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Ideologi

En overordnet filosofisk, religiøs og/eller politisk livsanskuelse, med et sett av verdier, holdninger og idealer, et forsvar for hva som er sant og rettferdig. Et sett av meninger, antakelser, trosforestillinger og holdninger. Et verdisystem. "[T]he term is used to designate some kind of especially coherent and rigidly held system of political ideas." (James H. Kavanagh i Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 306)

I vid forstand er ideologier alle politiske, religiøse, estetiske og andre bevissthets-former som fungerer som uttrykk for og legitimering av samfunnsforhold og interesser (Arnold og Sinemus 1983 s. 474-475). Ideologier skjuler eller mystifiserer forskjellene og motsetningene som finnes i alle sosiale grupperinger (Groupe my 1990 s. 252).

"Mike Cormack in his book *Ideology* (1992) begins by quoting four competing accounts of the term [...] Terry Eagleton in *Ideology: An Introduction* (1991) lists as many as sixteen definitions currently in circulation" (Taylor og Willis 1999 s. 57). Blant de forskjellige definisjonene som Eagleton omtaler er:

Prosessuell produksjon av betydninger, tegn og verdier i samfunnslivet

En sosialt motivert tenkemåte

En måte for personer i samfunnet til å skape en meningsfull verden

Et handlingsorientert kompleks av overbevisninger

Et medium som som får enkeltpersoner til å oppleve sine relasjoner som en sosial struktur

En framgangsmåte som gjør samfunnsliv om til naturgitt virkelighet (dvs. noe selvfølgelig)

Et korpus av ideer som er karakteristisk for en bestemt sosial gruppe eller klasse

Sammenfall av makt og diskurs (språkbruk)

Forestillinger som bidrar til å legitimere en herskende politisk makt

Falske forestillinger som bidrar til å legitimere en herskende politisk makt

En sosialt nødvendig illusjon

Systematisk fordreid kommunikasjon

Ideologi er et omstridt begrep ("contested concept") i likhet med f.eks. frihet og demokrati. "Just as concepts can be contested, they can also be decontested, in that they achieve a stable meaning within a given framework. […] 'ideologies', which can be understood both as constellations of ideas that are ideologies as conventionally found in the real world of politics, and also as interrelated systems of meaning that are the conceptual frames of scholarly usage." (David Collier i https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569310600923782; lesedato 12.10.21)

"Ideology is a system of concepts and views which serves to make sense of the world while obscuring the *social interests* that are expressed therein, and by its completeness and relative internal consistency tends to form a *closed* system and maintain itself in the face of contradictory or inconsistent experience." (Terry Eagleton sitert fra https://www.thoughtco.com/ideology-definition-3026356; lesedato 19.03.18) David Hawkes hevder at ideologi "ultimately refers to a distortion of the relationship between ideas, matter and representation" (upaginert introduksjon i Hawkes 2003). Det som for én filosof eller sosiolog oppfattes som kunnskap, mener en annen er ideologi (Boudon 1986 s. 36).

Fakta og vurderinger glir over i hverandre (Boudon 1986 s. 48). "Er" (deskriptivt) og "bør" (normativt) kan ikke skilles fra hverandre i ideologien. En person som blir tilhenger av en ny ideologi, får nye oppfatninger og vurderinger, f.eks. slik at bestemte tradisjoner, autoriteter og hierarkier går fra å ha negativ til å ha positiv verdi (Boudon 1986 s. 44).

"1) ideologies are based on a set of relatively simple metaphors and images to which people respond on the basis of their shared experience and expectations; 2) ideologies are not purely cognitive, but depend principally on emotional responses; 3) ideologies are presented at such times and in such ways as to enhance the public impression (and justify the claims and resources) of presenters and/or adherents; ideological enactment is fundamentally dramaturgical and interactional; and 4) ideologies are linked to groups and to the relationships between groups, which in turn depend on a set of resources in order to enact ideologies effectively. Ideologies are symbolic, affective, behavioral, and relational. […] ideology consists of a set of interconnected beliefs and their associated attitudes, shared and used by members of a group or population, that relate to problematic aspects of social and political

topics. These beliefs have an explicit evaluative and implicit behavioral component." (Gary Alan Fine og Kent Sandstrom i https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/201978.pdf; lesedato 20.10.21)

"Most social scientists have assumed that if ideology is separable from some other political beliefs or opinions, it is because ideology is intrinsically normative and generative [...] A classic example of an intrinsically normative definition of ideology comes from Downs (1957: 96): "We define an ideology as a verbal image of the good society and of the chief means of constructing such a society." This idea that ideological differences are fundamentally about differences in valuations, both abstract and concrete (that is, "values" and "attitudes"), is widespread [...] The second common understanding of ideology is that it is, as Downs (1957: 96) stressed, generative: it facilitates our taking a stand on a particular issue" (John Levi Martin i https://journals.openedition.org/spp/1782; lesedato 13.09.21).

En ideologi er blant annet et system av verdier. Disse verdiene gir den selvforståelsen som samfunnet skaper som modell for det enkelte samfunns-medlem. En "politically innocuous meaning of ideology comes close to the notion of "world view", in the sense of a relatively well-systematised set of categories which provide a "frame" for the belief, perception and conduct of a body of individuals" (Terry Eagleton gjengitt fra Westwell 2006 s. 6). Menneskets aktiviteter er fulle av ideologi (Paul Aron i https://journals.openedition.org/contextes/177; lesedato 18.02.22).

"Religion is the most successful ideological project ever devised" (Terry Eagleton i https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789047443223/; lesedato 30.03.22). "Man desires a world where good and evil can be clearly distinguished, for he has an innate and irrepressible desire to judge before he understands. Religions and ideologies are founded on this desire." (Milan Kundera sitert fra Auken, Lauridsen og Rasmussen 2015 s. 372)

Ideologien fungerer som et filter (Rieffel 2005 s. 220), ved å styre hva som blir gitt oppmerksomhet og tillagt vekt. Noe blir synlig og tydelig, mens annet blir utydelig eller helt usynlig. Noen handlinger framstår som verdifulle og etisk gode, mens andre framstår som nøytrale, uviktige eller kanskje direkte etisk uakseptable. Hva som oppfattes som fornuftig, vanlig, selvfølgelig og naturlig, preges av samfunnets eller sosiale gruppers ideologi.

Den amerikanske sosiologen Edward Shils mener at en ideologi har blant annet disse kjennetegnene: krav om samtykke og samhold; blokkering mot fornyelse og forandring; det "intolerante" ved det den forutsetter; tilknytning til institusjoner som forsterker og realiserer normer i ideologien (gjengitt fra Boudon 1986 s. 34).

Ideologi er ifølge Teresa L. Ebert "*misrepresentation*, not in that it is a false version of some originary "real" or that it stands in opposition to the "truth" or an

"objective" science outside ideology (as in Althusser's theory), but in that it *represents* itself and its signifying practices as "natural," unified – even global – totalities free of contradictions. It conceals not only its own inconsistencies but also its own construction through signification. "Representations" are thus not mental or physical reflections of "natural" and "real" referents, but ideological constructs through which ideology *misrepresents* its own actuality as a signifying system that refers only to its own significations. Ideology sets the conditions of intelligibility that determine not only subjectivity but knowledge as well and establishes the boundaries beyond which we cannot know. There is no "outside" ideology, no unmediated direct access to the "real" or the "truth" from which to critique ideology; to be outside one ideology is merely to be located in another one. If one is always situated in ideology, then the only way to demystify these ideological operations of production and concealment – the only way to engage in ideology critique – is to occupy the interstices of contesting ideologies or to seek the disjunctures and opposing relations created within a single ideology by its own contradictions. […] Hegemonic ideologies, such as patriarchal practices, successfully conceal their own contradictions, oppositions, and constructedness and effectively co-opt and suppress contesting ideologies and efforts to challenge their domination." (Ebert 1988)

Ideologi er "falsk totalitet" fordi den "ikke har satt sine egne grenser og ikke er bevisst sin egen begrensning […] Den eksisterer fordi det finnes ting som det ikke er lov å tale om." (Pierre Macherey i Brackert og Lämmert 1977 s. 235). En ideologis svakhet ligger ikke i dens svar, for den lykkes alltid med svarene i å etablere forståelige sammenhenger, dens svakhet er snarere de spørsmålene som forblir uten svar (Pierre Macherey i Brackert og Lämmert 1977 s. 235). "Ideologi er vedvarende *realitetstap*." (Pierre Macherey i Brackert og Lämmert 1977 s. 234) Ideologier får folk til å akseptere noe ukritisk, uten bevis eller sikker kunnskap, og uten selvstendig vurdering. Det er en slags forvridning bort fra selvstendig, autonom stillingstaking.

"Til tross for at ideologier står så sentralt i vår politiske virkelighet, har de et ganske frynsete rykte. De fremstilles ofte som rigide og lukkede – det motsatte av den pragmatiske og kompromissvillige holdningen som får et moderne demokrati til å gå rundt. […] Ideologi kan i høyeste grad føre til manglende kompromissvilje og gruppetenkning i politikken, og til at sannhetsforpliktelsen svekkes til fordel for ideologisk ønsketenkning og konformitet […] Det er imidlertid en annen side ved ideologi, som sjelden løftes frem: Ideologer er, med alle sine problematiske sider, også legitime – ja, helt naturlige – frukter av fri tankebrytning og sannhetssøken. De politiske tenkerne vi i dag forbinder med de ulike ideologiske tradisjonene ønsket som regel først og fremst å si noe sant. De var motivert av det samme som driver vitenskapen fremover: begjæret etter å se hvordan vår virkelighet henger sammen, og utlede implikasjoner av disse (påståtte) innsiktene. Dersom ideologi er et forsøk på å forstå samfunnet, er ideologisering – en skjerpelse av politisk grunnsyn som også kan endre og forme dette grunnsynet – en form for sannhets-

søken. […] Der våre moralske, etiske, politiske, ontologiske og epistemologiske grunnantagelser står i spenning og ikke går helt opp, der er det grobunn for ideologier.” (Andreas H. Hvidsten i *Morgenbladet* 30. september–6. oktober 2022 s. 24)

“People *feel* their ideologies deeply and sincerely, just as their feelings lead to ideological choices. Ideology is linked to emotion recursively – both causing and being caused by affect. […] Through ideology emotional reactions are generalized beyond their situated contexts. This statement does not deny the analytical component of ideology, but only emphasizes that emotions are central. Further, emotional responses cannot be separated from cognitive ones, just as attitudes are linked intricately to both.” (Gary Alan Fine og Kent Sandstrom i https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/201978.pdf; lesedato 20.10.21)

“*Ideologi* er et uttrykk med flere ulike betydninger. Felles for disse er at det siktes til bærende idéer i et samfunnssyn eller et politisk system. Uttrykket brukes både i negative og mer nøytrale betydninger. Den negative bruken av ordet går tilbake til Napoleon Bonaparte, som kritiserte tilhengere av demokratiet for å opphøye opplysningsfilosofien til ideologi. En mer kjent, negativ bruk av uttrykket finnes hos Marx og Engels, hvor en ideologi karakteriseres som en falsk og abstrakt tenkning som har til hensikt å tilsløre de reelle maktforholdene og interesse-motsetningene i et samfunn. Mer spesifikt legitimerer ideologier privilegiene til en overklasse ved å fremstille denne klassens særinteresser som om de var allmenne, og derigjennom svekker ideologien arbeiderklassens evne og vilje til å bekjempe en urettferdig samfunnsorden. I den marxistiske analysen er altså en ideologi et forkledd uttrykk for én samfunnsklasses interesser. I kunnskapssosiologien utvides et slikt perspektiv til at ethvert tankesystem er uttrykk for en gruppes interesse, dvs. at enhver gruppe eller klasse vil ha sin ideologi, og hvor det ikke finnes noe ikke-ideologisk ståsted. Ideologi kan også brukes i en mer nøytral betydning hvor uttrykket simpelthen betegner et mer eller mindre sammenhengende sett av verdier, prinsipper og holdninger som motiverer eller veileder politisk og sosial handling. Denne mer nøytrale bruken av uttrykket er blitt den mest vanlige i dag.” (Lars Fr. H. Svendsen i https://www.civita.no/politisk-ordbok/hva-er-ideologi; lesedato 14.12.20)

“In any case, what is ideology? To Marx and Engels, it was organized beliefs at a high level of abstraction; they used the term to include morality, religion, metaphysics, politics, law and judicial theory, and certainly speculative philosophy. While it is not the case that all beliefs are ideological, these ones are because they are idealized, universalized and detached expressions of actual social relations. [...] Thus ideology is a generalization of social relations; it is the ideal form of the actual relations, seen from the perspective of one position in this set of relations, but universalized, idealized and abstracted. Marx and Engels, thinking at the largest scale, were of course concerned specifically with the general relations of production in a social world – those that, seen sociologically, appear as class

relations, and that, seen juridically, appear as property relations." (John Levi Martin i https://journals.openedition.org/spp/1782; lesedato 13.09.21)

Ifølge marxismen er ideologi "that set of ideas which encapsulates the power of the bourgeoisie, making it seem right and natural. A key aspect of this is that ideology misrepresents the class nature of society to those who are exploited, namely the working class. (Jason Toynbee i Gillespie og Toynbee 2006 s. 171)

"For ideological analysis the task is to show how power operates at the level of ideas. In the original Marxist conception of ideology dominant ideas represent the dominant class and its interests. From this perspective, analysis of ideology should show how media texts carry those embedded assumptions which naturalise or legitimate social relations. In other words, this is a realist approach which examines how texts may systematically cover up the real. However, in the Althusserian view of ideology which became dominant in film and media studies in the 1970s, ideology and the texts which embody it are thought to be the *source* of power as well as being powerful in their effects. As a result social reality almost disappears from view. With this move comes a strong scepticism towards the possibility of knowledge, or even the existence, of the real. Indeed, realist texts are treated with the most suspicion precisely because of their misleading claim to be able to convey reality. As regards values and beliefs, textual analysis in what we have been calling the 'big ideology' school still has a critical edge. It operates on the basis that dominant social relations ought to be changed. But since these can hardly be discerned it expects to be able to do little more than show ideological processes at work in the media." (Jason Toynbee i Gillespie og Toynbee 2006 s. 183)

"All societies represent and give meaning to the lives of their inhabitants by constructing systems of ideas about them. These systems are not optional extras, but constitute the lived reality of the people." (Hawkes 2003 s. 143-144)

"The term "ideology" is generally associated with a negative connotation. On the other hand the listing of some circulating ideology definitions shows that the term "ideology" is awarded a number of different meanings, which are not only negative:

- systematically distorted communication
- something that permits the subject to take position
- socially motivated ways of thinking
- identity thinking
- socially necessary illusion
- action-oriented complex of convictions
- intermingling of language and phenomenal reality"
(https://web.archive.org/web/20061202044734/http://www.ideologieforschung.de/en/; lesedato 14.12.20)

"It is common for sociological discussions of ideology to begin by acknowledging, if not bemoaning, the plurality of different ways of using the term "ideology" [...] Marx and Engels used it to denote the most abstract conceptions that populate an imaginary world of ideas independent of material life; later Marxists often used it to denote a conspiratorial ideational wool pulled over the eyes of the masses; political scientists use it to denote packages of positions, often believed to be unifiable in a single preferred optimal state, and, of course, many of us use it to denote the beliefs, attitudes and opinions of those with whom we disagree." (John Levi Martin i https://journals.openedition.org/spp/1782; lesedato 13.09.21)

"[I]deologies do not operate through single ideas; they operate in discursive chains, in clusters, in semantic fields, in discursive formations" (Stuart Hall sitert fra Brunsdon og Spigel 2008 s. 266). I en ideologi tolkes alltid hendelser innenfor ideologiens eget tankesystem (Mucchielli 1986 s. 24). Noen verk og sjangrer "celestialize hierarchy" (Hugh Duncan sitert fra Sayre 2011 s. 126), dvs. forsvarer de herskendes ideologi og deres undertrykkelsesmekanismer. Ideologier røper seg gjennom sine motsetninger (Dirkx 2000 s. 82). Dessuten henger ideologier uløselig sammen med praksiser, måter å utføre noe på.

"Ideology is less tenacious as a "set of ideas" than as a system of representations, perceptions, and images that precisely encourages men and women to "see" their specific place in a historically peculiar social formation as inevitable, natural, a necessary function of the "real" itself." (James H. Kavanagh i Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 310)

"Ideology is a social process that works on and through every social subject, that, like any other social process, everyone is "in," whether or not they "know" or understand it. It has the function of producing an obvious "reality" that social subjects can assume and accept, precisely as if it had not been socially produced and did not need to be "known" at all." (James H. Kavanagh i Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 311)

Filosofen Theodor W. Adorno: "Ideologi legger seg ikke over samfunnslivet som et sjikt som kan fjernes, men befinner seg inne i det."

Den sveitsiske forfatteren Friedrich Dürrenmatt: "Ideologi er orden på bekostning av å tenke nytt."

Politiker og militær leder Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Ideologer er folk som tror at menneskeheten er bedre enn mennesket."

Den tyske journalisten Dagobert Lindlau: "Fristelsen til å gjøre seg livet lettere i en forutskapt ideologi er stor ikke bare under totalitær tvang."

Den italienske forfatteren Carlo Manzoni: "Ideologi er forsøket på å gjøre gatenes tilstand bedre gjennom å sette opp nye skilt."

Den slovenske forfatteren Žarko Petan: "Historikerne forfalsker fortiden, ideologene framtiden."

Lingvisten Horst Dieter Schlosser: "Ideologi er filosofi med ferdigproduserte byggekomponenter." (Adorno m.fl. er her sitert fra http://www.philolex.de/ideologi.htm; lesedato 13.09.21)

"Ideology, which slides into every level of the social structure, has the particular function of cohesion. It fulfills this function by establishing at the level of the agent's experience relations which are obvious … and which allow their practical activities to function within the unity of a formation. … Ideology has the precise function of hiding real contradictions and of reconstituting on an imaginary level a relatively coherent discourse which serves as the horizon of the agent's experience; it does this by moulding their representations of their real relations and inserting these in the overall unity of the relations of production. … [The function of ideology] is not to produce knowledge effects, not to give agents knowledge of the social structure, but simply to insert them as it were into their practical activities supporting the existing social formations." (Nicos Poulantzas i *Political Power and Social Classes*, 1968; her sitert fra Resch 1992 s. 207)

"The historian Michael Hunt, meanwhile, views ideology in more specific terms as performing a particular function: it is "an interrelated set of convictions or assumptions that reduces the complexities of a particular slice of reality to easily comprehensible terms and suggests appropriate ways of dealing with that reality." [...] Ideology is a shared belief system that may serve at once to motivate and to justify. It generally asserts normative values and includes causative beliefs. How do things happen? What does it all mean? An ideology may be utopian and progressive or protective of the status quo. It offers a way in which to order the world, defining enemies and allies, dangers and opportunities, us and them. Ideologies are formal, structured, and involve their own particular logic, often appearing in the guise of science or objective knowledge. Ideology is implicated in collective action, as criticism, goad, explanation, or promise. It is represented in symbols and beliefs held by a community and is publicly expressed. Ideology is at once philosophy, science, religion, and imagination." (https://www.american foreignrelations.com/E-N/Ideology-What-is-ideology.html; lesedato 13.09.21)

"[C]ultural processes are by definition also ideological in so far as the way in which the world is made to mean in a society tends to coincide with the interests of the dominant or powerful classes and groups in that society. […] the media function ideologically; how, that is, in processes of institutionalized cultural production particular meanings are encoded into the structure of texts, 'preferred

meanings' which tend to support existing economic, political and social power relations." (Ang 1996 s. 138)

"[M]edia texts represent and construct *knowledge, values and beliefs*. This is how and why texts function ideologically. [...] questions of value and of evaluation in textual analysis *are* commonly explored in media studies through examining the political or ideological values that shape or underpin a text." (Gillespie og Toynbee 2006 s. 2)

"Ideology, after all, is nothing more than "the fiction one would prefer to believe," the system of representations that the dominating class uses to justify its power and which the dominated need, or think they need, to rationalize their powerlessness." (Stam 1992 s. 77)

John Thompsons skriver i boka *Studies in the Theories of Ideology* (1984) at ideology er "linked to the process of sustaining asymmetrical relations of power – to maintain domination. . . by disguising, legitimating, or distorting those relations" (sitert fra http://www.jpcs.in/; lesedato 03.06.15) "In *Studies in the Theories of Ideology*, John Thompson examines many recent theories of ideology and finds that many of them sever the link between ideology and domination, and therefore rob ideology of the critical edge that it had in Marx and other neo-Marxists. I would therefore agree with Thompson on the need to link the concept of ideology with theories of hegemony and domination, and thus to delimit its application to ideas and positions which serve functions of legitimation, mystification, and class domination that assure the domination of the ruling class over other classes and groups within society, rather than equating all ideas or political positions with ideology" (Kellner 1991).

Ideologi "designates the indispensable practice – including the "systems of representation" that are its products and supports – through which individuals of different class, race, and sex are worked into a particular "lived relation" to a sociohistorical project. Ideological analysis studies the ways in which those "lived relations" and systems of representation are constituted, transformed, and affiliated with various specific political programs. More committed forms of ideological analysis also attempt to change the association of influential ideological ensembles and particular political programs. For there can be no successful political program that is not driven by powerful and comprehensive forms of ideological address. Thus, literary and cultural texts of all kinds constitute a society's ideological practice, and literary and cultural criticism constitutes an activity that, in its own rather meager way, either submits to, or self-consciously attempts to transform, the political effects of that indispensable social practice." (James H. Kavanagh i Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 319-320)

"Handling the category of "ideology" has become difficult for us (those who write in the liberal context of the early 21st century). Western governments after World

War II were built on the denial of ideology: the very opposite of past fascist regimes and contemporary communist governments. On the contrary, liberal regimes presented themselves as freed from what was construed as a particular form of political thought, and as being able to accommodate a wide variety of opinions (and art forms). Ideology has since become synonymous with a form of blindness, lack of discernment, and inability to let other ideas exist." (Jérôme Bazin i https://journals.openedition.org/critiquedart/29316; lesedato 28.09.21)

Den britiske kulturkritikeren Raymond Williams vektla "that there are also 'residual', 'emergent', 'oppositional' or 'alternative' ideologies. Residual ideologies are those which, although formed in the past, are still active. Emergent ideologies are those of new groups, existing outside of the dominant groups. Oppositional ideologies actively mount a challenge to the dominant ideology, while alternative ideologies may happily coexist with it. Art, and artistic production, may represent any one of these kinds of ideology." (gjengitt fra Barnard 1988 s. 48)

Ideologiske inkonsistenser blir bare synlige når det har oppstått en motsetning innad i ideologien. Men en ideologi er til for å gi svar i motsetningsfulle situasjoner; det er dens oppgave å viske ut motsetninger (Pierre Macherey i Brackert og Lämmert 1977 s. 234). Kun den som kan distansere seg helt fra en ideologi, kan vite hva en ideologi sier og representerer (Pierre Macherey i Brackert og Lämmert 1977 s. 235).

"Anglo-European colonialist ideology […] permitted a small group of small nations – England, France, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands – to dominate most of the globe from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century and which permitted white Americans, in turn, to dominate the Native American lands we now call the United States of America and to hold African captives as slaves. An ideology this successful dies hard. […] one reason colonialist ideology is so successful is that it is supported by a complex psychology that strongly influences the way we perceive ourselves and others." (Tyson 2006)

"Ideology cannot exist without the psychology appropriate to it, without the psychology that sustains it. Thus, such ideologies as classism, sexism, heterosexism, and racism are not merely belief systems. They are also ways of relating to oneself and others and, as such, involve complex psychological modes of being. Perhaps nowhere is the intimate connection between ideology and psychology demonstrated more clearly than in postcolonial criticism. For one of postcolonial theory's most definitive goals is to combat colonialist ideology by understanding the ways in which it operates to form the identity – the psychology – of both the colonizer and the colonized. And as a pervasive force in Western civilization, colonialist ideology can be found operating, sometimes invisibly but almost always effectively, even in those cultural practices and productions in which we would not expect to find it" (Tyson 2006).

Både sakprosa og skjønnlitteratur har et ideologisk nivå som kan beskrives eller avsløres i en litterær analyse. Knut Hamsuns ideologiske tilbøyeligheter beveget seg politisk fra anarkistiske tendenser via konservatisme til reaksjonære holdninger som ligger nær fascismen. En slik utvikling kan etterspores i tekstene hans. Han har også tydelige rasistiske innslag i sin skjønnlitteratur og sakprosa (afroamerikanerne i USA er "Væsner med Tarmer i Hovedet"; "Hans ansigt er ubehagelig, jødisk"). Det ideologiske i et verk kan også inngå i analyser av tegneserier, film, dataspill og andre medier.

En litterær tekst kan fungere som en imaginær løsning på ideologiske konflikter, ved å konstruere konflikter i teksten som lar seg løse i teksten (Sayre 2011 s. 148). En litterær tekst kan ifølge amerikaneren Stephen Zelnick også fungere som en "permissive narrative" som bygger opp en komplisert konflikt som begrunner hvorfor en ideologisk konflikt må fortsette i virkelighetens verden (Sayre 2011 s. 148).

En roman, en film eller et dataspill kan presentere f.eks. "capitalist values and beliefs as always correct, timeless and therefore ahistorical. This view of any value system is highly ideological and open to challenge. However, the familiarity of the generic codes and conventions does not invite the audience to challenge its value system." (Taylor og Willis 1999 s. 64)

Når det legges sterke føringer fra politiske partier og myndigheter på hvordan litteratur skal skrives, har resultatet blitt kalt "planleggingslitteratur" og "politikk-kunst" (Joch, Mix m.fl. 2009 s. 130 og 133).

"[I]deological analysis attempts to understand how dominant social groups are able to reproduce their social and economic power" (Taylor og Willis 1999 s. 57).

Nederlenderen Teun A. van Dijk kaller fire posisjoner for "den ideologiske firkanten" ("The ideological square"), posisjoner som "provides the features for positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. This ideological square emphasises the positive 'Us' and de-emphasises the positive 'Them'; similarly, it emphasises the negative 'Them' and de-emphasises the negatives 'Us'." (https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-artslaw/corpus/conference-archives/2017/general/paper212.pdf; lesedato 20.11.19)

Ideologi er dynamisk produksjon og manipulasjon av midler som brukes til å oppnå bestemte mål (Hamon 1984 s. 10). "Politiske ideologier er gigantiske forenklings-apparater. De reduserer virkeligheten til enkle, gripbare marsjordrer. Nettopp fordi virkeligheten forenkles så ekstremt, blir det enklere å gripe inn i historiens strøm." (professor i statsvitenskap Bernt Hagtvet i *Dagbladet* 30. juli 2011 s. 72)

Franskmannen Destutt de Tracy hevdet i *Eléments d'Idéologie* (1804-15) at "there were no innate ideas, all thought being derived from sensation. On the other hand,

he also thought that 'Nothing exists for us except by the ideas we have of it, because our ideas are our whole being, our existence itself.' […] The only way to avoid the sceptical position that true knowledge is impossible, so it seemed to Destutt, would be to analyse the process by which our minds translate material things into ideal forms. This area of study had already been opened up by Condillac; under the leadership of Destutt it was institutionalized in the section of the Institut de France which dealt with moral and political sciences, and it was given the name 'Idéologie': the science of ideas. Ideology thus originates as a 'meta-science', a science of science. It claims to be able to explain where the other sciences come from and to give a scientific genealogy of thought. […] To 'unmask' the source of ideas was to deny them absolute validity. If this was to be done to all ideas, it was easy to see how Destutt's ambition to change the face of the earth might seem plausible enough." (Hawkes 2003 s. 60-61)

Karl Marx oppfattet ideologier som kollektive illusjoner eller løgner, falsk bevissthet som tilslører sanne sammenhenger. Ideologier rettferdiggjør rådende, urettferdige samfunnsforhold og ulike former for undertrykkelse. "De herskende tanker er de herskendes tanker", hevdet han. Ideologier framstiller noe som selvfølgelig, naturlig og/eller nødvendig, nesten alltid på en slik måte at det tjener makthaverne og de dominerende sosiale klassene. De dominerende ideene i enhver historisk periode er ideene til den ledende klassen, dvs. de som har den sterkeste økonomiske og politiske makten i samfunnet (dominant-ideologi-tesen). Gjennom prinsipper, lover, institusjoner m.m. blir ideologiene preget inn i samfunnets medlemmer slik at de mer eller mindre godtar de rollene som den rådende ideologien gir dem.

I Marx og Engels' *Det kommunistiske partis manifest* (1848) "it is announced that 'the ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class' (VI, 503). This is the so-called 'dominant ideology thesis', which suggests that the class which is economically dominant will try to impose its own peculiar way of seeing the world on society as a whole." (Hawkes 2003 s. 114)

Marx' dominant-ideologi-tese lar ideer omfatte både intellektuelle ideer, verdier og (moralske, politiske, sosiale) normer. Den dominerende ideologien i en periode framstilles av makthaverne som noe nødvendig og uunngåelig, en selvfølgelighet som det er meningsløst å opponere mot. "*The Dominant Ideology Thesis* suggests that there is in most societies a set of beliefs which dominates all others and which, through its incorporation in the consciousness of subordinate classes, tends to inhibit the development of radical political dissent. […] the dominant ideology has the function of maintaining the dominant class's control over property in feudalism and early capitalism. In late capitalism, however, the changing nature of the dominant class in terms of a partial divorce between ownership and control means that the dominant ideology ceases to be crucial for the coherence of the dominant class." (Son-Ung Kim m.fl. i http://www.sociology index.com/dominant_ideology _thesis.htm; lesedato 23.06.15)

"Money is not merely a convenient vehicle for exchange; money has significance, it *means* something. In short, money talks, and it speaks the language of ideology." (Hawkes 2003 s. 9)

Den franske sosiologen Pierre Bourdieu kaller ideologi for "symbolsk makt". Både det vitenskapelige, estetiske, moralsk og religiøse fyller ideologiske funksjoner (Peytard 1995 s. 32). Begrepet inkluderer både epistemologiske, sosiologiske, politiske og psykologiske faktorer. Ideologi avgrenser hva som lar seg tenker, føle, uttrykke og forstå, og skaper soner der alt er uforståelig eller usynlig (Sayre 2011 s. 135). Bourdieus begrep "doxa" dekker mye av det samme som ideologibegrepet, dvs. alle de "selvfølgelige" ideene som en virkelighetsoppfatning er basert på (Gisèle Sapiro i https://journals.openedition.org/contextes/165; lesedato 18.02.22).

Den franske filosofen Louis Althusser hevdet at alle mennesker befinner seg fullstendig innenfor en ideologi. Oppdragelse, familie, utdannelse, mediene, religiøse organisasjoner i en stat styrer hva og hvordan vi tenker og handler. Althusser oppfatter ideologi som en ubevisst dimensjon i mennesket som åndsvesen. I en viss forstand er ideologi derfor et historieløst fenomen, i motsetning til de politiske ideologiene som f.eks. marxismen og nazismen (Aron og Viala 2006 s. 34). Det generelle fenomenet ideologi gir en viss autonomi til måten mennesket oppfatter sin situasjon i verden på. Marxisten Althusser oppfatter ideologi som en representasjon av individers imaginære relasjon til sine reelle livsbetingelser (gjengitt etter Sarfati 2001 s. 97). Denne relasjonen gir seg utslag i tenkemåter og i konkrete handlinger.

"Louis Althusser combined Marxism with the scientifically oriented methods of Structuralism in his essay Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatuses (1970) and analysed how the dominant systems enforce their control by subtly moulding their subjects through ideology. Ideology has been earlier defined by Engels as "false consciousness" to refer to the ways in which hegemony is naturalised, justified and sustained in society, and to the invisible ways in which the cultural forms seek to ensure the perennial dominance of the ruling class." (Nasrullah Mambrol i https://literariness.org/2016/04/12/althusserian-marxism/; lesedato 30.11.22)

"Althusser (1971) followed Marx in understanding ideology as 'mental production', but went much further in the claims he made for its scale and power. Firstly, he suggested that ideology was all pervasive, stretching from common-sense ideas in everyday life through to theoretical reflection in the social sciences. Secondly, he argued that ideology was as much about being as knowing. The key work done by ideology was in summoning up that deep sense of subjectivity, the 'I', which we use to name ourselves." (Jason Toynbee i Gillespie og Toynbee 2006 s. 172) "For the writers influenced by Althusser, however, it is no longer seen as

false knowledge because it is virtually everywhere." (Jason Toynbee i Gillespie og Toynbee 2006 s. 176)

Althusser forener under "ideologi" både ideer, begreper, teorier, bilder/metaforer, det moralske, det filosofiske og det religiøse (Boudon 1986 s. 47).

Althusser oppfatter ideologi som "a social symbolic system governed by practical interests and subject-centered experience […] a structured system of meaning embodied in and reproduced by concrete practices and institutions." (Resch 1992 s. 205) Han ser ikke ideologi ut fra motsetningen sant og usant, han oppfatter snarere ideologi som selve "luften" et samfunn trenger for å fungere (Boudon 1986 s. 37).

For Althusser "ideology is a fundamental component of all human societies rather than a temporary aberration to be overcome with the triumph of socialism." (Resch 1992 s. 225) Likevel kan ideologier kritiseres, f.eks. "the bourgeois ideology of possessive individualism" (Resch 1992 s. 225). En amerikansk litteraturforsker skriver om "such ideologies as bourgeois individualism, patriarchal capitalism, and Cartesian dualism" (Jon Smidt i https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/24907804.pdf; lesedato 13.10.21). "Althusser's thesis that all practice takes place in ideology" (Resch 1992 s. 227).

"Ideology, says Althusser, exists before the individual. When the concrete individual comes along, ideology has 'always already' determined a specific set of roles, a particular subjectivity, into which the individual will be slotted. This occurs through a process of 'interpellation', which basically means that a person will be systematically addressed, or 'hailed', in such a way as to force him or her into this pre-allocated 'subject-position'. Nor is this process unique to twentieth-century capitalism, for 'the formal structure of all ideology is always the same' (177)." (Hawkes 2003 s. 119)

Bruken av "the term 'overdetermination' is Althusser's major contribution to the theory of ideology. It means that every situation has more than one determining factor. For example, the forms taken by oppression in twentieth-century France cannot be reduced to merely economic factors. At a glance, one can see that other, ideal forces, such as conceptions of race, sexuality or gender, are at work." (Hawkes 2003 s. 123) Ideologi er ifølge Althusser den (overdeterminerte) enheten av det reelle og det imaginære, og uttrykk for vilje, håp og lengsel snarere enn beskrivelse av virkelighet (gjengitt fra Clarke, Cohen m.fl. 1981 s. 96). Det ideologiske har samme forklaringskraft for Althusser som det underbevisste har innen psykoanalysen (Dirkx 2000 s. 82).

For Althusser "ideologies are more basic to social formations than are the sciences since, unlike sciences, they are necessary to any conceptualization of social formations. Ideology, Althusser maintains, is "an organic part of every social totality […] a structure essential to the historical life of society" (Althusser 1969,

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232-33). In contrast to science, ideology performs a ubiquitous social function, one that must be fulfilled in every society, including a socialist society, since in all societies men and women must be formed, transformed, and equipped to respond to their conditions of existence. This process of socialization requires a system of ideas, beliefs, and values by which men and women experience their world as a coherent whole and find their place within it as subjects." (Resch 1992 s. 206-207)

"Precisely because of the natures of science and ideology, science can never break with ideology "in general" but only and always with a specific ideology. Furthermore, this break inaugurates a continuous struggle that is never over or won." (Resch 1992 s. 268)

Den ideologien som en selv har, er mer eller mindre "usynlig" for en selv. "Religious beliefs, political opinions, conceptions of race and sex or social class, even our most deeply seated notions of life – all these constitute our ideological frame of reference. Although we may live as if our beliefs were the only true and real explanations of how the world is, we need only compare our own ideology with that of another group or culture or era to see how historically and socially shaped many of those views are." (Bordwell og Thompson 2007 s. 63). "[I]deology is most effective when it erases itself" (Deacon m.fl. 1999 s. 154), dvs. fungerer på en allestedsnærværende, men usynlig måte.

"Feministiske, multikulturalistiske, høyrepopulistiske, sosialistiske, nyliberale posisjoner trer inn på den politiske scenen og skjeller hverandre ut for å være ideologiske. […] Terry Eagleton […] sa en gang at ideologi er som dårlig ånde, man merker det ikke på seg selv. [...] I snevrere betydning gjelder ideologi-begrepet kulturelle tolkningsmønstre og sosiale praksiser som bidrar til å rettferdiggjøre og opprettholde sosial urettferdighet og undertrykkelse" (sosialfilosofen Robin Celikates i https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/nach-dem-ende-der-geschichte-wie-funktioniert-ideologie.2162.de.html?dram:article_id=424056; lesedato 13.09.21).

Ideologier skaper ifølge Marx og Althusser en imaginær, illusorisk koherens som gjør at mennesker kan neglisjere den sosiale urettferdigheten i samfunnet (Dirkx 2000 s. 82). En ideologi er ambivalent, den forsoner menneskene, men omfatter også den utilfredsheten som må forsones (Hager 1992 s. 146). Det kan skilles mellom regressive ideologier som ser tilbake mot et ønsket samfunn som en gang eksisterte (eller som folk tror at eksisterte), nåtidslegitimerende ideologier som vil bevare status quo, og progressive ideologier som vil forandre kraftig eller fjerne den nåværende tilstanden og bygge noe annerledes/bedre.

"Ideology aims for cohesion, and it achieves this aim by means of the social subject, not as a result of the autonomous activity of human beings, but rather by means of the structured process of constituting human beings as social subjects. For Althusser, any theory of ideology predicated on an individual or a class subject not

only slips inevitably into an essentialist problematic of alienation but also mistakes effect for cause since ideology creates subjects rather than breaks them down or alienates them from their nature or essence. Ideology also masks existing social contradictions by naturalizing existing social relations, the positions occupied by social subjects, within an imaginary discourse that presents these relations as inevitable (thereby excluding the possibility that things might be different) and coherent (thereby excluding or rationalizing the existence of problems within these social relations). This initial conception of ideology asserts both too much and too little. It claims too much by blandly proclaiming the total success of ideology with respect to its functions of cohesion and masking (without any elaboration of the specific mechanisms by which such effects are realized). It claims too little insofar as the effectivity of ideology, despite certain indications to the contrary, is defined largely in negative and oppressive terms – as nothing more than the "false consciousness" without which capitalism could not survive." (Resch 1992 s. 207)

"Swedish sociologist Göran Therborn, in *The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology* (1980), emphasizes the contradictory nature of ideological interpellation. Although he accepts Althusser's theory of ideology as his point of departure, Therborn insists first that the ideological apparatuses are unevenly developed as well as structurally integrated and second that the contradictions within the interpellation process take a precise general form stemming from the fact that ideologies not only subject individuals to the existing social order but also qualify them for conscious social action. […] According to Therborn, ideology subjects and qualifies individuals by telling them what exists, what is good, and what is possible, and there is always a certain "lack of fit" between these three messages. […] Therborn is especially sensitive to the difficulty of relating all ideology to economic class position. He divides the world of ideological interpellation along two bipolar axes, one existential, the other historical. Each axis has two polar positions, an "inclusive" pole (being a member of a meaningful whole) and a "positional" pole (having a particular place in the world in relation to other members). From this typology Therborn infers the existence of four basic types of interpellation: inclusive-existential ideologies, for example, the meaning of life and death; inclusive-historical ideologies, such as nationalism or ethnicity; positional-existential ideologies, for example, gender distinctions; and positional-historical ideologies, such as social class or caste (Therborn 1980, 22-27)." (Resch 1992 s. 221-223)

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                           existential

   ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
   │ inclusive-existential              positional-existential     │
   │ (for example                       (for example              │
   │ the meaning of life)               gender distinctions)       │
   │                                                               │
inclusive              IDEOLOGIES                        positional
   │                                                               │
   │                                                               │
   │ inclusive-historical               positional-historical     │
   │ (for example                       (for example              │
   │ nationalism)                       social class)              │
   └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

                            historical
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Det er totalitære ideologier som f.eks. kommunismen og nazismen som skaper mest fanatisme. Totalitære ideologier fungerer som "erstatningsreligioner". Mens ekte religioner bevarer en ærefrykt for det uforklarlige, for noe ukjent som mennesket er en del av, skrumper verden for ideologene ofte inn til noe som skal "forklares og kureres fra ett punkt" (Safranski 1999 s. 326)

Det finnes en lang marxistisk tradisjon for teorier om ideologi, men det finnes også en ikke-marxistisk tradisjon. Raymond Boudon (1986 s. 78-79) har systematisert posisjoner på denne måten, med to måter å forklare ideologiers funksjon på:

Tradisjoner	Irrasjonell forklaringsmåte	Rasjonell forklaringsmåte
Marxistisk tradisjon	Marx I: Ideologi gir et fordreid bilde av virkeligheten, påvirket av klasseinteresser	Marx II: Ideologi som resultat av et perspektiv eller som bevisst samtykke til nyttige oppfatninger Lenin: Ideologi som våpen i kampen mellom klassene
Ikke-marxistisk tradisjon	Aron og Shils: Ideologi skaper lidenskaper og fanatisme	Mannheim: Ideologi som tillit til normer tilpasset en historisk situasjon Geertz: Ideologi som veikart til å orientere seg i en kompleks verden

"Marx took over the term "ideology" from the French Revolution of 1789. It was actually coined in the 1790s by Antoine Destutt de Tracy and originally meant a "science of ideas" capable of conceiving a set of progressive positions that could guide society in an enlightened direction. (Evidently Napoleon later invented the term "ideologue" at a particularly conservative bend in his own winding career, when he wanted to attack "dogmatic" revolutionists like Destutt de Tracy.) At first, Marx retained this original usage in some of his early essays, even though he would ultimately define ideology in at least four different ways throughout his career. Later, Lenin would also utilize a variation of this first conception in *What Is To Be Done?* (1905), when he called socialism "the ideology of struggle of the proletarian class"and claimed that in the class struggle "socialism" is necessarily "introduced by the ideologues" (Eagleton, 1991, pp. 85-91). Revealingly enough, the other three concepts of ideology used by Marx at various moments are not always easy to interrelate with this first and quite straightforward definition of it as a programmatic set of consciously held ideas about society." (David Craven i Smith og Wilde 2002 s. 277-278)

"In *The German Ideology* (1846), Marx and Engels referred to ideology in a much more negative vein as a set of illusory beliefs that keep people from rationally understanding their real conditions of material existence. This very influential second definition went as follows: "[I]n all ideology people and their circumstances appear upside down as in a *camera obscura*. … In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth; here we ascend from earth to heaven. … We set out from real, active people, and on the basis of their real life process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life process." (Marx and Engels, 1975, 5, p. 36) This second definition of ideology was also the one that on 14 July 1893 led Engels, in a letter to Franz Mehring (over a decade after Marx's death) to describe ideology for the first time as "false consciousness" (Marx and Engels, 1953, p. 541). Although Marx never actually used this phrase, it was definitely consistent with his contention that ideology often entails an illusory misunderstanding of how society unfolds. This "negative" understanding of ideology as an illusionary sense of material conditions was subsequently the starting point for Althusser's ingenious structural redefinition of ideology as mere "false *un*consciousness." Or, as Althusser put it, ideology constitutes "the imaginary relationships of individuals to their real conditions of existence" (Althusser, 1978, p. 162). For all the cogency of this antihistoricist interpretation of ideology by Althusser (who baldly remarked in the same essay that "Ideology has no history"), it presupposes a congruence between ideology and falsehood that is illuminating at certain moments and dead wrong at others." (David Craven i Smith og Wilde 2002 s. 278)

For Marx ligner ideologienes funksjon camera obscura, dvs. at mennesket ikke oppfatter verden slik den er, men "omsnudd" (Olivesi 2013 s. 198). "[W]hile the idealists believe men act as they do because of how they think (their

consciousness), materialists believe that men think as they do (their consciousness is as it is) because of their "material life-process." So it seems what Marx is saying in this quote is that, although ideology ("mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc.," as described by Marx in the same paragraph) may make it appear that the idealist understanding is true, what ideology does is flip reality (the materialist understanding) on its head. This flipping itself is a phenomenon that arises as a product of the "historical life-process," that is, history itself has produced these idealist ideologies. In the same way, the flipping of objects on the retina is produced by the physical life-process. So ideology itself is a product of material reality: the ideas that are expressed in ideology are not themselves truths that exist in some higher plain divorced from the material world but are expressions of the thought processes of people as they perceive and understand the material world. […] So an oppressed and super exploited worker can become a religious, pro-capitalist, anti-communist, anti-union fascist reactionary because, as he interacts with the material world, his understanding of the reality of his place in, and the processes of, his society have been turned upside-down by the ideologies that have shaped the material reality in which he exists. And since the capitalist class controls almost all of the means of communication and education (schools, media, etc.), it is no surprise that the working masses are imbued with the ideology of their oppressors." (https://www. reddit.com/r/Marxism/comments/p6qiq/eli5_marxs_camera_obscura_metaphor_for _ideology/; lesedato 16.02.21)

"The third concept of ideology used by Marx entailed a broadening of his understanding of this phenomenon, but this alternative vantage point did not simply invalidate all that was of merit in the two earlier definitions. Instead of being programmatic beliefs about social change or mystified views about social conditions, the third definition was in a certain sense a combination of both. Here ideology was construed to be a legitimate expression of the actual interests of a particular class, part fictive and part factual in nature, in relation to a given system. Anchored realistically in certain social formations and yet banking on the as-yet-unrealized (hence "unreal") potential of these formations, ideology so defined is not so much right or wrong as it is more or less limited. According to this definition, the superiority of working-class ideology is that it takes into account the interests of all humanity (and is thus a "classless", as well as radically egalitarian, ideology). All other class-based ideologies are only beneficial to one social class or group, to one degree or another. They thus represent less the interests of humanity, than those of an elite or provincial group within it. This third definition of ideology features a subtle ratio of truth value to outright illusion that revolves around the gap between empirical observation and an abstract worldview – with the latter generally edging out the former for acceptance. Thus, ideology involves both a cognitive and noncognitive grasp of reality that is true on one level and false on another. This third and more complicated concept of ideology in Marx's later work is one that yielded some especially remarkable advances in the 1920s and 1930s, from Gramsci and Mariátegui through Benjamin and Adorno. It was with this group and

the origin of "critical theory" that the noteworthy shift was made from seeing ideology just as a system of progressive ideas or negative illusions to grasping it as a set of *lived* social practices marked by varying degrees of self-realization. This conception also triggered the concept of "behavioral" ideology that emerged with Voloshinov in the 1920s and flourished after the 1960s in the work of Pierre Bourdieu. For Bourdieu, the sociologist, ideology involves habitual acts within society that are based on class-structuring disposition. These ideological habits are bound together by an internalized "cultural unconsciousness" with *actual* relations to both real and imagined conditions of existence (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 192)." (David Craven i Smith og Wilde 2002 s. 278-279)

"The fourth and final definition of ideology used by Marx appeared most arrestingly in an extremely complicated passage from his later writings, that is, the first part of volume one of *Kapital* (1867). In this magisterial discussion of the secrets of *commodity fetishism*, Marx deployed 'ideology' to mean a field of duplicitous and disfiguring relationships that are not so much wrong as they are misleading and socially constraining. As a result of this dislocated link to material conditions, "the mind reflects an inversion in reality itself" that results from the tenacious but never absolute hold of commodity fetishism. That is, we both see and misperceive the nature of our relations to the world through the veil of fetishized commodities in a constellated system that revolves around them. The metaphor of the *camera obscura* that Marx uses without much success in his early writings on ideology, as others have noted (Mitchell, 1986, pp. 168ff), suddenly gained unprecedented trenchancy in this fourth definition of ideology. Here we can paraphrase Terry Eagleton again: in *The German Ideology* Marx defined it as a matter of not seeing things as they really are, and in *Kapital* he discussed ideology more expansively as a form of structurally constrained thought that is less downright false than it is markedly reductive and generally disempowering (thus being tied to one's class interests rather than to those of humanity in a more all-encompassing manner). Ideology here is *both true and false*, while being contingent upon a deceptive combination of the two that *naturalizes* the historically constructed in such a way as to make it look "inevitable" (Eagleton, 1991, pp. 85-91)." (David Craven i Smith og Wilde 2002 s. 279-280)

"This highly nuanced fourth definition of ideology spawned a series of brilliant engagements with the problem of ideology, starting with two legendary books from 1922-3: *Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein* (*History and Class Consciousness*) by Hungarian philosopher Georg Lukács and *Marxismus und Philosophie* by German thinker Karl Korsch. Each of these studies in turn had a profound impact first on the 1930s – when "critical theory" was originated by the Frankfurt School (Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, T. W. Adorno, and Walter Benjamin) – and then on the 1960s – through Guy Debord's critique of the "society of the spectacle" and Henri Lefebvre's crucial work on the logic of quotidian life in the postwar West. In his book, the young Lukács virtually invented the concept of reification as we now understand it. Enormously controversial in its own day and still much debated in

our own, this landmark critique both inspired the creation of the Frankfurt School in 1923 and was promptly denounced by the Bolshevik leaders of the Comintern in 1924. Whether intentionally or nor, Lukács revalorized subjectivity and critical self-reflexivity in a way that became a stark rebuke to the economism of Soviet-style "dialectical materialism." As Lukács explained reification, it dramatically extended Marx's notion of alienation (or the estrangement from oneself, from others, from one's own work, and from the labor process per se). For Lukács this meant that reification entailed the fragmentation and dislocation of modern social experience in a way that causes people to forget that the course of society always presupposes a collective process, an overarching structural logic. The experience of modernity thus encourages people to see things as if they were mere isolated objects, or as if they were utterly autonomous agents. Consequently, the present is *not identical-with-itself* (to recall Adorno's extension of this position) once the potential of the present to be transformed is suppressed by the status quo (Lukács, 1923)." (David Craven i Smith og Wilde 2002 s. 280)

"Stærkt påvirket af Marx udarbejdede Karl Mannheim en sociologisk teori om ideologi. [...] Det centrale værk er: "Ideologi og utopi" (1929). Mannheim skelner først mellem "partikulær" og "total" ideologi. Det partikulære ideologibegreb henter Mannheim fra den politiske strid: Man tager ikke uden videre modparten på ordet, men anser bestemte synspunkter og ideer "for at være mere eller mindre bevidste tilsløringer af sagsforhold, som modstanderen ikke har interesse i, skal erkendes klart". Det partikulære ideologibegreb bygger på den psykologiske mistanke; man søger efter de bagvedliggende motiver for tilsløring og fordrejning. Mens den partikulære ideologimistanke kun vedrører en persons enkelt-standpunkter, udvides perspektivet radikalt med det totale ideologibegreb. Dette gælder en tidsalder eller en samfundsklasses begrebsapparat og tankesæt. Mannheim taler om tidsalderens eller samfundsklassens "totale bevidstheds-struktur" [...] Mannheim skelner dernæst mellem en "speciel" og en "generel" variant af det totale ideologibegreb. I den specielle formulering er det kun andres perspektiv, der betragtes som ideologisk. Den dogmatiske marxisme anvender sig af et sådant ideologibegreb, idet den unddrager sig den betragtningsmåde den anlægger på andre. Den generelle variant af den totale ideologimistanke opstår derimod, "når man våger at se ikke blot modstanderens, men principielt alles, altså også ens eget standpunkt som ideologisk"." (Bernt Hagtvet og Rune Slagstad i https://www.leksikon.org/art.php?n=1169; lesedato 25.05.21)

"Trods det at Mannheim så stærkt betoner den indre sammenhæng mellem tanke og samfundsposition, mellem idé og klasse, fører dette ifølge Mannheim ikke til opløsning af det klassiske spørgsmål om sandhed. Selv om enhver tanke kun kan forstås i forhold til en bestemt samfundsposition, betyder det ikke, at den er falsk eller ugyldig. Den indgår snarere som moment i en overordnet helhed eller syntese. Denne syntese er det ifølge Mannheim de intellektuelle, der skal udforme. Som "fritsvævende intelligens" er de ikke – som samfundets øvrige grupper – spærret inde i deres eget klasseperspektiv. De intellektuelle – nærmest en slags klasseløs

klasse – har muligheden for at danne en almen og helhedsorienteret opfattelse på baggrund af de mangfoldige ideer og synspunkter. Som arbejderklassen hos Marx repræsenterer de intellektuelle hos Mannheim almeninteressen." (Bernt Hagtvet og Rune Slagstad i https://www.leksikon.org/art.php?n=1169; lesedato 25.05.21)

"In the United States today, the dominant ideology is one that, in keeping with Marx's theory, supports capitalism and a society organized around it. The central tenet of this ideology is that U.S. society is one in which people are free and equal, and thus, can do and achieve anything they want in life. At the same time, in the U.S., we value work and believe that there is honor in hard work, no matter what the job. These ideas are part of an ideology that supports capitalism because they help us make sense of why some people achieve so much in terms of success and wealth and why others, not so much. […] Marx would argue that these ideas, values, and assumptions work to justify the reality in which very few people have positions of power and authority within corporations, firms, and financial institutions, and why the majority are simply workers within this system. Laws, legislation, and public policies are crafted expressing and supporting this ideology, which means that it plays a significant role in shaping how society operates and what lives are like within it. And while these ideas may be part of the dominant ideology in today's America, there are in fact ideologies that challenge them and the status quo they support. The 2016 presidential campaign of Senator Bernie Sanders spotlighted one of these alternate ideologies – one that instead assumes that the capitalist system is fundamentally unequal and that those who have amassed the most success and wealth are not necessarily deserving of it. Rather, this ideology asserts that the system is controlled by them, rigged in their favor, and designed to impoverish the majority for the benefit of the privileged minority. Sanders and his supporters, thus advocate laws, legislature, and public policies that are designed to redistribute society's wealth in the name of equality and justice." (Nicki Lisa Cole i https://www.thoughtco.com/ideology-definition-30263 56; lesedato 19.03.18)

Det som i andre samfunn blir (eller ble) oppfattet som sant og rettferdig, kan i ens eget samfunn bli oppfattet som usant og urettferdig. Innen et samfunn kan noen sannheter bli oppfattet som kun én gruppes meninger og tro (f.eks. den kristne religion), ikke en overordnet sannhet med konsensus i hele samfunnet. "[W]hat feminists know about sexual harassment are beliefs that are based also on principles of feminist ideology, such as equality, autonomy and so on. Others (especially anti-feminists) may deem such knowledge as mere opinions or exaggerated beliefs." (Dijk 1995) En ideologi skjuler sannheten samtidig som sannheten omformes styrt av bestemte interesser, formål og ønsker, hevder en fransk essayist (Lévy 1977 s. 167).

"[I]deology represents gender differences, which are significations, as natural, biological givens, thereby producing the seemingly stable subject positions of male and female for individuals to occupy. Ideology calls, or in Althusser's term

"interpellates," individuals to take up their place in the gendered subject positions represented in discourses (specifically narratives) in terms of which we make ourselves and the world intelligible. Individuals are not coerced but willingly ("freely") enter the site of male or female in the already existing patriarchal system of difference, privilege, power, and exclusion signified by gender because ideology, particularly through the harnessing of desire, makes gendered subject positions seem not only desirable and pleasurable but also *the way things are*: the obvious that goes without saying. Ideology thus constitutes, according to Rosalind Coward and John Ellis, "the very basis of the subject's activity, the conditions of its positions *as* subject, and the coherency of that subject in the face of contradictions which make up society." In other words, subject positions provide the individual with a reassuring sense of coherence and stability, concealing not only its split-self but also its own contradictory situation in ideology: contradictory both because the individual is located in multiple and conflicting subject positions and, more importantly, because ideology itself and the subjectivities it produces are fissured by inconsistencies." (Ebert 1988)

"Ideology as theorized in postmodern feminist cultural critique is not false consciousness or distorted perception, as it is in traditional Marxist usage, nor is it a set of disembodied ideas. Rather, ideology is the organization of material signifying practices that constitute subjectivities and produce the lived relations by which subjects are connected – whether in hegemonic or oppositional ways – to the dominant relations of production and distribution of power (and the consequent relations of exploitation) in a specific social formation at a given historical moment." (Ebert 1988)

"Postmodern feminist cultural theory breaks with the dominant humanist view […] in which the subject is still considered to be an autonomous individual with a coherent, stable self constituted by a set of natural and pre-given elements such as biological sex. It theorizes the subject as *produced* through signifying practices which precede her and not as the *originator* of meaning. One acquires specific subject positions – that is, existence in meaning, in social relations – by being constituted in ideologically structured discursive acts. Subjectivity is thus the *effect* of a set of ideologically organized signifying practices through which the individual is situated in the world and in terms of which the world and one's self are made intelligible." (Ebert 1988)

"[S]ystemet råder også over mekanismer, der hurtigt, effektivt og ubemærket kan afmontere oprøret ved at suge dets overflade af ungdom, nyhed og sanselig intensitet op i flader af mediebilleder og forbrugsvarer." (Michael Buchwald i Skyum-Nielsen 1982 s. 173)

"En vanlig oppfatning om ideologi er at det er fasttømrede prinsipper som skal forklare alt. Men det virker mer som om ideologi arter seg som et filter mellom inntrykkene, verdens sprikende fakta, og de årsaksforklaringene vi velger å trekke

mellom alle inntrykkene." (Sigve Indregard i *Morgenbladet* 14.–20. august 2015 s. 4)

For den franske idéhistorikeren og filosofen Michel Foucault var det "ultimately unimportant (as well as impossible) to distinguish ideological, political, economic, or theoretical practices, for such distinctions don't really matter: they are all merely forms of power." (Resch 1992 s. 232)

"The social inspiration for a theory of ideological structure […] must be sought in the basic properties of (social) groupness, of which the following ones have particular relevance:
1. Membership devices (gender, ethnicity, appearance, origin, etc.): Who are we?
2. Actions: What do we do?
3. Aims: Why do we do this?
4. Norms and Values: What is good or bad?
5. Position: What is our position in society, and how do we relate to other groups?
6. Resources: What is ours? What do we want to have/keep at all costs?"
(Pullum 2004)

En ideologi kan romme mange tendenser og -ismer i ulike blandinger. Janzen Kooistra skriver at den britiske middelklassen i victoriatiden hadde en ideologi som inkluderte "capitalism, paternalism, racism, imperialism, sexism and the like" (1995 s. 57). Det går an å studere ideologien i en tekst, teksten i ideologien, ideologien som tekst, flere ideologier som brytes i samme tekst, m.m. (Hamon 1984 s. 5).

"[B]oth racism and antiracism are ideologies, and so are sexism and feminism. Ideologies may thus serve to establish or maintain social dominance, as well as to organize dissidence and opposition." (Pullum 2004) Noen ideologier har pådratt seg et svært tydelig sosialt og etisk stigma. Den franske forfatteren Maurice Barrès (1862-1923) var både nasjonalist og antisemitt. "I tilfellet Barrès [var det] frem til ganske nylig [...] vanskelig å oppdrive bøkene hans og ganske suspekt å sitere selv apolitiske tekster fra hans hånd. Undertegnede har selv skamfullt unngått blikk fra undrende bokhandlere ved kjøp av gamle utgaver av noen av disse verkene i Latinerkvarteret i Paris." (Øystein Tvede i *Morgenbladet* 25. september–1. oktober 2009 s. 20)

"A striking illustration of […] selective reading is the working-class response – or rather, nonresponse – to imperialist propaganda. Patrick Dunae and others have argued that a whole generation of boys were converted to imperialism by the novels of [den engelske forfatteren] G. A. Henty and similar forms of indoctrination. "At school, in church groups, in recreational associations – at almost every turn boys were exposed to the imperial idea": that undeniable fact leads Dunae to the conclusion that "in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century most British youths were acutely aware of their imperial heritage. They could scarcely have

been otherwise." They certainly could have been otherwise. The majority of those youths were working-class, and they seem to have been acutely unaware of their empire. Although John MacKenzie has shown that imperialist propaganda saturated textbooks, popular literature, and later the cinema, he fails to prove that this message got through to its intended audience. The memoirs of Robert Roberts, Willie Gallacher, and Harry Pollitt all document workers' indifference to the empire, except for brief and exceptional outbursts of jingoism during the First World War. […] Apparently they did not even notice the ideological freight carried by these tales, which were read purely as adventure stories, in which India or Africa was simply an exotic backdrop, not a territory the reader wanted to spend his life policing. […] John M. MacKenzie, *Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960* (Manchester, 1984)" (Jonathan Rose i artikkelen "Rereading the English Common Reader"; her sitert fra https://www. jstor.org/stable/pdf/2709910.pdf; lesedato 26.01.17).

"Bourgeois ideology, for Brecht, masks the people's loss of real power by fostering certain illusions – the illusion of individual autonomy, of a free contractual relationship between labor and capital, producers and consumers, and so forth. This ideology it not a Machiavellian imposition by a dominating class, but rather a phenomenon generated by the social structure itself. It becomes our "lived world," in Althusserian terms, a kind of normal pathology, the moorings of the dominant system within the psychic and intellectual structures of *all* classes. It is precisely the normality of ideology that necessitates an art which makes things strange. Brecht believed that bourgeois normality numbs human perception and masks the contradictions between professed values and social realities; therefore he called for an art that would free socially conditioned phenomena from the "stamp of familiarity" and reveal them as striking, as calling for explanation, as other than "natural." " (Stam 1992 s. 211) "Without resorting to coercion or violence, hegemony makes people accept a certain ideological position through a discourse, as if it were something natural." (Kim 1996 s. 223)

Ifølge Althusser uttrykker forfattere ideologi i sine verk uten å være seg det bevisst, og det er mulig å rekonstruere hva ideologien består i gjennom tolkning av verket, gjennom å forstå "symptomene" i teksten, dens ideologiske spenninger og konflikter (Aron og Viala 2006 s. 34-35). I verket *Forsvar for en teori om den litterære produksjon* (1966) prøver franskmannen Pierre Macherey å vise hvordan forfatterne Honoré de Balzac og Jules Verne skaper romaner med ideologiske implikasjoner som de selv ikke er seg bevisst (Aron og Viala 2006 s. 35).

"In the USA, for example, unemployment, poverty, and hard times are experienced perhaps more than anywhere else as personal failures; ideologies of individualism inevitably result in self-blame. When self-blame creates threats to the personality, the result is scapegoating, revivals of virulent racism, national chauvinism, and so on. This is inevitable in a society in which psychology treats the individual person as such (a psychology which reifies possessive, isolated, privatized individuals),

rather than in terms of the totality of relationships which constitute the individual's social life. [...] This line of reasoning may illuminate why public opinion polls in the USA almost invariably conclude that the "public" has never lost faith in the economic and political systems. Rather, little faith is granted particular political leaders' desire or capacity to perform their high functions well (except when they are serving their own self-interests). What is perceived, therefore, is a crisis of social integration at the highest levels of power. System problems are thus personalized and leaders scapegoated." (O'Connor 1987 s. 153)

Et eksempel på hvordan populærkultur fungerer ideologisk er hvordan konflikter vises i mange tegneserier i comics-tradisjonen. Konfliktene vises som uttrykk for individuelle motsetninger og "tilfeldigheter", ikke overgripende maktkonflikter (Greiner 1974 s. 48). Dessuten blir samfunnet framstilt som et stivt hierarki der det er "flaks" eller "uflaks" som avgjør om du er oppe eller nede i hierarkiet. Enkeltmennesket oppfatter sitt liv som "skjebne", fordi muligheten for omfattende solidarisering ikke blir vist. Privatinteresser og individets behov framstilles som langt mer fundamentale og viktige enn fellesskapets interesser (s. 48). Ariel Dorfman og Armand Mattelart ga i 1971 ut boka *How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic*.

Øyvind Holen, forfatter av boka *Donald-landet: Hvordan en and i matrosdress formet det moderne Norge* (2012) uttalte i et intervju: "Det er aldri systemet sin feil at det går galt for Donald, det er hans eget overmot eller hans udugelighet. Det er den amerikanske drømmen. Mulighetene er der, og Donald kløner det til for seg selv." (*Morgenbladet* 9.–15. november 2012 s. 20)

Anders Heger publiserte i 2012 en bok om Thorbjørn Egner med tittelen *Egner: En norsk dannelseshistorie*. I et intervju sa Heger: "Egner er en type forfatter, på samme måte som Bjørnson, der du kan avlese samtidens ideologi og ideologiskifter veldig tydelig i arbeidet hans. - Er det så mange ideologiskifter hos Egner? Jeg trodde det var samme stabile verdensbilde hele veien. - Nei, faktisk ikke. Ta for eksempel forholdet mellom utenforskap og fellesskap, et tema han tar opp i alle hovedverkene sine. Hvordan skal vi behandle dem som ikke passer inn? I *Karius og Baktus*, som ble til midt under krigen, er svaret enkelt: Vi skyller dem ut. Inntrengerne kastes på dør. I *Hakkebakkeskogen* tvinges derimot outsiderne inn i en streng sosial konsensus, noe som egentlig er ganske dramatisk når vi snakker om rovdyr som må bli vegetarianere. - Og i *Kardemomme by*? - Personlig regner jeg det som hans litterære mesterstykke. Der er ikke løsningen at de kriminelle innvandrerne Kasper, Jesper og Jonathan tvinges til å endre sin natur. Gjennom kjærlig omgang og mildt sosialt press får storsamfunnet i stedet frem den de egentlig er – deres opprinnelige natur får nytt utløp som sirkusdirektør, brannmann og bakerassistent. - Hvilke mentalitetsskifter i det norske samfunnet speiles her? - Du kan si at verdensbildet i *Kardemomme by* er naivt. Men historien foregriper likevel ganske nøyaktig den kriminalreformen Norge fikk et tiår senere, der lovbrytere gjennom behandling og inkludering skulle rehabiliteres tilbake til de

gode menneskene de opprinnelig ble født som. I Egners fjerde storverk, *Musikantene kommer til byen*, som er skrevet i 1967, er moralen ikke at samfunnet skal tvinge de bohemaktige musikantene inn i fellesskapet, men tvert imot at *dropoutsene* skal lære storsamfunnet en lekse om musikalitet og livsglede. Med andre ord: Hippiene hadde rett, opprørerne har noe å lære fellesskapet. […] *Hakkebakkeskogen* og *Kardemomme by* sier noe om hele den nordiske modellen, som vokste frem samtidig som de ble skrevet. De formulerer en identitet for det norske samfunnet." (*Morgenbladet* 2.–8. november 2012 s. 44)

"In July 1989 I witnessed a public controversy [in India] over the depiction of two mythological heroines on television, Sita of the *Ramayana* and Draupadi of the *Mahabharata*. Everyone, from vegetable vendors and cab drivers to upper-class intellectuals who usually dismissed television serials, was discussing it. A leading newsmagazine ran a poll to ask which of the two better represented "the modern Indian Woman." Many comparisons and contrasts were drawn between Sita, who symbolizes devotion and patience, and Draupadi, noted for her intelligence and fiery strength. Historically, both Sita and Draupadi have served as symbols for Indian Womanhood (ideal types of the *bhartiya naari*). For instance, nationalist ideologues have appropriated both Draupadi's rage and Sita's resilience to encourage orthodox Hindu women to join anticolonial movements (Mankekar 1990)." (Purnima Mankekar i Brunsdon og Spigel 2008 s. 257)

Indiske tv-seere "are reconstituted as subjects not just by the form and content of serials but the manner in which these texts resonate with the viewers' experiences of dominant social discourses. Viewers' deep emotional engagement with television, the *bhaav* that a text arouses in them, spurs them to introspection about themselves and their lives. [...] Morley has described "the average sitting room" as a "site of some very important political conflicts – it is, among other things, one of the principal sites of the politics of gender and age. ... The sitting room is exactly where we need to start from if we finally want to understand the constitutive dynamics of abstractions such as "the community" or "the nation." (Morley 1991: 12)" (Purnima Mankekar i Brunsdon og Spigel 2008 s. 265).

"Gerbner and Gross (1976) argue that television is the central cultural arm of American society serving to socialize people into standardized roles and behaviors. Television accomplishes this through a presentation of basic assumption about the way life is and what values are important. They suggest that television cultivates people's beliefs, about how the world works more through the sum total of interactions, behaviors and values present in television content." (Aaliya Ahmed i http://www.ijsrp.org/research_paper_jun2012/ijsrp-June-2012-47.pdf; lesedato 27.09.18)

Den amerikanske regissøren Steven Spielbergs film *Jaws* (1975) "received attention from academic critics. Stephen Heath relates the film's ideological meanings to the then-recent Watergate scandal. He argues that Brody represents the

"white male middle class – [there is] not a single black and, very quickly, not a single woman in the film", who restores public order "with an ordinary-guy kind of heroism born of fear-and-decency"." (http://www.gradesaver.com/jaws/wikipedia/ inspirations-and-themes/; lesedato 14.11.13)

For den franske sosiologen Pierre Bourdieu er habitus en betegnelse for en persons sosiale erfaringer som har blitt så vesentlig for denne personen at de preger hvordan hun/han oppfatter verden, tenker og lever sitt liv. "The structured social-symbolic field of ideological significations, which Bourdieu refers to as habitus, enables agents to generate an infinity of practices adapting to endlessly changing situations without ever being constituted as a monolithic set of rules, rituals, or principles. […] Bourdieu emphasizes habitus as a generative matrix of ideological practice and symbolic capital as the overdetermined effectivity of economic relations within the field of ideological relations." (Resch 1992 s. 217 og 221)

Roger Fowler hevder i boka *Literature as social discourse: The practice of linguistic criticism* (1981) at fordi en av språkets funksjoner er å produsere ideologi, er også det litterære språket fullt av ideologi (Sayre 2011 s. 205).

Språkbruksnormer er ideologiske. Gjennom bruken av språket viderebringer vi en rekke begreper og tolkninger som ligger innvevd i språket, og som gjør oss blinde for andre betydninger og tolkninger enn de som allerede er godtatt (Lundquist 1983 s. 139). Geoffrey K. Pullum har satt opp en liste over prinsipper som "garanterer" at Standard English som språklig norm er best for engelskmenn. Lista kan altså brukes som "basis for justifying prescriptive claims":

"- *Nostalgia*. Justificatory basis: The past glory of some vanished golden age, an imagined linguistic utopia in which people spoke correctly. To avoid: Change – decay and deterioration, either linguistic or social.
- *Classicism*. Justificatory basis: The standing of other higher-prestige languages such as Latin. To avoid: Adoption of an inferior form of human language.
- *Authoritarianism*. Justificatory basis: Subordination to the established authority of high-prestige masters of the language. To avoid: Social disgrace from using low-grade English.
- *Aestheticism*. Justificatory basis: Beauty and aesthetic responses. To avoid: Ugliness and awkwardness.
- *Coherentism*. Justificatory basis: Consistency and order of patterning. To avoid: Chaos, randomness, disorder.
- *Logicism*. Justificatory basis: Logic in the strict sense. To avoid: Irrationality.
- *Commonsensism*. Justificatory basis: Common sense. To avoid: Silliness.
- *Functionalism*. Justificatory basis: Efficiency of the communicative function. To avoid: Ambiguity, misunderstanding, redundancy, etc.
- *Asceticism*. Justificatory basis: Discipline and self-control. To avoid: Laziness and sloppiness."
(Pullum 2004)

"[V]arious ideologies become sedimented in common sense" (Rosalind Gill i https://extra.shu.ac.uk/wpw/chicklit/gill.html; lesedato 05.09.22).

"Social psychological research suggests that people do not see their world through complex formulations, but through simple slogans, folk ideas, images, and metaphors. They rely on labels or categories that clump experience in understandable and repeatable chunks (Rosch 1978), thus creating typifications of lived experience (Rogers 1981). Ideology depends on this clumping and chunking. It is a filter that activates and organizes selected contents of consciousness. In particular, it "activates certain [attitudes and] affects … and permits these to be communicated via reflexive, articulate and shared ideas" (Gouldner 1976, p. 82). […] Individuals are predisposed to accept ideology without thinking because they accept the labels or categories as natural or inevitable" (Gary Alan Fine og Kent Sandstrom i https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/201978.pdf; lesedato 20.10.21).

"As Rayner (1980, p. 104) contends, the linguistic form of ideology "is picturesque and flamboyant; in particular, it abounds with metaphor." He asserts further – metaphorically – that "metaphor is an important brush in the ideologist's paintbox, filling in the picture with a broad sweep, creating connections with the range of associations which a well-turned metaphor has at its disposal" (Rayner 1980, p. 107). Metaphor, then, is a handy tool for the ideologist in presenting pictures of "how things are" and of "how they might ought to be" – pictures that both resonate with people's lived experience and offer them an appealing sense of how they can and should live. Through metaphorical images, the ideologist mobilizes images that enable people to experience the "moral." Although metaphor is an important component of ideology, we must be careful not to overemphasize its salience. As argued by Dundes and others (R. Brown 1977; Gusfield 1976; Lakoff and Johnson 1980; McCloskey 1990; Nisbet 1976), people's interpretations of their world are inevitably and necessarily grounded in metaphorical understandings. Metaphor is not a distinctive feature of ideology; it is built into the structure of all human thought and communication. Nevertheless, ideologies are characterized by the apparent abundance of metaphorical usage, not only in the conscious tropes that speakers employ, but also in their choices of images when they are "just" communicating." (Gary Alan Fine og Kent Sandstrom i https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/201978.pdf; lesedato 20.10.21)

"[T]he concept of *ideologeme* has gained a foothold. This concept was first described by M. Bakhtin. He interpreted the ideologeme as a way of representing particular ideology: "Every word/discourse betrays the ideology of its speaker; great novelistic heroes are those with the most coherent and individuated ideologies. Therefore, every speaker is an ideologue and every utterance is an ideologeme" (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 429). Most subsequent definitions to some extent can be found in M. Bakhtin's approach. He defines the ideologeme as a way of expression or representation of a particular ideology. In western reference

materials, the ideologeme is usually interpreted as a fundamental unit of ideology. M. Bakhtin views the ideologeme in a broad semiotic sense (i.e. the word as a social sign is an ideological phenomenon) […] Other researchers define this concept as "a word (or composed name) with the semantics containing an ideological component or a worldview paradigm wrapped in a linguistic form" (Kupina, 2000, p. 183), "a cognitive category, source of conceptual schemes and categories" (Vodak, 1997, p. 27), "mental unit that includes an ideological component" (Nakhimov, 2011, p. 194), "the minimum piece of written text or speech stream, object or symbol that is perceived by the author, listener, or reader as a reference to the meta-language or to an imaginary code of ideological norms and fundamental ideological attitudes..." (Guseinov, 2003, p. 27). N. Klushina interprets the ideologeme as an "ideologically saturated generalising word (usually figurative), a metaphor that has a strong suggestive force (*bright future*, *empire of evil*, *axis of evil*, *Cold War*, etc.) (Klushina, 2008, p. 38)." (Lylo 2017)

"Bakhtin's approach, "Every word/discourse betrays the ideology of its speaker; great novelistic heroes are those with the most coherent and individuated ideologies. Therefore, every speaker is an ideologue and every utterance is an ideologeme". [...] The ideologeme, as in reference to progress, is the social collection of an ideology or a sign that represents an ideology within a certain framework – the utterance of a speaker (as the speaker is the collection of concepts) or a word that represents a collective concept." (https://www.reddit.com/r/Ask LiteraryStudies/comments/etcdib/ideologeme/; lesedato 28.09.21)

"Other approaches define the ideologeme as "a special type of a multi-level concept within which ideologically marked conceptual features containing the collective, often stereotyped and even mythological representation of power, the state, civil society, political and ideological institutions for language speakers emerge" (Malysheva 2009, p.35).The researcher K. Serazhym (16, 238) argues that ideologemes are usually constant because they are based mainly on "eternal values", the essence of which is only modified on the basis of their communicative and cultural environment. Other studies focus on the variation of the above environment, which makes it possible to treat the ideologeme as a non-self-sufficient and volatile concept (depending on the conjuncture). An example of such instability can be the dynamics of receptions of the "propaganda" ideologeme from positive in the Soviet media discourse to negative after the collapse of the USSR and its rehabilitation (primarily for the purpose of this ideologeme) in context of the Russian-Ukrainian war in the eastern Ukraine." (Lylo 2017)

"S. Kordonskyi and N. Shulga note that firstly, ideologemes are partial and do not provide a comprehensive description of the order, rather they are concentrated ideas (sometimes to the level of slogans) of what a certain political power is dissatisfied with and how it will act in order to advance to the ideal social order. […] Communist ideologues realised that state governance would be more effective if political terminology and basic ideologemes for society were encoded in catchy

slogans. This is how the ideological encoding of party directives, role models and phenomena to be condemned was implemented. As a result, appeared such ideologemes as "the third world", "one country, two systems" (referring to the reintegration of Hong Kong with China in 1997), "one central task and two basic points" (this ideologeme expresses the essence of today's obligatory policy of building socialism with Chinese specifics), "two alls" (all that Mao did was correct and all he said to do was appropriate; after Deng Xiaoping came to power, this ideologeme was replaced with "the sole criterion of knowing the truth is practice"), "four modernisations" (actualised by Deng Xiaoping, it involves modernisation as a condition for building socialism, industry, agriculture, science and culture), "the four cardinal principles" (recorded in the preamble to the constitution and the statute of the Communist party: the socialist path, dictatorship of the proletariat, leadership of the party and the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology; in 1982 "the dictatorship of the proletariat" was replaced with "people's democratic dictatorship", and in 1997, the four ideological principles were supplemented with the fifth one – "ideas of Deng Xiaoping"), "five black elements" (the ideologeme appeared during the "cultural revolution" and regulated class divisions until 1983, it was used to refer to the categories of society subjected to repression: landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, generals, representatives of right-wing views), "five red elements" (workers, poor peasants and middle peasants, revolutionary cadres of the party, soldiers of the revolution or revolution martyrs)." (Lylo 2017)

"Personal ideologemes tend to emerge around heads of states, leaders or heroes (the father of peoples (Stalin), the chief designer (Khrushchev), the true Leninist (Brezhnev), the architect of perestroika (Gorbachev), Tsar Boris (Yeltsin), etc.). It should be noted that this classification is not quite correct, since any ideologeme (including personal one) is socially important, because a dictionary defines the word social as associated with social life and relationships of people in society. Other researchers (Chudinov, 2003) suggest distinguishing between two types of ideologemes in political communication. The first consists of words which meaning varies for supporters of different political views (democracy, capitalism, socialism...). The second includes terms used exclusively by supporters of certain po-litical views (socialist commonwealth countries/Soviet satellites)." (Lylo 2017)

"According to other classifications (Karamova, 2015), ideologemes are divided into mono-ideological ideologemes – phraseologemes loaded with ideological meaning relevant to a particular ideology; and poly-ideological ideologemes that are relevant for more than one ideology. […] Ideologemes are rigid regulatory structures that do not allow anything that could undermine their stability (and consequently the stability of the social order) to enter their internal sense and value boundaries, hence it makes sense to single out the function of stabilisation and consolidation of the ideological priorities of society. The ideologeme is also described as the key and communicative unit of social and political discourse, as a mean of ideological and political influence on socio-cultural activities of the public and as a uniting

factor of society around the category of the public good – therefore we can talk of the integrative function of ideologemes. Some authors (Piontek, 2010, p. 85) interpret the ideologeme as a part of ideology, an element of the ideological system that helps to understand and assess the attitudes of individuals or groups of individuals towards reality." (Lylo 2017)

"[T]he ideologeme of "consumerism" can be introduced into the human mind without any material sign form. This type of relationship between the content and the form of a sign is described among others by Giulietto Chiesa, when he analyses the functioning of the ideologemes of the consumerism ideology in the advertising text. He describes a vehicle ad that reads as: "Get ready to want it!". The researcher believes that this phrase comprises the spirit and the ideology of the era, the essence of which comes down to the following imperative: "Remember, your desires do not belong to you. We offer them to you readymade. You only need to get ready for them". The author adds: "This is not advertising anymore, this is a lifestyle imposed on the population of the planet" (Chiesa, 2006, p. 234). […] A characteristic feature of the functioning of ideologemes in the modern media text is their ability to break free from the formal characteristics of their ideological existence, while preserving their content and suggestive purpose." (Lylo 2017)

For Michel Pêcheux, i *Language, Semantics, and Ideology* (1982), "ideology supplies the self-evidentness of meaning – while at the same time masking the relationship of meaning and interpellation by means of the "transparency" of language." (gjengitt fra Resch 1992 s. 263)

En spissborger er en egoistisk og trangsynt person, preget av konformitet og selvgod uforanderlighet. Spissborgeren er grunnleggende fornøyd med sin sosiale og økonomiske situasjon, og ønsker derfor at livet skal vare i det uendelige akkurat slik det er nå, men kan likevel drømme om det store loddet. Den danske filosofen Søren Kierkegaard skrev analytisk-polemisk om spissborgerens tilværelse. Den østerriksk-ungarske forfatteren Ödön von Horváth ga i 1930 ut romanen *Den evige spissborger*. Tyskeren Hermann Glaser har lagd uttrykket "spissborger-ideologi" og beskriver hva den går ut på i boka *Spissborger-ideologi: Om ødeleggelsen av den tyske ånd i det 19. og 20. århundre og nasjonalsosialismens oppkomst* (1964; ny versjon 1985).

Ord som "kapitalisme" og "kommunisme" får helt forskjellige konnotasjoner avhengig av den ideologiske konteksten ordene brukes i (Lundquist 1983 s. 141).

En oversettelse er "én versjon. Den speiler ikke bare den enkelte oversetters ferdigheter eller valg av strategier, men den speiler også en oversetterideologi som er mer knyttet til tiden og kulturen." (oversetteren Ika Kaminka i *Bok og bibliotek* nr. 3 i 2017 s. 7)

Den franske forfatteren Albert Camus hadde ikke tro på noen politisk eller revolusjonær bevegelse som var villig til å drepe barn for å nå sine mål (Dubois 1995 s. 40). Han skrev om marxismen: "Med et fortvilet ønske om umiddelbar rettferdighet har de marxistene som kaller seg ortodokse, valgt å dominere verden i den framtidige rettferdighets navn. På en måte befinner de seg, uansett om det kan synes motsatt, ikke lenger på denne jord. De befinner seg i logikken. […] Jeg har kommet til den konklusjon at marxismens virkelighetsbegrep ikke bare er falskt, men at det blir drepende." (sitert fra Dubois 1995 s. 131 og 133)

Den amerikanske sosiologen Daniel Bells bok *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties* (1960) hevder at noen "ideologies told us what mattered. "A total ideology," Bell explained in his most famous book, "is an all-inclusive system of comprehensive reality, it is a set of beliefs, infused with passion, and seeks to transform the whole of a way of life. This commitment to ideology – the yearning for a 'cause,' or the satisfaction of deep moral feelings – is not necessarily the reflection of interests in the shape of ideas. Ideology, in this sense, and in the sense that we use it here, is a secular religion." […] Bell likened Marxian socialism to a secular religion and stressed its eschatological imperative. About non-Marxist forms of ideology, he had little to say. […] Ideology simplified, whereas the post-ideological intellectual afforded a clear view of complexity, ambiguity, and difficulty." (John Summers i https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/daniel-bell-and-the-end-of-ideology; lesedato 13.09.21)

James H. Kavanagh gir eksempler på "the relation between ideological and political struggle, of how the power to define what is "obvious" helps to determine who rules, and of the relative strength of insurgent versus dominant ideological frameworks we can offer the widely publicized tussle during the 1984 presidential campaign over the "meaning" of Bruce Springsteen. This began with a column by George Will, America's favorite reactionary nerd, lauding Springsteen as a shining example of the American dream – of how hard work, ambition, and the unfettered ability to accumulate wealth can give hope, if not ensure success, to working-class Americans. This version of Springsteen was then worked into a Reagan speech in Springsteen's home state of New Jersey, attempting to appropriate Springsteen, the cultural icon, as a Reaganite kind of guy. The national media soon followed, with full segments on the network nightly news, interviewing fans at Springsteen concerts, who proclaimed that, indeed, Springsteen appeared to them as another proof of the obvious American social fact that if he could make it, anybody can. All of the hoopla eventually prompted Springsteen himself to remind his concert audiences that the words of his songs (like "My Hometown") hardly proclaim the durability of the Anerican dream; to donate concert proceeds to union welfare funds; and to speak to workers rallying against plant closures, telling them: "What goes unmeasured is the price that unemployment inflicts on people's families, on their marriages on the single mothers out there trying to raise their kids on their own." At stake here was how the vast appeal of an attractive cultural icon, and the wildly popular and pleasing cultural texts (rock songs) he produced, could be

appropriated to support specific political and socioeconomic programs. Do Bruce Springsteen and his work obviously reaffirm or obviously challenge the American Dream according to Reagan and Will? Do he and his songs show an America that is a land of opportunity for everyone, or a land of broken hopes for too many? In this case, the repeated, if somewhat less-publicized, direct interventions of the "author" led right-wing propagandists to back off somewhat on their attempts to appropriate his work, and the result can be described as a kind of stand-off. [...] to say this is not to issue some kind of ultraleftist criticism of Bruce Springsteen, who has been forthrightly and refreshingly progressive, but to recognize a sociocultural fact – namely, that he and his work are enmeshed in ideological apparatuses and ideological struggles that determine its "meaning" in ways he can (and does) affect but cannot entirely control." (James H. Kavanagh i Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 318- 319)

Den engelske regissøren Sophie Fiennes' film *A Pervert's Guide to Ideology* (2012) er lagd i samarbeid med en kjent slovensk filosof. "Filosofen Slavoj Žižek og filmskaper Sophie Fiennes bruker sin tolkning av berømte filmscener for å presentere en fengslende filmatisk reise inn i kjernen av ideologi, drømmene som former vår kollektive tro og praksis. Den filosofiske provokatøren Slavoj Žižek er stjernen i filmen. Han undersøker filmklipp fra mer enn 20 filmer som hjelper ham å klikke seg gjennom kapitalismen, fascisme, forbruk, stalinisme, religion og mer. Tankevekkende og garantert stor underholdning." (tidsskriftet *Cinemateket* nr. 5 i 2014 s. 36)

"When most people hear the word "ideology," they think of a large set of socio-political beliefs that typically end in "ism;" communism, liberalism, conservatism, etc. When Žižek uses the term "ideology," he is using it in a Marxist sense. For Karl Marx, ideology is a series of discourses that push false ideas on people. When people buy into these false ideas, they develop a "false consciousness" about the world, how it works, and their place in it. According to Marx, without ideology, no society could function for very long. [...] According to Marx, other ideologies like capitalism or liberalism work the same way. They are created, work to help sustain a particular social structure, and ultimately fall out of favor when a new idea comes to force. When this happens, the whole structure of society can change in a hurry as a new ideology fills the void. Žižek, himself essentially a Marxist, starts with this idea and goes further. Taking off on the development of the idea of ideology done by Louis Althusser, Žižek incorporates psychology into ideology. While for Marx, ideology is a conscious exercise, Žižek suggests that ideology is also a subconscious phenomenon that helps to shape the world we live in. [...] Žižek wants you to question everything about society, especially when something seems to be so obvious it shouldn't be questioned." (Scotty Hendricks i https://bigthink. com/culture-religion/slavoj-zizek-ideology?rebelltitem=2#rebelltitem2; lesedato 13.09.21)

"Nasjonalisme er den mest mobiliserende ideologien verden har sett. Dens mangfold er dens styrke, og årsaken til dens holdbarhet og tøyelighet. I mange land fungerer nasjonalisme som et substitutt for religiøst fellesskap og som rammeverk for velferdsstaten. Siden nasjonalismen formes av lokale forhold, har den avfødt et mangfold av sosiale og politiske systemer. Disse farges gjerne av tilstøtende ideologier. Sosialdemokrater, hinduer og konservative – alle kan de være nasjonalister. Tankestrømmen er derfor vanskelig å avgrense. […] Uten å være universalistisk har nasjonalismen blitt universell. Det internasjonale system utgjøres av nasjonalstater." (Asle Toje i *Morgenbladet* 13.–19. april 2018 s. 31)

Torborg Nedreaas' roman *Av måneskinn gror det ingenting* (1947) ble skrevet "på et tidspunkt da myten om den store kjærligheten og den eneste rette fremdeles var en dominerende ideologi som unge kvinner fra alle samfunnsklasser ble utsatt for. Myten var like utbredt blant sosialister og kommunister som i mer konservative kretser." (litteraturprofessor Toril Moi i *Morgenbladet* 31. juli–6. august 2020 s. 40)

"En felles kjerne i ekstreme ideologier er fantasier om *enhet* og *renhet*, sier den tyske psykoanalytikeren Werner Bohleber. Ideen om enhet viser til en forestilling om å være ett med noe større som kan gi trygghet og tilhørighet: Nazismen hadde ideen om nasjon og folk; radikal islamisme har forestillingen om Ummah og kalifatet; nyere høyreradikalisme har tanken om et etnisk, kulturelt og religiøst homogent Europa som demmer opp for "Eurabia". Forestillingen om renhet innebærer samhørighet med gruppemedlemmer som utgjør ens egne – de andre blir utålelige fremmede som forurenser samfunnet og oss andre, og som utgjør en trussel. I nazismen ble jødene "jordens berme", en "pariakaste"; i høyreradikale ideologier i dag kan det være muslimer. Identifikasjonen med en ren nasjon kan være en løsning dersom det å skape en personlig, selvstendig identitet er for vanskelig – spørsmålet om "hvem er jeg" erstattes av spørsmålet "hvem tilhører jeg". Ideologier som forviser "den fremmede", er også svar på sosiale og politiske frustrasjoner og subjektive opplevelser av tap i et multikulturelt samfunn, og kan på den måten appellere til store folkegrupper. […] Lærdommen fra Utøya er at utøvelse av terror kan springe ut av personlig motivert, ofte ubevisst, hat og hevntrang, men som blir rasjonalisert og rettferdiggjort gjennom en slags politisk analyse. Individet bygger seg opp gjennom en ideologi som i neste omgang gjør handling såkalt nødvendig. I retten gjentok Breivik gang på gang at han innså at det han gjorde var horribelt – men det var "nødvendig". Forholdet mellom psykologi og ideologi er dialektisk: Personen søker en ideologi som svarer på indre konflikter og behov, og ideologien er helt nødvendig for å legitimere handling. Et skadet sinn, ja, men det er ideologien som skaper en bro fra psykologi til handling. Slik var det for Breivik. Og slik er det kanskje i enda større grad nå, når tilhørigheten til ideologiske grupper på nettet – grupper som veier opp for opplevd utenforskap – blir stadig viktigere for mange." (psykologiprofessor Siri Gullestad i *Morgenbladet* 20.–26. august 2021 s. 26)

Rambo og andre filmer

I Michael Ryan og Douglas Kellners bok *Camera Politica: The Politics and Ideology of Contemporary Hollywood Film* (1988) forsøker to filmeksperter å vise hvordan den liberalismen som ligger til grunn for svært mange Hollywood-filmer på 1970-tallet, på 1980-tallet ble erstattet av en annen ideologi. Hollywood-filmene på 80-tallet rommet ofte en politisk konservatisme som støttet Ronald Reagans politikk, blant annet gjennom å diskreditere fellesskapsløsninger og favorisere individuell heroisme (Mai og Winter 2006 s. 10). Reagan selv var en stor fan av Sylvester Stallone m.fl.s *Rambo*-filmer. Her vinner den ekstreme individualisten.

"To carry out an ideology critique of *Rambo*, for instance, it wouldn't be enough simply to attack its militarist or imperialist ideology, and the ways that the militarism and imperialism of the film serves capitalist interests by legitimating intervention in such places as Southeast Asia, Central America or wherever. One would also have to criticize its sexism and racism to carry out a full ideology critique, showing how representations of women, men, the Vietnamese, the Russians, and so on are a fundamental part of the ideological text of *Rambo*. This requires analyzing how the dimensions of class, gender, race, and imperialist ideology intersect in the film, reproducing rightist ideologies of the period. […] *Rambo* (1985) is but one of a whole series of return-to-Vietnam films that began with the surprising success of *Uncommon Valor* in 1983 and continued with the three Chuck Norris *Missing in Action* films of 1984-1986. All follow the same formula of representing the return to Vietnam of a team of former vets, or a superhuman, superhero vet like Rambo, to rescue a group of American soldiers "missing in action" who are still imprisoned by the Vietnamese and their evil Soviet allies. The film *Rambo* synthesizes this "return to Vietnam" cycle with another cycle that shows returning vets transforming themselves from wounded and confused misfits to super warriors (i.e. *Rolling Thunder*, *Firefox*, *First Blood*). All of these post post-Vietnam syndrome films show the U.S. and the American warrior hero victorious this time and thus exhibit a symptom of inability to accept defeat. They also provide symbolic compensation for loss, shame, and guilt by depicting the U.S. as "good" and this time victorious, while its communist enemies are represented as the incarnation of "evil" who this time receive a well-deserved defeat. Cumulatively, the return-to-Vietnam films therefore exhibit a defensive and compensatory response to military defeat in Vietnam and, I would argue, an inability to learn the lessons of the limitations of U.S. power and the complex mixture of good and evil involved in almost all historical undertakings." (Kellner 1991)

"On the other hand, *Rambo* and the other Stallone-Norris meathead films can be read as symptoms of the victimization of the working class. Both the Stallone and Norris figures are resentful, remarkably inarticulate, brutal, and thus indicative of the way many American working class youth are educationally deprived and offered the military as the only way of affirming themselves. Rambo's neurotic

resentment is less his own fault than that of those who run the social system in such a way that it denies his class access to the institutions of articulate thought and mental health. Denied selfesteem through creative work they seek surrogate worth in metaphoric substitutes like sports (Rocky) and war (Rambo). It is symptomatic that Stallone plays both Rocky and Rambo during a time when economic recession was driving the Rockys of the world to join the military where they became Rambos for Reagan's interventionist foreign policies. The Rocky-Rambo syndrome, however, puts on display the raw masculism which is at the bottom of conservative socialization and ideology. The only way that the Rockys and Rambos of the world can gain recognition and self-affirmation is through violent and aggressive self-display. And Rambo's pathetic demand for love at the end of the film is an indication that the society is not providing adequate structures of mutual and communal support to provide healthy structures of interpersonal relationships and ego ideals for men in the culture. Unfortunately, the Stallone films intensify this pathology precisely in their celebration of violent masculism and militarist self-assertion." (Kellner 1991)

Rambo-filmene ga det amerikanske publikummet "en symbolsk kompensasjon for nederlaget i Vietnam" (Dörner og Vogt 2013 s. 191). Og Reagans hardhendte utenrikspolitiske stil fikk "gjennom fortellingen og bildene fra Rambo-filmene en virkningsfull visuell legitimasjon" (Dörner og Vogt 2013 s. 191).

Russel Berman skriver i artikklen "Rambo: From Counter-Culture to Contra" (1985) om noen av Reagan-periodens filmer: "In an era where bad film stars become reactionary politicians, political films which are equally bad may be something we will just have to live with. So after the Nicaraguan occupation of Smallville in Red Dawn, Ricky goes to Vietnam in Rambo. This box office hit of the summer appears to confirm all the claims of leftist criticism regarding the ideology of Reaganism. Above all, it represents the revisionist history of the Vietnam War, won on the battlefield but lost by politicians who capitulated to the totalitarian pawns of Moscow, who in turn continue to imprison and torture unnumbered POWs" (http://philpapers.org/rec/BERRFC; lesedato 05.06.15).

"What is perhaps most curious, however, is how *Rambo* appropriates countercultural motifs for the right. Rambo has long hair, a head-band, eats only natural foods (whereas the bureaucrat Murdock swills Coke), is close to nature, and is hostile toward bureaucracy, the state, and technology – precisely the position of many 60s counterculturalists. But, as Russell Berman (1985: 145) has pointed out, Rambo's real enemy is the "governmental machine, with its massive technology, unlimited regulations, and venal political motivations. Rambo is the anti-bureaucratic nonconformist opposed to the state, the new individualist activist." Thus Rambo is a supply-side hero, a figure of individual entrepreneurism, who shows how Reaganite ideology is able to assimilate earlier countercultural figures, much as fascism was able to provide a "cultural synthesis" of nationalist, primitivist, socialist, and racialist ideologies (Bloch 1933). This analysis suggests

that Reaganism should be seen as revolutionary conservativism with a strong component of radical conservative individualism and activism, and that this fits in with *Star Wars*, *Indiana Jones*, *Superman*, *Conan* and other films and television series which utilize individualist heroes who are anti-state and who are a repository of conservative values." (Kellner 1991)

"The representations and thematics of race also contribute fundamentally to the militarist theme. The Vietnamese and Russians are presented as alien Others, as the embodiment of Evil, in a typically Hollywood manichean scenario that presents the Other, the Enemy, "Them," as the embodiment of evil, and "Us," the good guys, as the incarnation of virtue, heroism, goodness, innocence, etc. *Rambo* appropriates stereotypes of the evil Japanese and Germans from World War II movies in its representations of the Vietnamese and the Russians, thus continuing a manichean Hollywood tradition with past icons of evil standing in for – from the Right's point of view – contemporary villains. The Vietnamese are portrayed as duplicitous bandits, ineffectual dupes of the evil Soviets, and cannon fodder for Rambo's exploits while the Soviets are presented as sadistic torturers and inhuman, mechanistic bureaucrats. And yet reflections on the construction of gender and race in the film make clear that these phenomena are socially constructed, are artificial constructs that are produced in such things as films and popular culture. The stereotypes of race and gender in *Rambo* are so exaggerated, so crude, that they point to the artificial and socially constructed nature of all ideals of masculinity, femininity, race, ethnicity, and other subject positions." (Kellner 1991)

"The generic war film and "return to Vietnam" codes, combined with Rambo's triumph, present the film as a conservative imperialist/militarist fantasy which transcodes Reaganite anti-communist and pro-militarist discourses. In fact, Reagan himself stated during a frustrating period of dealing with so-called terrorists that "I've just seen *Rambo* and I'll know what to do the next time"; indeed, Reagan constantly employed Ramboesque solutions to the political challenges of the day, fighting secret wars all over the world and engaging in overt military actions. Thus Reagan's response to *Rambo* disclosed that he really believed that violence was the best way to solve conflicts, and not by accident were Oliver North and other members of Reagan's secret government referred to as "Rambos" when they engaged in their illegal and criminal covert operations. Furthermore, the "happy ending" closure situates the film as a return to the conservative Hollywood adventure tradition, and the victory over the evil communists codes *Rambo* as a mythic redemption of U.S. defeat in Vietnam by heroic action – a trope reproduced in the films of Stallone, Chuck Norris, and countless other films, pulp novels, and television shows and which was instantiated in the political actions of Ronald Reagan and Oliver North (Jewett and Lawrence 1988: 248f.). Although the U.S. was denied victory in Vietnam, it has attempted to achieve it in popular culture. This phenomenon shows some of the political functions of popular culture which include providing compensations for irredeemable loss while offering reassurances that all is well in the American body politic – reassurance denied in less

conservative films such as Oliver Stone's *Salvador*, *Platoon*, *Wall Street* and *Talk Radio* which provide an instructive counter-cycle to the Stallone Rocky/Rambo cycles and which thus testify to the conflictual nature of cinematic ideology in the contemporary period." (Kellner 1991)

Presidentens uttalelse "Boy, after seeing Rambo last night, I know what to do next time" skal ha blitt sagt med en lur blunking med et øye (Dörner og Vogt 2013 s. 191).

"Reagan's most "popular" acts were his invasion of Grenada and bombing of Libya – precisely the sort of "action" celebrated in *Rambo*, *Top Gun*, *Iron Eagle* and the other militarist epics of the Reagan era. And so it is that Hollywood film in the Age of Reagan enacts rites of mythical redemption in narratives which attempt to manage social anxieties, to soothe and alleviate the sense of shame associated with defeat, and to smooth away the rough edges of history (i.e. U.S. atrocities in Vietnam as depicted in *Platoon*) in a mythical scenario where the Americans incarnate goodness and innocence while the communists represent pure evil – precisely the fantasy of Ronald Reagan in his pre-detente incarnation and precisely the mind-set of the classical Hollywood cinema in which Reagan dutifully performed." (Kellner 1991)

"*Rambo* presents a fantasy of rightwing heroism and ideological compensation for loss in Vietnam, it depicts a fundamentally corrupt political establishment, and Rambo's final assault against the computer system inadvertently depicts the obsolescence of the primitive warrior in a high tech weapons system where chumps like Rambo are at best cannon fodder who will be increasingly irrelevant to high-tech warfare. Read against the grain, *Rambo* can be seen as testimony to working class victimization and as a demonstration of the cynical uses and manipulation of uneducated working class youth like Rambo – an explicit theme of *Platoon* which early on establishes that it is poor white working class and third world ethnics who are being used as fodder in the Vietnam war games." (Kellner 1991)

Den amerikanske regissøren John Milius' film *Red Dawn* (1984) "appeared during a period of intense debate over Reagan's support of the Nicaruguan contras and other anti-communist, counterrevolutionary groups all over the world, accompanied by his military build-up and hostile posture toward the Soviet Union. *Red Dawn* thus advances an anti-communist, counterrevolutionary position which plays on and reproduces specific political fears that Reagan constantly played on. The film opens with titles on the screen narrating a rightwing nightmare of the Left taking over the world with the United States completely isolated. Ponderous Germanic music then accompanies images of clouds and sky, and the camera zooms down to a mountain vista, zeroing in on a monument – all aggressively fascist images culled from the work of Nazi filmmaker Leni Riefenstahl: the opening hommage to her film *The Triumph of the Will* clearly signals the rightwing nature of Milius' vision. The monument contains an ideological text by ultra-imperialist Theodore Roosevelt

whose warrior values the film obviously wants to advance: "Far better is it to dare mighty things than to take rank with those poor timid spirits who know neither victory nor defeat." " (Kellner 1991)

"*Red Dawn* wants to advance a specifically anti-communist agenda by showing Soviet, Cuban, and Nicaruguan troops invading and occupying the United States after their seizure of a highly strategic high school in the countryside of Colorado. This scenario, however, forces Milius to present a fullscale communist invasion – surely the sort of "mighty" daring that Roosevelt/Milius praise. Moreover, the opening images show small town America as the locus of "poor timid spirits" where football and a Saturday night date are the most highly valued activities. In other words, the patriotic film is really anti-American, highly contemptuous of contemporary American society, while the anti-communist film is secretly sympathetic to communist revolution, to the daring and audacity of communist revolutionaries. *Red Dawn* enacts its militarist scenario through scenes which transform a small group of teenagers into partisan resistance fighters, and attempts the daring feat of recuperating for the Right the figure of the heroic revolutionary freedom fighter – a figure that played a central role in 60s leftist mythology in the form of Che Guevera, the Viet Cong, and others, which the Reagan administration was trying to seize for the Right in its attempt to present U.S.-funded Nicaruguan terrorists as "freedom-fighters." In making a Cuban communist, Col. Bella (Ron O'Neil), the emblem of such a figure, Milius, however, undercuts his rightwing comic book anti-communism. Furthermore, the supposedly "democratic" freedom fighters are highly authoritarian. In a key early scene, the teen leader Jed refuses to allow democratic voting and beats up the liberal high school President who opposes him. We are supposed to sympathize with Jed's "strength" and to see democracy as the ploy of weak, self-interested politicos." (Kellner 1991)

Red Dawn "displays the extreme contempt that the Right feels for democracy in the United States – a contempt then being acted out in the political adventures of the time directed by William Casey, George Bush, and their stooge Oliver North. In *Red Dawn*, anyone associated with democracy is presented as corrupt: the high school President betrays the "resistance fighters" and is assassinated by one of the members in the group and his father, the mayor, is also shown as a spineless collaborator. In addition, the film (inadvertently?) puts on display the masculist socialization in patriarchal society. When Jed and Matt visit their father incarcerated in a prison camp, he tells them that he was "tough" with them as children to prepare them for the hard knocks of life – a conservative view of the world confirmed in the film's ideological scenario. His final advice to them is an order not to cry and a pathetic plea to "avenge me!" One then sees Jed being equally authoritarian and "tough" as his father as the film creaks along, signalling the way that patriarchal authority is handed down from father to son, in which the sons replay the authoritarian and aggressive roles of their father (though one might note that this conservative socialization scenario being touted in the film is under attack by more liberal socialization practices in the United States today). The film

also attempts to incorporate women and feminism into its rightwing warrior ideology. Two teenage girls join the "resistance fighters" and become warriors, every bit as effective as the men. The message seems to be that real women are most like real men and thus incorporates feminism into its militarist agenda at a time when the U.S. was becoming dependent upon women recruits for its volunteer army. Indeed, the film suppresses sexuality altogether, with one of the young women, Erika (played by Lea Thompson), developing a crush on an older pilot who joins the warrior band but later is conveniently killed. The other woman warrior, Toni, only expresses her feelings for the band's *fuhrer* Jed when she is dying, as he cautiously plants a chaste kiss on her forehead." (Kellner 1991)

"Marginal elements, however, undercut in subtle ways the film's [*Red Dawn*] rightist ideology. Cracks in the dominant American ideology show through in a scene in the Arapaho National Battlefield where one of "the great battles of the American West" took place. Milius tries to cover over the theft of Indian land and butchery of Native American resistance fighters by having a Russian Communist translate the plaque into Marxist terminology: "There was a great peasant uprising in 1908 of wild Indians. They were crushed by President Theodore Roosevelt, leading armies of imperialist cossacks and cowboys. The Battle lasted all winter. More than 35,000 were killed." While Milius may be trying to occlude the colonial history here by utilizing off-putting Soviet communist jargon, the "marginal" statistic of "35,000 killed" uncovers and points to the violent destructiveness of American imperialist adventures. The episode also (unwittingly?) equates the communist invaders with the American pioneers who had earlier invaded Indian territory, thus showing Communist and American aggressors to be brothers under their imperialist skins, one no better or worse than the other. It is also unclear what the teen warriors are supposed to be fighting and dying for. At the point where they confront the need to kill the traitor in their midst, one of the teens asks: "what's the difference between us and them," and the teen fascist Jed offers the rather feeble response: "we live here!" […] both *Red Dawn* and the TV mini-series *Amerika* represent the ideological bankruptcy of rightist ideology. As symbols of patriotism worth fighting and dying for about all they can come up with is the flag, the national anthem, and masculist self-assertion." (Kellner 1991)

"Furthermore, while *Red Dawn* attempts to advance an entire agenda of rightwing values, I would argue that the ideological project ultimately is incoherent and falls apart (one could make similar arguments concerning Milius' earlier *Conan* film). Far from glorifying war and the warrior, *Red Dawn* ultimately shows the futility, emptiness, and destructiveness of military violence (much as does *Platoon* from an explicitly critical-liberal position). For after glorifying the teen resistance Fighters' heroics, during the last third of the film one by one they are progressively brutalized and eventually killed off. Thus, *Red Dawn*, arguably, undercuts the warrior ethic as the teen warriors become more and more brutalized and pay with their lives for their heroism. In one poignant scene near the end, Jed and his brother Matt return to the park where they used to play football as children and one takes

out a childhood picture of two smiling happy young faces. Mentally comparing this childhood idyll with what they have become, Jed tears up the picture and begins crying. In the violent finale, some of the remaining teen warriors are killed and the fate of the two brothers, Jed and Matt, is left up in the air in the final narration as Ericka (Lea Thompson) describes her escape to the "free zone" and indicates that she never saw the two brothers again. These final war scenes thus, inadvertently perhaps, portray warrior heroism as an ode of death and destruction opposed to the pleasures and joys of life. The most interesting moment, however, occurs when the Cuban revolutionary, Col. Bella, whose love of life had led him to decide to resign his position when he saw that he was becoming more of a police official than a revolutionary emancipator – playing once again on the Che Guevara myth – decides not to shoot Jed who is carrying the mutilated body of his brother Matt. Bella throws down his rifle in disgust and walks away. What is happening here? Is the self-proclaimed Zen fascist warrior John Milius really a closet liberal and pacificist? Or is even the rightwing becoming aware of the human costs of military adventures?" (Kellner 1991)

"*Red Dawn* is an incoherent text torn by contradictions. […] Milius sets up the communist invaders as barbaric hordes by introducing them after a black high school teacher is lecturing on Ghenghis Khan and is then shot and killed by the communist invaders. He also employs the aesthetic of realism to use details of the visual screen to depict the ways that the communists have set up a police state, drawing on the earlier codes of the anti-communist genre which was a staple of Hollywood film during the late 1940s and early 1950s. As in the Jack Webb film *Red Nightmare*, there are images of individuals torn from their houses, marched through the streets, and interned in concentration camps; another image portrays the local movie theater playing classical Russian films. Yet the triumphant entrance into the town of Colonel Bella to the martial music of the *International* codes him as a powerful and heroic figure and his sympathetic portrayal throughout the film wins some sympathy for the communist revolutionary – a trope repeated with the later entrance of the Russian leader of a special forces group, Strelnikov, who is also presented sympathetically. So a contradiction emerges between Milius' anti-communist scenario and his pro-warrior ethos with his cinematography investing both the communist and "resistance" warriors with the most positive resonance. […] [*Red Dawn*] becomes more and more incoherent and confusing as it proceeds, thus depriving Milius of the honor of becoming the foremost cinematic auteur and ideologue of Reaganite anti-communist (a prize that Stallone wins hands down). Consequently, whereas Milius may have intended to make a rightist, militarist, and anti-communist film – and it certainly contains ample examples of these themes and was read in this way when it came out – the film is ultimately incoherent and undercuts in various ways its militarist and anticommunist project." (Kellner 1991)

Tyrkias "recent growing interest in conservative film production, in many cases, is understood to have connections with the so called light-Islamist party, Justice and Development Party, AKP. A commonly held belief is that the ruling party, AKP,

supported conservative cinema-art sector because they both shared the same cause (Uguz, 2010). For instance, Uguz claims that the director of *New York'ta Beş Minare* (*Five Minarets in New York*, 2010), a Mahsun Kırmızıgül film, enforces AKP-oriented international and national policies, and Fetullah Gulen tendentious world view. Several comments connect this tradition and the film to the currently increasing political Islam and the Fetullah Gulen movement. It is only recently that cinema's socio-political effects have been rediscovered by conservative cinema producers and they have begun to include Islamic and traditional topics in their films (Guven, 2008). This new interest for making films about conservative and nationalist themes grew exponentially especially when Islamic and/or conservative business firms increased their market share in the Turkish economy and began investing in the art sector as they used to invest in religious structures and activities. These wealthy business people backed art forms that would highlight traditional values, enforce cultural unity and advocate for national togetherness as seen in the TV series *Kurtlar Vadisi* (*Valley of the Wolves*, 2003), *New York'ta Beş Minare* (*Five Minarets in New York*, 2010), *Hür Adam* (*Free Man*, 2010), and *Fetih 1453* (*Conquest 1453*, 2012). For example, the producer and the director of *Free Man*, Mehmet Tanrisever (he is known to have close relations with the Fetullah Gulen Movement), is also a businessman and the owner of the Feza Film company which produced other conservative cinema films such as *Minyeli Abdullah I* and *II*. Tanrisever's return to cinema as a producer and director after 20 years of absence was because of his belief in cinema's role in educating people. […] Often referred to as 'The Gulen Movement' or 'The Fetullah Gulen Community', it is a social (Islamic) movement that originates in Turkey. The movement has millions of supporters in Turkey and hundreds of schools and cultural centers, many publication houses, and television stations in Turkey and all around the world. The leader of the community, Fetullah Gulen (Hodja Effendi), currently [2014] resides in the Poconos of Pennsylvania, USA." (Necati Anaz i http://www.participations. org/Volume%2011/Issue%201/2.pdf; lesedato 22.06.15)

"Ideology: a systematically false consciousness." (Hawkes 2003 s. 195) "[P]ostmodernists are unwilling to speak of 'ideology', since this category implies a binary opposition between true and false modes of thought" (Hawkes 2003 s. 189).

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