


# Daily Report 190/2020

11 August 2020<sup>1</sup>

## Summary

- The SMM recorded one ceasefire violation in Donetsk region and none in Luhansk region. (In the previous reporting period the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations in both regions).
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. Inside the latter two areas, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle observed people during evening and night hours.
- The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in a training area in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable the maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 outbreak, including at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted.\*

## Ceasefire violations<sup>2</sup>



<sup>1</sup> Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 10 August 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

<sup>2</sup> For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and near Shyrokyne were not operational.

<sup>3</sup> Including explosions.

<sup>4</sup> Including from unidentified weapons.

### Map of recorded ceasefire violations

**OSCE** Organization for Security and  
Co-operation in Europe  
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

## Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 10 August 2020



#### Ceasefire violation concentration

- High
- 
- Low

- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 11/08/2020

## Ceasefire violations

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded one ceasefire violation – an explosion in an area east-south-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 90km south of Donetsk) (see table below). In the [previous reporting period](#), it recorded no ceasefire violations.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations for six consecutive days.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 257 ceasefire violations, both in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 46 explosions, two projectiles in flight, three illumination flares and 206 bursts and shots of small-arms fire).

## Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske<sup>5</sup>

Inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) on the southern edge of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On the evening and night of 8-9 August, inside the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted five people inside former positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces – two people about 650m south of the area’s northern edge and about 1km east of its western edge (at the same location, an SMM UAV spotted three people also on the night between 9 and 10 August); one person about 1.2km south of the area’s northern edge and about 1.1km east of its western edge; as well as one person about 180m and one person about 500m west-south-west of its north-eastern corner (an SMM long-range UAV also spotted a person at the latter location on the night between 9 and 10 August).

On the nights between 8 and 9 August and 9 and 10 August, also inside the area, SMM long-range UAV spotted in total two people within a former position of the armed formations near the area’s eastern edge and about 1.5km north of the area’s south-eastern corner.

On the night between 9 and 10 August, outside the area, about 200m north of its northern edge, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a probable armoured combat vehicle (for further details, see the table below).

On 10 August, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), three of whom it saw entering and walking about 350m north inside the disengagement area and then returning.

On the same day, outside the disengagement area, the SMM saw for the first time two metal barriers about 200m and 500m, respectively, south of the checkpoint of the armed formations and a 75m long ditch running north from the last barrier, assessed as for

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<sup>5</sup> Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

communication cables. The Mission also saw two deminers using metal detectors on the western side of road T-1316 about 200m south of the checkpoint of the armed formations.

On the evening of 8 August, inside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted two people within a former position of the armed formations near the area's south-eastern corner (an SMM long-range UAV also spotted at least five people there on the evening of 9 August). On the same evening, also inside the area, an SMM long-range UAV spotted six people within former positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces – three people about 550m east-north-east of the area's south-western corner and three people about 120m north of the area's southern edge and about 1.5km east of its western edge.

Outside the disengagement area, about 200m south of the its southern edge and about 750m west-south-west of its south-eastern corner, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a recently-dug trench (40m long) (not visible in imagery from 4 July), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On 10 August, while positioned at two locations near the disengagement area, the Mission observed a calm situation.

### **Withdrawal of weapons**

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

The Mission saw six self-propelled howitzers in a training area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, in violation of withdrawal lines. It also saw tanks and self-propelled mortars beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites on both sides of the contact line in Donetsk region, including in training areas in non-government-controlled areas (for further details, see the tables below).

### **Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone<sup>6</sup>**

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun in the security zone in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions and an armoured combat vehicle in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region (for further details, see the table below).

### **Presence of mines near Vodiane and Pikuzy and missile hazard sign near Molodizhne**

On 9 August, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted about 21 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across the road about 2km north of Vodiane (government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report 22 April 2020](#)).

In a field near the south-western edge of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 92km south of Donetsk), the same UAV also again spotted 200 anti-tank mines (TM-62) (part of a larger minefield). About 2.6km south of the

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<sup>6</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

aforementioned mines, the UAV also again spotted 70 anti-tank mines (TM-62). All of these mines were assessed as belonging to the armed formations (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Reports of [3 August](#) and [4 August](#)).

On 10 August, about 1.7km north-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) and about 520m south-east of the south-western corner of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM saw for the first time a missile hazard sign with “Caution, anti-tank guided missiles operating” written in Russian, in a field on the side of the road running parallel to the southern edge of the area.

### **SMM facilitation of repairs to as well as maintenance and operation of critical civilian infrastructure**

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable preparations of construction works south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above) and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

The Mission also continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to water infrastructure between Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk) and Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), near Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 70km south of Donetsk), in Yashchykove (non-government-controlled, 46km west of Luhansk) and in Pankivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to localised ceasefires to enable vegetation clearance, inspection and maintenance of railway tracks near Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk), repairs to power lines near Vesela Hora, and demining activities near government-controlled Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk), Hirske (63km west of Luhansk), and Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) (see above).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation near the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

### **Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter COVID-19 outbreak**

In Luhansk region, the SMM noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were operational.

While at the EECP at about 08:55 and 09:30, the Mission saw in total about 1,100 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) queuing to enter government-controlled areas and in total about 200 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) queuing in the opposite direction. The SMM saw that two golf carts were transporting people between the EECP and the new section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

In Donetsk region, the SMM noted that the EECP near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) were operational.

At the EECP near Novotroitske between 09:20 and 15:00, the SMM saw five cars and two buses with about 40 people (mixed genders and ages) entering government-controlled areas and four buses with about 100 people (mixed genders and ages) travelling in the opposite direction.

While at the checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka, between 09:15 and 12:15 and again between 13:25 and 15:00, the Mission saw in total about 60 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and seven cars traveling in the same direction. It also saw two cars and two buses with about 50 passengers each entering non-government-controlled areas.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

### **\*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

*The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report 10 August 2020](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.*

*Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:*

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:

- On the evening of 9 August, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between Pisky (government-controlled, 11km north-west of Donetsk) and Taramchuk (government-controlled, 29km south-west of Donetsk), as well as between Rodnykove (non-government-controlled, 36km south of Donetsk) and Starobesheve (non-government-controlled, 32km south-east of Donetsk).<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV's position.

## Table of weapons

### Weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
<b>Non-government-controlled areas</b>				
08/08/2020	6	Probable self-propelled howitzer (2S1 <i>Gvozdika</i> , 122mm)	In a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk)	Long-range-UAV

### Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
<b>Government-controlled areas</b>				
10/08/2020	26	Tanks (T-64)	At the railway station in Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk)	Patrol
<b>Non-government-controlled areas</b>				
08/08/2020	8	Tank (T-72)	In a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk)	Mini-UAV
	19	Tank (four T-64 and 15 T-72)		
	3	Self-propelled mortar (2S9 <i>Nona-S</i> , 120mm)	In a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk)	Long-range-UAV
	30	Tank (one T-72, ten probable T-72, seven probable T-64 and 12 undetermined)		

### **Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone<sup>8</sup>**

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
<b>Government-controlled areas</b>				
07/08/2020	1	Combat engineering vehicle (BAT-2)	Near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk)	Mini-UAV
08/08/2020	1	Armoured combat vehicle	In a residential area in Novoselivka (31km north of Donetsk)	
	1	Anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm)	Near Slavne (26km south-west of Donetsk)	
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR variant)		
	1	Probable armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2)	Near Zoloti Pisky (12km north-west of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV
	2	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70)	Near Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk)	
	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (probable BMP-2)	Near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk)	
09/08/2020	1	Armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2)	Near Zoloti Pisky (12km north-west of Donetsk)	
	2	Armoured combat vehicle (one of them probable)	Near Novomykhailivka (28km south-west of Donetsk)	
09/08/2020	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)	Near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk)	
	1	Armoured combat vehicle (probable BMP variant)		
	1	Combat engineering vehicle (BAT-2)		
<b>Non-government-controlled areas</b>				
07/08/2020	1	Armoured combat vehicle	Near Pryvitne (11km north of Luhansk)	Mini-UAV

<sup>8</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

**Table of ceasefire violations as of 10 August 2020<sup>9</sup>**


<b>SMM position</b>	<b>Event location</b>	<b>Means</b>	<b>No.</b>	<b>Observation</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Weapon</b>	<b>Date, time</b>
SMM camera at entry-exit checkpoint in Hnutove (government-controlled, 90km S of Donetsk)	2-4km ESE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	10-Aug, 04:58

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<sup>9</sup> The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by the SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.



### Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions<sup>10</sup>



<sup>10</sup> The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs, and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff has temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and patrols in this settlement during daylight hours, as well).