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A LIVING MEMORIAL TO THE HOLOCAUST


Vol. 1, No. 1
October 1987

MUSEUM OF JEWISH HERITAGE

Commission Gains
Fundraising Co-chairs



Recent Acquisitions



Team of Consultants
Help Shape New Museum



Museum Plan
Advances



Commission Gains Fundraising Co-chairs

Peter A. Cohen, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Shearson Lehman Brothers Inc. and Stephen Robert, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., were appointed recently as co-chairmen of The New York Holocaust Memorial Commission's Fundraising Committee for A Living Memorial to the Holocaust—Museum of Jewish Heritage. "We are extremely fortunate to have two such prominent leaders from the financial community to spearhead our fundraising efforts," said George Klein, co-chairman of the Commission.

Mr. Cohen and Mr. Robert join Rosa Strygler, Holocaust survivor, author and one of the original members of the Commission, as Fundraising Committee co-chairs. Active in Jewish communal affairs, Mrs. Strygler, who is a long-time advocate and supporter of the Museum, operates a jewelry business in New York with her husband, Harry.

Mr. Cohen, who is also a director of American Express Company, the New York Stock Exchange and the United Merchants and Manufacturing Inc., is a trustee of Mt. Sinai Hospital and The Ohio State University Foundation.

Mr. Robert, a trustee of Brown University and The Dalton School, is Managing Director of the Joffrey Ballet, a director of NacRe Corp., and a director of Securities Industry Association. He volunteered to assist the Commission because "as time goes on and living eyewitnesses grow fewer, the memory of the Holocaust is fading. Those who have a vested interest in minimizing or even denying what happened will have greater and greater sway. We can't let that happen. The very existence of this Museum, located in New York City, a major world center where countless numbers of people will visit each year, will serve as an important reminder to the citizens of the world that this kind of thing did happen, and can again, unless we understand and remember."



Peter A. Cohen



Stephen Robert



Rosa Strygler

Dear Friends:

Only a generation ago, six million Jews—including one-and-one-half million children—were slaughtered by the Nazis. And the Holocaust did not end with these abominable murders. The Nazi criminals also sought to eradicate all evidence of Jewish culture, so as to rob the world of its European Jewish heritage forever.

We cannot rebuild the devastated communities of European Jewry; we cannot restore the synagogues, the homes, the vibrant pulse of life.

But there is something of utmost importance which we *can* do. As the Jews of Europe died, their last wish was that the world remember how they lived, how they died, and the hope that they cherished for the survival of the Jewish people and the Jewish spirit. It is the sacred obligation of our generation—and our unique privilege—to fulfill this wish.

To do so, we are building A Living Memorial to the Holocaust—Museum of Jewish Heritage.

This museum will be unique, for it will celebrate the vitality and creativity of European Jewish civilization, even as it bears witness to the terror and tragedy of that world's annihilation. And it will be unique because of its special location: the City of New York. This city is home to the largest number of Holocaust survivors outside of Israel, and the largest Jewish community in the world. This city of museums is also one to which American Jews have contributed with unparalleled energy, ever since Jews first landed on the shores of North America in 1654, only a short walk from the Museum's entrance. Accordingly, the Museum also will tell the story of Jewish immigration and achievement in America from colonial days to the present.

Perhaps the Museum's most imposing component will be its Memorial, a 60-foot high cube built of stone and translucent glass, that will serve as a reminder of the six million who died, and of the survival of the Jewish people in spite of the Holocaust.

This museum must be built now—for the eloquent voices of the survivors grow fewer every day. And even as we lose them, obscene new voices rise to distort the fragile history of the Holocaust, to

prey upon the world's all-too-ready tendency to forget, and to drown out the testimony of those who help us to remember.

And this museum must be built here—for New York is the crossroads of the free world and the museum capital of the world, and thus the most forceful, visible and effective place for us to fight the voices of denial. Standing on the shoreline opposite the Statue of Liberty, augmenting the light of her torch with its own nighttime beacon, the Museum will serve as a call to conscience, proclaiming to millions of visitors from all corners of the earth the necessity to *learn* from the world's past inaction. And at the same time the Museum will insure that the precious tradition of European Jewry will transmit its legacy to all humankind.

On behalf of the New York Holocaust Memorial Commission, we pledge ourselves to creating this Living Memorial to the Holocaust—Museum of Jewish Heritage. We invite all those of like will and spirit to join us in this great and challenging task by giving generously of their financial resources, by contributing artifacts and other memorabilia, by lending us their creative talents and advice, and later by taking full advantage of the unique learning opportunities which the Museum will afford us.

Here in New York we can find a way to retell the story of European Jewish culture and the Holocaust for everyone, so as to reaffirm the meaning of modern life, while looking to the future with the strength that memory brings. Please help us—join us—so that together we can fulfill our sacred obligation to remember, not only for ourselves, but for our children and for all the world's children yet to come.

George Klein
Robert M. Morgenthau

A New Kind of Museum

By David Altshuler

A Living Memorial to the Holocaust—Museum of Jewish Heritage is becoming a reality. That process began in July of 1981 when Mayor Koch appointed a Task Force on the Holocaust, whose report was issued the next spring. The next four years saw the establishment of the New York Holocaust Memorial Commission, initial planning studies for the Museum, and the final selection of the Battery Park City site, which was dedicated on September 4, 1986. That dramatic occasion led to an explosion of activity; with each passing month, the project is developing with increased pace and intensity. Official groundbreaking ceremonies are scheduled for the spring of 1988. The Museum, which will take two and a half years to complete, will open in November, 1990.

Many New Yorkers are aware that the dream of building for this city a suitable memorial for the victims of the Holocaust dates back to the 1940s, even before the death camps of Europe were liberated. Earlier efforts foundered for a variety of reasons, and the current project—because of its ambitious scope and complexity of design—will have taken a number of years to complete. But the result will be a true realization of the dreams and visions so many have shared. It will be a unique and eternal memorial, alive with memory and with hope.

Three characteristics distinguish this museum from all other Holocaust memorials. First, its location at the tip of Manhattan links it visually and conceptually with the Statue of Liberty, Ellis Island and the port of New Amsterdam, where the first Jews arrived in 1654. More than three million tourists a year already visit Liberty Island, and the developments underway at Ellis Island and throughout lower Manhattan insure that our museum will be at the focus of public attention from the moment its architectural structure becomes discernible next year.

Secondly, the Museum's programmatic themes are distinctive. Permanent exhibitions and a whole range of other facilities and activities will describe European Jewish civilization in the early twentieth century, the history of the Holocaust, the lives of survivors in Europe, Israel and

around the world after liberation, and the renewal of the Jewish heritage in America from the earliest immigrants until today. Thus, this museum will focus not only on the terrible and unprecedented tragedy of the *Shoah*, but also on the rich and beautiful civilization created by European Jewry and perpetuated by its heirs.

Finally, the Museum will be alive with learning. Its exhibitions will draw from the broadest palette of teaching materials and techniques, incorporating in their displays historical artifacts and fine arts, original documents and papers, photographs and film footage, videotaped testimonies and musical recordings, reconstructed environments and animated graphics. The Education Wing and Auditorium will offer daily programs for school and community groups, teacher training workshops and adult lectures and seminars, film series and dramatic and musical performances. Finally, the Learning Center will make accessible the broadest available range of textual and visual materials on Jewish heritage and the Holocaust through the most advanced audiovisual and computerized teaching resources.

In future newsletters, I will have the opportunity to describe in far greater detail the specific plans to which I have alluded above. For now, simply let me say that our professional team of architects and designers, scholars and curatorial researchers, education and media specialists—together with the dedicated lay leaders of the New York Holocaust Memorial Commission—already have created the essence of what our museum soon will become. In fifteen years of university teaching about Judaic Studies, and in work on projects like the *Precious Legacy* exhibition, I have been privileged to see some of the most exciting efforts to advance Jewish life and culture around the world. I feel confident in predicting that A Living Memorial to the Holocaust—Museum of Jewish Heritage will make a unique contribution. The memory of our ancestors and the future of our descendants require no less.

Recent Acquisitions



PHOTO: PETER GOLDBERG

Frania Blum's Liberation Dress

This dress, made in Dachau by Frania Bratt Blum shortly after the camp was liberated in 1945, was given recently to A Living Memorial to the Holocaust—Museum of Jewish Heritage by Mrs. Blum. U.S. Army liberators brought bolts of blue-and-white checked fabric to the women inmates, who had only camp uniforms to wear. A friend of Mrs. Blum's cut the cloth, and everyone who knew how to sew did. Those who were too weak to sew or who didn't know

how were helped by those who could. Mrs. Blum sewed this dress, fashioned in the peasant style she had so admired as a girl in Poland before the war, by hand. For years afterward, she wore it on special occasions and holidays, a reminder not only of her friend who cut the cloth—she died of tuberculosis shortly after liberation—but of the day she was allowed to celebrate her freedom dressed once again as a dignified citizen of the world.




PHOTO: PETER GOLDBERG

Desecrated Torah

The Nazis routinely desecrated Torahs and used them for profane purposes. This piece of Torah, a gift of Peter

Ehrenthal to the Museum, appears to have been intended for use as a shoe insole.

Museum Seeking Donations For its Permanent Collection



PHOTO: PETER GOLDBERG

Drawing by Alfred Kantor. Gift of the artist.

A Living Memorial to the Holocaust—Museum of Jewish Heritage will be a cultural and educational institution unlike any other in the world. While it will contain a powerful monument to the Jews who died during the Holocaust, it will serve as a living institution that documents, studies and preserves the cultural and religious life that existed among European Jews before, during, and after the Holocaust. No comparable facility exists today at any secular or Jewish museum, archive, library or learning center anywhere in the world.

A major effort is now underway to acquire objects for the Museum's permanent collection that depict, reflect and illuminate the rich civilization that existed among European Jews before the war, the struggle and resistance of the Jewish people during the Holocaust, and the survival and transformation of that heritage after the destruction of European Jewry. Many different kinds of objects, which will be conserved, studied and exhibited, are being sought, including historical artifacts, fine art (such as paintings, drawings, graphics and sculpture), personal memorabilia, film footage, documents and manuscripts, and photographs.

To make the Museum a truly "living" memorial, the cooperation and gener-

osity of anyone and everyone in possession of such objects are necessary if the one main goal of the new institution is to be realized: to keep memory alive and make it meaningful. Tangible evidence of the Holocaust is evermore critical as the number of living eyewitnesses decreases and the number of people who would minimize the historical record increases. This will be a teaching museum with a powerful and unified message. In exploring Jewish heritage and the Holocaust on such an extensive scale, the Museum will offer its visitors the opportunity to understand and to remember, and by its very existence will help ensure that what happened to the Jews in the 20th century is not repeated again.

If you are interested in discussing the possibility of donating an object, collection, artifact or work of art to the permanent collection, or if you know a liberator, survivor, or someone else who may have something to donate, mail a brief description to Esther Brumberg, Coordinator of Collections Research, A Living Memorial to the Holocaust—Museum of Jewish Heritage, 342 Madison Avenue, Suite 717, New York, New York 10017.



From the left, Museum architect James Polshek, reviewing architectural plans with: Richard Meier, member of the Museum's Architectural Advisory Com-

mittee; Ralph Schwarz, Director of Design and Construction for the Museum; and David Altshuler, Museum Director.



**A Living Memorial to the Holocaust—
Museum of Jewish Heritage**

Museum Director

David Altshuler

Editor

Sharon Zane

Designer

Chermayeff & Geismar Associates

**The New York
Holocaust Memorial Commission**

Chairmen

George Klein

Robert M. Morgenthau

Peter A. Cohen

Manfred Ohrenstein

Executive Director

David L. Blumenfeld

Team of Consultants Help Shape New Museum



Museum Director David Altshuler (upper left) pictured with (clockwise) consultants Ralph Schwarz, Karl Katz and Jeshajahu Weinberg. Not pictured are David Edell and Linda Low.

The New York Holocaust Memorial Commission has engaged a team of expert consultants to help guide A Living Memorial to the Holocaust—Museum of Jewish Heritage from its planning and design phase, through construction, to opening day. David Edell and Ralph Schwarz recently joined Karl Katz and Jeshajahu Weinberg as consultants to the new Museum.

David Edell, who with Linda Low heads The Development Resource Group, Inc., a New York based management and development consulting firm, is coordinating fundraising efforts for the new Museum. Formerly, Mr. Edell spent twelve years at the United Jewish Appeal-Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, where his positions included Director of Leadership Development, Executive Director of Field Staff, and Executive Director of Major Gifts. A graduate of Boston University, Mr. Edell holds an MSW degree from the University of Maryland School of Social Work and Community Planning. He is a member of the Association of Jewish Community Organization Personnel; the Association for Training and Development; the Conference of Jewish Communal Service; and the National Society of Fundraising Executives.

Karl Katz, currently Special Consultant and Head of the Office of Film and Television at The Metropolitan Museum of Art, is acting as a Museum Consultant to the new Museum. Formerly, he was Chairman of the Planning Team of Beth Hatefutsoth, the Nahum Goldmann Museum of the Jewish Diaspora in Tel Aviv, and Director of the Jewish Museum in New York. Among his many consultancies, Mr. Katz, who is a graduate of Columbia University from which he received both his B.A. and M.A. in Art History, is an advisor to the Honorable Teddy Kollek, Mayor of Jerusalem; consultant to the Municipality of Jerusalem on cultural projects and city planning; and advisor-consultant to the Israel National Museum. He is presently in the process of designing several museums around the world, including institutions in Copenhagen, Los Angeles, Montreal and Rio de Janeiro.

Ralph Schwarz, former partner in the award-winning, internationally recognized architectural firm of Richard Meier & Partners, is coordinating exhibit and architectural development as Director of Design and Construction for the Museum. He has more than thirty years of experience in organizing, developing, representing and working with major institutions, as well as cultural, historic and philanthropic foundations. Most recently, he directed the planning and programming of the schematic phase for the Getty Center, the new fine arts complex of the J. Paul Getty Trust in Los Angeles. Mr. Schwarz received his B.A. and M.A. degrees from Lehigh University, and a Doctor of Humanities degree from Indiana State University, and was honored by the Department of Housing and Urban Development in 1974 and 1976. In addition, he was awarded the American Institute of Architects Medal in June, 1982.

Jeshajahu Weinberg is Museum Consultant for the new Museum. He was Director of Beth Hatefutsoth, the Nahum Goldmann Museum of the Jewish Diaspora in Tel Aviv, from which he retired in 1984. He was also responsible for the planning and development of that museum from its inception. Mr. Weinberg is consulting on various museum development projects, including the Museum of the History of Jerusalem, located in the Tower of David compound in the Old City of Jerusalem. A native of Warsaw, Poland, Mr. Weinberg has been a resident of Palestine, later Israel, since 1933.

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March 28, 1988

MAX

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We were pleased to learn you will be meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow at the end of May and early June. We are confident your meetings will be helpful to the Free World.

Starting on May 25 and lasting through June 3, 1988, "STROYDORMASH '88" will be going on in Moscow. This is billed by the Soviets as the Third International Exhibition for Construction and Road Building Equipment and there will be an American pavillion under the sponsorship of the U. S. Department of Commerce. A number of our member companies will be exhibiting their products including Caterpillar Inc., the world's largest manufacturer of construction equipment. As you know, Lee Morgan, the retired Chairman and CEO of Caterpillar is currently serving as Co-Chairman of your "EXPORT NOW" program.

Another company, GOMACO CORP., will actually have the largest display in the U. S. Pavillion and therein lies an interesting story. GOMACO is a relatively small company located in Ida Grove, Iowa, a community of 2400 people. For years they succeeded in marketing their highly competitive concrete paving equipment all over the world. On May 23, 1984, you awarded their President and CEO your "E" Award in the Rose Garden. I believe this growing company might be one of the finest examples of the international entrepreneurship you wish to promote with "EXPORT NOW".

If your schedule in Moscow permits, your visit to the American pavillion at "STROYDORMASH '88" would emphasize the positive messages of your negotiations with the Soviets. Your hosts might also appreciate your recognition of their efforts to join in commercial exchange with the world community to our mutual benefit.

Respectfully,

J. Wm. Peterson
Director of Government Affairs

JWP:cmc

As I See Gorbachev

Natan Sharansky

THREE days before the Reagan-Gorbachev summit last December, I was invited to a briefing at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. in which four Soviet officials—in the new spirit of *glasnost*—spent 90 minutes answering journalists' questions. It did not take long to realize that while now smiles were allowed to crack the grim visages of the actors, and sweet courtesy was replacing rude and clumsy stonewalling, the script of the show was the same: the same tired catechisms, the same doubletalk, and the same fear of making "mistakes."

"What about violations of the Helsinki accords?" asked a reporter.

"You have a suit on and I have a suit on. Your suit wouldn't suit me and my suit wouldn't suit you. We shouldn't try to switch suits," answered Albert Vlasov, Communist party spokesman.

"Why have you not tried to publish the October 21 speech of Boris Yeltsin?" asked another.

"We thought it incorrect to publish a speech delivered at the party plenum," said Yegor Yakovlev, editor of the *Moscow News*. And Vitaly Korotich, editor of *Ogonyok* magazine, the flagship of *glasnost*, chimed in: "As a member of the party I would not dream of permitting myself to violate party discipline and disobey its instructions."

"When are you going to have a free press?" yelled an impatient questioner.

"We have a free press!" answered Yakovlev.

I was experiencing *déjà vu*, as if I were back at the Moscow headquarters of the KGB in the 70's. I said to a reporter, "You see, at the lower levels, the KGB is rude and rough, but at the top they are rather intellectual and smooth. The way they answer questions now is a lot like that. They acknowledge almost every problem in the distant past, but they really won't confront problems that are still going on now. *Glasnost* is not a form of freedom. It's just a new set of instructions on what is and isn't permitted."

NATAN (formerly Anatoly) SHARANSKY, the Jewish leader and human-rights activist who spent nine years in Soviet prisons and labor camps, was released in 1986 and now makes his home in Israel. *Fear No Evil*, Mr. Sharansky's memoir of his life as a dissident in the Soviet Union, will be published by Random House in June.

To my surprise, my remarks and my picture got almost as much space as the Soviets did in the following morning's *Washington Post*. To my even greater surprise, the day the story appeared a brick was tossed into my host's car—in which he had driven me from the briefing—while it was parked in front of his home. It smashed the rear window and reached the steering wheel, leading the police to believe that it had been thrown from a passing vehicle. In Moscow, correspondents who drove spokesmen of dissidents around would find their cars with punctured tires in the morning. The *déjà vu* was complete.

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV is a huge success in the West. Viewed as more honest, more talented, and more courageous than his predecessors, he has induced a euphoria in the media, in the public, and among politicians. He regularly bests Western leaders in public-opinion polls. He, not Ronald Reagan, is the hero of the arms-control agreement and his *glasnost* and *perestroika*, now securely enshrined in our language, are viewed as harbingers of even better things to come. The conventional wisdom is that he is on the right track, that while he cannot change everything at once ("he has opposition in the Kremlin and in the bureaucracy, you know") he will, given time and Western support, bring democracy and renewed vigor to the Soviet Union and peace to the world. Concomitantly, most seem to believe that the Soviet people, like a sleeping princess now awakening to the kiss of *glasnost*, are pining for Western-style democracy and ecstatically relish the daily broadening of their horizons.

There is something very winning in this optimistic view. But it fails to consider the genesis, purpose, and depth of Gorbachev's reforms, and it underestimates what generations of coercion, negligence, tyranny, and brutality have done to the soul of the Russian people.

Not that the reforms have been insignificant. Some have been dramatic and, in the context of Soviet society, even revolutionary. But a comparison with the upheaval which led to Nikita Khrushchev's rise to power in the 50's is instructive. Then, the KGB chief was executed, and the KGB's

iron grip on the government and the populace was noticeably weakened. Hundreds of thousands were released from the gulag, exonerated, and rehabilitated.

Under Gorbachev the KGB may be more subtle and sophisticated, and careful to keep a low profile. But there is no sign that its powers have been curtailed. With its blessing, and using *glasnost* as a license, Nazi-like anti-Semitic gangs have been allowed to organize and grow, to distribute *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* freely, and to assault Jews in the streets, thus doing the KGB's dirty work without reflecting directly on the regime. Jailed refuseniks, known as "prisoners of Zion," and a few score of dissidents, mostly "celebrities" famous in the West, have been released, but there have been no admissions of error by the regime, and none of the falsely convicted has been rehabilitated. (The privilege of rehabilitation is now reserved for figures from the 20's and 30's who were murdered by Stalin and have been non-persons ever since.)

The less publicized victims have been less fortunate, however. Anatoli Marchenko and Alexsei Niktin, proponents of free trade unions, have died in prison, and Vladimir Klebanov, another labor activist, is lost somewhere in the psychiatric gulag. Vazif Meilanoff, who spent seven years in an isolation cell for the crime of protesting Andrei Sakharov's exile, is himself still in exile, and Leonid Lubman, who was arrested on trumped-up charges very similar to those used against me, and sentenced to the same term—thirteen years—is still in prison. The number of such prisoners is estimated at anywhere between 2,000 and 15,000, but only 500 of their names are known to Amnesty International. When Robert Bernstein, chairman of Helsinki Watch in America, asked Gorbachev why, after two-and-a-half years in power, he did not simply release all political prisoners, he replied, furiously, with a harangue about Americans shooting at Mexican "wetbacks."

Khrushchev, as it turned out, did indeed have strong opposition in the Kremlin—the KGB and other elements whose wings he clipped never forgave him. But until he was finally toppled, rumors of rifts in the leadership were vehemently denied by the Kremlin. Now news of opposition to Gorbachev, a KGB protégé, usually *originates* in the Kremlin and is disseminated with great fanfare. The purpose, it seems, is not only to aver that unless he is supported abroad he will be overthrown at home, but to impart the impression that the Kremlin is just like any other government, with hawks and doves vying for influence.

ANOTHER useful comparison can be drawn in the area of emigration—this time between Gorbachev the "reformer" and Brezhnev the "ruthless dictator." Under Gorbachev the number of Jewish applicants granted exit visas jumped from 1,000 in 1986 to 8,000 in

1987. Under *glasnost*-less Brezhnev, almost 300,000 Jews left the Soviet Union in the 1970's, 51,000 of them in the peak year of 1979.

It is testimony to Gorbachev's skill that the sudden but far from impressive increase in exit permits, accompanied by hints, winks, and veiled promises by Soviet officials to visiting Jewish leaders, gave rise to hopes of massive Jewish emigration. In the general euphoria, many failed to realize that the new Soviet emigration law enacted under Gorbachev is not designed to facilitate emigration but to terminate it. It limits eligibility for emigration to those who can receive invitations from blood relatives of the first degree living abroad—parents, children, or siblings. It thus excludes over 90 percent of the 400,000 Jews who have indicated their desire to leave.

The Soviet authorities, now in a post-summit mode and flush with Gorbachev's popular success, are stringently enforcing these draconian restrictions. The new regulations also stipulate that of the 10 percent eligible to apply, those who possess "state secrets" would automatically be turned down. (The Soviets have applied this restriction to, among others, a seventy-four-year-old widow whose mathematician husband died seventeen years ago, under the pretext that he might have left her "state secrets.")

Not surprisingly, the number of would-be emigrants now refused visas on these grounds has drastically increased, and some old-time refuseniks have been notified that previous reasons for rejecting their applications have been canceled only to be replaced by "security considerations." Even relatives of such refuseniks, known in the dark humor of Jewish activists as "genetic security risks," are thus excluded. And since applying under these conditions courts being branded a traitor willing to compromise state secrets, a potential applicant would have to contemplate the possibility not only of being fired and harassed and of living in limbo for many years but of imprisonment for treason. The few who succeed in getting through this sieve are required to provide an affidavit from all relatives, including in-laws and ex in-laws, that there are no financial claims against them. A brand-new regulation stipulates that they must pass a psychiatric examination to ascertain their sanity before they can exit.

Lest it be forgotten, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, reaffirmed in the Helsinki accords, to which the USSR is a signatory, clearly states that the right to leave any country, including one's own, is a basic human right. Contracts obviously mean different things to different people. Or, as the Communist party spokesman put it in Washington, "Your suit wouldn't suit me and my suit wouldn't suit you."

The one area in which *glasnost* has had to "give" more is the field of communications and the arts. Even seventy years of primitive conformism have not completely destroyed the Russian genius in

literature, music, and dance, or suppressed the ferment among the intelligentsia and artistic community. To assuage the envy with which the Soviet intelligentsia view the freedom their colleagues in other Communist countries have been enjoying for decades, creative editors have been appointed at newspapers and magazines, and such subjects as crime, drug addiction, corruption, the Afghan war, and even—though rarely—anti-Semitism, all hitherto virtually taboo, are now discussed. Some banned dead writers, including Boris Pasternak, Mikhail Bulgakov, and Vladimir Nabokov can now be read, and even a live émigré, Nobel-prize-winner Joseph Brodsky, is being published. Marc Chagall's paintings, previously considered prime examples of "bourgeois decadence," were exhibited in Moscow last year, albeit without mentioning his Jewishness, and the movie *Repentance*, a potent denunciation of Stalinist terror, though still cautious enough never to mention him by name, is a big hit. The restless energies of Soviet youth, for whom anything Western is a seductive symbol of liberty, have been placated by the legitimizing of rock, jazz, and jeans.

Other foreign influences, however, have not fared so well. At last year's Moscow book fair, forty English-language books and twenty Russian books published outside the USSR were confiscated, and foreign artists of whose affiliations and sympathies the Soviet Union does not approve, including such luminaries as Leonard Bernstein, Zubin Mehta, Itzhak Perlman, and Daniel Barenboim, cannot perform there.

The traditional fear of foreign influence is matched by the traditional horror of demonstrations and rallies, and of the uncontrollable momentum they might create. When a large group of Tatars, a people exiled by the Soviet authorities from their land during World War II and never allowed to return, tried to demonstrate in front of the Kremlin, they were forcibly packed into buses and driven away. When a hundred refuseniks gathered in Moscow on the day a quarter of a million Jews marched in Washington to demand free emigration for Soviet Jews, they were roughed up by 200 agents of the KGB and dispersed. Peaceful protests of Jewish women in Moscow and Leningrad, by Latvians in Riga, and by Kazakhs in Alma Ata, were also forcibly put down.

WHAT is discouraging about these incidents is not that they were suppressed, but that the grabbings at the crumbs of freedom have been so few. Almost all have been expressions of national and ethnic aspirations by minorities, not a surge for liberty by the majority. This tends to confirm the pessimistic view that the apathy, fatalism, and cynicism that permeate the Soviet Union make a groundswell for greater liberty—something like the momentum for liberalization which occurred in Poland during the heyday of Solidarity—quite unlikely. Alexander Zinoviev de-

scribes the new Soviet man as an empty vessel unable to think or revolt, ignorant of the world and his own history, and conditioned to believe not that what the authorities tell him is *true* but that it must be accepted as an inevitable part of life, the way one accepts rain. And, indeed, not only the authorities consider citizens cogs in the wheel of the state, the people so consider themselves too. The Western notion that the government is subject to the constraints of law is alien to the Soviet citizen. The government is the law. It can grant rights to its subjects and it can take them away. It can be benevolent and it can be cruel. But, by definition, it cannot violate the law. Gorbachev has not changed this principle, nor can he do so within the framework of the system. All he has done is to increase the number of gifts the government is currently willing to bestow.

The "credit" for creating such passivity and conformity should perhaps not be given exclusively to the Communist regime. The czars, although far more liberal in allowing foreign contacts and emigration, deserve at least part of it. A decade before the Bolshevik takeover, the Stolypin reforms encouraged peasants to emerge from feudal "collectivism" and adopt free-enterprise methods. The reforms were an abysmal failure because, among other reasons, those who established successful independent farms were assaulted by fellow peasants who considered the communal tenure of the feudal village the only just and egalitarian system.

This kind of attitude puts the prospects of Gorbachev's *perestroika* into question. Gorbachev wants to introduce a modicum of free enterprise, create new incentives to prod people of talent and intelligence, and allow efficiency and productivity, rather than bureaucratic inertia, to determine the survival of plants and factories. He wants to do this without giving up the power to dictate, without a real decentralization of economic planning, and, needless to say, without allowing market forces of supply and demand into play. His reforms, at least initially, will mean more work and less vodka, higher prices and lower wages, and the dislocation of workers and unemployment. They will require enthusiasm, enterprise, and a lot of popular trust in the party-created ruling class, which is just as remote from the masses and just as privileged as the czars and noblemen who preceded them. It is a tall order.

The generalizations about the Soviet populace do not usually apply to Jews. Perhaps because they have always been considered outsiders, or because their own cultural heritage served as a powerful counterinfluence, the Jews never quite accepted enforced conformity and the obliteration of individualism. Ever since emerging from the ghetto they have tended to push for change, and the number of Jews who participated in revolution and upheaval was always grossly disproportionate to their percentage in the population. But in times

of retrenchment, their effervescence was deemed dangerous, and they have never been considered loyal Soviet citizens. Much is being said about the possibility, the logic of which is seemingly unassailable, that Gorbachev will attempt to make life in the USSR so attractive for Jews that they will not want to leave. For most, the freedom to study Hebrew and worship in a synagogue is less important than the prospect of attending a good university and attaining a high professional position. But it is doubtful that they will be given these opportunities.

GORBACHEV's reforms are not, then, intended to lead to the democratization of Soviet society or to any true pluralism. As he himself told the French-USSR Friendship Society last year, "We openly say that nobody will be allowed to act against socialism."

The reforms are dictated, rather, by the need to invigorate the Soviet economy, now in one of its worst slumps since the 1920's, and to reverse its decline. International factors, like the crash in oil prices, which has caused Soviet indebtedness to the West to rise to \$40 billion (it may reach \$60 billion by 1990), as well as industrial inefficiency, corruption, backwardness and sloth, and a lopsided defense and space-exploration budget, threaten to make the economic gap between the USSR and the West unbridgeable. Even if *perestroika* succeeds beyond expectations, the modernization of the economy cannot be achieved without Western help. The official bluster about the inevitability of socialist victory over capitalism notwithstanding, the Soviet leaders know that the limitations inherent in the Soviet system preclude successful competition with the West. But the West, wary of dark dictatorships, must be assured of Soviet benignity. As Gorbachev put it on the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, "[Our reforms] are eliminating the fear of the 'Soviet threat.'"

The formula for this was found not in Marx or Lenin, but on Madison Avenue, or, rather, through Soviet officials familiar with the American public-relations-conditioned psyche. Shapers of Soviet thinking of the old school like Boris Ponomarev were replaced by Ambassadors Anatoly Dobrynin and Aleksandr Yakovlev, who had served many years in North America. English-speaking "journalists" versed in the ways of the West, like Genadi Gerasimov, who used to be minor apparatchiks and anonymous lackeys, are now official spokesmen. It finally dawned on the Soviet leadership that in the day of television a smile, a modulated voice, and an amicable appearance are far more effective than bullying and threats, and immeasurably more important than substance in shaping public opinion.

In the substance of Soviet foreign policy it is difficult to discern change. Despite the dire economic conditions, the Soviet Union has reduced neither its military budget nor the military aid it

extends to its client states. Last summer, in a major speech in Warsaw, Gorbachev reiterated his commitment to the Brezhnev Doctrine, which sanctions Soviet intervention to defend socialist regimes from foreign attack as well as internal upheaval. He has also made it clear that while economic liberalization in Eastern Europe is welcome, there will be no loosening of either the political or the economic leash with which the USSR holds these countries.

As if to stress that arms agreements and closer ties with the West must not be allowed to change traditional Communist attitudes toward the capitalist world, there has been no letup in anti-American propaganda. Soviet papers still allege that AIDS was invented at Fort Detrick, Maryland, as a biological-warfare weapon, and that the CIA murdered the 918 members of the Jim Jones People's Temple who committed suicide in Guyana in 1978 to prevent their emigration to the USSR. But this is either unknown or ignored in the West, where the preoccupation with nuclear disarmament overshadows all else, and it has not diminished the popularity Gorbachev enjoys for signing an intermediate-range nuclear-arms agreement. There would have been no treaty had the U.S. not introduced Pershing missiles in Europe despite the four-year Soviet walkout from the arms talks and the massive demonstrations throughout the continent. And it is a measure of Gorbachev's public-relations adroitness that he successfully transformed a move dictated by strategic considerations into what is perceived as a gesture of magnanimity and peace.

At the summit he also succeeded in setting the agenda. Subjects the USSR preferred not to discuss—regional conflicts and human rights—were pushed aside. The principle of linkage, intrinsic to the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which ties "favored-nation" status in trade relations to Soviet performance on human rights, and the Helsinki accords, which tie political boundaries and security arrangements to human rights, had disappeared. A State Department official told me just before the summit that the U.S. was no longer committed to linkage *per se*. "Now," he said, "we conduct talks on the four main topics—arms, trade, regional conflicts, and human rights—in parallel fashion."

"How, then, do you expect them to make concessions in such areas as human rights or regional conflicts?" I asked.

"We count on the atmosphere to do it, and on the fact that we clearly attach similar importance to all four subjects," he replied.

To count on "atmosphere" to reverse Soviet policy is, to put it charitably, pollyannish. The Soviets encourage regional conflicts not only because they extend Soviet influence and power and serve as a trump card in dealing with the West, but because they inspire xenophobic ideological fervor in the Soviet population and a willingness to sacrifice

and conform. That is why throughout its seventy years of existence, the Soviet Union has indiscriminately supported violent movements and regimes. Turmoil serves the Soviets well: violent conflict is the only area in which they can successfully compete with the West.

A withdrawal from Afghanistan is therefore a crucial test of Soviet intentions. For in addition to the moral, geopolitical, and strategic issues involved, it would constitute a precedent: the first time the Soviets have been willing to give up on a conflict and voluntarily relinquish a conquered piece of land. (When they joined the war against Japan in the last days of World War II, hardly engaging in the fighting with the Japanese, the Soviets captured four tiny islands near the northern coast of Japan, the largest of which, Shikotan, is barely noticeable on the map. Strategically, politically, and economically, these occupied territories are meaningless. The Japanese, who would like to have them back for reasons of national pride, have made extravagant offers, including substantial assistance in developing projects in Siberia which the Soviets cannot accomplish by themselves. But the thought of relinquishing a possession is such an anathema to the Soviets that even though they need the help, and are eager to improve relations with Japan, they have not been able to bring themselves to give up the islands.)

ANOTHER regional conflict in which the Soviets have been involved, albeit not with the Red Army but through proxies and advisers, is the Middle East. Recent Soviet moves hinting at the resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel, and the resumption of such relations at a low level by Poland, have been perceived as a change of heart, as an inevitable and welcome part of the general superpower thaw. In fact they signify only a change of tactics. Soviet policy has been consistent. Even when its anti-Israel propaganda was at its most virulent, it did not want to destroy Israel. Unlike the Nazis, the Soviet rulers do not let their anti-Semitism determine foreign policy. What they want is an Israel weak enough to tantalize Arab radicals with hopes of destroying it, thus making Israel dependent on Soviet good will to squelch these hopes; and they want Arab regimes radical enough to nurse such hopes even at the price of total dependence on the Soviet Union. What they do *not* want is a strong, independent Israel capable of drawing Egypt away from the family of Soviet clients, able to frustrate Soviet-abetted terrorism by Libya, Syria, and the PLO, and ready to stabilize the region further by making its own peace with Jordan. When Gromyko says, "Zionist Israel is not what we voted for in the UN," he means an independent, Western-oriented, strong Israel.

To return to a position of arbiter after the defeat of its clients in the 1967 war, the Soviets floated the idea of an international peace confer-

ence on the Middle East whose participants would include the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the parties to the conflict. Except for a short-lived stab at it following the 1973 war, aborted after the opening sessions, Israel rejected the idea. But, under Gorbachev, the Soviets began to drop hints that, in return for Israeli participation in such a conference, they would resume diplomatic relations and allow free Jewish emigration.

Some Israeli leaders saw these hints as forerunners of a commitment, and agreed to an international conference, provided the PLO was excluded, and the role of the big powers was limited to the ceremonial. But for the Soviets to refrain from an active role at such a conference would contradict basic Soviet strategic and political dogma. The temptation to appear as the Arabs' active champion in forcing an Israeli withdrawal would be irresistible, as would the opportunity to pressure the U.S. to make concessions at Israel's expense.

If, say, the Soviets were to promise concessions, real or imagined, on the popular issue of arms control in return for American pressure on Israel, there is little doubt that not only the State Department but American public opinion would support the deal. And the Soviets would have a field day with Israel's eagerness to reach its two main goals—peace and the emigration of Soviet Jews. If Israel refused to yield, the Soviets might threaten that Soviet Jews would suffer from Israel's "intransigence." Activists for Soviet Jewry would then feel compelled to beg Israel to make sacrifices for the sake of Soviet Jews. Conversely, if international pressure to release Soviet Jews were to increase, the Soviets could get tougher at the conference, until the Israeli government was forced to ask for the easing of such pressure so that the Soviets would be more amenable on Middle East issues. Free of pressure from press and parliament clamoring for settlement, the Soviets enjoy an advantage at such "peace" conferences that is unbeatable.

To believe that the advent of *glasnost* justifies giving the Soviets a role in determining the fate of Israel or, for that matter, in anything at all, is to ignore the fact that neither domestic reforms nor diplomatic thaws have ever heralded a moderation of Soviet ambition. Khrushchev, the Soviet leader most committed to reform, conducted an exceptionally adventurous foreign policy. And during the *détente* of the 1970's, the Soviets exploited the improved international ambience, and the resultant public pressure for disarmament and disengagement in the West, to launch the biggest arms build-up in their history, foment wars in Ethiopia, Angola, the Middle East, and Nicaragua, and to invade Afghanistan.

MANY conclude from this recent history that the Western response to Soviet reforms and gestures of rapprochement should not be one of conciliation and assistance, but of rejec-

tion and boycott, and that the troubled Soviet economy should not be rescued again the way it was salvaged in the 20's, 40's, and 70's by Western assistance, but allowed to collapse. Only thus, the reasoning goes, can today's totalitarian threat to the democracies be removed.

But to expect the West to launch a successful boycott of the Soviet Union in today's world is not realistic. The Soviets have managed to circumvent even so watertight a constraint as the Stevenson amendment, which prohibits the U.S. Export-Import bank from granting Moscow taxpayer-subsidized trade credits. By going directly to major banks, they have received billions of dollars at ridiculously low interest rates in untied loans, not linked to any specific trade deal or project. The question is not whether or not there will be deals with the Soviets but under what conditions, and with what results.

Gorbachev is the most pragmatic and most real-

istic of all Soviet dictators. As his reversal of the Soviet attitude to arms negotiations following the positioning of American Pershing missiles in Europe showed, he has more respect for facts than for doctrine, and if an initial idea fails, he will cast about for others. Skillful in gauging and manipulating the public mood in the West, he can become more dangerous than his predecessors. But his realism also gives room for hope, for it should enable him correctly to assess his regime's weaknesses and the real power of his adversaries. That is why it is vitally important to expose his deceptions and demonstrate massive opposition to his policies. The march of 250,000 Jews in Washington before last December's summit, decrying Soviet violations of human-rights treaties and the ongoing refusal to allow Jewish emigration, aimed at doing just that. It also showed that the gut reaction of people is sometimes healthier than that of politicians.

Background: The World Bank is the preeminent source of long-term official finance and policy advice for developing countries. It consists of three institutions, with a fourth expected to begin operations in 1988:

- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Founded at the end of 1945, the IBRD lends at market-related rates of interest to countries at more advanced stages of development. In its 1987 fiscal year, the IBRD made loan commitments valued at \$14.2 billion to 39 countries. Since its founding, it has approved \$133 billion in loans.
- International Development Association (IDA). The IDA was established in 1960 to provide credits on concessional terms to the poorest countries--those that cannot afford alternative financing. It committed \$3.5 billion to 45 countries in fiscal year 1987. Cumulative total lending is \$43 billion.
- International Finance Corporation (IFC). Since 1956, the IFC has sought to mobilize resources for private sector development. In fiscal year 1987, the IFC channeled \$920 million in loans and equity capital directly to private businesses in 41 developing countries.
- Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). In June 1986 the US signed the convention forming the MIGA. The Administration received congressional authority and funding for the US contribution in its fiscal year 1988 budget request. The MIGA, which should begin operation in 1988, will insure private foreign investment in developing countries against political risk, mobilizing private capital for development.

World Bank's role: The World Bank promotes economic growth in developing countries. It works to raise living standards by investing in productive projects and by promoting the adoption of sustainable economic and financial policies. The Bank traditionally has financed infrastructure such as roads and power facilities. It also invests in people; by expanding opportunities for education, health care, and housing, it helps the poor to help themselves. Agriculture and rural development also receive emphasis, particularly by the IDA. More recently, the Bank has provided structural adjustment loans to help countries grow out of their financial problems through market-oriented policy and institutional reforms. The Bank's multilateral character and professional expertise put it in a strong position to advise countries undertaking these programs.

Funding: The IBRD obtains most of its resources from borrowing in private capital markets, backed by its member governments' guarantees. Despite the economic difficulties facing many IBRD borrowers, most maintain excellent repayment records. The IBRD's superior financial reputation keeps the cost of borrowing low. It

regularly earns a profit, which is used to improve its financial position and to finance new loans. The IDA finances most of its lending operations from direct contributions from developed country members. A new 3-year replenishment of \$12.5 billion was agreed to in December 1986. Funding for the IFC comes from member government subscriptions and from borrowings.

Burdensharing: The US is the largest contributor to the World Bank but shares the cost widely. For each dollar the US contributes to the IDA, other countries contribute more than three. The US share of total payments to the IFC is 24%. The IBRD has the added advantage of leveraging the funds actually paid in by borrowing in private capital markets. Only 3% of the current US capital subscription requires a direct budgetary outlay. For example, in fiscal year 1986 the IBRD lent more than \$100 for each dollar of capital paid in by the US Government.

US interest: The US position as a world leader depends on an open and growing world economy based on economic and political freedom. The World Bank has proved to be a cost-effective instrument for promoting US interest in integrating the developing countries into such a trade and financial system. Furthermore, the Bank bolsters our bilateral aid programs by providing substantial assistance in many countries where the US has important political and security interests. The Bank also meets our humanitarian concerns by assisting in alleviating poverty and rebuilding the economies of countries affected by natural disasters. In addition, the Bank serves our commercial interests by expanding markets for US exports and financing the purchase of US goods and services.

The future: While building on its traditional strengths in the design and financing of sound investment projects, the World Bank also must remain flexible to respond to the changing needs of borrowers. Measures to support economic growth will be at the center of its lending program. The Bank will be called upon to promote private sector development, to ensure that other capital flows are encouraged and that all resources are used effectively.

In 1985, the Bank launched a Special Facility for Africa to support policy changes and institutional reforms during 1985-87. Contributions to this facility reached \$1.9 billion, with the US contributing \$137 million. Up to 50% of the IDA replenishment funds are earmarked for Africa.

In the major debtor countries, the Bank is designing programs to help make their economies more efficient and productive. The US has asked the Bank and private lenders to support countries undertaking serious growth-oriented, self-help efforts.

For the private sectors of developing countries, the Bank is working to mobilize new investment funds. A doubling of the capital base of the International Finance Corporation is now underway, and funding is being sought for the MIGA.



Free Sons of Israel, Hashachar, American Zionist Federation, New York Board of Rabbis, United Synagogue of America,

COALITION TO FREE SOVIET JEWS

Representing concerned organizations in New York City, Long Island, Westchester, Rockland and Bergen Counties.

Rabbinical Council of America, American Jewish Committee, Center for Russian Jewry, Westchester Jewish Conference,

National Federation of Temple Sisterhoods, International Network of Children of Jewish Holocaust Survivors, New York Legislators Coalition for Soviet Jewry, B'nai B'rith Youth Organization, Women's League for Conservative Judaism, Queens Council for Soviet Jewry, Brooklyn Coalition for Soviet Jewry, Herut Zionists of America, Rabbinical Assembly, Betar, Council of Jewish Organizations in Civil Service, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, N.Y. Legal Coalition to Free Soviet Jews, Survivors of Nazi Camps and Resistance Fighters, International League for the Repatriation of Russian Jews, Association of Orthodox Jewish Teachers, Poale Agudath Israel, Zionists Organization of America, Jewish Community Council of Canarsie, B'nai B'rith Metropolitan Conference, Warsaw Ghetto Resistance Organization, Rockland County Committee for Soviet Jewry, Association of Reform Rabbis of New York, Labor Zionists Alliance, Women's League for Israel, Staten Island Committee for Soviet Jewry, Americans For Progressive Israel, Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, Jewish War Veterans, B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundation, United Jewish Community of Bergen County, Manhattan Coalition for Soviet Jewry, American Jewish Congress, Oceanfront Council for Soviet Jewry, Jewish Association of College Youth/Hillel, American ORT Federation, Queens Jewish Community Council, Emunah Women, Alumni Association Teachers Institute of Seminary College of Jewish Studies, Religious Zionists of America, B'nai Akiva, Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry, National Council of Young Israel, Economists for Ida Nudel, Jewish Community House of Bensonhurst, Women's American ORT, Board of Jewish Education, Jewish Teachers Association, AMIT Women, United Synagogue Youth, American Federation of Jewish Fighters, Camp Inmates and Nazi Victims, National Federation of Temple Youth, B'nai Zion, National Conference on Synagogue Youth, Association of Orthodox Jewish Scientists, Noar Mizrahi, Long Island Committee for Soviet Jewry, Jersey Action for Soviet Jewry, Washington Heights-Inwood Council for Soviet Jewry, Jewish Labor Committee, Young Israel Collegiates and Young Adults, New York Federation of Reform Synagogues, Workmen's Circle, Pioneer Women, Jewish American Political Affairs Committee, Hadassah, National Council of Jewish Women, B'nai B'rith Women, Masada/ZOA

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April 6, 1988

Max Green
Associate Director, Office of Public Liaison
Old Executive Office Building, Room 196
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Max:

On May 29th, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev will meet again.

And again, the Soviet Jewry movement must focus its resources and energy to make certain that our issue is prominently raised at the summit and that steps are taken toward normalizing the emigration process.

In the past three years, there has been a shift in Soviet policy and tactics. The USSR is waging a subtle yet unmistakable campaign designed to squelch the Soviet Jewry issue, and persuade the West that the issue no longer exists.

But thousands of Soviet Jews still eager to emigrate to Israel and the failure of the Soviets to grant Jews religious and cultural rights tell us otherwise.

December 6th was an historic day for the Soviet Jewry movement... as 200,000 people sent a resounding message to the leaders of our nation and the Kremlin.

Now, we must build on that momentum. We must reinforce and give new scope to the message that was so dramatically expressed on December 6th.

The Gorbachev campaign presents us with both an ominous challenge and a unique opportunity. After considerable discussions with our officers, board members and other leaders active in the Soviet Jewry movement, the decision has been made to launch a major new campaign -- one that will amplify our recent efforts, and culminate with a Solidarity Sunday at a time when its impact will be the greatest. As a result, the May 1st "Solidarity Sunday" march and rally has been put "on hold."

We believe we have adapted our strategy to the needs of the movement and changes in U.S.-Soviet relations. In order to advance our goals, we have outlined several key events. Among them:

April 6, 1988
page two

- * A "Community Action Day" in Washington in May that will feature meetings with key Congressional and Administration officials to gain their full support for the goals of freer emigration and human rights for Soviet Jews;
- * A public meeting will be sought with the Presidential candidates at which they would take a forthright stand on the issue of Soviet Jewry;
- * Just prior to the summit, President Reagan is scheduled to deliver a statement on human rights in Helsinki. A delegation of leadership will be in Helsinki to publicly convey a message that the Soviet Union must adhere to the Helsinki Accords and the International Declaration of Human Rights;
- * A special effort to reach into Moscow itself with a plea for freedom for Soviet Jews;
- * A series of ads in major publications, and other public pronouncements highlighting the nature of the Coalition's campaign;
- * A major event in New York that coincides with the start of the summit itself;
- * The distribution of buttons and other paraphernalia to organizations and to tens of thousands of concerned citizens for use prior to, during and after the summit meeting.


Of course, all our efforts will involve many of our organizations and community groups. We also are working closely with the National Conference on Soviet Jewry.

We do not intend to allow Gorbachev to shove the Soviet Jewry issue under the political rug. In both pre- and post-summit events -- in New York, in Washington, in Helsinki and in Moscow -- we will bring a new resolve and a renewed sense of purpose to the struggle on behalf of Soviet Jews.

As in the past, flexibility and action will be the watchwords of our campaign, and we know we can rely on your continued involvement and enthusiastic support.

We will contact you shortly so that we can work together on these programs. Be assured that we will keep you fully informed as our campaign unfolds.

Sincerely,



Alan D. Pesky
Chairman



Zeesy Schnur
Executive Director

FROM: THE COALITION TO FREE SOVIET JEWS
8 West 40th Street
New York, NY 10018

Howard J. Rubenstein Associates, Inc.
Public Relations - Tel: (212) 489-6900
Contact: Sy Schwartz

- - - - -

A "global campaign," keyed to the Reagan-Gorbachev summit and designed to heighten and sustain public awareness of the continuing plight of Soviet Jewry was announced today by the New York-based Coalition to Free Soviet Jews.

On May 29th, President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev will meet again. "And again," said Alan D. Pesky, Coalition chairman, "the Soviet Jewry movement must focus its resources and energies to make certain our issue is prominently raised at the summit, and that steps are taken toward normalizing the emigration process."

Mr. Pesky noted that each spring for the past 16 years the Coalition has sponsored a "Solidarity Sunday" march and rally -- a massive outpouring of support for emigration to Israel and human rights for Soviet Jews.

This year's event, however, originally scheduled for May 1st, has been put "on hold," Mr. Pesky said. "Instead, we are launching a major campaign, one of global proportions, that will amplify our recent efforts and culminate with a Solidarity Sunday at a time when its impact will be the greatest."

Mr. Pesky said the Coalition has mapped a series of pre- and post-summit events that "will bring a new resolve and a renewed sense of purpose to our struggle on behalf of Soviet Jews.

COALITION TO FREE SOVIET JEWS/2

The activities include:

- * A "Community Action Day" in Washington in May that will feature meetings with key Congressional and Administration officials to gain their full support for the goals of freer emigration and human rights for Soviet Jews.
- * A public meeting will be sought with the Presidential candidates at which they would be urged to take a forthright stand on the issue of Soviet Jewry.
- * Just prior to the summit, President Reagan may deliver a statement on human rights in Helsinki. A delegation of leadership will be in Helsinki to publicly convey a message that the Soviet Union must adhere to the Helsinki Accords and the International Declaration of Human Rights.
- * A special effort to reach into Moscow itself with a plea for freedom for Soviet Jews.
- * A series of ads in major publications, and other public pronouncements highlighting the nature of the Coalition's campaign.
- * A major event in New York that coincides with the start of the summit itself.
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COALITION TO FREE SOVIET JEWS/3

All of our efforts, Mr. Pesky said, "will involve many area organizations and community groups. We also will be working closely with the National conference on Soviet Jewry."

In the past three years, there has been a shift in Soviet policy and tactics. The USSR is waging a subtle yet unmistakable campaign designed to squelch the Soviet Jewry issue, and persuade the West that the issue no longer exists.

"But thousands of Soviet Jews still eager to emigrate to Israel and the failure of the Soviets to grant Jews religious and cultural rights tell us otherwise."

"December 6th was a historic day for the Soviet Jewry movement ... as 200,000 people rallied in Washington, D.C. to send a resounding message to the leaders of our nation and the Kremlin."

"We must build on that momentum. We must reinforce and give new scope to the message that was expressed so dramatically on December 6th," Mr. Pesky added.

#

PERSPECTIVE

New Challenge to Jackson-Vanik

Once again, prominent voices are calling for the rescinding of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which links trade benefits to the removal of emigration restrictions. A recent report by a high-level group from the business, government and academic communities proposes the repeal of Jackson-Vanik if the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev continues to make human rights progress.

Inspired by the late Sen. Henry M. Jackson 15 years ago, the amendment is a keystone of the strategy on behalf of Soviet Jews and all those in Communist countries who seek to emigrate. Its leverage has been of considerable importance in removing barriers to emigration in the Soviet Union, and in Romania as well.

Jackson-Vanik permits Communist countries which ease emigration procedures to receive most-favored-nation tariff treatment from the United States—tariff rates of only 3% instead of 39%—and cheaper government credits, along with investment and credit guarantees. A waiver provision in the legislation allows the President, if he is “assured” that a Communist regime is moving in a positive direction in its emigration policy, to grant the specified trade benefits.

The waiver requires annual renewal. And, significantly, it also requires Congressional acceptance of the President’s decision. Either house of Congress can veto the

waiver if it finds that the emigration pattern is not moving toward the Jackson-Vanik objectives. The annual review provision serves to keep the pressure on governments whose record on behalf of free emigration has been notoriously inadequate. To repeal the legislation, especially at the point when the U.S.S.R. finally accedes to international standards, is to jeopardize both the leverage and the hopes of future emigrants.

Holding firm to Jackson-Vanik must remain a central element in the struggle for Soviet Jewry. When it was introduced in the Senate in March 1973, Sen. Jackson emphasized that he was basing his amendment upon Article 13(b) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—“Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.”

Once introduced, Jackson-Vanik compelled Moscow in late March 1973 to halt an infamous “diploma” tax that had obliged Soviet Jewish emigrants to pay exorbitant sums. It was the first time in Soviet history that a Kremlin edict was declared null and void. How many were prevented from emigrating during the eight months the tax was in force will never be known. Nor can we know how many of the 200,000 Jews who emigrated after 1973 could do so only because they were no longer required to pay the equivalent of a huge ransom.

A decade later, President Nicolae

Ceausescu of Romania also tried to impose a large education tax upon Jews who sought to emigrate. As Romania was benefiting from most-favored-nation tariff treatment under Jackson-Vanik, Washington officials warned that the benefits would come to a quick end unless the tax was rescinded. Bucharest responded by dropping the levy. And if thousands of Romanian Jews have left for Israel since 1975, a key factor was the lever provided annually by Jackson-Vanik.

If Jackson-Vanik remains on the statute books, this does not mean that it cannot be applied flexibly—through the waiver clause—when the Soviet Union shows good faith by moving to the emigration levels of the 1970’s, especially the late seventies. The current level is still comparatively limited, less than one-half the average of the previous decade.

The departure of high profile refuseniks like Ida Nudel and Yosef Begun is no indication of a willingness to comply with the Helsinki accords and international standards. Recently enacted Soviet regulations limiting exit visas to those with close relatives abroad severely restrict the number who can apply to leave.

Retention of Jackson-Vanik, therefore, is vital.

William Korey

Korey is director of International Policy Research for B'nai B'rith. □

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1987

Gorbachev Can't Defy Human-Rights Tide

By MORRIS B. ABRAM

Now that the much celebrated summit between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev has ended, it is appropriate to evaluate the meeting in light of its own agenda. On Oct. 30, in a joint statement convening the summit, Mr. Gorbachev promised to make substantial headway on human rights. The cryptic statements made at the conclusion of the summit may not tell the full story of the achievements in that area; President Reagan's assurance of "future, more substantial movement" on the issue of human rights is certainly encouraging. However, some of Mr. Gorbachev's statements on the subject are deeply troubling.

In a discussion of the right of emigration, Mr. Gorbachev said of the U.S.: "What right does it have to be the teacher—who gave it the moral right?" This challenge invites the simple answer that the right comes from pledges made by the Soviet Union. In three separate international documents—the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 1975 Helsinki accords the Soviet Union guaranteed that "Everyone shall have the right to leave any country, including his own."

When Mr. Gorbachev went on to say to the president, "You are not the prosecutor and I am not the accused," he was mistaken. The Soviet Union, having given the international community its pledge, also gave the community the right and duty to judge its compliance with the international human-rights agreements. It bestowed

upon mankind the right to judge the Soviet Union's performance. When President Reagan advocated the cause of human rights, he spoke for all mankind.

Mr. Gorbachev compared the human-rights situation in his country with unemployment in the West. Although the poverty we see in our country merits serious concern, only a cynic would equate such problems with the denial of basic human rights: freedom of speech, freedom to assemble and petition one's government, and the right to leave one's country.

Mr. Gorbachev excused and explained Soviet refusal to grant emigration visas by referring to "state secrecy concerns." This is an absurd position that contradicts the statement he made in Paris in 1975 that even if a person possessed secrets, the secrets' usefulness would expire in five (and at most 10) years. Some refuseniks who have never held any significant posts or any positions sensitive to national security have been held in the Soviet Union for more than 17 years on the grounds of "state secrecy concerns."

Furthermore, two new Soviet laws are designed to further constrict Jewish emigration. The first requires any Soviet Jew who applies for a visa to produce an invitation from an immediate family member in Israel. Thousands do not qualify. The second, the so-called "family law," requires that every applicant have permission to emigrate from family members in the Soviet Union. This device permits the Soviet Union to manipulate reasons for refusal while disguising its role.

There never can be a normal relation-

ship between the Soviet Union and the West until the Soviets normalize their conduct of human rights. Similarly, trade relations never will be normal until the conditions that gave rise to the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments are redressed. The next move is up to Mr. Gorbachev.

Based on the actions taken by his government while Mr. Gorbachev was in Washington, there is every reason to be skeptical of his intentions. When Americans were marching in Washington last week in support of basic human rights in the Soviet Union, a similar demonstration in Moscow by Soviet Jews and others who have been denied visas was roughly broken up by police. That action speaks much louder and clearer than any of Mr. Gorbachev's rhetoric about glasnost.

It is to be hoped that the treaty on intermediate-range nuclear missiles will be a major step toward peace. But as John F. Kennedy said a few weeks before he was slain: "Is not peace, in the final analysis, a matter of human rights?" Last week more than 200,000 Americans joined in a freedom rally in Washington to insist that the Soviet Union comply with the human-rights standards that it has pledged to mankind. They represented the entire spectrum of American political, religious, ethnic, labor and cultural life. Mr. Gorbachev cannot defy the tides of history no more than legend says King Canute attempted to defy the ocean's tides.

Mr. Abram is chairman of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry.



National Conference on Soviet Jewry

December 18, 1987

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In the best of all worlds, we would send an individual expression of appreciation to you for a very special day, Freedom Sunday for Soviet Jews, when nearly a quarter million people from the United States and Canada, Jews and non-Jews, gathered in Washington, D.C. on the eve of the summit. Whether in person, or through the media, we witnessed the most impressive outpouring this country has ever seen on behalf of a Jewish issue. And, remarkably, the people came to proclaim their support for the rights of a minority, in a distant land, struggling for freedom and their basic rights.

Newspaper headlines the next day said it all, and the images on television left an indelible mark and an impressive visual record of this exciting day. Within hours, of course, we were swept up in the events which marked the third Summit meeting between President Ronald Reagan and Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.

Did the march and the rally on the mall, in Washington, have any impact on the Summit? For one thing, the official Soviet news agency, Tass, mounted a virulent attack, the next day, on the human rights record of the United States and Israel. One person in Moscow was quoted as saying that the Soviet authorities were "very upset about these Jews demonstrating in Moscow and Washington, D.C., on the eve of the summit. This is their way of putting things right or getting even."

The rally also had a tremendous impact on several groups. These included: a) refuseniks in the USSR who were able to hear the demonstration broadcast live on VOA; b) people who attended the rally and have not previously been involved in Jewish concerns; c) U.S. officials whose commitment to the issue was reinforced by the showing of popular support; d) Soviet officials who both privately and publicly noted that the American people have "made their views known."

Gennadi Gerasimov, the chief Soviet press spokesman, conceded that the massive rally in Washington had made its point. It was our expectation that Freedom Sunday would be seen as a positive force and Gerasimov, in response to a question, answered that "I don't think it was an anti-Soviet demonstration . . . it was a demonstration on an issue, the issue of Jewish migration. And as I understood, those who took part in the demonstration wanted to make a point, and I think they did"

The rally, from all accounts, was a spectacular display of communal solidarity with and commitment to Soviet Jews, a message not lost on the discussants. According to reports, the President began his opening session with Gorbachev by discussing human rights, especially the cases of Jews not permitted to leave. He also cited the rally and the very impressive figure of 200,000 people. Gorbachev later told the President that "I am not on trial and you are not a judge to judge me," and compared his country's emigration restrictions to this nation's limitations on immigration. Apparently the General Secretary drew no distinction between restrictions on letting people in, a matter of law in nearly every country, and people who wish to leave. This is an issue enshrined in various international documents

A coalition of forty-five national organizations and over three hundred local community councils and federations

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which the Soviet Union has signed, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act.

More importantly, given that the Jewish community is perceived as having spoken in a loud and unified voice, we are in a very strong position to move forward with our message. Indeed a debriefing with Secretary of State Shultz will take place in early January, and there will be meetings with top U.S. trade officials.

It is vital to recall that the President and Secretary of State were both briefed extensively, prior to Gorbachev's visit, and that the theme of the discussion was the same as in 1985 -- that the test of the Soviets' credibility would be judged by their performance on human rights; that theme must continue to be pressed, publicly and privately.

Summit Outcome

It is still too early to judge the final outcome of the Summit. While Mikhail Gorbachev was obdurate on the possibility of any major changes in the overall human rights issue, some modest, but positive shifts affecting emigration can be discerned as a result of the Summit. There is some easing of the first-degree family restriction as a requirement for invitations to leave. Indeed, in some cities, from 25% to 30% of new applicants receiving permission did not have such invitations. There is also a possibility of flexibility in the application of regime considerations or "state secrets" for many applicants, even though hundreds of long-term refusenik families are still in that category. One U.S. official expressed his expectation that the Russians will continue to cut back on the use of "state secrets" as a barrier to emigration in the future. Finally, there is speculation that the barrier of so-called "family obligations" might be subject to review. One thought is that persons could sue their own family if permission has not been granted to an applicant because of so-called family obligations. While we are aware that lawyers might not be willing to engage in such a lawsuit, and the burden would fall on the shoulders of the applicant, such a shift should encourage us to press demands for more substantive changes.

Any modifications in Soviet practice, as a result of the Summit, are important. They also show why we must continue an accelerated campaign and use the glow of the Freedom Sunday rally to encourage us.

Jackson-Vanik

During the discussions, the matter of trade and the Jackson-Vanik Amendment did surface. We have been asked whether the U.S. Congress understands our views. In case you missed it on the December 13, 1987, THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY show, the following exchange occurred between Mr. George Will and Senator Sam Nunn:

MR. WILL (to Senator Nunn): The Jackson-Vanik legislation denies the Soviet Union certain significant trade advantages with the United States, contingent upon a substantial liberalization of the right to leave the Soviet Union.

Do you think there will be such a liberalization? And can you give some quantity? What would it -- we're going to get into a bidding war pretty clearly. What would it require on the part of the Soviet Union to build support in Congress to repeal Jackson-Vanik?

SENATOR NUNN: Well, I think we'd listen to people like Morris Abram, who is very much involved in the heart of that negotiation with the Soviets. And when Morris says that the Soviets have eased up quite a bit, and that we need to consider, for instance, some restructuring, perhaps we will. But I do not think we have arrived at that point yet. I do not think we are close to it.

How about that!

Program For Action

At a special post-Summit assessment meeting, held on December 17, the following proposals for future action were developed. Where these represent new policy, they will be submitted to our Board of Governors.

- A high quality video tape and audio cassette of the event will be produced, as well as a permanent written record which would include articles, photographs, and other memorabilia from "Freedom Sunday." Funding for these projects will be sought.
- A strategy planning meeting will be held on January 10, prior to NCSJ's Board of Governors meeting.
- Meetings will be arranged with corporate leaders who are planning to undertake business with the Soviets, and an ad campaign directed to such corporations will be considered.
- Communities should make use of political campaigns by communicating with candidates on the issue of Soviet Jews.
- Communities should also utilize the media to make use of and/or call attention to those who traveled to Washington for the rally.
- An international conference will be considered, perhaps in Brussels or Helsinki, in May or June 1988, to bring together world Jewry and its supporters on new strategies and programs.

Thanks To All

We would like to take this opportunity, on behalf of the Summit III Task Force, to commend the tremendous efforts made by local CRCs, Federations, and synagogues, as well as national agencies. A superb job was done in bringing people to Washington and providing the financial resources for the rally. The enormous amount of team work, and the dedication of thousands of volunteers and professionals from across the country, ensured that "Freedom Sunday" became a moment when the Jewish people came forward to tell Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that neither age, nor distance, nor physical condition would deter us from the struggle which we know all too well -- the struggle for freedom.

We especially recognize the impressive response by the Washington Jewish community in producing an estimated 50,000 people, as well as the many thousands of people and the professional support from New York, through the Coalition to Free Soviet Jews,

and the large attendance from Baltimore and Philadelphia. The National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, of course, was the vital instrument in mobilizing and coordinating local communities, from Los Angeles to Birmingham to Boston, while the Council of Jewish Federations ensured that funds would be available to the Summit Task Force to do its work, in addition to the help from Federations for their own local efforts.

As we celebrate Hanukkah, the Festival of Freedom, we wish you a good holiday, filled with peace and happiness. With our combined and continued efforts, perhaps Hanukkah 5748 will herald a year of redemption for those Jews still in the Soviet Union.

Sincerely,



Morris B. Abram
Chairman

MBA/JG:ag



Jerry Goodman
Executive Director

STATEMENT APPROVED DECEMBER 17, 1987

A quarter of a million Americans, representative of all classes, creeds and parties, have said they are determined that US/Soviet relations depend on a satisfactory outcome of all four agreed upon agenda items. These include arms reduction, regional conflicts, bilateral issues, and human rights.

We know the results of the arms reduction negotiations. The results of the discussions on human rights and Jewish emigration will be demonstrated by Soviet progress in these areas in the next few weeks and months.

We will judge the results of the Summit on the basis of actual movements on all of the agenda items on which the Soviet Union gave its word. If, as was promised, there is not significant headway on human rights, we shall consider this another Soviet breach of promise.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 4, 1987

I am pleased to acknowledge and applaud the efforts of the "Campaign to the Summit" on behalf of Soviet Jewry.

Peacefully yet forcefully, in true democratic spirit, you are making your cause known not only to the Soviet leadership but to the world at large. Your cause has always had our undivided support -- the struggle of Soviet Jews for freedom of emigration and the right to practice their religion without fear of persecution. Their valiant quest for freedom exemplifies the cause of liberty for all mankind.

The Soviet leadership has taken some limited, but positive, steps on the issue of human rights. We welcome these actions, but they are far from enough. There are more recent signs of stagnation, but I have high hopes for new, forward steps by the Soviets. I shall press for them in my talks with General Secretary Gorbachev in the coming days -- for the release of all refuseniks, for full freedom of emigration, and for complete freedom of religion and cultural expression. We shall not be satisfied with less.

We -- you and I -- cannot relax our vigil. Let me say to all of you and to those who wait in the Soviet Union -- if freedom is won through faith, dedication, and perseverance, I have no doubt that your efforts will ultimately prevail. God bless you all.

Ronald Reagan

Allan Wendt

Current
Policy
No. 1031

Export Control Policy and COCOM



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following are a statement by Allan Wendt, Senior Representative for Strategic Technology Policy, before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C., on November 3, 1987, and an address by Mr. Wendt before the Conference on Strategic Export Controls sponsored by the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House, London, England, November 19, 1987.

NOVEMBER 3, 1987

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee to discuss the status of the multilateral effort to control exports of strategically significant commodities and technologies in international trade.

Strengthening Multilateral Export Controls

For several years, the United States has sought to strengthen COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Security Export Controls]—the multilateral system that safeguards the transfer of strategic technology. We have been working to clarify and prune the embargo lists, particularly the one that controls items with both civil and military applications. At the same time, we have worked to strengthen the procedures by which these items are controlled. We have pursued both activities on a multilateral basis, and progress has been made.

A process is now underway both to review the entire control list for those items that no longer need to be controlled and to ensure that the control list, once purged of such items, continues to focus only on those items that are most critical militarily. This is not an "instant" decontrol activity, but rather, an accelerated review of all items on the control list in cooperation with our partners in COCOM, whereby the strategic concerns that warranted the inclusion of an item on the list are carefully reviewed and evaluated.

We have also been engaged in a parallel effort to improve the administration and enforcement of the controls. The United States and many of its allies have made significant progress in improving our national control systems and multilateral coordination of export controls. But, clearly, more needs to be done.

The illegal sale of multi-axis milling machines by Toshiba Machine Company and Kongsberg Trading Company clearly demonstrates that there are gaps. The United States and its COCOM partners face a determined Soviet effort to acquire militarily significant technologies and goods. This effort has sought to exploit the various differences in national export control systems, many of which were, unfortunately, based on outdated legislation or informal administrative arrangements. Resources needed to administer the export licensing system and enforce

laws and regulations were also lacking in many places. Acknowledging the gaps, the Governments of Japan and Norway have taken major steps to strengthen their national export control and enforcement systems, including increases in penalties for violations and in the statutes of limitations governing prosecution. We welcome these measures.

Just as the Governments of Japan and Norway have moved quickly to remedy shortcomings in their control systems, we believe that all members of COCOM, including the United States, need to review their systems and meet certain minimum control standards. Building on the July special COCOM meeting, we have consulted with our allies in recent weeks on how COCOM can be strengthened further. These consultations are continuing this week and beyond.

New U.S. Initiative

Last month, the United States outlined a new initiative in export control policies and practices to a number of our COCOM partners. The initiative calls for a major revitalization of COCOM, based on improved public understanding of its objectives and on a common, standard level of effective protection for all exports of controlled strategic commodities, with a view to eventual elimination of licensing of dual-use commodities among COCOM countries once all have reached an adequate level of export control outside the COCOM community.

through improved public understanding of its mission and a common, effective level of export licensing and enforcement throughout COCOM. Achievement of this objective would permit phased elimination of export licensing of dual-use commodities among COCOM countries. In pursuit of this initiative, we are proposing a Senior Political Meeting of the COCOM partners that we hope will agree on concrete commitments to turn this initiative into a reality.

Admittedly, this will be a difficult task. Laws will need changing, resource allocations may need adjusting, and greater trust may be required among the various partners. But the payoff is potentially enormous, both in commercial and security terms. Commercial firms need relief from over-regulation, and our military and budget planners need relief from the current laxity in export control enforcement.

If we move vigorously now, we can go a long way toward accomplishing both goals. ■

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MISSIONS...CONTINUED

Committee to Bridge the Gap (CBG), a public-interest group in Los Angeles that is studying the space-reactor projects. The Soviet reactors churn out just a fraction of that amount over their three-month life-spans. However, if the SP-100 reactor crashes before its dangerous fuel becomes harmless (which will take at least 300 years), and if radioactive materials are released, the accident could cause thousands of cancers; if it landed in a highly populated area, it could cause numerous deaths.

The record of past nuclear space missions is not encouraging to those worried about the safety of space-based reactors. Of the fifty, nine, or nearly a fifth, have ended in failure and some have skirted catastrophe. In 1964 a U.S. navigational satellite failed to reach its designated orbit and plummeted back to earth. Its power source contained about 17,000 curies of plutonium-238, one of the most toxic substances in existence. The plutonium dispersed into the atmosphere, tripling the amount of Pu-238 already present in the environment owing to atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. In 1978 and 1983 two Soviet nuclear-powered satellites re-entered the atmosphere. Their reactors are believed to have burned up, releasing thousands of curies of radioactivity. "So far, the debate over SDI has been over the strategic issues," says Steve Aftergood, an engineer and the executive director of CBG. "But the dramatic failures in both the U.S. and Soviet programs make the current efforts an issue of safety and public acceptance of SDI technology."

One estimate of the dangers inherent in launching nuclear materials lies in an unreleased 1979 DOE study. According to the study, if a reactor approximately the size of the SP-100 re-entered the earth's atmosphere after operating for a year, and disintegrated, the fallout could cause as many as 50,000 fatal cancers. The hypothetical re-entry scenario mirrors what happened in January of 1978, when the Soviet *Cosmos 954* fell prematurely back to earth, scattering radioactive debris over a broad area in north-west Canada.

While DOE isn't ignoring the risks, it is doing its best to minimize the dangers publicly and pre-empt critics before Congress starts asking sticky questions. Earl Wahlquist, DOE's program director for the SP-100's ground engineering system, concedes that the SP-100 program faces "many technical problems" but says that his department has concluded

that all the technologies are feasible and that "it's just a question of engineering." Because the reactor will not be activated until it reaches orbit, an accident during a launch would release very little radioactivity. Once in space, the reactor will follow an orbit said to be high enough to ensure that by the time the reactor re-enters the atmosphere, its level of radioactivity will be very low. Any reactors in lower orbits will be boosted higher by rockets once their missions are completed, in order to ensure safe decay.

Regardless of Wahlquist's assurances, a launch accident could cause the reactor to reach "uncontrolled supercriticality," in which an almost instantaneous surge in power would destroy the reactor. Aftergood wrote in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, "Preliminary studies determined that flooding the SP-100 reactor core with water and increasing the space between fuel rods (which might occur upon crash landing in a body of water) would make the reactor supercritical even with the internal control rods in place." An Air Force researcher concluded that "avoidance of launch pad accidents that will produce a supercritical reactor is a very near impossible task. . . . In fact, it may not be possible to preclude a supercritical excursion on the launch pad." As the *Challenger* explosion demonstrated, launch-pad accidents happen. It is true that such an accident would release relatively small amounts of radioactivity into the biosphere. The greatest threat might be from the dispersal of the beryllium.

Not so if the reactor returned to earth prematurely after, say, ten years in orbit. Objects orbiting in space can't just drop from the sky; their orbits decay slowly as gravity draws them closer to the earth. Upon this fact of physics rests Wahlquist's and others' firm belief that putting the reactor into an orbit high enough will ensure that it will be harmless when it returns to earth. Unfortunately, satellites can be struck by space debris and dislodged from their orbits. Indeed, when a booster failed to lift *Cosmos 954* into a higher orbit, some Soviet scientists suggested that the failure, which led to the satellite's re-entry and break-up, might have been caused by just such a collision.

SOME EXPERTS SAY that SDI could do without the SP-100. According to John Pike, of the Federation of American Scientists, DOD is already reducing its power requirements for reactors. At

first, Pike says, SP-100-size reactors were envisioned as energy sources for systems such as space-based radars, and multi-megawatt reactors were expected to furnish the tremendous pulse power needed to generate laser beams. Now, however, the chief military use for the SP-100 appears to be in the space surveillance and tracking system, intended to track warheads. And the space-based lasers for which the multi-megawatt reactors were intended—excimer lasers, rail-guns, and particle-beam generators—are currently out of favor, because they seem more vulnerable than ground-based free-electron lasers would be. Pike says that the surveillance and tracking system will run on far less power than a large radar needs, and could draw enough energy from a system under development called the dynamic-isotope power system. Pike wonders whether "the SP-100 is being developed for the military or is a jobs program for the same people who like to fool around with high-temperature reactors."

Though the inherently tougher ("harder") design of any nuclear reactor is one reason the military favors nuclear over solar power, the design of the SP-100 does not meet all military survivability criteria. Because meeting those criteria would make the reactor heavier, harder to launch, and more expensive, they are currently only "enhancement options," which the military might add later. The history of projects changed in mid-course does not bode well for the U.S. Treasury.

Whether the program exists just to satisfy a few nuclear engineers is debatable. What does seem clear, however, is that it is moving forward with relatively little outside scrutiny, particularly from Congress—as has happened with many military programs that have turned into boondoggles. This lack of interest in an orbiting reactor could be dangerous. In 1986 there were 3,000 mishaps at the more than 100 U.S. commercial nuclear reactors; of these nearly 700 were emergency shut-downs, or scrams. These reactors pose such dangers to the public because for twenty years the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Congress were lax with the nuclear-power industry. Critics of the SP-100 program worry that the military will hurl reactors into space before the public and Congress can judge whether it is prudent to have radioactive cores circling the globe.

—Jonathan Tasini

INTERVIEWS

**MULTINATIONAL
MONITOR**

NOVEMBER -DECEMBER 1987

Pg. 36

Interview

PAUL FREEDENBERG

Paul Freedenberg is Acting Undersecretary of Commerce for Export Administration. In this position he oversees the administration and enforcement of U.S. national security and foreign policy export controls. Prior to his 1985 appointment to the Commerce Department, Freedenberg worked for 10 years on the staff of the Senate Banking Committee and the Subcommittee on International Finance, where he was Staff Director from 1980 to 1985.

Multinational Monitor: What do you think of our export control policy?

Paul Freedenberg: I think our export control policy for East-West trade is highly successful. The Soviet Union has been deprived of a substantial part of technology that it needs to run its military machine, in terms of acquiring that technology from the West. There is obviously a lot of room for improvement. Over the last year, the U.S. has been spearheading an effort to increase COCOM cooperation so that it would have a more effective net of export controls around the Soviet Union. We have also had success in getting the neutral countries of Europe and the Pacific Rim to cooperate with the United States in that effort. So overall, during the two years that I have been involved there has been a substantial increase in overall national security from the point of view of technology transfer. Obviously, we could improve. The Toshiba transfer affair showed that Japan's system is not effective. The Japanese have taken a number of measures to improve it. There is still more to do but I think their response is very encouraging. It shows there is a genuine belief that



Paul Freedenberg

the U.S. effort is a legitimate one, because otherwise they would tell us that it is none of our business to ask them for these changes. Instead of doing that, they've moved with almost lightning speed, enacting national legislation to satisfy a number of our requests.

Monitor: Does the administration oppose sanctions on Toshiba?

Freedenberg: Yes, we still do, very firmly.

Monitor: Is that because of the great reliance of some large U.S. corporations on Toshiba parts and products?

Freedenberg: No, absolutely not. It's a very bad way to do foreign policy. You

don't punish a company in a foreign country for violating that country's laws. You let that country enact and prosecute under its own laws. We have never had a policy from the beginning of our nation of enforcing other country's laws on their citizens or on their corporations. It is not a good time to start now. That would be the height of extra-territoriality.

Monitor: Isn't Congress intent on implementing some kind of sanction?

Freedenberg: That is exactly why we have been lobbying so hard with them not to do it, because it is a bad precedent. In fact, what happens is that you have the opposite effect. If you are going to enforce their laws for them they might, in fact, either pull back from cooperation with COCOM or pull back on the penalties they have in their own legal system. In fact they are pursuing the wrong-doers and those wrong-doers are on trial right now, and the investigation is ongoing.

Monitor: Do you support reducing controls to fewer items and increasing the penalty for individual abuses?

Freedenberg: What you want to have is the most extensive net, meaning if you have 16 countries within COCOM and you add another 20 countries outside of COCOM, then the net is more extensive. So, a more effective net means that much less technology transfer. The simple point is there has been no effort either in Congress or in the administration to loosen controls on East-West trade in general. There has been an effort within the administration and COCOM to get items off the list that no longer belong there. We are about to take personal computers off the list because they're so widely available in the free market. There is also other lower level technology that will go off the list. It would be chasing things that are widely available and generally made not only in the West, but also in the East.

Monitor: Officials at the Defense Department have called foreign availability an excuse to decontrol technology. How do you respond to this statement?

Freedenberg: The Department of Defense can say what it likes, but it is the law, like it or not. This is a government of laws, not some cabal of industry executives. The foreign availability clause is being used, and should be more widely used. Only a few important items have been decontrolled, but there is a list of thousands of items that need to be reviewed on the grounds of foreign availability. I believe the Office of Foreign Availability (OFA) does work effectively. We've been trying to have a shorter list because technology just marches on, and some of the things that are on have been on for a decade and are being made all over the world, and there is simply no point in controlling them.

Monitor: What sectors of the U.S. economy are hit hardest by export controls?

Freedenberg: Obviously, the high technology sectors.

Monitor: Has there been a strengthening of the lobby on the part of those sectors to loosen controls?

Freedenberg: Except for one amendment that would cut the list by 40 percent, there has been no great effort to cut the export control list itself. They've been trying more to cut the constraints on West-West trade. That's been the big emphasis. One amendment supported by Mr. Bonker deals with the whole list with the belief that the list is really too long. We think that it ought to be done in detail, go item by item and decide whether it is relevant or not relevant, rather than doing it in a meat-axe fashion.

Monitor: Won't loosening controls on West-West trade allow for greater flow of U.S.-origin products to the East as well?

Freedenberg: That's if you don't get trade partners to

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

INTERVIEW...CONTINUED

increase their own enforcement and licensing. However, we have been doing that. We've just gotten agreements in a number of areas. The Japanese and the Norwegians, who did have weak systems, are strengthening them. The other thing to point out is that if you cut off U.S. products to Western Europe because they don't have a strong enough system, almost all of the things that you cut off are made by the Japanese, Germans, or French. So you don't cut off the flow of that product to the East. What you do is cut off that flow of the product to the West. The better way to do it is by getting them to increase their own national security [export control] systems. Whether or not you sell it to them, it's still going to go to the East, because they are making the thing themselves or they are able to buy it freely from Japan. The whole idea is to make it multilateral not unilateral.

Monitor: The laws governing export control policy specify that Commerce should have primary authority, but the department often seems to relinquish authority to the Defense Department. Which agency should have primary authority over export control policy?

Freedenberg: We don't abdicate authority. There are laws that specify the Defense Department has a veto in areas of East-West trade. Where they have a veto we recognize that reality, but out of 110,000 cases last year, there were about 3,000 East-West COCOM type cases. That's where Defense really has an impact, or on China. That's an area where the law specifies they have to give approval or have to be overridden by the President. We think that the NAS report was a good report. It emphasized West-West trade, which is what we are doing. That's why we have put out all the regulations that deemphasize extra-territoriality and make it easier to trade within the West by cutting out some of the licensing at the low end of the list, and we are going to continue that policy. The interagency battle is unfortunate, but in terms of where the authority lies, you put it very clearly. We're a government of laws, not of men. The law says explicitly that Commerce has the lead and will continue to be the lead. Again, when you are talking about the universe of cases, it is a very small universe that DoD reviews. Congress wanted it that way. The House, if they have it their way, will make it an even smaller universe that they will be reviewing. We just think that with whatever law is passed, we will execute it. There are some spectacular cases where DoD gets involved, and in those cases it gets a lot of press, but it is really just a small part of the overall processing.

Monitor: Have we reached a point where controls are limiting R&D, international competitiveness and exports without adding significantly to national security?

Freedenberg: We have made that argument with regard to revising our regulations. For example, it's absurd to have extra regulations on U.S. micro-processors if the exact same ones are available from Japan with no controls. What we have tried to do is both get them to agree to the same rules of the game and also drop the extraterritorial concerns in our regulations. I think it has balanced it a little better than in the past. Unilateral controls are ineffective. We have been going down the list of our controls and trying to get rid of those that are unilateral. We agree with the premise of your statement, that the strength of America is in its industrial base. If you lose export sales, then

you lose the industrial base and therefore lose the game. So, in the process of denying the Soviets in 1987, you might not have the capacity to stay ahead of them in 1995, if you are not doing the R&D.

Monitor: Are non-COCOM members capable of providing items restricted by our export controls?

Freedenberg: That's right, but we have had success with Switzerland, Sweden, Austria, Finland, Singapore and around the world in cutting off that source. We have a memorandum of understanding with a number of countries both in Europe and the Pacific Rim.

Monitor: How recent are these developments?

Freedenberg: Over the last two years, but we don't give it a lot of publicity because most of these countries don't like to give publicity to cooperation in that area, since they have a neutral status. They have done it in their own sovereign interests. They believe that it is best to have good trade relations with us, and we say that to have good trade relations with us, you have to agree not to ship certain items to the Soviet Union or the Eastern bloc. They agree to that condition as a way of trading with the United States and the rest of the West. So it has been very successful.

Monitor: What potential is there for expansion of high-tech trade with the East?

Freedenberg: Well, I said it from the beginning that there is a very high potential if you want to reduce COCOM controls. There is no great desire either in the United States or the rest of Western Europe to do so, so I don't know that there is a likelihood that it is going to occur. There is obviously a potential. The Soviets desperately need computers and all the rest of the things that would make a centralized economy work better. They don't have a good telecommunications system. They don't have a good computer system. They don't produce all the sorts of things that would make up a modern industrial state, so there is obviously a market. On the other hand, all these things have dual use, or most of these things do, so it is difficult to remove them from the list of proscribed items. We depend on technological superiority for our security, and we are likely to continue to depend on this for our security. That's not something we are about to give away, so whatever anybody says, that's not the policy of this administration, and it's not likely to be the policy of the next administration, whoever is in charge. We can argue about the length of the list with the Japanese and the Germans, because they want a shorter list, but we are not arguing about the core. Nobody wants to sell the core technology to the Soviets, nor are they likely to in the foreseeable future.

Monitor: Looking at the long run, if the next administra-

There has been an effort within the administration and COCOM to get items off the list that no longer belong there. We are about to take personal computers off the list because they're so widely available in the free market.

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INTERVIEW...CONTINUED



Retail sales of Pepsi-Cola in the Soviet Union, boosted by the ongoing anti-alcohol campaign, have reached 35 million cases annually.

tion is a Dole administration or a Democratic administration, do you think it would be more likely in the long run for East-West trade, particularly U.S.-Soviet, trade to expand?

Freedenberg: I don't know that Mr. Dole, except for selling more wheat which is understandable given his constituency, is pushing for any strategic trade. The Democratic administration is anybody's guess. They may see it as a part of detente. That's a difficult question to answer. Obviously, policy could change and obviously the Soviets have it as a high priority. They want more trade, particularly in the strategic areas, because they're doing so miserably in high technology. They make the world's largest semi-conductor, which is nothing to brag about. They

aren't selling their VCRs at Radio Shack. They are not very competitive in almost anything. Obviously, if I were in Mr. Corbachev's shoes I would be nervous about it. It is a

"We depend on technological superiority for our security, and we are likely to continue to depend on this for our security. That's not something we are about to give away."

very frightening thought to be so miserably behind, but I don't think it is in the U.S. strategic interest to help them get out of this problem. As I understand it, it is not our policy to do that. In fact, we emphasize not selling them any production equipment. That is what they really want, the capacity to produce semiconductors, the capacity to produce computers, not just buy them.

Monitor: How do you think the U.S. should respond to the Soviet request for participation in GATT, the World Bank, and the IMF, and should we support their current efforts to integrate into the world economy?

Freedenberg: Yes, we should support it, but no I don't give them much hope because they would have to be more capitalist. It is a good effort to become more market oriented, but basically it is almost impossible. They are not likely to open themselves up, particularly on the IMF side of things. They may open up on GATT because they want to get better trade conditions. But the IMF side of it, they just aren't going to open their economy to that kind of scrutiny or that kind of control.

Monitor: Don't you think DoD might consider it is dangerous to call for greater efficiency in the Soviet economy?

Freedenberg: I guess you found the core of our differences. We are not against efficiency. □