UNDERSTANDING THE SUCCESS OF THE KNOW-NOTHING PARTY

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<u>ABSTRACT</u>

We study the contribution of economic conditions to the success of the first avowedly nativist political party in the United States. The Know-Nothing Party gained control of a number of state governments in the 1854-1856 elections running on a staunchly anti-Catholic and anti-Irish platform. Our analysis focuses on the case of Massachusetts, which had experienced a wave of Irish Famine immigration and was at the forefront of industrialization in the United States. Voters in towns with more exposure to Irish labor market crowdout and deskilling in manufacturing were more likely to vote for Know-Nothing candidates in state elections. These two forces played a decisive role in 1855, but not the other years of the Know Nothings' success. We find evidence of reduced wealth accumulation for native workers most exposed to labor market crowdout and deskilling, though this was tempered by occupational upgrading.

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I Introduction

Many countries around the world, including the United States and in Europe, have experienced an upswing in support for nationalist and xenophobic parties over the past two decades. These patterns have historical antecedents which help shed light on their formation, evolution, and longevity. Pursuant to this aim, we study the Know-Nothings also known as the American Party, the first nativist party to achieve electoral success in the United States. In the mid-1800s, the party gained control of the governorships of five states and several mayorships in the Northeast. The Know-Nothings' success came on the heels of the influx of millions of low-skilled Irish Catholic famine refugees and during a period of rapid industrialization and urbanization. Scholars have debated the key factors underlying their ascendancy: Fogel (1989) and Mulkern (1990) emphasize distinct economic factors whereas other scholars argue that widespread anti-Catholicism and xenophobia were more central (Foner 1970; Anbinder 1992). We bring new data and modern methods to deepen the understanding of the causes for the Know-Nothings' phenomenal success.

The Know-Nothings enjoyed their most striking victory in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the focus of our analysis. In 1854, the Know-Nothing party secured all but three seats in the Massachusetts legislature and won the governorship with over 60% of the popular vote. More generally, Know-Nothing popularity was positively correlated with manufacturing employment, immigration and urbanization (Figure 1).[1] Massachusetts was the vanguard of industrialization during this period and received a disproportionate share of the immigrants from Ireland.

We investigate the effects of immigrant labor market competition and deskilling in manufacturing on the Know-Nothing vote share. On the labor supply side, a shock came in the form of mass migration of Irish. An estimated one million Irish fled their homeland during the Potato Famine of 1846 (see Figure 2). Over the period 1841 to 1851, Boston absorbed over 100,000 Irish immigrants, and by 1855 the Irish comprised one-quarter of the city's overall population and 85% of its foreign-born population (Handlin 1959). Irish immigrants competed with low-skill native-born workers mainly as laborers, as factory operatives, and in fishing (Ferrie 1997). On the labor demand side, the shock came from deskilling in manufacturing. As early as the mid-1820s, manufacturing had grown to be the largest sector of the Massachusetts economy. By the 1850s, the movement to factory production led to the hollowing out of the skill distribution in manufacturing as skilled-mechanics and artisans were replaced with less skilled factory operatives (Field 1980; At-

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[1]This analysis focuses on Northern and border states in which the Know-Nothing Party fielded a candidate. Anbinder (1992) argues that the party platform was dramatically different between these states and the South.

ack *et al.* 2005; Katz & Margo 2013). Although this process occurred in many Northern states at the time, the Commonwealth was at the leading edge (Temin 1999).

Our primary outcome is town-level gubernatorial vote counts for the Know-Nothing candidate digitized from the *The Massachusetts Register* yearly from 1854 to 1857. The Know-Nothings were widely known as the nativist party, and placed anti-immigrant, anti-Catholic grievances and policies at the center of the party's identity. Thus, votes for the Know-Nothing Party may be viewed as a proxy for nativist sentiment. Following Autor *et al.* (2020), we produce cross-sectional measures of exposure to labor market shocks and test which, if any, were of political consequence. To construct measures of exposure to immigrant labor market competition and deskilling in manufacturing, we digitize the 1845 and 1855 Census of Manufacturers from Massachusetts in their entirety and digitize approximately 300,000 individual hand-written occupations from the 1855 Population Census of Massachusetts. We also use the 100% population census from IPUMS for the state of Massachusetts for the years 1840 and 1850 (Ruggles *et al.* 2018).

Our measure of exposure to deskilling is constructed by weighting the state-level shift in average establishment size between 1845 and 1855 with the town-specific specialization in a given industry in 1845. A negative wage-establishment-size gradient has been documented in the 19th and 20th centuries, by Atack *et al.* (2004) and Goldin & Katz (1998), respectively.[2] The exposure of native workers to immigrant labor market competition is constructed similarly in that state-level shifts are weighted by local shares and summed. The state-level 1850 to 1855 occupation-specific shift in Irish-born employment relative to initial employment in that occupation is multiplied by the initial 1850 town-specific *native-born* occupational shares.[3]

Our identifying assumption is that, conditional on other variables that proxy for competing explanations, these indices capture the causal effect of crowdout and deskilling on political outcomes. We include proxies for cultural assimilation and control for fiscal burden, urbanization, pre-famine political and economic structure, the size of the immigrant population shock, and include county fixed-effects. For both exposure measures, the identification concern remains that local shares may be endogenous, even conditional on the broad set of controls included. We follow the procedures developed in Goldsmith-Pinkham *et al.* (2020) to describe the identifying variation and assess potential threats to identification. One advantage of our context is that the Know-Nothings targeted their attacks most ardently on the Irish, above all other immigrant groups. Irish immigrants were

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[2]Atack *et al.* (2004, 174) note this correlation is "broadly consistent with the deskilling hypothesis."
[3]Given data constraints during this early period, we use the earliest high quality data to construct the exposure measures.

generally lower-skilled than the German "forty-eighters", the British, or even pre-Famine Irish immigrants (Ferrie 1997; Dippel & Heblich 2019; Collins & Zimran 2019). Two key features of antebellum Irish immigration make it unique: its massive numbers and overwhelmingly low-skilled workforce. German and British immigrants in Massachusetts, with their much smaller numbers and diverse skill mix, did not pose the same threat to the native workers as the Irish immigrants did. We test whether local exposure to occupation shifts in these groups elicit the same behavioral response from voters as shifts from Irish workers.[4] We also examine whether our exposure variables predict electoral outcomes from the decade prior and assess robustness to the inclusion of lagged industry shares.

Separate identification of the crowdout and deskilling effects is more challenging if low-skill migrants spur industrialization (Rosenbloom 2002). Indeed, Sequeira *et al.* (2020) document how immigration during the Age of Mass Migration (1860-1920) increased the number of manufacturing establishments, and, by 1930, increased output per capita. To address the question of endogenous industrialization, we test but fail to find evidence that changes in average establishment size or value per capita are predicted by changes in Irish immigration.[5]

We find that direct labor market competition from low-skill Irish immigration had a positive and significant effect on voter support for the Know-Nothing party: a one standard deviation increase in crowdout is associated with about a 3.5 percentage point increase in the Know-Nothing vote share in 1854. Deskilling associated with industrialization also played a prominent role, with a one standard deviation increase associated with approximately a 1.4 percentage point increase in Know-Nothing vote share. Taken together, labor market competition and deskilling explain approximately 15% of the mean Know-Nothing vote share in 1854.

These magnitudes are modest, but the effects are decisive in the 1855 election cycle and consistent with Margalit (2019) who distinguishes between *outcome* and *explanatory* significance of economic factors in the rise of populism throughout history. Margalit notes that economic factors tend to be decisive for the *outcome* of electoral success for populist leaders but are dwarfed in explanatory significance by non-economic factors (e.g. culture). Of course, highly persistent and/or near ubiquitous cultural factors can be challenging to identify. In our context, an Irish assimilation index does not predict vote shares; however,

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[4]For example, in the 1855 Massachusetts Census almost 60% of the Irish were laborers compared to only 20% of Germans. Germans were more likely to be employed as mechanics (40%) than the Irish (20%). Moreover, the size of the shifts from German and British immigrants were small relative to the large shifts from Irish immigration. The majority of occupational shifts for these two immigrant groups were less than a quarter the size of the Irish shifts (Author's calculations).

[5]The discordant results are likely due to different contexts and time periods of analysis, discussed further below in Section V.C.

the role of non-economic factors is hinted at by the fact that deskilling and crowdout does not predict Know-Nothing vote shares in stronghold locations.[6] Indeed, anti-Catholic and xenophobic sentiment had percolated for decades prior to the 1850s, even leading to short bursts of ethnic violence (Billington 1938).

Our findings are robust to the inclusion of county fixed effects, controlling for Irish immigration and proxies for Irish enfranchisement, urbanization, pre-famine voting patterns as well as measures of fiscal burden and assimilation. In addition, we find much weaker and statistically insignificant effects of British or German labor market crowdout. We also fail to find evidence that Irish crowdout or deskilling positively predicted voting behavior prior to the immigration wave from the Irish Potato Famine. The results are unaffected by including controls of the pre-period economic structure, namely employment shares by industry constructed from the 1840 Population census.[7] Finally, we find negative impacts on wealth accumulation over the medium-term (between 1850 and 1860) for native-born workers more exposed to crowdout and deskilling. As postulated by Haynes (1897), however, these effects were partially offset by occupational upgrading.

The Irish crowdout measure interacts with the share of Irish in a given location, suggesting that labor-market competition is amplified by a greater number of Irish workers. Deskilling (which captures movement into larger central establishments) interacts strongly with the growth of cottage or "putting out" systems. As discussed by Hazard (1913) in her detailed examination of the boot and shoe industries in New England, cottage industries represented a step in the evolution from home to factory production. This interaction captures a similar displacement effect on semi-skilled workers from moving production to the "putting out" system, which was likely deskilling as it relied on increased division of labor, and employed large numbers of women.

Our study relates to several literatures. Scholarship by economists has tried to unpack the factors contributing to the recent rise of populist, nationalist, and far-right political parties.[8] One line of research seeks to link trade shocks to electoral outcomes, in particular the "China Shock". In the U.S., areas more exposed to import competition from China were more likely to elect a conservative Republican in competitive house districts, more likely to support Donald Trump for president in 2016, and had representatives who were more likely to support protectionist legislation (Autor *et al.* 2020; Feigenbaum & Hall 2015).[9]

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[6]A possible interpretation of our findings is that these economic factors are set against a backdrop of (somewhat universal) animus towards Irish Catholics by the primarily Protestant native-born population of New England. We thank William J. Collins for this suggestion.

[7]Note that we cannot construct our crowdout measure using these shares because they do not provide ethnicity.

[8]See Guriev & Papaioannou (2020) for a recent summary of this literature as well as Eichengreen (2018)

[9]Voting behavior in Europe demonstrated similar patterns. See Colantone & Stanig (2018b), Colantone

Another line of research links technological progress and immigration to electoral outcomes. For example, Frey *et al.* (2018) show that local exposure to automation in the form of industrial robots leads to an increase in the voting share for Donald Trump in 2016, relative to Mitt Romney in 2012. Counterfactual exercises show that important swing states would have instead voted for Hillary Clinton with modest decreases in automation.

Findings on the electoral impact of immigration are more heterogeneous.[10] In the U.S. context, Tabellini (2020) uses a panel of 180 cities from 1910 to 1930 and variation from World War I and the U.S. Immigration Quota Acts to estimate the impact of immigration on political outcomes. The results indicate that although native workers benefited economically from immigration, it led to a political backlash resulting in the election of more conservative legislators and greater support for the Quota Acts. Goldin (1994) explored the relationship between foreign-born share and support for quota restrictions, revealing an inverted U-shape.

Second, we relate to the literature on the effect of immigration on native labor market outcomes and industrialization. We find negative impacts on wealth accumulation for native-born males that faced more labor market competition from Irish immigrants, which was partially offset by occupational upgrading. We find no evidence of a short-run impact of immigration on the acceleration of industrialization. These conclusions differ from recent contributions by Sequeira *et al.* (2020) and Tabellini (2020) likely due to differences in the context, size and nature of the shock and time horizon over which effects are measured.[11] Our results on native wealth accumulation accord with Goldin (1994) who finds a negative effect of immigration on the manufacturing wage across U.S. cities during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

The demise of the Whig party over compromises made on the extension of slavery to new territories opened the door for the nativist Know-Nothings to gain power. In the end, however, Know-Nothing success in Massachusetts was brief. Two years after their overwhelming success in 1854 they lost control of the legislature, and by 1857 lost the governorship. Their main rival for support, the anti-slavery Republicans, won the contest to replace the Whigs as the second party in the North. By this time, deskilling and crowdout had ceased to be predictive of electoral outcomes. The singular plank of nativism failed

& Stanig (2018a), Dippel *et al.* (2017), Barone & Kreuter (2019), Caselli *et al.* (2020), and Malgouyres (2017).

[10]In Denmark, municipalities that received more refugees from 1986 to 1998 increased nativist voting in small cities, but led to less nativist voting in the largest cities (Dustmann *et al.* 2018). Areas with higher immigration were more likely to support the nativist, populist, or far-right candidate in Italy (Berlusconi: Barone *et al.* (2016)), in Austria (Joerg Haider and the Freedom Party: Halla & Zweimueller (2017)), and in France (Edo & Poutvaara (2017).

[11]The U.S. economy of the 1850s was likely less able to absorb such a large influx (Fogel 1989) relative to the later periods studied in Sequeira *et al.* (2020) and Tabellini (2020).

to reflect the electorate's increasing concerns regarding imminent civil war.[12]

The rest of the article is structured as follows. First, we provide historical background on the Irish immigration and the long history of anti-Catholic sentiment in the United States. We then move to discussing industrialization and deskilling in antebellum Massachusetts and the success of the Know-Nothings. In Section III, we introduce the data we use in the analysis and the construction of the indices. Section IV describes the empirical framework. Section V reports the results and Section VI concludes.

II Historical Background

In this section, we describe the Know-Nothing as a party and their platform. Next, we discuss key historical factors postulated to have contributed to the rise of the Know-Nothing party, such as immigration, "papist" enfranchisement and industrialization.

II.A Know-Nothing Origins, Principles and Platform

The Know-Nothing party grew from the union of oath-bound secret societies that merged into the Order of the Star-Spangled Banner in 1852.[13] Party structure centered around lodges established in each town, with membership requirements including being a native-born citizen, a Protestant, born of Protestant parents, and not married to a Roman Catholic.[14] According to Desmond (1904, 52), the Know-Nothings were unique from other secret orders such as the Free Masons in that they were dedicated to political advancement. The oath used to induct members required them to *"not vote or give your influence for any man for any office in the gift of the people, unless he be an American-born citizen in favor of Americans ruling America, nor if he a Roman Catholic."* Only native-born Protestants could be supported for public office and political appointments (Massachusetts Constitution of the State Council, 1854; Connecticut Constitution of the State Council, 1854).[15]

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[12]Our results are consistent with the narratives told by historians for the disappearance of the Know-Nothings: first and foremost, that voters placed increasing priority on issues related to slavery (Foner 1970), but also that Massachusetts Republicans absorbed pieces of the nativist agenda (Mulkern 1990), and perhaps living standards improved for native-born New Englanders in the late 1850s (Fogel 1989).

[13]Because lodge members were sworn to secrecy, they were instructed to say that they "knew nothing" about the party if queried.

[14]Strictness on native-born parentage varied across states. Connecticut required that a member's parents also be native-born Protestants. Massachusetts initially required one set of grandparents to be native-born. Indiana chapters did not even require the member to be native-born as these chapters recruited from a population whose ancestry's only recently arrived in the U.S. (Massachusetts Register, 1853-1862)

[15]What type of men joined the secret lodges of the Know-Nothing party? We replicate and extend the analysis of Anbinder (1992) who first linked Know-Nothing members listed in chapter books to their records in the decennial U.S. census manuscripts. We digitized the names of members of the East Boston and Worcester Membership lists, and hand-matched them to the 1850 census. Relative to the average 18-65 year old man, members of the party are slightly older (36 versus 33 years old), slightly more likely to hold a profession rather than being a common laborer, and have about the same average occupational income (occ-score). Over 10 percent of Know-Nothing members report positive real estate wealth, relative to 3.6 percent

Less than two years after its formation, the party had branches in every state and claimed over 1 million members (Gienapp 1985). Nationally, the Know-Nothings captured nine gubernatorial seats, dozens of national legislative seats and mayorships in major cities along the Eastern Seaboard. Nowhere did the party enjoy such unparalleled success as in Massachusetts, as described by Mulkern (1990, 76):

> ...the American party had managed the greatest election upset in the history of the state. Every constitutional state officer, the entire congressional delegation, all forty state senators, and all but 3 of the 379 representatives bore the Know-Nothing stamp. Henry Gardner's 63% majority and his 81,500 vote total for governor were the largest ever. He carried every city and all but twenty of the state's more than three hundred towns.

Once in power the Know-Nothings pursued a platform outlined in Gardner's inaugural speech, including circumscribing foreign enfranchisement. The party pushed for a state constitutional amendment for a literacy test for new voters, which was ultimately successful, but was not able to push through an amendment that immigrants must wait 21 years from entry before gaining suffrage. Other legislation targeting Catholics included convent inspections, a ban on (Irish) militias, and the required reading of the King James Bible in public schools. The Know-Nothings of Massachusetts also absorbed progressive elements of the Whig and Democratic party – and under their leadership, funding for schools and hospitals was increased, while anti-corruption reforms were enacted and taxes raised.[16]

The Know-Nothings' emergence filled a power vacuum left by the Whig party after it had been weakened considerably by the deaths of key leaders (Daniel Webster and Henry Clay), the admission of California into the U.S., and subsequent compromises by the Whigs on the expansion of slavery (Foner 1970). The timing has been linked to the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in May 1854, which allowed for the extension of slavery into newly organized territories on the basis of a popular vote. The act effectively repealed the Missouri Compromise that had limited slavery to south of latitude 36°30′ North since 1820. The passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act required the support of the Southern Whigs, causing the large block of anti-slavery Northern Whigs to abandon the party.

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of male residents. The occupational distribution for Worcester is shown in Appendix Figure A.1 and can be compared to the occupation distribution. Members of the Know-Nothing party were much more likely to be mechanics than those in the general population, where mechanics includes carpenters, mechanics, blacksmiths, wheelwrights, etc. We conclude from this preliminary comparison that Know-Nothing party members were average working class men, not poor, but not the elite members of Boston society either.

[16]Many of the campaign promises for labor reform went unfulfilled. These included a secret ballot for laborers and 10-hour workdays.

At the state-level, anti-corruption and pro-democracy reform efforts failed in a popular vote to amend the Massachusetts Constitution in 1853 (Mulkern 1990). Fed up with elite control of both the Whig and Democrat political machinery, Massachusetts voters were attracted by the popular reform aspects of the Know-Nothings in 1854. Table 1 reports state-wide vote shares by party for the annual gubernatorial elections, where the Know-Nothings' overwhelming success and the Whig's demise can be seen in the 1854 totals.

II.B   Irish Immigration and Native Fears

The Know-Nothing party's success followed an increase in the numbers of immigrants entering the state fleeing the Irish Potato Famine and the German revolutions. At the national level, immigration was 1.5 million in the decade prior to the Know-Nothing victory, a vast increase over the approximately 100,000 for the twenty year period between 1790 to 1810, the 200,000 between 1820 and 1830, and nearly 800,000 in the 1830s (Gardner 1855).

Irish immigration flows accounted for much of that surge, picking up in 1845, but slowing down after 1855. In Massachusetts, immigrants moved to Boston, but also to manufacturing hubs and mill towns which stretched across the state – see Figure 3 panel (A). Over 40 percent of the working age male population of Boston was foreign-born by 1850, growing to 48 percent by 1860. The rapid demographic change stirred long held fears about Catholics in the mostly Protestant native population of New England.[17]

Anti-Catholicism: Anti-Catholic prejudice permeated the culture of the colonies well before Famine-induced immigration, and was widespread throughout New England and nationally (Billington 1938).[18] Early Americans feared that Catholics lacked experience with democratic institutions of government, which the colonists had fought for, and the early Americans had sustained. Many in New England believed immigration could lead to the U.S. becoming a Papal state, despite the fact that Roman Catholic power – as proxied by Church property value – was not unusually high in the region, as evidenced by its location on the distribution of valuations across states.[19] Much of the hatred stemmed from the anti-national nature of the Catholic church combined with the fear that Catholicism was a force to overthrow Protestant governments (Billington 1938).

Events in the early 1850s appeared to increase anti-Catholic sentiment, though the United States had earlier experienced periodic outbursts of violence aimed at Catholics (Anbinder 1992). School controversies developed in 1852 when a council of American

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[17]The port of Boston recorded 5,560 immigrants in 1840 jumping to nearly 30,000 by 1849 (Shattuck (1845) quoted in Meckel (1985, 400).

[18]As evidence of the widespread nature of religious prejudice, the most widely read contemporary book was an anti-Catholic screed "The Awful Disclosures of Maria Monk," which described alleged horrific abuses of nuns carried out by priests.

[19]See Appendix Figure A.2 Panel (B)

Catholic Bishops called for Catholics to be educated in *state funded* parochial schools, a use of public funds to which Protestants dissented. The sects also clashed on the use of the King James Bible in the classroom. Catholics refused to let their children read from this Bible in school, and Protestants saw a Papal conspiracy to "...overthrow and demolish our Common schools."[20]

Fear of the Irish Voter: Deep-seated concerns about the inability of the Catholic to embrace separation of Church and state were stoked by the flood of Irish immigrants. Allowing the Irish to vote could jeopardize U.S. sovereignty, as highlighted in Gardner's inauguration speech: *"Believing these dangers and probabilities real, it is a solemn duty to restrict alien franchise, that while entire toleration is granted to others to worship their Maker according to the dictates of their own judgment, we preserve the same right to us and ours untrammeled and unendangered."* (Gardner 1855)

Two events reinforced Protestants' worries about the political leanings of potential Irish voters. First, there was a concern among abolitionists that the Irish would favor the Fugitive Slave Law and the Kansas-Nebraska Act (McPherson 1988, 137).[21] Second, a proposed new state constitution in 1853 of the Democratic, Free-Soil, and "Locofoco" coalition aimed to reform the state political system and overhaul representation by giving more representation to rural areas where Democrats held a stronghold. Nativist language was used in the defense of this reapportionment.[22] When the constitution failed to pass, many contemporaries of the time blamed the Irish vote (O'Connor 1983). Indeed, the Catholic newspaper, *The Pilot* delighted in the defeat of the Constitution: **"The new Constitution rejected! Waterloo defeat of the Coalition!"** (O'Connor 1983). More recent analyses have suggested that turnout among Whig strongholds was a more decisive factor (Sweeney 1976); with Irish shares not correlating strongly with the vote percent (see Figure 3 panel (B)). However, given the *perception* of contemporaries that the Irish vote helped defeat the Constitution, we use "nay" votes as measure of organized Irish electoral power in our empirical exercise.

Fear of the Irish Pauper: Over much of the antebellum period, local governments were responsible for providing poor relief, and the increase in pauperism placed tremendous pressure on local budgets (Kiesling & Margo 1997). Amplifying these concerns, was the fact that a large and growing share of relief spending went to provide for indigent Irish

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[20]Pratt (1967) quoted in Anbinder (1992, 25)

[21]These fears were heightened after an Irish militia in Massachusetts, the *Columbian Artillery*, prevented the *Sons of Liberty* from freeing an imprisoned fugitive person who had been enslaved in Virginia. See www.masshist.org/object-of-the-month/march-2017.

[22]From the Free-soiler newspaper, *Commonwealth*, quoted by Sweeney (1976, 126) "what with vast accommodation of capital on one hand and the influx of a poor, ignorant foreign population on the other they [cities] no longer represent the Historical Massachusetts."

immigrants. A report to the legislature captured the scale of the problem. Over 10,000 people without legal residence in the state applied for poor relief in 1851, with 8,527 being foreign-born or children of the foreign-born. That year Massachusetts (towns and state inclusive) spent $212,000 on paupers without legal residence (Report of the Joint Committee to the Senate, April 29, 1852, *Boston Advertiser*, May 8, 1852).[23] Figure A.3 Panel (A) from the 1850 census indeed demonstrates that foreign-born paupers dominated those born in the U.S., and Massachusetts was second only to New York in the total annual cost to support the pauper population.

Town coffers were strained by immigrant arrivals, and the system of reimbursement led to conflict and fraud. The State's response to the *"futile struggle between the towns and the Commonwealth over the support of unsettled paupers was the opening in 1855 of three large (but not large enough) almshouses,"* (Meltsner 2012, 70). The constant friction between towns and the state about the adjustments of the per capita reimbursements eased after the almshouses opened, though not before cementing the stereotype of the Irish as beggars, paupers and criminals.

Fear of the Irish Laborer: Just as concerning was the threat the Irish influx might pose to native workers, which was frequently cited by Know-Nothing newspapers: *"[T]he enormous influx of foreigners will in the end prove ruinous to American workingmen by reducing the wages of labor to a standard that will drive them from the farm and workshops altogether"* from the Sun (1854) quoted in Ferrie (1999, 163). The party platform listed reducing the immigrant threat to native workers as a primary political goal; a view espoused by their most prominent member in Massachusetts; as stated by Henry Gardner in his acceptance speech for Governor in 1855: *"The present European immigration is deeply prejudicial to the fair remuneration of American labor. The mechanic, the artisan, the agriculturist, daily suffer from its influence...,"* (Gardner 1855).

Despite contemporaries concern for negative wage effects from immigration, economic historians debated their importance. As described by Haynes (1897) *"The fear of the immigrant as a wage earner...the rank and file of the laboring class proved themselves devoted believers in the wage fund theory."* Haynes' view was that the antebellum economy could absorb the mi-

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[23]Legislative efforts aimed to stem the tide of Irish paupers backfired. An 1848 law created a Superintendent of Alien Passengers to inspect all ships carrying immigrants before allowing them to land in a Massachusetts port. Passengers deemed unlikely to become paupers were charged $2 a head from the shipowner. For alien passengers thought likely to become a burden to any city or town at any time in the future, the Superintendent required a bond from the ship-owner of $1,000 (Haynes 1897, 76). The per head charge and size of the bond was onerous compared to those legislated in New York, leading to the practice of landing passengers in New York who then completed the remainder of the journey to Massachusetts by rail. In this case, New York received the benefit of the bond and fees without any of the expenditure risk (Haynes 1897).

grants, while opening up better opportunities for native workers as supervisors. Haynes (1897, 75) defended his position quoting Edward Everett Hale from *Letters on Irish Immigration* (1852) who states: "*They (the Irish) do the manual labor. It does not follow that natives who must otherwise have performed it, do nothing or starve. They are simply pushed up into foremen of factories, superintendents of farms, railroad agents, machinists, inventors, etc.*"[24]

A century later, the question of whether direct competition for jobs between Irish and native-born workers contributed to the wave of support for the Know-Nothing party remained unsettled. Fogel (1992, 17) writes that "*[T]he timing of immigration and the distribution of immigrants over space are very important for understanding the economic distress suffered by native northern labor during the last two decades of the antebellum era*". Fogel argued (1992, 6): "*It is unlikely that the nativist political movement would have come close to the northern successes it obtained in 1853-1855 without the pressures on labor markets generated by the massive immigration of 1848-1854....*". The prominence of labor market explanations was not without detraction, however. Mulkern (1990) notes that other states experienced mass immigration yet did not turn with such enthusiasm to Know-Nothingism.[25] The Irish immigrants into Massachusetts were generally lower-skilled than the German "forty-eighters", the British, or pre-Famine Irish immigrants (Ferrie 1997; see also Dippel & Heblich 2019 and Collins & Zimran 2019). Since the Irish immigrants were generally low-skilled, direct job competition and economic distress would have predicted to be worse for this group of native workers. Yet, precisely the groups Gardner references, artisans, mechanics and agriculturalists, who were considered semi- to high-skill at the time, would have been affected by changes to the Massachusetts economy that began decades earlier.[26] Instead, he points to "explosive urban and industrial growth" which led to "wrenching social and economic dislocations" - i.e. industrialization and deskilling.

II.C Industrialization and Deskilling in Antebellum Massachusetts

As early as the mid-1820s, manufacturing had grown to be the largest sector of the Massachusetts economy. Industrial statistics taken in 1845 and 1855 showed the value of manufacturing output increased from $83 million to $215 million 10 years later (nominal

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[24]Haynes also cites lectures by Carroll D. Wright at Johns Hopkins as corroborating his stance.

[25]Mulkern (1990, 5) writes: "*Explosive urban and industrial growth had thrust the Commonwealth into the forefront of the industrializing states in the antebellum period, creating, in the process, wrenching social and economic dislocations. The failure of the established parties to mount a significant response to the myriad issues and problems spawned in the matrix of modernization weakened partisan attachments and set the rank and file of the established parties on a quest for a political vehicle that would make a difference in their lives. In 1854, such a vehicle materialized in the form of an anti-party, anti-politician populist movement that promised to cleanse the statehouse of corruption and self-serving political careerists and turn the government over to the people...*"

[26]According to our data, the occupations listed by Gardner experienced only slight increases in the share Irish (see Figure A.1).

dollars). The 1850 U.S. Manufacturing Census showed Massachusetts as the undisputed leader of textile and boot and shoe manufacturing, the first and third largest industries in the country. At the same time, the share of labor force in agriculture in the Commonwealth fell from 0.57 in 1820 to 0.15 by 1850 with 65 percent of the decline occurring between 1840 and 1850 (Field 1978, 153). Field (1978; 1980) attributes the rapid sectoral shift to competition from Midwestern agricultural products with increased East-West trade from improved transportation networks (see also Atack *et al.* (2010)). Although some of this labor was absorbed via an exodus to the frontier, credit and information constraints coupled with opportunities in cities slowed adjustment along this margin and aided urbanization.[27]

Field, in a series of papers, describes the sectoral shift from agriculture to industry in antebellum Massachusetts, finding that the process overall was deskilling.[28] Production shifted to factories and increased the demand for less skilled labor (Atack *et al.* 2005). The factory and putting out systems primarily displaced semi-skilled (i.e. artisan) labor (Katz & Margo 2013).[29] Other well-documented factors that contributed to the growth in establishment size in manufacturing, included the development of financial markets (Rousseau & Sylla 2005), and legal changes in business organization (Lamoreaux 2006; Hilt 2008). Although this process was occurring in many Northern states at the time (see Temin (1999)), the Commonwealth was at the leading edge.

The rise of manufacturing meant population growth in cities. By 1840, Massachusetts was the most densely populated state in the nation at 127 inhabitants per square mile.[30] The proportion of the population living in towns of 2,500 residents or more increased from 11 percent in 1790 to 23 percent in 1820, to 50 percent in 1850 (see Appendix Figure A.4). With the exception of Rhode Island, Massachusetts was the most urbanized state, and faced the most rapid increase in urbanization.[31]

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[27]According to Field (1978), such constraints explain why the overall "land abundant" U.S. industrialized at all.

[28]Field (1980, 165) writes: *"[A] very large share of manufacturing employment in the period of early industrialization in Massachusetts was in industries which, because of the nature of the materials being processed, were then, and are today, relatively unskilled industries. Second, a relatively small share – perhaps 5 percent of the manufacturing labor force, ...was employed in the relatively high-skill machine-building industry."*

[29]Field (1978) argues that Massachusetts farming involved expertise and thus any movement out of the agriculture sector furthered overall deskilling.

[30]See Table XII in DeBow (1854, 40).

[31] Indeed, although by 1850 Massachusetts had the largest percent Irish, it was not very different from New York or Rhode Island in that regard (they were all around 12% - see Figure A.2 Panel (A)). Mulkern (1990) points out these other states did not overwhelmingly elect nativist leaders.

II.D Conceptual Framework: Crowdout, Deskilling and Native-born Living Standards

Our framework for understanding this time period is a model in which deskilling and immigration create differential shocks to high-skill and low-skill labor markets, thereby affecting their equilibrium wages (see Figure 4). Deskilling would have reduced demand for semi-skilled workers thus depressing their wages. This would have been exacerbated by competition from immigration, though Irish were generally involved in low-skill jobs. On the other hand, deskilling was complementary to low-skill workers at the time, pushing out the demand for factory workers. Although this alone might have increased equilibrium low-skill wages, an increase in supply of Irish workers could still lead to a lower overall equilibrium wage.

We lack high-quality, high-frequency wage data during this time period which would allow us to fully interrogate these hypotheses. In general, the wage data for this time period has been criticized for not accurately capturing the living standards of ordinary workingmen (Fogel 1992, 482-84). One notable exception is the series created by Margo & Villaflor (1987) using wages paid to civilian workers by the U.S. Army. Based on these data, wages of artisans and laborers fell by 18% and 10%, in the Northeast over the 1848 to 1855 period. Fogel remarks these are likely underestimates as they are not adjusted for unemployment. Moreover this figure neglects other margins of adjustment – such as migration and occupational upgrading by the native-born. Apart from this series, the Census of Social Statistics, reported at the town level, did include average wages for four occupations: farm laborers, day laborers, carpenters, and domestic servants. We digitized these data and explored their potential use. However, this source of wage information displays significant heaping both across towns and over time, and does not separate wages to immigrants or the native-born. Appendix Figure A.5 plots the distribution of wages in 1850 and 1860 and demonstrates these issues.

Ferrie (1999) examines the specific question of whether immigration depressed native incomes in the antebellum period.[32] Using a sample of approximately 3,000 adult native-born men linked across the 1850 and 1860 decennial censuses, Ferrie finds a positive effect of foreign-born on occupational upgrading of native-born low-skill workers but a negative effect for skilled workers. We conduct a similar exercise looking at the effect of labor market crowdout and deskilling on wealth accumulation for native-born men between 1850 and 1860 in Section V.C.

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[32]Goldin (1994) and Hatton & Williamson (1998) find that mass immigration at the turn of the 20th century had a negative effect on native wages.

III   Data and Measurement

III.A   Election Returns Data

Our primary outcome is town-level gubernatorial race vote counts for the Know-Nothing candidate published in the *The Massachusetts Register (1853-1862)*. We digitized votes using hand-double-entry, and verified the data with original hand-written returns for the 1854 and 1857 elections held at the Massachusetts State Archives. Massachusetts provides the finest geographic detail for election returns during the period based on using the town as the primary political unit (see Figure A.6). Summary statistics for election returns are reported in Appendix Table A.1.

Massachusetts towns were meaningful political and economic units with local elections conducted at this level. Know-Nothing vote share is calculated as the number of votes for the Know-Nothing candidate divided by the total votes in the town. The benefit of election data is that it measures actual behavior as opposed to self-reported perceptions, since the latter can be contaminated with demand bias.[33] One drawback of using vote data as a proxy for anti-immigrant sentiment is that voters select a candidate based on a bundle of attributes such as valence and policy positions. However, the core of the platform for the Know-Nothing party was anti-immigrant. As another measure of nativist policy and sentiment, we digitize town-level state legislature representatives' votes for the 1857 literacy amendment which aimed to disenfranchise immigrant voters.

III.B   Exposure to Immigrant Labor Market Competition:

Town-level exposure to Irish labor market competition is measured as the change in the number of Irish-born workers in each occupational group j between 1850 and 1855 normalized by total employment in occupational group j in 1850. This shift is then weighted by the share of native-born workers in town i in occupational group j:[34]

$$(1) \qquad crowdout_i = \sum_j \frac{L^{1850,i}_{Native,j}}{L^{1850,i}_{TotNative}} \cdot \frac{(L^{1855,Mass}_{Irish,j} - L^{1850,Mass}_{Irish,j})}{L^{1850,Mass}_{Total,j}} \quad ,$$

and the time step is between the 1850 Federal Census and the 1855 Massachusetts Census.

Variation in $crowdout_i$ across local labor markets comes from variation in the local occupation-structure of employment during the initial period, prior to the Irish immigra-

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[33]Opinion polls provide another measure of the extent of nativist views and are commonly used in the modern literature (Hainmueller & Hopkins 2014; Inglehart & Norris 2016)

[34]We follow the construction of the exposure index from Autor *et al.* (2013), and used in Autor *et al.* (2020) to link import competition from China to electoral outcomes. Acemoglu & Restrepo (2020) and Collins & Niemesh (2019) use a similar construction of local *exposure* to a labor market shock, industrial robots in manufacturing and labor unions, respectively. See also Card & Peri (2016) for the link to theory.

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tion. Towns where native employment was concentrated in occupations with large shifts were more *exposed* to Irish labor market crowdout.

Occupation groups are defined as broad categories, comparable across datasets: agriculturalists, boot and shoe makers, factory operatives, laborers, manufacturers, mariners, low-skill mechanics, high-skill mechanics, merchants, professionals, and miscellaneous. The eleven broad categories correspond to those used in the published aggregate statistics of the 1855 Massachusetts census. We use these to verify that our digitization of the microdata aligns closely with the published aggregates.[35] We restrict the sample to men between the ages of 15 and 65. Female employment during this period was heavily concentrated in the cottage industries (the boot and shoe industry as well as straw hat making) as well as in textile mills. We include cottage employment (the sum of employment in boot and shoe and hat making) as a control variable.[36]

State-level shifts in Irish workers for each occupation group are constructed from a combination of the 1850 complete count census provided by IPUMS, and the 1855 Massachusetts Population Census microdata provided by FamilySearch.org (Ruggles *et al.* 2018; FamilySearch 2016). The latter required digitizing the 1855 Massachusetts microdata, hand-entering occupations for 300,000 working age men.[37]

Figure 5 plots the share of state-level native employment in each occupation in 1850 and the occupation-specific Irish employment shift, the first and second terms of Equation 1, respectively. Although we use town-level shares in our empirical exercise, the figure provides a visualization of the variation in the shift and a summary of the native occupational distribution. The largest shifts occurred in factory operatives, boot and shoe makers, and laborers. Native-born employment, on the other hand, was concentrated in farming, mechanics of all type, boot and shoe making, and laborers.[38]

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[35]Card (2001) and Friedberg (2001) used occupations as a measure of skill when estimating the impact of immigration in the modern United States.

[36]Employment was only asked of men ages 15 and older in the 1850 census, not for women. Moreover, women could not vote in state and presidential elections in Massachusetts at this time. The voting data does not include the political views of women, except to the extent that men took them, or the economic effects of immigration on women's labor market outcomes, into account.

[37]First, occupation strings were coded into the 1880 specific IPUMS occupation codes (OCC). The 1850 IPUMS complete count census microdata contains OCC codes. For both the 1850 and 1855 data, we then constructed the state-level foreign-born (or Irish) proportion in each of the 11 broad occupation categories.

[38]The mechanics category includes carpenters, blacksmiths, and all jobs ending in "maker" such as papermaker, etc., except for boot and shoe makers, which we place in its own category. Boot and shoe making was the second largest manufacturing industry in the state by output value after textiles. Production occurred primarily through the putting-out system of home production, not in factories.

III.C   Exposure to Deskilling

Exposure to deskilling in manufacturing follows the general setup of Equation 1 – industry-specific changes in average establishment size are interacted with lagged local industry employment shares:

$$(2) \qquad deskilling_i = \sum_k \frac{L_k^{1845,i}}{L_{Tot}^{1840,i}} \cdot \left(\frac{L_k^{1855,Mass}}{N_k^{1855,Mass}} - \frac{L_k^{1845,Mass}}{N_k^{1845,Mass}} \right) \quad ,$$

where i denotes town, k denotes industry, L denotes employment and N represents the number of establishments. The initial industry shares by town are constructed from town-level reports in the 1845 Massachusetts Manufacturing Census, which were hand-entered (Palfrey 1846). Note that the denominator for the share of employed is taken from the 1840 census. This is so we could normalize by all employment in a town, not just manufacturing employment as reported in the 1845 Manufacturing Census.

We focus on average establishment size since it is often viewed as a signpost of industrialization and deskilling. New England underwent a transition from the small artisanal shop to factories from 1820 to 1860. Sokoloff (1984) documents a sharp increase in establishment size over this period, in both mechanized and non-mechanized industries. High-skilled artisans were replaced by capital and machines, but also by moving to a minute division of labor in non-mechanized factories. Goldin & Sokoloff (1984) show that employment of women and children, two groups that arguably represent a less skilled workforce, increased with establishment size. Finally, Atack *et al.* (2004) demonstrate that the average wage declines with establishment size consistent with deskilling.

To construct this measure, we digitized town-level aggregate reports from the 1837, 1845, and 1855 Massachusetts censuses of manufacturing (Bigelow 1838; Palfrey 1846; De-Witt 1856). The average establishment size for the years 1837, 1845 and 1855 is shown in Figure 6, increasing from 20 in 1837 to 35 in 1855. Our preferred specification uses the shares available from 1845, and shifts from 1845 to 1855, as this specification provides the most coverage of industries.[39]

III.D   Control Variables

We collect a variety of town-level characteristics from various sources. The Data Appendix provides details on the construction and sources of all control variables. Summary statistics are reported in Appendix Table A.3.

To distinguish our Irish labor crowdout measure from Irish immigration, we include

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[39]Industry coverage in the 1837 manufacturing census is less complete than in 1845. We provide results using the 1837 measure in Appendix Table A.2.

the share of town population in 1855 that was born in Ireland (see Figure 3 Panel (A)). This variable also partially captures Irish voting patterns, though in robustness checks we include a better measure: the 1853 vote for a new Massachusetts Constitution. As noted above, the defeat of the proposed Constitution was widely blamed on the Irish voter (see Chapter 2 of Mulkern (1990)). A map of the nay vote is shown in Figure 3 Panel (B).

We measure the fiscal burden posed by Irish immigration by digitizing the number and nativity of paupers by town from the 1850 Census of Social Statistics schedules. Included in our control set is an indicator for *any* foreign pauper in the town as the distribution is highly skewed. However, normalizing foreign paupers by ratable polls (as a measure of population of taxable adults/voting population) or total pauper population does not alter our main results.

To capture urbanization more broadly, we include an urban indicator equal to one for towns with populations greater than 2,500 in 1855. In robustness checks we include log population in 1855. We also include the town-level number of manufacturing establishments per capita in 1855, the 1840 share of the population that is involved in manufacturing and the number of individuals in cottage employment in 1837. The latter is defined as those in industries dominated by women but are not organized into establishments (i.e. the putting out system).[40]

To proxy for assimilation, we construct measures of the fraction of Irish-born immigrants granting their U.S. born children traditionally Irish names, using methods described in Abramitzky *et al.* (2019). Examples of names identified as being "Irish" include Brigit and Pat, whereas Willie and Georgeanna are categorized as non-Irish. The Data Appendix B describes the full construction of this index.

The local shares used to construct the exposure indices are potentially endogenous, so we include a set of earlier industry sector shares as controls: manufacturing, commerce, agriculture, mining, river navigation, ocean navigation and professional staff/engineering using the IPUMS 1840 Population Census schedule for Massachusetts (Ruggles *et al.* 2018).

To provide further confidence in our preferred interpretation of the findings, we digitize additional election returns from ten years prior to the rise of the Know-Nothing party and before increase in immigration from the Irish famine. In robustness checks, we use the earlier vote shares for the Whig gubernatorial candidate in 1844 as a control for pre-existing variation in voting patterns. There is some narrative evidence that the Whigs

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[40]Cottage industries include: boots and shoes (71% of all cottage employment); straw bonnets and hats (27%); snuff, tobacco, and cigars ($< 1\%$); whips; port-monnaies, pocket-books, etc. ($< 1\%$); clothing ($< 1\%$); bookbinding ($< 1\%$). The boot and shoe, and straw bonnet and hat industries make up 45 percent of total manufacturing employment in the state. See the Data Appendix for more details on the construction of the cottage industry exposure variable.

were the home of anti-Catholic nativism in the early 1840s (Mulkern 1990). This control potentially captures any pre-existing "cultural" nativist voting behavior.

IV Empirical Framework

To test the contribution of labor market crowdout and deskilling to the Know-Nothing electoral success in Massachusetts, we estimate:

$$(3) \qquad KnowNothingShare_i = \alpha + \tau crowdout_i + \gamma deskilling_i + X_i \beta' + \delta_{county} + \varepsilon_i$$

where X includes the elements described above, and δ_{county} is a set of county indicators. We first estimate the effect of crowdout and deskilling on Know-Nothing vote share in 1854, their first election on the ballot and in which they won a resounding victory (Figure A.6 Panel (A)), before turning to subsequent gubernatorial races.

Identification of τ and γ, the coefficients of interest, comes from within-county variation in the exposure to direct Irish labor market competition and deskilling, conditional on X_i. Regressions are weighted by eligible voters by town from the registration reports (i.e. ratable polls). Because the governor was elected by state-wide popular vote, weighting provides a more natural estimate of the treatment effect. Additionally, since some of the towns are small, weighting helps reduce noise in our estimates. We reduce concerns of one major outlier driving the results by dropping Boston from the main analysis. We provide results without weighting and with including Boston in robustness checks (Table 3). Note both the deskilling and crowdout measures are standardized to have mean zero and a standard deviation of one.

Identification of τ and γ as the causal effect of labor market crowdout and deskilling rely on our construction of indices using time-lagged shares and state-level shifts and the conditional independence assumption. In particular, our empirical strategy is an *exposure* design, where the exogenous initial shares capture the differential exposure to the common shock. In papers that seek to identify the effects of immigration on economic outcomes using shift-share instruments, the identification concern is that historical immigration patterns are endogenous to growth. In our context, we use nativist occupation shares, and our main outcome is a political one. We follow the guidance of Goldsmith-Pinkham *et al.* (2020) and include lagged industry sector shares as a control in robustness checks below. We also demonstrate that neither exposure index has positive explanatory power for historical voting patterns prior to the Irish famine shock.

Although lagged values of indices reduce simultaneity bias, they engender the concern that native workers might move between the time of our shocks and the Know-Nothing vote. In the best case scenario, this would only lead to measurement error in our exposure

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estimates. However, the moves may be systematic; indeed they may be *caused* by crowdout or deskilling. However, we find economically small effects of either factor on migration rates of native-born workers (see Table 6).

V Results

V.A Main Results

Results from estimating Equation (3) are in Table 2, where the outcome is the share of votes for the Know-Nothing candidate for Massachusetts governor in 1854, Henry J. Gardner. We add controls moving across columns. In Column (1) we include only the main variables of interest – the deskilling and crowdout indices. We find that a one standard deviation increase in labor market crowdout increases the Know-Nothing vote share by 3.1 percentage points. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in the deskilling index increases the vote share by 0.8 percentage points.

In column (2) we add county fixed effects (combining Dukes and Nantucket due to their small number of towns, resulting in 13 indicator variables). Column (3) adds the controls for urbanization discussed above, an indicator for towns with greater than 2,500 people in 1850; the employment in cottage industries in 1845; and manufacturing establishments per capita at the town level in 1855. Column (4) adds the percent Irish in 1855; column (5) adds the controls for culture and fiscal burden. Finally, column (6) adds share of employment in manufacturing and in agriculture as recorded in the 1840 U.S. census. The results across all columns are fairly consistent and column (6) is our preferred specification. The magnitude of the crowdout effect is roughly double the effect of deskilling for a one standard deviation increase in the variables, respectively. However, the p-value of the Wald test that the coefficients between crowdout and deskilling is only marginally statistically significant when the full controls are included.

The economic factors are not highly correlated nor are they driven by outliers. Figure 7 panels (A) and (B) demonstrate the marginal effect of crowdout and deskilling holding all other variables constant from our preferred specification (Table 2 column (6)). The unadjusted scatter plot between the two measures is shown in Panel (C). Deskilling is null in some locations either because industry employment shares are equal to zero in industries with establishment size shifts, or average establishment size in an industry did not increase over 1845 to 1855 (i.e. the shift was zero).[41] In these instances, we set deskilling to the minimum value in the sample when standardizing.

To benchmark the relative importance of crowdout and deskilling, we conduct a coun-

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[41]Out of 106 industries listed, establishments were reported for 62 in both 1845 and 1855. Six of the remaining industries are considered cottage industries with shift equal to zero as deskilling was already complete by 1845.

terfactual exercise where there was no change in Irish employment (i.e. the shifts are equal to zero) and manufacturing establishment size remained unchanged between 1845 to 1855, yet Irish immigration settlement patterns remained the same (holding the share of Irish population constant at the 1855 observed levels). We obtain coefficient estimates using our observed data, then set each observation, for one exposure at a time, to the sample minimum and predict the outcome. The counterfactual Know-Nothing vote share drops 5% when deskilling is set to its minimum and approximately 10% when crowdout is so minimized. We find that these factors were not decisive in 1854, when the Know-Nothing party victory was overwhelming - but as the support began to wane in subsequent years, reshuffling Know-Nothing votes due to economic factors would have changed the electoral outcome.[42]

V.B Robustness and Falsification Checks

In Table 3 column (1) we add the vote share from the constitution of 1853 as a proxy for perceived Irish enfranchisement. In column (2) we add the historical vote for the Whigs in 1844. Neither change the results significantly. Columns (3) and (4) expand the control set for urbanization by adding an indicator for a mill town and the log of 1855 population. Column (5) controls for native labor demand by using the change in employment of natives between 1850 and 1855 across all industries in town i normalized by their initial value. Column (6) accounts for early industrial development by including local employment shares of all categories reported in the 1840 Population Census: Manufacturing, Commerce, Professional, River Transportation, Ocean Transportation, Mining, and Agriculture.[43] Column (7) includes Boston in the sample. The results are fairly consistent across all these changes. Finally in column (8), we drop weighting by eligible voters. The standard errors increase and the magnitudes do decline, but not substantially.

Tables 2 and 3 convey a robust association between the Know-Nothing vote share and Irish labor market crowdout and deskilling. As an additional robustness check against spurious correlations, we run permutation tests. We replace the actual exposures in a town with randomly chosen values of the crowdout and deskilling indices from the full sample of towns. We create 1,000 samples and re-estimate Equation (3), placing our actual estimates in the distribution of the placebo estimates. Appendix Figure A.7 presents the distribution of coefficients on deskilling and crowdout. Our main results are in the tails of the distribution: the actual effect of crowdout is greater than the 99th percentile of the placebo distribution, and the actual effect of deskilling is greater than the 94th percentile.

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[42]We reach this conclusion by setting each economic factor to the minimum, predicting votes and reallocating the votes to other parties.

[43]The omitted category is the share of employment in ocean transportation.

Finally, we show that spatial correlation in the data does not artificially inflate the p-values for our main findings (Kelly 2019; Conley 1999). See Appendix Table A.7 for these results.[44]

Shift-share Identification We follow the procedure developed in Goldsmith-Pinkham *et al.* (2020) to identify which initial occupation and industrial shares drive the identifying variation in our shift-share exposure indices. Results are reported in Appendix Tables A.4 through A.6. An analysis of the Rotemberg weights for the crowdout index reveals that identification stems from the native shares with the largest Irish shifts.[45] The identifying variation for the deskilling index stems from a set of textile industries and boots and shoe production. Note that our results are robust to including additional controls such as a mill town indicator and the level of cottage industry employment. Moreover, our results are robust to the inclusion of pre-period industry sector shares from 1840.[46]

An additional test of the identification assumption is to assess whether the shift-share exposure predicts pre-trends in the outcome (Goldsmith-Pinkham *et al.* 2020). The Know-Nothings first competed in an election in 1854, so we test whether crowdout and deskilling predict political outcomes prior to the Irish-Famine migration. Table 4 repeats our main specification from Table 2 with Democratic Governor vote share in 1844 and Whig vote share in 1844 as the outcome (columns (1) and (2), respectively). We fail to find strong evidence that either factor predicts pre-Irish Famine political outcomes. Although crowdout is marginally significant for the 1855 Whig share outcome, it has the wrong sign.

Non-Irish Crowdout: We exploit the anti-Irish and Catholic sentiment at the center of the Know-Nothing platform to construct crowdout exposures for non-Irish immigrants. In our setting, there is little overlap in the occupational structure of Irish immigrants with that of German and British immigrants. Figure 8 demonstrates that almost 60% of the Irish were laborers compared to only 20% of Germans. Germans were more likely to be employed as mechanics (40%) than Irish (20%). Moreover, there were far fewer German and British immigrants to Massachusetts than the Irish (see Figure 8 Panel (B) for frequencies). Finally, the size of the shifts in Figure 8 Panel (C) from German and British

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[44]The null of no spatial correlation is rejected at very short distances, such as 20km, but allowing for correlation of residuals at longer distances we fail to reject the null. For reference, Massachusetts is 296km East to West and 186km North to South. In general, the tests indicate that our data do not suffer from a high degree of spatial correlation. We also test and find no evidence of spatial spillovers.

[45]The correlation coefficient between the occupation weights and the magnitude of the occupation-specific shifts is 0.80, consistent with the intuition of the shift-share the common shock of Irish immigration affected places differently based on the initial composition of occupations.

[46]Not only do these historical sectoral shares follow the suggestions of Goldsmith-Pinkham *et al.* (2020), they effectively stratify the analysis to compare locations with similar initial levels of manufacturing (or agriculture), but which are differentially exposed to the shocks based on a town's concentration in different *types* of manufacturing. This variation likely provides better comparisons across towns that would have had counterfactually similar outcomes absent the Irish labor supply shock and deskilling labor demand shock.

immigrants is small relative to the large shifts from Irish immigration.

Columns (3) to (5) of Table 4 examine the robustness of our findings to these additional crowdout measures using occupational shifts for Germans, the British, and the two groups combined. The magnitudes on Irish crowdout and deskilling remain essentially unchanged. Moreover, the coefficients on these crowdout measures are economically small and statistically insignificant, suggesting no additional impact from these groups on top of Irish labor market competition. Note that the shifts for these groups are smaller but are somewhat correlated with the shifts from Irish immigrants, particularly for factory operatives (see Figure 8 Panel (C)). The fact that the distribution of skill/occupations in Panels (A) and (B) are so different across ethnic groups, but the shifts are similar suggests that there was growing demand for labor in these occupations – potentially independent from the Irish per se; a point we turn to next.

V.C   Short- and Medium-term Effects on Industrialization and Native-born Living Standards

One threat not addressed in the robustness analyses above is whether the Irish aided in industrialization. Furthermore, no evidence has been presented that demonstrates native-born workers materially suffered from these economic exposures. We address both these issues in this section.

Did the Irish Cause Short-Run Industrialization? We find no evidence that Irish immigrants were more likely to settle in areas that experienced faster industrialization between 1845 and 1855, consistent with immigration not causing short-run industrialization in our setting. Table 5 investigates whether Irish settlement patterns predict either levels or changes in manufacturing measures. In column (1), we find that the percent Irish in a town in 1855 is negatively associated with the number of manufacturing establishments per capita in 1855, and in column (4) is positively associated with the dollar value of manufacturing output per capita in 1855. These results are consistent with Irish immigrants being more likely to reside in larger cities, mill towns, and mill villages with a small number of large establishments. However, the more relevant test is whether the level or change in Irish employment predicts *growth* in manufacturing. We find no evidence that this was the case for the change in establishments in columns (2) and (3), or for the change in output value in columns (5) and (6).

Effects of State-level Irish Crowdout on Native Wealth, Migration and Occupational Upgrading Although the results in Table 5 suggest that there was no short-run benefit to industrialization from Irish immigration, there could still have been effects on the native-born worker. As discussed above, we lack detailed wage data from this period, but there

are other margins of adjustment we can explore.

Following Ferrie (1997), we construct a linked sample of 50,587 native-born Massachusetts men from the 1850 to the 1860 Census.[47] The individual-level data on economic outcomes and occupation enables us perform an analysis using a crowdout measure specific to the individuals' occupational group as defined in 1850. Such an analysis is not possible with aggregate town-level voting outcome data. Specifically, we define state-level crowdout as the 1850 to 1855 growth of Irish-born into the native individual's 1850 occupational group, essentially the occupation-specific "shift" portion of our crowdout measure.[48]

We use the town-level deskilling exposure from the main analysis, because unlike for crowdout, a person-specific measure for deskilling is impossible to construct. The 1850 census reports occupation, not industry. Thus, industry-level changes in average establishment size cannot be linked to individual workers. Instead, we include town-level exposure to deskilling as a proxy. Deskilling is interacted with an indicator for mechanics to capture the likely heterogeneity of effects across occupations.[49]

The outcomes of interest include property wealth in 1860 (dollar value of personal and real estate property), occupational upgrading (an increase in the wealth score of the occupation between 1850 and 1860) and migration. Migration is an indicator for any individual who has changed towns between the two censuses. Approximately 60% of the movers in the sample migrate within state. All regressions condition on county and age group fixed effects as well as 1850 real estate wealth and an indicator for any positive amount of property in 1850.

The results are gathered in Table 6. In column (1), a one standard deviation increase in crowdout reduces wealth by 22%. The effect of deskilling is concentrated in native mechanics, with a one standard deviation increase associated with an 8% decrease in wealth. In column (2), we add an indicator for whether the individual moved and the interaction between crowdout and migration. We find that the negative effects of crowdout on wealth are mitigated to some extent by migration. Similarly, in column (3) the negative effects of crowdout on wealth are offset by occupational grading.[50] Column (4) to (6) replicate the

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[47]We follow the standard iterative method of Abramitzky *et al.* (2014). These links are available on the CensusLinkingProject.org website. In Appendix Table B.10, we show that linked individuals have higher wealth and more prestigious occupations than those who were not matched, consistent with other matching literature. Our results are unchanged if we reweight the matched sample to match the population

[48]This is the state-level change in Irish-born individuals in occupational group j between 1855 to 1850 divided by the total employed in occupational group j in 1850.

[49]Using the individual matched sample, we could recover the town-level Irish crowdout exposure measure used in the main analysis. Collapsing the occupational frequencies in the individual data to the town level would provide the weights for a weighted sum of the state-level occupation specific shifts. Doing so results in noisy estimates of negative impacts on property wealth from both Irish crowdout and deskilling.

[50]There are differences between the two adaptations to economic pressures, whereby the main effect of

results from columns (1) to (3) for the outcome of any positive wealth in 1860. Results are consistent with crowdout decreasing property wealth on the extensive margin, and deskilling having no effect. Column (7) demonstrates that a one standard deviation increase in deskilling increases the propensity to move by 1.4 percentage points (5% of the mean), but is not concentrated solely in mechanics. Crowdout is not associated with increased migration. Finally in column (8), a one-standard deviation increase in Irish crowdout (deskilling) is associated with a 13.7 percentage point (1.7 percentage point) increase in occupational upgrading, respectively. Taken together, these results suggest that more exposure to Irish labor market crowdout and deskilling in manufacturing led to decreased wealth accumulation for native-born men over the medium term.

V.D   Heterogeneity and Mechanisms

Know-Nothing Strongholds Although the Know-Nothings lost popular support rather quickly, some voters clearly continued to prefer them – despite having alternatives in the new Republican party to the former Whig hegemony. Know-Nothing support declined from 63 percent of the state-wide vote in 1854 to 29 percent in 1857, when they lost the governorship to the Republicans.[51] We turn our attention to understanding whether economic factors have predictive power in "stronghold locations". Since there is no universally accepted definition of a stronghold location we use several. These definitions all share the general notion that a stronghold is a place where Know-Nothing support is consistently, relatively high. We then use such definitions to examine whether the Know-Nothing rise in 1854 in stronghold locations is affected by economic factors.

These results are gathered in Table 7. The outcome is the Know-Nothing vote share in 1854. Column (1) replicates the preferred specification from Table 2 column (6) for comparison. In column (2) we define stronghold as a town that was in the upper 75th percentile of the Know-Nothing vote share in both 1854 as well as in 1855 – when there existed another viable alternative for abolitionists and progressives in the Republican candidate. Column (3) uses a definition of stronghold based on the other year a Republican candidate was fielded – 1857. Finally column (5) defines a stronghold as a place that was in the top 50th percentile of Know-Nothing votes in every year from 1854 to 1858. A map of these locations according to this last definition is shown in Panel (B) of Figure A.6.

Across all columns, we see a pattern in which economic factors, particularly crowdout, are less relevant in predicting Know-Nothing early success in stronghold locations. In the

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moving is negative but of occupational upgrading is positive on wealth. Though these must be interpreted with caution as they do not take into account the interaction, plausibly capture selection into migration and upgrading, and we do not have instruments for either.

[51] Table 1 lists vote totals for all major parties in the 1852-1858 elections.

last column, among locations where the vote shares are more reliably at the upper end of the distribution for Know-Nothings, there is no effect of crowdout or deskilling once adding the main and interaction effects.

In sum, our results document Know-Nothing support related to both long-simmering (i.e. industrialization and deskilling) and more acute (i.e. immigration and crowdout) economic changes. This support was brief, however, and economic factors do not well explain nativist patterns for the most ardent supporters.

1857 Suffrage Literacy Amendment Next, we examine the correlation of deskilling and crowdout with support for a clearly nativist policy, the passage of the 1857 constitutional amendment implementing a literacy test to vote. The amendment required men whose grandfathers were unable to vote to pass a literacy test to gain suffrage rights. In practice and in purpose, immigrants, the formerly enslaved, and their descendants were disenfranchised. We estimate our preferred specification from Table 2 Column (6) using votes of state legislators in favor of the amendment as the dependent variable.[52] We find evidence that our exposure measures are indeed correlated with nativist sentiment. Crowdout is positively correlated with a yes vote on the amendment (coef.: 0.067; s.e.: 0.040), and is marginally significant. Deskilling works in the same direction, but is smaller and not statistically significant (coef.: 0.017; s.e.: 0.024). These results suggest that crowdout and deskilling, through their effect on anti-immigrant sentiment, increase support for the Know-Nothing candidate, not through support for other planks in the Know-Nothing platform.

Heterogeneity Next, in Table 8 we examine whether interactions with our main economic factors can further elucidate the relationship between crowdout, deskilling and the Know-Nothing vote share in 1854. In column (1) we find that there is not a strong interaction between deskilling and crowdout. This may now not be very surprising since the two measures are not highly correlated and are designed to pick up different shocks for different skill levels in the occupational distribution (see Figure 7 Panel (C)).

Column (2) demonstrates that crowdout has a larger effect where there are more Irish living in a location. Evaluated at the 75th percentile share Irish in 1855 (approximately .27) - the results suggest that a one standard deviation increase in crowdout would increase Know-Nothing vote share by about seven percentage points. The next column of interest is the interaction of deskilling with cottage industries (column (5)). Our main specification includes a lagged control for cottage employment, and in this interaction we assess whether the growth in cottage industries interacts with the shift towards factory produc-

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[52]The sample consists of 221 towns. Some towns sent no representative. The variable takes on a 0 or 1 in towns with a single representative, and ranges between 0 and 1 in the 21 towns that sent multiple.

tion. We find evidence that these two effects are indeed multiplicative. Lastly, we test whether there is an interaction between lack of assimilation, fiscal burden and crowdout or deskilling. Using the measures we have at hand for these postulated "non-economic" factors, we fail to find consistent support for their importance in the movement.

Effects on Voter Turnout We find no evidence that Irish labor market crowdout and deskilling in manufacturing increased the Know-Nothing vote share by increasing voter turnout. Table 9 reports regression results using turnout in a given election year as the dependent variable in our preferred specification from column (6) in Table 2. In general, deskilling and crowdout do not strongly predict turnout. If anything, increased crowdout reduced turnout, working against Know-Nothing success. These results are consistent with economic factors increasing Know-Nothing vote share through the movement of marginal voters away from the other established parties.

V.E   Results in Broader Context: the Dynamics of Realignment

In this section, we place our results in the broader context of the realignment and disruptions occurring in the lead-up to the Civil War. In the 1850s, it became increasingly difficult for a national party to straddle the North and South regions of the United States (Foner 1970; Holt 1992; Howe 1976). The Whig party dissolved after its capitulation on the expansion of slavery caused many Northerners to abandon it (Holt 1973). The collapse of the Whigs coupled with changing views on slavery, immigration and labor reform created an opportunity for new parties to emerge: including the Free Soilers, Know-Nothings, and (later) the Republicans (Anbinder 1992). In Massachusetts, the platforms of all three parties overlapped to some extent. For instance, before the emergence of the Know-Nothing party, the anti-slavery Free Soilers embraced pro-labor reforms and provided the workingman with an alternative to the feckless Democratic party (Mulkern 1990).[53]

Table 1 reports vote shares for gubernatorial elections between 1852 and 1858 with bold font denoting winners. The table reveals the fluidity that characterized this time period. The Whigs were the dominant party prior to 1854, but the Free Soil party began to gain momentum with over 20 percent of the vote share in the early 1850s. Free Soil momentum stalled with the entrance of the Know-Nothings in 1854, who held the Governor's office for three years. In 1857, the Republicans gained control of all branches of power in the state, which they then held for decades.

How did the economic forces described above affect voters over time? Figure 9 plots the estimated coefficients and confidence intervals for crowdout and deskilling for the

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[53]According to Mulkern (1990), the Whigs were the party of Boston capital, they were against the 10-hour workday and land redistribution in the West, and in favor of the Tariff. The Free Soilers, on the other hand, ran on pro-labor and anti-corruption platform in Massachusetts.

Know-Nothing party. The results demonstrate that economic factors were important for the years in which they were in power (1854 to 1857, see Panels (A) and (B)). Once they lost power, however, economic factors cease to be predictive of vote share. In sharp contrast, Panel (C) demonstrates that the non-economic factors pauperism and assimilation, as we measure them, were never important predictors in *any* year.

Figure 10 repeats the exercise for years 1852 to 1859 and for all parties. Consistent with the emphasis on economic factors made by Mulkern (1990) and Fogel (1989, 1992), we find that labor market crowdout reduced support of the Whig party, in Panel (A).[54] In the early years, the lost Whig votes went to the upstart Free Soilers, who combined fervent abolitionism and lukewarm support for labor reforms (Mulkern 1990). In 1854, the Know-Nothings provided a new outlet for a combined nativist and labor reform agenda. Now, crowdout shifted marginal voters to the Know-Nothings, away from the Whigs. In Panel (B) we find that deskilling slightly shifted voters to the Democratic Party prior to 1854, but again, this changed with the appearance of the Know-Nothing party as a potentially more effective political force for reform (Mulkern 1990).

The estimated effects of crowdout and deskilling remain consistent for the three election years in which Gardner was victorious, 1854 to 1856. In 1857, the Know-Nothings lost the governorship to the Republicans. In that year and after, the effect of crowdout and deskilling on Know-Nothing vote share declines, and remains essentially zero for *all* parties. Irish labor market crowdout and deskilling in manufacturing had lost their influence on election outcomes in the state. After the 1856 election, the Know-Nothings played only a minimal role in Massachusetts politics. Our results on the declining influence of Irish labor market competition and deskilling in manufacturing are consistent with many of the hypothesized causes of disappearance of the Know-Nothings. Nativism's pull as a political issue diminished in the face of an overshadowing existential threat to the Union in the Civil War.

This interpretation accords with many historians who have studied the period. The rising importance of anti-slavery in the North, culminating in the Civil War, was the main force that led to the decline of the Know-Nothings as a national party (Foner 1970; Baum 1978; Gienapp 1985; Fogel 1989; Mulkern 1990; Anbinder 1992). In the end, Republicans won the competition to replace the Whigs as the northern anti-Democrat party. Republican leaders learned from their defeat as a single-issue (abolitionist) party in 1855, and worked to expand their coalition at the expense of the American Party by including parts of

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[54]Because vote shares across parties sum to one, lost votes to one party must be a gain to another.

the Know-Nothing's nativist agenda (Mulkern 1990).[55,56] In addition, Fogel (1989) empha-sizes a number of improvements in the economic situation in the mid-1850s that reduced the pull of nativism: drastic reductions in immigration, the rapid recovery in northern manufacturing from the Panic of 1857, and a decline in prices ending a decade of erosion of the real wage.

VI Conclusion

We investigate a long-standing question in economic history regarding the causes of the success of the Know-Nothing Party. Using newly digitized population and manufacturing censuses for Massachusetts, we construct local measures of exposure to both Irish labor market crowdout and deskilling in manufacturing. Consistent with Fogel's hypothesis, we find strong support for the notion that labor market competition among low-skill workers was an important factor accounting for approximately 10% of the rise. However, the pro-cess of industrialization and deskilling in manufacturing that started at least two decades before the great waves of Irish immigration also played a key role (Mulkern 1990). We find evidence of direct economic harm on native-born men more exposed to crowdout and deskilling, a potential motive for the nativist backlash against Irish immigration.

Our findings on when and where economic factors matter are also instructive. Eco-nomic factors predict vote shares for the Know-Nothing candidate for governor in years in which they win, were decisive overall in the 1855 election but unimportant among stronghold locations. These results suggest economic factors may tip marginal communi-ties towards a nativist platform. The electoral impact of deskilling and crowdout evapo-rated as the crisis over slavery and the existential threat to the Union posed by civil war sidelined other concerns. This shift in emphasis was foreshadowed by Abraham Lincoln, writing in 1855: *"I am not a Know-Nothing…how could I be? How can any one who abhors the oppression of negroes, be in favor of degrading classes of white people?"* The differences between native-born and Irish-born exploited by the Know-Nothing party were overshadowed, at

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[55]Some historians argue that the inclusion of nativist elements did not play an important role in Republi-can success in the late 1850s. See Foner (1970) and Baum (1978). Republicans as a national party were wary to adopt the mantle of nativism. Foner (1970) says the nativists "were absorbed into a party which made no concessions to them". The Western states (WI, IL, IN, OH) needed the anti-slavery votes of a large group of German voters. In New England, however, German immigrants were a small minority, where most immi-gration was of Irish Catholics. Moreover, nativism earned its biggest successes in this region, leading other historians to point out that Republican coalitions in New England actively sought out former Know-Nothing voters, but went to great lengths to distance their nativist agenda from the national party (Gienapp 1985; Fogel 1989; Mulkern 1990; Holt 1992).

[56]The findings on Know-Nothing voters are similar to those on Know-Nothing legislators. Using data on town-level representatives from the elections of 1853 to 1857, we find that almost all Know-Nothing legislators who had prior experience in the General Court (11 individuals), defected from the Whig Party. For those Know-Nothing legislators that survived the party's demise, they moved to the Republican party (see Appendix Figure A.8 Panel (B)).

least temporarily, by the divide between North and South.

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VII Tables

Table 1: Massachusetts Gubernatorial Election Outcomes, 1852-1858

	(1) 1852	(2) 1853	(3) 1854	(4) 1855	(5) 1856	(6) 1857	(7) 1858
Share of state-wide votes							
Know-Nothing	.	.	**0.63**	**0.38**	**0.59**	0.29	0.10
Whig	**0.45**	**0.46**	0.21	0.10	0.05	.	.
Democrat	0.28	0.27	0.11	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.32
Republican	.	.	.	0.27	.	**0.47**	**0.58**
Free Soil	0.26	0.23	0.05	.	.	.	.

Notes: State-wide vote shares (including Boston). Winning party in bold. An empty cell implies no votes cast for the party in that year. *Sources:* Various issues of the *Massachusetts Register* (1853-1860).

Table 2: Main Findings – Know-Nothing Rise, 1854 Vote Share

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Irish Labor Crowdout	0.031***	0.034***	0.033***	0.034***	0.034***	0.035***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Deskilling Index	0.008**	0.009**	0.009**	0.015***	0.014***	0.014**
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
County FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Urbanization	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pct Irish 1855	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Culture & Fiscal Burden	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Share Mfg & Ag 1840	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
No. of Observations	307	307	307	307	307	307
R-squared	0.056	0.189	0.188	0.198	0.193	0.188
P-value	0.029	0.018	0.035	0.108	0.111	0.099
Mean of Dept. Var	0.628	0.628	0.628	0.628	0.628	0.628

Notes: Table reports OLS estimates from Equation (3). The outcome across all specifications is the Share of Know-Voting Vote for Governor in Massachusetts in 1854. Please see text for the formal definition of crowdout and deskilling in Section III.B. Urbanization controls refer to an urban indicator (population > 2500 in 1855), number employed in cottage industries (1837), the share of native working age males in 1850 with an empty occupation string, and manufacturing establishments per capita (1855). Culture and Fiscal Burden control include an indicator for housing a foreign-born pauper in a given town and the assimilation index based on names of children of Irish-born parents. Share manufacturing and share agriculture are based on the 1840 census which asked employment at the household level. Regressions are weighted by ratable polls (similar to a measure of potential voters). The p-value from a Wald test of equality between the crowdout and deskilling coefficients is reported for each column. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
Sources: See Data Appendix in Section B in Section B for a detailed list of data sources.

Table 3: Robustness Checks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
				Added Controls				
	Irish Enfran-chisement	Share Whig 1844	Mill Town Indicator	Log Popu-lation 1855	Native Labor Demand	All Sector Shares 1840	Add Boston	No Weights
Irish Labor Crowdout	0.034***	0.034***	0.033***	0.034***	0.035***	0.028***	0.032***	0.020*
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Deskilling Index	0.014**	0.014**	0.012*	0.015**	0.014**	0.009	0.013**	0.011
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Const. Vote 1853	0.023							
	(0.070)							
Share Whig 1844		-0.068						
		(0.075)						
Mill			0.019					
			(0.019)					
Log Population 1855				-0.011				
				(0.016)				
Native Labor Demand					0.007			
					(0.024)			
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Urbanization	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pct Irish 1855	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Culture & Fiscal Burden	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Share Mfg & Ag 1840	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
All Sector Shares	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
No. of Observations	307	307	307	307	307	307	308	307
R-squared	0.185	0.188	0.187	0.187	0.185	0.215	0.201	0.153
P-value	0.104	0.121	0.093	0.130	0.100	0.127	0.115	0.526

Notes: Table reports OLS estimates from Equation (3). The outcome across all specifications is the Share of Know-Voting Vote for Governor in Massachusetts in 1854. Please see text or data appendix for the formal definition of crowdout and deskilling in Section III.B. Urbanization controls refer to an urban indicator (population > 2500 in 1855), number employed in cottage industries (1845), the share of native working age males in 1850 with an empty occupation string, and manufacturing establishments per capita (1855). Culture and Fiscal Burden control include an indicator for housing a foreign-born pauper in a given town and the assimilation index based on names of children of Irish-born parents. Share manufacturing and share agriculture are based on the 1840 census which asked employment at the household level. Each column is a slightly different specification indicated by the column table. Column (1) includes a proxy for Irish enfranchisement – the constitutional vote of 1853. Column (2) includes the Share Whig vote in 1844 as a control for historical voting patterns. Column (3) includes an indicator for mill town. Column (4) includes log population 1855. Column (5) includes a proxy for native labor demand - the shift in native men in manufacturing between 1850 and 1855. Column (6) includes employment shares that span all categories in the 1840 census. Column (7) includes Boston in the sample. Regressions are weighted by ratable polls (similar to a measure of potential voters) except in column (8). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
Sources: See Data Appendix in Section B for a detailed list of data sources.

Table 4: Placebo Outcomes and Non-Irish Crowdout

	(1) Placebo Outcomes	(2)	(3) Non-Irish Crowdout	(4)	(5)
	1844 Democrats	1844 Whig	British Crowdout	German Crowdout	German & British Crowdout
Irish Labor Crowdout	0.007	-0.017*	0.033***	0.034***	0.033***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Deskilling Index	0.003	0.005	0.013*	0.013*	0.013*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
British Labor Crowdout			0.004		
			(0.010)		
German Labor Crowdout				0.004	
				(0.010)	
British & German Crowdout					0.004
					(0.010)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Urbanization	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pct Irish 1855	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Culture & Fiscal Burden	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Share Mfg & Ag 1840	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of Observations	307	307	307	307	307
R-squared	0.180	0.170	0.185	0.185	0.185

Notes: Table reports OLS estimates from Equation (3). The outcome varies across the first two columns and is listed in the column heading. The outcome for columns (3) to (5) is the share of Know-Nothing vote in 1854 with British crowdout (column (3)), German crowdout (column (4)) and British-German crowdout (column (5)) as added as controls. Please see text for the formal definition of crowdout and deskilling in Section III.B. Urbanization controls refer to an urban indicator (population > 2500 in 1855), number employed in cottage industries (1837), the share of native working age males in 1850 with an empty occupation string, and manufacturing establishments per capita (1855). Culture and Fiscal Burden control include an indicator for housing a foreign-born pauper in a given town and the assimilation index based on names of children of Irish-born parents. Share manufacturing and share agriculture are based on the 1840 census which asked employment at the household level. Regressions are weighted by ratable polls. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
Sources: See Data Appendix in Section B for a detailed list of data sources.

Table 5: Short-Run Industrial Response to Irish Immigration

	(1) 1855 Estab. p.c.	(2) Δ 1855-45 Estab. p.c.	(3) Δ 1855-45 Estab. p.c.	(4) 1855 Value p.c.	(5) Δ 1855-45 Value p.c.	(6) Δ 1855-45 Value p.c.
Percent Irish 1855	-0.018*** (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)		3.262*** (0.852)	1.363 (0.873)	
Δ Share Mfg Labor Irish Males			0.003 (0.004)			0.551 (0.701)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Urbanization	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Culture & Fiscal Burden	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Share Mfg & Ag 1840	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of Observations	307	307	307	307	307	307
R-squared	0.320	0.340	0.338	0.627	0.203	0.194

Notes: Table reports OLS estimates on the relationship between industrialization and the percent of Irish in 1855 (columns (1) (2), (4), and (5)) or the change in share manufacturing labor comprised of Irish males (columns (3) and (6)). The other controls are as described in the notes for Table 2. Regressions are weighted by registered voters. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.

Sources: See Data Appendix in Section B for a detailed list of data sources.

Table 6: Effects of State-level Irish Crowdout on Native Wealth, Migration and Occupational Upgrading

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
								Occupational
	Ln(Total Wealth, 1860)			Any Wealth in 1860 (=1)			Moved (=1)	Upgrade
Irish Labor State Crowdout	-0.221***	-0.311***	-0.504***	-0.012***	-0.016***	-0.034***	0.004	0.137***
	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.007)
Deskilling Exposure (Town)	-0.001	0.003	-0.022	-0.002	-0.001	-0.003	0.014**	0.017***
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Deskill X Mechanic	-0.080*	-0.075*	-0.062	-0.007	-0.007	-0.006	0.000	-0.012
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.008)
Mechanic (=1)	-0.109**	-0.087	-0.150***	0.004	0.006	0.001	0.043***	0.100***
	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.046)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.018)
Crowdout X Moved (=1)		0.268***			0.013**			
		(0.037)			(0.006)			
Moved (=1)		-0.508***			-0.053***			
		(0.067)			(0.010)			
Crowdout X Occ. Upgrade			0.313***			0.024***		
			(0.045)			(0.006)		
Occ. Upgrade			0.740***			0.057***		
			(0.041)			(0.006)		
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age Group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ln(Real Property, 1850)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Any Real Property, 1850 (=1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of Observations	50587	50587	50587	50587	50587	50587	50587	50587
Mean of Dept. Var	5.862	5.862	5.862	0.796	0.796	0.796	0.266	0.282

Notes: Observations represent native-born Massachusetts men linked in the 1850 and 1860 censuses. Crowdout is the state-level shift of Irish into the occupation of the native-born individual in 1850. All regressions include county fixed effects for 1850 residence, age group fixed effects, and controls for real property in 1850. Standard errors are clustered at the town level are in parentheses. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
Sources: See Data Appendix in Section B for a detailed list of data sources.

Table 7: Predictors of Know-Nothing Rise in Stronghold Locations

	(1) All towns	(2) Stronghold 75^{th}pctile 1854 & 1855	(3) Stronghold 75^{th}pctile 1854 & 1857	(4) Stronghold 75^{th}pctile 1854 & 1858	(5) Stronghold $>$ 50^{th}pctile every year
Irish Labor Crowdout	0.035***	0.029***	0.037***	0.040***	0.033***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Deskilling Index	0.014**	0.014***	0.012**	0.013**	0.014**
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Stronghold1		0.167***			
		(0.013)			
Stronghold1xCrowdout		-0.030**			
		(0.015)			
Stronghold1xDeskill		-0.021			
		(0.013)			
Stronghold2			0.166***		
			(0.016)		
Stronghold2xCrowdout			-0.043**		
			(0.020)		
Stronghold2xDeskill			-0.048***		
			(0.010)		
Stronghold3				0.136***	
				(0.019)	
Stronghold3xCrowdout				-0.062***	
				(0.021)	
Stronghold3xDeskill				0.008	
				(0.021)	
Stronghold4					0.092***
					(0.019)
Stronghold4xCrowdout					-0.028
					(0.024)
Stronghold4xDeskill					-0.018**
					(0.008)
Full Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. Stronghold	.	40	26	22	34
No. Observations	307	300	300	300	307
R-squared	0.188	0.382	0.317	0.274	0.229

Notes: Table reports OLS estimates on the relationship between Share of Gubernatorial Votes for 1854 Know-Nothing Candidate and the Irish labor crowdout and deskilling indices. All specification includes full controls, which are: urbanization controls refer to an urban indicator (population > 2500 in 1855); number employed in cottage industries (1837); the share of native working age males in 1850 with an empty occupation string; manufacturing establishments per capita (1855); culture and fiscal burden control include an indicator for housing a foreign-born pauper in a given town and the assimilation index based on names of children of Irish-born parents; share manufacturing and share agriculture are based on the 1840 census which asked employment at the household level. Regressions are weighted by ratable polls. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
Sources: See Data Appendix in Section B for a detailed list of data sources.

Table 8: Heterogeneity

	(1) Deskill x Crowdout	(2) Crowdout x Irish	(3) Deskill x Irish	(4) Crowdout x Cottage	(5) Deskill x Cottage	(6) Crowdout x Assim.	(7) Deskill x Assim.	(8) Crowdout x Pauper	(9) Deskill x Pauper
Irish Crowdout	0.032***	-0.001	0.035***	0.037***	0.033***	-0.016	0.035***	0.010	0.035***
	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.063)	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.010)
Deskilling Index	0.010	0.013**	0.027**	0.014**	0.008	0.014**	-0.005	0.013**	0.024
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.058)	(0.006)	(0.021)
CrowdoutxDeskill	0.009								
	(0.005)								
CrowdoutxIrish		0.272***							
		(0.089)							
DeskillxIrish			-0.059						
			(0.056)						
CrowdoutxCottage				-0.014					
				(0.019)					
DeskillxCottage					0.035**				
					(0.016)				
CrowdoutxAssim.						0.074			
						(0.094)			
DeskillxAssim.							0.028		
							(0.086)		
CrowdoutxPauper								0.039**	
								(0.019)	
DeskillxPauper									-0.011
									(0.021)
Full Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Estimate	0.040	0.271	-0.024	0.023	0.069	0.058	0.063	0.048	0.024
Standard Error	0.009	0.076	0.055	0.018	0.018	0.033	0.088	0.012	0.022

Notes: Table reports OLS estimates from Equation (3). The outcome across all specifications is the Share of Know-Voting Vote for Governor in Massachusetts in 1854. Please see text for the formal definition of crowdout and deskilling in Section III.B. Each of these indices is interacted and the name of the interaction is given by the column heading. Irish is the share of population that is Irish-born in 1855 (ranges from 0-1). Cottage industry employment in 1845 is measured in thousands of employed. Pauper is an indicator for the presence of any foreign-born pauper in 1850. See the text and data appendix for detailed explanations of variable construction. Regressions are weighted by ratable polls (similar to a measure of potential voters). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
Sources: See Data Appendix in Section B for sources.

Table 9: Turnout by Year

	(1) 1852 Turnout	(2) 1853 Turnout	(3) 1854 Turnout	(4) 1855 Turnout	(5) 1856 Turnout	(6) 1857 Turnout
Irish Labor Crowdout	-0.013* (0.007)	-0.016** (0.008)	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.010)
Deskilling Index	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.008)	0.000 (0.008)	0.005 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.011)	0.006 (0.012)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Urbanization	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pct Irish 1855	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Culture & Fiscal Burden	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Share Mfg & Ag 1840	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of Observations	308	307	308	307	308	307
R-squared	0.487	0.395	0.199	0.280	0.336	0.266
P-value	0.306	0.177	0.093	0.308	0.609	0.521

Notes: Table reports OLS estimates from Equation (3). Turnout is measured as total votes for governor divided by ratable polls, a measure of eligible voters. Urbanization controls refer to an urban indicator (population > 2500 in 1855), number employed in cottage industries (1837), the share of native working age males in 1850 with an empty occupation string, and manufacturing establishments per capita (1855). Culture and Fiscal Burden control include an indicator for housing a foreign-born pauper in a given town and the assimilation index based on names of children of Irish-born parents. Share manufacturing and share agriculture are based on the 1840 census which asked employment at the household level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.

Figure 1: Correlates of Know-Nothing Governor Vote Share

Panel (A): Manufacturing Employment

Panel (B): Share Population Foreign-born

Panel (C): Share Population Urban

Notes: Binned scatterplots depict the bivariate relationship between county-level vote share for Know-Nothing gubernatorial candidates and socio-economic variables measured in the 1850 Census. The sample is limited to Northern and border states in which the Know-Nothing Party (also known as American Party) fielded a candidate (e.g. 1854: Delaware, Massachusetts, New York; 1855: Kentucky, New Hampshire, Vermont; 1856: Illinois; 1857: Iowa, Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania). The underlying regressions include state fixed effects and are weighted by county vote totals. The slope estimates reported with standard errors in parentheses clustered by state. *Sources*: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (1999) and Haines *et al.* (2010).

Figure 2: Irish Immigration into U.S.

Panel (A): Irish Immigration 1820 – 1870

Panel (B): Immigration Inflows 1820 – 2000

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975); U.S. Bureau of the Census (1995);
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2017)

Notes: Shaded area is the timing of the Potato Famine in Ireland (1845-1852). Dark red line is the timing of the Know-Nothing landslide in Massachusetts. *Source:* Ferenczi & Willcox (1929).

Figure 3: Percent Irish and Nay Votes

Panel (A): Percent Irish (1855)

Panel (B): Percent Vote Nay 1853 Constitution

Note: Data from for Panel (A) from the 1855 Massachusetts Census and data from Panel (B) are from the *Daily Advertiser*. Values for Boston are not included in the maps.

Figure 4: Conceptual Framework

Notes: Supply and Demand Shocks in Antebellum Massachusetts.

Figure 5: Irish Shift (1850 to 1855) and Baseline (1850) Share Native in Occupational Categories

Figure 6: Change in Average Establishment Size, Massachusetts

Notes: Data from the Massachusetts Manufacturing Census in 1837, 1845 and 1855. Histogram of average establishment size (number of workers per establishment by industry) over the three time periods.

Figure 7: Correlation Plots: Rise of Know-Nothings

Panel (A): Crowdout

Panel (B): Deskilling

Panel (C): Correlation between Crowdout and Deskilling

Note: Partial correlation plots from Equation (3) between crowdout in Panel (A) and deskilling in (B) and the outcome of Share Know-Nothing votes for Governor in Massachusetts, 1854. Panel (C) depicts a simple correlation between crowdout and deskilling. See text for details.

Figure 8: Occupations by Ethnicity

Panel (A): Percent of Ethnicity in an Occupation

Panel (B): Frequencies of Ethnicity in an Occupation

Panel (C): Shift by Ethnicity

Source: Massachusetts and Federal Population Censuses, 1850 and 1855 (FamilySearch 2016; Ruggles *et al.* 2018).

Figure 9: Regression Results: Hypothesized Factors

Panel (A): Deskilling	Panel (B): Crowdout	Panel (C): Non-Economic Factors

Note: Figure plots estimates from Equation (3). The outcome across all specifications is the Share of vote for the respective party in each year. Please see text or data appendix for the formal definition of crowdout and deskilling in Section III.B. We include the same controls as 2 Column (6). The Panel heading provides the coefficient plotted.

Figure 10: Regression Results for All Political Parties

Panel (A): Irish Labor Market Crowdout

Panel (B): Deskilling

Note: Standardized coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from Equation (3) over time for each party running a gubernatorial candidate: Whigs (W), Democrats (D), Free Soilers (FS), Know-Nothings (KN), and Republicans (R). We include the same controls as 2 Column (6). The Panel heading provides the coefficient plotted.

A Supplemental Appendix

Table A.1: Summary Statistics: Voting Outcomes

	(1) Mean	(2) s.d.	(3) 25th	(4) 50th	(5) 75th	(6) N
Know-Nothing Vote Share						
1854	0.61	0.15	0.52	0.63	0.71	307
1855	0.35	0.16	0.22	0.36	0.46	306
1856	0.61	0.16	0.51	0.63	0.73	305
1857	0.25	0.15	0.14	0.25	0.36	306
1858	0.08	0.08	0.02	0.05	0.12	307
1859	0.11	0.10	0.03	0.09	0.16	303
Turnout						
1852	0.63	0.13	0.56	0.64	0.71	307
1853	0.59	0.13	0.52	0.60	0.68	306
1854	0.56	0.13	0.48	0.56	0.63	307
1855	0.58	0.13	0.50	0.59	0.66	306
1856	0.66	0.14	0.59	0.67	0.73	307
1857	0.55	0.14	0.48	0.54	0.62	306
Legislator "Yea" on 1857 Literacy Amendment						
Mean within town	0.76	0.40	0.50	1.00	1.00	221

Notes: Unweighted summary statistics for towns in the main estimation sample (excludes Boston). Turnout is measured as the number of votes cast for governor in an election divided by ratable polls in 1854. The 1857 literacy amendment enforced literacy tests for voters whose grandfathers could not vote, (e.g. immigrants and the formerly enslaved and their descendants). Votes for the amendment were in the legislature. This variable is the proportion of legislatures for a given town that voted "Yea" for the amendment.
Sources: See Data Appendix in Section B for detailed information on the construction and data sources for all variables.

Table A.2: Robustness Check: 1837-55 Deskilling Index

	(1) Base Tab 1 - Col. 6	(2) 1837-55 Deskilling
Irish Labor Crowdout	0.035*** (0.010)	0.034*** (0.010)
1845-55 Deskilling Index	0.014** (0.006)	
1837-55 Deskilling Index		0.017*** (0.006)
County FE	Yes	Yes
Urbanization	Yes	Yes
Pct Irish 1855	Yes	Yes
Culture & Fiscal Burden	Yes	Yes
Share Mfg & Ag 1840	Yes	Yes
No. of Observations	307	307
R-squared	0.188	0.192
P-value	0.099	0.178

Notes: Table reports OLS estimates from Equation 3. The outcome across all specifications is the Share of Know-Voting Vote for Governor in Massachusetts in 1854. Column (1) uses the deskilling index measured from 1845-55 and 1845 industry shares. Column (2) uses the deskilling index measured from 1837-55 and 1837 industry shares. Controls are the same as in Table 2 Column (6). Regressions are weighted by ratable polls (similar to a measure of potential voters) except in column (8). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
Sources: See Data Appendix in Section B for a detailed list of data sources.

Table A.3: Summary Statistics: Controls

	(1) Mean	(2) s.d.	(3) 25th	(4) 50th	(5) 75th	(6) N
Irish Labor Crowdout	-0.011	0.934	-0.761	-0.065	0.756	307
Deskilling Index	0.001	1.002	-0.534	-0.447	0.139	307
Population in 1855	3,165	4,298	1,112	1,876	3,246	307
Ln(Population) in 1855	7.615	0.869	7.014	7.537	8.085	307
Urban (=1)	0.384	0.487	0.000	0.000	1.000	307
Share population Irish in 1855	0.092	0.073	0.034	0.075	0.135	307
Any foreign-born pauper in 1850	0.505	0.501	0.000	1.000	1.000	307
Failure to assimilate	0.682	0.124	0.649	0.681	0.715	307
Share labor in manufacturing (1840)	0.316	0.191	0.160	0.274	0.446	307
Share in agriculture (1840)	0.581	0.241	0.388	0.621	0.785	307
Share in mining (1840)	0.003	0.019	0.000	0.000	0.000	307
Share in commerce (1840)	0.022	0.027	0.004	0.015	0.029	307
Share in professional (1840)	0.016	0.012	0.009	0.013	0.018	307
Share in river transport (1840)	0.002	0.009	0.000	0.000	0.000	307
Share in ocean transport (1840)	0.060	0.158	0.000	0.001	0.013	307
Native-born share of employment (1850)	0.894	0.061	0.875	0.908	0.932	307
Change in labor demand of native-born	-0.055	0.311	-0.105	0.005	0.104	307
Cottage industry employment (1845)	203	512	8	46	203	307
Manufacturing estab. per capita (1855)	0.007	0.006	0.003	0.005	0.008	307
Change in man. estab. p.c. (1855-45)	0.001	0.006	-0.001	0.001	0.003	307
$ value of man. output p.c. (1855)	4.557	1.111	3.989	4.731	5.337	307
Change in $ val. of man. out. p.c. (1855-45)	0.783	0.850	0.327	0.689	1.191	307
Change in p.p. of Irish emp. (1855-45)	0.037	0.077	0.006	0.029	0.063	307

Notes: Unweighted summary statistics for the 307 towns included in the main results.
Sources: See Data Appendix in Section B for detailed information on the construction and data sources for all variables.

Table A.4: Shift-Share Exposure: Rotemberg Weights

Panel (A): Crowdout Exposure Occupation Weights and Shifts

	$\hat{\alpha}_k$	g_k	$\hat{\beta}_k$
Factory Operatives	0.27	0.37	0.047
Laborer	0.20	0.06	0.004
Agriculturalist	0.16	-0.06	0.036
Low Skill Mechanics	0.11	-0.05	0.018
Boot and Shoe	0.11	0.03	0.051
Merchants	0.07	-0.07	0.100
Mariners	0.02	-0.07	0.083
High Skill Mechanics	0.02	-0.04	-0.016
Misc	0.02	-0.04	-0.011
Professionals	0.02	-0.07	0.077
Manufacturers	0.00	-0.07	-0.407
Share Top-5	0.84		
cor($\hat{\alpha}_k$,g_k)	0.80		

Panel (B): Deskilling Exposure Negative and Positive Weights

	Sum	Mean	Share
Positive	1.049	0.016	0.623
Negative	-0.049	-0.001	0.377

Panel (C): Deskilling Exposure Industry Weights and Shifts

	$\hat{\alpha}_k$	g_k	$\hat{\beta}_k$
Cotton Mills	0.57	40.89	0.022
Calico	0.15	37.34	-0.001
Boots and Shoes	0.12	-8.85	0.039
Woolen	0.06	18.84	0.012
Linen	0.03	154.65	0.040
Share Top-5	0.94		
cor($\hat{\alpha}_k$,g_k)	0.27		

Notes: This table reports summary statistics of the Rotemberg weights ($\hat{\alpha}_k$) on each initial share in the exposure indices using the procedure developed in Goldsmith-Pinkham *et al.* (2020). Panel (A) explores the underlying identifying information for the Irish labor market crowdout exposure index. Occupations are listed in order of the highest weight. Note that all occupations have positive weights. g_k is the the demeaned occupation-specific shift and $\hat{\beta}_k$ is the coefficient from the just-identified regression using the share as the instrument. The top-5 occupation categories by weight make up 84 percent of the total weight, and the correlation coefficient between the Rotemberg weights and occupation shifts is 0.80. Panel (B) reports the sum of weights, mean weight, and share of industries with positive and negative weights. Panel (C) repeats the analysis of Panel (A) for the top-5 industries by weight in the deskilling exposure index.

Table A.5: Relationship Between Occupation Shares and Observable Characteristics

	(1) Factory Operative	(2) Laborer	(3) Agriculturalist	(4) Low-Skill Mechanics	(5) Boots and Shoes	(6) Crowdout
Percent Irish (1855)	0.001	0.008	-0.528***	0.053	-0.012	0.662
	(0.038)	(0.093)	(0.089)	(0.108)	(0.191)	(0.988)
Urban (=1)	-0.000	0.002	-0.046***	0.001	0.008	0.013
	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.123)
Man. Est. p.c. (1855)	-0.019	-0.560	-0.748	1.181	-1.293	-5.830
	(0.205)	(0.830)	(0.850)	(1.093)	(1.346)	(7.422)
Native Labor Demand	-0.014*	-0.007	-0.013	0.009	0.028	-0.267
	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.173)
Cottage Emp (1845)	-0.003	0.001	-0.003	-0.024***	0.037**	0.114
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.091)
Pauper	0.000	0.011	-0.011	0.011	-0.016	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.101)
Assimilation	0.019	0.042	-0.013	0.069	-0.001	0.688
	(0.018)	(0.056)	(0.074)	(0.053)	(0.074)	(0.563)
Share Whig (1844)	0.010	-0.033	0.088**	0.093*	-0.127*	-0.671*
	(0.008)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.053)	(0.066)	(0.358)
Deskilling Index	0.006**	0.008	0.011**	0.001	-0.038***	-0.012
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.051)
Share Man. (1840)	0.013	-0.029	-0.036	0.191***	0.502***	2.542***
	(0.016)	(0.056)	(0.051)	(0.065)	(0.097)	(0.495)
Share Ag. (1840)	0.010	0.090**	0.467***	0.024	0.234***	2.039***
	(0.016)	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.056)	(0.075)	(0.435)

Notes: Each column reports results of a single regression of town-level native-born occupation share on observable characteristics. Only the top five occupation categories by weight are reported. See Goldsmith-Pinkham *et al.* (2020) for the procedure to construct weights. The final column is the Irish labor market crowdout exposure index. Regressions are weighted by ratable polls (similar to a measure of potential voters). Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
Sources: See Data Appendix in Section B for detailed information on the construction and data sources for all variables.

Table A.6: Relationship Between Manufacturing Industry Shares and Observable Characteristics

	(1) Cotton Mills	(2) Calico	(3) Boots and Shoes	(4) Woolen	(5) Linen	(6) Deskilling
Percent Irish (1855)	0.460*	0.220	-0.003	0.155	0.019	5.233***
	(0.246)	(0.137)	(0.003)	(0.142)	(0.018)	(1.849)
Urban (=1)	-0.030	-0.015	0.000	0.035**	0.002	-0.134
	(0.025)	(0.012)	(0.000)	(0.016)	(0.002)	(0.171)
Man. Est. p.c. (1855)	-0.412	-1.435	0.005	1.275	-0.075	-9.225
	(2.122)	(1.204)	(0.029)	(0.833)	(0.110)	(17.128)
Native Labor Demand	-0.072	-0.013	0.000	-0.021	-0.004	-0.534
	(0.079)	(0.023)	(0.000)	(0.018)	(0.003)	(0.412)
Cottage Emp (1845)	-0.057***	-0.011	-0.000	-0.025***	-0.002*	-0.546***
	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.000)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.117)
Pauper	-0.007	0.006	0.000	0.011	-0.001	0.108
	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.000)	(0.010)	(0.002)	(0.143)
Assimilation	-0.093	0.098	0.000	0.025	-0.008	-0.052
	(0.101)	(0.068)	(0.001)	(0.048)	(0.018)	(0.800)
Share Whig (1844)	-0.003	-0.002	0.001	-0.060	0.002	0.275
	(0.092)	(0.025)	(0.001)	(0.059)	(0.003)	(0.653)
Irish Labor Crowdout	0.014	-0.006	0.000	0.002	0.001	-0.027
	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.000)	(0.008)	(0.001)	(0.109)
Share Man. (1840)	0.544***	0.111	0.000	0.182***	0.008	5.159***
	(0.133)	(0.073)	(0.001)	(0.054)	(0.007)	(0.980)
Share Ag. (1840)	0.075	0.031	0.000	0.154***	0.014*	1.863**
	(0.110)	(0.049)	(0.001)	(0.044)	(0.008)	(0.777)

Notes: Each column reports results of a single regression of town-level industry share in 1845 on observable characteristics. Only the top five industry categories by Rotemberg weight are reported. See Goldsmith-Pinkham *et al.* (2020) for the procedure to construct weights. The final column is the deskilling exposure index. Regressions are weighted by ratable polls (similar to a measure of potential voters). Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.

Sources: See Data Appendix in Section B for detailed information on the construction and data sources for all variables.

Table A.7: Robustness to Spatial Correlation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Distance Cutoff				
	20km	50km	100km	150km	None
Panel (A): Moran's *I* Statistic of Global Correlation					
Chi-square	4.43	2.99	2.60	2.32	2.44
p-value	0.04	0.08	0.11	0.13	0.12
Panel (B): Standard Errors Adjusted for Spatial Correlation					
Irish Labor Crowdout	0.035***	0.035**	0.035**	0.035**	0.035***
	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.005)
Deskilling Index	0.014**	0.014**	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Panel (C): Local Spillovers of Crowdout and Deskilling					
Irish Labor Crowdout	0.029**	0.034***	0.033***	0.031***	0.033***
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Deskilling Index	0.014**	0.014**	0.015***	0.015***	0.015**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Lagged Crowdout	0.017	-0.003	0.008	0.015	0.006
	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Lagged Deskilling	0.027	0.023	0.025	0.033*	0.032*
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Urbanization	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pct Irish 1855	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Culture & Fiscal Burden	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Share Mfg & Ag 1840	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The outcome across all specifications is the Share of Know-Voting Vote for Governor in Massachusetts in 1854. Panel (A) reports results from estimating Moran's I using residuals from Equation (3) from Column (6) of Table 2, and an inverse distance weighting matrix. Panel (B) adjusts standard errors for spatial autocorrelation using the procedure developed by Conley (1999) and a weighting matrix with a linear distance decay. Panel (C) estimates a SLX model using an inverse distance weighting matrix and includes first-order spatial lags of the two exposure variables of interest. Regressions are weighted by ratable polls in 1854. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.

Figure A.1: Occupational Distribution for Know-Nothing Members and All Native Males in Massachusetts

Notes: Data from Archives of Massachusetts Historical Society provided by Tyler Anbinder (Anbinder 1992). Pink bars describe the occupational distribution for Know-Nothing members using lists from Worcester and purple bars provide the same for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Figure A.2: State Characteristics

Panel (A): Share Irish — Panel (B): Share Catholic Valuation

Notes: Data from 1850 U.S. Census. Panel (A) describes the share of population that is Irish-born, Panel (B) describes the share of church property value that is owned by Roman Catholics.

Figure A.3: Pauperism and Criminals

Panel (A): Total Number of Paupers Supported Panel (B): Total Annual Cost of Support

Panel (C): Total Number of Criminals Convicted Panel (D): Total Number of Criminals In Prison

Notes: Data from Table CLXXIII. Pauperism in the United States, 1850. Panel (A) describes the whole number of native and foreign Paupers supported in whole or part within the year ending June 1, Panel (B) describes an annual cost of support. Data from Table CLXXVI. Statistics of Criminals. Panel (C) describes the whole number of criminals convicted within the year of 1850, Panel (D) describes the whole number of criminals in prison on June 1, 1850.

Figure A.4: Urbanization Rates by State (1790-1860)

Notes: Blue line is Massachusetts. Black line is New York. Top gray line is Rhode Island. *Source*: Author calculation from 1790 - 1860 Census: US Population Data provided by NHGIS

Figure A.5: Wage Observations from Census of Social Statistics (1850 & 1860)

Panel (A): Daily wage without board for day laborers

1850 1860

Panel (B): Daily wage carpenters

1850 1860

Panel (C): Monthly wage for farm laborers

1850 1860

Notes: Histograms provide the frequency of exact reported wages in contemporary dollars. The sample size varies between 299 and 302 towns. Directions to Census marshalls as to how to collect and report local wage information consisted entirely of the following statement: *"The information called for in the six columns relating to wages is so simple, and so plainly set forth in the headings thereof, that it is deemed unnecessary to add thereto."* (DeBow 1854, xxv)

Source: Manuscripts of the Census of Social Statistics of 1850 and 1860. Data was hand entered by authors from manuscript images published on Ancestry.com.

Figure A.6: Know-Nothing Gubernatorial Votes Over Time (Percent)

Panel (A): Map of Votes in 1854 and 1857

(a) 1854 (b) 1857

Panel (B): Map of Republicans in 1857 and Stronghold

(c) 1857 (d) Stronghold

Notes: Color scheme held constant across exhibits (a)-(c) with breakpoints at 0, 20, 40, 60, 80 and 100. Stronghold defined as municipalities where the Know-Nothing vote is greater than 50 pctile in every year. *Sources*: Various years of the *Massachusetts Register*.

Figure A.7: Permutation Tests

Panel (A): Crowdout

Panel (B): Deskilling

Notes: Distribution of coefficients from permutation test of crowd-out and deskilling indicies, respectively.

Figure A.8: Know-Nothing Legislators

Panel (A): Know-Nothing Town Representatives

Note: labels on each marker represent a total number of observations.

Panel (B): Know-Nothing Legislators Shifting Parties

Note: Base year = 1854

Note: Data from the *Daily Advertiser* entered for the election cycles 1853 to 1857 and demonstrates the number of legislators of a given party and, for those Know-Nothing legislators that could be linked, their party affiliation over time.

B Data Appendix

B.A Town Harmonization

Over the period from which we draw data sources, 1840-1860, Massachusetts newly incorporated 26 towns and cities. We begin with towns listed in the 1840 U.S. Decennial Census to create a base list used to construct a panel of consistent towns across data sources. We aggregate data from the post-1840 incorporated towns into the original town from which they were split, leaving us with 309 towns in the base list (dropping Boston in the main regressions leaves a sample size of 308). Appendix Table B.8 provides a crosswalk of newly incorporated towns to original towns in the 1840 town base list.

Table B.8: Town Crosswalk

Town	Year of Incorporation	Original/Aggregate Town
Achushnet	1860	Dartmouth
Agawam	1855	West Springfield
Ashland	1846	Framingham
Belmont	1859	Cambridge
Blackstone	1845	Mendon
Chicopee	1848	Springfield
Clinton	1850	Lancaster
Holyoke	1850	West Springfield
Lakeville	1853	Middleborough
Lawrence	1847	Andover
Marion	1852	Rochester
Mattapoisett	1857	Rochester
Melrose	1850	Malden
Monterey	1847	Tyringham
Nahant	1853	Lynn
North Andover	1855	Andover
North Reading	1853	Reading
Norwell	1849	Scituate
Peabody	1855	Danvers
Revere	1852	Chelsea
Swampscott	1852	Lynn
West Brookfield	1848	Brookfield
Winchester	1850	Woburn
Winthrop	1852	Chelsea

Two towns additional towns - Boston Corner and Mashpee - are dropped from the analysis that infrequently appear in reported sources. Boston Corner was ceded from Massachusetts to New York in 1853. Mashpee was a reservation for the Wampanoag tribe of indigenous peoples.

B.B Voting Data

The primary outcome variables are town-level annual election returns for governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts from various years of the *Massachusetts Register* (1856), and various newspapers. Election returns for governor for 1852-1859 were hand-entered from the *Massachusetts Register*, an annually published state almanac during the period. We corroborate the reported vote totals for 1854 and 1857 in the *Massachusetts Registers* with the original hand-written tallies from the Secretary of Commonwealth's office kept in the Massachusetts State Archives. Returns for the 1853 State Constitution vote also come from the *Massachusetts Register*. Election returns for the 1844 gubernatorial election and were entered from the hand-written records of the Secretary of the Commonwealth held at the Massachusetts State Archives.

We convert the candidate votes in the share of votes received by each political party by dividing by the total votes cast in the town. Turnout in a given year is calculated from the total votes cast in the town divided by the ratable polls in 1854. Ratable polls were the concept used at the time to measure the number of potential voters, and were reported in the *Massachusetts Register* (1855).

Infrequently, a few towns did not send returns to the State. These towns are dropped from regressions in years in which vote totals are not reported, but are included in the sample in years for which totals were reported. This is the reason why the sample size varies across years in the election outcomes regressions. These anomalies in the reporting are listed below and any adjustments that we make:

1. 1852 - Governor votes not reported in Sharon. Used presidential votes for turnout.
2. 1853 - Governor votes not reported in Tisbury. Missing turnout.
3. 1855 - Governor votes not reported in Chilmark. Missing turnout.
4. 1854 - All towns reported.
5. 1856 - Governor votes not reported in Holland and Tolland. Used presidential votes for turnout.
6. 1857 - Governor votes not reported in New Ashford. Missing turnout.
7. 1858 - Used unofficial results reported in footnotes for Oxford and Wellfleet.

In addition, ratable polls in 1854 were not reported for Sherbourn and Weymouth. For these two towns, we predicted ratable polls as a function of 1855 town population, using the regression coefficient of ratable polls on population.

B.C Exposure to Labor Market Crowdout

Labor market crowdout measures a town's *exposure* to the state-wide labor supply shock from Irish immigration. It interacts the initial town-level occupation distribution of native-born workers with the state-wide growth in Irish employment in those same occupational categories:

$$(4) \qquad crowdout_i = \sum_j \frac{L_{Native,j}^{1850,i}}{L_{TotNative}^{1850,i}} \cdot \frac{(L_{Irish,j}^{1855,Mass} - L_{Irish,j}^{1850,Mass})}{L_{Total,j}^{1850,Mass}} \quad ,$$

where i indexes local labor markets, j represents skill groups, and the time step is between the 1850 Federal Census and the 1855 Massachusetts Census. State-wide shifts in skill cell-specific labor market competition from Irish immigrants - the second term in Equation (4) - is measured as the change in the number of each skill cell that is Irish-born between 1850 and 1855 normalized by total labor in that occupation in 1850. These shifts are weighted by the skill cell's share in each local labor market's initial native-born employment.

Skill-groups are defined by broad occupational categories, comparable across datasets: agriculturalists, boot and shoe makers, factory operatives, laborers, manufacturers, mariners, low-skill mechanics, high-skill mechanics, merchants, professionals, and miscellaneous. The eleven broad categories correspond to those used in the published aggregate statistics of the 1855 Massachusetts census (DeWitt 1856). We use these to verify that our data digitization of the 1855 microdata aligns closely with the published aggregates.

The initial occupation distributions are constructed from the 1850 Decennial Census microdata provided by (Ruggles *et al.* 2018). State-level changes in foreign-born penetration for each skill group are constructed from a combination of the 1850 complete count census, and the 1855 Massachusetts Population Census microdata provided by FamilySearch.org (FamilySearch 2016). The latter required digitizing the 1855 Massachusetts microdata, hand-entering occupations for 300,000 working age men. First, occupation strings were coded into the 1880 specific IPUMS occupation codes (OCC). The 1850 IPUMS complete count census microdata contains OCC codes. For both the 1850 and 1855 data, we then constructed the state-level foreign-born (or Irish) proportion in each of the eight broad occupation categories. The sample is limited to men, at least 16 years old, with a reported occupation and reported country of birth for both the 1850 and 1855 data. A reported occupation corresponds to an 1880 IPUMS OCC code of less than 300.

The primary labor market crowdout variable includes only the increase in Irish workers in each broad occupational category between 1850 and 1855. However, we also construct a number of other shocks based on immigrant ethnicity to use in robustness checks: British, German, and a combined British and German category.

B.D Exposure to Deskilling

Exposure to deskilling follows the general setup of a shift-share variable equation – state-wide industry-specific changes in average establishment size are interacted with lagged local industry employment shares:

$$
(5) \qquad deskilling_i = \sum_k \frac{L_k^{1845,i}}{L_{Tot}^{1840,i}} \cdot \left(\frac{L_k^{1855,Mass}}{N_k^{1855,Mass}} - \frac{L_k^{1845,Mass}}{N_k^{1845,Mass}} \right) \quad ,
$$

where i denotes town, k denotes industry, L denotes employment and N represents the number of establishments. The initial industry employment levels $L_k^{1845,i}$ by town are constructed from town-level reports in the 1845 Massachusetts Manufacturing Census, which we hand-entered (Palfrey 1846). The census reported town by industry aggregates, not firm-level microdata. An example of the type of information provided can be seen in Appendix Figure B.9. A total of 106 industry categories were reported in the 1845 Manufacturing Census, which are listed in Appendix Table B.9. Note that the denominator for

the share of employed is taken from the 1840 U.S. Decennial Population Census provided by IPUMS (Ruggles *et al.* 2018). This is so we could normalize by all employment in both manufacturing and agriculture, since the latter is not reported in the manufacturing census. Transportation workers, merchants, and professionals are also included in the total labor force.

Atack *et al.* (2004) demonstrate that average establishment wage declines with establishment size consistent with deskilling. See also Sokoloff (1984), Goldin & Sokoloff (1984) and Atack *et al.* (2010) for additional motivation for the use of establishment size as related to deskilling. Thus, the shifts in the deskilling exposure variable comes from the industry-specific state-wide changes in average establishment size. We use the 1845 and 1855 Massachusetts Manufacturing Censuses to construct this shift (Palfrey 1846; DeWitt 1856). State-wide totals of establishments and employment by industry were hand-entered to construct the shift. Per the instructions to assessors, information on the number of establishments was not requested for all industries. We are left with 62 industries in 1845 and 83 in 1855 where we can estimate average establishment size. The industries that did not report number of establishments fit into one of two categories: cottage industries using the putting-out system where the idea of an establishment lacks much meaning in our measure, or in industries with relatively small employment that resembled small shops.

By construction, our deskilling index gives a shift of zero in the industries where we cannot estimate average establishment size in both years. However, cottage industries had already experienced the deskilling process. These industries that formerly relied on itinerant artisans for all aspects of production now moved to using the putting out system. Production was divided into a series of low- and high-skill tasks, with low-skill tasks given to private households to complete during free time, say when not working in fields. For example, according to Hazard (1913) the boot and shoe industry in Massachusetts had already switched from skilled artisan cobblers to the low-skilled putting out system by the late 1830s. Thus, the fact that cottage industries experience no deskilling in the construction of our exposure variable is not an issue.

B.E   Other variables

1. **Population, urbanization, and share Irish population in 1855:** Controls for log population, an indicator for urban (town population >= 2,500), and the share of town population that was Irish immigrants are constructed using the 1855 Massachusetts Census microdata provided by FamilySearch (2016).

2. **Culture:** We proxy for culture using an index of how Irish are first names that Irish born parents give to their children once in the United States. We take all native-born children born to native or Irish parents and under age 10 in the 1855 State Census. We calculate the Irish name index following Abramitzky *et al.* (2019). Specifically for each given name i, $IrishIndex_i = \frac{\frac{\#Irish_i}{Total_i}}{\frac{\#Irish_i}{Total_i} + \frac{\#Native_i}{Total_i}}$. This variable ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 being a completely American name and 1 being a solely Irish name.

3. **Fiscal Burden of Immigration:** We measure the fiscal burden of immigration using the number of foreign-born paupers in the 1855 Massachusetts Census microdata. The primary variable to measure fiscal burden is an indicator equal to 1 if there are

Table B.9: Industries Used in Exposure to Factories Variable

No.	MA Census Code	1845 Listed Industries	No.	MA Census Code	1845 Listed Industries
1	1	Cotton Mills	54	58	Fire Arms
2	2	Calico Manufactures	55	59	Cannon
3	3	Bleaching and Coloring	56	60	Chocolate Mills
4	4	Woollen	57	61	Chair and Cabinet Manufacturers
5	5	Carpeting	58	62	Tin ware
6	6	Worsted	59	63	Comb Manufactories
7	7	Hosiery	60	64	White Lead and Other Paints
8	8	Linen	61	65	Linseed Oil
9	9	Silk	62	66	Camphene or Burning Fluid
10	10	Rolling, Slitting, and Nail Machines	63	67	Glue and Gum Manufactories
11	11	Forges	64	68	Cotton Gins
12	12	Pig-iron	65	69	Flour Mills
13	13	Hollow Ware and Castings	66	70	Tanneries
14	14	Machinery	67	71	Currying Establishments
15	15	Steam Engines and Boilers	68	72	Patent and Enameled Leather
16	16	Fire Engines	69	73	Boots and Shoes
17	17	Scythes	70	74	Straw Bonnets and hats
18	18	Axes, Hatchets, and Edge Tools	71	75	Bricks
19	19	Cutlery, Door Handles and Latches	72	76	Mathematical Instruments
20	20	Screws	73	77	Snuff, Tobacco, and Cigars
21	21	Butts or Hinges	74	78	Building Stone
22	23	Locks	75	79	Marble
23	24	Tacks and Brads	76	80	Lime
24	25	Shovels, Spades, Forks, and Hoes	77	81	Mineral Coal and Iron Ore
25	26	Ploughs and Other Agricultural Implements	78	82	Charcoal
26	27	Iron Railings, Fences, and Safes	79	83	Whips
27	28	Copper	80	84	Blacking
28	29	Brass Foundries	81	85	Blocks and Pumps
29	30	Brittania Ware	82	86	Mechanics Tools
30	31	Buttons	83	87	Wooden Ware
31	32	Glass	84	88	Corn and Other Brooms
32	33	Starch	85	90	Lasts and Shoe Pegs
33	34	Chemical Preparations	86	91	Lumber
34	35	Paper	87	92	Firewood
35	36	Piano-Fortes and Other Musical Instruments	88	117	Casks
36	37	Clocks	89	118	Fringe and Tassels
37	38	Sewing Machines	90	119	Stone and Earthen Ware
38	40	Chronometers, Watches, Gold and Silver Ware and Jewelry, Gold Pens	91	120	Sashes, Doors, and Blinds
39	41	Brushes	92	121	Gas
40	42	Saddles, Harness, and Trunks	93	122	Pickles and Preserves
41	43	Upholstery	94	123	Alcohol and other Distilled Liquors
42	44	Hats and Caps	95	124	Beer
43	45	Cordage	96	125	Friction Matches
44	46	Boats	97	126	India Rubber Goods
45	48	Masts and Spars	98	127	Bread
46	50	Cards	99	128	Types and Stereotype Plates
47	51	Salt	100	129	Boxes of all kinds
48	52	Railroad Cars, Coaches, Chaises, Wagons, Sleighs, and Other Vehicles	101	130	Confectionery
49	53	Lead	102	132	Porte-monnaies, Pocket-books, etc.
50	54	Sugar Refined	103	133	Clothing
51	55	Oil and Sperm Candles	104	138	Printing
52	56	Soap and Tallow Candles	105	139	Bookbinding
53	57	Powder Mills	106	140	Gravestones, Wheelwright Stock, Baskets, Umbrellas and a variety of other articles not elsewhere enumerated

Figure B.9: Example of 1845 Massachusetts Manufacturing Census Town-level Tabulation

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Woollen Mills, 1 ; sets of machinery, 1 ; wool consumed, 11,000 lbs. ; flannel or blanketing, m'd, 30,350 yds. ; V. $8,269 ; C. $5,000 ; M. E. 7 ; F. E. 2.

Establishments for m. of Rail-road Cars, Coaches, Chaises and other vehicles, 2 ; V. of vehicles m'd, $1,000 ; C. $500 ; E. 4.

Shoes m'd, 36,661 pairs ; V. $23,717 ; M. E. 62 ; F. E. 43.

Lumber prepared, 90,000 feet ; V. $1,038 ; E. 7.

Fire Wood prepared, 1,418 cords ; V. $4,098 ; E. 25.

Sheep, 6 ; V. $12 ; wool produced, 30 lbs ; V. $15.

Horses, 58 ; V. $2,505 ; neat cattle, 311 ; V. $6,814 ; swine, 103 ; V. $997.

Indian Corn or Maize raised, 2,341 bush. ; V. $1,404 ; rye, 354 bush. ; V. $283 ; barley, 37 bush. ; V. $29 ; oats, 321 bush. ; V. $128 ; potatoes, 7,095 bush. ; V. $2,128 ; other esculent vegetables, 750 bush. ; V. $112 ; hay, 714 tons ; V. $7,464.

Fruit raised, 3,755 bush. ; V. $750.

Butter, 11,026 lbs. ; V. $1,874.

Source: Palfrey (1846)

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any foreign-born paupers in a town. As a robustness check, we use the share of paupers that are foreign-born. The distribution of the share is highly skewed with a majority of zeros, and thus suggests our use of the indicator.

4. **Pre-existing industry composition:** In regressions, we control for some or all town-level industry shares of employment from the 1840 U.S. Population Census provided by IPUMS (Ruggles *et al.* 2018). The industry categories include: agriculture, manufacturing, commerce, professional, mining, river transportation, and ocean transportation. There were nine towns that existed in 1840 and should have been included in the census microdata, but were not. We use the county average industry shares for these towns: Boxford, Brookline, Easthampton, Essex, Georgetown, Hanover, Rowley, Somerville, Westhampton.

5. **Mill Town Indicator:** A mill town is defined as a settlement that developed around one or more textile mills. The mill town indicator is equal to one if the town had a high proportion of town employment in textile mills in the 1845 Massachusetts Manufacturing Census (Palfrey 1846).

6. **Native Labor Demand Shift:** Meant to control for potential changes in demand for native labor, the native demand shift is measured as: $D_{i,native} = \frac{L_{i,native}^{1855} - L_{i,native}^{1850}}{L_{i,native}^{1850}}$, using data from the 1850 U.S. and 1855 Massachusetts population censuses (Ruggles *et al.* 2018; FamilySearch 2016).

7. **Industrialization variables:** Our results on the short-run industrial response to Irish immigration use the level and change in establishments per capita and log output dollar value per capita at the town level. Establishments per capita is calculated as the total number of manufacturing establishments in a town in 1855 (or 1850) divided by the population in the town in 1855 (1850). The log dollar value of manufacturing output per capita is calculated similarly. Change in establishments per capita is the difference in levels. Change in output value is the difference in log dollars per capita. Establishments and output value was digitized from the 1845 and 1855 Massachusetts Manufacturing Censuses (Palfrey 1846; DeWitt 1856). Population is calculated from the 1850 U.S. census and 1855 Massachusetts census microdata (Ruggles *et al.* 2018; FamilySearch 2016).

8. **Cottage industry exposure:** Town cottage industry employment is measured using the employment counts in the 1845 Massachusetts Manufacturing Census (Palfrey 1846). We code an industry as "cottage" if it has a high percentage of female workers and a high percentage of hand power in 1850, or there is narrative evidence that production was primarily done by the putting out system. Cottage industries include: boots and shoes (71% of all cottage employment); straw bonnets and hats (27%); snuff, tobacco, and cigars ($< 1\%$); whips; port-monnaies, pocket-books, etc. ($< 1\%$); clothing ($< 1\%$); bookbinding ($< 1\%$). The boot and shoe, and straw bonnet and hat industries make up 45 percent of total manufacturing employment in the state.

9. **Share empty occupation string:** Measured in 1850 at the town-level using the 1850 U.S. census microdata (Ruggles *et al.* 2018), this variable captures the share of native-born males of working age (>15) with an empty occupation string or non-occupational response. We include this variable to capture potential measurement error in the initial 1850 occupation shares used in the crowdout exposure index. Errors by census

takers, in the digitization process, and when categorizing occupation strings into codes may lead to empty occupation strings that cluster within towns and lead to mismeasured occupation shares.

10. **Town latitude and longitude:** Robustness to forms of spatial correlation requires the use of location information for each historical town. We calculate the latitude and longitude of the centroid of each modern town using the shapefile produced by the Massachusetts Bureau of Geographic Information.[57] The shapefile uses the state plane coordinate system (Massachusetts - 2001), which we convert to latitude and longitude and calculate town centroids using ArcMap. The modern shapefile includes towns incorporated after our 1840 town base list, and does not include historical towns that no longer exist. To handle towns incorporated after 1840, we use two methods. First, we apply the modern geographic centroid of the original town from which the newly incorporated town seceded. Second, we average the latitude and longitude of all modern town centroids that were part of the 1840 town. Results are not affected by this choice. Nine historical towns no longer exist: four were annexed by Boston, four were flooded by the construction of the Quabbin Reservoir in 1938, and one town was ceded to Rhode Island.[58]

    (a) Brighton - annexed by Boston in 1874, dropped pin by eyeballing centroid in google maps, 42.34; -71.15

    (b) Charlestown - annexed by Boston in 1874. See `https://tools.wmflabs.org/geohack/geohack.php?pagename=Charlestown,_Boston&params=42_22_31_N_71_03_52_W_region:US-MA_type:city`

    (c) Dorchester - annexed by Boston in 1870, dropped pin by eyeballing centroid in google maps, 42.29; -71.06

    (d) West Roxbury - annexed by Boston in 1868, dropped pin by eyeballing centroid in google maps, 42.28; -71.16

    (e) Dana - disincorporated as part of Quabbin Reservoir. See `https://tools.wmflabs.org/geohack/geohack.php?pagename=Dana,_Massachusetts&params=42_25_19_N_72_13_39_W_type:city_region:US-MA`

    (f) Enfield - disincorporated as part of Quabbin Reservoir. See `https://tools.wmflabs.org/geohack/geohack.php?pagename=Enfield,_Massachusetts&params=42_19_0_N_72_19_58_W_type:city_region:US-MA`

    (g) Greenwich - disincorporated as part of Quabbin Reservoir. See `https://tools.wmflabs.org/geohack/geohack.php?pagename=Greenwich,_Massachusetts&params=42_21_33_N_72_17_47_W_type:city_region:US-MA`

    (h) Prescott - disincorporated as part of Quabbin Reservoir. See `https://tools.wmflabs.org/geohack/geohack.php/pagename=Prescott,_Massachusetts&params=42_23_30_N_72_20_41_W_type:city_region:US-MA`

    (i) Pawtucket - ceded to Rhode island in 1862. See `https://tools.wmflabs.org/geohack/geohack.php?pagename=Pawtucket,_Rhode_Island&params=41_52_32_N_71_22_34_W_type:city`

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[57]Source: http://www.mass.gov/anf/research-and-tech/it-serv-and-support/application-serv/office-of-geographic-information-massgis/datalayers/townsurvey.html (Accessed on June 17, 2020)

[58]All websites accessed on June 17, 2020.

Table B.10: Matched Sample vs Unmatched Population

	(1) Population Mean	(2) Difference: Matched-Population
=1 if urban	0.248	-0.0559***
		(0.002)
=1 if owns property	0.336	0.111***
		(0.002)
Ln(Real Estate Property+1)	2.462	0.822***
		(0.018)
=1 if literate	0.996	0.002***
		(0.0001)
=1 if Agriculturalist	0.250	0.053***
		(0.002)
=1 if Boots and Shoes	0.119	0.015***
		(0.002)
=1 if Factory Operative	0.005	-0.001***
		(0.0001)
=1 if High Skill Mechanic	0.095	0.001
		(0.001)
=1 if Laborer	0.110	-0.031***
		(0.001)
=1 if Low Skill Mechanic	0.146	-0.013***
		(0.002)
=1 if Manufacturer	0.025	0.002***
		(0.001)
=1 if Mariner	0.072	-0.003***
		(0.001)
=1 if Merchant	0.094	-0.013***
		(0.001)
=1 if Miscellaneous	0.056	-0.006***
		(0.001)
=1 if Professional	0.025	-0.003***
		(0.001)
Age	35.80	0.824***
		(0.076)

Notes: N=176,634 (118,908 unmatched; 60,726 matched). Table reports Population means and differences in variables between population and matched sample. We regress the variable of interest on a dummy for being in the matched sample. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.