



OF6-12/APA36/A16-3
Serial No. 0174

COMMANDER TRANSPORT SQUADRON TWELVE
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

30 September 1945.

From: Commander NAGASAKI Group (Commodore H. B. KNOWLES, USN,
C.T.G. 54.3 and ComtransRon 12, U.S.S. CAMBRIA, Flagship).
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 54.1 (ComPhibGrp 4).
(2) Commander Task Force 54 (ComFIFTHPhibFor).
(3) Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Action Report, Landings at NAGASAKI, 18 - 28 September
1945.

Reference: (a) PacFlt Conf. Ltr. 101-45 dated 1 January 1945.
(b) ComFIFTHPhibFor Operation Plan No. A1501-45.
(c) ComPhibGrp 4 Operation Plan No. A411-45.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Action Report.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded in compliance with references
(a), (b), and (c).


H. B. KNOWLES

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ComTransDiv 60
ComTransDiv 13 (Temp) (U.S.S. WAYNE)
ComLSTFlot 23
ComLSAFlot 16



Edw. M. BROWN,
Lieut. Comdr., USNR
Flag Secretary.

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COMMANDER TRANSPORT SQUADRON TWELVE
(ComNAGASAKI Group and C.T.G. 54.3)

ACTION REPORT - LANDINGS AT NAGASAKI

PART I - BRIEF SUMMARY

1. Task Group 54.3 (NAGASAKI Group) embarked the SECOND Marine Division at SAIPAN and commencing on 23 September, landed troops and equipment in the NAGASAKI Harbor area without enemy opposition.
2. The SECOND Marine Division was embarked in ships of this group as follows: 8th RCT on ships of TransDiv 34 (Temp), 2nd RCT on ships of TransDiv 60 (Temp) and 6th RCT in ships of TransDiv 13 (Temp). Artillery, Pioneer Bn., Motor Transport, Shore Party, Tank Bn., 43rd C.B. and miscellaneous engineer equipment was embarked in LST's of LSTFlot 23 (Temp) and LSM's of LSMFlot 16.
3. Unloading of transport types was completed on 28 September, prior to which date most LST's and LSM's had completed unloading and had departed from the area.

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ACTION REPORT - LANDINGS AT NAGASAKI

PART II - PRELIMINARIES

1. T.G. 54.3, NAGASAKI Group, was a part of the Southern Occupation Group (T.G. 54.1) under Rear Admiral Reifsnider, which in turn was a part of T.F. 54, FIFTH Amphibious Force, under Vice Admiral Hill.

2. The composition of this group was as follows:

T.G. 54.3 NAGASAKI Group - Commodore Knowles

59.1.2 SECOND Marine Division - Maj. Gen. Hunt, USMC

54.3.1 TransRon 12 (Temp) - Commodore Knowles

54.3.11 TransDiv 34 (Temp) - Commodore Knowles

GAMBRIA (SP) (APA-36)
LEHARD (APA-201)
APPLING (APA-58)
FREESTONE (APA-167)
LYCOLING (APA-155)
ANDROMEDA (AKA-15)
CAFRICORNUS (AKA-57)

54.3.12 TransDiv 60 (Temp) - Captain Hoan

GRILES (F) (APA-172)
BERNSTEIN (APA-203)
DELLSTE (APA-156)
BRANTON (APA-138)
LANIER (APA-125)
LAURENSA (AKA-84)
TYRRELL (AKA-60)

54.3.13 TransDiv 13 (Temp) - Captain Cooper

VANE (F) (APA-54)
KENNEDY (APA-202)
GAGE (APA-163)
AUDRAIN (APA-59)
MC INTYRE (APA-129)
AQUARIUS (AKA-16)
OTTAWA (AKA-101)

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Action Report - NAGASAKI - PART II - PRELIMINARIES.

54.3.2 LST Flotilla 23 (Temp) - Captain Weeden

Flotilla Flagship - LC(FP) 790

54.3.21 LST Group 13 (Temp) - Comdr. Lea

LST 481 (F), 166 (Csy Set), 571 (PB)
734, 785, 788 (Csy Set), 817,
829, 871 (Csy Set), 887 (Csy Set),
953, 975, 1073 (PB), 1123 (PB),
1140 (Csy Set)

NOTES:

(Csy Set) - Causeway Set on board.

(PB) - Pontoon Barges on board.

54.3.3 LSM Flotilla 16 (Temp) - Comdr. McKee

54.3.31 LSM Unit ONE - Comdr. McKee

LSM 498 (FP), 307, 309, 439, 441, 94,
170, 78, 253, 227

54.3.32 LSM Unit TWO - Lt. Cdr. Lane

LSM 450 (F), 448, 465, 263, 462, 452,
122, 466, 103, 286

54.3.4 LCT Flotilla (Temp)

LCT's as assigned from T.U. 54.2.4

54.3.5 TransRon 12 Control Party - Lieut. Stone

54.3.51 TransDiv 34 Control Officer -

54.3.52 TransDiv 60 Control Officer -

54.3.53 TransDiv 13 (Temp) Control Officer -

54.3.6 TransRon 12 Beach Party - Lt. Cdr. Cook

54.3.61 TransDiv 34 Beach Party -

54.3.62 TransDiv 60 Beach Party -

54.3.63 TransDiv 13 (Temp) Beach Party -

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Action Report - NAGASAKI - PART II - PRELIMINARIES

3. This group loaded the 2nd MarDiv at SAIPAN, much of the loading having been completed under the direction of ComTransDiv 60 (Temp) prior to the assumption of command of this group by ComTransRon 12. Assumption of command was as of 150243 Z September.

4. Personnel, vehicles and cargo scheduled for loading in ships of this group were as follows:

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u> (Number)	<u>VEHICLES</u> (Number)	<u>CARGO</u> (Short Tons)
<u>TRANSPORT DIVISION THIRTY-FOUR (Temp.)</u>			
GAMBRIA (APA-36) (SF)	754	121	516
MENARD (APA-201)	1467	75	655
APPLING (APA-50)	582	30	529
FRYESTONE (APA-167)	1282	105	606
LYCOMING (APA-155)	1064	45	900
ANDROMEDA (AKA-15)	128	83	1850
CAPRICORNUS (AKA-57)	173	68	1964

<u>TRANSPORT DIVISION SIXTY (Temp.)</u>			
GRILES (APA-172) (F)	1014	103	732
MERLETTIER (APA-203)	1084	94	637
BELLEFE (APA-156)	781	57	626
BALXTON (APA-138)	1250	103	541
LINER (APA-125)	1176	117	707
WAUNESHA (AKA-84)	87	108	1824
TYRELL (AKA-80)	103	118	1890

<u>TRANSPORT DIVISION THIRTEEN (Temp.)</u>			
WAYNE (APA-54) (F)	1277	69	782
HEMIFEL (APA-202)	1226	124	683
GAGE (APA-168)	1300	114	641
AUDLIGH (APA-59)	383	53	527
McINTYRE (APA-129)	519	51	524
AQUARIUS (AKA-16)	137	103	1715
OTTAWA (AKA-101)	125	91	1942

	<u>LST's</u>		
LST 481	80	65	504
LST 166	232	33	560
LST 785	303	46	531
LST 788	207	46	445
LST 734	205	62	451
LST 837	307	44	398

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Action Report - MAG.SAKI - PART II - PRELIMINARIES

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u> (Number)	<u>VEHICLES</u> (Number)	<u>CARGO</u> (Short Tons)
	<u>LST's</u>		
LST 953	439	64	632
LST 975	192	54	251
LST 1073	319	26	340
LST 571	233	59	546
LST 871	332	72	600
LST 1125	270	52	593
LST 1140	130	73	402
LST 817	Loaded at GUAM - Hospital Evac.		
LST 829	226	54	442

LSM's

UNIT ONE

LSM 498	4	28	127
LSM 307	42	13	95
LSM 309	44	12	160
LSM 439	47	19	133
LSM 441	54	23	115
LSM 94	43	20	226
LSM 170	41	15	183
LSM 78	44	14	210
LSM 253	43	14	199
LSM 277	42	12	226

LSM's

UNIT TWO

LSM 450	7	14	60
LSM 443	46	24	86
LSM 465	32	26	39
LSM 263	40	14	202
LSM 462	39	14	219
LSM 452	43	15	170
LSM 122	38	14	189
LSM 466	45	16	232
LSM 103	55	13	260
LSM 236	41	15	250

5. Departure from SAIPAN was originally scheduled by operation plans of higher echelons for 21 September and arrival at the target scheduled for 26 September. Division and Corps plans for times and places for the landing at MAG.SAKI were revised frequently, and on the morning of 17 September word was received from higher authority that the

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Action Report - NAGASAKI - PART II - PRELIMINARIES

landing date for NAGASAKI had been changed from the 26th to the 23rd, necessitating hurried completion of loading of the ships and revision of landing plans.

6. LST's and LSM's of LSTFlot 23 (Temp) and LSMFlot 16 (Temp) sortied from SAIPAN during the afternoon of 17 September as T.U. 54.19.2. One LST (817) with hospital evacuation unit embarked had not arrived at SAIPAN from GUAM and one DE was ordered to rendezvous with it and proceed independently to the target as T.U. 54.19.4. LSM's 441, 448, 450 carrying motor transport equipment were subsequently ordered detached to proceed ahead of the remainder of the tractor group as T.U. 54.19.3.

7. Transports completed loading and topping off and sortied from SAIPAN on the 18th as T.U. 54.19.1. Movement to NAGASAKI was made in accordance with ComTransRon 12 Sortie and Movement Order No. 7-45, Enclosure (A).

8. Because of the limited time and information available and last minute changes in planning, it was not possible to prepare extensive and detailed Landing Plans. An outline plan, ComTransRon 12 Landing Plan No. A6-45, Enclosure (A), was prepared in conjunction with ComGen 2nd MarDiv and details were perfected during the movement to the objective.

9. The mission of this group was to land troops, equipment and supplies of the 2nd MarDiv in the NAGASAKI Area. Landings were commenced at 1300, 23 September, RCT 2 landing on the east side of NAGASAKI Harbor and RCT 6 on the west side. RCT 8 landed on the east side on 24 September.

10. Departure of ships of the NAGASAKI Group from the NAGASAKI Area was effected in echelons. Fifteen LSM's had completed unloading and were ordered to depart at 1400, 26 September. Seven LST's completed unloading and departed NAGASAKI at 1600, 26 September, and eleven transport types were unloaded and sortied by 1900 the same day. Three LST's and five LSM's were unloaded and departed at 0800, the 27th. ComTransRon 12 and all remaining transport types had completed unloading and departed NAGASAKI at 1300, 28 September, as of which time all other units of the NAGASAKI Group had completed unloading except the LST 817 (the LST which had not arrived from GUAM until the 27th). Remaining unloaded LST's were scheduled to depart immediately after ComTransRon 12.

11. No enemy opposition was encountered.

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ACTION REPORT - LANDINGS AT NAGASAKI

PART III - CHRONOLOGY

SECTION (A) - MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE (times as stated)

17 September 1945 (Times Minus TEN Zone)

1400 T.U. 54.19.2, consisting of 14 LST's, 1 LC(FP), and 20 LSM's, escorted by ROBERTS (DE-749), departed SAIPAN for NAGASAKI, JAPAN; SOA 9 knots.

18 September 1945 (Times Minus TEN Zone)

1600 Squadron (Temporary) underway to sortie for movement to NAGASAKI, JAPAN. Proceeded as T.U. 54.19.1 with C.T.G. 54.19, ComTransRon 12, O.T.C. and guide in CAMBRIA. Cruising disposition 3 W; Standard Speed 14 knots; SNYDER (DE-745) and GLEAVES (DD-423) as escort.

1830 Changed clocks to minus NINE Zone time.

2000 Position: 15°-55'6" North, 144°-52' East.

19 September 1945 (Times Minus NINE Zone)

0705 MENIFEE (APA-202) lost steering control and sheered out of column.

0709 MENIFEE (APA-202) regained steering control.

0800 Position: 17°-44'7" North, 142°-43'9" East.

1200 Position: 18°-32' North, 142°-17'8" East.

1300 Commenced exercises at ship handling by watch officers.

1438 Ceased exercises at ship handling.

2000 Position: 20°-07'6" North, 141°-24'5" East.

20 September 1945 (Times Minus NINE Zone)

0730 TILLS (DE-748) reported from SAIPAN that LST 817 departed GUAM for BUCKNER BAY for onward routing NAGASAKI. Requested instructions.

0800 Position: 22°-29'9" North, 140°-11' East.

0900 TransRon 12 ordered to use position buoys.

1000 TransRon 12 exercised at flag hoist drills.

1024 TILLS (DE-748) ordered to sail for BUCKNER BAY, join and escort LST 817 prior arrival, if possible. To form T.U. 54.19.4 with LST 817 and proceed to NAGASAKI.

1118 C.T.U. 54.19.2 ordered to form T.U. 54.19.3 consisting of LSM's 441, 448, and 450 and detach same immediately at best speed for NAGASAKI; to await arrival of transports at point DOGWOOD unless passed at sea.

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Action Report - NAGASAKI - PART (III) - CHRONOLOGY

- 1147 C.T.U. 54.19.2 reported destruction of Jap 4 horned mine by gun fire. Lat. $23^{\circ} - 39'$ North, Long. $139^{\circ} - 15'$ East.
1200 Position: $23^{\circ} - 17'15$ North, $139^{\circ} - 15'$ East.
1505 Ship bearing 086° T, distant 12.5 miles identified as HARVESON (DE 316) with group of LST's.
2000 Position $24^{\circ} - 48'12$ North, $138^{\circ} - 16'$ East.

21 September 1945 (times minus TIME zone)

- 0315 Passed T.U. 54.19.2 abeam to port distant 3 miles on course 306° , speed 9.6 knots.
0800 Position: $26^{\circ} - 35'16$ North, $135^{\circ} - 43'18$ East.
0912 GAGE (APA 166) reported steering casualty; keeping station with emergency gear.
0930 GAGE (APA 168) reported steering gear repairs completed.
1000 Commenced flag hoist drills, CTD 60 leading.
1055 Ceased flag hoist drills.
1200 Position: $27^{\circ} - 00'15$ North, $134^{\circ} - 52'15$ East.
1814 McINTYRE (APA 129) reported temporary breakdown.
1817 McINTYRE (APA 129) reported loss of vacuum, recovery of same, and rejoined formation.
2000 Position: $28^{\circ} - 06'18$ North, $132^{\circ} - 53'11$ East.
2113 OTTELA (AKA 101) reported steering casualty.
2132 OTTELA (AKA 101) reported steering casualty repaired.
2330 Identified ships on port bow as AI 376 and AG 125, course 050° , Speed 9 knots.

22 September 1945 (times minus TIME zone)

- 0127 C.T.U. 52.6.7 (32.6.7) contacted C.T.G. 54.19 by radio: Com-position 13 LST's and COSS (DE 444), distant $17\frac{1}{2}$ miles, bearing 043° , course 230° T, Speed 10 knots.
0205 Land picked up on SK radar bearing 320° , distant 101 miles.
0800 Position: $29^{\circ} - 29'$ North, $130^{\circ} - 13'$ East.

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Action Report - HIGASAKI - PART (III) - CHRONOLOGY

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- 1200 Position: 29°35'6 North, 129°22'4 East.
 - 1405 OTTAWA (AKA-101) reported steering casualty; steering with emergency gear.
 - 1445 OTTAWA (AKA-101) reported steering casualty repaired.
 - 1752 ComCortDiv 53 reported exploding by gunfire 4 horned, type 93 Japanese mine - Lat. 29°57' North, Long. 128°54' East.
 - 1330 Radar contact identified as C.T.G. 55.7.57 on CHELANGO (CVE-28) with OOPER (AFD-62), being part of POW evacuation unit.
 - 1654 T.U. 55.7.57 passed clear on port beam.
 - 2000 CIC reported radar contact with LSM's bearing 173° T., distant 17 1/2 miles.
 - 2150 Sighted DAVIES (DD 357).

23 September 1945 (Times minus NINE Zone)

- 0050 Identified three ships off starboard bow as TOLBIGREE (AOG-11); PECOS (AO-65) and LINCOLN (DMS-23).
- 0427 Contacted HELM (DD-388) by radio, proceeding toward us on course 180°; speed 15 knots.
- 0450 HELM (DD-388) reported speed and course as above and that BAGLEY (DD-386) was stationed at point LUDLOW.
- 0501 Notified ComDesRon 24 that T.U. 54.19.1 would arrive at point DOGWOOD at 0540.
- 0524 HELM (DD-388) instructed that C.T.U. 54.19.1 wanted swept channel cleared and could make up to 14 knots.
- 0635 SNYDER (DE-745) reported passing buoy 6 to starboard.
- 0650 SNYDER (DE-745) reported passing buoy 7 25 yards off starboard.
- 0755 Ships of TransRon 12 (Temp) in assigned berths eastward of OKINO SHIMA as follows: CALBRIA - 8; TYRRELL - 2; GRILES - 6; WAYNE - 56; BRAXTON - 9; LEMIPPE - 52; LANIER - 7; GAGE - 51; LIEBERTHER - 4; AUDRAIN - 57; LELLETT - 5; LC INTYRE - 53; WAUKESHA - 3; AQUARIUS - 54; OTTAWA - 55; HENARD, LYCOMING, APPLING, ANDROMEDA, FREESTONE and C. FRICORNUS in the channel.
- 0800 Weather: barometer 29.76; wind force 7 knots from 240° T., heavy rain squalls.
- 0801 Remaining ships of TransDiv 34 assigned berths as follows: HENARD - 22; FREESTONE - 20; LYCOMING - 43; APPLING - 24; ANDROMEDA - 45;
- 1140 QUELH Hour confirmed by ComTransRon 12 as 1300;
- 1201 CALBRIA and TYRRELL underway for inner harbor.
- 1300 First waves RCT2 (BLT 1/2) alongside Dojima Wharf.
- 1303 CALBRIA moored in berth 1 H.G.S.KI inner harbor.
- 1336 BLT 1/6 from TransDiv 60 enroute to beach.
- 1346 LANIER directed to stand into inner harbor.
- 1347 Requested ETD of IES SPEAKER and U.S.S. BILOXI, which were occupying much needed berthing space in the inner harbor, and advised no definite ETD had been established.

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Action Report - NAGASAKI - PART (III) - CHRONOLOGY.

- 1348 MENIFEE directed to stand into inner harbor 30 minutes after LANIER entered.
- 1359 BLT 2/6 dispatched to beach from GAGE.
- 1401 All BLT's from GAGE boated and enroute to beach.
- 1405 CAMBRIA and TYRRELL in inner harbor; TYRRELL at dock unloading.
- 1421 BLT 3/6 from WAYNE enroute to beach.
- 1431 BLT 1/2 from MERLEETHER enroute to beach.
- 1509 Japanese surrender delegation headed by Lt. Gen. Hailko Toguchi and Governor of NAGASAKI came aboard.
- 1515 Formal instructions issued to the Japanese delegation, which left the ship shortly thereafter.
- 1515 LANIER standing into inner harbor.
- 1524 TYRRELL ordered to commence general unloading.
- 1600 LSM's 441 and 448 unloaded.
- 1605 CAMBRIA, TYRRELL, LANIER and MENIFEE in inner harbor; GRIMES standing in.
- 1630 GRIMES moored starboard side to TYRRELL at Customs Wharves.
- 1631 ComTransDiv 60 and ROT 2 ordered to commence general unloading.
- 1634 GAGE ordered to stand into inner harbor.
- 1707 MERLEETHER ordered to stand into inner harbor.
- 1933 OTTAWA in drydock No. 3.
- 2000 C.T.G. 54.3 dispatched the following (paraphrase):
Situation Summary: Arriving at point LUDLOW 0730 I, started preparation for landing in consultation with representatives of the FIFTH Amphibious Corps; about 7000 troops were landed without incident beginning at 1300. Started general unloading of TransDiv's upon getting nine ships into inner harbor at berths, docks and one in dry dock 3. The Governor of NAGASAKI and party received instructions from General HUNT of the 2nd MarDiv. LST's and LSM's with shore party equipment due to arrive 24 September. Found unloading situation much less favorable than anticipated due to fire support ships, evacuation shipping and wrecks.
- 2037 TransRon beachmaster requested every effort be made at high tide to clear wreckage from Area EASY 3 so LST's could land in the morning.
- 2235 SOPA (C.T.G. 55.7) ordered ComTransRon 12 to move BRAXTON (APA-138) from berth in inner harbor by daylight to make room for HAVEN (AH-12).

24 September 1945 (Time Minus NINE Zone)

- 2235 Ships of TransRon 12 (Temp) continued unloading from following wharves, docks and anchorages:

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Action Report - MAGASAKI - PART (III) - CHRONOLOGY.

1st District: GAMBRIA - 1; BRAXTON - 6-8; LANIER - 2-3; MENIFEE - 3-5; OTTAWA in dry dock.

2nd District: MERLEETHER - 12-13; GAGE - 13-14.

3rd District: WAYNE - 10; MC INTYRE - 9; AUDRAIN - 7.

Outer Harbor: CAPRICORNUS - 1; ANDROMEDA - 2; WAUKESHA - 3; AQUARIUS - 4; MELLETTTE - 5; APPLING - 6; LYCOMING - 7; FREESTONE - 8 and MENARD - 52.

0315 LANIER reported vehicles completely unloaded.

0350 TransRon beachmaster reported 30 loaded LCV(P)'s at Dejima Wharf.

0545 FREESTONE dispatched first wave BLT 1/8 to beach.

0615 BRAXTON underway clearing berth to make room for HAVEN (AH-12).

0620 RCT 8 commenced landings at finger pier north of Dejima Wharf.

0625 TransRon beachmaster reported RCT 8 landing satisfactorily.

0629 FREESTONE reported BLT 1/8 disembarked.

0714 AUDRAIN berthed in inner harbor.

0758 CAPRICORNUS directed by C.T.G. 54.3 to proceed at 0900 to inner harbor and moor at Dejima Wharf astern of TYRRELL.

0808 WAUKESHA directed by C.T.G. 54.3 to proceed at 0930 to inner harbor and moor to Dejima Wharf astern CAPRICORNUS.

0815 FREESTONE directed by C.T.G. 54.3 to proceed at 1000 to inner harbor and berth at Dejima Wharf alongside CAPRICORNUS.

0825 ComTransDiv 60 and TransRon beachmaster directed by C.T.G. 54.3 to unload LSM's at YOROI SAKI.

0830 LST's of T.U. 54.19.2 under ComLSTFlot 23 berthed in outer harbor.

0832 MC INTYRE proceed to assigned berth in inner harbor.

0832 TransRon beachmaster requested 2 LCM's with towing equipment to clear beach of hulks. (slip beyond Fisherman's Wharf).

0845 MERLEETHER reported all vehicles unloaded.

0900 CAPRICORNUS proceeded to berth in inner harbor as directed.

0924 MC INTYRE moored at north end of Mitsubishi Shipyard.

0930 LSM's of T.U. 54.19.2 berthed in outer harbor.

0930 WAUKESHA underway for assigned berth in inner harbor.

1000 MENIFEE reported cargo completely unloaded; now unloading troops.

1006 FREESTONE moored alongside CAPRICORNUS at Dejima Wharf ordered to send control officer and beach party to Fish Market Wharf and to unload all available vehicles there.

1010 MENARD ordered to Dejima Wharf, after disembarking troops, and to moor alongside WAUKESHA; to unload all available vehicles at Fish Market Wharf.

1026 LST's 887 and 734 ordered to berth 1 in First District.

1047 LYCOMING directed to stand into inner harbor at 1130 and moor bow and stern to buoys in berths 3-5, First District.

1100 APPLING completed discharging vehicles of reserve battalion.

1140 Rear Admiral REIFSNIDER and members of his staff came aboard GAMBRIA to confer with Commodore KNO LES.

1145 Major General SCHMIDT (USMC) came aboard for conference with Major General HUNT and Commodore KNO LES.

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Action Report - NAGASAKI - PART (III) - CHRONOLOGY.

- 1147 Rear Admiral FAHRION (ComCruDiv 4) came aboard for conference with Commodore KNOWLES.
- 1235 Rear Admiral HELFSNIDER, Major General SCHMIDT and Rear Admiral FAHRION left ship.
- 1240 MENARD standing into inner harbor.
- 1309 TransDiv's ordered to commence general unloading, giving highest priority to needed vehicles.
- 1310 LYCOMING moored bow and stern to mooring buoys berths 3-5.
- 1320 TransRon beachmaster reported moving Beach to the cross water ways due to bridge on road being too weak to carry load.
- 1346 MENARD instructed to moor bow and stern to buoys in berths 9-10, inner harbor, First District.
- 1425 2nd Marine I.P. Company enroute from LANIER to shore.
- 1455 LSM 975 unloaded and retracted from Customs Wharf.
- 1458 LSM 465 enroute to Customs Wharf.
- 1500 BELLETT standing into inner harbor to moor bow and stern to buoys in berths 9-10.
- 1545 GAGE completely unloaded and standing out to berth 5 east of OKINO SHIMA.
- 1546 APPLING standing into inner harbor to moor bow and stern to buoys in berths 13-14.
- 1600 MENIFEE, WAYNE and GAGE; LST's 788 and 975: - 100% unloaded.
- 1644 GAGE anchored east of OKINO SHIMA.
- 1700 LSM's 498, 448, 451, 103, 450, 465, 18, 120, and 263 completely unloaded.
- 1822 Marines reported that it was not practicable to unload LST's on West side with gear for East side because roads were too poor and one way traffic existed in many places.
- 1842 TransRon beachmaster reported boats piling up and not being discharged due to lack of shore party.
- 1908 TransRon beachmaster reported it impracticable to unload trailers from LSM 439 because of congested road conditions.
- 1957 LSM 123 unloaded 100%.
- 2000 C.T.G. 54.3 dispatched the following:
Situation Summary: Continued landing troops and supplies with no incidents. Three RCT's ashore plus additional division troops. Total about 12,000 troops and 10,000 tons cargo. Have 17 transports at docks and berths in inner harbor which is very congested. Tractor groups arrived 0830 and unloading included in above summary. Unloading facilities improving but traffic congestion with poor roads now determining factor. Adequate office space and billeting of Navy personnel to be based here will be difficult.
- 2045 LST 734 unloaded 100%.
- 2221 AUDRAIN unloaded 100%.
- 2239 Port director requested C.T.G. 54.3 to assign 2 LCM's to assist in unmooring U.S.S. WICHITA at 0600 25 September.

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2400 LSM's 78, 94, 103, 122, 253, 307, 441, 448, 450, 465, and 498
and LST's 734 and 463: - 100% unloaded.
T.U. 54.3.31 and T.U. 54.3.32 (LSM's): - 100% unloaded.

25 September 1945 (Time Minus NINE Zone)

0000 Assignments of ships of TransRon 12 inner and outer harbor
NAGASAKI:

1st District: CAMBRIA - 1; LYCOMING - 2-3; LANIER - 2-3;
MELLETT - 9-10; MC INTYRE and AUDRAIN moored
at docks; OTTAWA in dry dock; GRILES, TYRRELL,
FREESTONE, CAPRICORNUS, WAUKESHA and MENARD
moored at Customs Wharves.

2nd District: MERTLETT - 12-13; APPLING - 13-14.

3rd District: BRAXTON - 7; WAYNE - 10.

East OKINO SHIMA: ANDROMEDA - 2; MENIFEE - 3; AQUARIUS - 4;
GAGE - 5.

0632 TransRon beachmaster reported unloading of LST's delayed by
traffic difficulties due to narrow road entrances. Unloading
progressing as fast as trucks available.

0700 U.S.S. WICHITA underway and standing out.

0817 AQUARIUS directed to stand into inner harbor and moor bow and
stern in berths 6-8, astern ANDROMEDA.

0830 Assumed duties as SOPA (Admin). Issued directive to all ships
as follows:

"C.T.G. 54.3 and ComTransRon 12 assumes duties of Admin SOPA
at NAGASAKI. There will be no shore leave or liberty for any
personnel embarked on Navy ships in this area until further
orders. Officers having official business ashore have per-
mission to conduct such business but shall not use this as a
pretext for sightseeing and shore leave."

0900 Personnel ordered to GORSON (AVP-37) to assist setting up tem-
porary F.P.O.

0900 ComGen 2nd MarDiv assumed command ashore.

0912 C.T.G. 54.3 directed all group, division and flotilla commanders
and the commanding officers of all ships in the NAGASAKI Area
(except LST's and LSM's, whose group and flotilla commanders were
directed to disseminate the instructions to those ships) to report
aboard CAMBRIA between 0900-1100. Commanding officers and group,
division and flotilla commanders were warned that the ComGen 2nd
MarDiv and ComTransRon 12 had agreed that no naval personnel was
to be permitted ashore except officers on official business (and
boat crews and beach parties who were restricted to the immediate
vicinity of their beaches and boats), and that any violations
would be reported by the ComGen 2nd MarDiv and would be severely
punished.

1000 Officer and enlisted personnel and equipment assigned to port
director to assist in setting up Officer Messenger Mail Center
on beach.

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- 1038 GRIMES, WAYNE and CAMBRIA directed to send their fire fighter boats to report to CAMUILLA at buoy 8.
- 1056 MENARD ordered to send beach party to Area GEORGE 4 to relieve FREESTONE's beach party.
- 1105 GAGE and AUDRAIN beach parties granted permission to secure.
- 1154 ANDROMEDA reported all planes unloaded and dispatched to Dejima Wharf.
- 1200 MC INTYRE 100% unloaded.
- 1306 LST's 390, 1022 and 828 ordered to anchor in Area ROGER, outer harbor.
- 1728 TransDiv 60 beachmaster reports that situation on HON 1 beach is not good. No unloading for last hour. Cranes not operating.
- 2000 C.T.G. 54.3 dispatched the following Situation Summary:
C.T.G. 54.3 became Admin SOPA on departure of C.T.G. 55.7 at 0700. ComGen 2nd MarDiv assumed command ashore at 0900. Landed to date, 16,500 troops, 19,000 tons of cargo. Inadequate dump areas and road congestion slowing up unloading rate but progress satisfactory. Unloading percentages: transports 70%, LST's 50% and LSM's 90% unloaded. Setting up port director ashore with available personnel and facilities. Departures past twenty-four hours: C.T.G. 55.7 in NICHITA, C.T.G. 55.5 in CAPE GLOUCESTER, WIGFORD, COUGHLIN, STRAUSS, RUTILICUS, HAVEN, EBER, GILMER, WATUI. Arrivals: LST's 390, 828, 870, 1022; ComLCSDiv 28 in LCS 103 with LCS 102, 104, 105, 106, and 107; CORBESTER.
- 2400 The following completely unloaded: GRIMES, BRAXTON, KAMIER, WAYNE, MENIFEE, GAGE, AUDRAIN, MC INTYRE, AQUARIUS.

26 September 1945 (Time Minus NINE Zone)

- 0910 All LST's of T.U. 54.3.2 100% unloaded except 785 - 70%; 1073 - 90%; 888 - 80%; 887 - 90%; 571 - 55%.
- 1040 ComLSMFlot 16 ordered to form task unit with Commander Mc KEE in LSH 498, LSM's 78, 94, 103, 122, 170, 227, 253, 286, 307, 309, 452, 462, 465, and 466 in company, and ROBERTS (DE-749) as escort, and when RFS depart NAGASAKI at 1400 26 September for OKINAWA, via routes indicated, to load 10th Army Corps and onward routing to HIRO WAN reporting to ComPhibGrp ELEVEN.
- 1045 TransDiv 60, less WAKESHA and TYRRELL, and TransDiv 13, less AQUARIUS and OTTAWA, ordered to execute boat pool plan, sending boats to CAMBRIA. In addition MERI METHER, BELLETTE and MC INTYRE ordered to leave one LCP(L) each.

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- 1100 AQUARIUS completed unloading.
- 1120 C.T.G. 54.3 issued the following orders:
Form task unit number to be assigned later, consisting of GRILES (F) (Captain HOEN, ComTransDiv 60 (Temp)) BRAXTON, LANIER, MERTWEATHER, BELLETTE, WAYNE, MINIFEE, GAGE, AUDRAIN, MC INTYRE, and AQUARIUS with SHYDER as escort; when RFS 1900 I 26 September departed NAGASAKI for MANILA via points and routes as indicated in dispatch; SOA 12.5 knots; ETA 1 October.
- 1219 LST's 571 and 1073 ordered to launch pontoon barges and LST 166 launch causeway for use of Port Director.
- 1237 ComLSTGrp 13 ordered to form task unit and be ready for sea at 1600 as follows: Commander LEE in LST 481 with LST's 166, 734, 785, 788, 953, and 975 to proceed to LEYTE via routes indicated; SOA 9.5 knots; ETA 1200 I, 2 October.
- 1332 TransRon 12 beachmaster ordered to report aboard CAMBRIA.
- 1354 Medical teams 1, 2, and 3 less medical officers ordered to report to FREESTONE for temporary duty.
- 1526 TYRRELL ordered to clear wharf and moor bow and stern in berths 4-6 and ANDROMEDA ordered to go alongside in spot vacated by TYRRELL.
- 1600 CAMBRIA completed unloading.
- 1708 TransDiv 60, less WAUKESHA and TYRRELL, and TransDiv 13, less AQUARIUS and OTTAWA underway in accordance to previous instructions.
- 1742 TransDiv 34 plus WAUKESHA, TYRRELL and OTTAWA ordered to send boat pool boats to CAMBRIA when unloaded.
- 2000 C.T.G. 54.3 dispatched the following:
Situation Summary: Continued unloading with no incidents. Total landed to date 18,236 troops, 25,853 tons of cargo. Ton transports remaining average 75% unloaded. Port director starts functioning 27th with personnel and facilities at hand.
Arrivals: EAGER, EXECUTE, REFRESH, FIXITY, HAZARD, DOUR, ATA203, PGM 31, LCI 651, 613, 1071, S.S. CARLSBAD. Departures: SCURRY, SHELTER, CORESIER, LCI 681, KLINE, GRILES, WAYNE, AQUARIUS, AUDRAIN, BRAXTON, GAGE, LANIER, MC INTYRE, BELLETTE, MINIFEE, MERTWEATHER, SHYDER, CLEAVES, LST's 78, 94, 103, 122, 170, 227, 253, 286, 307, 309, 465, 452, 462, 466, and 493 and LST's 166, 461, 734, 785, 788, 953, 975; ROBERTS.
- 2021 APPLING completed unloading.
- 2040 C.O.'s of TransDiv 34, plus WAUKESHA, TYRRELL and OTTAWA ordered to report aboard CAMBRIA at 2100.
- 2055 C.T.G. 54.3 directed as follows:
When RFS, 0800 I, 27 September LST 1073, 571, 807 proceed with LCS 104 as escort to SASEBO via points and routes as directed. SOA 9 knots, ETA 1300 I 27 September. On arrival report to C.T.G. 54.1 and ComLSTGroup 14. LCS 104 make repairs and return to NAGASAKI when directed on completion.

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2103 C.T.G. 54.3 directed (in part) as follows:
When RFS 0800 I, 27 September depart NAGASAKI with LSM's 450, 439, 441, 263, and 448 and proceed without escort to OKINAWA via points and routes as directed. SOA 13 knots; ETA 281611 (I).

2305 MENARD completed unloading.

27 September 1945 (Time minus NINE Zone)

0747 LYCOLING completed unloading.

0805 MENARD assigned to berth 5 east of OKINO SHIMA in outer harbor.

1008 OTTAWA directed to anchor in berth 7 east of OKINO SHIMA in outer harbor.

1045 Permission granted TransRon and TransDiv beachmasters for closing Fisherman's Wharf unloading area.

1135 TYRRELL completed unloading.

1217 OTTAWA completed unloading and ordered to assist ANDROMEDA.

1418 TYRRELL directed to proceed to berth 2 east of OKINO SHIMA in outer harbor.

1539 C.T.G. 54.3 directed as follows:

When RFS Form task unit no number designation assigned, consisting of LC(FP) 790, Captain WEEDEN, and LST's 817, 829, 871, 1123, and 1140. Depart NAGASAKI for IIRIANAS via points and routes directed. Upon arrival report to AdComPhibsPac-IIRIANAS for loading 5thPhibCorps elements as directed by ComGen VAC. AdComPhibsPac-IIRIANAS requested to advise ComLSTFlot 23 final destination.

1541 C.T.G. 54.3 directed as follows:

When unloaded and ready for sea sail LST's 390, 828, 870 and 1022 from NAGASAKI to SASEBO via points and routes directed. Upon arrival report to ComLSTGroup 14.

1731 Commanding officer of ANDROMEDA ordered to report to C.T.G. 54.3 aboard CAMBRIA.

1756 MAUKESHA completed unloading.

1826 CAPRICORNUS and TYRRELL directed to turn in boats, as per boat pool order, to CAMBRIA prior to 2000.

1833 FREESTONE and ANDROMEDA directed to have boats for boat pool at CAMBRIA by 0630.

2000 C.T.G. 54.3 dispatched the following:

Situation Summary: Completed unloading all APA's and AKA's except ANDROMEDA and CAPRICORNUS. Totals landed to date 19, 378 troops, 32,100 tons of cargo. Steady light rain, otherwise favorable. One case of multiple felony now being in-

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- vestigated, otherwise, quiet. Intend to sail remaining ships TransRon 12 (Temp) tomorrow morning. Port director will assume SOPA (Admin) unless otherwise directed. Arrivals: CORBESIER, TILLS, and LST 817; Departures: FIXITY, EAGER, EXECUTE, REFRESH, HAZARD, DOUR, PC# 31; ATA 203, LST's 571, 887, 1073, LCI's 651, 1071, LSM's 263, 439, 441, 448, 450, LCS 104.
- 2010 C.T.G. 54.3 by dispatch directed attention of ComLSFlot 16 and ComLSTGroup 13 to typhoon advisory 270814 and directed that they seek lee of OKINAWA if situation warranted.
- 2015 C.T.G. 54.3 directed the following:
When RFS about 0800 I, 28 September form TransRon 12 (Temp) CAMBERIA (SF) Commodore KNOWLES, with FREESTONE, HENARD, LYCOMING, APPLING, ANDROMEDA, CAPRICORNUS, WAUKESHA, TYRRELL, OTTAMA with TILLS (DE-748) as escort. Depart NAGASAKI for MANILA via points and routes directed. SOA 13 knots making own ETA 24 hours prior arrival. Be prepared to pick up designated Army boats at LINGAYEN.
- 2217 WAUKESHA directed to clear deck at daylight.

28 September 1945 (Time Minus NINE Zone)

- 0000 All ships unloaded except ANDROMEDA and CAPRICORNUS who were unloading with assistance of several other units.
- 0630 All ships completely unloaded.
- 1310 CAMBERIA underway from berth 1 inner harbor NAGASAKI, KYUSHU, JAPAN enroute to MANILA, P.I., ComTransRon 12 in CAMBERIA with following ships in company: HENARD (APA-201), APPLING (APA-58), CAPRICORNUS (AKA-57), TYRRELL (AKA-80), FREESTONE (APA-167), LYCOMING (APA-155), OTTAMA (AKA-101), WAUKESHA (AKA-84), and ANDROMEDA (AKA-15) escorted by TILLS (DE-748).

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COMMANDER TRANSPORT SQUADRON TWELVE
(ComNAGASAKIGroup and C.T.G. 54.3)

ACTION REPORT - LANDINGS AT NAGASAKI

PART IV - SPECIAL REPORTS

Section (A) - Intelligence

1. General

AdComPhibsPac Intelligence (PEARL HARBOR) furnished one copy "Port of NAGASAKI OP 16 FE 53-45" and copies of such other publications and charts which were left with them for distribution at PEARL HARBOR. Parts of "Port of NAGASAKI" were reproduced for information within the command and were used extensively.

Most of the intelligence material for this squadron was distributed at SAIPAN by TransDiv 60 (Temp) before our arrival. A check showed it had been distributed promptly and intelligently.

Additional material for distribution was received at SAIPAN and distributed. Before departure from SAIPAN a third lot of material was received from PhibGrp 4 and distributed. All materials were checked against materials available to insure that all available material was distributed, and V PhibCorps Intelligence Section was contacted for the same purpose. Because of the small number of charts of the harbor and "Beach and Dock Diagrams" furnished, all ships were ordered to make additional sketches, diagrams, or overlays.

Recommendations: Whenever possible more copies of charts and harbor diagrams should be furnished, since facilities for duplicating such information aboard transports are very limited.

2. Minefield Intelligence

Information on mines and minefields was compiled from CinCPac-CinCPoa Bulletin 208-45 furnished by AdComPhibsPac at PEARL HARBOR, "Q" messages, Minefield Intelligence Dispatches, Operation Orders and Plans, Twentieth Air Force Charts and all other available sources, and kept plotted in accordance with ComFIFTH Fleet Operation Plan No. 6-45. Information concerning a mine destroyed by the screen enroute to NAGASAKI at Latitude 29°57'N and Longitude 128°54'E. was disseminated. Information of an alleged minefield reported by local police to troops ashore was dispatched to all interested in minefield intelligence: location near Latitude 32°52'N., Longitude 128°55'E off GOTO ISLAND.

Recommendations: due to the fact that so many garbles creep up in dispatches and prevent accurate plotting, it is believed that place names, latitude and longitude and H.O. chart numbers should all be used in all dispatches when reporting important minefield information.

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Action Report - NAGASAKI - PART (IV) - SPECIAL REPORTS - SECTION
(A) - INTELLIGENCE

3. Operation Orders and Plans

One copy of Com5thPhibFor Operation Plan No. A1501-45 was obtained from AdComPhibsPac at PEARL HARBOR. At GUAM the Intelligence Office of CNOB supplied another together with one copy of ComCruDiv 13 Operation Plan No. 10-45; Change No. 2 to Com5th-PhibFor Operation Plan No. 1501-45; CominPac Operation Plan No. 12-45; SOP-4A.

Although each TransRon Commander is listed in the distribution list to ComFIFTHFleet Operation Plan No. A6-45 as having been sent two copies of that plan, they have not yet been received. Efforts to obtain a copy through the emergency distribution centers at GUAM and SAIPAN were without success; we were advised they had no copies to distribute. Fortunately, ComPhibGrp 4 was able to lend us one copy (which was obtained on 14 September).

After departure of ComPhibGrp 4 from SAIPAN, several requests were received, particularly from ships designated screening duties for this group, for a copy of various senior orders applicable to the operation. These ships reported that they had not received their copies and that they were unable to obtain copies of applicable orders from the emergency distribution center.

Recommendation: Since it is imperative that a command operating as required of the NAGASAKI Group should have necessary operation plans and orders of higher echelons bearing on the operation, it is recommended that such plans and orders be designated for special handling to insure that their distribution is a matter of highest priority and urgency and that ample spares be supplied the emergency distribution centers.

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COMMANDER TRANSPORT SQUADRON TWELVE
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ACTION REPORT - LANDINGS AT NAGASAKI

PART IV - SPECIAL REPORTS

SECTION (B) - AEROGRAHY

1. Weather information.

(a) Two weather maps a day were prepared as long as radio reception was favorable. Canned maps from NPN GUAM were the main source of this information. Forecasts were prepared from information obtained from the daily maps, NPN forecasts and local observations. Submarine and aircraft reports were of minor assistance in forecasting. Typhoon information was carefully plotted twice daily.

(b) Sept. 14 to 18 - at SAIPAN.

Skies were partly cloudy with little shower activity. Moderate sea swells, average in length, persisted throughout.

(c) Sept. 18 to 23, enroute SAIPAN to NAGASAKI.

Departed SAIPAN with skies partly cloudy on the 18th, becoming broken on the 19th, with alto-cumulus and low cumulus clouds ranging between 1000 to 2000 feet. Visibility was good, being reduced some in scattered showers. A weak cold front persisted between CHICHI SHIMA and SAIPAN the 20th and 21st resulting in moderate scattered showers in area. A low pressure area accompanied by frontal conditions was encountered on the 22nd resulting in overcast skies in afternoon and evening and somewhat squally conditions on the evening of the 22nd. A general clearing up of these conditions came on the 23rd, leaving the sky partly cloudy with a low short sea swell upon entrance into NAGASAKI Harbor.

(d) Sept. 23 to 28 at NAGASAKI.

The 23rd remained partly cloudy with low sea swell. Sky conditions were mainly broken on the 24th with light showers in the early morning period of the 25th. A high of 1014 to 1017 persisted over the 25th and 26th resulting in partly cloudy skies. Air mass showers on the evening of the 26th. A low of 999 accompanied by cold occlusion and showers on the 27th. General clearing up of skies on the 28th.

(e) Early morning fog and haze persisted each morning - dissipating entirely by 0900.

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ACTION REPORT - NAGASAKI - PART (IV) - SPECIAL REPORTS - SECTION (B)
- AEROGRAPHY.

2. Reliability of daily forecasts.

The reliability of our own weather forecasts has improved steadily. From SAIPAN to NAGASAKI they were 79% correct. This increase in forecast accuracy can be attributed to more Pacific seasonal data and reports of general weather conditions, aerological bulletins, climatic charts and other authoritative sources regarding various local conditions and weather averages by months.

3. Daily reports and tornado information.

These reports have given an accurate forecast as to possible movements of various tornados, typhoons and tropical storms. They have also been of value in plotting and keeping an accurate track of these storms.

OP6-12/AF36/A16-3
Serial No. 0174

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ACTION REPORT - LANDINGS AT NAGASAKI

PART IV - SPECIAL REPORTS

SECTION (C) - NAVAL ORDNANCE AND GUNNERY, INCLUDING AIR AND SMOKE

1. Upon approach to the objective, a naval gunfire and air support control team was transferred to the flagship and established communication with the carrier air support and naval gunfire group assigned to the NAGASAKI landings. Their services were not employed, as no opposition was encountered.

2. The anti-small craft screen and Fly catcher plan augmented by a boat patrol was established and preparations were made to execute a smoke plan, but no occasion arose requiring execution of the latter.

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Serial No. 0174

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COMMANDER TRANSPORT SQUADRON TWELVE
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ACTION REPORT - LANDINGS AT NAGASAKI

PART IV - SPECIAL REPORTS

SECTION (D) - NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS

1. RADIO

(a) General

For the occupation of NAGASAKI the time for advance communication planning was shortened to two days; there was no opportunity for a rehearsal, barely enough time for the testing of voice circuits. The flagship, CAMBRIA, had just completed a conversion of communication spaces to conform to the adopted pattern for RAGC's and the new installations were untested. As senior occupation force commander and later SOPA (administrative) at NAGASAKI we had a greater traffic burden to handle than ever before. Yet despite these handicaps communications functioned with remarkable smoothness. Part of this success can be attributed to the familiarity of all participants with the basic plan from previous operations. The importance of having adopted a standard workable communication plan for amphibious operations from the time of the SAIPAN operation to the present cannot be over-emphasized. Another asset was the fact that the principals had worked together before, and knew how to cooperate effectively. ComPhibGrp 4 provided extra officers and personnel to man the air support and naval gunfire circuits guarded the initial day of the occupation and gave us great assistance in relaying messages destined for the FOX schedule to GUAM on a point-to-point circuit. ComGen 2nd MarDiv, whom we carried with us, cooperated in every way to assure the rapid and certain distribution of messages between the two staffs. From the time the Division CP was established ashore until the day of our departure the marines maintained on CAMBRIA a rear echelon composed of personnel to operate two voice circuits to their headquarters ashore and officers to stand a continuous coding watch so long as we were radio guard for the division. We assisted them by handling a considerable volume of their traffic over Navy channels, supplying them with copies of all messages we received or originated, and furnishing equipment to guard all their frequencies except those in the SCR 300 series.

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Another service we performed was in assisting Commander BLAIN, Port Director, NAGASAKI, to establish communications. We provided him with a complete file of current operational dispatches, maintained radio guard for him until we departed, then arranged for another guard, and loaned him two radiomen and one signalman until such time as his own personnel arrived.

(b) Circuits

(1) Amphibious radio channels were established according to the circuit diagram in Transport Doctrine only as needed. Since there was no formal Line of Departure nor vessels for control work, the Control Vessel Common was not used. Shortage of personnel and the absence of combat conditions warranted securing the TBX ship-shore administrative circuit for transport beach parties; division and transport beachmasters as well as ships, however, continued to guard this circuit as an auxiliary channel of communications. On the third day all stations were directed to secure division ship-shore channels and commence guard on the Harbor Circuit (2716 kcs). SOPA (Administrative) traffic was cleared on the latter frequency to all ships present. On the fourth day the division boat control channels were dispensed with in favor of the Landing Boat Common. The fewer boats and simpler control problem justified the consolidation of these circuits.

Recommendations: In occupation landings substitute the Harbor Circuit (2716 kcs voice) for division ship-shore administrative channels; dispense with TBX for beach parties, thereby conserving on personnel. Use the Landing Boat Common for all SCR 610's instead of assigning division boat control frequencies.

(2) The Harbor Circuit (2716 kcs voice) was also useful as a secondary means of communication with ComPhibGrp 4 at SASEBO, especially at night. Our primary net, however, was the more reliable Task Group Commanders' circuit (2172 kcs C1), by which we cleared most of our traffic.

(3) With the relaxation of radio silence, the primary ship-to-shore frequency (4235 kcs) became heavily overloaded. Much of this traffic could have been avoided had the planning period been longer. Eight messages, for example, were required to effect a rendezvous between an LST and her DE escort and get them both safely on their way to the objective. RDO GUAM did their best to handle the greatly increased volume. The

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only fault we found was that the shore station had a tendency to accept traffic of the same precedence from stations with the best signal regardless of turn.

Recommendation: Now that conditions of radio silence can be relaxed the feasibility of a ship to ship area circuit should be considered. This would have the advantage of delivery by the receipt method and reduction of traffic on the ship-to-shore nets and FOX schedules.

(c) Circuit discipline

Circuit discipline on all of the amphibious channels was uniformly good. This was in part attribute to those responsible for the radio materiel program who have outfitted the transports and landing ships with reliable equipment, thereby eliminating the menace to circuit discipline of weak stations. It also showed an effective program of training conducted by the individual ships. Our command channel operated as a controlled net was again the most active circuit. About two-thirds of our voice traffic passed over this channel. Insistence upon officer supervision of this circuit increased the speed of transmissions and kept repeats to a minimum.

The small number of ships present created no problems of circuit discipline on the Harbor Circuit and Fleet Common. They were refreshingly free from idle chatter and endless repeats. The Task Group Commanders' channel (2716 mcs) was a fast well-disciplined net. The Task Force Common (457 kcs), on the other hand, fell short of proper standards. Although essential traffic was cleared on this channel, it tended to be used for QMO's. Also on September 26 and 27 there were several instances of chitchat between operators, direct violations of circuit discipline.

(d) Security

During the NAGASAKI occupation security rules seemed to be in a state of limbo. It was not uncommon to receive two dispatches from different senior commands both on ship movements, one in plain language, the other encrypted. Departure reports were made in plain language for transmission over the FOX schedules, listing ships by name and

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by place. At the same time, we were religiously using voice calls for the identical ships on VHF Voice channels. The only directive we received on the subject was one from C.T.F. 55 ordering us to make movement reports in plain language:

"Daily summaries and sailing dispatches should be sent in plain language unless information contained therein manifestly requires classification."

Recommendation: The present confusion on security practice should be clarified by higher authority and some consistency restored. Voice calls for ships are being jeopardized by present practices and should be abolished.

(e) Materiel

As has already been observed above, problems of materiel in this operation were notable for their absence. No breakdowns seriously interrupted communications. LST's, LSM's, and LCS's were remarkably free from equipment failures.

Probably the flagship experienced more difficulties than any other ship. The yard conversion job left many things for ship's force to put in order before much of the equipment could function. For example there were half a dozen errors in wiring on the patch panels. The electrician must have been color blind who wired the RPU's, for despite color charts, only five out of sixteen were properly connected. The load of circuits required the use of every transmitter on the ship. On the first day or two we had to experiment by switching antennas before we were able to reduce local interference on our own receivers to an acceptable level. The technical force worked long hours in the process and did a commendable job in placing all this new equipment in operation in the short time available.

2. VISUAL

Whenever possible flashing light and flag hoists were used for making routine reports, calling for boats, etc. Unfortunately visual signalling was somewhat curtailed because the harbor of NAGASAKI is in the shape of a dog's leg and it was not always possible to anchor a ship in the vicinity of the turn.

At night visual silence was relaxed for the transmission of important traffic. Colored lenses fitted to adapters were mandatory on all 12" lights from sunset to sunrise. The use of red lenses was quickly discouraged because of the danger of confusing that source of red light with breakdown signals.

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Recommendations: For night signalling where visual silence can safely be lifted, adapters with green, blue or amber lenses should be used, never red.

3. INTERCEPTS

We guarded both RDO GUAM GEORGE FOX and HONOLULU HOW FOX during the operation. Reception was frequently difficult because of man-made static (ship's own and Japanese stations) and because of the location of NAGASAKI, a pocket in the midst of surrounding hills. Our own interference we partially corrected by patching different antennas to our receivers and finally arriving at the best combination. The geographical difficulties were impossible to overcome. The KWAJALEIN rebroadcast of the HOW FOX made that signal as strong as that of GUAM GEORGE FOX. The only criticism we have to make of the KWAJALEIN rekeying of the HOW FOX is that if the HONOLULU signal is distorted when received at KWAJALEIN, the automatic rekeying does nothing to eliminate the distortion but merely sends it on in amplified form.

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COMMANDER TRANSPORT SQUADRON TWELVE
(ComNAAGAS.KIGroup and C.T.G. 54.3)

ACTION REPORT - LANDINGS AT NAGASAKI

PART (IV) - SPECIAL REPORTS

SECTION (E) - REPORT OF C.I.C. OPERATIONS

1. Tracking

The method practiced in tracking surface targets was to search initially on the A-scope of the SG-1 radar, then switch to the VF Precision PPI when the image was clear on the latter. First contacts could be seen at greater ranges in the SG-1 radar. The extreme range of the VF was 50,000 yards; small targets were apt to show an incomplete pip on the B-scope of the VF until the range had closed considerably more. Once the image was clear on the VF B-scope new accurate ranges and bearings were obtainable without stopping the sweep of the antenna. The DRT was used for actual plotting of the track. Little air tracking was done.

2. Air and Surface Search

For air search the 75 mile scale on the SK radar was used. Targets at 8,000 foot altitude and above were seen consistently on the scope at 70-75 miles ranges. On surface search, ranges were generally normal for the antenna height (133 feet). The maximum range of 64,000 yards was obtained on an unidentified surface contact (Course - 070° T, speed - 9 knots) 75 miles northwest of SAIPAN at 2230 (I) on 18 September.

3. Fire control radar, Mark 26, was not used.

4. Navigation

On the approach to the target, initial radar contact with land was made about 0100 (I) on 21 September. The SK was used to obtain initial contacts on high islands. The maximum range obtained on this radar was 102 miles on YAKU SHIMA (height 6,352 feet) at 0202 (I) on 22 September. For low islands the SG-1 radar proved more perceptive than the SK. Using the 80 mile scale on the VF PPI, KUSUKI SHIMA (height 574 feet) was picked up at 45 miles and KURO SHIMA (height 2,037 feet) at 61 miles, both before the SK radar made contact. On the approach to the harbor accurate navigational fixes were obtained by ranging at 10 degree intervals on land targets and plotting the results on a transparent circular template divided into 360 degrees. This method has

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long been standard practice of the flagship.

5. Station keeping

The SG-1 radar located in Flag Plot is used for station keeping at night. It has a 12" PPI adapted to a 5,000 yard scale on which the images of ships in the transport formation are clearly visible. Close checks of ranges and bearings on individual ships were made on the A-scope of the SG-1. For station keeping this PPI was much more useful than the VF Precision PPI. The latter PPI scope (6" diameter) is too small; the minimum range of the B-scope does not permit ranges on the close-in ships.

6. Composition

A valuable use for the B-scope of the VF was found in determining surface target composition and disposition. On 22 September at OIIO (I) south of KYUSHU a group of ships was detected on the SG-1 radar. Both the A-scope and PPI showed a formation with one escort, number of ships and disposition undetermined. At a range of 30,000 yards the VF B-scope revealed two outside columns of four ships each and a center column of five ships with an escort in the lead. Some time later the group was identified visually as 13 LST's with 1 DE as escort. By showing the disposition of a group, the VF B-scope several times has indicated the group's course as accurately as a DRT track. The only exception to this would be when a formation of ships is travelling on a course different from the fleet axis.

7. The VG scope was used to keep a summary plot only when several surface contacts were on the scope at once. By using plexiglass rulers to the PPI scale in use, it was possible to solve maneuvering board problems on this scope.

8. The RM consistently identified aircraft at over 70 miles.

9. Rain squalls were identified at ranges of 75,000 yards on the A-scope of SG-1 radar.

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SECTION (F) - OPERATION OF CONTROL, BEACH AND SHORE PARTIES

Control

1. The physiography of the area, and the limited facilities for unloading transport types, LST's and landing craft was such that control on a squadron scale was not feasible. The troops were landed in accordance with landing directives of ComGen 2nd MarDiv: 2nd Regiment landed on the east side of NAGASAKI Harbor, on finger piers north of Dejima Wharf. 6th Regiment landed on west side of harbor near dry dock number one. 8th Regiment landed the second day over same piers as the 2nd Regiment.

2. Regiments landed in column of battalions and were under control of the boat group commanders of each ship. Wave formation and landings were satisfactory. Cargo unloading was accomplished by dock facilities and small boats with traffic control in charge of boat group commanders, under direction of beachmasters. There was much inter-ship transfer of boats to facilitate unloading of ships in the stream, but control of boats was good throughout the operation.

Beach and Shore Parties - General

3. Due to the late date of arrival at SAIPAN of the squadron beachmaster and the advancement of the date of departure, there was no opportunity for this officer to hold any conferences with the transport beachmasters. The uncertainty as to the landing plans further handicapped detailed organization of unloading plans.

4. After arriving at NAGASAKI a survey was made of possible landing areas. It was decided that the 6th Marines would land in the CHARLIE and BAKER areas as shown on enclosure (A), and 2nd Marines in areas HOW and TEE. Surveys were also conducted for cargo unloading spots. It was found that in area KING an unloading beach for 3 LST's or LSH's could be prepared, and in area EASY 3 two more could be beached and another in area LOVE 2. Dejima Wharf had facilities for three large APA's or AKA's, but could not be used for more than one until the hospital ships left the dock on the 24th. Area HOW 1 was used for cargo unloading for the 2nd Marines. Area CHARLIE and BAKER for the 6th Marines

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and area GEORGE 4 and on the 26th GEORGE 1 on east side of the slip.

5. Transport beach parties landed with assault troops, with the advance elements landing in the third wave and the remainder on an on-call basis. Two-thirds of the shore party personnel and their gear were unloaded in LST's; the other 500 were loaded on one transport. The shore party commander and the squadron beachmaster were embarked together.

Unloading

6. Difficulties in unloading were caused, in the main, by four factors:

(a) limited mooring and berthing facilities in the inner harbor and congestion on the 23rd and 24th created by ships other than those attached to the NAGASAKI Group;

(b) limited beaching areas which could handle cargo from LST's, LSM's and landing craft and lack of adequate dump spaces;

(c) ruin and destruction of the entire NAGASAKI Area around the First District caused by B-29 raids (West side) and Atomic bomb (North and East side), which, coupled with an originally inadequate road system, created one-way traffic bottlenecks which continually hampered movement of supplies from the limited beaching areas and docks to the dumps;

(d) late arrival of the LST's carrying most of the shore party personnel and equipment (this was the result of the last minute advance in the date for the landings at NAGASAKI, which left insufficient time for the LST's to arrive at NAGASAKI on the 23rd, although they sortied from SAIPAN the day the change in landing date was promulgated).

7. Enclosure (A) shows the limited berthing and docking facilities but is not an indication of the true picture as of the 23rd and 24th of September. Upon arrival of the NAGASAKI Group on the 23rd, dock space along the Dejima Wharf was occupied by the HAVEN (AH-12) and the SANCTUARY (AH-17). Occupying berths in the First and Second Districts on the 23rd were MICHITA, BILOXI, HMS SPENGLER, WEBER (APD-75) and other APD's and RUTILICUS (AK-113). The AH's cleared Dejima Wharf on the 24th, but one transport which had moored in the First District had to be ordered out of her berth when C.T.G.

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55.7 ordered that the berth be cleared to make room for the HEVEN when she left the wharf.

8. A total of 5 LST's or LSM's was the limit of the beaching capacity on the east side of the harbor, where both RCT 2 and RCT 8 were ordered to land. While there were four additional LST-LSM beaching slots on the west side, there were only 3 LST's loaded with gear for unloading on that side. Destruction of the roads prevented unloading RCT 2 and RCT 8 equipment in the spaces available on the west side.

9. Difficulties in unloading were anticipated due to the fact that the shore party personnel and equipment were loaded in the LST's which arrived about twenty-four hours after the transports. The available shore party personnel was divided between the two combat RCT's. The 6th RCT landed on the west side and set up unloading areas taking advantage of a Japanese hammerhead crane for unloading of heavy lifts. Lighter cargo was man-handled out of the boats. This cargo was stored in a warehouse immediately behind the unloading area, avoiding a transportation problem. Limited warehouse and storage area and lack of unloading facilities was a great handicap to the 2nd RCT. Only one small cherry picker was available for unloading of the 2nd RCT general cargo when general unloading started the afternoon of 23rd of September.

10. Despite these handicaps the unloading progressed steadily, but delays naturally occurred at times. As RCT transportation for transports and the LSM's became available, it was used to unload the one AKI which docked at Dejima Wharf. On September 24, two additional AKI's were docked, and LST's and LSM's were beached and unloaded as shore party equipment and personnel became available.

11. The 8th RCT was ordered to land over the same area as the 2nd RCT and a dump area in the north end of the harbor was assigned to them. In order to increase their area, another area in the slip in the north end of the harbor was developed and placed in operation on the 26th.

12. The following is a daily summary of personnel, vehicles and cargo (short tons) unloaded by the entire NAGASAKI Group:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Vehicles</u>	<u>Short Tons</u>
23 Sept.	6501	169	742
24 Sept.	5478	1514	8,947
25 Sept.	4451	862	9,297
26 Sept.	1806	270	6,867
27 Sept.	1142	272	6,165
28 Sept.	673	198	2,936
(Grand Total)	20,051	3,285	34,954

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13. Unloading Table - Transport Types (by percentage).

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>Sept 23</u>	<u>Sept 24</u>	<u>Sept 25</u>	<u>Sept 26</u>	<u>Sept 27</u>	<u>Sept 28</u>
CAMERLA	1	20	85	100		
LEONARD	0	20	61	95	100	
APPLING	1	33	65	100		
FREESTONE	0	16	33	62	100	
LYCOMING	0	13	32	90	100	
ANDROMEDA	0	8	13	33	75	100
CAPRICORNUS	0	10	30	55	86	100
GRILES	41	70	100			
MERT JETHER	25	50	80	100		
MELLETTTE	15	35	99	100		
BRAXTON	21	67	100			
LANIER	38	80	100			
WAUKESHA	08	18	40	68	100	
TYRRELL	45	65	84	94	100	
WAYNE	49	100				
GENIFEE	50	100				
GAGE	38	100				
JUDRAIN	21	100				
MC INTYRE	10	68	100			
AQUARIUS	09	35	75	100		
OTTAWA	02	43	65	91	100	

14. Unloading Table - Transport Types - Short Tons of Cargo*

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>Sept. 23</u>	<u>Sept. 24</u>	<u>Sept. 25</u>	<u>Sept. 26</u>	<u>Sept. 27</u>	<u>Sept. 28</u>	<u>Total</u>
CAMBIRA	8	122	40	346			516
LEONARD	0	12	338	225			575
APPLING	26	94	195	133	54		502
FREESTONE	0	100	134	244	386		864
LYCOMING	0	61	131	400	260		852
ANDROMEDA	0	95	205	200	1100	250	1850
CAPRICORNUS	0	11	384	615	570	384	1964
GRILES	3	414	202	100			719
MERT JETHER	3	197	150	288			638
MELLETTTE	0	185	310	131			626
BRAXTON	9	370	162				541
LANIER	12	547	66	50			675
WAUKESHA	0	335	190	750	539	10	1824
TYRRELL	190	930	410	195	179		1904

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14. Unloading Table - Transport Types - Short Tons of Cargo* (Cont'd)

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>Sept. 23</u>	<u>Sept. 24</u>	<u>Sept. 25</u>	<u>Sept. 26</u>	<u>Sept. 27</u>	<u>Sept. 28</u>	<u>Total</u>
WAYNE	63	719					782
MENIFEE	8	675					683
GAGE	59	582					641
AUDRAIN	0	410	117				527
MC INTYRE	0	254	270				524
AQUARIUS	0	376	824	1119			2319
OTTAWA	0	905	655	615	351		2526
TOTAL	381	7394	4783	5411	3439	644	22,052

* NOTE: Differences between scheduled loads and tons unloaded were created by last minute unscheduled additions to the cargo of some ships.

15. Daily Unloading Percentage LST's.

<u>LST's</u>	<u>2400 Sept. 23</u>	<u>2400 Sept. 24</u>	<u>2400 Sept. 25</u>	<u>2400 Sept. 26</u>	<u>2400 Sept. 27</u>	<u>2400 Sept. 28</u>
481		85	100			
166		18	62	100		
571		0	40	100		
734		100				
785		0	30	100		
788		100				
817		0	0	0	25	70
829		0	0	45	100	
871		0	0	60	100	
887		50	80	100		
953		60	100			
975		100				
1073		10	60	100		
1123		0	0	70	100	
1140		0	0	30	100	
1022		0	0	0	100	
390		0	0	0	80	100
826		0	0	0	35	100
870		0	0	0	95	100
888		0	60	87	100	

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16. Daily Unloading Percentage LSM's (Original Cargo)

<u>LSM's</u>	<u>2400</u> <u>Sept.</u> <u>23</u>	<u>2400</u> <u>Sept.</u> <u>24</u>	<u>2400</u> <u>Sept.</u> <u>25</u>
498	0	100	
307	0	100	
309	0	0	100
439	0	0	100
441	100		
94	0	100	
170	0	75	100
78	0	100	
253	0	100	
227	0	0	100
450	100		
448	100		
465	0	100	
263	0	45	100
462	0	0	100
452	0	0	100
122	0	100	
466	0	0	100
103	0	100	
286	0	100	

Enclosure (A) - Unloading Area - NAGASAKI Harbor.



SECTION ENCLOSURE (A)

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SECTION (G) - UNDERWATER DEMOLITION TEAMS

Although no underwater demolition was found necessary, UDT personnel embarked in U.S.S. KLINE (AFD-120) were most cooperative, offering their services and reporting on board CAMBRIA daily for assignment to any job which might have developed. Prior to the arrival of the tractor group an officer of the UDT team made a thorough survey of the harbor with an officer representative of ComLSTFlot 23. This resulted in the LST commander having accurate and valuable information on the available beaching spots for LST's and LSI's.

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SECTION (H) - MEDICAL REPORT

1. The FREESTONE was designated as the Casualty Receiving Ship. A roster of medical officers attached to ships of this squadron and their specialties was prepared. Emergency medical teams to supplement the hospital staff of the Casualty Receiving Ship were organized aboard the HENARD, LANIER, and WAYNE. These teams were to board the FREESTONE on demand.

2. The medical section of the beach parties were prepared to land on immediate notice.

3. Patients were received aboard the FREESTONE from September 23 - 27. Those requiring treatment consisted for the great part of emergency surgery (such as acute appendicitis) or traumatic injuries (such as fractures, contusions, cuts). On September 26, the emergency teams minus medical officers were ordered from the designated ships to the FREESTONE to assist in the management of casualties. Enclosure (A) is the report of the Casualty Receiving Ship.

4. Demands for supplementary medical supplies were few and were adequately handled. D.D.T. emulsion was supplied to several units.

5. The Casualty Receiving Plan proved satisfactory and on September 28, 25 (twenty-five) of the casualties received aboard the FREESTONE were evacuated ashore in care of the Division Surgeon 2nd Marine Division. The non-evacuables consisted of 20 (twenty) ambulatory and 5 (five) litter cases.

6. There were no reports of outbreak of disease or unusual medical problems.

Enclosure (A) - Casualty Receiving Ship Report

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Section (I) - Logistics

1. Logistic support for TransRon 12 (Temp) was effected at SAIPAN, MARIANAS during the period 5 - 18 September 1945. ComTransDiv 60 (Temp) acted as temporary squadron commander and was responsible for logistic support from 5 September 1945 pending arrival of ComTransRon 12. At 1200 (I) 15 September 1945 ComTransRon 12 assumed responsibility for all logistic preparations.
2. All ships were found to have complete or near complete allowances of allowance list material on board. No critical shortages were found to exist. Commanding officers of all ships reported their engineering plants in good to excellent condition. No urgent repairs of any nature were required by any ship.
3. ComTransDiv 60 (Temp) at SAIPAN directed ships as they reported to draw full allowance of provisions (fresh, frozen, and dry), general stores, clothing and small stores, ship's store stock, medical supplies, spare parts, and ammunition and to fuel to capacity, each ship to make its own arrangements.
4. Upon receipt of orders to depart SAIPAN four days ahead of schedule it was found impossible for all ships to top off with fuel and provisions for the following reasons:
 - (a) departure of TransRon 22 from SAIPAN on 16 September 1945. This squadron spent only forty-eight hours in SAIPAN and all facilities were utilized to meet its needs during this period. TransRon 22 had critical shortages of fuel and provisions, having sailed from PEARL HARBOR to SAIPAN with troops embarked.
 - (b) departure of LSTFlot 23 (Temp) and LSTFlot 16 (Temp) from SAIPAN on 17 September 1945.
 - (c) extremely heavy swells in the outer harbor which made it impossible (except in emergencies) for ships to fuel safely or send boats for provisions until 1800, 15 September. This situation was further aggravated by the limited number of yard oilers and tankers available.
 - (d) strict adherence to the unit plan in issuing of provisions by MSD SAIPAN. Many ships desiring to draw allowance of fresh, frozen

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(I) - LOGISTICS.

or dry provisions as prescribed by ComFIFTHPhibFor Operation Plan No. A1501-45 and ComPhibGrp 4 Operation Plan No. A412-45 were unable to do so because they did not have adequate stowage space to take the unneeded items contained in a unit. TransDiv 60 (Temp), for example, had loaded frozen to capacity at GUAM and receipt of adequate fresh and dry to bring ships up to prescribed allowances would have necessitated complete waste of frozen items.

5. All ships had on board an ample supply of provisions, and no concern was felt over the ability of TransRon 12 (Temp) to carry out its assigned mission.

6. The Port Director SAIPAN was most cooperative in attempts to top off all ships with fuel prior to departure. By complete utilization of all resources at his command - two yard oilers, one Navy tanker, one merchant tanker, and three fueling docks - eleven transport types and the screen were topped off on 17 - 18 September. The remaining ten transport types had on board prior to departure 92 per cent or more of their fuel capacity.

7. In the objective area ships of TransRon 12 were the only sources of provisions, black fuel, ship's store stock, clothing and small stores and general stores except the U.S.S. RUTILICUS (AK-113). The RUTILICUS had on board 75 tons of dry stores, 11 tons of ship's store stock and one ton of clothing and small stores for issue when she departed for SASEBO at 0700, 25 September 1945. The RUTILICUS would have been an invaluable source of supply for LSM's and LST's which had arrived 23 and 24 September 1945 and had not completed unloading at the time of her departure and for LCS's and other small craft arriving after her departure.

8. Forseeing the critical situation which would develop after departure of TransRon 12 and because of the heavy drain on the transports, ComTransRon 12 requested ComPhibGrp 4 on 25 September 1945 to send an AF or AK with fresh, frozen, and dry provisions and a tanker carrying both diesel and black oil to NAGASAKI. ComPhibGrp 4 replied that the U.S.S. HYADES (AF-28) would arrive NAGASAKI on 1 October 1945. The fuel situation was alleviated by the arrival of the merchant tanker SS CARLSEAD on 26 September 1945.

9. Small craft and landing craft other than LSM's at NAGASAKI were directed to arrange for provisions and fuel through C.T.G. 54.3 (ComTransRon 12) rather than with individual ships. This method of handling was utilized; (a) to provision and fuel from unloaded and low priority ships, (b) to maintain proportionate supply among all ships and (c) to ensure even distribution to small vessels.

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10. LST #888 was loaded to capacity with frozen and dry provisions, and Garrison Beach Battalion Number One was issued a supply of dry provisions sufficient to sustain 125 men for 15 days, pending arrival of its own provisions from SASEBO. Small craft were advised that provisions in an emergency would be available from LST #888 and Garrison Beach Battalion Number One prior to arrival of the U.S.S. MYADES (AF-28) on 1 October 1945.

11. The APPLING (APA-58), HENARD (APA-201) and GRIEES (APA-172) entered pay vouchers on pay records and paid the crew of LST 1022, SCURRY (AM-301), and CAHILLA (ATF-152) on orders from this command.

12. Logistic support in the objective area was rendered by ships of this group as indicated in the table below:

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(I) - LOGISTICS.

SHIP	PROVISIONS	FUEL	WATER	SHIP'S STORE STOCK, C&SS, GEN. STORE	REMARKS
ANTHONY (DD-515)	Fresh, frozen and dry provisions to capacity from ANDROMEDA (AKA-15)	X	X	X	Directed by CTF 55 dispatch 220622
ROCKS (DD-804)	Fresh, frozen and dry provisions to capacity from M.H. McINTYRE (APA-129)	X	X	X	do
ALIEN (DD-527)	Fresh, frozen and dry provisions to capacity from APPLING (APA-58)	X	X	X	do
BEALE (DD-471)	Dry to capacity; 2/3 fresh frozen from AQUARIUS (AKA-16) Remainder from APPLING (APA-58)	X	X	X	do
DALY (DD-519)	Fresh, frozen and dry to capacity from CAPRICORNUS (AKA-57)	X	X	X	do
ICS #102	10 days supply dry provisions from MENARD (APA-201)	X	5000 gals. from GAGE (APA-168)	X	

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SHIP	PROVISIONS	FUEL	WATER	SHIP'S STORE	
				STOCK, C&SS,	GEN. STORE REMARKS
LCS# 103	10 days supply dry provisions from TYRRELL (APA-80)	X	5000 gal. from GAGE (APA-168)	X	
LCS #104	10 days supply dry provisions from WAYNE (APA-54)	From LST #481	5000 gals from WAYNE (APA-54)	X	
LCS #105	10 days supply dry provisions from WAYNE (APA-54)	From LST #1073	5000 gals. from WAYNE (APA-54)	X	
LCS #106	10 days supply dry provisions from LYCOLING (APA-155)	From LST #390	5000 gals. from MENIFEE (APA-201)	X	
LCS #107	10 days supply dry provisions from AUDRAIN (APA-59)	From LST designated by ComLST Flot 23 (Temp)	5000 gals. from MENIFEE (APA-201)	X	
LC(ES) #790	Fresh frozen and dry provisions from H.H. McINTYRE (APA-129)	From LST #871	7500 gals. from H.H. McINTYRE (APA-129)		
PC #003	10 days frozen and dry provisions from CAMBRIA (APA-36)	X	3000 gals. from WAYNE (APA-54) 2500 gals. from CAMBRIA (APA-36)	Ship's store stock from CAMBRIA (APA-36)	

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Action Report - N.A.S. SRT - PART (IV) - SPECIAL REPORTS - SECTION (I) - LOGISTICS.

SHIP	PROVISIONS	FUEL	WATER	SHIP'S STORE STOCK, C&S, GEN. STORE	REMARKS
LST #155	X	X	5000 gals. from BRAXTON (APA-138) 10,000 gals. from HEMARD (APA-201)	X	
LST #888	Dry provisions as required to load to capacity from FREESTONE (APA-167). 5000 lbs. frozen from LYCOING (APA-155)	X		Ship's store stock (emergency) from FREESTONE (APA-167)	LST #888 loaded to capacity to serve as emergency source for small craft.
Garrison Beach Battalion No. 1	15 days supply dry provisions (3 apicco) from OTTAWA (APA-101) and WYOMING (APA-84)	X	X	X	Garrison Beach Battalion #1 to serve as second emergency source for small craft.
KLEE (APB-120)	X	Received 10,000 gals. from APPLING (APA-58) Ceased fueling to stand out in accordance orders.	X	X	
TILLS (DE-748)	X	Fueled from LST #166	X	X	
GLENS (DB-123)	X	Received approx. 1500 bbls. from HENRIE (APA-201)	X	X	

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Action Report - YAGISAKI - PART (IV) - SPECIAL REPORTS - SECTION
(I) - LOGISTICS.

SHIP	PROVISIONS	FUEL	WATER	SHIP'S STORE STOCK, C&SS, GEN. STORE.	REMARKS
SNYDER (DE-745)	X	Received approx. 60000 gals. from LST #731	X	X	
POTAWATOMIE (ATF-109) CAHULL (ATF-152)	X	X	X	Ship's store Stock, C&SS from CAHULL (APA-36)	
LST's	From LST's as directed by ComLST Flot 23 (Temp)	From LST's as directed by ComLST Flot 23 (Temp)		Ship's service stock, C&SS from transports on individual ship transfers.	
LSM #441	X	Received 6000 gals. diesel from GRIBES (APA-172)	Received 2000 gals. from GRIBES (APA-172)	X	

Port Director,
YAGISAKI

Received 105 blankets, 63 cots, 7 ensigns (various sizes), navigational equipment, general stores, and office supplies from all ships TransRon 12.

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COMMANDER TRANSPORT SQUADRON TWELVE
(ComNAGASAKI Group and C.T.G. 54.3)

ACTION REPORT - LANDINGS AT NAGASAKI

PART IV - SPECIAL REPORTS

SECTION (J) - OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF NAVAL VESSELS

1. APA's and AKA's

Although this was the first time most of the ships had been assigned to the squadron, all of them turned in a creditable performance. In only one respect can any criticism be directed to them. Despite the fact that all commanding officers were called aboard the flagship and personally directed to make certain that unauthorized naval personnel were not allowed to go ashore and that proper supervision of beach parties and boat crews was maintained so as to preclude the possibility of their wandering from the immediate vicinity of the beach, several instances of violations were reported by ComGen 2nd HarDiv, and one of the violations resulted in an incident of the most serious character involving the alleged commission of several crimes by two Coast Guard enlisted personnel. This was the type of incident the stringent restrictions instituted by ComTransRon 12 as SOPA (Admin), NAGASAKI, against naval personnel going ashore were designed to prevent, and commanding officers of ships engaged in these operations must take whatever steps are necessary to see that such restrictions are not violated.

2. LST's and LSM's

The LST's and LSM's performed in a most satisfactory manner. Close relationship between the LST group commander and the beachmaster continued throughout the entire unloading period and contributed a great deal to the rapid unloading of these ships. Small use was made of LSM's to aid in the unloading of transports, since, upon the arrival of the tractor group, all available beaching spots were necessary for the unloading of the cargo, particularly the shore party equipment, comprising original loads in LST's and LSM's. This factor necessarily slowed the unloading of the transports, but did not affect the speed of the overall unloading operation.

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Action Report - NAGASAKI - PART (IV) - SECTION (J) - OPERATION AND
MAINTENANCE OF NAVAL VESSELS.

3. Pontoon Causeways and Barges

Causeways and barges played a very minor role in the initial unloading. On 26 September authority was received from ComPhib-Grp 4 to launch two causeways and eight barges. This was done at the request of the port director, who indicated a desire for this equipment to facilitate the unloading of resupply shipping. The barges were actually put to use in the unloading of some initial shipping and aided materially in the last phases of unloading, particularly that of the AKA's.

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ACTION REPORT - LANDINGS AT NAGASAKI

PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE

1. Personnel of the U.S.S. WAYNE (APA-54) are deserving of special comment for their performance during this operation. No transport division was assigned to one of the divisions. For operational and administrative purposes the commanding officer of the WAYNE was designated division commander of TransDiv 13 (Temp), and three members of the staff of this command were loaned to the WAYNE on temporary additional duty. Despite the lack of time for adequate planning, the obvious deficiencies in material and personnel which any transport commanding officer would suffer in attempting to take on the additional duties and responsibilities of a transport division commander, the WAYNE turned in a performance which would have been a credit to any regularly organized TransDiv commander.

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ACTION REPORT - LANDINGS AT NAGASAKI

PART VI - LESSONS LEARNED, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Intelligence Material

Insufficient copies of charts of the harbor, beach, and dock diagrams were received for distribution to ships for use of boat crews.

Recommendation: Whenever possible more copies of charts and harbor diagrams should be furnished, since facilities for duplicating such information aboard transports are very limited.

2. Minefield Intelligence

Recommendation: Because so many garbles appear in dispatches and prevent accurate plotting, it is recommended that place names, latitude and longitude and H.O. chart numbers be used in dispatches reporting important minefield information.

3. Operation Orders and Plans

Recommendation: Since it is imperative that a command operating as required of the NAGASAKI Group should have necessary operation plans and orders of higher echelons bearing on the operation, it is recommended that such plans and orders be designated for special handling to insure that their distribution is a matter of highest priority and urgency and that ample spares be supplied the emergency distribution centers.

4. Radio Circuits

Recommendation: In occupation landings experience gained in this operation indicates that the Harbor Circuit (2716 kcs voice) should be substituted for TransDiv ship-shore administrative channels and the TBX for beach parties can be dispensed with, thereby conserving on personnel. The Landing Boat Common should be used for all SCR 610's instead of assigning division boat control frequencies.

5. Ship-to-Shore Area Circuit

Recommendation: Now that conditions of radio silence can be relaxed

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Action Report - NAGASAKI - PART (VI) - LESSONS LEARNED, CONCLUSIONS
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the feasibility of a ship-to-ship area circuit should be considered. This would have the advantage of delivery by the receipt method and reduction of traffic on the ship-to-shore nets and FOX schedule.

6. Security

Movement reports are made in plain language, but voice calls are still being used on VHF Voice Channels.

Recommendation: The present confusion on security practices, of which the above practice is only one of several examples which might be cited, should be clarified by higher authority and some consistency restored. The use of voice calls for ships should be abolished, now that hostilities have ceased.

7. Visual Signalling

Recommendation: On night signalling when visual silence can safely be lifted, adapters with green, blue or yellow lenses should be used, never red, in order to avoid the possibility of confusing the red adapter signal light with breakdown signals.