone's right to refuse any
exchange that does not seem advantageous, but which would rather (only)
disrupt the established "paternal" order of social values.
Once again the effect of such a policy of behavioral controls is, in any
case, relative impoverishment. Through the imposition of such controls not
only is one group of people hurt by the fact that they are no longer allowed
to perform certain nonaggressive forms of behavior but another group
benefits from these controls in that they no longer have to tolerate such dis-
liked forms of behavior. More specifically, the losers in this redistribution of
property rights are the user-producers of the things whose consumption is
now hampered, and those who gain are nonusers/nonproducers of the con-
sumer goods in question. Thus, a new and different incentive structure
regarding production or nonproduction is established and applied to a given
population. The production of consumer goods has been made more cost-
ly since their value has fallen as a consequence of the imposition of controls
regarding their use, and, mutatis mutandis, the acquisition of consumer
satisfaction through nonproductive, noncontractual means has been made
relatively less costly. As a consequence, there will be less production, less
saving and investing, and a greater tendency instead to gain satisfaction at
the expense of others through political, i.e., aggressive, methods. And, in
particular, insofar as the restrictions imposed by behavioral controls con-
cern the use that a person can make of his own body, the consequence will
be a lowered value attached to It and, accordingly, a reduced investment in
human capital.
With this we have reached the end of the theoretical analysis of conser-
vatism as a special form of socialism. Once again, in order to round out the
discussion a few remarks which might help illustrate the validity of the above
conclusions shall be made. As in the discussion of social-democratic
socialism, these illustrative observations should be read with some precau-
tions: first, the validity of the conclusions reached in this chapter has been,
can, and must be established independent of experience. And second, as
far as experience and empirical evidence are concerned, there are unfor-
tunately no examples of societies that could be studied for the effects of
conservatism as compared to the other variants of socialism and capitalism.
There is no quasi-experimental case study which alone could provide one
with what is normally considered "striking" evidence. Reality is rather such
that all sorts of policy measures-conservative, social-democratic, Marxist-
socialist, and also capitalist-liberal-are so mixed and combined, that their
respective effects cannot usually be neatly matched with definite causes,
but must be disentangled and matched once more by purely theoretical
means.
With this in mind, though, something might well be said about the ac-
tual performance of conservatism in history. Once more, the difference in
the living standards between the United States and the countries of Western
Europe (taken together) permits an observation that fits the theoretical pic-
ture. Surely, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Europe has more
redistributive socialism-as indicated roughly by the overall degree of taxa-
tion-than the United States, and is poorer because of this. But more strik-
ing still is the difference that exists between the two with respect to the
degree of conservatism.26 Europe has a feudal past that is noticeable to
this very day, in particular in the form of numerous regulations that restrict
trade and hamper entry and prohibitions of nonaggressive actions, whereas

the United States is remarkably free of this past. Connected with this is the
fact that for long periods during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
Europe had been shaped by policies of more or less explicitly conservative
parties rather than by any other political ideology, whereas a genuinely con-
servative party never existed in the United States. Indeed, even the socialist
parties of Western Europe were infected to a notable extent by conser-
vatism, in particular under the influence of the labor unions, and imposed
numerous conservative-socialist elements (regulations and price controls,
that is) on the European societies during their periods of influence (while
they admittedly helped abolish some of the conservative behavioral con-
trols). In any case then, given that Europe is more socialist than the United
States and its living standards are relatively lower, this is due less to the
greater influence of social-democratic socialism in Europe and more to the
influence of the socialism of conservatism~as indicated not so much by its
higher overall degrees of taxation, but rather by the significantly higher num-
bers of price controls, regulations, and behavioral controls in Europe. I
should hasten to add that the United States is not richer than it actually is
and no longer exhibits its nineteenth century economic vigor not only be-
cause they adopted more and more of redistribute socialism's policies
over time, but more so because they, too, increasingly fell prey to the con-
servative ideology of wanting to protect a status quo of income and wealth
distribution from competition, and in particular the position of the haves
among existing producers, by means of regulations and price controls.27
On even a more global level, another observation fits the theoretically

derived picture of conservatism causing impoverishment. For outside the
so-called Western world, the only countries that match the miserable
economic performance of the outrightly Marxist-socialist regimes are
precisely those societies in Latin America and Asia that have never serious-
ly broken with their feudal past. I n these societies, vast parts of the economy
are even now almost completely exempt from the sphere and the pressure
of freedom and competition and are instead locked in their traditional posi-
tion by regulatory means, enforced, as it were, by outright aggression.
On the level of more specific observations the data also clearly indicate
what the theory would lead one to expect. Returning to Western Europe,
there can be little doubt that of the major European countries, Italy and
France are the most conservative, especially if compared with the northern
nations which, as far as socialism is concerned, have been leaning more
toward its redistributive version. 28 While the level of taxation in Italy and
France (state expenditure as part of GNP) is not higher than elsewhere in
Europe, these two countries clearly exhibit more conservative-socialist ele-
ments than can be found anywhere else. Both Italy and France are studded
with literally thousands of price controls and regulations, making it highly
doubtful that there is any sector in their economies that can be called "free"
with some justification. As a consequence (and as could have been
predicted), the standard of living in both countries is significantly lower than
that of northern Europe, as anyone who is not traveling exclusively in resort
towns cannot fail to notice. In both countries, to be sure, one objective of
conservatism seems to have been reached: the differences between the
haves and the have-nots have been well-preserved-one will hardly find as
extreme income and wealth differentials in West Germany or the United
States as in Italy or France-but the price is a relative drop in social wealth.
As a matter of fact, this drop is so significant that the standard of living for
the lower and lower-middle class in both countries is at best only a bit higher
than that in the more liberalized countries of the East bloc. And the southern
provinces of Italy, in particular, where even more regulations have been piled
on top of those valid everywhere in the country, have just barely left the
camp of the third world nations.
Finally, as a last example that illustrates the impoverishment caused by

conservative policies, the experience with national-socialism in Germany
and to a lesser degree with Italian fascism should be mentioned. It is often
not understood that both were conservative-socialist movements. 29 It is as
such, i.e., as movements directed against the change and the social disrup-
tions brought about by the dynamic forces of a free economy, that they-
other than Marxist-socialist movements-could find support among the class
of established proprietors, shop owners, farmers and entrepreneurs. But to
derive from this the conclusion that it must have been a pro-capitalist move-
ment or even the highest stage in the development of capitalism before its
final demise, as Marxists normally do, is entirely wrong. Indeed, fascism's
and Nazism's most fervently abhorred enemy was not socialism as such,
but liberalism. Of course, both also despised the socialism of the Marxists
and Bolshevists, because at least ideologically they were internationalists
and pacifists (relying on the forces of history that would lead to a destruc-
tion of capitalism from within), while fascism and Nazism were nationalist
movements devoted to war and conquest; and, probably even more impor-
tant regarding its public support, because Marxism implied that the haves
would be expropriated by the have-nots and the social order thus would be
turned upside-down, while fascism and Nazism promised to preserve the
given order. 30 But, and this is decisive for their classification as socialist
(rather than capitalist) movements, to pursue this goal implies-as has been
explained in detail above-just as much a denial of the rights of the individual
user-owner of things to do with them whatever seems best (provided one
does not physically damage another's property or engage in noncontrac-
tual exchanges), and just as much an expropriation of natural owners by
"society11 (that is, by people who neither produced nor contractually acquired
the things in question) as does the policy of Marxism. And indeed, in order
to reach this goal both fascism and Nazism did exactly what their classifica-
tion as conservative-socialist would have led one to expect: they estab-

lished highly controlled and regulated economies in which private owner-
ship was still existent in name, but had in fact become meaningless, since
the right to determine the use of the things owned had been almost com-
pletely lost to political institutions. The Nazis, in particular, imposed a sys-
tem of almost complete price controls (including wage controls), devised
the institution of four-year plans (almost like in Russia, where the plans
spanned the period of five years) and established economic planning and
supervising boards which had to approve all significant changes in the
production structure. An "owner" could no longer decide what to produce
or how to produce it, from whom to buy or to whom to sell, what prices to
pay or to charge, or how to implement any changes. All this, to be sure,
created a feeling of security. Everyone was assigned a fixed position, and
wage-earners as well as owners of capital received a guaranteed, and in
nominal terms, stable or even growing income. In addition, giant forced
labor programs, the ^introduction of conscription, and finally the implemen-
tation of a war economy strengthened the illusion of economic expansion
and prosperity.31 But as would have to be expected from an economic sys-
tem that destroys a producer's incentive to adjust to demand and avoid not
adjusting to it, and that thereby separates demand from production, this
feeling of prosperity proved to be nothing but an illusion. In reality, in terms
of the goods that people could buy for their money the standard of living
fell, not only in relative but even in absolute terms. 32 And in any case, even
disregarding here all of the destruction that was caused by the war, Ger-
many and to a lesser extent Italy were severely impoverished after the defeat
of the Nazis and fascists.
6
THE SOCIALISM OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING
and
THE FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS
A n light of the theoretical arguments presented in the preceding chapters

it appears that there is no economic justification for socialism. Socialism
promised to bring more economic prosperity to the people than capitalism,
and much of its popularity is based on this promise. The arguments brought
forward, though, have proved that the opposite is true. It has been shown
that Russian-type socialism, characterized by nationalized or socialized
means of production, necessarily involves economic waste since no prices
for factors of production would exist (because means of production would
not be allowed to be bought or sold), and hence no cost-accounting (which
is the means for directing scarce resources with alternative uses into the
most value-productive lines of production) could be accomplished. And as
regards social-democratic and conservative socialism, it has been
demonstrated that in any event, both imply a rise in the costs of production
and, mutatis mutandis, a decline in the costs of its alternative, i.e., non-
production or black-market production, and so would lead to a relative
reduction in the production of wealth, since both versions of socialism es-
tablish an incentive structure that (compared to a capitalist system) relative-
ly favors nonproducers and noncontractors over producers and contractors
of goods, products and services.
Experience, too, supports this. By and large, living standards in the East
European countries are significantly lower than in Western Europe, where
the degree to which the socialization of means of production that has taken
place, though certainly remarkable, is relatively much lower. Also, wherever
one extends the degree of redistribute measures and the proportion of
produced wealth that is redistributed is increased, as, for instance, in West

Germany during the 1970s under social-democratic liberal government
coalitions, there is a retardation in the social production of wealth or even
an absolute reduction in the general standard of living. And wherever a
society wants to preserve the status quo, that is, a given income and wealth
distribution, by means of price controls, regulations, and behavioral con-
trols--as, for instance, in Hitler's Germany or present-day Italy and France-
-the living standards will constantly fall further behind those of more liberal
(capitalist) societies.
Nonetheless, socialism is very much alive and well, even in the West
where social-democratic socialism and conservatism have remained
powerful ideologies. How could this come about? One important factor is
that its adherents abandoned the original idea of socialism's economic su-
periority and instead, resorted to a completely different argument: that
socialism might not be economically superior but is morally preferable. This
claim will be considered in Chapter 7. But that is certainly not the end of the
story. Socialism has even regained strength in the field of economics. This
became possible because socialism combined its forces with the ideology
of empiricism, which traditionally has been strong in the Anglo-Saxon world
and which, in particular through the influence of the so-called Vienna-circle
of positivist philosophers, became the dominant philosophy-epistemology-
methodology of the twentieth century, not only in the field of the natural
sciences but also in the social sciences and economics. This applies not
only to the philosophers and methodologists of these sciences (who, in-
cidentally, have since freed themselves from the spell of empiricism and
positivism) but probably even more so to the practitioners (who are still very
much under its influence). Combining its force with empiricism or
positivism, which includes for our purposes the so-called critical rationalism
of K. R. Popper and his followers, socialism developed into what will hence-
THE SOCIALISM OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING 97
THE FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
forth be called the "socialism of social engineering."1 It is a form of socialism

very different in its style of reasoning from traditional Marxism, which was
much more rationalistic and deductive-one that Marx had adopted from the
classical economist D. Ricardo, the most important source for Marx's own
economic writings. But it seems to be precisely because of this difference
in style that the socialism of social-engineering has been able to win more
and more support from the traditional camps of social-democratic and con-
servative socialists. In West Germany, for instance, the ideology of
"piecemeal social engineering," as K. R. Popper has called his social
philosophy,2 has now become something like the common ground of
"moderates" in all political parties, and only doctrinaires, so it seems, of either
side do not subscribe to it. The former SPD-chancellor Helmut Schmidt
even publicly endorsed Popperianism as his own philosophy.3 However, it
is in the United States that this philosophy is probably more deeply rooted,
as it is almost custom-tailored to the American way of thinking in terms of
practical problems and pragmatic methods and solutions.
How could empiricism-positivism help save socialism? On a highly
abstract level the answer should be clear. Empiricism-positivism must be
able to provide reasons why all the arguments given so far have failed to be
decisive; it must try to prove how one can avoid drawing the conclusions
that I have drawn and still claim to be rational and to operate in accordance
with the rules of scientific inquiry. But how, in detail, can this be ac-
complished? On this the philosophy of empiricism and positivism offers two
seemingly plausible arguments. The first and indeed the most central of its
tenets is this:4 knowledge regarding reality, which is called empirical
knowledge, must be verifiable or at least falsifiable by experience; and ex-
perience is always of such a type that it could, in principle, have been other
than it actually was so that no one could ever know in advance, i.e., before
actually having had some particular experience, if the outcome would be

one way or another. If, mutatis mutandis, knowledge is not verifiable or fal-
sifiable by experience, then it is not knowledge about anything real-empiri-
cal knowledge, that is--but simply knowledge about words, about the use
of terms, about signs and transformational rules for them-or analytical
knowledge. And it is highly doubtful that analytical knowledge should be
ranked as "knowledge" at all.
If one assumes this position, as I will do for the moment, it is not dif-
ficult to see how the above arguments could be severely rebuffed. The ar-
guments regarding the impossibility of economic calculation and the
cost-raising character of social-democratic or conservative measures
necessarily leading to a decline in the production of goods and services and
hence to reduced standards of living evidently claimed to be valid a priori,
i.e., not falsifiable by any kind of experience, but rather known to be true
prior to any later experiences. Now if this were indeed true, then according
to the first and central tenet of empiricism-positivism, this argument could
not contain any information about reality, but instead would have to be con-
sidered idle verbal quibbling-an exercise in tautological transformations of
words such as "cost," "production," "output of production," "consumption"-
-which do not say anything about reality. Hence, empiricism concludes that
insofar as reality, i.e., the real consequences of real socialism, is concerned,
the arguments presented thus far carry no weight whatsoever. Rather, in
order to say anything convincing about socialism, experience and ex-
perience alone would have to be the decisive thing to consider.
If this were indeed true (as I will still assume), it would at once dispose
of all of the economic arguments against socialism which I have presented
as being of a categorical nature. There simply could not be anything
categorical about reality. But even then, wouldn't empiricism-positivism still
have to face up to the real experiences with real socialism and wouldn't the
result of this be just as decisive? In the preceding chapters, much more em-
phasis was placed on logical, principle, categorical (all used synonomous-

ly here) reasons directed against socialism's claims of offering a more
promising way to economic prosperity than through capitalism; and ex-
perience was cited only loosely in order to illustrate a thesis whose validity
could ultimately have been known independent of illustrative experience.
Nonetheless, wouldn't even the somewhat unsystematically cited ex-
perience be sufficient to make a case against socialism?
The answer to these questions is a decisive "no." The second tenet of

empiricism-positivism explains why. It formulates the extension or rather
the application of the first tenet to the problem of causality and causal ex-
planation or prediction. To causally explain or predict a real phenomenon
is to formulate a statement of either the type "if A, then B" or, should the vari-
ables allow quantitative measurement, "if an increase (or decrease) of A,
then an increase (or decrease) of B." As a statement referring to reality (with
A and B being real phenomena), its validity can never be established with
certainty, i.e., by examination of the proposition alone or of any other
proposition from which the one in question could in turn be logically
deduced, but will always be and remain hypothetical, depending on the out-
come of future experiences which cannot be known in advance. Should ex-
perience confirm a hypothetical causal explanation, i.e., should one observe
an instance where B indeed followed A, as predicted, this would not prove
that the hypothesis is true, since A and B are general, abstract terms ("univer-
sals," as opposed to "proper names") which refer to events or processes of
which there are (or, at least might, in principle, be) an indefinite number of
instances, and hence later experiences could still possibly falsify it. And if
an experience falsified a hypothesis, i.e., if one observed an instance of A
that was not followed by B, this would not be decisive either, as it would still
be possible that the hypothetical^ related phenomena were indeed causal-
ly linked and that some other previously neglected and uncontrolled cir-
cumstance ("variable") had simply prevented the hypothesized relationship

from being actually observed. A falsification would only prove that the par-
ticular hypothesis under investigation was not completely correct as it stood,
but rather needed some refinement, i.e., some specification of additional
variables which one would have to watch out for and control in order to be
able to observe the hypothesized relationship between A and B. But to be
sure, a falsification would never prove once and for all that a relationship be-
tween some given phenomena did not exist.
Given that this empiricist-positivist position on causal explanation is cor-

rect, it is easy to see how socialism could be rescued from empirically jus-
tified criticism. Of course, a socialist-empiricist would not deny the facts.
He would not argue that there indeed is a lower standard of living in Eastern
than in Western Europe, and that increased taxation or a conservative policy
of regulations and controls have indeed been found to correlate with a retar-
dation or shrinking in the production of economic wealth. But within the
boundaries of his methodology he could perfectly well deny that based on
such experiences a principled case against socialism and its claim of offer-
ing a more promising path toward prosperity could be formulated. He could,
that is to say, play down the (seemingly) falsifying experiences, and any
other that might be cited, as merely accidental; as experiences that had been
produced by some unfortunately neglected and uncontrolled circumstan-
ces which would disappear and indeed turn into its very opposite, revealing
the true relationship between socialism and an increased production of so-
cial wealth, as soon as these circumstances had been controlled. Even the
striking differences in the standard of living between East and West Ger-
many~the example that I stressed so heavily because it most closely
resembles that of a controlled social experiment-could thus be explained
away: in arguing, for instance, that the higher living standards in the West
must be explained not by its more capitalist mode of production, but by the
fact that Marshall aid had streamed into West Germany while East Germany
had to pay reparations to the Soviet Union; or by the fact that from the very
beginning, East Germany encompassed Germany's less developed, rural,
agricultural provinces and so had never had the same starting point; or that
in the eastern provinces the tradition of serfdom had been discarded much
later than in the western ones and so the mentality of the people was indeed
different in both East and West Germany, etc.
In fact, whatever empirical evidence one brings forward against

socialism, as soon as one adopts the empiricist-positivist philosophy, i.e.,
as soon as the idea of formulating a principled case either in favor of or
against socialism is dropped as in vain and ill-conceived, and it is instead
only admitted that one can, of course, err with respect to the details of some
socialist policy plan but would then be flexible enough to amend certain
points in one's policy whenever the outcome was not satisfactory, socialism
is made immune to any decisive criticism, because any failure can always
be ascribed to some as yet uncontrolled intervening variable. Not even the
most perfectly conducted, controlled experiment, it should be noted, could
change this situation a bit. It would never be possible to control all variables
that might conceivably have some influence on the variable to be explained-
-for the practical reason that this would involve controlling literally all of the
universe, and for the theoretical reason that no one at any point in time could
possibly know what all the variables are which make up this universe. This
is a question whose answer must permanently remain open to newly dis-
covered and discerned experiences. Hence, the above characterized im-
munization strategy would work without exception and unfailingly. And
since, as we know from the writings of the empiricists themselves, and in
particular those of D. Hume, there exists no "band" that one could observe
to connect visibly certain variables as causes and effects,5 it should be noted
that there would be no way whatsoever to exclude any variable as a pos-
sible disturbing influence from the outset without indeed trying it out and
controlling it. Not even the seemingly most absurd and ridiculous variables,
such as, for instance, differences in weather, or a fly passing by in one case
but not in the other, could be ruled out in advance; all that could be done
would be to point to experience again. ("Flies passing or not passing by
never made a difference for the outcome of an experiment.") But accord-
ing to the empiricist doctrine itself, this experience, referring as it does only
to past instances, would once again not help decide the matter definitively,
and a reference to it would only amount to a begging of the question.
No matter what the charges brought against socialism are, then, as long
as they are based on empirical evidence the empiricist-socialist could argue
that there is no way of knowing in advance what the results of a certain policy
scheme will be without actually enacting it and letting experience speak for
itself. And whatever the observable results are, the original socialist idea-
the "hard-core" of one's "research programme" as the neo-Popperian
philosopher Lakatos would have called it 6 ~can always be rescued easily by
pointing out some previously neglected, more or less plausible variable,
whose noncontrol is hypothesized to be responsible for the negative result,
with the newly revised hypothesis again needing to be tried out indefinitely,
ad infinitum.7 Experience only tells us that a particular socialist policy
scheme did not reach the goal of producing more wealth; but it can never
tell us if a slightly different one will produce any different results, or if it is
possible to reach the goal of improving the production of wealth by any
socialist policy at all.
I have now reached the point in my argument where I shall challenge

the validity of these two central tenets of empiricism-positivism. What is
wrong with them, and why cannot even empiricism help save socialism?
The answer will be given in three stages. First, I will demonstrate that the
empiricist position proves to be self-defeating at closer analysis because it
itself must at least implicitly assume and presuppose the existence of non-
empirical knowledge as knowledge about reality. This being mainly a
destructive task, I will then have to address the question of how it is possible
to have or conceive of knowledge that informs about reality, but which is
not itself subject to confirmation or falsification by experience. And thirdly,
I will show that such knowledge not only is conceivable and must be presup-
posed but that there are positive instances of it which serve as the firm epis-
temological foundation on which the economic case against socialism can
be and indeed all along has been built.
In spite of the apparent plausibility of empiricism's central ideas, it might

be noted at the very outset that even on the level of intuition things do not
seem to be exactly the way empiricism would want them to be. It certainly
is not evident that logic, mathematics, geometry, and also certain state-
ments of pure economics, like the law of supply and demand or the quan-
tity theory of money, because they do not allow any falsification by
experience, or rather because their validity is independent of experience,
do not give us any information about reality but are merely verbal quibble.
The opposite seems much more plausible: that the propositions advanced
by these disciplines-tor instance, a statement of geometry such as "If a
straight line S and a circle C have more than one point in common then S
has exactly two points in common with C," or a statement more closely re-
lated to the field of action with which I am concerned here, such as "One
cannot have his cake and eat it, too"~do in fact inform about reality and in-
form about what cannot possibly be different in reality at pain of contradic-
tion. 8 If I had a cake and ate it, it can be concluded that I do not have it
anymore-and this clearly is a conclusion that informs about reality without
being falsifiable by experience.
But much more important than intuition, of course, is reflexive analysis,

and this will prove the empiricist position to be simply self-defeating. If it
were true that empirical knowledge must be falsifiable by experience and

that analytical knowledge, which is not so falsifiable, thus cannot contain
any empirical knowledge, then what kind of statement is this fundamental
statement of empiricism itself? It must again be either analytical or empiri-
cal. If analytical, then according to its own doctrine this proposition is noth-
ing but some scribbling on paper, hot air, entirely void of any meaningful
content. It is only because the terms used in the statement such as
"knowledge," "experience," "falsifiable," etc., have already been given some
meaningful interpretation that this might at first be overlooked. But the en-
tire meaninglessness of analytical statements follows conclusively from the
empiricist-positivist ideology. Of course, and this is the first self-defeating
trap, if this were true, then empiricism could not even say and mean what it
seems to say and mean; it would be no more than a rustling of leaves in the
wind. To mean anything at all, an interpretation must be given to the terms
used, and an interpretation of terms, to be sure, is always (as long as one
expression cannot be explained in terms of another one) a practical affair;
an affair, that is, in which the usage of a term is practiced and learned with
real instances of the concept designated by the term, and by which a term
is thus tied to reality.9 However, not just any arbitrary interpretation would
do: "falsifiable," for instance, does not mean what one means by "red" or
"green." In order to say what empiricism-positivism evidently wants to say
when formulating its basic tenets, the terms must be given the meaning that
they actually have for the empiricist as well as for those whom he wants to
convince of the appropriateness of his methodology. But if the statement
indeed means what we thought it did all along, then it evidently contains in-
formation about reality. As a matter of fact it informs us about the fundamen-
tal structure of reality: that there is nothing in it that can be known to be true
in advance of future confirming or falsifying experiences. And if this proposi-
tion now is taken to be analytical, i.e., as a statement that does not allow fal-
sification but whose truth can be established by an analysis of the meanings

of the terms used alone, as has been assumed for the moment, then one
has no less than a glaring contradiction at hand and empiricism once again
proves to be self-defeating.10
Hence, it seems that empiricism-positivism would have to choose the

other available option and declare its central creed itself to be an empirical
statement. But then, clearly, the empiricist position would no longer carry
any weight whatsoever: after all, the fundamental proposition of empiricism
serving as the basis from which all sorts of rules of correct scientific inquiry
are derived could be wrong, and no one could ever be sure if it was or was
not so. One could equally well claim the exact opposite and within the con-
fines of empiricism there would be no way of deciding which position was
right or wrong. Indeed, if its central tenet were declared an empirical
proposition, empiricism would cease to be a methodo-/ogy--a logic of
science-altogether, and would be no more than a completely arbitrary ver-
bal convention for calling certain (arbitrary) ways of dealing with certain
statements certain (arbitrary) names. It would be a position void of any jus-
tification of why it, rather than any other one, should be adopted. 11
However, this is not all that can be mustered against empiricism, even
if the second available alternative is chosen. Upon closer inspection this es-
cape route leads to another trap of self-defeat. Even if this route were
chosen, it can be shown that the empiricist-positivist position must tacitly
presuppose the existence of nonempirical knowledge as "real" knowledge.
In order to realize this, let it be assumed that a causal explanation relating
two or more events has been found to fit one particular instance of experien-
ces regarding such events, and is then applied to a second instance,
presumably to undergo some further empirical testing. Now, one should
ask oneself what is the presupposition which must be made in order to re-
late the second instance of experience to the first as either confirming or fal-
sifying it? At first it might seem almost self-evident that if in the second in-
stance of experience the observations of the first were repeated, this would
be a confirmation, and if not, a falsification-and clearly, the empiricist
methodology assumes this to be evident, too, and does not require further
explanation. But this is not true. 12 Experience, it should be noted, only
reveals that two or more observations regarding the temporal sequence of
two or more types of events can be "neutrally" classified as "repetition" or
"nonrepetition." A neutral repetition only becomes a "positive" confirmation
and a nonrepetition a "negative" falsification if, independent of what can ac-
tually be discovered by experience, it is assumed that there are constant
causes which operate in time-invariant ways. If, contrary to this, it is as-
sumed that causes in the course of time might operate sometimes this way
and sometimes that way, then these repetitive or nonrepetitive occurrences
simply are and remain neutrally registered experiences, completely inde-
pendent of one another, and are not in any way logically related to each
other as confirming or falsifying one another. There is one experience and
then there is another, they are the same or they are differ ent, but that is all
there is to it; nothing else follows.
Thus, the prerequisite of being able to say "falsify" or "confirm" is the

constancy principle: the conviction that observable phenomena are in prin-
ciple determined by causes that are constant and time-invariant in the way
they operate, and that in principle contingency plays no part in the way
causes operate. Only if the constancy principle is assumed to be valid does
it follow from any failure to reproduce a result that there is something wrong
with an original hypothesis; and only then can a successful reproduction in-
deed be interpreted as a confirmation. For only if two (or more) events are
indeed cause and effect and causes operate in a time-invariant way must it
be concluded that the functional relationship to be observed between
causally related variables must be the same in all actual instances, and that
if this is not indeed the case, something must be at fault with the particular
specification of causes.
Obviously now, this constancy principle is not itself based on or derived

from experience. There is not only no observable link connecting events.
Even if such a link existed, experience could not reveal whether or not it was
time-invariant. The principle cannot be disproved by experience either,
since any event which might appear to disprove it (such as a failure to dupli-
cate some experience) could be interpreted from the outset as if experience
had shown here that merely one particular type of event was not the cause
of another (otherwise the experience would have been successfully
repeated). However, to the extent that experience cannot exclude the pos-
sibility that another set of events might actually be found which would turn
out to be time-invariant in its way of operating, the validity of the constancy
principle cannot be disproved.
Nonetheless, although neither derived from nor disprovable by ex-

perience, the constancy principle is nothing less than the logically neces-
sary presupposition for there being experiences which can be regarded as
either confirming or falsifying each other (in contrast to isolated, logically
unconnected experiences). And hence, since empiricism-positivism as-
sumes the existence of such logically related experiences, it must be con-
cluded that it also implicitly assumes the existence of nonempirical
knowledge about reality. It must assume that there are indeed time-in-
variantly operating causes, and it must assume that this is the case although
experience could never possibly prove nor disprove it. Once again, then,
empiricism turns out to be an inconsistent, contradictory philosophy.
By now it should be sufficiently clear that aprioristic knowledge must

exist, or at least, that empiricism-positivism-the philosophy which is the
most skeptical about its possibility-must in fact presuppose its existence.
Admittedly, though, the very idea of knowledge as knowledge about real

things whose validity can be ascertained independent of experience is a dif-
ficult one to grasp-otherwise the overwhelming success of the philosophy
of empiricism-positivism in the scientific community and in the opinion of
the "educated public" could hardly be explained. Hence, before proceed-
ing to the more concrete task of elucidating the specific aprioristic founda-
tions on which the economic case against socialism rests, it would seem
appropriate to make a few rather general comments which should help make
it more plausible that there is indeed something like aprioristic knowledge.
It seems to be of great importance to first rid oneself of the notion that

aprioristic knowledge has anything to do with "innate ideas" or with "intui-
tive" knowledge which would not have to be discovered somehow or
learned. Innate or not, intuitive or not: these are questions that concern the
psychology of knowledge. In comparison, epistemology is concerned ex-
clusively with the question of the validity of knowledge and of how to ascer-
tain validity-and, to be sure, the problem of aprioristic knowledge is solely
an epistemological one. Aprioristic knowledge can be, and in fact quite
often is, very similar to empirical knowledge from a psychological point of
view, in that both types of knowledge must be acquired, discovered, learned.
The process of discovering aprioristic knowledge might and very often in-
deed seems to be even more difficult and painstaking than that of acquiring
empirical knowledge, which frequently enough simply seems to press itself
onto us without our having done much about it; and also, it might well be
the case genetically that the acquisition of aprioristic knowledge requires
one's having previously had some sort of experience. But all this, it should
be repeated, does not affect the question of the validation of knowledge,
and it is precisely and exclusively in this regard that aprioristic and empiri-
cal knowledge differ categorically.13
On the positive side, the most important notion for understanding the
possibility of a priori knowledge, I submit, is that there are not only nature-
given things which one has to learn about through experience, but that there
are also artificial, man-made things which may require the existence or use
of natural materials, but which to the very extent that they are constructs
can nonetheless not only be fully understood in terms of their structure and
implications, but which also can be analyzed for the question of whether or
not their method of construction can conceivably be altered. 14
There are three major fields of constructs: language and thought, ac-
tions, and fabricated objects, all of which are man-made things. We shall
not deal here with fabricated objects but will only mention in passing that
Euclidean geometry, for instance, can be conceived of as ideal norms we
cannot avoid using in constructing measurement instruments that make em-
pirical measurements of space possible. (In so far, then, Euclidean
geometry cannot be said to have been falsified by the theory of relativity;
rather, this theory presupposes its validity through the use of its instruments
of measuring.)15 The field of action, as our area of main concern, will be
analyzed when the aprioristic foundations of economics are discussed. The
first explanation of aprioristic knowledge, then, as knowledge of rules of con-
struction which cannot conceivably be altered, shall be given using the ex-
ample of language and thought. This is chosen as the starting point,
because it is language and thought which one uses in doing what is being
done here, that is, in communicating, discussing, and arguing.
As empiricists see it, language is a conventionally accepted system of

signs and sign-combinations, which, again by convention, are given some
meaning, ultimately by means of ostensive definitions. According to this
view, it may seem that although language is an artificial, man-made product,
nothing can be known about it a priori. And indeed, there are lots of dif-
ferent languages, all using different signs, and the meaning of the terms used
can be assigned and changed arbitrarily, so that everything there is to know
about language must, or so it seems, be learned from experience. But this

view is incorrect, or at best is only half of the truth. True, any language is a
conventional sign system, but what is a convention? Evidently, it cannot be
suggested that "convention" in turn be defined conventionally, as that would
simply be begging the question. Everything can be called a convention
(and, for that matter, a language), but surely not everything that can be called
one is in fact a conventional agreement. Saying and being understood in
saying "convention is used in such and such a way" presupposes that one
already knows what a convention is, as this statement would already have
to make use of language as a means of communication. Hence, one is
forced to conclude that language is a conventional sign system and as such
knowledge about it can only be empirical knowledge. But in order for there
to be such a system it must be assumed that every speaker of a language
already knows what a convention is, and he must know this not simply in
the way he knows that "dog" means dog, but he must know the real, true
meaning of convention. As such his knowledge of what a language is must
be considered a priori. This insight can be repeated for more particular
levels. There are all sorts of specific statements that can be made in a lan-
guage, and surely experience plays a role here. However, knowing what it
means to make a proposition can definitely not be learned from experience,
but rather must be presupposed of any speaker of a language. What a
proposition is cannot be explained to a speaker by just another statement
unless he already knows how to interpret this as a proposition. And the
same is true with definitions: it would not do to define "definition" osten-
sively by pointing to someone who is just pointing out some definition, be-
cause just as in the case in which the word "dog" is defined by pointing to
a dog, an understanding of the meaning of ostensive definitions must al-
ready be presupposed when it is understood that pointing to a dog, accom-
panied by the sound [dog] means that "dog" means dog, so in the case of
"definition." To define definition ostensively would be entirely meaningless,

unless one already knew that the particular sound made was supposed to
signify something whose identification should be assisted by pointing, and
how then to identify particular objects as instances of general, abstract
properties. In short, in order to define any term by convention, a speaker
must be assumed to have a priori knowledge of the real meaning-the real
definition-of "definition."16
The knowledge about language, then, that must be considered a priori

in that it must be presupposed of any speaker speaking any language, is
that of how to make real conventions, how to make a proposition by making
a statement (i.e., how to mean something by saying something) and how to
make a real definition and identify particular instances of general properties.
Any denial of this would be self-refuting, as it would have to be made in a
language, making propositions and using definitions. And as any ex-
perience is conceptual experience, i.e., experience in terms of some lan-
guage-and to say that this is not so and mean it would only prove the point
as it would have to be cast in a language, too-by knowing this to be true of
a language a priori, one would also know an a priori truth about reality: that
it is made of particular objects that have abstract properties, i.e., properties
of which it is possible to find other instances; that any one object either does
or does not have some definite property and so there are facts that can be
said to be the case, true or wrong; and also that it cannot be known a priori
what all the facts are, except that they indeed also must be facts, i.e., instan-
ces of particular abstract properties. And once again, one does not know
all this from experience, as experience is only what can appear in the forms
just described. 17
With this in mind we can turn to the field of action in order to prove the
specific point that one also has positive, aprioristic knowledge of actions
and consequences of actions because actions, too, are man-made con-
structs which can be fully understood regarding their rules of construction;

and that empiricism-positivism cannot-at pain of contradiction-possibly be
thought to be weakening or even seriously challenging the economic case
against socialism, as this case ultimately rests on such foundations, whereas
the empiricist philosophy stands in contradiction to it.
In the first argumentative step I shall demonstrate that the empiricist

methodology, contrary to its own claim, cannot possibly apply to actions
and thereby reveal a first, albeit rather negative, instance of aprioristic
knowledge about actions. Empiricism claims that actions, just as any other
phenomenon, can and must be explained by means of causal hypotheses
which can be confirmed or refuted by experience. Now if this were the case,
then empiricism would be forced to assume (contrary to its own doctrine
that there is no a priori knowledge as knowledge about reality) that time-in-
variantly operating causes with respect to actions exist. One would not
know in advance which particular event might be the cause of a particular
action-experience would have to reveal this. But in order to proceed the
way that empiricism wants us to proceed-to relate different experiences
regarding sequences of events as either confirming or falsifying each other,
and if falsifying, then responding with a reformulation of the original causal
hypothesis-a constancy over time in the operation of causes must be
presupposed. However, if this were true, and actions could indeed be con-
ceived as governed by time-invariantly operating causes, what about ex-
plaining the explainers, i.e., the persons who carry on the very process of
hypothesis creation, of verification and falsification;--all of us, that is, who
act the way the empiricists tell us to act? Evidently, to do all this-to assimi-
late confirming or falsifying experiences, to replace old hypotheses with new
ones-one must assumedly be able to learn. However, if one is able to learn
from experience, and the empiricist is compelled to admit this, then one can-
not know at any given time what one will know at later time and how one will
act on the basis of this knowledge. Rather, one can only reconstruct the
causes of one's actions after the event, as one can only explain one's
knowledge after one already possesses it. Thus, the empiricist methodol-
ogy applied to the field of knowledge and action, which contains knowledge
as its necessary ingredient, is simply contradictory~a logical absurdity.18
The constancy principle may be correctly assumed within the sphere of
natural objects and as such the methodology of empiricism may be ap-
plicable there, but with respect to actions, any attempt at causal empirical
explanation is logically impossible, and this, which is definitely knowledge
about something real, can be known with certainty. Nothing can be known
a priori about any particular action; but a priori knowledge exists regarding
actions insofar as they are actions at all. It can be known a priori that no ac-
tion can be conceived of as predictable on the basis of constantly operat-
ing causes.
The second insight regarding action is of the same type. I will

demonstrate that while actions themselves cannot be conceived of as
caused, anything that is an action must presuppose the existence of
causality in the physical world in which actions are performed. Causality--
which the empiricist-positivist philosophy somehow had to assume existed
in order to make its own methodological procedures logically feasible, even
though its assumption definitely could not be said to be derived from ex-
perience and justified in terms of it-is a category of action, i.e., it is produced
or constructed by us in following some procedural rule; and this rule, as it
turns out, proves to be necessary in order to act at all. In other words, this
rule is such that it cannot conceivably be falsified, as even the attempt to fal-
sify it would have to presuppose it.
After what has been said about causality, it should indeed be easy to
see that it is a produced rather than a given feature of reality. One does not
experience and learn that there are causes which always operate in the same
way and on the basis of which predictions about the future can be made.
Rather, one establishes that phenomena have such causes by following a
particular type of investigative procedure, by refusing on principle to allow
any exceptions, i.e., instances of inconstancy, and by being prepared to
deal with them by producing a new causal hypothesis each time any such
an apparent inconstancy occurs. But what makes this way of proceeding
necessary? Why does one have to act this way? Because behaving this
way is what performing intentional actions is; and as long as one acts inten-
tionally, presupposing constantly operating causes is precisely what one
does. Intentional acts are characterized by the fact that an actor interferes
in his environment and changes certain things, or prevents them from
changing, and so diverts the "natural" course of events in order to achieve
a preferred result or state of affairs; or should an active interference prove
impossible, that he prepares himself for a result he cannot do anything about
except anticipate in time, by watching out for temporally prior events which
indicate the later result. In any case, in order to produce a result that other-
wise would not have happened, or to be able to adapt to an inevitable result
that otherwise would have come as a complete surprise, the actor must
presuppose constantly operating causes. He would not interfere if he did
not assume this would help bring about the desired result; and he would not
prepare for and adjust to anything unless he thought the events on whose
basis he began his preparations were indeed the constantly operating
causal forces that would produce the result in question, and the preparation
taken would indeed lead to the goal desired. Of course, an actor could go
wrong with respect to his particular assumptions of cause-and-effect rela-
tions and a desired result might not come about in spite of the interference,
or an anticipated event for which preparations had been made might fail to
occur. But no matter what happens in this respect, whether or not the results
conform to the expectations, whether or not actions regarding some given
result or event are upheld for the future, any action, changed or unchanged,
presupposes that there are constantly operating causes even if no particular
cause for a particular event can be pre-known to any actor at any time. In
fact, disproving that any natural phenomenon is governed by time-invariant-
ly operating causes would require one to show that given phenomenon can-
not be anticipated or produced on the basis of antecedent variables. But
clearly, trying to prove this would again necessarily presuppose that the oc-
currence or nonoccurrence of the phenomenon under scrutiny could be ef-
fected by taking appropriate action and that the phenomenon must thus
assumedly be embedded in a network of constantly operating causes.
Hence, one is forced to conclude that the validity of the constancy principle
cannot be falsified by any action as any action would have to presuppose
it. 19 (There is only one way in which it might be said that "experience" could
"falsify" the constancy principle: if the physical world were indeed so chaotic
that one could no longer act at all, then of course it would not make much
sense to speak of a world with constantly operating causes. But then human
beings, whose essential characteristic is to act intentionally, would also no
longer be the ones who experience this inconstancy. As long as one sur-
vives as a human being-and this is what the argument in effect says-the
constancy principle must be assumed to be valid a priori, as any action must
presuppose it and no experience that anyone could actually have could pos-
sibly disprove this.) 20
Implied in the category of causality is that of time. Whenever one

produces or prepares for a certain result and thereby categorizes events as
causes and effects, one also distinguishes between earlier and later events.
And to be sure, this categorization is not simply derived from experience,
i.e., the mere observance of things and events. The sequence of experien-
ces as it appears in the temporal order of one's observations is quite a dif-
ferent thing from the real sequence of events in real time. As a matter of
fact, one can observe things in an order that is exactly the opposite of the
real temporal order in which they stand to each other. That one knows how
to interpret observations in a way that might deviate from and correct on the
temporal order in which they were made and can even locate events in ob-
jective time requires that the observer be an actor and know what it means
to produce or prepare for some result.21 Only because one is an actor, and
experiences are those of an acting person, can events be interpreted as oc-
curring earlier and later. And, one cannot know from experience that ex-
periences must be interpreted with reference to actions, as the performance
of any action already presupposes the possession of experiences inter-
preted this way. No person who did not know what it means to act could
ever experience events placed in real time, and hence the meaning of time
must be assumed to be known a priori to any actor because of the fact that
he is an actor.
Furthermore, actions not only presuppose causality and an objective

time order, they also require values. Values, too, are not known to us
through experience; rather, the opposite is true. One only experiences
things because they are things on which positive or negative value can be
placed in the course of action. Only by an actor, that is to say, can things
be experienced as value-laden and, even more generally, only because one
is an actor does one have conscious experiences at all, as they inform about
things which might be valuable for an acting person to know. More precise-
ly: with every action an actor pursues a goal. 22 He wants to produce a
definite result or be prepared for a result that he cannot prevent from hap-
pening. Whatever the goal of his action (which, of course, one could only
know from experience), the fact that it is pursued by an actor reveals that
he places value on it. As a matter of fact, it reveals that at the very start of
his action he places a relatively higher value on it than on any other goal of
action he could think of, otherwise he would have acted differently. Further-
more, since in order to achieve his most highly valued goal any actor must
interfere at an earlier point in time or must watch out for an earlier event in
order to start preparations for some later occurrence, every action must also
employ means (at least those of the actor's own body and the time absorbed
by the interference or the preparations) to produce the desired end. And as
these means are assumed to be causally necessary for achieving the valued
goal, otherwise the actor would not employ them, value must also be placed
on them. Not only the goals, then, have value for an actor, but the means
do, too-a value that is derived from that of the desired end, as one could
not reach an end without employing some means. In addition, as actions
can only be performed sequentially by an actor, every action involves
making a choice. It involves taking up that course of action which at the
moment of acting promises the most highly valued result to the actor and
hence is given preference by him; at the same time it involves excluding
other possible actions with expected results of a lesser value. As a conse-
quence of having to choose whenever one acts--of not being able to realize
all valued goals simultaneously--the performance of each and every action
implies the incurrence of costs. The cost of an action is the price that must
be paid for having to prefer one course of action over another, and it
amounts to the value attached to the most highly valued goal that cannot
be realized or whose realization must now be deferred, because the means
necessary to produce it are bound up in the production of another, even
more highly valued end. And while this implies that at its starting point every
action must be considered to be worth more than its costs and able to secure
a profit to the actor, i.e., a result whose value is ranked higher than the costs,
every action is also threatened by the possibility of a loss. Such a loss would
occur if in retrospect an actor found that-contrary to his own previous ex-
pectation»the result in fact had a lower value than that of the relinquished
alternative. And just as every action necessarily aims at a profit, the pos-
sibility of a loss, too, is a necessary accompaniment to any action. For an
actor can always go wrong regarding his causal-technological knowledge,
and the results aimed for cannot be produced successfully or the events for
which they were produced do not occur; or he can go wrong because every
action takes time to complete and the value attached to different goals can
change in the meantime, making things less valuable now that earlier ap-
peared to be highly valuable.
All of these categories-values, ends, means, choice, preference, cost,

profit and loss-are implied in the concept of action. None of them is derived
from experience. Rather, that one is able to interpret experiences in the
above categories requires that one already know what it means to act. No
one who is not an actor could understand them as they are not "given," ready
to be experienced, but experience is cast in these terms as it is constructed
by an actor according to the rules necessary for acting. And to be sure, as
actions are real things and one cannot not act-as even the attempt to do
so would itself be an action aimed at a goal, requiring means, excluding
other courses of action, incurring costs, subjecting the actor to the pos-
sibility of not achieving the desired goal and so suffering a loss-the
knowledge of what it means to act must be considered knowledge about
reality which is a priori. The very possession of it could not be undone or
disproved, since this would already presuppose its very existence. As a
matter of fact, a situation in which these categories of action would cease
to have a real existence could not itself ever be observed, as making an ob-
servation is itself an action. 23
Economic analysis, and the economic analysis of socialism in particular,

has as its foundation this a priori knowledge of the meaning of action as well
as its logical constituents. Essentially, economic analysis consists of: (1)
an understanding of the categories of action and an understanding of the
meaning of a change in values, costs, technological knowledge, etc.; (2) a
description of a situation in which these categories assume concrete mean-

ing, where definite people are identified as actors with definite objects
specified as their means of action, with definite goals identified as values
and definite things specified as costs; and (3) a deduction of the consequen-
ces that result from the performance of some specified action in this situa-
tion, or of the consequences that result for an actor if this situation is
changed in a specified way. And this deduction must yield a priori-valid con-
clusions, provided there is no flaw in the very process of deduction and the
situation and the change introduced into it being given, and a priori-valid
conclusions about reality if the situation and situation-change, as described,
can themselves be identified as real, because then their validity would ul-
timately go back to the indisputable validity of the categories of action.
It is along this methodological path that in the preceding discussion of

socialism the conclusion was derived, for instance, that if the labor expended
by an actor was not itself his goal of action, but rather only his means of
reaching the goal of producing income and if this income then is reduced
against his consent-by taxation-then for him the cost of expending labor
has been increased, as the value of other, alternative goals that can be pur-
sued by means of his body and time has gone up in relative terms, and hence
a reduced incentive to work must result. Along this path, too, the con-
clusion--as an a priori conclusion-was reached that, for instance, if the ac-
tual users of means of production do not have the right to sell them to the
highest bidder, then no one can establish the monetary costs involved in
producing what is actually produced with them (the monetary value, that is,
of the opportunities foregone by not using them differently), and no one can
assure any longer that these means are indeed employed in the production
of those goods considered to be the most highly valued ones by the actors
at the beginning of their productive efforts. Hence a reduced output in terms
of purchasing power must ensue.
After this rather lengthy digression into the field of epistemology, let us
now return to the discussion of the socialism of social engineering. This
digression was necessary in order to refute the claim of empiricism-
positivism, which if true would have saved socialism, that nothing categori-
cal can be said against any policy-scheme, as only experience can reveal
the real consequences of certain policies. Against this I have pointed out
that empiricism clearly seems to contradict intuition. According to intuition,
logic is more fundamental than experience and it is also knowledge about
real things. Furthermore, empiricism-positivism turns out to be self-con-
tradictory, as it itself must presuppose the existence of a priori knowledge
as real knowledge. There indeed exists a stock of positive a priori
knowledge which must be presupposed of every experiencing and acting
person, because he knows what it means to act, and which cannot possib-
ly be refuted by experience, as the very attempt to do so would itself presup-
pose the validity of what had been disputed.
The discussion has led us to a conclusion which can be summed up as
follows: "Experience does not beat logic, but rather the opposite is true."
Logic improves upon and corrects experience and tells us what kind of ex-
periences we can possibly have and which ones are instead due to a mud-
dled mind, and so would be better labeled "dreams" or "fantasies" rather than
as experiences regarding "reality." With this reassurance about the solidity
of the foundations on which the economic case against socialism has been
built, a straightforward criticism of the socialism of social engineering is now
possible; a criticism which is again a logical one, drawing on a priori
knowledge, and demonstrating that the goals pursued by the socialism of
social engineering can never be reached by its proposed means, since this
would stand in contradiction to such knowledge. The following critique can
now be brief, as the ideology of social engineering, apart from its empiricist-
positivlst methodology which has been proven faulty, is really no different

from the other versions of socialism. Hence, the analyses provided in the
preceding chapters regarding Marxist, social-democratic and conservative
socialism find application here, too.
This becomes clear once the property rules of the socialism of social
engineering are stated. First, the user-owners of scarce resources can do
whatever they want with them. But secondly, whenever the outcome of this
process is not liked by the community of social engineers (people, that is,
who are not the user-owners of the things in question and who do not have
a contractually acquired title to them), it has the right to interfere with the
practices of the actual user-owners and determine the uses of these means,
thereby restricting their property rights. Further, the community of social
engineers has the right to determine unilaterally what is or is not a preferred
outcome, and can thus restrict the property rights of natural owners when-
ever, wherever, and to the extent that it thinks necessary in order to produce
a preferred outcome.
Regarding these property rules, one realizes at once that although
socialism of social engineering allows for a gradual implementation of its
goals with only a moderate degree of intervention in the property rights of
natural owners, since the degree to which their rights can be curtailed is to
be determined by society (the social engineers), private ownership is in prin-
ciple abolished and peoples' productive enterprises take place under the
threat of an ever-increasing or even total expropriation of private owners. In
these respects there is no difference whatsoever between social-democratic
and conservative socialism and socialism's socially engineered version.
The difference again is reduced to one of social psychology. While Marxist,
redistribute, and conservative socialism all want to achieve a general goal
determined in advance~a goal of egalite or of the preservation of a given
order~the socialism of social engineering does not have any such design.
Its idea is one of punctuated, unprincipled intervention; flexible, piece-meal

engineering. The engineering socialist is thus seemingly much more open

to criticism, changing responses, new ideas-and this attitude certainly ap-
peals to a lot of people who would not willingly subscribe to any of the other
forms of socialism. On the other hand, though, and this should be kept in
mind as well, there is almost nothing, including even the most ridiculous
thing, that some social engineers would not like to try out on their fellow-
men, whom they regard as bundles of variables to be technically manipu-
lated like pawns on a chessboard by setting the right stimuli.
In any case, since the socialism of social engineering does not differ in
principle from any of the other versions of socialism, in that it implies a
redistribution of property titles away from the users and contractors of
scarce resources and onto nonusers and noncontractors, it, too, raises the
cost of production and so leads to a reduction in the production of wealth;
and this is necessarily so and no one need try it out first to reach this con-
clusion. This general conclusion is true regardless of the specific course
social engineering might take. Let us say that the community of social en-
gineers does not approve of some people having a low income and so
decides to fix minimum wages above the current market level. 24 Logic tells
one that this implies a restriction of the property rights of the employers as
well as the employees who are no longer allowed to strike certain kinds of
mutually beneficial bargains. The consequence is and must be unemploy-
ment. Instead of getting paid at a lower market wage, some people now will
not get paid at all, as some employers cannot pay the additional costs or
hire as many people as they would be willing to hire at lower costs. The
employers will be hurt as they can only employ fewer people and the out-
put of production hence will be lower, in relative terms; and the employees
will be hurt, as instead of some income, albeit low, they now have no in-
come. It cannot be stated a priori who of the employees and the employers
will suffer most from this, except that it will be those of the former whose
specific labor services have a relatively low value on the market, and those
of the latter who specifically hire precisely this type of labor. However, know-
ing from experience, for instance, that low-skilled labor services are par-
ticularly frequent among the young, among blacks, among women, among
older people who want to reenter the labor force after a longer period of
household-work, etc., it can be predicted with certainty that these will be the
groups hit the hardest by unemployment. And to be sure, the very fact that
the problem which intervention was originally supposed to cure (the low in-
come of some people) is now even worse than before could have been
known a priori, independent of any experience! To think that, misled by faul-
ty empiricist methodology, all this first has to be tried out as it otherwise
could not have been known is not only scientific humbug; like all acting
based on ill-conceived intellectual foundations, it is extremely costly as well.
To look at yet another example, the community of social engineers does

not like the fact that rents for houses or apartments are as high as they are,
and hence some people are not able to live as comfortably as they think
they should. Accordingly, rent-control legislation is passed, establishing
maximum rents for certain apartments.25 This is the situation, for instance,
in New York City, or on a much grander scale, in all of Italy. Again, without
having to wait for the consequences to become real one knows what they
will be. The construction of new apartments will decrease, as the returns
from investment are now lower. And with respect to old apartments, im-
mediate shortages will appear, as the demand for them, their prices being
lower, will rise. Some older apartments might not even be rented out
anymore, if the fixed rents are so low that the rent would not even cover the
cost of the deterioration that occurs by just living in and using the apart-
ment. Then there would be a tremendous shortage of housing next to
thousands of empty apartments (and New York City and Italy provide us
with perfect illustrations of this). And there would be no way out of this, as
it still would not pay to construct new apartments. In addition, the increased
shortages would result in very costly inflexibilities, as people who had hap-
pily gotten into one of the low-priced apartments would be increasingly un-
willing to move out again, in spite of the fact that, for instance, the family size
normally changes during the life cycle and so different needs as regards
housing emerge, and in spite of the fact that different job opportunities might
appear at different places. And so a huge waste of rental space occurs, be-
cause old people, for example, who occupy large apartments that were just
the right size when the children were still living at home but are much too
big now, still will not move into smaller apartments as there are none avail-
able; and young families who are in need of larger premises cannot find
those either, precisely because such places will not be vacated. Waste also
occurs because people do not move to the places where there is the greatest
demand for their specific labor services, or they spend large amounts of
time commuting to rather distant places, merely because they cannot find
a place to live where there is work for them, or they can only find accom-
modations at a much higher price than their presently fixed low rent. Clear-
ly, the problem that the social engineers wanted to solve by means of
introducing rent control legislation is much worse than before and the
general standard of living, in relative terms, has declined. Once again, all of
this could have been known a priori. For the social engineer, however,
misled by an empiricist-positivist methodology which tells him that there is
noway of knowing results unless things are actually tried out, this experience
will probably only set the stage for the next intervention. Perhaps the results
were not exactly as expected because one had forgotten to control some
other important variable, and one should now go ahead and find out. But
as this chapter has demonstrated, there is a way of knowing in advance that
neither the first nor any subsequent acts of intervention will ever reach their
goal, as they all imply an interference with the rights of the natural owners
of things by nonusers and noncontractors.26
In order to understand this, it is only necessary to return to sound

economic reasoning; to realize the unique epistemological nature of
economics as an aphoristic science of human action that rests on founda-
tions whose very denial must presuppose their validity; and to recognize, in
turn, that a science of action grounded in an empiricist-positivist methodol-
ogy is as ill-founded as the statement that "one can have his cake and eat
it, too."
7
THE ETHICAL JUSTIFICATION OF
CAPITALISM
and
WHY SOCIALISM IS MORALLY
INDEFENSIBLE
A he last four chapters have provided systematic reasons and empirical

evidence for the thesis that socialism as a social system that is not thorough-
ly based on the "natural theory of property" (the first-use-first-own rule) which
characterizes capitalism must necessarily be, and in fact is, an inferior sys-
tem with respect to the production of wealth and the average standard of
living. This may satisfy the person who believes that economic wealth and
living standards are the most important criteria in judging a society-and
there can be no doubt that for many, one's standard of living is a matter of
utmost importance-and because of this it is certainly necessary to keep all
of the above economic reasoning in mind. Yet there are people who do not
attach much importance to economic wealth and who rank other values
even higher-happily, one might say, for socialism, because it can thus quiet-
ly forget its original claim of being able to bring more prosperity to mankind,
and instead resort to the altogether different but even more inspiring claim
that whereas socialism might not be the key to prosperity, it would mean
justice, fairness, and morality (all terms used synonymously here). And it
can argue that a trade-off between efficiency and justice, an exchange of
"less wealth" for "more justice" is justified, since justice and fairness, are fun-
damentally more valuable than economic wealth.
This claim will be examined in some detail in this chapter. In so doing,

two separate but related claims will be analyzed: (1) the claim made in par-
ticular by socialists of the Marxist and the social-democratic camp, and to
a lesser degree also by the conservatives, that a principled case in favor of
socialism can be made because of the moral value of its principles and,
mutatis mutandis, that capitalism cannot be defended morally; and (2) the
claim of empiricist socialism that normative statements ("should" or "ought"
statements)-since they neither solely relate to facts, nor simply state a ver-
bal definition, and thus are neither empirical nor analytical statements-are
not really statements at all, at least not statements that one could call "cog-
nitive" in the widest of all senses, but rather mere "verbal expressions" used
to express or arouse feelings (such as "wow" or "grrrrr").1
The second, empiricist or, as its position applied to the field of morals
is called, "emotivist" claim will be dealt with first, as in a way it is more far-
reaching.2 The emotivist position is derived by accepting the central em-
piricist-positivist claim that the dichotomous distinction between empirical
and analytical statements is of an all-inclusive nature; that is, that any state-
ment whatsoever must be empirical or analytical and never can be both.
This position, it will be seen, turns out to be self-defeating on closer inspec-
tion, just as empiricism in general turned out to be self-defeating.3 If
emotivism is a valid position, then its basic proposition regarding normative
statements must itself be analytical or empirical, or else it must be an ex-
pression of emotions. If it is taken to be analytical, then it is mere verbal
quibble, saying nothing about anything real, but rather only defining one
sound by another, and emotivism would thus be a void doctrine. If, instead,
it is empirical, then the doctrine would not carry any weight, as its central
proposition could well be wrong. In any case, right or wrong, it would only
be a proposition stating a historical fact, i.e., how certain expressions have

been used in the past, which in itself would not provide any reason what-
soever why this would have to be the case in the future, too, and hence why
one should or rather should not look for normative statements that are more
than expressions of emotions in that they are meant to be justifiable. And
the emotivist doctrine would also lose all its weight if it adopted the third al-
THE ETHICAL JUSTIFICATION OF CAPITALISM 129
WHY SOCIALISM IS MORALLY INDEFENSIBLE
ternative and declared its central tenet itself a "wow" statement, too. For if
this were the case, then it would not contain any reason why one should re-
late to and interpret certain statements in certain ways, and so if one's own
instincts or feelings did not happen to coincide with somebody else's
"wowing," there would be nothing that could stop one from following one's
own feelings instead. Just as a normative statement would be no more than
the barking of a dog, so the emotlvist position then is no more than a bark-
ing comment on barking.
On the other hand, if the central statement of empiricism-emotivism, i.e.,

that normative statements have no cognitive meaning but are simply expres-
sions of feelings, is itself regarded as a meaningful statement communicat-
ing that one should conceive of all statements that are not analytical or
empirical as mere expressive symbols, then the emotivist position becomes
outrightly contradictory. This position must then assume, at least implicit-
ly, that certain insights, i.e., those relating to normative statements, cannot
simply be understood and meaningful, but can also be given justification as
statements with specific meanings. Hence, one must conclude that
emotivism falters, because if it were true, then it could not even say and
mean what it says-it simply would not exist as a position that could be dis-
cussed and evaluated with regard to its validity. But if it is a meaningful posi-
tion which can be discussed, then this fact belies its very own basic premise.
Moreover, the fact that it is indeed such a meaningful position, it should be
noted, cannot even be disputed, as one cannot communicate and argue
that one cannot communicate and argue. Rather, it must be presupposed
of any intellectual position, that it is meaningful and can be argued with
regard to its cognitive value, simply because it is presented in a language
and communicated. To argue otherwise would already implicitly admit its
validity. One is forced, then, to accept a rationalist approach towards ethics
for the very same reason that one was forced to adopt a rationalist instead
of an empiricist epistemology.4 Yet with emotivism so rebuffed, I am still far

away, or so it seems, from my set goal, which I share with the Marxist and
conservative socialists, of demonstrating that a principled case in favor of
or against socialism or capitalism can be made. What I have reached so far
is the conclusion that the question of whether or not normative statements
are cognitive ones is itself a cognitive problem. However, it still seems to
be a far cry from there to the proof that actual norm proposals can indeed
be shown to be either valid or invalid.
Fortunately, this impression is wrong and there is already much more

won here than might be suspected. The above argument shows us that any
truth claim-the claim connected with any proposition that it is true, objec-
tive, or valid (all terms used synonymously here)--is and must be raised and
decided upon in the course of an argumentation. And since it cannot be
disputed that this is so (one cannot communicate and argue that one can-
not communicate and argue), and it must be assumed that everyone knows
what it means to claim something to be true (one cannot deny this state-
ment without claiming its negation to be true), this has been aptly called 'the
apriori of communication and argumentation."5
Now, arguing never just consists of free-floating propositions claiming
to be true. Rather, argumentation is always an activity, too. But given that
truth claims are raised and decided upon in argumentation and that ar-
gumentation, aside from whatever is said in its course, is a practical affair,
it follows that intersubjectively meaningful norms must exist-precisely those
which make some action an argumentation-which have special cognitive

status in that they are the practical preconditions of objectivity and truth.
Hence, one reaches the conclusion that norms must indeed be as-
sumed to be justifiable as valid. It is simply impossible to argue otherwise,
because the ability to argue so would in fact presuppose the validity of those
norms which underlie any argumentation whatsoever.6 The answer, then,

to the question of which ends can or cannot be justified is to be derived from
the concept of argumentation. And with this, the peculiar role of reason in
determining the contents of ethics is given a precise description, too. In
contrast to the role of reason in establishing empirical laws of nature, reason
can claim to yield results in determining moral laws which can be shown to
be valid a priori. It only makes explicit what is already implied in the con-
cept of argumentation itself; and in analyzing any actual norm proposal, its
task is merely confined to analyzing whether or not it is logically consistent
with the very ethics which the proponent must presuppose as valid insofar
as he is able to make his proposal at all. 7
But what is the ethics implied in argumentation whose validity cannot

be disputed, as disputing it would implicitly have to presuppose it? Quite
commonly it has been observed that argumentation implies that a proposi-
tion claims universal acceptability, or, should it be a norm proposal, that it
is "universalizable." Applied to norm proposals, this is the idea, as formu-
lated in the Golden Rule of ethics or in the Kantian Categorical Imperative,
that only those norms can be justified that can be formulated as general
principles which are valid for everyone without exception.8 Indeed, as ar-
gumentation implies that everyone who can understand an argument must
in principle be able to be convinced of it simply because of its argumenta-
tive force, the universalization principle of ethics can now be understood
and explained as grounded in the wider "apriori of communication and ar-
gumentation." Yet the universalization principle only provides a purely for-
mal criterion for morality. To be sure, checked against this criterion all
proposals for valid norms which would specify different rules for different
classes of people could be shown to have no legitimate claim of being
universally acceptable as fair norms, unless the distinction between different
classes of people were such that it implied no discrimination, but could in-
stead be accepted as founded in the nature of things again by everyone.

But while some norms might not pass the test of universalization, if enough
attention were paid to their formulation, the most ridiculous norms, and what
is of course even more relevant, even openly incompatible norms could easi-
ly and equally well pass it. For example, "everybody must get drunk on Sun-
days or be fined" or "anyone who drinks alcohol will be punished" are both
rules that do not allow discrimination among groups of people and thus
could both claim to satisfy the condition of universalization.
Clearly then, the universalization principle alone would not provide one
with any positive set of norms that could be demonstrated to be justified.
However, there are other positive norms implied in argumentation aside
from the universalization principle. In order to recognize them, it is only
necessary to call three interrelated facts to attention. First, that argumenta-
tion is not only a cognitive but also a practical affair. Second, that argumen-
tation, as a form of action, implies the use of the scarce resource of one's
body. And third, that argumentation is a conflict-free way of interacting. Not
in the sense that there is always agreement on the things said, but in the
sense that as long as argumentation is in progress it is always possible to
agree at least on the fact that there is disagreement about the validity of what
has been said. And this is to say nothing else than that a mutual recogni-
tion of each person's exclusive control over his own body must be presup-
posed as long as there is argumentation (note again, that it is impossible to
deny this and claim this denial to be true without implicitly having to admit
its truth).
Hence, one would have to conclude that the norm implied in argumen-
tation is that everybody has the right of exclusive control over his own body
as his instrument of action and cognition. Only if there is at least an implicit
recognition of each individual's property right in his own body can argumen-
tation take place. 9 Only as long as this right is recognized is it possible for
someone to agree to what has been said in an argument and hence can
what has been said be validated, or is it possible to say "no" and to agree
only on the fact that there is disagreement. Indeed, anyone who would try
to justify any norm would already have to presuppose the property right in
his body as a valid norm, simply in order to say, 'This is what I claim to be
true and objective." Any person who would try to dispute the property right
in his own body would become caught up in a contradiction, as arguing in
this way and claiming his argument to be true, would already implicitly ac-
cept precisely this norm as being valid.
Thus it can be stated that whenever a person claims that some state-
ment can be justified, he at least implicitly assumes the following norm to
be justified: "Nobody has the right to uninvitedly aggress against the body
of any other person and thus delimit or restrict anyone's control over his
own body." This rule is implied in the concept of justification as argumen-
tative justification. Justifying means justifying without having to rely on coer-
cion. In fact, if one formulates the opposite of this rule, i.e., "everybody has
the right to uninvitedly aggress against other people" (a rule, by the way,
that would pass the formal test of the universalization principle!), then it is
easy to see that this rule is not, and never could be, defended in argumen-
tation. To do so would in fact have to presuppose the validity of precisely
its opposite, i.e., the aforementioned principle of nonaggression.
With this justification of a property norm regarding a person's body it
may seem that not much is won, as conflicts over bodies, for whose pos-
sible avoidance the nonaggression principle formulates a universally justifi-
able solution, make up only a small portion of all possible conflicts.
However, this impression is not correct. To be sure, people do not live on
air and love alone. They need a smaller or greater number of other things
as well, simply to survive-and of course only he who survives can sustain
an argumentation, let alone lead a comfortable life. With respect to all of

these other things norms are needed, too, as it could come to conflicting
evaluations regarding their use. But in fact, any other norm must be logi-
cally compatible with the nonaggression principle in order to be justified it-
self, and, mutatis mutandis, every norm that could be shown to be
incompatible with this principle would have to be considered invalid. In ad-
dition, as the things with respect to which norms have to be formulated are
scarce goods-just as a person's body is a scarce good-and as it is only
necessary to formulate norms at all because goods are scarce and not be-
cause they are particular kinds of scarce goods, the specifications of the
nonaggression principle, conceived of as a special property norm referring
to a specific kind of good, must in fact already contain those of a general
theory of property.
I will first state this general theory of property as a set of rules applicable
to all goods with the purpose of helping one to avoid all possible conflicts
by means of uniform principles, and will then demonstrate how this general
theory is implied in the nonaggression principle. Since according to the
nonaggression principle a person can do with his body whatever he wants
as long as he does not thereby aggress against another person's body, that
person could also make use of other scarce means, just as one makes use
of one's own body, provided these other things have not already been ap-
propriated by someone else but are still in a natural, unowned state. As
soon as scarce resources are visibly appropriated-as soon as someone
"mixes his labor," as John Locke phrased it, 10 with them and there are ob-
jective traces of this-then property, i.e., the right of exclusive control, can
only be acquired by a contractual transfer of property titles from a previous
to a later owner, and any attempt to unilaterally delimit this exclusive con-
trol of previous owners or any unsolicited transformation of the physical
characteristics of the scarce means in question is, in strict analogy with ag-
gressions against other people's bodies, an unjustifiable action. 11
The compatibility of this principle with that of nonaggression can be

demonstrated by means of an argumentum a contrario. First, it should be
noted that if no one had the right to acquire and control anything except his
own body (a rule that would pass the formal un'rversalization test), then we
would all cease to exist and the problem of the justification of normative
statements (or, for that matter, any other problem that is of concern in this
treatise) simply would not exist. The existence of this problem is only pos-
sible because we are alive, and our existence is due to the fact that we do
not, indeed cannot, accept a norm outlawing property in other scarce goods
next and in addition to that of one's physical body. Hence, the right to ac-
quire such goods must be assumed to exist. Now, if this is so, and if one
does not have the right to acquire such rights of exclusive control over un-
used, nature-given things through one's own work, i.e., by doing something
with things with which no one else had ever done anything before, and if
other people had the right to disregard one's ownership claim with respect
to such things which they had not worked on or put to some particular use
before, then this would only be possible if one could acquire property titles
not through labor, i.e., by establishing some objective, intersubjectively con-
trollable link between a particular person and a particular scarce resource,
but simply by verbal declaration; by decree. 12 However, acquiring proper-
ty titles through declaration is incompatible with the above justified nonag-
gression principle regarding bodies. For one thing, if one could indeed
appropriate property by decree, then this would imply that it would also be
possible for one to simply declare another person's body to be one's own.
Yet this, clearly enough, would conflict with the ruling of the nonaggression
principle which makes a sharp distinction between one's own body and the
body of another person. And this distinction can only be made in such a
clear-cut and unambiguous way because for bodies, as for anything else,
the separation between "mine" and "yours" is not based on verbal declara-
tions but on action. (Incidentally, a decision between rival declarative claims

could not be made unless there were some objective criterion other than
declaration.) The separation is based on the observation that some par-
ticular scarce resource had in fact-for everyone to see and verify, as objec-
tive indicators for this would exist-been made an expression or
materialization of one's own will, or, as the case may be, of someone else's
will. Moreover, and more importantly, to say that property is acquired not
through action but through a declaration involves an open practical con-
tradiction, because nobody could say and declare so unless in spite of what
was actually said his right of exclusive control over his body as his own in-
strument of saying anything was in fact already presupposed.
It has now been demonstrated that the right of original appropriation
through actions is compatible with and implied in the nonaggression prin-
ciple as the logically necessary presupposition of argumentation. Indirect-
ly, of course, it has also been demonstrated that any rule specifying different
rights, such as a socialist property theory, cannot be justified. Before enter-
ing a more detailed analysis, though, of why any socialist ethic is indefen-
sible~a discussion which should throw some additional light on the
importance of some of the stipulations of the "natural," capitalist theory of
property-a few remarks about what is or is not implied by classifying these
latter norms as justified seem to be in order.
In making this assertion, one need not claim to have derived an "ought"
from an "is." In fact, one can readily subscribe to the almost generally ac-
cepted view that the gulf between "ought" and "is" is logically unbridgeable.13
Rather, classifying the rulings of the natural theory of property in this way is
a purely cognitive matter. It no more follows from the classification of the
principle underlying capitalism as "fair" or "just" that one ought to act ac-
cording to it, than it follows from the concept of validity or truth that one
should always strive for it. To say that this principle is just also does not
preclude the possibility of people proposing or even enforcing rules that are
incompatible with it. As a matter of fact, with respect to norms the situation
is very similar to that in other disciplines of scientific inquiry. The fact, for
instance, that certain empirical statements are justified or justifiable and
others are not does not imply that everyone only defends objective, valid
statements. Rather, people can be wrong, even intentionally. But the dis-
tinction between objective and subjective, between true and false, does not
lose any of its significance because of this. Rather, people who are wrong
would have to be classified as either uninformed or intentionally lying. The
case is similar with respect to norms. Of course there are many people who
do not propagate or enforce norms which can be classified as valid accord-
ing to the meaning of justification which I have given above. But the distinc-
tion between justifiable and nonjustifiable norms does not dissolve because
of this, just as that between objective and subjective statements does not
crumble because of the existence of uninformed or lying people. Rather,
and accordingly, those people who would propagate and enforce such dif-
ferent, invalid norms would again have to be classified as uninformed or
dishonest, insofar as one had explained to them and indeed made it clear
that their alternative norm proposals or enforcements could not and never
would be justifiable in argumentation. And there would be even more jus-
tification for doing so in the moral case than in the empirical one, since the
validity of the nonaggression principle and that of the principle of original
appropriation through action as its logically necessary corollary must be
considered to be even more basic than any kind of valid or true statements.
For what is valid or true has to be defined as that upon which everyone ac-
ting according to this principle can possibly agree. As a matter of fact, as
has just been shown, at least the implicit acceptance of these rules is the
necessary prerequisite to being able to live and to argue at all. 14
Why is it, then, precisely, that socialist property theories of any kind fail
to be justifiable as valid? First, it should be noted that all of the actually prac-
ticed versions of socialism and most of its theoretically proposed models
as well would not even pass the first formal universalization test, and would
fail for this fact alone! These versions all contain norms within their
framework of legal rules which have the form "some people do, and some
people do not." However, such rules, which specify different rights or obliga-
tions for different classes of people, have no chance of being accepted as
fair by every potential participant in an argumentation for simply formal
reasons. Unless the distinction made between different classes of people
happens to be such that it is acceptable to both sides as grounded in the
nature of things, such rules would not be acceptable because they would
imply that one group is awarded legal privileges at the expense of com-
plementary discriminations against another group. Some people, either
those who are allowed to do something or those who are not, therefore could
not agree that these were fair rules. 15 Since most kinds of socialism, as
practiced or preached, have to rely on the enforcement of rules such as
"some people have the obligation to pay taxes, and others have the right to
consume them" or "some people know what is good for you and are allowed
to help you get these alleged blessings even if you do not want them, but
you are not allowed to know what is good for them and help them accord-
ingly" or "some people have the right to determine who has too much of
something and who too little, and others have the obligation to comply" or
even more plainly, 'the computer industry must pay to subsidize the
farmers," 'the employed for the unemployed," 'the ones without kids for
those with kids," etc., or vice versa, they all can be discarded easily as
serious contenders to the claim of being part of a valid theory of norms qua
property norms, because they all indicate by their very formulation that they
are not universalizable.
But what is wrong with the socialist property theories if this is taken care
of and there is indeed a theory formulated that contains exclusively univer-

salizable norms of the type "nobody is allowed to" or "everybody can"? Even
then--and this, more ambitiously, is what has been demonstrated indirectly
above and shall be argued directly-socialism could never hope to prove its
validity, no longer because of formal reasons, but because of its material
specifications. Indeed, while those forms of socialism that can easily be
refuted regarding their claim to moral validity on simple formal grounds can
at least be practiced, the application of those more sophisticated versions
that would pass the universalization test prove, for material reasons, to be
fatal: even if we tried, they simply could never be put into effect.
There are two related specifications in the norms of the natural theory
of property with at least one of which a socialist property theory comes into
conflict. The first such specification is that according to the capitalistic ethic,
aggression is defined as an invasion of the physical integrity of another
person's property.16 Socialism, instead, would define aggression as an in-
vasion of the value or psychic integrity of another person's property. Con-
servative socialism, it should be recalled, aimed at preserving a given
distribution of wealth and values, and attempted to bring those forces which
could change the status quo under control by means of price controls,
regulations, and behavioral controls. Clearly, in order to do so, property
rights to the value of things must be assumed to be justifiable, and an in-
vasion of values, mutatis mutandis, must be classified as unjustifiable ag-
gression. Yet not only conservatism uses this idea of property and
aggression. Social-democratic socialism does, too. Property rights to
values must be assumed to be legitimate when social-democratic socialism
allows me, for instance, to demand compensation from people whose chan-
ces or opportunities negatively affect mine. And the same is true when com-
pensation for committing psychological or "structural violence"-a
particularly dear term in the leftist political science literature-is permitted. 17
In order to be able to ask for such compensation, what was done-affecting

my opportunities, my psychic integrity, my feeling of what is owed to me~
would have to be classified as an aggressive act.
Why is this idea of protecting the value of property unjustifiable? First,

while every person, at least in principle, can have full control over whether
or not his actions cause the physical characteristics of something to change,
and hence also can have full control over whether or not those actions are
justifiable, control over whether or not one's actions affect the value of some-
one else's property does not rest with the acting person, but rather with other
people and their subjective evaluations. Thus no one could determine ex
ante if his actions would be classified as justifiable or unjustifiable. One
would first have to interrogate the whole population to make sure that one's
planned actions would not change another person's evaluations regarding
his own property. And even then nobody could act until universal agree-
ment was reached on who is supposed to do what with what, and at which
point in time. Clearly, for all the practical problems involved, one would be
long dead and nobody would argue anything any longer long before this
was ever accomplished. 18 But more decisively still, the socialist position
regarding property and aggression could not even be effectively argued,
because arguing in favor of any norm, socialist or not, implies that there is
conflict over the use of some scarce resource, otherwise there would simp-
ly be no need for discussion. However, in order to argue that there is a way
out of such conflicts, it must be presupposed that actions must be allowed
to be performed prior to any actual agreement or disagreement, because if
they were not, one could not even argue so. Yet if one can do this-and
socialism too must assume that one can, insofar as it exists as an argued
intellectual position-then this is only possible because the existence of ob-
jective borders of property i.e., borders which every person can recognize
as such on his own, without having to agree first with anyone else with
respect to one's system of values and evaluations. Socialism, too, then, in
spite of what it says, must in fact presuppose the existence of objective
property borders, rather than of borders determined by subjective evalua-
tions, if only in order to have any surviving socialist who can make his moral
proposals.
The socialist idea of protecting value instead of physical integrity also

fails for a second, related reason. Evidently, the value of a person, for ex-
ample, on the labor or marriage market, can be and indeed is affected by
other people's physical integrity or degree of physical integrity. Thus, if one
wanted property values to be protected, one would have to allow physical
aggression against people. However, it is only because of the very fact that
a person's borders-that is, the borders of a person's property in his body
as his domain of exclusive control with which another person is not allowed
to interfere unless he wishes to become an aggressor-are physical borders
(intersubjectively ascertainable, and not just subjectively fancied borders)
that everyone can agree on anything independently (and, of course, agree-
ment means agreement of independent decision-making units!). Only be-
cause the protected borders of property are objective then, i.e., fixed and
recognizable as fixed prior to any conventional agreement, can there at all
be argumentation, and possibly agreement, between independent decision-
making units. There simply could not be anyone arguing anything unless
his existence as an independent physical unit was first recognized. No one
could argue in favor of a property system defining borders of property in
subjective, evaluative terms-as does social ism--because simply to be able
to say so presupposes that, contrary to what the theory says, one must in
fact be a physically independent unit saying it.
The situation is no less dire for socialism when one turns to the second
essential specification of the rulings of the natural theory of property. The
basic norms of capitalism were characterized not only by the fact that
property and aggression were defined in physical terms; it was of no less

importance that in addition property was defined as private, individualized
property and that the meaning of original appropriation, which evidently im-
plies making a distinction between prior and later, had been specified. It is
with this additional specification as well that socialism comes into conflict.
Instead of recognizing the vital importance of the prior-later distinction in
deciding between conflicting property claims, socialism proposes norms
which in effect state that priority is irrelevant in making such a decision and
that late-comers have as much of a right to ownership as first-comers. Clear-
ly, this idea is involved when social-democratic socialism, for instance,
makes the natural owners of wealth and/or their heirs pay a tax so that the
unfortunate latecomers might be able to participate in its consumption. And
this idea is also involved, for instance, when the owner of a natural resource
is forced to reduce (or increase) its present exploitation in the interest of
posterity. Both times it only makes sense to do so when it is assumed that
the person accumulating wealth first, or using the natural resource first,
thereby commits an aggression against some late-comers. If they have
done nothing wrong, then the late-comers could have no such claim against
them. 19
What is wrong with this idea of dropping the prior-later distinction as

morally irrelevant? First, if the late-comers, i.e., those who did not in fact do
something with some scarce goods, had indeed as much of a right to them
as the first-comers, i.e., those who did do something with the scarce goods,
then literally no one would be allowed to do anything with anything, as one
would have to have all of the late-comers' consent prior to doing whatever
one wanted to do. Indeed, as posterity would include one's children's
children-people, that is, who come so late that one could never possibly
ask them-advocating a legal system that does not make use of the prior-
later distinction as part of its underlying property theory is simply absurd in
that it implies advocating death but must presuppose life to advocate any-
thing. Neither we, our forefathers, nor our progeny could, do, or will survive
and say or argue anything if one were to follow this rule. In order for any
person-past, present, or future-to argue anything it must be possible to
survive now. Nobody can wait and suspend acting until everyone of an in-
determinate class of late-comers happens to appear and agree to what one
wants to do. Rather, insofar as a person finds himself alone, he must be
able to act, to use, produce, consume goods straightaway, prior to any
agreement with people who are simply not around yet (and perhaps never
will be). And insofar as a person finds himself in the company of others and
there is conflict over how to use a given scarce resource, he must be able
to resolve the problem at a definite point in time with a definite number of
people instead of having to wait unspecified periods of time for unspecified
numbers of people. Simply in order to survive, then, which is a prerequisite
to arguing in favor of or against anything, property rights cannot be con-
ceived of as being timeless and nonspecific regarding the number of people
concerned. Rather, they must necessarily be thought of as originating
through acting at definite points in time for definite acting individuals.20
Furthermore, the idea of abandoning the prior-later distinction, which

socialism finds so attractive, would again simply be incompatible with the
nonaggression principle as the practical foundation of argumentation. To
argue and possibly agree with someone (if only on the fact that there is dis-
agreement) means to recognize each other's prior right of exclusive control
over his own body. Otherwise, it would be impossible for anyone to first say
anything at a definite point in time and for someone else to then be able to
reply, or vice versa, as neither the first nor the second speaker would be in-
dependent physical decisionmaking units anymore, at any time. Eliminat-
ing the prior-later distinction then, as socialism attempts to do, is tantamount
to eliminating the possibility of arguing and reaching agreement. However,
as one cannot argue that there is no possibility for discussion without the
prior control of every person over his own body being recognized and ac-
cepted as fair, a late-comer ethic that does not wish to make this difference
could never be agreed upon by anyone. Simply saying that it could implies
a contradiction, as one's being able to say so would presuppose one's ex-
istence as an independent decision-making unit at a definite point in time.
Hence, one is forced to conclude that the socialist ethic is a complete

failure. In all of its practical versions, it is no better than a rule such as "I can
hit you, but you cannot hit me," which even fails to pass the universalization
test. And if it did adopt universalizable rules, which would basically amount
to saying "everybody can hit everybody else," such rulings could not con-
ceivably be said to be universally acceptable on account of their very
material specification. Simply to say and argue so must presuppose a
person's property right over his own body. Thus, only the first-come-first-
own ethic of capitalism can be defended effectively as it is implied in ar-
gumentation. And no other ethic could be so justified, as justifying
something in the course of argumentation implies presupposing the validity
of precisely this ethic of the natural theory of property.
8
THE SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIALISM
or
THE THEORY OF THE STATE
A n the preceding chapters it has been demonstrated that socialism as a

social system implying a redistribution of property titles away from user-
owners and contractors to nonuser-owners and noncontractors necessari-
ly involves a reduction in the production of wealth, since the use and
contracting of resources are costly activities whose performance is made
even more costly as compared with alternatives available to actors.
Secondly, such a system cannot be defended as a fair or just social order
from a moral point of view because to argue so, in fact to argue at all, in
favor or against anything, be it a moral, nonmoral, empirical, or logico-
analytical position, necessarily presupposes the validity of the first-use-first-
own rule of the natural theory of property and capitalism, as otherwise no
one could survive and then say, or possibly agree on, anything as an inde-
pendent physical unit.
If neither an economic nor a moral case for socialism can be made, then
socialism is reduced to an affair of merely social-psychological significance.
What, then, are the socio-psychological foundations on which socialism
rests? Or, since socialism has been defined as an institutionalized policy of
redistribution of property titles away from user-owners and contractors, how
is an institution that implements a more or less total expropriation of natural
owners possible?
If an institution exists that is allowed to appropriate property titles other
than through original appropriation or contract, it must assumedly damage
some people who consider themselves to be the natural owners of these
things. By securing and possibly increasing its monetary and/or non-

monetary income it reduces that of other people-something categorically

different from the situation that exists when there is a contractual relation-
ship among people in which no one gains at the expense of anyone else but
everyone profits, as otherwise there simply would not be any exchange. In
this case one can expect resistance to the execution of such a policy. This
inclination to resist can, of course, be more or less intensive, and it can
change over time and become either more or less pronounced and pose a
greater or smaller threat to the institution carrying out the policy of redistribu-
tion. But as long as it exists at all, the institution must reckon with it. In par-
ticular, it must reckon with it if one assumes that the people representing
this institution are ordinary people who, like everyone else, have an interest
not only in stabilizing their current income which they are able to secure for
themselves in their roles as representatives of this institution but also in in-
creasing this income as much as possible. How, and this is precisely the
problem, can they stabilize and possibly increase their income from non-
contractual exchanges, even though this necessarily creates victims-and,
over time, increasing numbers of victims, or victims who are increasingly
hurt?
The answer can be broken down into three parts which will be discussed
in turn: (1) by aggressive violence; (2) by corrupting the public through let-
ting them or rather parts of them share in the enjoyment of the receipts coer-
cively extracted from natural owners of things; and (3) by corrupting the
public through letting them or parts of them participate in the specific policy
of expropriation to be enacted.
To assure its very existence, any institution that enforces a socialist
theory of property must rely on the continual threat of violence. Any such
institution threatens people who are unwilling to accept its noncontractual
appropriations of their natural property with physical assault, imprisonment,
enslavement, or even death, and it must carry out such threats if necessary,
THE SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIALISM 147
in order to stay 'trust-worthy" as the kind of institution that it is. Since one
is dealing with an institution-an organization, that is, which performs these
actions on a regular basis-it is almost self-explanatory that it refuses to call
its own practice of doing things "aggression," and instead adopts a different
name for it, with neutral or possibly even positive connotations. In fact, its
representatives might not even think that they themselves are aggressors
when acting in the name of this organization. However, it is not names or
terms that matter here or elsewhere, but what they really mean. 1 Regard-
ing the content of its actions, violence is the cornerstone of socialism's ex-
istence as an institution. And to leave no room for misunderstanding here,
the violence on which socialism rests is not the kind of violence that a natural
owner of things would use or threaten to use against aggressive intruders
of his property. It is not the defensive threat toward a prospective murderer
of, let us say, subjecting him to capital punishment, should he in fact mur-
der someone. Rather, it is aggressive violence directed at innocent victims.
An institution carrying out socialism literally rests on the threat posed by a
prospective murderer against innocent people (i.e., people who have not
done any physical harm whatsoever to anyone) to kill them should they not
comply with his demands, or even to kill them just for the "fun" of killing.
It is not at all difficult to recognize the truth of this. In order to do so, it
is only necessary to assume a boycott of any exchange-relation with the
representatives of socialism because such an exchange, for whatever
reasons, no longer seems profitable. It should be clear that in a social sys-
tem based on the natural theory of property-under capitalism-anyone
would have the right to boycott at any time, as long as he was indeed the
person who appropriated the things concerned by using them before
anyone else did or by acquiring them contractually from a previous owner.
However much a person or institution might be affected by such a boycott,
it would have to tolerate it and suffer silently, or else try to persuade the
boycotter to give up his position by making a more lucrative offer to him.

But it is not so with an institution that puts socialist ideas regarding proper-
ty into effect. Try, for instance, to stop paying taxes or to make your future
payments of taxes dependent on certain changes or improvements in the
services that the institution offers in return for the taxes-it would fine, as-
sault, imprison you, or perhaps do even worse things to you. Or to use
another example, try to ignore this institution's regulations or controls im-
posed on your property. Try, that is to say, to make the point that you did
not consent to these limitations regarding the use of your property and that
you would not invade the physical integrity of anyone else's property by ig-
noring such impositions, and hence, that you have the right to secede from
its jurisdiction, to "cancel your membership" so to speak, and from then on
deal with it on equal footing, from one privileged institution to another.
Again, assumedly without having aggressed against anyone through your
secession, this institution would come and invade you and your property,
and it would not hesitate to end your independence. As a matter of fact, if
it did not do so, it would stop being what it is. It would abdicate and be-
come a regular private property owner or a contractual association of such
owners. Only because it does not so abdicate is there socialism at all. In-
deed, and this is why the title of this chapter suggested that the question
regarding the socio-psychological foundations of socialism is identical to
that of the foundations of a state, if there were no institution enforcing
socialistic ideas of property, there would be no room for a state, as a state
is nothing else than an institution built on taxation and unsolicited, noncon-
tractual interference with the use that private people can make of their
natural property. There can be no socialism without a state, and as long as
there is a state there is socialism. The state, then, is the very institution that
puts socialism into action; and as socialism rests on aggressive violence
directed against innocent victims, aggressive violence is the nature of any
THE SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIALISM 149
state.2
But socialism, or the state as the incorporation of socialist ideas, does

not rest exclusively on aggression. The representatives of the state do not
engage solely in aggressive acts in order to stabilize their incomes, though
without it there would not be any state! As long as the relationship between
the state and private property owners is exclusively a parasitic one, and the
activities of the representatives of the state consist entirely of unsolicited in-
terferences with other people's property rights, designed to increase the in-
come of the former at the expense of a corresponding reduction in income
of the latter, and these agents of socialism then do nothing else with their
income than consume it for their own private purposes, then the chances
for the state's growth and the spread of socialism are at least very limited
and narrow. Certainly, one man, or one group of men, possessed with suf-
ficient aggressive energies can inspire enough fear in one and possibly even
in a few others, or in another more numerous group of men who, for whatever
reason, lack such characteristics, and can establish a stable relationship of
exploitation. But it is impossible to explain the fact, characteristic of all states
and each and every socialist social system, that the group of men repre-
senting the state can hold people ten, a hundred, or even a thousand times
more numerous than they themselves in submission, and extract from them
the incredibly large amounts of income that they in fact do, only by instilling
fear in them.
It might be thought that an increase in the degree of exploitation could

explain the size of income. But from the economic reasoning of previous
chapters we know that a higher degree of exploitation of natural owners
necessarily reduces their incentive to work and produce, and so there is a
narrow limit to the degree to which one person (or group of persons) can
lead a comfortable life on the income coercively extracted from another per-
son (or a roughly equally sized group of persons) who would have to sup-
port this life style through his (their) work. Hence, in order for the agents of
socialism to be able to lead a comfortable life and prosper as they do, it is
essential that the number of exploited subjects be considerably larger and
grow over-proportionally as compared with those of the representatives of
the state itself. With this, however, we are back to the question of how the
few can rule the many.
There would also be no convincing way around this explanatory task by

arguing that the state could simply solve this problem by improving its
weaponry; by threatening with atomic bombs instead of with guns and rifles,
so to speak, thereby increasing the number of its subjects. Since realisti-
cally one must assume that the technological know-how of such improved
weaponry can hardly be kept secret, especially if it is in fact applied, then
with the state's improved instruments for instilling fear, mutatis mutandis the
victims' ways and means of resisting improve as well, and hence, such ad-
vances can hardly be thought of as explaining what has to be explained.3
One must conclude, then, that the problem of explaining how the few can
rule the many is indeed real, and that socialism and the state as the incor-
poration of socialism must rest in addition to aggression on some sort of
active support among the public.
David Hume is one of the classic expositors of this insight. In his essay
on 'The first principles of government" he argues:
Nothing appears more surprising to those who consider

human affairs with a philosophical eye, than the easiness
with which the many are governed by the few, and the im-
plicit submission, with which men resign their own senti-
ments and passions to those of their rulers. When we
inquire by what means this wonder is effected we shall find,
that as Force is always on the side of the governed, the
governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is,
therefore, on opinion only that government is founded, and
this maxim extends to the most despotic and most military
governments, as well as to the most free and most popular.

The soldan of Egypt, or the emperor of Rome, might drive
his harmless subjects, like brute beasts, against their sen-
timents and inclination. But he must, at least, have led his
mamalukes or praetorian bands, like men, by their
opinion.4
How indeed is this support brought about? One important component

in the process of generating it is ideology. The state spends much time and
effort persuading the public that it is not really what it is and that the conse-
quences of its actions are positive rather than negative. Such ideologies,
spread to stabilize a state's existence and increase its income, claim that
socialism offers a superior economic system or a social order that is more
just than capitalism, or claim that there is no such thing as justice at all prior
to the state's stepping in and simply declaring certain norms to be just.5
And such ideologies, too, less attractive now, but once extremely powerful,
are those, for example, of the state being sanctified by religion, or of the
rulers not being ordinary people but instead god-like superhumans, who
must be obeyed because of their natural superiority. I have gone to great
lengths in previous chapters to demonstrate that such ideas are false and
unjustified, and I will return to the task of analyzing and unmasking another
fashionable ideology in the final chapter of this treatise. But regardless of
the falsity of these ideologies, it must be recognized that they certainly do
have some effect on people, and that they do contribute-some more so
than others~to their submission to a policy of aggressive invasion of the
property rights of natural owners.
Yet there is another more important component contributing to public
support and this is not verbal propaganda, but rather actions with a clear-
cut, tangible impact. Instead of being a mere parasitic consumer of goods
that other people have produced, the state, in order to stabilize itself and in-
crease its income as much as possible, adds some positive ingredients to

its policy, designed to be of use to some people outside the circle of its own
personnel. Either it is engaged as an agent of income transfer, i.e., as an
organization that hands out monetary or nonmonetary income to B that it
has previously taken away from A without A's consent-naturally after sub-
tracting a handling charge for the never costless act of such a transfer-or
it engages in the production of goods or services, using the means ex-
propriated earlier from natural owners, and thus contributes something of
value to the users/buyers/consumers of these goods. Either way, the state
generates support for its role. The recipients of transferred incomes as well
as the users/consumers of state-produced goods and services become de-
pendent to varying degrees on the continuation of a given state policy for
their current incomes, and their inclination to resist the socialism embodied
in state rule is reduced accordingly.
But this is only half of the picture. The positive achievements of the state
are not undertaken simply to do something nice for some people, as, for in-
stance, when someone gives somebody else a present. Nor are they done
simply to gain as high an income as possible from the exchange for the or-
ganization doing them, as when an ordinary, profit-oriented institution
engages in trade. Rather, they are undertaken in order to secure the exist-
ence and contribute to the growth of an institution that is built on aggres-
sive violence. As such, the positive contributions emanating from the state
must serve a strategic purpose. They must be designed to break up resis-
tance to or add support for the continued existence of an aggressor as an
aggressor. Of course, the state can err in this task, as can any ordinary busi-
ness, because its decisions about what measures best serves its strategic
purposes have to be made in anticipation of certain expected results. And
if it errs with respect to the responses following its policy decisions, instead
of rising its income can fall, jeopardizing its very existence, just as a profit-
oriented institution can make losses or even go bankrupt if the public is not
willing to deliberately buy what It was expected to buy. But only if the
peculiar strategic purpose of state transfers and state production as com-
pared with private transfers or production is understood does it become
possible to explain typical, recurring structural patterns of a state's actions,
and to explain why states generally and uniformly prefer to go into certain
lines of activities rather than others.
As regards the first problem: it does not make sense for a state to ex-
ploit every individual to the same extent, since this would bring everyone
against it, strengthen the solidarity among the victims, and in any case, it
would not be a policy that would find many new friends. It also does not
make sense for a state to grant its favors equally and indiscriminately to
everybody. For if it did, the victims would still be victims, although perhaps
to a lesser degree. However, there would then be less income left to be dis-
tributed to people who would truly profiteer from state action, and whose
increased support could help compensate for the lack of support from vic-
timized persons. Rather, state policy must be and indeed is guided by the
motto "divide et impera": treat people differently, play them against each
other, exploit one possibly smaller group and favor another possibly larger
group at the former's expense, and so counterbalance increased resent-
ment or resistance of some by increased support of others. Politics, as
politics of a state, is not 'the art of doing the possible," as statesmen prefer
to describe their business. It is the art, building on an equilibrium of terror,
of helping to stabilize state income on as high a level as possible by means
of popular discrimination and a popular, discriminatory scheme of distribu-
tional favors. To be sure, a profit-oriented institution can also engage in dis-
criminatory business policies, but to do so and to follow a discriminatory
employment policy or not to sell indiscriminately to anyone who is willing to
pay the price set for a given service or product is costly, and so an economic
incentive to avoid such action exists. For the state, on the other hand, there
is every incentive in the world to engage in such discriminatory practices.6
Regarding the kinds of services preferably offered by the state: clear-

ly, the state cannot produce everything, or at least not everything to the
same extent, for if it tried to do so its income would actually fall-as the state
can only appropriate what has in fact been produced earlier by natural
owners, and the incentive to produce anything in the future would be almost
completely gone in a system of all-around socialization. It is of utmost im-
portance in trying to implement socialism, then, that a state engage in and
concentrate on the production and provision of such goods and services
(and, mutatis mutandis, drive private competitors out of competition in such
lines of productive activities, thereby monopolizing their provision) which
are strategically relevant for preventing or suppressing any actual revolt,
rebellion, or revolution.7
Thus, all states-some more extensively than others, but every state to
a considerable degree-have felt the need to take the system of education,
for one thing, into their own hands. It either directly operates the education-
al institutions, or indirectly controls such institutions by making their private
operation dependent on the granting of a state license, thus insuring that
they operate within a predefined framework of guidelines provided by the
state. Together with a steadily extended period of compulsory schooling,
this gives the state a tremendous head start in the competition among dif-
ferent ideologies for the minds of the people. Ideological competition which
might pose a serious threat to state rule can thereby be eliminated or its im-
pact considerably reduced, especially if the state as the incorporation of
socialism succeeds in monopolizing the job market for intellectuals by
making a state license the prerequisite for any sort of systematic teaching
activity.8
The direct or indirect control of traffic and communication is of similar

strategic importance for a state. Indeed, all states have gone to great pains
to control rivers, coasts and seaways, streets and railroads, and especially,
mail, radio, television, and telecommunication systems. Every prospective
dissident is decisively restrained in his means of moving around and coor-
dinating the actions of individuals if these things are in the hand or under
the supervision of the state. The fact, well known from military history, that
traffic and communication systems are the very first command posts to be
occupied by any state attacking another vividly underlines their central
strategic significance in imposing state rule on a society.
A third central concern of strategic relevance for any state is the con-
trol and possible monopolization of money. If the state succeeds in this task
and, as is the case now all over the world, supplants a system of free bank-
ing and metal-based currency-most commonly the gold standard-with a
monetary system characterized by a state-operated central bank and paper-
money backed by nothing but paper and ink, a great victory has indeed
been reached. In its permanent struggle for higher income, the state is no
longer dependent on the equally unpopular means of increased taxation or
currency depreciation (coin-clipping), which at all times has been unmasked
quickly as fraudulent. Rather, it can now increase its own revenue and
decrease its own debt almost at will by printing more money, as long as the
additional money is brought into circulation before the inflationary conse-
quences of this practice have taken effect or have been anticipated by the
market.9
Fourth and last, there is the area of the production of security, of police,
defense, and judicial courts. Of all the state-provided or controlled goods
or services this is certainly the area of foremost strategic importance. In
fact, it is of such great significance for any state to gain control of these
things, to outlaw competitors, and to monopolize these activities, that "state"
and "producer of law and order" have frequently been considered

synonyms. Wrongly so, of course, as the state must be correctly described

as an institution of organized aggression attempting only to appear as an
ordinary producer in order to continue aggressing against innocent natural
owners. But the fact that this confusion exists and is widely shared can be
explained with reference to the observation that all states must monopolize
the production of security because of its central strategic importance, and
hence, these two terms, different as they are with respect to their intention-
al meaning, indeed have the same extensional meaning.
It is not difficult to see why in order to stabilize its existence, a state can-
not, under any circumstances, leave the production of security in the hands
of a market of private property owners. 10 Since the state ultimately rests on
coercion, it requires armed forces. Unfortunately (for any given state, that
is), other armed states exist which implies that there is a check on a state's
desire to expand its reign over other people and thereby increase its revenue
appropriated through exploitation. It is unfortunate for a given state, too,
that such a system of competing states also implies that each individual
state is somewhat limited regarding the degree to which it can exploit its
own subjects, as their support might dwindle if its own rule is perceived as
more oppressive than that of competing states. For then the likelihood of a
state's subjects collaborating with a competitor in its desire to 'take over,"
or that of voting with their feet (leaving one's own country and going to a
different one) might increase.11 It is even more important, then, for each in-
dividual state to avoid any such unpleasant competition from other poten-
tially dangerous armed organizations at least within the very territory it
happens to control. The mere existence of a private protection agency,
armed as it would have to be to do its job of protecting people from aggres-
sion and employing people trained in the use of such arms, would constitute
a potential threat to a state's ongoing policy of invading private people's
property rights. Hence, such organizations, which would surely spring up
on the market as the desire to be protected against aggressors is a genuine

one, are eagerly outlawed, and the state arrogates this job to itself and its
monopolistic control. As a matter of fact, states everywhere are highly in-
tent on outlawing or at least controlling even the mere possession of arms
by private citizens-and most states have indeed succeeded in this task-as
an armed man is clearly more of a threat to any aggressor than an unarmed
man. It bears much less risk for the state to keep things peaceful while its
own aggression continues, if rifles with which the taxman could be shot are
out of the reach of everyone except the taxman himself!
With respect to the judicial system matters are quite similar. If the state
did not monopolize the provision of judicial services, it would be unavoidable
that, sooner or later (and most likely sooner), the state would come to be
regarded as the unjust institution it in fact is. Yet no unjust organization has
any interest in being recognized as such. For one thing, if the state did not
see to it that only judges appointed and employed by the state itself ad-
ministered the law, it is evident that public law (those norms regulating the
relationship between the state and private individuals or associations of such
individuals) would have no chance of being accepted by the public, but in-
stead would be unveiled immediately as a system of legalized aggression,
existing in violation of almost everyone's sense of justice. And secondly, if
the state did not also monopolize the administration of private law (those
norms regulating the relationships among private citizens) but left this task
to competing courts and judges, dependent on the public's deliberate finan-
cial support, it is doubtful that norms implying an asymmetrical distribution
of rights or obligations between different persons or classes of persons
would have even the slightest chance of becoming generally accepted as
valid laws. Courts and judges who laid down such rules would immediate-
ly go bankrupt due to a lack of continued financial assistance.12 However,
since the state is dependent on a policy of divide et impera to maintain its
power, it must stop the emergence of a competitive system of private law
courts at all costs.
Without a doubt, all of these state-provided services-education, traffic

and communication, money and banking, and, most importantly, security
and the administration of justice-are of vital importance to any society what-
soever. All of them would certainly have to be provided, and would, in fact,
be produced by the market if the state did not take these things into its own
hands. But this does not mean that the state is simply a substitute for the
market. The state engages in these activities for an entirely different reason
than any private business would-not simply because there is a demand for
them, but rather because these areas of activities are of essential strategic
importance in assuring the state's continued existence as a privileged in-
stitution built on aggressive violence. And this different strategic intent is
responsible for a peculiar kind of product. Since the educators, employees
of traffic and communication systems, those of central banks, the police and
judges, are all paid by taxes, the kind of products or services provided by a
state, though certainly of some positive value to some people, can never be
of such quality that everyone would deliberately spend his own money on
them. Rather, these services all share the characteristic that they contribute
to letting the state increase its own coercively extracted income by means
of benefiting some while harming others. 13
But there is even more to the socio-psychological foundations of the

state as an institution of continued aggression against natural owners than
the popular redistribution of strategically important goods and services.
Equally important for the state's stability and growth is the decision-making
structure which it adopts for itself: its constitution. An ordinary profit-
oriented business would try to adopt a decision-making structure best suited
to its goal of maximizing income through the perception and implementa-
tion of entrepreneurial opportunities, i.e., differences in production costs and
anticipated product demand. The state, in comparison, faces the entirely

different task of adopting a decision-making structure which allows it to in-
crease maximally its coercively appropriated income-given its power to
threaten and bribe persons into supporting it by granting them special
favors.
I submit that the best decision-making structure for doing so is a

democratic constitution, i.e., the adoption of majority rule. In order to real-
ize the validity of this thesis, only the following assumption need be made.
Not only the persons actually representing the state have the desire (which
they, incidentally, are always permitted to satisfy) to increase their income
at the expense of a corresponding income reduction of natural owners,
producers, and contractors; this lust for power and the desire to rule others
also exists among the people governed. Not everyone has this desire to the
same extent; indeed some people might never have it. But most people
have it quite normally on recurring occasions. If this is so (and experience
informs us that this is indeed the case), then the state must reckon with resis-
tance from two analytically distinct sources. On the one hand there is resis-
tance by the victims which any state policy creates. The state can try to
break this up by making supportive friends; and indeed it will succeed in
doing so to the extent that people can be corrupted through bribery. On
the other hand, if lust for power exists among the victims and/or the persons
favored by a given state policy, then there must also be resistance or at least
discontent originating from the fact that any given policy of expropriation
and discriminatory distribution automatically excludes any other such policy
with its advocates in the state-ruled population, and hence must frustrate
their particular plan of how power should be used. By definition, no change
in the expropriation-redistribution policy of the state can eliminate this sort
of discontent, as any change would necessarily exclude a different policy.
Thus, if the state wants to do something to reduce the resistance (stemming
from the frustration of one's lust for power) that any one particular policy im-
plies, it can only do so by adopting a decision-making structure which min-
imizes the disappointment of potential power wielders: by opening up a

popular scheme of participation in decision making, so that everyone lust-
ing for his particular power policy can hope to have a shot at it in the future.
This, precisely, is the function of a democracy. Since it is based on a

respect for the majority, it is by definition a popular constitution for decision
making. And as it indeed opens up the chance for everyone to lobby for his
own specific plan of wielding power at regular intervals, it maximally reduces
current frustrated lust for power through the prospect of a better future.
Contrary to popular myth, the adoption of a democratic constitution has
nothing to do with freedom or justice. 14 Certainly, as the state restrains it-
self in its use of aggressive violence when engaging in the provision of some
positively valued goods and services, so it accepts additional constraints
when the incumbent rulers subject themselves to the control of the majority
of those being ruled. Despite the fact, though, that this constraint fulfills the
positive function of satisfying certain desires of certain people by reducing
the intensity of the frustrated lust for power, it by no means implies the state's
forsaking its privileged position as an institution of legalized aggression.
Rather, democratizing the state is an organizational measure undertaken for
the strategic purpose of rationalizing the execution of power, thereby in-
creasing the amount of income to be aggressively appropriated from natural
owners. The form of power is changed, but majority rule is aggression, too.
In a system based on the natural theory of property-under capitalism-
majority rule does not and cannot play any role (apart from the fact, of
course, that if accepted, anyone could join an association adopting majority
rule, such as a sports club or an association of animal lovers, whose juris-
diction is deliberately accepted by members as binding for the duration of
one's membership). In such a system, only the rules of original appropria-
tlon of goods through use or contractual acquisition from previous owners

are valid. Appropriation by decree or without a previous user-owner's con-
sent regardless of whether it was carried out by an autocrat, a minority,
against a majority, or by a majority against a minority is without exception
an act of aggressive violence. What distinguishes a democracy from an
autocracy, monarchy, or oligarchy is not that the former means freedom,
whereas the others mean aggression. The difference between them lies
solely in the techniques used to manage, transform, and channel popular
resistance fed by the frustrated lust for power. The autocrat does not allow
the population to influence policy in any regular, formalized way, even
though he, too, must pay close attention to public opinion in order to stabi-
lize his existence. Thus, an autocracy is characterized by the lack of an in-
stitutionalized outlet for potential power wielders. A democracy, on the
other hand, has precisely such an institution. It allows majorities, formed
according to certain formalized rules, to influence policy changes regular-
ly. Accordingly, if disappointed lust for power becomes more tolerable
when there is a regular outlet for it, then there must be less resistance to
democratic rule than to autocratic power. This important socio-psychologi-
cal difference between autocratic and democratic regimes has been
described masterfully by B. de Jouvenel:
From the twelfth to the eighteenth century governmental

authority grew continuously. The process was understood
by all who saw it happening; it stirred them to incessant
protest and to violent reaction. - In later times its growth
has continued at an accelerated pace, and its extension
has brought a corresponding extension of war. And now
we no longer understand the process, we no longer protest,
we no longer react. This quiescence of ours is a new thing,
for which Power has to thank the smoke-screen in which it
has wrapped itself. Formerly it could be seen, manifest in
the person of the king, who did not disclaim being the
master he was, and in whom human passions were discern-
ible. Now, masked in anonymity, it claims to have no ex-

istence of its own, and to be but the impersonal and pas-
sionless instrument of the general will. - But that is clearly
a fiction. - ... Today as always Power is in the hands of a
group of men who control the power house.... All that has
changed is that it has now been made easy for the ruled to
change the personnel of the leading wielders of Power.
Viewed from one angle, this weakens Power, because the
wills which control a society's life can, at the society's
pleasure, be replaced by other wills, in which it feels more
confidence. ~ But by opening the prospect of Power to all
the ambitious talents, this arrangement makes the exten-
sion of Power much easier. Under the "ancien regime,"
society's moving spirits, who had, as they knew, no chance
of a share in Power, were quick to denounce its smallest
encroachment. Now, on the other hand, when everyone is
potentially a minister, no one is concerned to cut down an
office to which he aspires one day himself, or to put sand
in a machine which he means to use himself when his turn
comes. Hence, it is that there is in the political circles of a
modern society a wide complicity in the extension of
Power. 15
Given an identical population and an identical state policy of the dis-
criminatory provision of goods and services, a democratic state has more
opportunities for increasing its own aggressively appropriated income. And
mutatis mutandis, an autocracy must settle for a relative lower income. In
terms of the classics of political thought, it must rule more wisely, i.e., rule
less. Since it does not allow any will other than that of the autocrat, and per-
haps his immediate advisors, to gain power or influence policy on a regular
basis, its execution of power appears less tolerable to those ruled. Thus, its
stability can only be secured if the overall degree of exploitation enacted by
the state is relatively reduced.
The situation over the last two centuries vividly illustrates the validity of
this thesis. During this time we have experienced an almost universal sub-
stitution of relatively democratic regimes for relatively autocratic-monarchi-

cal systems.16 (Even Soviet Russia is notably more democratic than czarist
Russia ever was.) Hand in hand with this change has gone a process never
experienced before regarding its speed and extent: a permanent and seem-
ingly uncontrollable growth of the state. In the competition of different states
for exploitable populations, and in these states' attempts to come to grips
with internal resistance, the democratic state has tended to win outright over
the autocratic one as the superior power-variant. Ceteris paribus, it is the
democratic state-and the democratic socialism incorporated in it-which
commands the higher income and so proves to be superior in wars with
other states. And ceteris paribus, it is this state, too, that succeeds better
in the management of internal resistance: it is, and historically this has been
shown repeatedly, easier to save the power of a state by democratizing it
than by doing the opposite and autocratizing its decision-making structure.
Here, then, we have the socio-psychological foundations of the state as

the very institution enacting socialism. Any state rests on the monopo-
lization or the monopolistic control of strategically important goods and ser-
vices which it discriminately provides to favored groups of people, thereby
breaking down resistance to a policy of aggression against natural owners.
Furthermore, it rests on a policy of reducing the frustrated lust for power by
creating outlets for public participation in future changes in a policy of ex-
ploitation. Naturally, every historical description of a state and its specific
socialist policy and policy changes will have to give a more detailed account
of what made it possible for socialism to become established and to grow.
But if any such description is supposedly complete and is not to fall prey to
ideological deception, then all measures taken by the state must be
described as embedded in this very institutional framework of violence,
divide etimpera, and democratization.
Whatever any given state does in terms of positively evaluated contribu-

tions to society, and however great or small the extent of such contributions
might be; whether the state provides help for working mothers with depend-
ent children or gives medical care, engages in road or airport construction;
whether it grants favors to farmers or students, devotes itself to the produc-
tion of educational services, society's infrastructure, money, steel or peace;
or even if it does all of these things and more, it would be completely falla-
cious to enumerate all of this and leave it at that. What must be said in ad-
dition is that the state can do nothing without the previous noncontractual
expropriation of natural owners. Its contributions to welfare are never an or-
dinary present, even if they are given away free of charge, because some-
thing is handed out that the state does not rightfully own in the first place.
If it sells its services at cost, or even at a profit, the means of production
employed in providing them still must have been appropriated by force. And
if it sells them at a subsidized price, aggression must continue in order to
uphold the current level of production.
The situation is similar with respect to a state's decision-making struc-

ture. Whether a state is organized autocratically or democratically, has a
centralized or decentralized decision-making structure, a single or multi-
stage representational structure; whether it is organized as a system of par-
ties or as a corporate state, it would be delusory to describe it in these terms
and leave it at that. In order to be exhaustive, what must be added is that
first and foremost, the constitution of a state is an organizational device for
promoting its existence as an institution of aggression. And insofar as its
stability rests on constitutionally guaranteed rights to participate in the in-
auguration of policy changes, it must be stressed that the state rests on an
institutionalized appeal to motivational energies that people in their private
lives would regard as criminal and accordingly would do everything to sup-
press. An ordinary business enterprise has a decision-making structure that
must adapt to the purpose of enabling it to secure as high a profit as pos-
sible from sales to deliberately supportive customers. A state's constitution
THE SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIALISM 165
has nothing in common with this, and only superficial sociological "studies
in organization" would engage in investigations of structural similarities or
differences between the two. 17
Only if this is thoroughly understood can the nature of the state and
socialism be fully grasped. And only then can there be a complete under-
standing of the other side of the same problem: what it takes to overcome
socialism. The state cannot be fought by simply boycotting it, as a private
business could, because an aggressor does not respect the negative judg-
ment revealed by boycotts. But it also cannot simply be fought by counter-
ing its aggression with defensive violence, because the state's aggression
is supported by public opinion. 18 Thus, everything depends on a change
in public opinion. More specifically, everything depends on two assump-
tions and the change that can be achieved regarding their status as realis-
tic or unrealistic. One such assumption was implied when it was argued
above that the state can generate support for its role by providing certain
goods and services to favored groups of people. There, evidently, the as-
sumption involved was that people can be corrupted into supporting an ag-
gressor if they receive a share, however small, of the benefits. And, since
states exist everywhere, this assumption, happily for the state, must indeed
be said to be realistic everywhere, today. But then, there is no such thing
as a law of nature stating that this must be so forever. In order for the state
to fail in reaching its objective, no more and no less than a change in general
public opinion must take place: state-supportive action must come to be
regarded and branded as immoral because it is support given to an or-
ganization of institutionalized crime. Socialism would be at its end if only
people stopped letting themselves be corrupted by the state's bribes, but
would, let us say, if offered, take their share of the wealth in order to reduce
the state's bribing power, while continuing to regard and treat it as an ag-
gressor to be resisted, ignored, and ridiculed, at any time and in any place.
The second assumption involved was that people indeed lust for power
and hence can be corrupted into state-supportive action if given a chance
to satisfy this lust. Looking at the facts, there can hardly be any doubt that
today this assumption, too, is realistic. But once again, it is not realistic be-
cause of natural laws, for at least in principle, it can deliberately be made
unrealistic.19 In order to bring about the end of statism and socialism, no
more and no less must be accomplished than a change in public opinion
which would lead people away from using the institutional outlets for policy
participation for the satisfaction of power lust, but instead make them sup-
press any such desire and turn this very organizational weapon of the state
against it and push uncompromisingly for an end to taxation and regulation
of natural owners wherever and whenever there is a chance of influencing
policy. 20
9
CAPITALIST PRODUCTION AND THE
PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY
JL he previous chapters have demonstrated that neither an economic nor

a moral case for socialism can be made. Socialism is economically and
morally inferior to capitalism. The last chapter examined why socialism is
nonetheless a viable social system, and analyzed the socio-psychological
characteristics of the state-the institution embodying socialism. Its exist-
ence, stability, and growth rest on aggression and on public support of this
aggression which the state manages to effect. This it does, for one thing,
through a policy of popular discrimination; a policy, that is, of bribing some
people into tolerating and supporting the continual exploitation of others by
granting them favors; and secondly, through a policy of popular participa-
tion in the making of policy, i.e., by corrupting the public and persuading it
to play the game of aggression by giving prospective power wielders the
consoling opportunity to enact their particular exploitative schemes at one
of the subsequent policy changes.
We shall now return to economics, and analyze the workings of a

capitalist system of production-^ market economy-as the alternative to
socialism, thereby constructively bringing my argument against socialism
full circle. While the final chapter will be devoted to the question of how
capitalism solves the problem of the production of so-called "public goods,"
this chapter will explain what might be termed the normal functioning of
capitalist production and contrast it with the normal working of a system of
state or social production. We will then turn to what is generally believed to
be a special problem allegedly showing a peculiar economic deficiency in
a pure capitalist production system: the so-called problem of monopolistic
production.
Ignoring for the moment the special problems of monopolistic and

public goods production, we will demonstrate why capitalism is economi-
cally superior as compared to its alternative for three structural reasons.
First, only capitalism can rationally, i.e., in terms of consumer evaluations,
allocate means of production; second, only capitalism can ensure that, with
the quality of the people and the allocation of resources being given, the
quality of the output produced reaches its optimal level as judged again in
terms of consumer evaluations; and third, assuming a given allocation of
production factors and quality of output, and judged again in terms of con-
sumer evaluations, only a market system can guarantee that the value of
production factors is efficiently conserved over time.1
As long as it produces for a market, i.e., for exchange with other people
or businesses, and subject as it is to the rule of nonaggression against the
property of natural owners, every ordinary business will use its resources
for the production of such goods and such amounts of these goods which,
in anticipation, promise a return from sales that surpasses as far as possible
the costs which are involved in using these resources. If this were not so,
a business would use its resources for the production of different amounts
of such goods or of different goods altogether. And every such business
has to decide repeatedly whether a given allocation or use of its means of
production should be upheld and reproduced, or if, due to a change in
demand or the anticipation of such a change, a reallocation to different uses
is in order. The question of whether or not resources have been used in the
most value-productive (the most profitable) way, or if a given reallocation
was the most economic one, can, of course, only be decided in a more or
less distant future under any conceivable economic or social system, be-
cause invariably time is needed to produce a product and bring it onto the
market. However, and this is decisive, for every business there is an objec-
tive criterion for deciding the extent to which its previous allocations
CAPITALIST PRODUCTION AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 169
decisions were right or wrong. Bookkeeping informs us-and in principle

anyone who wanted to do so could check and verify this information--
whether or not and to what extent a given allocation of factors of produc-
tion was economically rational, not only for the business in total but for each
of its subunits, insofar as market prices exist for the production factors used
in it. Since the profit-loss criterion is an ex post criterion, and must neces-
sarily be so under any production system because of the time factor involved
in production, it cannot be of any help when deciding on future ex ante al-
locations. Nevertheless, from the consumers' point of view it is possible to
conceive of the process of resource allocation and reallocation as rational,
because every allocations decision is constantly tested against the profit-
loss criterion. Every business that fails to meet this criterion is in the short
or long run doomed to shrink in size or be driven out of the market entirely,
and only those enterprises that successfully manage to meet the profit-loss
criterion can stay in operation or possibly grow and prosper. To be sure,
then, the institutionalization of this criterion does not insure (and no other
criterion ever could) that all individual business decisions will always turn
out to be rational in terms of consumer evaluations. However, by eliminat-
ing bad forecasters and strengthening the position of consistently success-
ful ones, it does insure that the structural changes of the whole production
system which take place overtime can be described as constant movements
toward a more rational use of resources and as a never-ending process of
directing and redirecting factors of production out of less value-productive
lines of production into lines which are valued more highly by the consumer.2
The situation is entirely different and arbitrariness from the point of view
of the consumer (for whom, it should be recalled, production is undertaken)
replaces rationality as soon as the state enters the picture. Because it is dif-
ferent from ordinary businesses in that it is allowed to acquire income by
noncontractual means, the state is not forced to avoid losses if it wants to
stay in business as are all other producers. Rather, since it is allowed to im-
pose taxes and/or regulations on people, the state is in a position to deter-
mine unilaterally whether or not, to what extent, and for what length of time
to subsidize its own productive operations. It can also unilaterally choose
which prospective competitor is allowed to compete with the state or pos-
sibly outcompete it. Essentially this means that the state becomes inde-
pendent of cost-profit considerations. But if it is no longer forced to test
continually any of its various uses of resources against this criterion, i.e., if
it no longer need successfully adjust its resource allocations to the changes
in demand of consumers in order to survive as a producer, then the se-
quence of allocations decisions as a whole must be regarded as an ar-
bitrary, irrational process of decision making. A mechanism of selection
forcing those allocations "mutations" which consistently ignore or exhibit a
maladjustment to consumer demand out of operation simply no longer ex-
ists.3 To say that the process of resource allocation becomes arbitrary in
the absence of the effective functioning of the profit-loss criterion does not
mean that the decisions which somehow have to be made are not subject
to any kind of constraint and hence are pure whim. They are not, and any
such decision faces certain constraints imposed on the decision maker. If,
for instance, the allocation of production factors is decided democratically,
then it evidently must appeal to the majority. But if a decision is constrained
in this way or if it is made autocratically, respecting the state of public opinion
as seen by the autocrat, then it is still arbitrary from the point of view of volun-
tarily buying or not-buying consumers.4 Hence, the allocation of resources,
whatever it is and however it changes over time, embodies a wasteful use
of scarce means. Freed from the necessity of making profits in order to sur-
vive as a consumer-serving institution, the state necessarily substitutes al-
locational chaos for rationality. M. Rothbard nicely summarizes the problem
as follows:
How can it (i.e. the government, the state) know whether

to build road A or road B, whether to invest in a road or in
a school-in fact, how much to spend for all its activities?
There is no rational way that it can allocate funds or even
decide how much to have. When there is a shortage of
teachers or schoolrooms or police or streets, the govern-
ment and its supporters have only one answer: more
money. Why is this answer never offered on the free
market? The reason is that money must be withdrawn from
some other uses in consumption or investment,... and this
withdrawal must be justified. This justification is provided
by the test of profit and loss: the indication that the most
urgent wants of the consumers are being satisfied. If an
enterprise or product is earning high profits for its owners
and these profits are expected to continue, more money
will be forthcoming; if not, and losses are being incurred,
money will flow out of the industry. The profit-and-loss-test
serves as the critical guide for directing the flow of produc-
tive services. No such guide exists for the government,
which has no rational way to decide how much money to
spend, either in total, or in each specific line. The more
money it spends, the more service it can supply-but where
to stop?5
Besides the misallocation of factors of production that results from the
decision to grant the state the special right to appropriate revenue in a non-
contractual way, state production implies a reduction in the quality of the
output of whatever it decides to produce. Again, an ordinary profit-oriented
business can only maintain a given size or possibly grow if it can sell its
products at a price and in such quantity that allow it to recover at least the
costs involved in production and is hopefully higher. Since the demand for
the goods or services produced depends either on their relative quality or
on their price-this being one of many criteria of quality-as perceived by
potential buyers, the producers must constantly be concerned about "per-
ceived product quality" or "cheapness of product." A firm is dependent ex-
clusively on voluntary consumer purchases for its continued existence, so

there is no arbitrarily defined standard of quality for a capitalist enterprise

(including so-called scientific or technological standards of quality) set by
an alleged expert or committee of experts. For it there is only the quality as
perceived and judged by the consumers. Once again, this criterion does
not guarantee that there are no low-quality or overpriced products or ser-
vices offered on the market because production takes time and the sales
test comes only after the products have appeared on the market. And this
would have to be so under any system of goods production. Nonetheless,
the fact that every capitalist enterprise must undergo this sales test and pass
it to avoid being eliminated from the market guarantees a sovereign posi-
tion to the consumers and their evaluations. Only if product quality is con-
stantly improved and adjusted to consumer tastes can a business stay in
operation and prosper.
The story is quite different as soon as the production of goods is under-

taken by the state. Once future revenue becomes independent of cost
covering sales-as is typically the case when the state produces a g o o d -
there is no longer a reason for such a producer to be concerned about
product quality in the same way that a sales-dependent institution would
have to be. If the producer's future income can be secured, regardless of
whether according to consumer evaluations the products or services
produced are worth their money, why undertake special efforts to improve
anything? More precisely, even if one assumes that the employees of the
state as a productive enterprise with the right to impose taxes and to regu-
late unilaterally the competitiveness of its potential rivals are, on the average,
just as much interested or uninterested in work as those working in a profit-
dependent enterprise,6 and if one further assumes that both groups of
employees and workers are on the average equally interested or
uninterested in an increase or decrease in their income, then the quality of
products, measured in terms of consumer demand and revealed in actual
purchases, must be lower in a state enterprise than in private business, be-

cause the income of the state employees would be far less dependent on
product quality. Accordingly, they would tend to devote relatively less ef-
fort to producing quality products and more of their time and effort would
go into doing what they, but not necessarily the consumer, happen to like.7
Only if the people working for the state were superhumans or angels, while
everyone else was simply an ordinary, inferior human being, could the result
be any different. Yet the same result, i.e., the inferiority of product quality
of any state-produced goods, would again ensue if the human race in the
aggregate would somehow improve: if they were working in a state
enterprise even angels would produce a lower quality output than their
angel-colleagues in private business, if work implied even the slightest dis-
utility for them.
Finally, in addition to the facts that only a market system can ensure a
rational allocation of scarce resources, and that only capitalist enterprises
can guarantee an output of products that can be said to be of optimal quality,
there is a third structural reason for the economic superiority, indeed unsur-
passability of a capitalist system of production. Only through the operation
of market forces is it possible to utilize resources efficiently over time in any
given allocation, i.e., to avoid overutilization as well as underutilization. This
problem has already been addressed with reference to Russian style
socialism in Chapter 3. What are the institutional constraints on an ordinary
profit-oriented enterprise in its decisions about the degree of exploitation or
conservation of its resources in the particular line of production in which
they happen to be used? Evidently, the owner of such an enterprise would
own the production factors or resources as well as the products produced
with them. Thus, his income (used here in a wide sense of the term) con-
sists of two parts: the income that is received from the sales of the products
produced after various operating costs have been subtracted; and the value
that is embodied in the factors of production which could be translated into

current income should the owner decide to sell them. Institutionalizing a
capitalist system-a social order based on private property-thus implies es-
tablishing an incentive structure under which people would try to maximize
their income in both of these dimensions. What exactly does this mean? 8
Every act of production evidently affects both mentioned income dimen-
sions. On one hand, production is undertaken to reach an income return
from sales. On the other hand, as long as the factors of production are ex-
haustible, i.e., as long as they are scarce and not free goods, every produc-
tion act implies a deterioration of the value of the production factors.
Assuming that private ownership exists, this produces a situation in which
every business constantly tries not to let the marginal costs of production
(i.e., the drop in value of the resources that results from their usage) to be-
come greater than the marginal revenue product, and where with the help
of bookkeeping an instrument for checking the success or failure of these
attempts exists. If a producer were not to succeed in this task and the drop
in the value of capital were higher than the increase in the income returns
from sales, the owner's total income (in the wider sense of the term) would
be reduced. Thus, private ownership is an institutional device for safeguard-
ing an existing stock of capital from being overexploited or if it is, for punish-
ing an owner for letting this happen through losses in income. This helps
make it possible for values produced to be higher than values destroyed
during production. In particular, private ownership is an institution in which
an incentive is established to efficiently adjust the degree of conserving or
consuming a given stock of capital in a particular line of production to an-
ticipated price changes. If, for instance, the future price of oil were expected
to rise above its current level, then the value of the capital bound up in oil
production would immediately rise as would the marginal cost involved in
producing the marginal product. Hence, the enterprise would immediately
be impelled to reduce production and increase conservation accordingly,

because the marginal revenue product on the present market was still at the
unchanged lower level. On the other hand, if in the future oil prices were
expected to fall below their present level, this would result in an immediate
drop in the respective capital values and in marginal costs, and hence the
enterprise would immediately begin to utilize its capital stock more inten-
sively since prices on the present market would still be relatively higher. And
to be sure, both of these reactions are exactly what is desirable from the
point of view of the consumers.
If the way in which a capitalist production system works is compared

with the situation that becomes institutionalized whenever the state takes
care of the means of production, striking differences emerge. This is true
especially when the state is a modern parliamentary democracy. In this
case, the managers of an enterprise may have the right to receive the returns
from sales (after subtracting operation costs), but, and this is decisive, they
do not have the right to appropriate privately the receipts from a possible
sale of the production factors. Under this constellation, the incentive to use
a given stock of capital economically over time is drastically reduced. Why?
Because if one has the right to privately appropriate the income return from
product sales but does not have the right to appropriate the gains or losses
in capital value that result from a given degree of usage of this capital, then
there is an incentive structure institutionalized not of maximizing total in-
come-i.e., total social wealth in terms of consumer evaluations--but rather
of maximizing income returns from sales at the expense of losses in capital
value. Why, for instance, should a government official reduce the degree of
exploitation of a given stock of capital and resort to a policy of conservation
when prices for the goods produced are expected to rise in the future? Evi-
dently, the advantage of such a conservationist policy (the higher capital
value resulting from it) could not be reaped privately. On the other hand,
by resorting to such a policy one's income returns from sales would be

reduced, whereas they would not be reduced if one forgot about conserv-
ing. In short, to conserve would mean to have none of the advantages and
all of the disadvantages. Hence, if the state managers are not super-humans
but ordinary people concerned with their own advantages, one must con-
clude that it is an absolutely necessary consequence of any state produc-
tion that a given stock of capital will be overutilized and the living standards
of consumers impaired in comparison to the situation under capitalism.
Now it is fairly certain that someone will argue that while one would not
doubt what has been stated so far, things would in fact be different and the
deficiency of a pure market system would come to light as soon as one paid
attention to the special case of monopolistic production. And by necessity,
monopolistic production would have to arise under capitalism, at least in the
long run. Not only Marxist critics but orthodox economic theorists as well
make much of this alleged counter-argument.9 In answer to this challenge
four points will be made in turn. First, available historical evidence shows
that contrary to these critics' thesis, there is no tendency toward increased
monopoly under an unhampered market system. In addition, there are
theoretical reasons that would lead one to doubt that such a tendency could
ever prevail on a free market. Third, even if such a process of increasing
monopolization should come to bear, for whatever reason, it would be harm-
less from the point of view of consumers provided that free entry into the
market were indeed ensured. And fourth, the concept of monopoly prices
as distinguished from and contrasted to competitive prices is illusory in a
capitalist economy.
Regarding historical evidence, if the thesis of the critics of capitalism
were true, then one would have to expect a more pronounced tendency
toward monopolization under relatively freer, unhampered, unregulated lais-
sez-faire capitalism than under a relatively more heavily regulated system of

"welfare" or "social" capitalism. However, history provides evidence of

precisely the opposite result. There is general agreement regarding the as-
sessment of the historical period from 1867 to World War I as being a rela-
tively more capitalist period in history of the United States, and of the
subsequent period being one of comparatively more and increasing busi-
ness regulations and welfare legislation. However, if one looks into the mat-
ter one finds that there was not only less development toward
monopolization and concentration of business taking place in the first period
than in the second but also that during the first period a constant trend
towards more severe competition with continually falling prices for almost
all goods could be observed. 10 And this tendency was only brought to a
halt and reversed when in the course of time the market system became
more and more obstructed and destroyed by state intervention. Increasing
monopolization only set in when leading businessmen became more suc-
cessful at persuading the government to interfere with this fierce system of
competition and pass regulatory legislation, imposing a system of "orderly"
competition to protect existing large firms from the so-called cutthroat com-
petition continually springing up around them. 11 G. Kolko, a left-winger and
thus certainly a trustworthy witness, at least for the critics from the left, sums
up his research into this question as follows:
There was during this [first] period a dominant trend toward

growing competition. Competition was unacceptable to
many key business and financial leaders, and the merger
movement was to a large extent a reflection of voluntary,
unsuccessful business effects to bring irresistible trends
under control...As new competitors sprang up, and as
economic power was diffused throughout an expanding
nation, it b e c a m e a p p a r e n t to many important
businessmen that only the national government could
[control and stabilize] the economy...Ironically, contrary to
the consensus of historians, it was not the existence of
monopoly which caused the government to intervene in the
economy, but the lack of it.
In addition, these findings, which stand in clear contradiction to much

of the common wisdom on the matter, are backed by theoretical considera-
tions. 13 Monopolization means that some specific factor of production is
withdrawn from the market sphere. There is no trading of the factor, but
there is only the owner of this factor engaging in restraint of trade. Now if
this is so, then no market price exists for this monopolized production fac-
tor. But if there is no market price for it, then the owner of the factor can
also no longer assess the monetary costs involved in withholding it from the
market and in using it as he happens to use it. In other words, he can no
longer calculate his profits and make sure, even if only ex post facto, that
he is indeed earning the highest possible profits from his investments. Thus,
provided that the entrepreneur is really interested in making the highest pos-
sible profit (something, to be sure, which is always assumed by his critics),
he would have to offer the monopolized production factors on the market
continually to be sure that he was indeed using them in the most profitable
way and that there was no other more lucrative way to use them, so as to
make it more profitable for him to sell the factor than keep it. Hence, it
seems, one would reach the paradoxical result that in order to maximize his
profits, the monopolist must have a permanent interest in discontinuing his
position as the owner of a production factor withheld from the market and,
instead, desire its inclusion in the market sphere.
Furthermore, with every additional act of monopolization the problem
for the owner of monopolized production factors-i.e., that because of the
impossibility of economic calculation, he can no longer make sure that those
factors are indeed used in the most profitable way-becomes ever more
acute. This is so, in particular, because realistically one must assume that
the monopolist is not only not omniscient but that his knowledge regarding
future competing goods and services by the consumers in future markets
becomes more and more limited as the process of monopolization advan-

ces. As production factors are withdrawn from the market, and as the circle
of consumers served by the goods produced with these factors widens, It
will be less likely that the monopolist, unable to make use of economic cal-
culation, can remain in command of all the relevant information needed to
detect the most profitable uses for his production factors. Instead, it be-
comes more likely in the course of such a process of monopolization, that
other people or groups of people, given their desire to make profits by en-
gaging in production, will perceive more lucrative ways of employing the
monopolized factors. 14 Not necessarily because they are better
entrepreneurs, but simply because they occupy different positions in space
and time and thus become increasingly aware of entrepreneurial oppor-
tunities which become more and more difficult and costly for the monopo-
list to detect with every new step toward monopolization. Hence, the
likelihood that the monopolist will be persuaded to sell his monopolized fac-
tors to other producers-nofa bene: for the purpose of thereby increasing
his profits-increases with every additional step toward monopolization.15
Now, let us assume that what historical evidence as well as theory

proves to be unlikely happens anyway, for whatever reason. And let us as-
sume straightaway the most extreme case conceivable: there is only one
single business, one super-monopolist so to speak, that provides all the
goods and services available on the market, and that is the sole employer
of everyone. What does this state of affairs imply regarding consumer satis-
faction, provided, of course, as assumed, that the super-monopolist has ac-
quired his position and upholds it without the use of aggression? For one
thing, it evidently means that no one has any valid claims against the owner
of this firm; his enterprise is indeed fully and legitimately his own. And for
another thing it means that there is no infringement on anyone's right to
boycott any possible exchange. No one is forced to work for the monopo-
list or buy anything from him, and everyone can do with his earnings from
labor services whatever he wants. He can consume or save them, use them
for productive or nonproductive purposes, or associate with others and
combine their funds for any sort of joint venture. But if this were so, then
the existence of a monopoly would only allow one to say this: the monop-
olist clearly could not see any chance of improving his income by selling all
or part of his means of production, otherwise he would do so. And no one
else could see any chance of improving his income by bidding away factors
from the monopolist or by becoming a capitalist producer himself through
original saving, through transforming existing nonproductively used private
wealth into productive capital, or through combining funds with others,
otherwise it would be done. But then, if no one saw any chance of improv-
ing his income without resorting to aggression, it would evidently be absurd
to see anything wrong with such a super-monopoly. Should it indeed ever
come into existence within the framework of a market economy, it would
only prove that this self-same super-monopolist was indeed providing con-
sumers with the most urgently wanted goods and services in the most effi-
cient way.
Yet the question of monopoly prices remains. 16 Doesn't a monopoly

price imply a suboptimal supply of goods to consumers, and isn't there then
an important exception from the generally superior economic working of
capitalism to be found here? In a way this question has already been
answered by the above explanation that even a super-monopolist estab-
lishing itself in the market cannot be considered harmful for consumers. But
in any case, the theory that monopoly prices are (allegedly) categorically
different from competitive prices has been presented in different, technical
language and hence deserves special treatment. The result of this analysis,
which is hardly surprising now, only reinforces what has already been dis-
covered: monopoly does not constitute a special problem forcing anyone
to make qualifying amendments to the general rule of a market economy
being necessarily more efficient than any socialist or statist system. What
is the definition of "monopoly price" and, in contrast to it, of "competitive
price" according to economic orthodoxy (which in the matter under inves-
tigation includes the so-called Austrian school of economics as represented
by L v. Mises)? The following definition is typical:
Monopoly is a prerequisite for the emergence of monopo-

ly prices, but it is not the only prerequisite. There is a fur-
ther condition required, namely a certain shape of the
demand curve. The mere existence of monopoly does not
mean anything in this regard. The publisher of a
copyrighted book is a monopolist. But he may not be able
to sell a single copy, no matter how low the price he asks.
Not every price at which a monopolist sells a monopolized
commodity is a monopoly price. Monopoly prices are only
prices at which it is more advantageous for the monopolist
to restrict the total amount to be sold than to expand its
sales to the limit which a competitive market would allow. 17
However plausible this distinction might seem, it will be argued that

neither the producer himself nor any neutral outside observer could ever
decide if the prices actually obtained on the market were monopoly or com-
petitive prices, based on the criterion "restricted versus unrestricted supp-
ly" as offered in the above definition. In order to understand this, suppose
a monopolist producer in the sense of "a sole producer of a given good" ex-
ists. The question of whether or not a given good is different from or
homogeneous to other goods produced by other firms is not one that can
be decided based on a comparative analysis of such goods in physical or
chemical terms ex ante, but will always have to be decided ex post facto,
on future markets, by the different or equal treatment and evaluations that
these goods receive from the buying public. Thus every producer, no mat-
ter what his product is, can be considered a potential monopolist in this
sense of the term, at the point of decision making. What, then, is the decision
with which he and every producer is faced? He must decide how much of
the good in question to produce in order to maximize his monetary income
(with other, nonmonetary income considerations assumed to be given). To
be able to do this he must decide how the demand curve for the product
concerned will be shaped when the products reach the market, and he must
take into consideration the various production costs of producing various
amounts of the good to be produced. This done, he will establish the
amount to be produced at that point where returns from sales, i.e., the
amount of goods sold times price, minus production costs involved in
producing that amount, will reach a maximum. Let us assume this happens
and the monopolist also happens to be correct in his evaluation of the fu-
ture demand curve in that the price he seeks for his products indeed clears
the market. Now the question is, is this market price a monopoly or a com-
petitive price? As M. Rothbard realized in his path-breaking but much
neglected analysis of the monopoly problem, there is no way of knowing.
Was the amount of the good produced "restricted" in order to take advantage
of inelastic demand and was a monopoly price thus reaped, or was the price
reached a competitive one established in order to sell an amount of goods
that was expanded 'to the limit that a competitive market would allow"?
There is no way to decide the matter. 18 Clearly, every producer will always
try to set the quantity produced at a level above which demand would be-
come elastic and would hence yield lower total returns to him because of
reduced prices paid. He thus engages in restrictive practices. At the same
time, based on his estimate of the shape of future demand curves, every
producer will always try to expand his production of any good up to the point
at which the marginal cost of production (that is, the opportunity cost of not
producing a unit of an alternative good with the help of scarce production
factors now bound up in the process of producing another unit of x) equals
the price per unit of x that one expects to be able to charge at the respec-
tive level of supply. Both restriction and expansion are part of profit-maxi-
mizing and market-price formation, and neither of these two aspects can be
separated from the other to make a valid distinction between monopolistic
and competitive action.
Now, suppose that at the next point of decision making the monopolist
decides to reduce the output of the good produced from a previously higher
to a new lower level, and assume that he indeed succeeds in securing higher
total returns now than at the earlier point in time. Wouldn't this be a clear
instance of a monopoly price? Again, the answer must be no. And this time
the reason would be the indistinguishability of this reallocational "restriction"
from a "normal" reallocation that takes account of changes in demand.
Every event that can be interpreted in one way can also be interpreted in
the other, and no means for deciding the matter exist, for once again both
are essentially two aspects of one and the same thing: of action, of choos-
ing. The same result, i.e., a restriction in supply coupled not only with higher
prices but with prices high enough to increase total revenue from sales,
would be brought about if the monopolist who, for example, produces a uni-
que kind of apples faces an increase in the demand for his apples (an up-
ward shift in the demand curve) and simultaneously an even higher increase
in demand (an even more drastic upward shift of the demand curve) for oran-
ges. In this situation he would reap greater returns from a reduced output
of apples, too, because the previous market price for his apples would have
become a subcompetitive price in the meantime. And if he indeed wanted
to maximize his profits, instead of simply expanding apple production ac-
cording to the increased demand, he now would have to use some of the
factors previously used for the production of apples for the production of
oranges, because in the meantime changes in the system of relative prices
would have occurred. However, what if the monopolist who restricts apple
production does not engage in producing oranges with the now available
factors, but instead does nothing with them? Again, all that this would indi-
cate is that besides the increase in demand for apples, in the meantime an
even greater increase in the demand for yet another good-leisure (more
precisely, the demand for leisure by the monopolist who is also a consumer) -
-had taken place. The explanation for the restricted apple supply is thus
found in the relative price changes of leisure (instead of oranges) as com-
pared with other goods.
Neither from the perspective of the monopolist himself nor from that of
any outside observer could restrictive action then be distinguished concep-
tually from normal ^allocations which simply follow anticipated changes in
demand. Whenever the monopolist engages in restrictive activities which
are followed by higher prices, by definition he must use the released factors
for another more highly valued purpose, thereby indicating that he adjusts
to changes in relative demand. As M. Rothbard sums up,
We cannot use "restriction of production" as the test of

monopoly vs. competitive price. A movement from a sub-
competitive to a competitive price also involves a restric-
tion of production of this good, coupled, of course, with an
expansion of production in other lines by the released fac-
tors. There is no way whatever to distinguish such a restric-
tion and corollary expansion from the alleged "monopoly
price" situation. If the restriction is accompanied by in-
creased leisure for the owner of the labor factor rather than
increased production of some other good on the market, it
is still the expansion of the yield of a consumer g o o d -
leisure. There is still no way of determining whether the
"restriction" resulted in a "monopoly" or a "competitive"
price or to what extent the motive of increased leisure was
involved. To define a monopoly price as a price attained
by selling a smaller quantity of a product at a higher price
is therefore meaningless, since the same definition applies
to the "competitive" price as compared with a subcompeti-
tive price.
The analysis of the monopoly question, then, provides no reason what-

soever to modify the description given above of the way a pure market
economy normally works and its superiority over any sort of socialist or
statist system of production. Not only is a process of monopolization high-
ly unlikely to occur, empirically as well as theoretically, but even if it did, from
the point of view of the consumers it would be harmless. Within the
framework of a market system a restrictive monopolistic price could not be
distinguished from a normal price hike stemming from higher demand and
changes in relative prices. And as every restrictive action is simultaneous-
ly expansionary, to say that the curtailment of production in one production
line coupled with an increase in total revenue implies a misallocation of
production factors and an exploitation of consumers is simply nonsense.
The misunderstanding involved in such reasoning has been accurately
revealed in the following passage from one of L v. Mises' later works in which
he implicitly refutes his own above-cited orthodox position regarding the
monopoly-price problem. He states:
An entrepreneur at whose disposal are 100 units of capital

employs, for instance, 50 units for the production of p and
50 units for the production of q. If both lines are profitable,
it is odd to blame him for not having employed more, e.g.,
75 units, for the production of p. He could increase the
production of p only by curtailing correspondingly the
production of q. But with regard to q the same fault could
be found with the grumblers. If one blames the
entrepreneur for not having produced more p, one must
blame him also for not having produced more q. This
means: one blames the entrepreneur for the fact that there
is scarcity of factors of production and that the earth is not
a land of Cockaigne. 20
The monopoly problem as a special problem of markets requiring state
action to be resolved does not exist.21 In fact, only when the state enters
the scene does a real, nonillusory problem of monopoly and monopoly

prices emerge. The state is the only enterprise whose prices and business
practices can be conceptually distinguished from all other prices and prac-
tices, and whose prices and practices can be called 'too high" or "exploita-
tive" in a completely objective, nonarbitrary way. These are prices and
practices which consumers are not voluntarily willing to pay and accept, but
which instead are forced upon them through threats of violence. And only
for so privileged an institution as the state is it also normal to expect and to
find a permanent process of increasing monopolization and concentration.
As compared to all other enterprises, which are subject to the control of
voluntarily buying or not-buying consumers, the enterprise "state" is an or-
ganization that can tax people and need not wait until they accept the tax,
and can impose regulations on the use people make of their property without
gaining their consent for doing so. This evidently gives the state, as com-
pared to all other institutions, a tremendous advantage in the competition
for scarce resources. If one only assumes that the representatives of the
state are as equally driven by the profit motive as anyone else, it follows from
this privileged position that the organization "state" must have a relatively
more pronounced tendency toward growth than any other organization.
And indeed, while there was not evidence for the thesis that a market sys-
tem would bring about a tendency toward monopolistic growth, the thesis
that a statist system would do so is amply supported by historical ex-
perience.
10
CAPITALIST PRODUCTION AND THE
PROBLEM OF PUBLIC GOODS
W e have tried to demolish socialism on the economic as well as moral

fronts. Having reduced it to a phenomenon of exclusively socio-psychologi-
cal significance, i.e., a phenomenon for whose existence neither good
economic nor good moral reasons can be found, its roots were explained
in terms of aggression and the corruptive influence that a policy of divide et
impera exercises on public opinion. The last chapter returned to economics
in order to give the final blows to socialism by engaging in the constructive
task of explaining the workings of a capitalist social order as socialism's
economically superior rival, ready for adoption at any time. In terms of con-
sumer evaluations, capitalism was indicated as being superior with respect
to the allocation of production factors, the quality of the output of goods
produced, and the preservation of values embodied in capital over time.
The so-called monopoly problem allegedly associated with a pure market
system was in fact demonstrated not to constitute any special problem at
all. Rather, everything said about the normally more efficient functioning of
capitalism is true also with respect to monopolistic producers, as long as
they are indeed subject to the control of voluntary purchases or voluntary
abstentions from purchases by consumers.
This final chapter will analyze an even more frequently cited special case
which allegedly requires one to make qualifying amendments regarding the
thesis of the economic superiority of capitalism: the case of the production
of so-called public goods. Considered in particular will be the production
of security.
If what has been stated in the foregoing chapter regarding the working
of a market economy is true, and if monopolies are completely harmless to
consumers as long as the consumers have the right to boycott them and
freely enter the market of competing producers themselves, then one must
draw the conclusion that for economic as well as moral reasons, the produc-
tion of all goods and services should be left in private hands. And in par-
ticular it follows that even the production of law and order, justice and
peace-those things that one has come to think of as being the most likely
candidates for state-provided goods for reasons explained in Chapter 8 -
should be provided privately, by a competitive market. This indeed is the
conclusion that G. de Molinari, a renowned Belgian economist, formulated
as early as 1849-at a time when classical liberalism was still the dominant
ideological force, and "economist" and "socialist" were generally (and right-
ly so) considered to be antonyms:
If there is one well established truth in political economy, it is this: That

in all cases, for all commodities that serve to provide for the tangible or in-
tangible need of the consumer, it is in the consumer's best interest that labor
and trade remain free, because the freedom of labor and trade have as their
necessary and permanent result the maximum reduction of price. And this:
That the interests of the consumer of any commodity whatsoever should al-
ways prevail over the interests of the producer. Now, in pursuing these prin-
ciples, one arrives at this rigorous conclusion: That the production of
security should, in the interest of consumers of this intangible commodity,
remain subject to the law of free competition. Whence it follows: That no
government should have the right to prevent another government from
going into competition with it, or require consumers of security to come ex-
clusively to it for this commodity.1
And he comments on this argument by saying: "Either this is logical
and true, or else the principles on which economic science is based are in-
valid."2
There is apparently only one way out of this unpleasant (for all socialists,
CAPITALIST PRODUCTION AND THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC GOODS 189
that is) conclusion: to argue that there are particular goods to which for
some special reasons the above economic reasoning does not apply. It is
this that the so-called public goods theorists are determined to prove. 3
However, we will demonstrate that in fact no such special goods or special
reasons exist, and that the production of security in particular does not pose
any problem different from that of the production of any other good or ser-
vice, be it houses, cheese, or insurance. In spite of its many followers, the
whole public goods theory is faulty, flashy reasoning, ridden with internal in-
consistencies, nonsequiturs, appealing to and playing on popular
prejudices and assumed beliefs, but with no scientific merit whatsoever.4
What, then, does the "escape route" that socialist economists have
found in order to avoid drawing Molinari's conclusion look like? Since
Molinari's time it has become increasingly common to answer the question
of whether there are goods to which different sorts of economic analyses
apply in the affirmative. As a matter of fact, nowadays it is almost impos-
sible to find a single economic textbook that does not make and stress the
vital importance of the distinction between private goods, for which the truth
of the economic superiority of a capitalist order of production is generally
admitted, and public goods, for which it is generally denied. 5 Certain goods
or services, and among them, security, are said to have the special charac-
teristic that their enjoyment cannot be restricted to those persons who have
actually financed their production. Rather, people who have not par-
ticipated in their financing can draw benefits from them, too. Such goods
are called public goods or services (as opposed to private goods or ser-
vices, which exclusively benefit those people who actually paid for them).
And it is due to this special feature of public goods, it is argued, that markets
cannot produce them, or at least not in sufficient quantity or quality, and
hence compensatory state action is required.6 The examples given by dif-
ferent authors for alleged public goods vary widely. Authors often classify
the same good or services differently, leaving almost no classification of a

particular good undisputed.7 This clearly foreshadows the illusory charac-
ter of the whole distinction. Nonetheless, some examples that enjoy par-
ticularly popular status as public goods are the fire brigade that stops a
neighbor's house from catching fire, thereby letting him profit from my fire
brigade, even though he did not contribute anything to financing it; or the
police that by walking around my property scare away potential burglars
from my neighbor's property as well, even if he did not help finance the
patrols; or the lighthouse, a particularly dear example to economists,8 that
helps ships find their way, even though they did not contribute a penny to
its construction or upkeep.
Before continuing with the presentation and critical examination of the

theory of public goods let us investigate how useful the distinction between
private and public goods is in helping decide what should be produced
privately and what by the state or with state help. Even the most superficial
analysis could not fail to point out that using this alleged criterion, rather
than presenting a sensible solution, would get one into deep trouble. While
at least at first glance it seems that some of the state-provided goods and
services might indeed qualify as public goods, it certainly is not obvious how
many of the goods and services that are actually produced by states could
come under the heading of public goods. Railroads, postal services,
telephone, streets, and the like seem to be goods whose usage can be
restricted to the persons who actually finance them, and hence appear to
be private goods. And the same seems to be the case regarding many
aspects of the multidimensional good "security": everything for which in-
surance could be taken out would have to qualify as a private good. Yet
this does not suffice. Just as a lot of state-provided goods appear to be
private goods, so many privately produced goods seem to fit in the category
of a public good. Clearly my neighbors would profit from my well-kept rose
garden-they could enjoy the sight of It without ever helping me garden. The
same Is true of all kinds of Improvements that I could make on my property
that would enhance the value of neighboring property as well. Even those
people who do not throw money in his hat could profit from a street
musician's performance. Those fellow travellers on the bus who did not help
me buy it profit from my deodorant. And everyone who ever comes into
contact with me would profit from my efforts, undertaken without their finan-
cial support, to turn myself into a most lovable person. Now, do all these
goods-rose gardens, property improvements, street music, deodorants,
personality improvements-since they clearly seem to possess the charac-
teristics of public goods, then have to be provided by the state or with state
assistance?
As these latter examples of privately produced public goods indicate,
there is something seriously wrong with the thesis of public goods theorists
that these goods cannot be produced privately but instead require state in-
tervention. Clearly they can be provided by markets. Furthermore, histori-
cal evidence shows us that all of the alleged public goods which states now
provide had at some time in the past actually been provided by private
entrepreneurs or even today are so provided in one country or another. For
example, the postal service was once private almost everywhere; streets
were privately financed and still are sometimes; even the beloved ligh-
thouses were originally the result of private enterprise;9 private police for-
ces, detectives, and arbitrators exist; and help for the sick, the poor, the
elderly, orphans, and widows has been a traditional field for private charity
organizations. To say, then, that such things cannot be produced by a pure
market system is falsified by experience one hundredfold.
Apart from this, other difficulties arise when the public-private goods
distinction is used to decide what to leave to the market and what not. What,
for instance, if the production of so-called public goods did not have posi-
tive but negative consequences for other people, or if the consequences

were positive for some and negative for others? What if the neighbor whose
house was saved from burning by my fire brigade had wished (perhaps be-
cause he was overinsured) that it had burned down, or my neighbors hate
roses, or my fellow travellers find the scent of my deodorant disgusting? In
addition, changes in the technology can change the character of a given
good. For example, with the development of cable TV, a good that was
formerly (seemingly) public has become private. And changes in the laws
of property-of the appropriation of property-can have the very same effect
of changing the public-private character of a good. The lighthouse, for in-
stance, is a public good only insofar as the sea is publicly (not privately)
owned. But if it were permitted to acquire pieces of the ocean as private
property, as it would be in a purely capitalist social order, then as the ligh-
thouse only shines over a limited territory, it would clearly become possible
to exclude nonpayers from the enjoyment of its services.
Leaving this somewhat sketchy level of discussion and looking into the
distinction between private and public goods more thoroughly, it turns out
to be a completely illusory distinction. A clear-cut dichotomy between
private and public goods does not exist, and this is essentially why there
can be so many disagreements on how to classify given goods. All goods
are more or less private or public and can~and constantly do~change with
respect to their degree of privateness/publicness with people's changing
values and evaluations, and with changes in the composition of the popula-
tion. They never fall, once and for all, into either one or the other category.
In order to recognize this, one must only recall what makes something a
good. For something to be a good it must be realized and treated as scarce
by someone. Something is not a good-as-such, that is to say, but goods
are goods only in the eyes of the beholder. Nothing is a good without at
least one person subjectively evaluating it as such. But then, since goods
are never goods-as-such-since no physico-chemical analysis can identify

something as an economic good-there is clearly no fixed, objective criterion
for classifying goods as either private or public. They can never be private
or public goods as such. Their private or public character depends on how
few or how many people consider them to be goods, with the degree to
which they are private or public changing as these evaluations change, and
ranging from one to infinity. Even seemingly completely private things like
the interior of my apartment or the color of my underwear thus can become
public goods as soon as somebody else starts caring about them. 1 0 And
seemingly public goods, like the exterior of my house or the color of my
overalls, can become extremely private goods as soon as other people stop
caring about them. Moreover, every good can change its characteristics
again and again; it can even turn from a public or private good to a public
or private bad and vice versa, depending solely on the changes in this caring
or uncaring. However, if this is so, no decision whatsoever can be based
on the classification of goods as private or public.11 In fact, to do so it would
not only become necessary to ask virtually every individual person with
respect to every single good whether or not he happened to care about it,
positively or negatively and perhaps to what extent, in order to determine
who might profit from what and should hence participate in its financing.
(And how could one know if they were telling the truth?!) It would also be-
come necessary to monitor all changes in such evaluations continually, with
the result that no definite decision could ever be made regarding the produc-
tion of anything, and as a consequence of a nonsensical theory all of us
would be long dead. 1 2
But even if one were to ignore all these difficulties, and were willing to
admit for the sake of argument that the private-public good distinction did
hold water, even then the argument would not prove what it is supposed to.
It neither provides conclusive reasons why public goods-assuming that

they exist as a separate category of goods-should be produced at all, nor

why the state rather than private enterprises should produce them. This is
what the theory of public goods essentially says, having introduced the
above-mentioned conceptual distinction: The positive effects of public
goods for people who do not contribute anything to their production or
financing proves that these goods are desirable. But evidently, they would
not be produced, or at least not in sufficient quantity and quality, in a free,
competitive market, since not all of those who would profit from their prod uc-
tion would also contribute financially to make the production possible. So
in order to produce these goods (which are evidently desirable, but would
not be produced otherwise), the state must jump in and assist in their
production. This sort of reasoning, which can be found in almost every
textbook on economics (Nobel laureates not excluded13) is completely fal-
lacious, and fallacious on two counts.
For one thing, to come to the conclusion that the state has to provide
public goods that otherwise would not be produced, one must smuggle a
norm into one's chain of reasoning. Otherwise, from the statement that be-
cause of some special characteristics of theirs certain goods would not be
produced, one could never reach the conclusion that these goods should
be produced. But with a norm required to justify their conclusion, the public
goods theorists clearly have left the bounds of economics as a positive,
wertfrei science. Instead they have transgressed into the field of morals or
ethics, and hence one would expect to be offered a theory of ethics as a
cognitive discipline in order for them to legitimately do what they are doing
and to justifiably derive the conclusion that they actually derive. But it can
hardly be stressed enough that nowhere in the public goods theory litera-
ture can there be found anything that even faintly resembles such a cogni-
tive theory of ethics. 14 Thus it must be stated at the outset, that the public
goods theorists are misusing whatever prestige they might have as positive
economists for pronouncements on matters on which, as their own writings

indicate, they have no authority whatsoever. Perhaps, though, they have
stumbled on something correct by accident, without supporting it with an
elaborate moral theory? It becomes apparent that nothing could be further
from the truth as soon as one explicitly formulates the norm that would be
needed to arrive at the above-mentioned conclusion aboutthe state's having
to assist in the provision of public goods. The norm required to reach the
above conclusion is this: whenever it can somehow be proven that the
production of a particular good or service has a positive effect on someone
but would not be produced at all, or would not be produced in a definite
quantity or quality unless others participated in its financing, then the use of
aggressive violence against these persons is allowed, either directly or indi-
rectly with the help of the state, and these persons may be forced to share
in the necessary financial burden. It does not need much comment to show
that chaos would result from implementing this rule, as it amounts to saying
that everyone can aggress against everyone else whenever he feels like it.
Moreover, it should be sufficiently clear from the discussion of the problem
of the justification of normative statements (Chapter 7) that this norm could
never be justified as a fair norm. For to argue in that way and to seek agree-
ment for this argument must presuppose, contrary to what the norm says,
that everyone's integrity as a physically independent decision-making unit
is assured.
But the public goods theory breaks down not just because of the faul-
ty moral reasoning implied in it. Even the utilitarian, economic reasoning
contained in the above argument is blatantly wrong. As the public goods
theory states, it might well be that it would be better to have the public goods
than not to have them, though it should not be forgotten that no a priori
reason exists that this must be so of necessity (which would then end the
public goods theorists' reasoning right here). For it is clearly possible, and
indeed known to be a fact, that anarchists exist who so greatly abhor state
action that they would prefer not having the so-called public goods at all to
having them provided by the state! 15 In any case, even if the argument is
conceded so far, to leap from the statement that the public goods are
desirable to the statement that they should therefore be provided by the
state is anything but conclusive, as this is by no means the choice with which
one is confronted. Since money or other resources must be withdrawn from
possible alternative uses to finance the supposedly desirable public goods,
the only relevant and appropriate question is whether or not these alterna-
tive uses to which the money could be put (that is, the private goods which
could have been acquired but now cannot be bought because the money
is being spent on public goods instead) are more valuable-more urgent-
than the public goods. And the answer to this question is perfectly clear. In
terms of consumer evaluations, however high its absolute level might be,
the value of the public goods is relatively lower than that of the competing
private goods, because if one had left the choice to the consumers (and had
not forced one alternative upon them), they evidently would have preferred
spending their money differently (otherwise no force would have been
necessary). This proves beyond any doubt that the resources used for the
provision of public goods are wasted, as they provide consumers with goods
or services which at best are only of secondary importance. In short, even
if one assumed that public goods which can be distinguished clearly from
private goods existed, and even if it were granted that a given public good
might be useful, public goods would still compete with private goods. And
there is only one method for finding out whether or not they are more ur-
gently desired and to what extent, or, mutatis mutandis, if, and to what ex-
tent, their production would take place at the expense of the nonproduction
or reduced production of more urgently needed private goods: by having
everything provided by freely competing private enterprises. Hence, con-
trary to the conclusion arrived at by the public goods theorists, logic forces
one to accept the result that only a pure market system can safeguard the
rationality, from the point of view of the consumers, of a decision to produce
a public good. And only under a pure capitalist order could it be ensured
that the decision about how much of a public good to produce (provided it
should be produced at all) is rational as well. 16 No less than a semantic
revolution of truly Orwellian dimensions would be required to come up with
a different result. Only if one were willing to interpret someone's "no" as real-
ly meaning "yes," the "nonbuying of something" as meaning that it is really
"preferred over that which the nonbuying person does instead of non-
buying," of "force" really meaning "freedom," of "non-contracting" really
meaning "making a contract" and so on, could the public goods theorists'
point be "proven."17 But then, how could we be sure that they really mean
what they seem to mean when they say what they say, and do not rather
mean the exact opposite, or don't mean anything with a definite content at
all, but are simply babbling? We could not! M. Rothbard is thus complete-
ly right when he comments on the endeavors of the public goods ideologues
to prove the existence of so-called market failures due to the nonproduc-
tion or a quantitatively or qualitatively "deficient" production of public goods.
He writes, "...such a view completely misconceives the way in which
economic science asserts that free-market action is ever optimal. It is op-
timal, not from the standpoint of the personal ethical views of an economist,
but from the standpoint of free, voluntary actions of all participants and in
satisfying the freely expressed needs of the consumers. Government inter-
ference, therefore, will necessarily and always move away from such an op-
timum." 18
Indeed, the arguments supposedly proving market failures are nothing

short of being patently absurd. Stripped of their disguise of technical jar-
gon all they prove is this: a market is not perfect, as it is characterized by
the nonaggression principle imposed on conditions marked by scarcity, and

so certain goods or services which could only be produced and provided if
aggression were allowed will not be produced. True enough. But no market
theorist would ever dare deny this. Yet, and this is decisive, this "imperfec-
tion" of the market can be defended, morally as well as economically,
whereas the supposed "perfections" of markets propagated by the public
goods theorists cannot. 19 It is true enough, too, that a termination of the
state's current practice of providing public goods would imply some change
in the existing social structure and the distribution of wealth. And such a
reshuffling would certainly imply hardship for some people. As a matter of
fact, this is precisely why there is widespread public resistance to a policy
of privatizing state functions, even though in the long run overall social
wealth would be enhanced by this very policy. Surely, however, this fact
cannot be accepted as a valid argument demonstrating the failure of
markets. If a man had been allowed to hit other people on the head and is
now not permitted to continue with this practice, he is certainly hurt. But
one would hardly accept that as a valid excuse for upholding the old (hit-
ting) rules. He is harmed, but harming him means substituting a social order
in which every consumer has an equal right to determine what and how
much of anything is produced, for a system in which some consumers have
the right to determine in what respect other consumers are not allowed to
buy voluntarily what they want with the means justly acquired by them and
at their disposal. And certainly, such a substitution would be preferable from
the point of view of all consumers as voluntary consumers.
By force of logical reasoning, then, one must accept Molinari's above-

cited conclusion that for the sake of consumers, all goods and services be
provided by markets. 20 It is not only false that clearly distinguishable
categories of goods exist, which would render special amendments to the
general thesis of capitalism's economic superiority necessary; even if they
did exist, no special reason could be found why these supposedly special
public goods should not also be produced by private enterprises since they
invariably stand in competition with private goods. In fact, in spite of all the
propaganda from the side of the public goods theorists, the greater efficien-
cy of markets as compared with the state has been realized with respect to
more and more of the alleged public goods. Confronted daily with ex-
perience, hardly anyone seriously studying these matters could deny that
nowadays markets could produce postal services, railroads, electricity,
telephone, education, money, roads and so on more effectively, i.e., more
to the liking of the consumers, than the state. Yet people generally shy away
from accepting in one particular sector what logic forces upon them: in the
field of the production of security. Hence, the rest of this chapter will ex-
plain the superior functioning of a capitalist economy in this particular area-
-a superiority whose logical case has already been made, but which shall
be rendered more persuasive once some empirical material is added to the
analysis and it is studied as a problem in its own right.21
How would a system of nonmonopolistic, competing producers of

security work? It should be clear from the outset that in answering this ques-
tion one is leaving the realm of purely logical analysis and hence the answers
must necessarily lack the certainty, the apodictic character of pronounce-
ments on the validity of the public goods theory. The problem faced is
precisely analogous to that of asking how a market would solve the problem
of hamburger production, especially if up to this point hamburgers had been
produced exclusively by the state, and hence no one could draw on past
experience. Only tentative answers could be formulated. No one could
possibly know the exact structure of the hamburger industry-how many
competing companies would come into existence, what importance this in-
dustry might have compared to others, what the hamburgers would look
like, how many different sorts of hamburgers would appear on the market
and perhaps disappear again because of a lack of demand, and so on. No

one couid know all of the circumstances and the changes which would in-
fluence the very structure of the hamburger industry that would take place
over time-changes in demand of various consumer groups, changes in
technology, changes in the prices of various goods that affect the industry
directly or indirectly, and so on. It must be stressed that all this is no dif-
ferent when it comes to the question of the private production of security.
But this by no means implies that nothing definitive can be said on the mat-
ter. Assuming certain general conditions of demand for security services
which are known to be more or less realistic by looking at the world as it
presently is, what can and will be said is how different social orders of
security production, characterized by different structural constraints under
which they have to operate, will respond differently.22 Let us first analyze
the specifics of monopolistic, state-run security production, as at least in
this case one can draw on ample evidence regarding the validity of the con-
clusions reached, and then turn to comparing this with what could be ex-
pected if such a system were replaced by a nonmonopolistic one.
Even if security is considered to be a public good, in the allocation of
scarce resources it must compete with other goods. What is spent on
security can no longer be spent on other goods that also might increase
consumer satisfaction. Moreover, security is not a single, homogeneous
good, but rather consists of numerous components and aspects. There is
not only prevention, detection, and enforcement but there is also security
from robbers, rapists, polluters, natural disasters, and so on. Moreover,
security is not produced in a "lump," but can be supplied in marginal units.
In addition, different people attach different importance to security as a
whole and also to different aspects of the whole thing, depending on their
personal characteristics, their past experiences with various factors of in-
security, and the time and place in which they happen to live. 23 Now, and
here we return to the fundamental economic problem of allocating scarce

resources to competing uses, how can the state-an organization which is
not financed exclusively by voluntary contributions and the sales of its
products, but rather partially or even wholly by taxes-decide how much
security to produce, how much of each of its countless aspects, to whom
and where to provide how much of what? The answer is that it has no ra-
tional way to decide this question. From the point of view of the consumers
its response to their security demands must thus be considered arbitrary.
Do we need one policeman and one judge, or 100,000 of each? Should
they be paid $100 a month, or $10,000? Should the policemen, however
many we might have, spend more time patrolling the streets, chasing rob-
bers, recovering stolen loot, or spying on participants in victimless crimes
such as prostitution, drug use, or smuggling? And should the judges spend
more time and energy hearing divorce cases, traffic violations, cases of
shoplifting, murder, or antitrust cases? Clearly, all of these questions must
be answered somehow because as long as there is scarcity and we do not
live in the Garden of Eden, the time and money spent on one thing cannot
be spent on another. The state must answer these questions, too, but
whatever it does, it does it without being subject to the profit-and-loss
criterion. Hence, its action is arbitrary and thus necessarily involves count-
less wasteful misallocations from the consumer's viewpoint.24 Independent
to a large degree of consumer wants, the state-employed security producers
instead do, as everyone knows, what they like. They hang around instead
of doing anything, and if they do work they prefer doing what is easiest or
work where they can wield power rather than serve consumers. Police of-
ficers drive around a lot in cars, hassle petty traffic violators, and spend huge
amounts of money investigating victimless crimes which a lot of people (i.e.,
nonparticipants) do not like, but which few would be willing to spend their
money on to fight, as they are not immediately affected by it. Yet with
respect to the one thing that consumers want most urgently--the prevention
of hard-core crime (i.e., crimes with victims), the detection and effective
punishment of hard-core criminals, the recovery of loot, and the securement
of compensation to victims of crimes from the aggressors-they are
notoriously inefficient, in spite of ever higher budget allocations.
Further, and here I return to the problem of a lowered quality of output

(with given allocations), whatever state-employed police or judges happen
to do (arbitrary as it must be), since their income is more or less independent
of the consumers' evaluations of their respective services, they will tend to
do poorly. Thus one observes police arbitrariness and brutality and the
slowness in the judicial process. Moreover, it is remarkable that neither the
police nor the judicial system offers consumers anything even faintly resem-
bling a service contract in which it is laid down in unambiguous terms what
procedure the consumer can expect to be set in motion in a specific situa-
tion. Rather, both operate in a contractual void which overtime allows them
to change their rules of procedure arbitrarily, and which explains the truly
ridiculous fact that the settlement of disputes between police and judges on
the one hand and private citizens on the other is not assigned to an inde-
pendent third party, but to another police or judge who shares employers
with one party~the government-in the dispute.
Third, anyone who has seen state-run police stations and courts, not to
mention prisons, knows how true it is that the factors of production used to
provide us with such security are overused, badly maintained, and filthy.
There is no reason for them to satisfy the consumers who provide their in-
come. And if, in an exceptional case, this happens not to be so, then it has
only been possible at costs that are comparatively much higher than those
of any similar private business.25
Without a doubt, all of these problems inherent in a system of monop-

olistic security production would be solved relatively quickly once a given

demand for security services was met by a competitive market with its en-
tirely different incentive structure for producers. This is not to say that a
"perfect" solution to the problem of security would be found. There would
still be robberies and murders; and not all loot would be recovered nor all
murderers caught. But in terms of consumer evaluations the situation would
improve to the extent that the nature of man would allow this. First, as long
as there is a competitive system, i.e., as long as the producers of security
services depend on voluntary purchases, most of which probably take the
form of service and insurance contracts agreed to in advance of any actual
"occurrence" of insecurity or aggression, no producer could increase its in-
come without improving services or quality of product as perceived by the
consumers. Furthermore, all security producers taken together could not
bolster the importance of their particular industry unless, for whatever
reason, consumers indeed started evaluating security more highly than
other goods, thus ensuring that the production of security would never and
nowhere take place at the expense of the non- or reduced production of, let
us say, cheese, as a competing private good. In addition, the producers of
security services would have to diversify their offerings to a considerable
degree because a highly diversified demand for security products among
millions and millions of consumers exists. Directly dependent on voluntary
consumer support, they would immediately be hurt financially if they did not
appropriately respond to the consumers' various wants or changes in wants.
Thus, every consumer would have a direct influence, albeit small, on the out-
put of goods appearing on or disappearing from the security market. In-
stead of offering a uniform "security packet" to everyone, as is characteristic
of state production policy, a multitude of service packages would appear
on the market. They would be tailored to the different security needs of dif-
ferent people, taking account of different occupations, different risk-taking
behavior, different things to be protected and insured, and different
geographical locations and time constraints.
But that is far from all. Besides diversification, the content and quality
of the products would improve, too. Not only would the treatment of con-
sumers by the employees of security enterprises improve immediately, the
"I could care less" attitude, the arbitrariness and even brutality, the
negligence and tardiness of the present police and judicial systems would
ultimately disappear. Since they then would be dependent on voluntary
consumer support, any maltreatment, impoliteness, or ineptitude could cost
them their jobs. Further, the above-mentioned peculiarity-that the settle-
ment of disputes between a client and his service provider is invariably
entrusted to the latter's judgment-would almost certainly disappear from
the books, and conflict arbitration by independent parties would become
the standard deal offered by producers of security. Most importantly
though, in order to attract and retain customers the producers of such ser-
vices would have to offer contracts which would allow the consumer to know
what he was buying and enable him to raise a valid, intersubjectively ascer-
tainable complaint if the actual performance of the security producer did not
live up to its obligations. And more specifically, insofar as they are not in-
dividualized service contracts where payment is made by the customers for
covering their own risks exclusively, but rather insurance contracts proper
which involve pooling one's own risks with those of other people, contrary
to the present statist practice, these contracts most certainly would no
longer contain any deliberately built-in redistribute scheme favoring one
group of people at the expense of another. Otherwise, if anyone had the
feeling that the contract offered to him involved his paying for other people's
peculiar needs and risks-factors of possible insecurity, that is, that he did
not perceive as applicable to his own case-he would simply reject signing
it or discontinue his payments.
Yet when all this is said, the question will inevitably surface, "Wouldn't
a competitive system of security production still necessarily result in per-
manent social conflict, in chaos and anarchy?" There are several points to
be made regarding this alleged criticism. First, it should be noted that such
an impression would by no means be in accordance with historical, empiri-
cal evidence. Systems of competing courts have existed at various places,
such as in ancient Ireland or at the time of the Hanseatic league, before the
arrival of the modern nation state, and as far as we know they worked well. 26
Judged by the then existent crime rate (crime per capita), the private police
in the Wild West (which incidentally was not as wild as some movies in-
sinuate) was relatively more successful than today's state-supported
police. 27 And turning to contemporary experience and examples, millions
and millions of international contacts exist even now-contacts of trade and
travel-and it certainly seems to be an exaggeration to say, for instance, that
there is more fraud, more crime, more breach of contract there than in
domestic relations. And this is so, it should be noted, without there being
one big monopolistic security producer and law-maker. Finally it is not to
be forgotten that even now in a great number of countries there are various
private security producers alongside to the state: private investigators, in-
surance detectives, and private arbitrators. Regarding their work, the im-
pression seems to confirm the thesis that they are more, not less, successful
in resolving social conflicts than their public counterparts.
However, this historical evidence is greatly subject to dispute, in par-

ticular regarding whether any general information can be derived from it.
Yet there are systematic reasons, too, why the fear expressed in the above
criticism is not well-founded. Paradoxical as it may seem at first, this is be-
cause establishing a competitive system of security producers implies erect-
ing an institutionalized incentive structure to produce an order of law and
law-enforcement that embodies the highest possible degree of consensus
regarding the question of conflict resolution, and hence will tend to generate
less rather than more social unrest and conflict than under monopolistic
auspices! 28 In order to understand this it is necessary to take a closer look
at the only typical situation that concerns the skeptic and allows him to
believe in the superior virtue of a monopolistically organized order of security
production. This is the situation when a conflict arises between A and B,
both are insured by different companies and the companies cannot come
to an immediate agreement regarding the validity of the conflicting claims
brought forward by their respective clients. (No problem would exist if such
an agreement were reached, or if both clients were insured by one and the
same company--at least the problem then would not be different in any way
from that emerging under a statist monopoly!) Wouldn't such a situation al-
ways result in an armed confrontation? This is highly unlikely. First, any
violent battle between companies would be costly and risky, in particular if
these companies had reached a respectable size which would be important
for them to have in order to appear as effective guarantors of security to
their prospective clients in the first place. More importantly though, under
a competitive system with each company dependent on the continuation of
voluntary consumer payments, any battle would have to be deliberately sup-
ported by each and every client of both companies. If there were only one
person who withdrew his payments because he was not convinced the bat-
tle was necessary in the particular conflict at hand, there would be immediate
economic pressure on the company to look for a peaceful solution to the
conflict.29 Hence, any competitive producer of security would be extreme-
ly cautious about his dedication to engaging in violent measures in order to
resolve conflicts. Instead, to the extent that it is peaceful conflict-resolution
that consumers want, each and every security producer would go to great
lengths to provide such measures to its clients and to establish in advance,
for everyone to know, to what arbitration process it would be willing to sub-
mit itself and its clients in case of a disagreement over the evaluation of con-
flicting claims. And as such a scheme could only appear to the clients of
different firms to be really working if there were agreement among them
regarding such arbitration^ measures, a system of law governing relations
between companies which would be universally acceptable to the clients of
all of the competing security producers would naturally evolve. Moreover,
the economic pressure to generate rules representing consensus on how
conflicts should be handled is even more far-reaching. Under a competi-
tive system the independent arbitrators who would be entrusted with the
task of finding peaceful solutions to conflicts would be dependent on the
continued support of the two disagreeing companies insofar as they could
and would select different judges if either one of them were sufficiently dis-
satisfied with the outcome of their arbitration work. Thus, these judges
would be under pressure to find solutions to the problems handed over to
them which, this time not with respect to the procedural aspects of law, but
its content, would be acceptable to all of the clients of the firms involved in
a given case as a fair and just solution.30 Otherwise one or all of the com-
panies might lose some of their customers, thus inducing those firms to turn
to a different arbitrator the next time they were in need of one. 31
But wouldn't it be possible under a competitive system for a security-

producing firm to become an outlaw company-a firm, that is, which, sup-
ported by its own clients, started to aggress against others? There is
certainly no way to deny that this might be possible, though again it must
be emphasized that here one is in the realm of empirical social science and
no one could know such a thing with certainty. And yet the tacit insinuation
that the possibility of a security firm becoming an outlaw company would
somehow indicate a severe deficiency in the philosophy and economics of
a pure capitalist social order is fallacious.32 First, it should be recalled that
any social system, a statist-socialist order no less than a pure market
economy, is dependent for its continued existence on public opinion, and

that a given state of public opinion at all times delimits what can or cannot
occur, or what is more or less likely to occur in a given society. The current
state of public opinion in West Germany, for instance, makes it highly un-
likely or even impossible that a statist-socialist system of the present-day
Russian type could be imposed on the West German public. The lack of
public support for such a system would doom it to failure and make it col-
lapse. And it would be even more unlikely that any such attempt to impose
a Russian-type order could ever hope to succeed among Americans, given
American public opinion. Hence, in order to see the problem of outlaw com-
panies correctly, the above question should be phrased as follows: How
likely is it that any such event would occur in a given society with its specific
state of public opinion? Formulated in this way, it is clear that the answer
would have to be different for different societies. For some, characterized
by socialist ideas deeply entrenched in the public, there would be a greater
likelihood of the reemergence of aggressor companies, and for other
societies there would be a much smaller chance of this happening. But then,
would the prospect of a competitive system of security production in any
given case be better or worse than that of the continuation of a statist sys-
tem? Let us look, for instance, at the present-day United States. Assume
that by a legislative act the state had abolished its right to provide security
with tax funds, and a competitive system of security production were intro-
duced. Given the state of public opinion, how likely would it then be that
outlaw producers would spring up, and what if they did? Evidently, the
answer would depend on the reactions of the public to this changed situa-
tion. Thus, the first reply to those challenging the idea of a private market
for security would have to be: what about you? What would your reaction
be? Does your fear of outlaw companies mean that you would then go out
and engage in trade with a security producer that aggressed against other
people and their property, and would you continue supporting it if it did?
Certainly the critic would be much muted by this counterattack. But more
important than this is the systematic challenge implied in this personal
counterattack. Evidently, the described change in the situation would imply
a change in the cost-benefit structure that everyone would face once he had
to make his decisions. Before the introduction of a competitive system of
security production it had been legal to participate in and support (state)
aggression. Now such an activity would be an illegal activity. Hence, given
one's conscience, which makes each of one's own decisions appear more
or less costly, i.e., more or less in harmony with one's own principles of cor-
rect behavior, support for a firm engaging in the exploitation of people un-
willing to deliberately support its actions would be more costly now than
before. Given this fact, it must be assumed that the number of people-
among them even those who otherwise would have readily lent their sup-
port to the state-who would now spend their money to support a firm
committed to honest business would rise, and would rise everywhere this
social experiment was tried. In contrast, the number of people still com-
mitted to a policy of exploitation, of gaining at the expense of others, would
fall. How drastic this effect would be would, of course, depend on the state
of public opinion. In the example at hand-the United States, where the
natural theory of property is extremely widespread and accepted as a private
ethic, the libertarian philosophy being essentially the ideology on which the
country was founded and that let it develop to the height it reached^-the
above-mentioned effect would naturally be particularly pronounced. Ac-
cordingly, security-producing firms committed to the philosophy of protect-
ing and enforcing libertarian law would attract the greatest bulk of public
support and financial assistance. And while it may be true that some people,
and among them especially those who had profited from the old order, might
continue their support of a policy of aggression, it is very unlikely that they
would be sufficient in number and financial strength to succeed in doing so.

Rather, the likely outcome would be that the honest companies would
develop the strength needed-alone or in a combined effort and supported
in this effort by their own voluntary customers-to check any such emer-
gence of outlaw producers and destroy them wherever and whenever they
came into existence.34 And if against all odds the honest security producers
should lose their fight to retain a free market in the production of security
and an outlaw monopoly reemerged, one would simply have a state again. 35
In any case, implementing a pure capitalist social system with private

producers of security~a system permitting freedom of choice-would neces-
sarily be better than what one has now. Even if such an order should then
collapse because too many people were still committed to a policy of ag-
gression against and exploitation of others, mankind would at least have ex-
perienced a glorious interlude. And should this order survive, which would
seem to be the more likely outcome, it would be the beginning of a system
of justice and unheard-of economic prosperity.
NOTES
CHAPTER 1
1. To avoid any misunderstanding from the outset: the thesis presented

here is that any given society's overall wealth will be relatively increased,
i.e., will grow more than it otherwise would, if the overall degree of socialism
is decreased and vice versa. The United States, for instance, would improve
their standards of living by adopting more capitalism (above the level that
would be attained otherwise), and so would Germany, etc. It is a somewhat
different task, though, to explain the relative position (as regards overall
wealth) of different societies at any given time because then, of course, the
"ceteris" are no longer necessarily "paribus," while, of course, other things,
in addition to an existing degree of socialism, undoubtedly affect a society's
overall wealth. A given society's history, for instance, has a tremendous ef-
fect on its present wealth. Every society is rich or poor not only because of
present but also past conditions; because of capital having been accumu-
lated or destroyed in the past by our fathers and forefathers. So it can easi-
ly happen that a society which is presently more capitalist can still be
significantly poorer than a more socialist one. And the same, only seeming-
ly paradoxical result can emerge because societies can (and do) differ with
respect to other formerly or presently operating factors affecting the produc-
tion of wealth. There can and do exist, for instance, differences in the work
ethic and/or in prevalent world-views and habits among societies and these
can and do account for divergencies (or similarities) in the production of
wealth of societies alike or different with respect to their present degree of
socialism. Thus, the most straightforward and best way to illustrate the
validity of the thesis that the degree of socialism is inversely related to a
society's wealth in any comparative social analysis, would be to compare
societies which, except for differences in their degree of socialism, are
paribus with respect to their history and the present socio-psychological
characteristics of their people, or are at least very similar, like, for instance,
West and East Germany: and here the predicted effect indeed shows in the
most dramatic way, as will be dealt with in the following.
2. Incidentally, "socialism" in the United States is called "liberalism" and the

socialist, or social democrat there, who calls himself "liberal" would general-
ly detest being called "socialist."
3. Recall the repeated pronouncements in the early days of Soviet-Russian

communism, up to the days of Khrushchev, that the capitalist world would
soon be economically surpassed!
CHAPTER 2
1. Cf. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (ed. Selby- Bigge), Oxford,

1968, esp. 3, 2, p.484; and, "Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals,"
in: Hume, Enquiries (ed. Selby-Bigge), Oxford, 1970; cf. also: L Robbins,
Political Economy: Past and Present, London, 1977, esp. pp.29-33.
2. Incidentally, the normative character of the concept of property also

makes the sufficient precondition for its emergence as a concept clear: Be-
sides scarcity "rationality of agents" must exist, i.e., the agents must be
capable of communicating, discussing, arguing, and in particular, they must
be able to engage in an argumentation of normative problems. If there were
no such capability of communication, normative concepts simply would not
be of any use. We do not, for instance, try to avoid clashes over the use of
a given scarce resource with, let us say, an elephant, by defining property
rights, for we cannot argue with the elephant and hence arrive at an agree-
ment on rights of ownership. The avoidance of future clashes in such a case
is exclusively a technical (as opposed to a normative) problem.
3. It should be noted that a person cannot intentionally not act, as even the
attempt not to act, i.e., one's decision not to do anything and instead remain
in some previously occupied position or state would itself qualify as an ac-
tion, thus rendering this statement aprioristically true, i.e., a statement that
cannot be challenged by experience, as anyone who would try to disprove
it thereby would have to choose and put his body willy-nilly to some specific
use.
4. Cf. L v. Mises, Human Action, Chicago, 1966, esp. part 1; M. N. Roth-

bard, Man, Economy and State, Los Angeles, 1970; also: L Robbins, Na-
ture and Significance of Economic Science, London, 1935.
5. On the concept of cost cf. in particular, M. Buchanan, Cost and Choice,

Chicago, 1969; LS.E. Essays on Cost (ed. Buchanan and Thirlby), In-
dianapolis, 1981.
6. It is worth mentioning here that the validity of all of what follows, of

course, in no way depends on the correctness of the description of the
natural position as "natural." Even if someone would only be willing to grant
the so-called natural position the status of an arbitrary starting point, our
NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 213
analysis assumes validity. Terms don't matter; what counts is what the
natural position really is and implies as such. The following analyses are
concerned exclusively with this problem.
7. Note again that the term "aggression" is used here without evaluative
connotations. Only later in this treatise will I demonstrate that aggression as
defined above is indeed morally indefensible. Names are empty; what alone
is important is what It really is that is called aggression.
8. When I discuss the problem of moral justification in Chapter 7,1 will return
to the importance of the distinction just made of aggression as an invasion
of the physical integrity of someone and, on the other hand, an invasion of
the integrity of someone's value system, which is not classified as aggres-
sion. Here it suffices to notice that it is some sort of technical necessity for
any theory of property (not just the natural position described here) that the
delimitation of the property rights of one person against those of another be
formulated in physical, objective, intersubjectively ascertainable terms.
Otherwise it would be impossible for an actor to determine ex ante if any
particular action of his were an aggression or not, and so the social func-
tion of property norms (any property norms), i.e., to make a conflict-free in-
teraction possible, could not be fulfilled simply for technical reasons.
9. It is worth mentioning that the ownership right stemming from produc-

tion finds its natural limitation only when, as in the case of children, the thing
produced is itself another actor- producer. According to the natural theory
of property, a child, once born, is just as much the owner of his own body
as anyone else. Hence, not only can a child expect not to be physically ag-
gressed against but as the owner of his body a child has the right, in par-
ticular, to abandon his parents once he is physically able to run away from
them and say "no" to their possible attempts to recapture him. Parents only
have special rights regarding their child-stemming from their unique status
as the child's producers-insofar as they (and no one else) can rightfully
claim to be the child's trustee as long as the child is physically unable to run
away and say "no."
10. On the disutility of work and waiting cf. the theory of time-preference as
espoused by L v. Mises, Human Action, Chicago, 1966, chapters 5,18, 21;
the same, Socialism, Indianapolis, 1981, chapter 8; M. N. Rothbard, Man,
Economy and State, Los Angeles, 1970, chapters 6, 9; also: E. v. Boehm-
Bawerk, Kapital und Kapitalzins. Positive Theory des Kapitals, Meisenheim,
1967; F. Fetter, Capital, Interest and Rent, Kansas City, 1976.
On a critical assessment of the term "human capital," in particular of the
absurd treatment that this concept has had at the hands of some Chicago-
economists (notably G. Becker, Human Capital, New York, 1975), cf. A. Rub-
ner, The Three Sacred Cows of Economics, New York, 1970.
11. On the theory of original appropriation cf. J. Locke, Two Treatises of

Government (ed. Laslett), Cambridge, 1960, esp. 2, 5.
12. On the distinction, flowing naturally from the unique character of a

person's body as contrasted with all other scarce goods, between "in-
alienable" and "alienable" property titles cf. W. Evers, 'Toward a Reforma-
tion of a Law of Contracts," in: Journal of Libertarian Studies, 1977.
13. The superimposition of public on private law has tainted and com-
promised the latter to some extent everywhere. Nonetheless, it is not dif-
ficult to disentangle existing private law systems and find what is here called
the natural position as constituting its central elements-a fact which once
again underlines the "naturalness" of this property theory. Cf. also Chapter
8, n. 13.
CHAPTER 3
1. On Marxism and its development cf. L. Kolakowski, Main Currents of Mar-

xism, 3 vols., Oxford, 1978; W. Leonhard, Sovietideologie. Die politischen
Lehren, Frankfurt/M., 1963.
2. When one speaks of socialism Russian style it is evident that one

abstracts from the multitude of concrete data which characterize any social
system and with respect to which societies may differ. Russian style
socialism is what has been termed by M. Weber an "ideal type." It "is arrived
at through the one-sided intensification of one or several aspects and
through integration into an immanently consistent conceptual repre-
sentation of a multiplicity of scattered and discrete individual phenomena"
(M. Weber, Gesammelte Aufsaetze zur Wissenschaftslehre, Tuebingen,
1922, p. 191). But to stress the abstract character of the concept by no
means implies any deficiency in it. On the contrary, it is the very purpose
of constructing ideal types to bring out those features which the acting in-
dividuals themselves regard as constituting relevant resemblances or dif-
ferences in meaning, and to disregard those which they themselves consider
to be of little or no importance in understanding either one's own or another
person's actions. More specifically, describing Russian style socialism on
the level of abstraction chosen here and developing a typology of various
forms of socialism later on should be understood as the attempt to
reconstruct those conceptual distinctions which people use to attach them-
selves ideologically to various political parties or social movements, hence
enabling an understanding of the ideological forces that in fact shape
present-day societies. On ideal types as prerequisites for historico-
sociological research cf. L. v. Mises, Epistemological Problems of
Economics, New York, 1981, esp. pp.75ff; the same, Human Action,
Chicago, 1966, esp. pp.59ff. On the methodology of "meaning reconstruc-
tion" of empirical social research cf. H. H. Hoppe, Kritik der kausalwis-
senschaftiichen Sozialforschung, Opladen, 1983, chapter 3, esp. pp.33ff.
3. For the following cf. in particular L v. Mises, Socialism, Indianapolis,

1981.
4. Of course, this complete outlawing of private investment, as stated under

(2) only applies strictly to a fully socialized economy. If next to a socialized
part of the economy a private part also exists, then private investment would
only become curtailed and hampered to the degree to which the economy
is socialized.
5. The related, crucial difference between capitalism and socialism is that

under the former, the voluntary actions of consumers ultimately determine
the structure and process of production, whereas it is the producer-
caretakers who do so under socialism. Cf. in particular Chapter 9 below.
6. Writes Mises, 'The essential mark of socialism is that one will alone acts.
It is immaterial whose will it is. The director may be anointed king or a dic-
tator, ruling by virtue of his charisma, he may be a Fuehrer or a board of
Fuehrers appointed by the vote of the people. The main thing is that the
employment of all factors of production is directed by one agency only" (L.
v. Mises, Human Action, Chicago, 1966, p.695).
7. Cf. L v. Mises, Socialism, Indianapolis, 1981, esp. part 2; also Human

Action, Chicago, 1966, esp. Chapters 25, 26.
8. On the following cf. also F. A. Hayek (ed.), Collectivist Economic Plan-

ning, London, 1935; Journal of Libertarian Studies 5,1,1981 (An Economic
Critique of Socialism).
9. On the free market as the necessary prerequisite for economic calcula-

tion and rational resource allocation cf. also Chapters 9,10 below.
10. Incidentally, this proves that a socialized economy will be even less
productive than a slave economy. In a slave economy, which of course also
suffers from a relatively lower incentive to work on the part of the slaves, the
slaveholder, who can sell the slave and capture his market value privately,
would not have a comparable interest in extracting from his slave an amount
of work which reduces the slave's value below the value of his marginal
product. For a caretaker of labor no such disincentive exists. Cf. also G.
Reisman, Government Against the Economy, New York, 1979.
11. Cf. H. H. Hoppe, Eigentum, Anarchie und Staat, Opladen, 1987, esp.
Chapter 5, 3.2.
12. To be sure, Russia was a poor country to begin with, with little accumu-
lated capital to be drawn on and consumed in an "emergency." On the
socio-economic history of Soviet Russia cf. B. Brutzkus, Economic Planning
in Soviet Russia, London, 1935; also, e.g., A. Nove, Economic History of the
USSR, Harmondsworth, 1969; also S. Wellisz, The Economies of the Soviet
Bloc, New York, 1964.
13. On the economic system of the Soviet-dominated East bloc cf. T.

Rakowska-Harmstone (ed)., Communism in Eastern Europe, Bloomington,
1984; H. H. Hohmann, M. Kaser, and K. Thalheim (eds.), The New Economic
Systems of Eastern Europe, London, 1975; C M . Cipolla (ed.)f Economic
History of Europe. Contemporary Economies, vol. 2, Glasgow, 1976.
14. On everyday life in Russia cf., e.g., H. Smith, The Russians, New York,
1983; D.K. Willis, Klass. How Russians Really Live, New York, 1985; S.
Pejovich, Life in the Soviet Union, Dallas, 1979; M. Miller, Rise of the Rus-
sian Consumer, London, 1965.
15. Cf. L Erhard, the initiator and major political exponent of post-war
economic policy, Prosperity through Competition, New York, 1958; and The
Economics of Success, London, 1968. For theoreticians of the German
"soziale Marktwirtschaft" cf. W. Eucken, Grundsaetze der Wirtschaftspolitik,
Hamburg, 1967; W. Roepke, A Humane Economy, Chicago, 1960; the same,
Economics of a Free Society, Chicago, 1963. For a critique of the West Ger-
man economic policy as insufficiently capitalist and ridden with inconsisten-
cies which would lead to increasingly socialist interventions in the course of
time cf. the prophetic observations by L v. Mises, Human Action, Chicago,
1966, p.723.
16. For comparative studies on the two Germanys cf. E. Jesse (ed.), BRD
und DDR, Berlin, 1982; H. v. Hamel (ed.), BRD-DDR. Die Wirtschaftssys-
teme, Muenchen, 1983; also K. Thalheim, Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung
der beiden Staaten in Deutschland, Opladen, 1978.
An honest but naive empirically minded comparative study which il-
lustrates that at best, economic statistics has very little to do with reality as
perceived by acting persons is P. R. Gregory and R.C. Stuart, Comparative
Economic Systems, Boston, 1985, Chapter 13 (East and West Germany).
For a valuable critique of economic statistics cf. 0 . Morgenstern, National
Income Statistics: A Critique of Macroeconomic Aggregation, San Francis-
co, 1979. For an even more fundamental criticism cf. L v. Mises, Theory of
Money and Credit, Irvington, 1971, part II, Chapter 5.
17. On life in East Germany cf. E. Windmoeller and T. Hoepker, Leben in

der DDR, Hamburg, 1976.
CHAPTER 4
1. Cf. L Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, 3 vols., Oxford, 1978; also

W. Leonhard, Sovietideologie heute. Die politischen Lehren, Frankfurt/M.,
1963.
2. Cf. note 16 below on the assessment of the somewhat different practice.
3. Cf. E. Bernstein, Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Auf-

gaben der Sozialdemokratie, Bonn, 1975, as a major expositor of the refor-
mist-revisionist course; K. Kautsky, Bernstein und das sozialdemokratische
Programm, Bonn, 1976, as exponent of the Marxist orthodoxy.
4. On the idea of a "market-socialism" cf. one of its leading representatives,

O. Lange, "On the Economic Theory of Socialism," in M. I. Goldman (ed.),
Comparative Economic Systems, New York, 1971.
5. On the ideology of the German Social Democrats cf. T. Meyer (ed.),

Demokratischer Sozialismus, Muenchen, 1980; G. Schwan (ed.), Demok-
ratischer Sozialismus fuer Industriegesellschaften, Frankfurt/M., 1979.
6. Indicators for the social-democratization of the socialist movement are

the rise of the socialist party and the corresponding decline of the orthodox
communist party in France; the emergence of a social-democratic party as
a rival to the more orthodox labour party in Great Britain; the moderation of
the communists in Italy as the only remaining powerful communist party in
Western Europe toward an increasingly social-democratic policy; and the
growth of the socialist-social-democratic parties in Spain and Portugal
under Gonzales and Soares, both with close ties to the German SPD. Fur-
thermore, the socialist parties of Scandinavia, which traditionally had close-
ly followed the German path and which later provided safe haven to a
number of prominent socialists during the Nazi persecution (most notably
W. Brandt and B. Kreisky), have long given credence to the revisionist
beliefs.
7. On the social-democratic position regarding the North-South conflict cf.

North-South: A Programme for Survival, Independent Commission on Inter-
national Development Issues (Chair: W. Brandt), 1980.
8. Note again that this characterization of social-democratic socialism has

the status of an "ideal type" (cf. Chapter 3, n. 2). It is not to be taken as a
description of the policy or ideology of any actual party. Rather, it should
be understood as the attempt to reconstruct what has become the essence
of modern social-democratic style socialism, underlying a much more
diverse reality of programs and policies of various parties or movements of
different names as the ideologically unifying core.
9. On the following cf. L v. Mises, Socialism, Indianapolis, 1981, esp. part

V; Human Action, Chicago, 1966, esp. part 6.
10. a . M. N. Rothbard, Power and Market, Kansas City, 1977.
11. In addition, it should not be overlooked that even if it led to increased

work by those taxed, a higher degree of taxation would in any case reduce
the amount of leisure available to them and thereby reduce their standard
of living. Cf. M.N. Rothbard, Power and Market, Kansas City, 1977, pp.95f.
12. A fictional account of the implementation of such a policy, supervised

by 'the unceasing vigilance of agents of the United States Handicapper
General" has been given by K. Vonnegut in "Harrison Bergeron," in: K. Von-
negut, Welcome to the Monkey House, New York, 1970.
13. On the phenomenon of politicalization cf. also K. S. Templeton (ed.),

The Politicalization of Society, Indianapolis, 1977.
14. On the concern of orthodox and social-democratic socialism for equality

cf. S. Lukes, "Socialism and Equality," in: L Kolakowski and S. Hampshire
(eds.), The Socialist Idea, New York, 1974; also B. Williams, 'The Idea of
Equality," in P. Laslettand W. G. Runciman (eds.), Philosophy, Politics, and
Society, 2nd series, Oxford, 1962.
For a critique of the socialist concept of equality cf. M. N. Rothbard,
"Freedom, Inequality, Primitivism and the Division of Labor," in K. S.
Templeton (ed.), The Politicalization of Society, Indianapolis, 1977; and
Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature, (title essay), Washington, 1974;
H. Schoeck, Envy, New York, 1966; and 1st Leistung unanstaendigi, Os-
nabrueck, 1971; A. Flew, The Politics of Procrustes, London, 1980; and
Sociology, Equality and Education, New York, 1976.
15. Traditionally, this approach has been favored, at least in theory, by or-
thodox Marxist socialism-in line with Marx' famous dictum in his "Critique
of the Gotha Programme," (K. Marx, Selected Works, vol. 2, London, 1942,
p.566), "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."
Economic reality, however, has forced the Russian-style countries to make
considerable concessions in practice. Generally speaking, an effort has in-
deed been made to equalize the (assumedly highly visible) monetary income
for various occupations, but in order to keep the economy going, con-
siderable difference in (assumedly less visible) nonmonetary rewards (such
as special privileges regarding travel, education, housing, shopping, etc.)
have had to be introduced.
Surveying the literature, P. Gregory and R. Stuart (Comparative
Economic Systems, Boston, 1985), state:"... earnings are more equally dis-
tributed in Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union than in the
United States. For the USSR, this appears to be a relatively new
phenomenon, for as late as 1957, Soviet earnings were more unequal than
the United States." However, in Soviet-style countries "a relatively larger
volume of resources... is provided on an extra market bases..." (p.502). In
conclusion: "Income is distributed more unequally in the capitalist countries
in which the state plays a relatively minor redistribute role... (United States,
Italy, Canada). Yet even where the state plays a major redistributive role
(United Kingdom, Sweden), the distribution of incomes appears to be slight-
ly more unequal than in the planned socialist countries (Hungary, Czechos-
lovakia, Bulgaria). The Soviet Union in 1966 appears to have a less
egalitarian distribution of income than its East European counterparts"
(p.504). Cf. also, F. Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order, New York,
1971, esp. Chapter 6.
16. This approach is traditionally most typical for social-democratic

socialism. In recent years it has been given much publicized support-from
the side of the economics profession--by M. Friedman with his proposal for
a "negative income tax" (Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago,
1962, Chapter 12); and by J. Rawls-from the philosophical side-with his
"difference principle" (Rawls,^ Theory of Justice, Cambridge, 1971, pp.60,
75ff, 83). Accordingly, both authors have received much attention from so-
cial-democratic party intellectuals. Generally, Friedman was only found
"guilty" of not wanting to set the minimum income high enough--but then,
he had no principled criterion for setting it at any specific point anyway.
Rawls, who wants to coerce the "most advantaged person" into letting the
"least advantaged one" share in his fortune whenever he happens to improve
his own position, was at times even found to have gone too far with his
egalitarianism. Cf. G. Schwan, Sozialismus in derDemokratie. Theorieeine
konsequent sozialdemokratischen Politik, Stuttgart, 1982, Chapter 3. D.
17. A representative example of social-democratically inclined research on

equality of opportunity, in particular regarding education, is C. Jencks, and
others, Inequality, London, 1973; the increasing prominence of the idea of
equalizing opportunity also explains the flood of sociological studies on
"quality of life" and "social indicators" that has appeared since the late 1960s.
Cf., for instance, A. Szalai and F. Andrews (eds.), The Quality of Life, Lon-
don, 1980.
18. On the following cf. also R. Merklein, Griff in die eigene Tasche, H-
amburg, 1980; and Die Deutschen werden aermer, Hamburg, 1982.
19. Cf. as a representative example, W. Zapf (ed.), Lebensbedingungen in

der Bundesrepublik, Frankfurt/M., 1978.
20. Cf. on this A. Alchian, 'The Economic and Social Impact of Free Tuition"
in: A. Alchian, Economic Forces at Work, Indianapolis, 1977.
CHAPTER 5
1. On the following cf. in particular M. N. Roth bard's brilliant essay "Left and
Right: The Prospects for Liberty" in the same, Egalitarianism as a Revolt
Against Nature, Washington, 1974.
2. On the social structure of feudalism cf. M. Bloch, Feudal Society,

Chicago, 1961; P. Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism, Lon-
don, 1974; R. Hilton (ed.), The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism, Lon-
don, 1978.
3. Cf. H. Pirenne, Medieval Cities. Their Origins and the Revival of Trade,
Princeton, 1974, Chapter5, esp. pp.126ff; alsocf. M. Tigarand M. Levy, Law
and the Rise of Capitalism, New York, 1977.
4. It is worth stressing that contrary to what various nationalist historians

have taught, the revival of trade and industry was caused by the weakness
of central states, by the essentially anarchistic character of the feudal sys-
tem. This insight has been emphasized by J. Baechler in The Origins of
Capitalism, New York, 1976, esp. Chapter 7. He writes: "The constant ex-
pansion of the market, both in extensiveness and in intensity, was the result
of an absence of a political order extending over the whole of Western
Europe." (p.73) 'The expansion of capitalism owes its origin and raison
d'eetre to political anarchy.... Collectivism and State management have only
succeeded in school text-books (look, for example, at the constantly
favourable judgement they give to Colbertism)." (p.77) "All power tends
toward the absolute. If it is not absolute, this is because some kind of limita-
tions have come into play... those in positions of power at the centre cease-
lessly tried to erode these limitations. They never succeeded, and for a
reason that also seems to me to be tied to the international system: a limita-
tion of power to act externally and the constant threat of foreign assault (the
two characteristics of a multi-polar system) imply that power is also limited
internally and must rely on autonomous centres of decisionmaking and so
may use them only sparingly." (p.78)
On the role of ecological and reproductive pressures for the emergence
of capitalism cf. M. Harris, Cannibals and Kings, New York, 1978, Chapter
14.
5. Cf. on this the rather enthusiastic account given by H. Pirenne, Medieval

Cities, Princeton, 1974, pp.208ff.
6. On this coalition cf. H. Pirenne, Medieval Cities, Princeton, 1974. 'The

clear interest of the monarchy was to support the adversaries of high
feudalism. Naturally, help was given whenever it was possible to do so
without becoming obligated to these middle classes who in arising against
their lords fought, to all intents and purposes, in the interests of royal
prerogatives. To accept the king as arbitrator of their quarrel was, for the
parties in conflict, to recognize his sovereignty ... It was impossible that
royalty should not take count of this and seize every chance to show its
goodwill to the communes which, without intending to do so, labored so
usefully in its behalf (p.179-80; cf. also pp.227f).
7. Cf. P. Anderson, Lineages of Absolutism, London, 1974.
8. a . LTigarand M. Levy, Law and the Rise of Capitalism, New York, 1977.
9. Cf. L v. Mises, Liberalismus, Jena, 1929; also E. K. Bramsted and K. J.

Melhuish (eds.), Western Liberalism, London, 1978.
10. Cf. F. A. Hayek (ed.), Capitalism and the Historians, Chicago, 1963.
11. On the social dynamics of capitalism as well as the resentment caused

by it cf. D. Me. C. Wright, Democracy and Progress, New York, 1948; and
Capitalism, New York, 1951.
12. In spite of their generally progressive attitude, the socialist left is not en-
tirely free of such conservative glorifications of the feudal past, either. In
their contempt for the "alienation" of the producer from his product, which
of course is the normal consequence of any market system based on
division of labor, they have frequently presented the economically self-suf-
ficient feudal manor as a cozy, wholesome social model. Cf., for instance,
K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation, New York, 1944.
13. Cf. R. Nisbet, "Conservatism," in: R. Nisbet and T. Bottomore, History of

Sociological Analysis, New York, 1978; also G. K. Kaltenbrunner (ed.),
Rekonstruktion des Konservatismus, Bern, 1978; on the relationship be-
tween liberalism and conservatism cf. F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liber-

ty, Chicago, 1960 (Postscript).
14. On the inconsistencies of liberalism cf. Chapter 10, n. 21.
15. Normally, peoples'attitudes toward change are ambivalent: on the one

hand, in their role as consumers people see change as a positive
phenomenon since it brings about a greater variety of choice. On the other
hand, in their role as producers people tend to embrace the ideal of stability,
as this would save them from the need to continually adapt their productive
efforts to changed circumstances. It is, then, largely in their capacity as
producers that people lend support to the various socialist stabilization
schemes and promises, only to thereby harm themselves as consumers.
Writes D. Me. C. Wright in Democracy and Progress, New York, 1948, p.81:
"From freedom and science came rapid growth and change. From rapid
growth and change came insecurity. From insecurity came demands which
ended growth and change. Ending growth and change ended science and
freedom."
16. On liberalism, its decline, and the rise of socialism cf. A. V. Dicey, Lec-
tures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England during
the Nineteenth Century, London, 1914; W. H. Greenleaf, The British Politi-
cal Tradition, 2 vols., London, 1983.
17. I might again mention that the characterization of conservatism, too,

has the status of an ideal-type (cf. Chapter 3, n. 2; Chapter 4, n. 8). It is the
attempt to reconstruct those ideas which people either consciously or un-
consciously accept or reject in attaching or detaching themselves to or from
certain social policies or movements.
The idea of a conservative policy as described here and in the following
can also be said to be a fair reconstruction of the underlying, unifying
ideological force of what is indeed labeled "conservative" in Europe.
However, the term "conservative" is used differently in the United States.
Here, quite frequently, everyone who is not a left-liberal-(social)-democrat
is labeled a conservative. As compared with this terminology, our usage of
the term conservative is much narrower, but also much more in line with
ideological reality. Labeling everything that is not "liberal" (in the American
sense) "conservative" glosses over the fundamental ideological differences
that-despite some partial agreement regarding their opposition to "liberal-
ism11—exist in the United States between libertarians, as advocates of a pure
capitalist order based on the natural theory of property, and conservatives

proper, who, from W. Buckley to I. Kristol, nominally hail the institution of
private property, only to disregard private owners' rights whenever it is
deemed necessary in order to protect established economic and political
powers from eroding in the process of peaceful competition. And in the field
of foreign affairs they exhibit the same disrespect for private property rights
through their advocacy of a policy of aggressive interventionism. On the
polar difference between libertarian ism and conservatism cf. G. W. Carey
(ed.), Freedom and Virtue. The Conservative/Libertarian Debate, Lanham,
1984.
18. D. Me. C. Wright (Capitalism, New York, 1951, p. 198) correctly

describes that both-left-liberalism, or rather social democracy, and conser-
vatism-imply a partial expropriation of producers/contractors. He then
misinterprets the difference, though, when he sees it as a disagreement over
the question of how far this expropriation should go. In fact, there is dis-
agreement about this among social-democrats and conservatives. Both
groups have their "radicals" and "moderates." What makes them social-
democrats or conservatives is a different idea about which groups are to be
favored at the expense of others.
19. Note the interesting relationship between our sociological typology of

socialist policies and the logical typology of market interventions as
developed by M. N. Rothbard. Rothbard (Power and Market, Kansas City,
1977, pp.1 Off) distinguishes between "autistic intervention" where 'the inter-
vener may command an individual subject to do or not to do certain things
when these actions directly involve the individual's person or property alone
... (i.e.) when exchange is not involved"; "binary intervention" where 'the in-
tervener may enforce a coerced exchange between the individual subject
and himself; and 'triangular intervention" where 'the intervener may either
compel or prohibit an exchange between a pair of subjects" (p. 10). In terms
of this distinction, the characteristic mark of conservatism then is its
preference for 'triangular intervention"--and as will be seen later in this Chap-
ter, "autistic intervention" insofar as autistic actions also have natural reper-
cussions on the pattern of inter-individual exchanges-tor such interventions
are uniquely suited, in accordance with the social psychology of conser-
vatism, to helping "freeze" a given pattern of social exchanges. As com-
pared with this, egalitarian socialism, in line with its described "progressive"
psychology, exhibits a preference for "binary interventions" (taxation). Note,
however, that the actual policies of socialist and social-democratic parties
do not always coincide precisely with our ideal-typical description of
socialism social-democratic style. While they generally do, the socialist par-
ties-most notably under the influence of labor unions-have also adopted

typically conservative policies to a certain extent and are by no means to-
tally opposed to any form of triangular intervention.
20. Cf. on the following M. N. Rothbard, Power and Market, Kansas City,
1977, pp.24ff.
21. While in order to stabilize social positions, price-freezing is needed and

price-freezing can result in maximum oi minimum prices, conservatives dis-
tinctly favor minimum price controls to the extent that it is commonly con-
sidered even more urgent that one's absolute-rather than one's
relative-wealth position be prevented from eroding.
22. To be sure, conservatives are by no means always actually willing to go

quite as far. But they recurringly do so-the last time in the United States
being during the Nixon presidency. Moreover, conservatives have always
exhibited a more or less open admiration for the great unifying social spirit
brought about by a war-economy which is typically characterized precise-
ly by full-scale price controls.
23. Cf. G. Reisman, Government Against the Economy, New York, 1979.
For an apologetic treatment of price-controls cf. J. K. Galbraith, A Theory of
Price Control, Cambridge, 1952.
24. G. Reisman, Government Against the Economy, New York, 1979, p. 141.
25. On the politics and economics of regulation cf. G. Stigler, The Citizen
and the State. Essays on Regulation, Chicago, 1975; M. N. Rothbard, Power
and Market, Kansas City, 1977, Chapter 3.3; on licenses cf. also M. Fried-
man, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago, 1962, Chapter 9.
26. Cf. also B. Badieand P. Birnbaum, The Sociology of the State, Chicago,
1983, esp. pp.107f.
27. a . on this R. Radosh and M. N. Rothbard (eds.), A New History of

Leviathan, New York, 1972.
28. Cf. Badie and Birnbaum, The Sociology of the State, Chicago, 1983.
29. Cf. L. v. Mises, Omnipotent Government, New Haven, 1944; F. A. Hayek,

The Road to Serfdom, Chicago, 1956; W. Hock, DeutscherAntikapitalismus,
Frankfurt/M., 1960.
30. Cf. one of the foremost representatives of the German "Historical

School," the "Kathedersozialist" and naziapologist: W. Sombart, Deutscher
Sozialimus, Berlin, 1934.
31. Cf. W. Fischer, Die Wirtschaftspolitik Deutschlands 1918-45, Hannover,

1961; W. Treue, Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Neuzeit, vol. 2, Stuttgart, 1973;
R. A. Brady, "Modernized Cameralism in the Third Reich: The Case of the
National Industry Group," in: M. I. Goldman (ed.), Comparative Economic
Systems, New York, 1971.
32. The average gross income of employed persons in Germany in 1938

(last figure available) was (in absolute terms, i.e., not taking inflation into ac-
count!) still lower than that of 1927. Hitler then started the war and resour-
ces were increasingly shifted from civilian to non-civilian uses, so that it can
safely be assumed that the standard of living decreased even further and
more drastically from 1939 on. Cf. Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer die BRD,
1960, p.542; cf. also V. Trivanovitch, Economic Development of Germany
Under National Socialism, New York, 1937, p.44.
CHAPTER 6
1. Cf. on the classical positlvist position A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and
Logic, New York, 1950; on critical rationalism K. R. Popper, Logic of Scien-
tific Discovery, London, 1959; Conjectures and Refutations, London, 1969;
and Objective Knowledge, Oxford, 1973; on representative statements of
empiricism-positivism as the appropriate methodology of economics cf. e.g.
M. Blaug, The Methodology of Economics, Cambridge, 1980; T. W. Hutchin-
son, The Significance and Basic Postulates of Economic Theory, London,
1938; and Positive Economics and Policy Objectives, London, 1964; and
Politics and Philosophy of Economics, New York, 1981; also M. Friedman,
'The Methodology of Positive Economics," in: M. Friedman, Essays in Posi-
tive Economics, Chicago, 1953; H. Albert, Marktsoziologie und
Entscheidungslogik, Neuwied, 1967.
2. On piecemeal social engineering cf. K. R. Popper, The Poverty of His-

toricism, London, 1957.
3. Cf. G. Luehrs (ed.), Kritischer Rationalismus und Sozialdemokratie, 2

vols., Bonn, 1975-76.
4. On the following cf. M. Hollis and E. Nell, Rational Economic Man,

Cambridge, 1975, pp.3ff.
5. Cf. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature and Enquiry Concerning Human

Understanding, in: Selby-Bigge (ed.), Hume's Enquiries, Oxford, 1970; also
H. H. Hoppe, Handeln und Erkennen, Bern, 1976.
6. a . I. Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research

Programmes," in: Lakatos and Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth
of Knowledge, Cambridge, 1970.
7. All of this has been brought home to Popperianism, mainly byT. S. Kuhn,
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, 1964; and it was then P.
Feyerabend who drew the most radical conclusion: to throw out science's
claim to rationality altogether, and to embrace nihilism under the banner
"everything goes" (P. Feyerabend, Against Method, London, 1978; and
Science in a Free Society, London, 1978). For a critique of this unfounded
conclusion cf. note 20 below.
8. Cf. on this and the following A. Pap, Semantics and Necessary Truth,
New Haven, 1958; M. Hollis and E. Nell, Rational Economic Man,
Cambridge, 1975; B. Blanshard, Reason and Analysis, La Salle, 1964.
9. Cf. on this W. Kamlah and P. Lorenzen, Logische Propaedeutik, Mann-

heim, 1967.
10. Cf. L. v. Mises, The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science, Kansas

City, 1978, p.5: 'The essence of logical positivism is to deny the cognitive
value of a priori knowledge by pointing out that all a priori propositions are
merely analytic. They do not provide new information, but are merely ver-
bal or tautological... Only experience can lead to synthetic propositions.
There is an obvious objection against this doctrine, viz., that this proposi-
tion is in itself a--as the present writer thinks, false-synthetic a priori proposi-
tion, for it can manifestly not be established by experience."
11. M. Hollis and E. Nell remark: "Since every significant statement is, for
a positivist, analytic or synthetic and none is both, we can ask for a clas-
sification .... We know of no positivist who has tried to produce empirical
evidence for statements of (the sort in question). Nor can we see how to
do so, unless by arguing that this is a matter of fact how people use terms
... which would prompt us to ask simply 'So what'?" (M. Hollis and E. Nell,
Rational Economic Man, Cambridge, 1975, p.110).
12. Cf. on this H. H. Hoppe, Kritik der kausalwissenschaftlichen Sozial-

forschung, Opladen, 1983; and "Is Research Based on Causal Scientific
Principles Possible in the Social Sciences," in Ratio, XXV, 1,1983.
13. Cf. I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in Kant, Werke (ed. Weischedel),
Wiesbaden, 1956, vol. II, p.45.
14. This, of course, is a Kantian idea, expressed in Kant's dictum that "reason
can only understand what it has itself produced according to its own design"
(Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in: Kant, Werke (ed. Weischedel), Wiesbaden,
1956, vol. II, p.23).
15. Cf. on this P. Lorenzen, "Wie ist Objektivitaet in der Physik moeglich";
"Das Begruendungsproblem der Geometrie als Wissenschaft der raeum-

lichen Ordnung," in: Methodisches Denken, Frankfurt/M., 1968; and Nor-
mative Logic and Ethics, Mannheim, 1969; F. Kambartel, Erfahrung und
Struktur, Frankfurt/M., 1968, Kap. 3; also H. Dingier, Die Ergreifung des
Wirklichen, Muenchen, 1955; P. Janich, Protophysik der Zeit, Mannheim,
1969.
16. On the problem of real vs. conventional or stipulated definitions cf. M.

Hollis and E. Nell, Rational Economic Man, Cambridge, 1975, pp.177ff.
"Honest definitions are, from an empiricist point of view, of two sorts, lexi-
cal and stipulative." (p.177) But "when it comes to justifying (this) view, we
are presumably being offered a definition of 'definition1. Whichever category
of definition the definition ... falls in, we need not accept it as of any epis-
temological worth. Indeed, it would not be even a possible epistemological
thesis, unless it were neither lexical nor stipulative. The view is both
inconvenient and self-refuting. A contrary opinion with a long pedigree is
that there are 'real' definitions, which capture the essence of the thing
defined" (p. 178); cf. also B. Blanshard, Reason and Analysis, La Salle, 1964,
pp.268f.
17. Cf. A. v. Melsen, Philosophy of Nature, Pittsburgh, 1953, esp. Chapters

1,4.
18. Cf. also H. H. Hoppe. Kritik der kausalwissenschaftlichen Sozial-

forschung, Opladen, 1983; and "Is Research Based on Causal Scientific
Principles Possible in the Social Sciences" in Ratio XXV, 1,1983. Here the
argument is summed up thus (p.37): "(1) I and--as possible opponents in
an argument-other people are able to learn. (This statement cannot be
challenged without implicitly admitting that it is correct. Above all, it must
be assumed by anyone undertaking research into causes. To this extent,
proposition (1) is valid a priori.) (2) If it is possible to learn, one cannot know
at any given time what one will know at any later time and how one will act
on the basis of this knowledge. (If one did know at any given time what one
will come to know at some later time, it would be impossible ever to learn
anything-but see proposition (1) on this point.) (3) The assertion that it is
possible to predict the future state of one's own and/or another's knowledge
and the corresponding actions manifesting that knowledge (i.e. find the vari-
ables which can be interpreted as the causes) involves a contradiction. If
the subject of a given state of knowledge or of an intentional act can learn,
then there are no causes for this; however, if there are causes, then the sub-
ject cannot learn-but see again proposition (1)."
19. M. Singer, Generalization in Ethics, London, 1863; P. Lorenzen, Nor-

mative Logic and Ethics, Mannheim, 1969; S.Toulmin, The Place of Reason
in Ethics, Cambridge, 1970; F. Kambartel (ed.), Praktische Philosophie und
konstruktive Wissenschaftstheorie, Frankfurt/M., 1974; A. Gewirth, Reason
and Morality, Chicago, 1978.
20. Causality, then, is not a contingent feature of physical reality, but rather
a category of action, and as such, a logically necessary trait of the physical
world. This fact explains why in spite of the possibility explained above of
immunizing any hypothesis against possible refutations by postulating ever
new uncontrolled variables, no nihilistic consequences regarding the under-
taking of causal scientific research follow (cf. note 7 above). For if it is un-
derstood that natural science is not a contemplative enterprise but ultimately
an instrument of action (cf. on this also J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human
Interests, Boston, 1971, esp. Chapter 6), then neither the fact that
hypotheses can be immunized nor that a selection between rival theories
may not always seem possible (because theories are, admittedly, under-
determined by data) ever affects the permanent existence of the rationality
criterion of "instrumental success." Neither immunizing hypotheses nor
referring to paradigmatic differences makes anyone less subject to this
criterion in whose light every theory ultimately proves commensurable. It is
the inexorability of the rationality criterion of instrumental success which ex-
plains why-not withstanding Kuhn, Feyerabend et al.-the development of
the natural sciences could bring about an ultimately undeniable, constant
technological progress.
On the other hand, in the field of human action, where, as has been
demonstrated above, no causal scientific research is possible, where predic-
tive knowledge can never attain the status of empirically testable scientific
hypotheses but rather only that of informed, not-systematically teachable
foresight, and where in principle the criterion of instrumental success is thus
inapplicable, the spectre of nihilism would seem indeed to be real, if one
were to take the empiricist methodological prescriptions seriously.
However, not only are these prescriptions inapplicable to the social scien-
ces as empirical sciences (cf. on this H. H. Hoppe, Kritik der kausalwis-
senschaftlichen Sozialforschung, Opladen, 1983, esp. Chapter 2); as I show
here, contrary to the empiricist doctrine according to which everything must
be tried out before its outcome can be known, a priori knowledge regard-
ing action exists, and apodictically true predictions regarding the social
world can be made based on this a priori knowledge. It is this, then, that
proves all nihilistic temptations unfounded.
21. Cf. also, H. H. Hoppe, Handeln und Erkennen, Bern, 1976,

pp.62f.
22. Cf. also L v. Mises, Human Action, Chicago, 1966; Epistemological

Problems of Economics, New York, 1981; and The Ultimate Foundation of
Economic Science, Kansas City, 1978.
23. The aprioristic character of the concept of action-i.e., the impossibility

of disproving the proposition that man acts and acting involves the
categories explained above, because even the attempt to disprove it would
itself be an action-has its complement in the field of epistemology, in the
law of contradiction and the unthinkability of its denial. Regarding this law
B. Blanshard writes: 'To deny the law means to say that it is false rather than
true, that its being false excludes its being true. But this is the very thing
that is supposedly denied. One cannot deny the law of contradiction without
presupposing its validity in the act of denying it" (B. Blanshard, Reason and
Analysis, La Salle, 1964, p.276).
In fact, as L v. Mises indicates, the law of contradiction is implied in the
epistemologically more fundamental "axioms of action." (L v. Mises, The
Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science, Kansas City, 1978, p.35). On
the relation between praxeology and epistemology cf. also Chapter 7, n. 5.
24. On the effects of minimum wages cf. also Y. Brozen and M. Friedman,
The Minimum Wage: Who Pays?, Washington, 1966.
25. On the effects of rent control cf. also C. Baird, Rent Control: The Peren-
nial Folly, San Francisco, 1980; F. A. Hayek et al., Rent Control: A Popular
Paradox, Vancouver, 1975.
26. Cf. also L v. Mises, A Critique of Interventionism, New Rochelle, 1977.

CHAPTER 7
1. For such a position cf. A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, New York,
1950.
On the emotivist position cf. C. L Stevenson, Facts and Values, New
Haven, 1963; and Ethics and Language, London, 1945; cf. also the instruc-
tive discussion by G. Harman, The Nature of Morality, New York, 1977; the
classical exposition of the idea that "reason is and can be no more than the
slave of the passions" is to be found in D. Hume, Treatise on Human Nature,
(ed. Selby-Bigge), Oxford, 1970.
3. Cf. also Chapter 6 above.
4. For various "cognitivist" approaches toward ethics cf. K. Baier, The Moral
Point of View, Ithaca, 1958; M. Singer, Generalization in Ethics, London,
1863; P. Lorenzen, Normative Logic and Ethics, Mannheim, 1969; S. Toul-
min, The Place of Reason in Ethics, Cambridge, 1970; F. Kambartel (ed.),
Praktische Philosophie und konstruktive Wissenschaftstheorie,
Frankfurt/M., 1974; A. Gewirth, Reason and Morality, Chicago, 1978.
Another cognitivist tradition is represented by various "natural rights"
theorists. Cf. J. Wild, Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural
Law, Chicago, 1953; H. Veatch, Rational Man. A Modern Interpretation of
Aristotelian Ethics, Bloomington, 1962; and For An Ontology of Morals. A
Critique of Contemporary Ethical Theory, Evanston, 1968; and Human
Rights. Fact or Fancy?, Baton Rouge, 1985; L Strauss, Natural Right and
History, Chicago, 1970.
5. Cf. K. 0. Apel, TransformationderPhilosophie, Vol. 2, Frankfurt/M.f 1973,

in particular the essay "Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft und
die Grundlagen der Ethik"; also J. Habermas, "Wahrheitstheorien," in: H.
Fahrenbach (ed.), Wirklichkeit und Reflexion, Pfullingen, 1974; Theoriedes
kommunikativen Handelns, Vol. 1, Frankfurt/M., 1981, pp.44ff; and Moral-
bewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln, Frankfurt/M., 1983.
Note the structural resemblance of the "a priori of argumentation" to the "a
priori of action," i.e., the fact, as explained in Chapter 6 above, that there is
no way of disproving the statement that everyone knows what it means to
act, since the attempt to disprove this statement would presuppose one's
knowledge of how to perform certain activities. Indeed, the indisputability
of the knowledge of the meaning of validity claims and action are intimate-
ly related. On the one hand, actions are more fundamental than argumen-
tation with whose existence the idea of validity emerges, as argumentation

is clearly only a subclass of action. On the other hand, to say what has just
been said about action and argumentation and their relation to each other
already requires argumentation and so in this sense-epistemologically, that
is-argumentation must be considered to be more fundamental than nonar-
gumentative action. But then, as it is epistemology, too, which reveals the
insight that although it might not be known to be so prior to any argumen-
tation, in fact the development of argumentation presupposes action in that
validity claims can only be explicitly discussed in an argument if the persons
doing so already know what it means to have knowledge implied in actions;
both, the meaning of action in general and argumentation in particular, must
be thought of as logically necessary interwoven strands of a priori
knowledge.
6. Methodologically, our approach exhibits a close resemblance to what A.

Gewirth has described as the "dialectically necessary method" (Reason and
Morality, Chicago, 1978, p.42-47)--a method of a priori reasoning modeled
after the Kantian idea of transcendental deductions. Unfortunately, though,
in his important study Gewirth chooses the wrong starting point for his
analyses. He attempts to derive an ethical system not from the concept of
argumentation, but from that of action. However, this surely cannot work,
because from the correctly stated fact that in action an agent must, by neces-
sity, presuppose the existence of certain values or goods, it does not follow
that such goods then are universalizable and should thus be respected by
others as the agent's goods by right. (On the requirement of normative
statements to be universalizable cf. the following discussion in the text.)
Rather, the idea of truth, or regarding morals, of universalizable rights or
goods only emerges with argumentation as a special subclass of actions
but not with action as such, as is clearly revealed by the fact that Gewirth,
too, is not engaged simply in action, but more specifically in argumentation
when he tries to convince us of the necessary truth of his ethical system.
However, with argumentation recognized as the one and only appropriate
starting point for the dialectically necessary method, a capitalist (i.e., non-
Gewirthian) ethic follows, as will be seen. On the faultiness of Gewirth's at-
tempt to derive universalizable rights from the notion of action cf. also the
perceptive remarks by M. Maclntyre, After Virtue, Notre Dame, 1981, pp.64-
65; J. Habermas, Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln,
Frankfurt/M., 1983, pp.110-111; and H. Veatch, Human Rights, Baton
Rouge, 1985, pp. 159-160.
7. The relationship between our approach and a "natural rights" approach

can now be described in some detail, too. The natural law or natural rights
tradition of philosophic thought holds that universally valid norms can be

discerned by means of reason as grounded in the very nature of man. It has
been a common quarrel with this position, even on the part of sympathetic
readers, that the concept of human nature is far 'too diffuse and varied to
provide a determinate set of contents of natural law" (A. Gewirth, "Law, Ac-
tion, and Morality" in: Georgetown Symposium on Ethics. Essays in Honor
of H. Veatch (ed. R. Porreco), New York, 1984, p.73). Furthermore, its
description of rationality is equally ambiguous in that it does not seem to
distinguish between the role of reason in establishing empirical laws of na-
ture on the one hand, and normative laws of human conduct on the other.
(Cf., for instance, the discussion in H. Veatch, Human Rights, Baton Rouge,
1985, p.62-67.)
In recognizing the narrower concept of argumentation (instead of the wider
one of human nature) as the necessary starting point in deriving an ethic,
and in assigning to moral reasoning the status of a priori reasoning, clearly
to be distinguished from the role of reason performed in empirical research,
our approach not only claims to avoid these difficulties from the outset, but
claims thereby to be at once more straightforward and rigorous. Still, to
thus dissociate myself from the natural rights tradition is not to say that I
could not agree with its critical assessment of most of contemporary ethi-
cal theory; indeed I do agree with H. Veatch's complementary refutation of
all desire (teleological, utilitarian) ethics as well as all duty (deontological)
ethics (see Human Rights, Baton Rouge, 1985, Chapter 1). Nor do I claim
that it is impossible to interpret my approach as falling in a "rightly conceived"
natural rights tradition after all. What I claim, though, is that the following
approach is clearly out of line with what the natural rights approach has ac-
tually come to be, and that it owes nothing to this tradition as it stands.
8. The universalization principle figures prominently indeed among all cog-

nitivist approaches to morals. For the classical exposition cf. I. Kant,
"Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten" and "Kritik der praktischen Ver-
nunft" in: Kant, Werke (ed. Weischedel), vol. IV, Wiesbaden, 1956.
9. It might be noted here that only because scarcity exists is there even a
problem of formulating moral laws; insofar as goods are superabundant
("free" goods) no conflict over the use of goods is possible and no action-
coordination is needed. Hence, it follows that any ethic, correctly con-
ceived, must be formulated as a theory of property, i.e., a theory of the
assignment of rights of exclusive control over scarce means. Because only
then does it become possible to avoid otherwise inescapable and unresolv-
able conflict. Unfortunately, moral philosophers, in their widespread ig-
norance of economics, have hardly ever seen this clearly enough. Rather,
like H. Veatch (Human Rights, Baton Rouge, 1985, p.170), for instance, they
seem to think that they can do without a precise definition of property and
property rights only to then necessarily wind up in a sea of vagueness and
ad-hoceries. On human rights as property rights cf. also M. N. Rothbard,
The Ethics of Liberty, Atlantic Highlands, 1982, Chapter 15.
10. Cf. J. Locke, Two Treatises on Government (ed. P. Laslett), Cambridge,

1970, esp.2,5.
11. On the nonaggression principle and the principle of original appropria-

tion cf. also M. N. Rothbard, For A New Liberty, New York, 1978, Chapter 2;
and The Ethics of Liberty, Atlantic Highlands, 1982, Chapters 6-8.
12. This, for instance, is the position taken by J. J. Rousseau, when he asks
us to resist attempts to privately appropriate nature given resources by, for
example, fencing them in. In his famous dictum, he says, "Beware of listen-
ing to this impostor; you are undone if you once forget that the fruits of the
earth belong to us all, and the earth itself to nobody" ("Discourse upon the
Origin and Foundation of Inequality among Mankind" in: J. J. Rousseau,
The Social Contract and Discourses (ed. G. Cole), New York, 1950, p.235).
However, it is only possible to argue so if it is assumed that property claims
can be justified by decree. Because how else could "all" (i.e., even those
who never did anything with the resources in question) or "nobody" (i.e., not
even those who actually made use of it) own something-unless property
claims were founded by mere decree?!
13. On the problem of the deriveability of "ought" from "is" statements cf.
W. D. Hudson (ed.), The Is-Ought Question, London, 1969; for the view that
the fact-value dichotomy is an ill-conceived idea cf. the natural rights litera-
ture cited in note 4 above.
14. Writes M. N. Rothbard in The Ethics of Liberty, Atlantic Highlands, 1982,

p.32: "Now, any person participating in any sort of discussion, including
one on values, is, by virtue of so participating, alive and affirming life. For if
he were really opposed to life he would have no business in such a discus-
sion, indeed he would have no business continuing to be alive. Hence, the
supposed opponent of life is really affirming it in the very process of discus-
sion, and hence the preservation and furtherance of one's life takes on the
stature of an incontestable axiom." Cf. also D. Osterfeld, 'The Natural Rights
Debate" in: Journal of Libertarian Studies, VII, 1,1983, pp.106f.
15. a . also M. N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, Atlantic Highlands, 1982,

p.45.
16. On the importance of the definition of aggression as physical aggres-

sion cf. also M. N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, Atlantic Highlands, 1982,
Chapters 8-9; the same, "Law, Property Rights and Pollution," in: Cato Jour-
nal, Spring 1982, esp. pp.60-63.
17. On the idea of structural violence as distinct from physical violence cf.
D. Senghaas (ed.), Imperialismus und strukturelle Gewalt, Frankfurt/M.,
1972.
The idea of defining aggression as an invasion of property vaiues also un-
derlies the theories of justice of both J. Rawls and R. Nozick, however dif-
ferent these two authors may have appeared to be to many commentators.
For how could he think of his so-called difference-principle-"Social and
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are... reasonably ex-
pected to be to everyone's-including the least advantaged one's-ad-
vantage or benefit" (J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, 1971,
pp.60-83; see also pp.75ff)-as justified unless Rawls believes that simply by
increasing his relative wealth a more fortunate person commits an aggres-
sion, and a less fortunate one then has a valid claim against the more for-
tunate person only because the former's relative position in terms of value
has deteriorated?! And how could Nozick claim it to be justifiable for a
"dominant protection agency" to outlaw competitors, regardless of what
their actions would have been like (R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia,
New York, 1974, pp.55f)? Or how could he believe it to be morally correct
to outlaw so-called nonproductive exchanges, i.e., exchanges where one
party would be better off if the other one did not exist at all, or at least had
nothing to do with it (as, for instance, in the case of a blackmailee and a
blackmailer), regardless of whether or not such an exchange involved physi-
cal invasion of any kind (ibid., pp.83- 86), unless he thought that the right
existed to have the integrity of one's property vaiues (rather than its physi-
cal integrity) preserved?! For a devastating critique of Nozick's theory in
particular cf. M. N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, Atlantic Highlands, 1982,
Chapter 29; on the fallacious use of the indifference curve analysis,
employed both by Rawls and Nozick, cf. the same, 'Toward a Reconstruc-
tion of Utility and Welfare Economics," Center for Libertarian Studies, Oc-
casional Paper No. 3, New York, 1977.
18. Cf. also M. N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, Atlantic Highlands, 1982,
p.46.
19. For an awkward philosophical attempt to justify a late-comer ethic cf.

J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, 1971, pp.284ff; J. Sterba, The
Demands of Justice, Notre Dame, 1980, esp. pp.58ff, pp.137ff; On the ab-
surdity of such an ethic cf. M. N. Rothbard, Man, Economy and State, Los
Angeles, 1972, p.427.
20. It should be noted here, too, that only if property rights are conceptual-
ized as private property rights originating in time, does it then become pos-
sible to make contracts. Clearly enough, contracts are agreements between
enumerable physically independent units which are based on the mutual
recognition of each contractor's private ownership claims to things acquired
prior to the agreement, and which then concern the transfer of property tit-
les to definite things from a specific prior to a specific later owner. No such
thing as contracts could conceivably exist in the framework of a late-comer
ethic!
CHAPTER 8
1. On the difference between institutional aggression committed by the

state as the very incorporation of socialism and common, criminal action cf.
L Spooner, No Treason, Colorado Springs, 1973, pp.19-20.: ."..the govern-
ment, like a highwayman, says to a man: "Your money, or your life." And
many, if not most, taxes are paid under the compulsion of that threat. The
government does not, indeed, waylay a man in a lonely place, spring upon
him from the roadside, and, holding a pistol to his head, proceed to rifle his
pockets. But the robbery is none the less a robbery on that account; and it
is far more dastardly and shameful. The highwayman takes solely upon him-
self the responsibility, danger, and crime of his own act. He does not pretend
that he has any rightful claim to your money, or that he intends to use it for
your own benefit. He does not pretend to be anything but a robber. He has
not acquired impudence enough to profess to be merely a "protector," and
that he takes men's money against their will, merely to enable him to
"protect" those infatuated travellers, who feel perfectly able to protect them-
selves, or do not appreciate his peculiar system of protection. He is too sen-
sible a man to make such professions as these. Furthermore, having taken
your money, he leaves you, as you wish him to do. He does not persist in
following you on the road, against your will; assuming to be your rightful
"sovereign," on account of the "protection" he affords you. He does not keep
"protecting" you, by commanding you to bow down and serve him; by re-
quiring you to do this, and forbidding you to do that; by robbing you of more
money as often as he finds it for his interest or pleasure to do so; and by
brandishing you as a rebel, a traitor, and an enemy to your country, and
shooting you down without mercy, if you dispute his authority or resist his
demands. He is too much of a gentleman to be guilty of such impostures
and insults and villainies as these. In short, he does not, in addition to rob-
bing you, attempt to make you either his dupe or his slave. The proceed-
ings of those robbers and murderers, who call themselves 'the government,"
are directly the opposite of these of the "single highwayman."
2. On the theory of the state cf. M. N. Rothbard, 'The Anatomy of the State,"
in: the same, Egalitarianism As A Revolt Against Nature, Washington, 1974;
For A New Liberty, New York, 1978; and The Ethics of Liberty, Atlantic High-
lands, 1982; H. H. Hoppe, Eigentum, Anarchie und Staat, Opladen, 1987;
cf. also A. Herbert, The Right and Wrong of Compulsion by the State (ed. E.
Mack), Indianapolis, 1978; H. Spencer, Social Statics, London, 1851; F. Op-
penheimer, The State, New York, 1926; A. J. Nock, Our Enemy, the State,
Delevan, 1983; cf. also J. Schumpeter's remark directed against then as now
prevalent views, notably among economists, that 'the theory which con-
strues taxes on the analogy of club dues or the purchase of a service of,
say, a doctor only proves how far removed this part of the social sciences
is from scientific habits of minds" (J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and
Democracy, New York, 1942, p. 198).
3. In addition, the use of at least some weaponry, such as atomic bombs,

against one's subjects would be prohibitive, since the rulers could hardly
prevent that they themselves would be hurt or killed by it, too.
4. D. Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, Oxford, 1971, p. 19; cf.
also E. de La Boetie, The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Volun-
tary Servitude, New York, 1975.
5. The classical exposition of the idea that in the "state of nature" no distinc-
tion between "just" and "unjust" can be made and that only the state creates
justice is to be found in T. Hobbes, Leviathan, Oxford, 1946. That this
"positivistic" theory of law is untenable has been implicitly demonstrated in
Chapter 7 above. In addition, it should be noted that such a theory does
not even succeed in doing what it is supposed to do: in justifying the state.
Because the transition from the state of nature to a statist system can of
course only be called justified (as opposed to arbitrary) if natural (pre-statist)
norms exist that are the justificatory basis for this very transition.
For modern positivists cf. G. Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, Bad Hom-
burg, 1966; H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, Wien, 1976; for a critique of legal
positivism cf. F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, 3 vols., Chicago,
1973-79.
6. For the classical exposition of this view of politics cf. N. Machiavelli, The
Prince, Harmondsworth, 1961; cf. also Q. Skinner, The Foundations of
Modern Political Thought, Cambridge, 1978.
7. Cf. on this and the following, M. N. Rothbard, Power and Market, Kansas
City, 1977, pp.182f.
8. On the role of the intellectuals and teachers as advocates of socialism

and statism cf. B. de Jouvenel, 'The Treatment of Capitalism by Continen-
tal Intellectuals," in: F. A. Hayek, Capitalism and the Historians, Chicago,
1954; L v. Mises, The Anti-Capitalist Mentality, South Holland, 1972.
9. On a free market monetary system and the effects of government inter-

vention on this system cf. R. Paul and L. Lehrman, The Case For Gold, San
Francisco, 1983, Chapters 2,3; M. N. Rothbard, What Has Government Done
to Our Money?, Novato, 1973.
10. On the problem of a free market production of law and order cf. Chap-
ter 10 below.
11. Cf. on this also Chapter 5, n. 4.
12. On this point cf. also Chapter 10 below.
13. F. Oppenheimer, System der Soziologie, Vol. II, Der Staat, Stuttgart,
1964. Oppenheimer sums up the peculiar, discriminatory character of state-
provided goods, in particular of its production of law and order, in this way
(pp.322-323): 'the basic norm of the state is power. That is, seen from the
side of its origin: violence transformed into might. Violence is one of the
most powerful forces shaping society, but is not itself a form of social inter-
action. It must become law in the positive sense of this term, that is, sociolo-
gically speaking, it must permit the development of a system of 'subjective
reciprocity': and this is only possible through a system of self-imposed
restrictions on the use of violence and the assumption of certain obligations
in exchange for its arrogated rights. In this way violence is turned into might,
and a relationship of domination emerges which is accepted not only by the
rulers, but under not too severely oppressive circumstances by their sub-
jects as well, as expressing a 'just reciprocity.' Out of this basic norm secon-
dary and tertiary norms now emerge as implied in it: norms of private law,
of inheritance, criminal, obligations, and constitutional law, which all bear
the mark of the basic norm of power and domination, and which are all
designed to influence the structure of the state in such a way as to increase
economic exploitation to the maximum level which is compatible with the
continuation of legally regulated domination." The insight is fundamental
that "law grows out of two essentially different roots (...): on the one hand,
out of the law of the association of equals, which can be called a 'natural'
right, even if it is no 'natural right,' and on the other hand, out of the law of
violence transformed into regulated might, the law of unequals."
14. Only the fact that democracy has become a sacred cow in modern
politics can explain why the extent to which the idea of majority rule is rid-
den with inner contradictions is almost generally overlooked: first, and this
is already decisive, if one accepts democracy as justified, then one would
also have to accept a democratic abolishment of democracy and a substitu-
tion of either an autocracy or a libertarian capitalism for democracy-and
this would demonstrate that democracy as such cannot be regarded as a
moral value. In the same way it would have to be accepted as justified if
majorities decided to eliminate minorities until the point at which there were
only two people, the last majority, left, for which majority rule could no longer
be applied, for logico-arithmetic reasons. This would prove once again that
democracy cannot in itself be regarded as justifiable. Or, if one did not want
to accept these consequences and instead adopted the idea of a constitu-
tionally limited, liberal democracy, one would at the same time have to admit
that the principles from which these limitations are derived must then be
logically more fundamental than the majority rule-and this again would point
to the fact that there can be nothing of particular moral value in democracy.
Second, by accepting majority rule it is not automatically clear what the
population is to which it should be applied. (The majority of which popula-
tion is to decide?) Here there are exactly three possibilities. Either one ap-
plies the democratic principle once again with regard to this question, and
decides to opt for the idea that greater majorities should always prevail over
smaller ones-but then, of course, there would be no way of saving the idea
of national or regional democracy, as one would have to choose the total,
global population as one's group of reference. Or, one decides that deter-
mining the population is an arbitrary matter-but in this case, one would have
to accept the possibility of increasingly smaller minorities seceding from
larger ones, with every individual being his own self-determining majority,
as the logical end point of such a process of secession-and once again the
unjustif iability of democracy as such would have been demonstrated. Third,
one could adopt the idea that selecting the population to which the majority
principle is applied is neither done democratically nor arbitrarily, but some-
how differently--but then again, one would have to admit that whatever this
different principle that would justify such a decision might be, it must be
more fundamental than the majority rule itself, and majority rule in itself must
be classified as completely arbitrary. Cf. on this M. N. Rothbard Power and
Market, Kansas City, 1977, pp.189ff., H. H. Hoppe, Eigentum, Anarchie und
Staat, Opladen, 1987, Chapter 5.
15. B. de Jouvenel, On Power, New York, 1949, pp.9-10; on the social

psychology of democracy cf. also the same, On Sovereignty, Cambridge,
1957; G. Mosca, The Ruling Class, New York, 1939; H. A. Mencken, Notes
on Democracy, New York, 1926; on the tendency of democratic rule to
"degenerate" to oligarchic rule cf. R. Michels, Zur Soziologie des Par-
teiwesens in der modernen Demokratie, Stuttgart, 1957.
16. Cf. on this process, R. Bendix, Kings or People, Berkeley, 1978.
17. On the fundamental difference between private business organizations

and the state cf. L v. Mises, Bureaucracy, New Haven, 1944.
18. L Spooner describes the supporters of the state as falling into two
categories: "1. Knaves, a numerous and active class, who see in the govern-
ment an instrument which they can use for their own aggrandizement or
wealth. 2. Dupes-a large class, no doubt-each of whom, because he is al-
lowed one voice out of millions in deciding what he may do with his own
person and his own property, and because he is permitted to have the same
voice in robbing, enslaving, and murdering others, that others have in rob-
bing, enslaving and murdering himself, is stupid enough to imagine that he
is a 'free man,1 a 'sovereign,' that this is a 'free government,' 'the best govern-
ment on earth,' and such like absurdities" (L Spooner, No Treason. The
Constitution of No Authority, Colorado Springs, 1973, p. 18).
19. Writes E. de la Boetie (The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of

Voluntary Servitude, New York, 1975, pp.52-53): "He who domineers over
you ... has indeed nothing more than the power that you confer upon him
to destroy you .... Resolve to serve no more, and you are at once freed. I
do not ask that you place hands upon the tyrant to topple him over, but
simply that you support him no longer; then you will behold him, like a great
Colossus whose pedestal has been pulled away, fall of his own weight and
break into pieces."
20. On a strategy for liberty, and in particular on the importance of a liber-

tarian movement for the achievement of these goals, cf. M. N. Rothbard, For
A New Liberty, New York, 1978, Chapter 15; and The Ethics of Liberty, At-
lantic Highlands, 1982, part 5.
CHAPTER 9
1. Cf. on this also Chapter 3 above and Chapter 10 below.
2. On the function of profit and loss cf. L v. Mises, Human Action, Chicago,
1966, Chapter 15; and "Profit and Loss," in: the same, Planningfor Freedom,
South Holland, 1974; M. N. Rothbard, Man, Economy and State, Los An-
geles, 1970, Chapter 8.
3. On the economics of government cf., esp. M. N. Rothbard, Power and

Market, Kansas City, 1977, Chapter 5.
4. Regarding democratically controlled allocations, various deficiencies

have become quite evident. For instance J. Buchanan and R. Wagner write
(The Consequences of Mr. Keynes, London, 1978, p. 19), "Market competi-
tion is continuous; at each purchase, a buyer is able to select among com-
peting sellers. Political competition is intermittent; a decision is binding
generally for a fixed number of years. Market competition allows several
competitors to survive simultaneously,...Political competition leads to an all-
or-nothing outcome....in market competition the buyer can be reasonably
certain as to just what it is that he will receive from his purchase. In politi-
cal competition, the buyer is in effect purchasing the services of an agent,
whom he cannot bind....Moreover, because a politician needs to secure the
cooperation of a majority of politicians, the meaning of a vote for a politician
is less clear than that of a 'vote' for a private firm." (Cf. on this also J.
Buchanan, "Individual Choice in Voting and the Market," in: the same, Fis-
cal Theory and Political Economy, Chapel Hill, 1962; for a more general
treatment of the problem J. Buchanan and G. Tullock, The Calculus of Con-
sent, Ann Arbor, 1962.)
What has commonly been overlooked, though-especially by those who
try to make a virtue of the fact that a democracy gives equal voting power
to everyone, whereas consumer sovereignty allows for unequal "votes"~is
the most important deficiency of all: that under a system of consumer
sovereignty people might cast unequal votes but, in any case, they exercise
control exclusively over things which they acquired through original ap-
propriation or contract and hence are forced to act morally. Under a
democracy of production everyone is assumed to have something to say
regarding things one did not so acquire, and hence one is permanently in-
vited thereby not only to create legal instability with all its negative effects
on the process of capital formation, but, moreover, to act immorally. Cf. on

this also L v. Mises, Socialism, Indianapolis, 1981, Chapter31; also cf. Chap-
ter 8 above.
5. M. N. Rothbard, Power and Market, Kansas City, 1977, p. 176.
6. This is a very generous assumption, to be sure, as it is fairly certain that

the so-called public sector of production attracts a different type of person
from the very outset and boasts an unusually high number of inefficient, lazy,
and incompetent people.
7. Cf. L v. Mises, Bureaucracy, New Haven, 1944; Rothbard, Power and

Market, Kansas City, 1977, pp. 172ff; and For A New Liberty New York, 1978,
Chapter 10; also M. and R. Friedman, The Tyranny of the Status Quo, New
York, 1984, pp.35-51.
8. On the following cf. L v. Mises, Human Action, Chicago, 1966, Chapter

23.6; M.N. Rothbard, Man Economy and State, Los Angeles, 1970, Chapter
7, esp. 7.4-6; "Conservation in the Free Market," in: Egalitarianism As A
Revolt Against Nature, Washington, 1974; and For A New Liberty, New York,
1978, Chapter 13.
9. On this and the following cf. L v. Mises, Socialism, Indianapolis, 1981,

part 3.2.
10. Thus states J. W. McGuire, Business and Society, New York, 1963,
pp.38-39: "From 1865 to 1897, declining prices year after year made it dif-
ficult for businessmen to plan for the future. In many areas new railroad links
had resulted in a nationalization of the market east of the Mississippi, and
even small concerns in small towns were forced to compete with other, often
larger firms located at a distance. At the same time there were remarkable
advances in technology and productivity. In short it was a wonderful era for
the consumer and a frightful age for the producers especially as competi-
tion became more and more severe."
11. Cf. on this G. Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism, Chicago, 1967; and
Railroads and Regulation, Princeton, 1965; J. Weinstein, The Corporate
Ideal in the Liberal State, Boston, 1968; M. N. Rothbard and R. Radosh
(eds.), A New History of Leviathan, New York, 1972.
12. G. Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism, Chicago, 1967, pp.4-5; cf. also
the investigations of M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge,
1965, to the effect that mass organizations (in particular labor unions), too,
are not market phenomena but owe their existence to legislative action.
13. On the following cf. L v. Mises, Socialism, Indianapolis, 1981, part 3.2;
and IHuman Action, Chicago, 1966, Chapters 25-26; M. N. Rothbard, Man,
Economy and State, Los Angeles, 1970, pp.544ff; pp.585ff; and "Ludwig von
Mises and Economic Calculation under Socialism," in: L Moss (ed.), The
Economics of Ludwig von Mises, Kansas City, 1976, pp.75-76.
14. Cf. F. A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order, Chicago, 1948, esp.
Chapter 9; I. Kirzner, Competition and Entrepreneurship, Chicago, 1973.
15. Regarding large-scale ownership, in particular of land, Mises observes

that it is normally only brought about and upheld by nonmarket forces: by
coercive violence and a state-enforced legal system outlawing or hamper-
ing the selling of land. "Nowhere and at no time has the large scale owner-
ship of land come into being through the working of economic forces in the
market. Founded by violence, it has been upheld by violence and that alone.
As soon as the latifundia are drawn into the sphere of market transactions
they begin to crumble, until at last they disappear completely....That in a
market economy it is difficult even now to uphold the latifundia, is shown by
the endeavors to create legislation institutions like the 'Fideikommiss' and
related legal institutions such as the English 'entail'....Never was the owner-
ship of the means of production more closely concentrated than at the time
of Pliny, when half the province of Africa was owned by six people, or in the
day of the Merovingian, when the church possessed the greater part of all
French soil. And in no part of the world is there less large-scale land owner-
ship than in capitalist North America," Socialism, Indianapolis, 1981, pp.325-
326.
16. Cf. on the following in M. N. Rothbard, Man, Economy and State, Los
Angeles, 1970, Chapter 10, esp. pp.586ff; also W. Block, "Austrian Monopo-
ly Theory. A Critique," in: Journal of Libertarian Studies, 1977.
17. L v. Mises, Human Action, Chicago, 1966, p.359; cf. also any current
textbook, such as P. Samuelson, Economics, New York, 1976, p.500.
18. Cf. M. N. Rothbard, Man, Economy and State, Los Angeles, 1970, Chap-
ter 10, esp. pp.604-614.
19. M. N. Rothbard, Man, Economy and State, Los Angeles, 1970, p.607.
20. L v. Mises, "Profit and Loss," In: Planning for Freedom, South Holland,
1974, p. 116.
21. In fact, historically, governmental anti-trust policy has almost exclusive-

ly been a practice of providing less successful competitors with the legal
tools needed to hamper the operation of their more successful rivals. For
an impressive assembly of case studies to this effect cf. D. Armentano, An-
titrust and Monopoly, New York, 1982; also Y. Brozen, Is Government the
Source of Monopoly? And Other Essays, San Francisco, 1980.
CHAPTER 10
1. G. de Molinari, 'The Production of Security," Center for Libertarian

Studies, Occasional Paper No. 2, New York, 1977, p.3.
2. lbid.,p.4.
3. For various approaches of public goods theorists cf. J. Buchanan and

G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor, 1962; J. Buchanan, The
Public Finances, Homewood, 1970; and The Limits of Liberty, Chicago,
1975; G. Tullock, Private Wants, Public Means, New York, 1970; M. Olson,
The Logic of Collective Action, New York, 1965; W. Baumol, Welfare
Economics and the Theory of the State, Cambridge, 1952.
4. Cf. on the following M. N. Rothbard, Man, Economy and State, Los An-
geles, 1970, pp.883ff; and 'The Myth of Neutral Taxation," in: Cato Journal,
1981; W. Block, "Free Market Transportation: Denationalizing the Roads,"
in: Journal of Libertarian Studies, 1979; and "Public Goods and Exter-
nalities: The Case of Roads," in: Journal of Libertarian Studies, 1983.
5. Cf. for instance, W. Baumol and A. Blinder, Economics, Principles and

Policy, New York, 1979, Chapter 31.
6. Another frequently used criterion for public goods is that of "non-rival-

rous consumption." Generally, both criteria seem to coincide: when free
riders cannot be excluded, nonrivalrous consumption is possible; and when
they can be excluded, consumption becomes rivalrous, or so it seems.
However, as public goods theorists argue, this coincidence is not perfect.
It is, they say, conceivable that while the exclusion of free riders might be
possible, their inclusion might not be connected with any additional cost
(the marginal cost of admitting free riders is zero, that is), and that the con-
sumption of the good in question by the additionally admitted free rider will
not necessarily lead to a subtraction in the consumption of the good avail-
able to others. Such a good would be a public good, too. And since ex-
clusion would be practiced on the free market and the good would not
become available for nonrivalrous consumption to everyone it otherwise
could-even though this would require no additional costs-this, according
to statist- socialist logic, would prove a market failure, i.e., a suboptimal level
of consumption. Hence, the state would have to take over the provision of
such goods. (A movie theater, for instance, might only be half-full, so it might
be "costless" to admit additional viewers free of charge, and their watching
the movie also might not affect the paying viewers; hence the movie would
qualify as a public good. Since, however, the owner of the theater would
be engaging in exclusion, instead of letting free riders enjoy a "costless" per-
formance, movie theaters would be ripe for nationalization.) On the
numerous fallacies involved in defining public goods in terms of non rival-
rous consumption cf. notes 12 and 16 below.
7. Cf. on this W. Block, "Public Goods and Externalities," in: Journal of Liber-
tarian Studies, 1983.
8. Cf. for instance, J. Buchanan, The Public Finances, Homewood, 1970,

p.23; P. Samuelson, Economics, New York, 1976, p.160.
9. Cf. R. Coase, 'The Lighthouse in Economics," in: Journal of Law and

Economics, 1974.
10. Cf. for instance, the ironic case that W. Block makes for socks being
public goods in "Public Goods and Externalities," in: Journal of Libertarian
Studies, 1983.
11. To avoid any misunderstanding here, every single producer and every
association of producers making joint decisions can, at any time, decide
whether or not to produce a good based on an evaluation of the privateness
or publicness of the good. In fact, decisions on whether or not to produce
public goods privately are constantly made within the framework of a market
economy. What is impossible is to decide whether or not to ignore the out-
come of the operation of a free market based on the assessment of the de-
gree of privateness or publicness of a good.
12. In fact, then, the introduction of the distinction between private and
public goods is a relapse into the presubjectivist era of economics. From
the point of view of subjectivist economics no good exists that can be
categorized objectively as private or public. This, essentially, is why the
second proposed criterion for public goods, i.e., permitting nonrivalrous
consumption (cf. note 6 above), breaks down, too. For how could any out-
side observer determine whether or not the admittance of an additional free
rider at no charge would not indeed lead to a reduction in the enjoyment of
a good by others?! Clearly, there Is no way that he could objectively do so.

In fact, it might well be that one's enjoyment of a movie or driving on a road
would be considerably reduced if more people were allowed in the theater
or on the road. Again, to find out whether or not this is the case one would
have to ask every individual-and not everyone might agree. (What then?)
Furthermore, since even a good that allows nonrivalrous consumption is not
a free good, as a consequence of admitting additional free riders "crowd-
ing" would eventually occur, and hence everyone would have to be asked
about the appropriate "margin." In addition, my consumption may or may
not be affected, depending on who it is that is admitted free of charge, so I
would have to be asked about this, too. And finally, everyone might change
his opinion on all of these questions over time. It is thus in the same way
impossible to decide whether or not a good is a candidate for state (rather
than private) production based on the criterion of nonrivalrous consump-
tion as on that of nonexcludability. (Cf. also note 16 below).
13. Cf. P. Samuelson, 'The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," in: Review
of Economics and Statistics, 1954; and Economics, New York, 1976, Chap-
ter 8; M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago, 1962, Chapter 2; F.
A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 3, Chicago, 1979, Chapter 14.
14. In recent years economists, in particular of the so-called Chicago-

school, have been increasingly concerned with the analysis of property
rights (cf. H. Demsetz, 'The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights,"
in: Journal of Law and Economics, 1964; and 'Toward a Theory of Proper-
ty Rights," in: American Economic Review, 1967; R. Coase, 'The Problem
of Social Cost," in: Journal of Law and Economics, 1960; A. Alchian,
Economic Forces at Work, Indianapolis, 1977, part 2; R. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law, Boston, 1977). Such analyses, however, have nothing to
do with ethics. On the contrary, they represent attempts to substitute
economic efficiency considerations for the establishment of justifiable ethi-
cal principles (on the critique of such endeavors cf. M. N. Roth bard, The
Ethics of Liberty, Atlantic Highlands 1982, Chapter 26; W. Block, "Coase and
Demsetz on Private Property Rights," in: Journal of Libertarian Studies,
1977; R. Dworkin, "Is Wealth a Value," in: Journal of Legal Studies, 1980;
M. N. Rothbard, 'The Myth of Efficiency," in: M. Rizzo (ed.), Time, Uncer-
tainty, and Disequilibrium, Lexington, 1979). Ultimately, all efficiency argu-
ments are irrelevant because there simply exists no nonarbitrary way of
measuring, weighing, and aggregating individual utilities or disutilities that
result from some given allocation of property rights. Hence, any attempt to
recommend some particular system of assigning property rights in terms of
its alleged maximization of "social welfare" is pseudo-scientific humbug (see
in particular, M. N. Rothbard, 'Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Wel-

fare Economics," Center for Libertarian Studies, Occasional Paper No. 3,
New York, 1977; also, L Robbins, "Economics and Political Economy," in:
American Economic Review, 1981).
The "Unanimity Principle" which J. Buchanan and G. Tullock, following K.
Wicksell (Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen, Jena, 1896), have repeated-
ly proposed as a guide for economic policy is also not to be confused with
an ethical principle proper. According to this principle only such policy
changes should be enacted which can find unanimous consent-and that
surely sounds attractive; but then, mutatis mutandis, it also determines that
the status quo be preserved If there is less than unanimous agreement on
any proposal of change-and that sounds far less attractive because it im-
plies that any given, present state of affairs regarding the allocation of
property rights must be legitimate either as a point of departure or as a to-
be-continued state. However, the public choice theorists offer no justifica-
tion in terms of a normative theory of property rights for this daring claim as
would be required. Hence, the unanimity principle is ultimately without ethi-
cal foundation. In fact, because it would legitimize any conceivable status
quo, the Buchananites most favored principle is no less than outrightly ab-
surd as a moral criterion (cf. on this also M. N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liber-
ty, Atlantic Highlands, 1982, Chapter 26; and 'The Myth of Neutral Taxation,"
in: Cato Journal, 1981, pp.549f).
Whatever might still be left for the unanimity principle, Buchanan and Tul-
lock, following the lead of Wicksell again, then give away by reducing it in
effect to one of "relative" or "quasi" unanimity.
15. Cf. on this argument M. N. Rothbard, 'The Myth of Neutral Taxation," in:
Cato Journal, 1981, p.533. Incidentally, the existence of one single anar-
chist also invalidates all references to Pareto-optimality as a criterion for
economically legitimate state action.
16. Essentially the same reasoning that leads one to reject the socialist-
statist theory built on the allegedly unique character of public goods as
defined by the criterion of nonexcludability, also applies when instead, such
goods are defined by means of the criterion of nonrivalrous consumption
(cf. notes 6 and 12 above). For one thing, in order to derive the normative
statement that they should be so offered from the statement of fact that
goods which allow nonrivalrous consumption would not be offered on the
free market to as many consumers as could be, this theory would face ex-
actly the same problem of requiring a justifiable ethics. Moreover, the
utilitarian reasoning is blatantly wrong, too. To reason, as the public goods
theorists do, that the free-market practice of excluding free riders from the
enjoyment of goods which would permit nonrivalrous consumption at zero

marginal costs would indicate a suboptimal level of social welfare and hence
would require compensatory state action is faulty on two related counts.
First, cost is a subjective category and can never be objectively measured
by any outside observer. Hence, to say that additional free riders could be
admitted at no cost is totally inadmissible. In fact, if the subjective costs of
admitting more consumers at no charge were indeed zero, the private
owner-producer of the good in question would do so. If he does not do so,
this reveals that to the contrary, the costs for him are not zero. The reason
for this may be his belief that to do so would reduce the satisfaction avail-
able to the other consumers and so would tend to depress the price for his
product; or it may simply be his dislike for uninvited free riders as, for in-
stance, when I object to the proposal that I turn over my less-than-capacity-
ftiled living room to various self-inviting guests for nonrivalrous
consumption. In any case, since for whatever reason the cost cannot be
assumed to be zero, it is then fallacious to speak of a market failure when
certain goods are not handed out free of charge. On the other hand, wel-
fare losses would indeed become unavoidable if one accepted the public
goods theorists' recommendation of letting goods that allegedly allow for
nonrivalrous consumption to be provided free of charge by the state. Be-
sides the insurmountable task of determining what fulfills this criterion, the
state, independent of voluntary consumer purchases as it is, would first face
the equally insoluble problem of rationally determining how much of the
public good to provide. Clearly, since even public goods are not free goods
but are subject to "crowding" at some level of use, there is no stopping point
for the state, because at any level of supply there would still be users who
would have to be excluded and who, with a larger supply, could enjoy a free
ride. But even if this problem could be solved miraculously, in any case the
(necessarily inflated) cost of production and operation of the public goods
distributed free of charge for nonrivalrous consumption would have to be
paid for by taxes. And this then, i.e., the fact that consumers would have
been coerced into enjoying their free rides, again proves beyond any doubt
that from the consumers' point of view these public goods, too, are inferior
in value to the competing private goods that they now no longer can ac-
quire.
17. The most prominent modern champions of Orwellian double talk are J.
Buchanan and G. Tullock (cf. their works cited in note 3 above). They claim
that government is founded by a "constitutional contract" in which everyone
"conceptually agrees" to submit to the coercive powers of government with
the understanding that everyone else is subject to it, too. Hence, govern-
ment is only seemingly coercive but really voluntary. There are several evi-
dent objections to this curious argument. First, there is no empirical

evidence whatsoever for the contention that any constitution has ever been
voluntarily accepted by everyone concerned. Worse, the very idea of all
people voluntarily coercing themselves is simply inconceivable, much in the
same way that it is inconceivable to deny the law of contradiction. For if the
voluntarily accepted coercion is voluntary, then it would have to be possible
to revoke one's subjection to the constitution and the state would be no
more than a voluntarily joined club. If, however, one does not have the "right
to ignore the state"--and that one does not have this right is, of course, the
characteristic mark of a state as compared to a club-then it would be logi-
cally inadmissible to claim that one's acceptance of state coercion is volun-
tary. Furthermore, even if all this were possible, the constitutional contract
could still not claim to bind anyone except the original signers of the con-
stitution.
How can Buchanan and Tullock come up with such absurd ideas? By a
semantic trick. What was "inconceivable" and "no agreement" in pre-Orwel-
lian talk is for them "conceptually possible" and a "conceptual agreement."
For a most instructive short exercise in this sort of reasoning in leaps and
bounds cf. J. Buchanan, "A Contractarian Perspective on Anarchy," in:
Freedom in Constitutional Contract, College Station, 1977. Here we learn
(p. 17) that even the acceptance of the 55 m.p.h. speed limit is possibly volun-
tary (Buchanan is not quite sure), since it ultimately rests on all of us con-
ceptually agreeing on the constitution, and that Buchanan is not really a
statist, but in truth an anarchist (p.11).
18. M. N. Rothbard, Man, Economy and State, Los Angeles, 1970, p.887.
19. This, first of all, should be kept in mind whenever one has to assess the
validity of statist-interventionist arguments such as the following, by J. M.
Keynes ('The End of Laissez Faire," in: J. M. Keynes, Collected Writings,
London 1972, vol. 9, p.291): 'The most important Agenda of the state relate
not to those activities which private individuals are already fulfilling but to
those functions which fall outside the sphere of the individual, to those
decisions which are made by no one if the state does not make them. The
important thing for government is not to do things which individuals are
doing already and to do them a little better or a little worse: but to do those
things which are not done at all." This reasoning not only appears phony,
it truly is.
20. Some libertarian minarchists object that the existence of a market

presupposes the recognition and enforcement of a common body of law,
and hence a government as a monopolistic judge and enforcement agen-
cy. (Cf., for instance, J. Hospers, Libertarianism, Los Angeles, 1971; T.

Machan, Human Rights and Human Liberties, Chicago, 1975.) Now, it is
certainly correct that a market presupposes the recognition and enforce-
ment of those rules that underlie its operation. But from this it does not fol-
low that this task must be entrusted to a monopolistic agency. In fact, a
common language or sign-system is also presupposed by the market; but
one would hardly think it convincing to conclude that hence the government
must ensure the observance of the rules of language. Just as the system of
language then, the rules of market behavior emerge spontaneously and can
be enforced by the "invisible hand" of self-interest. Without the observance
of common rules of speech people could not reap the advantages that
communication offers, and without the observance of common rules of con-
duct, people could not enjoy the benefits of the higher productivity of an ex-
change economy based on the division of labor. In addition, as I have
demonstrated in Chapter 7, independent of any government, the rules of the
market can be defended a priori as just. Moreover, as I will argue in the con-
clusion of this Chapter, it is precisely a competitive system of law administra-
tion and law enforcement that generates the greatest possible pressure to
elaborate and enact rules of conduct that incorporate the highest degree of
consensus conceivable. And, of course, the very rules that do just this are
those that a priori reasoning establishes as the logically necessary presup-
position of argumentation and argumentative agreement.
21. Incidentally, the same logic that would force one to accept the idea of
the production of security by private business as economically the best solu-
tion to the problem of consumer satisfaction also forces one, as far as moral-
ideological positions are concerned, to abandon the political theory of
classical liberalism and take the small but nevertheless decisive step (from
there) to the theory of libertarianism, or private property anarchism. Clas-
sical liberalism, with L. v. Mises as its foremost representative in this cen-
tury, advocates a social system based on the fundamental rules of the
natural theory of property. And these are also the rules that libertarianism
advocates. But classical liberalism then wants to have these laws enforced
by a monopolistic agency (the government, the state)-an organization, that
is, which is not exclusively dependent on voluntary, contractual support by
the consumers of its respective services, but instead has the right to
unilaterally determine its own income, i.e., the taxes to be imposed on con-
sumers in order to do its job in the area of security production. Now,
however plausible this might sound, it should be clear that it is inconsistent.
Either the principles of the natural property theory are valid, in which case
the state as a privileged monopolist is immoral, or business built on and
around aggression-the use of force and of noncontractual means of acquir-

ing resources-is valid, in which case one must toss out the first theory. It
is impossible to sustain both contentions and not be inconsistent unless, of
course, one could provide a principle that is more fundamental than both
the natural theory of property and the state's right to aggressive violence
and from which both, with the respective limitations regarding the domains
in which they are valid, can be logically derived. However, liberalism never
provided any such principle, nor will it ever be able to do so, since, as I
demonstrated in Chapter 7, to argue in favor of anything presupposes one's
right to be free of aggression. Given the fact then that the principles of the
natural theory of property cannot be argumentatively contested as morally
valid principles without implicitly acknowledging their validity, by force of
logic one is committed to abandoning liberalism and accepting instead its
more radical child: libertarianism, the philosophy of pure capitalism, which
demands that the production of security be undertaken by private business,
too.
22. Cf. on the problem of competitive security production G. de Molinari,

'The Production of Security" Center for Libertarian Studies, Occasional
Paper No. 2, New York, 1977; M. N. Rothbard, Power and Market, Kansas
City, 1977, Chapter 1; and For A New Liberty, New York, 1978, Chapter 12;
also: W.C. Wooldridge, Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man, NewRochelle, 1970,
Chapters 5-6; M. and L Tannehill, The Market for Liberty, New York, 1984,
part 2.
23. Cf. M. Murck, Soziologie der oeffentlichen Sicherheit, Frankfurt/M.,

1980.
24. On the deficiencies of democratically controlled allocation decisions cf.

above, Chapter 9, n. 4.
25. Sums up Molinari ("Production of Security," Center for Libertarian

Studies, Occasional Paper No. 2, New York, 1977, pp.13-14): "If...the con-
sumer is not free to buy security wherever he pleases, you forthwith see
open up a large profession dedicated to arbitrariness and bad management.
Justice becomes slow and costly, the police vexatious, individual liberty is
no longer respected, the price of security is abusively inflated and inequi-
tably apportioned, according to the power and influence of this or that class
of consumers."
26. Cf. the literature cited in note 21 above; also: B. Leoni, Freedom and
the Law, Princeton, 1961; J. Peden, "Property Rights in Celtic Irish Law," in:
Journal of Libertarian Studies, 1977.
27. Cf. T. Anderson and P. J. Hill, 'The American Experiment in Anarcho-

Capitalism: The Not So Wild, Wild West," in: Journal of Libertarian Studies,
1980.
28. Cf. on the following H. H. Hoppe, Eigentum, Anarchie und Staat,

Opladen, 1987, Chapter 5.
29. Contrast this with the state's policy of engaging in battles without having
everyone's deliberate support because it has the right to tax people; and
ask yourself if the risk of war would be lower or higher if one had the right
to stop paying taxes as soon as one had the feeling that the state's handling
of foreign affairs was not to one's liking!
30. And it may be noted here again that norms that incorporate the highest
possible degree of consensus are, of course, those that are presupposed
by argumentation and whose acceptance makes consensus on anything at
all possible, as shown in Chapter 7.
31. Again, contrast this with state-employed judges who, because they are
paid from taxes and so are relatively independent of consumer satisfaction,
can pass judgments which are clearly not acceptable as fair by everyone;
and ask yourself if the risk of not finding the truth in a given case would be
lower or higher if one had the possibility of exerting economic pressure
whenever one had the feeling that a judge who one day might have to ad-
judicate in one's own case had not been sufficiently careful in assembling
and judging the facts of a case, or simply was an outright crook.
32. Cf. on the following in particular, M. N. Rothbard, For A New Liberty,

New York, 1978, pp.233ff.
33. Cf. B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution,

Cambridge, 1967; J. T. Main, The Anti-Federalists: Critics of the Constitu-
tion, Chapel Hill, 1961; M. N. Rothbard, Conceived in Liberty, 4 vols., New
Rochelle, 1975-1979.
34. Naturally, insurance companies would assume a particularly important

role in checking the emergence of outlaw companies. Note M. and L Tan-
nehill: "Insurance companies, a very important sector of any totally free
economy, would have a special incentive to dissociate themselves from any
aggressor and, in addition, to bring all their considerable business influence
to bear against him. Aggressive violence causes value loss, and the in-
surance industry would suffer the major cost in most such value losses. An
unrestrained aggressor is a walking liability, and no insurance company,
however remotely removed from his original aggression, would wish to sus-
tain the risk that he might aggress against one of its own clients next. Be-
sides, aggressors and those who associate with them are more likely to be
involved in situations of violence and are, thus, bad insurance risks. An in-
surance company would probably refuse coverage to such people out of a
foresighted desire to minimize any future losses which their aggressions
might cause. But even if the company were not motivated by such foresight,
it would still be forced to raise their premiums up drastically or cancel their
coverage altogether in order to avoid carrying the extra risk involved in their
inclination to violence. In a competitive economy, no insurance company
could afford to continue covering aggressors and those who had dealings
with aggressors and simply pass the cost on to its honest customers; it
would soon lose these customers to more reputable firms which could af-
ford to charge less for their insurance coverage.
What would loss of insurance coverage mean in a free economy? Even
if [the aggressor] could generate enough force to protect itself against any
aggressive or retaliatory force brought against it by any factor or combina-
tion of factors, it would still have to go completely without several economic
necessities. It could not purchase insurance protection against auto acci-
dents, natural disasters, or contractual disputes. It would have no protec-
tion against damage suits resulting from accidents occurring on its property.
It is very possible that [it] would even have to do without the services of a
fire extinguishing company, since such companies are natural outgrowths
of the fire insurance business.
In addition to the terrific penalties imposed by the business ostracism
which would naturally follow its aggressive act [it] would have trouble with
its employees....[For] if a defense service agent carried out an order which
involved the intentional initiation of force, both the agent and the
entrepreneur or manager who gave him the order, as well as any other
employees knowledgeably involved, would be liable for any damages
caused" (M. and L Tannehill, The Market for Liberty, New York, 1984,
pp.110-111).
35. The process of an outlaw company emerging as a state would be even

further complicated, since it would have to reacquire the "ideological

legitimacy" that marks the existence of the presently existing states and
which took them centuries of relentless propaganda to develop. Once this
legitimacy is lost through the experience with a pure free market system, it
is difficult to imagine how it could ever be easily regained.
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Index
Note: A figure in parentheses following a page number indicates the number of a reference note on that page.
Albert, H., 228 (1) Erhard, L, 217(15)

Alchian, A., 221 (20), 250 (14) Eucken.W., 217(15)
Anderson, P., 222 (2), 223 (7) Evers, W.,214 (12)
Anderson, T., 256 (27) Fahrenbach, H., 233 (5)
Andres, F., 221 (17) Fetter, F., 213(10)
Apel, K. O., 233 (5) Feyerabend, P., 228 (7)
Armentano, D., 247 (21) Fischer, W., 227 (31)
Ayer, A. J., 228 (1), 233 (1) Flew, A., 219 (14)
Badie, B., 226 (26, 28) Friedman, M., 220 (16), 226 (25),
Baechler, J., 222 (4) 228 (1), 232 (24), 245 (7), 250 (13)
Baier, K., 233 (4) Friedman, R., 245 (7)
Bailyn, B., 256 (33) Galbraith, J. K., 226 (23)
Baird, C , 232 (25) Gewirth, A., 231 (19), 233 (4), 234 (6),
Baumol, W., 248 (3, 5) 235(7)
Becker, G., 214(10) Goldman, M. I., 218 (4), 227 (31)
Bendix, R., 243 (16) Gonzales, F.,218 (6)
Bernstein, E., 218(3) Greenleaf,W.H.,224(16)
Bimbaum, P., 226 (26, 28) Gregory, P. R., 217 (16), 220 (15)
Blanshard, B., 229 (8), 230 (16), Habermas, J., 231 (20), 233 (5), 234 (6)
232 (23) Hamel,H.v.,217(16)
Blaug, M., 228 (1) Hampshire, S., 219(14)
Blinder, A., 248 (5) Harris, M., 222 (4)
Bloch, M., 222 (2) Harman, G., 233 (1)
Block, W., 246(16), 248(4), Hayek, F. A., 216 (8), 224 (13),
249(7, 10), 250 (14) 227 (29), 232 (250), 240 (5, 8),
Boehm-Bawerk, E. v., 213 (10) 246 (14), 250 (13)
Boetie, E. de La, 240 (4), 243 (19) Herbert, A., 239 (2)
Bottomore, T., 223(13) Hill, P. J., 256 (27)
Brady, R. A., 227(31) Hilton, R., 222 (2)
Bramsted, E. K., 223 (9) Hitler, A., 227 (32)
Brandt, W., 62, 218(6, 7) Hobbes, T., 240 (5)
Bright, J., 73 Hock, W., 227 (29)
Brazen, Y., 232 (24), 247 (21) Hoepker,T.,217(17)
Brutzkus, B., 216(12) Hohmann, H. H., 217 (13)
Buchanan, J. M., 212 (5), 244 (4), Hollis, M., 228 (4), 229 (8,11),
248 (3), 249 (8), 251 (14), 230 (16)
252(17) Hoppe, H. H., 215 (2), 216 (11),
Buckley, W., 225 (17) 228 (5), 229 (12), 230(18),
Carey, G. W., 225(17) 231 (20), 232 (21), 239 (2),
Cipolla, C M . , 217(13) 242(14), 256(28)
Coase, R., 249 (9), 250 (14) Hospers, J., 254 (20)
Cobden, R., 73 Hudson, W. D., 236 (13)
Demsetz, H., 250 (14) Hume, D., 101, 150, 212 (1), 228 (5),
Dicey, A. V., 224 (16) 233 (1), 240 (4)
Dingier, H., 230(15) Hutchinson, T. W., 228(1)
Dworkin, R., 250 (14) Janich, P., 230(15)
Jellinek, G., 240 (5) Mitterand, F., 61

Jencks, C , 221 (17) Molinari, G. de, 188, 189, 198,
Jesse, E., 217 (16) 248 (1,2), 255 (22, 25)
Jouvenel, B. de, 161, 242 (8), Morgenstem, O., 219 (16)
242 (15) Mosca,G.,242(15)
Kaltenbrunner, G. K., 223 (13) Moss, L, 246(13)
Kambartel, F., 230 (9, 15), 231 (19), Murck, M., 255 (23)
233(4) Musgrave, A., 228 (6)
Kamlah, W., 229 (9) Nell, E., 228 (4), 229 (8, 11), 230 (16)
Kant, I., 229 (13, 14), 235 (8) Nisbet.R, 223(13)
Kaser, M., 217 (13) Nixon, R., 226 (22)
Kautsky,K.,218(3) Nock, 239 (2)
Kelsen, H., 240 (5) Nove,A.,217(12)
Keynes, M.,253 (19) Nozick, R., 237(17)
Khrushchev, N., 211 (3) Olson, M., 246 (12)
Kirzner, I., 246 (14) Oppenheimer, F., 239 (2)
Kolakowski, L, 215 (1), 217 (1), Osterfeld, D., 236(14)
219(14) Pap, A., 229 (8)
Kolko, G., 177, 245 (11), 246 (12) Parkin, F., 220(15)
Kreisky, B., 218(6) Paul, R.f 241 (9)
Kristol,l.,225(17) Peden, J., 256 (26)
Kuhn, T. S., 228 (7) Pejovich,S.,217(14)
Lakatos, I., 102,228(6) Pirenne, H., 222 (3), 223 (5, 6)
Lange,O.,218(4) Polanyi, K., 223 (12)
Laslett, P., 219 (14) Pol Pot, 85
Lehrman, L, 241 (9) Popper, K. R., 96, 97, 228 (1, 2)
Lenin, V., 40 Porreco, R., 235 (7)
Leonhard, W., 215 (1), 218 (1) Posner, P., 250 (14)
Leoni, B., 256 (26) Radosh, R., 226 (27), 245 (11)
Levy, M., 222 (3), 223 (8) Rakowska-Harmstone, T., 217 (13)
Locke, J., 69, 134,214(11), Rawls, J., 220 (16), 237 (17),
236 (10) 238 (19)
Lorenzen, P., 229 (9,15), 231 (19), Reisman, G., 83, 216 (10), 226 (23, 24)
232 (4) Ricardo, D., 97
Luehrs, G., 228 (3) Rizzo,M.,250(14)
Lukes, S., 219 (14) Robbins, L, 212 (1, 4), 251 (14)
Machan, T., 254 (20) Roepke, W., 217 (15)
Machiavelli, N., 240 (6) Rothbard, M., 170, 182, 184, 197, 212
Maclntyre, A., 234 (6) (4), 213 (10), 219 (10, 11, 14),
Main, J. T., 256 (33) 222 (1), 225 (19), 226 (20, 25, 27),
Marx, K., 19, 97, 220(15) 236(9, 11, 14), 237 (15, 16, 17,
McGuire,J.W.,245(10) 18), 238 (19), 239 (2), 240 (7),
Melhuish, K. J., 223 (9) 241 (9), 242 (14), 243 (20), 244
Melsen, A. v., 230(17) (2, 3), 245 (5, 7, 8, 11), 246 (13,
Mencken, H. A., 242(15) 16), 247 (18, 19), 248 (4), 250
Merklein, R., 221 (18) (14), 251 (15), 253 (18), 255 (22),
Meyer, T., 218 (5) 256 (32, 33)
Michels, R., 242(15) Rousseau, J.J., 236(12)
Miller, M., 217(14) Rubner, A., 214 (10)
Mises.Lv., 181, 185,212(4), Rundman, W . G., 219 (14)
213(10), 215(2,3), 216(6, 7) Samuelson, P., 246 (17), 249 (8),
217(15, 16), 219 (9), 223 (9), 250 (13)
227 (29), 229 (10), 232 (22, 23, Schmidt, H., 62, 97
26), 240 (8), 243 (17), 244 (2), Schoeck, H., 219(14)
245 (4), 245 (7, 8, 9), 246 (13, Schumpeter, J., 240 (2)
15, 17), 247 (20), 254 (21) Schwan, G., 218 (5), 220 (16)
INDEX 275
Senghaas, D., 237 (17) Toulmin, S., 231 (19), 233 (4)
Singer, M., 231 (10), 233 (4) Treue, W., 227 (31)
Skinner, Q., 241 (6) Trivanovitch, V., 227 (32)
Smith, A., 69 Tullock, G., 244 (4), 248 (3), 251 (14),
Smith, H., 217 (14) 252(17)
Soares, M., 218 (6) Veatch, H., 233 (4), 234 (6), 235 (7),
Sombart, W., 227 (30) 236 (9)
Spencer, H., 239 (2) Vonnegut, K., 219 (12)
Spooner, L, 239 (1), 243 (18) Wagner, R., 244 (4)
Sterba, J., 238 (19) Weber, M., 215 (2)
Stevenson, C. L, 233 (1) Weinstein, J., 245 (11)
Stigler, G., 226 (25) Wellisz, S., 217 (12)
Strauss, L, 233 (4) Wicksell, K., 251 (14)
Stuart, R. C , 217 (16), 220 (15) Wild, J., 233 (4)
Szalai, A., 221 (17) Williams, B., 219 (14)
Tannehill, M. and L, 255 (22), Willis, D. K., 217 (14)
257(34) Windmoeller, E., 217(17)
Templeton, K. S., 219 (13, 14) Woolridge, W. C , 255 (22)
Tigar, M., 222 (3), 223 (8) Wright, D. McC, 223 (11), 224 (15),
Thalheim, K., 217 (13, 16) 225 (18)
Thirlby, J. F., 212 (5) Zapf, W., 221 (19)

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About the Author vii

2 Property, Contract, Aggression, Capitalism, Socialism 7

3 Socialism Russian Style 19

4 Socialism Social-Democratic Style 39

5 The Socialism of Conservatism 65

6 The Socialism of Social Engineering and the

7 The Ethical Justification of Capitalism and

8 The Socio-Psychological Foundations of Socialism

or the Theory of the State 145

9 Capitalist Production and the Problem of Monopoly 167

10 Capitalist Production and the Problem of Public Goods . . . .187

Hans-Hermann Hoppe was born on September 2,1949, in Peine, West

He taught at several German universities as well as at the Johns Hop-

Three Institutions assisted me while I wrote this treatise. As a Heisen-

My wife Margaret gave unflagging emotional support for my work. She

My deepest gratitude is to my teacher and friend Murray N. Rothbard.

To these people and institutions I owe a sincere "thank you."

A he following study on the economics, politics and morals of socialism

starts from a logically incontestable statement (which is something very dif-

ferent from an "arbitrarily postulated axiom") and proceeds in a purely

pirically testable assumption, in addition) to results which are themselves

logically unassailable (and thus require no empirical testing whatsoever),

will it become possible to organize or interpret an otherwise chaotic, over-

ly complex array of unconnected, isolated facts or opinions about social

reality to form a true, coherent economic or moral conceptual system.

Hopefully it will be demonstrated that without such a theory, political

economy and philosophy can be considered nothing other than groping in

Specifically, a theory of property and property rights will be developed.

One goal then, is to demonstrate that the overall degree of socialism,

lesser degree of socialism, as can the fact that Switzerland is more

prosperous than Austria, or that England, in the nineteenth century the

more heavily on "personal" relations (as compared to impersonal business

relations); and where someone's "public" life is under constant observation

by "society," you simply have to go private.

And socialism will by no means be analyzed solely from an economic

Hopefully however, by a close analysis of the theory of property implicit

tification: Whoever argues in favor of anything, and in particular in favor of

Led by such considerations, the discussion finally returns to economics.

O e f o r e advancing to the more exciting field of analyzing diverse policy

Let us start with an elucidation of the precondition necessary for the

As a matter of fact, as long as a person acts, 3 i.e., as long as a person

To keep things simple and free of distracting details let us continue to

What, then, is the natural position regarding property implicit in one's

of the exchanging partners in retrospect (I might not like my looks after-

If, on the other hand, an action is performed that uninvitedly invades or

What is the underlying rationale of this natural position regarding proper-

called "natural" or "nonaggressive."9

The ideas of capitalism and socialism should be almost clear at this

The second effect might be called social. The introduction of elements

ture, in the moral composition of society, in turn leads to another reduction

in the level of investment in human capital.

Notwithstanding some evident differences between bodies and all other

A social system based on this natural position regarding the assignment

W e have defined socialism as an institutionalized policy of redistribution