History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1947 – 1949

Department of Defense Photo (Sgt. Hall)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff meet the press. *Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson (seated, left) confers with General Omar N. Bradley (seated, right), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at an informal press conference. Standing left to right are: General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, USAF; General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, USA; and Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, USN.*



Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal in conference with the Joint Chiefs, 1948. *Left to right: General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, USAF; Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, USN, General Omar N. Bradley, USA; and Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, USN.*

History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy

Volume II
1947 – 1949

Kenneth W. Condit

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Foreword

Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic direction of the armed forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners, have played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense in the years since World War II is essential to an understanding of their current work. An account of their activity in peacetime and during times of crisis provides, moreover, an important series of chapters in the military history of the United States. For these reasons. the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history be written for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization, and as a source of information for staff studies will be readily recognized.

The series, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,* treats the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the close of World War II. Because of the nature of the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the sensitivity of the sources, the volumes of the series were originally prepared in classified form. Classification designations, in text and footnotes, are those that appeared in the original classified volume. Following review and declassification, the initial four volumes, covering the years 1945 to 1952 and the Korean War, were distributed in unclassified form within the Department of Defense and copies were deposited with the National Archives and Records Administration. These volumes are now being made available as official publications.

Volume II describes JCS activities during the period 1947 to 1949 except for activities related to Indochina which are covered in a separate series. This volume is the work of Mr. Kenneth W. Condit of the Historical Division, Joint Secretariat; he developed the volume's concept and outline, performed the research, and wrote the chapters. The initial draft of Chapter 8 was prepared by Miss Judith A. Walters. Mr. William J. Tobin contributed to the production of Chapter 14. Final revision and historical editing proceeded under the supervision of the Chief, Histories Branch, Dr. Robert J. Watson. Resource constraints have prevented revision to reflect recent scholarship.

Readers familiar with the present-day operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will note that the activities described in this volume reflect a somewhat different organization and set of procedures—those existing some years before the implementation of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. As orga-

nized under the National Security Act of 1947, the Joint Staff had three main components: the Joint Strategic Plans Group, the Joint Intelligence Group, and the Joint Logistics Plans Group. At an organizational level above the three Joint Staff Groups were three joint committees composed of Service representatives (such as the Joint Strategic Plans Committee overseeing the work of the Joint Strategic Plans Group). The Joint Chiefs of Staff normally assigned tasks to one of the committees, which in turn called on its corresponding Joint Staff Group for a report. The resulting paper passed to the joint committee for review, amendment, and approval for return with instructions for revision) before being submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The JCS Committees and Groups that were established under the National Security Act of 1947 were direct successors of elements of the wartime JCS organization that had continued to function in the postwar period. The transition from old forms to new occurred during October 1947 and involved extensive changes in titles. Since some of the earlier organizational elements are mentioned in the text of this volume, the following table is presented to identify each one with its successor under the National Security Act.

Old	*New*
Joint Staff Planners	= Joint Strategic Plans Committee
Joint Intelligence Committee	= Joint Intelligence Committee
Joint Logistics Committee	= Joint Logistics Plans Committee
Joint War Plans Committee	= Joint Strategic Plans Group
Joint Intelligence Staff	= Joint Intelligence Group
Joint Logistics Plans Committee	= Joint Logistics Plans Group

This volume was reviewed for declassification by the appropriate US Government departments and agencies and cleared for release. The volume is an official publication of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but, inasmuch as the text has not been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it must be construed as descriptive only and does not constitute the official position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any subject.

Washington, DC
September 1996

DAVID A. ARMSTRONG
Director for Joint History

Preface

The period 1947–1949 marked the beginning of new responsibilities and new challenges for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, they acquired legal status and legally assigned duties for the first time. They were called upon to discharge these duties under particularly trying circumstances. As "principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense" the Joint Chiefs of Staff were called upon to support the national policy of "containment" by recommending military forces strong enough to prevent further communist advances. But an economy-minded President and Congress failed to provide them. As a result, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were compelled to shape their recommendations on military strategy and national policy to the means at hand. The result was a military strategy for general war that conceded the initial loss of both Western European and Eastern Asia, and a cautious approach to military commitments in situations below the level of general war.

The author received help from many sources in the preparation of this volume and freely acknowledges his indebtedness. A special debt is owed to Mr. Ernest H. Giusti, Chief of the Historical Division during most of the time this volume was being written, for his support and encouragement and to Dr. Robert J. Watson, then Chief of the Histories Branch, for his meticulous and constructive review of the manuscript. Without the research assistance of Mr. Sigmund W. Musinski and his staff in the JCS Records Information and Retrieval Branch, and of the Modern Military Records Division, National Archives and Records Service, the author's task would have been far more difficult. Special thanks are due to CWO William A. Barbee and Ms. Janet M. Lekang of the JCS Declassification Branch, for the many hours they devoted to reviewing and declassifying JCS documents cited in the volume. Miss Anna M. Siney, Editoral Assistant, and her successor Mrs. Janet W. Ball made an invaluable contribution through their cheerful and efficient direction of all phases of preparing the original manuscript. I also wish to thank Ms. Susan Carroll for preparing the Index and Ms. Penny Norman for performing the manifold tasks necessary to put the manuscript into publication form.

KENNETH W. CONDIT

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A New Era Begins

The middle of the year 1947 marked a new departure both for US foreign policy and for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After two and a half years of unsuccessful attempts to collaborate with the Soviet Union in conducting world affairs according to the principles of the United Nations, the United States Government concluded that its interests could only be served by a policy designed to prevent the imposition of totalitarian regimes on free peoples by direct or indirect Soviet aggression. President Truman viewed the spread of Soviet rule as undermining the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States. The result was a period of "cold war" consisting of diplomatic and military confrontations of varying intensity but always short of actual armed conflict on the part of US forces. Meanwhile the United States evolved a new complex of governmental institutions, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff were assigned a key role, to deal with problems of national security.

New Framework for National Defense: The National Security Act of 1947

On 26 July 1947, President Truman affixed his signature to Public Law 253, the National Security Act of 1947, and thus conferred legal status upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the first time.[1] Since February 1942, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff came into existence informally to provide the US component of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had neither a legal mandate nor formally defined duties. They were left free to extend their activities as needed to meet the requirements of the war. The desirability of preserving this useful flexibility was the chief reason offered by President Roosevelt himself for declining to seek congressional authorization for the Joint Chiefs of Staff or to issue them a basic directive. After the war had ended, the need for reform of the military establishment, including some legal provision for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was

widely recognized. But disagreements among the Services over integration delayed action until July of 1947.[2]

Congress intended, in providing for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Public Law 253, to perpetuate what was generally considered to be a successful military institution rather than to innovate. "The bill contemplates the continuation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with duties substantially as at present, and permits functioning in accordance with procedures developed by wartime experience," read the Senate report on the proposed legislation. And the House report stated that the intention was to continue "on a permanent basis the most effective interservice coordinating agency developed during the war."[3]

To this end, Public Law 253 gave legal status to the existing membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—namely, the Chief of Staff, US Army; the Chief of Staff, US Air Force; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, should the President choose to fill this last office.

As a statement of their continuing duties, Public Law 253 specifically directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(1) to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces;

(2) to prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the military services logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans;

(3) to establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security;

(4) to formulate policies for joint training of military forces;

(5) to formulate policies for coordinating the education of members of the military forces;

(6) to review major materiel and personnel requirements of the military forces, in accordance with strategic and logistic plans; and

(7) to provide United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

The law also provided a broad degree of flexibility in the functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by specifying that they would serve as the "principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense" and would "perform such other duties as the President and the Secretary of Defense may direct or as may be prescribed by law."[4]

Although Congress intended to continue the Joint Chiefs of Staff "with duties substantially as at present," the enumeration of duties in Public Law 253 reflected the tasks carried out during World War II and was not an accurate description of the functions actually being performed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the summer of 1947. True, they had drawn up, and obtained presidential

approval for, a unified command plan and had furnished US representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations. But they had not prepared any strategic or logistic plans, reviewed major materiel and personnel requirements of the military forces, or formulated policies for joint training or education. They had, however, been called upon to prepare strategic estimates.

Since the end of World War II, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had become increasingly involved in foreign policy questions. Even before the war had come to an end, President Roosevelt had asked their advice about the terms to be imposed on the vanquished powers and on aspects of the proposed United Nations Organization. In subsequent years, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave their views on such subjects as disarmament and the control of atomic energy, military alliances, provision of military assistance to friendly powers, base rights overseas, relations with the Soviet Union, and policy towards China. The involvement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in these matters could find legal justification only in Public Law 253 under the "such other duties" clause. This clause, if considered in the light of the congressional intention to continue the Joint Chiefs of Staff with duties "substantially as at present," could be construed as a congressional mandate to continue these activities in the foreign relations field.

If Public Law 253 was conservative in prescribing the functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it was far more innovative in setting up the environment in which those functions would be carried out. By creating the position of Secretary of Defense, whom the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to serve as "principal military advisers," Congress for the first time fixed responsibility over the entire defense establishment in one Cabinet official. He would have the following duties:

> (1) Establish general policies and programs for the National Military Establishment and for all of the departments and agencies therein;
>
> (2) Exercise general direction, authority, and control over such departments and agencies;
>
> (3) Take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary duplication or overlapping in the fields of procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health, and research;
>
> (4) Supervise and coordinate the preparation of the budget estimates of the departments and agencies comprising the National Military Establishment; formulate and determine the budget estimates for submittal to the Bureau of the Budget; and supervise the budget programs of such departments and agencies under the applicable appropriation Act.[5]

Congress, while assigning broad responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense, was less generous in providing him the necessary authority to carry them out. By limiting his authority over the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and by guaranteeing them direct access to the President as well as a position on the National Security Council, Congress, in effect, merely established a coordinator of the three existing Departments; there was no "Department" of Defense.

The extent to which the Secretary of Defense, when he assumed office, would call upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff as his "principal military advisers" to assist him in discharging these duties could not, of course, be known in the summer of 1947.

The National Military Establishment over which the Secretary of Defense was to preside was also created by the Act. It consisted of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Research and Development and Munitions Boards. The Department of the Air Force replaced the former Army Air Forces. The Munitions Board was an existing joint Army-Navy agency, while the Research and Development Board had formerly enjoyed independent status.

Public Law 253 also established a National Security Council (NSC), consisting of the President; the Vice President; the Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy, and the Air Force; and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board (another new creation, whose task was to coordinate civilian and military mobilization plans). This body was charged with advising the President "with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security." The function of the National Security Council was, in effect, to correlate the efforts of the executive agencies primarily concerned with national security matters. The Act made no provision for any relationship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the National Security Council. Military input into NSC deliberations was evidently intended to come from the civilian Secretaries of Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force.

The National Security Council superseded an earlier body, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), created during World War II, which had undertaken to coordinate political and military policies at the assistant secretary level. Service representatives served on the working subcommittees of SWNCC, while important papers were referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment, a practice soon adopted also by the NSC. After the passage of the National Security Act, SWNCC was renamed "State, Army, Navy, Air Force Coordinating Committee" (SANACC) and continued in existence until 30 June 1949.[6]

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), also established by the National Security Act under the NSC, served to assist, rather than to restrict, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the performance of their duties. Under the provisions of the Act, existing intelligence activities of the military departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to continue as before. The CIA was to assist them in these activities by performing for their benefit "such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally."

In specifying that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to be "principal military advisers to the President," the Act sought to continue a central working relationship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During World War II, President Roosevelt had chosen to deal directly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in matters pertaining to military operations and strategy and had deliberately by-passed the Secretaries of War and Navy. After the war had ended, President Truman resumed the practice of referring most matters concerning the armed forces to the Service Secretaries. On occasion, however, he dealt directly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, like his predecessor.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had also developed the practice of dealing directly with civilian agencies of the government. For instance, they advised the Secretary of State on such matters as the military consequence of Soviet acquisition of certain eastern Turkish provinces, and gave their views on international control of atomic energy to the US representative on the UN Atomic Energy Commission. It was not clear whether these direct relationships would continue after the newly authorized Secretary of Defense took office.

The officers who were about to take up the task of making the Joint Chiefs of Staff function effectively in the new national security machinery established by Public Law 253 were all individuals who had exercised high command with distinction during World War II. Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, had held the post ever since it was created in 1942. He had presided over the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and had provided invaluable liaison between them and the White House. Representing the Army on the Joint Chiefs of Staff was the Chief of Staff, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had commanded the victorious Allied armies in Western Europe. The Navy was also represented by a successful theater commander of World War II, the Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. As Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), he had commanded the operations across the Pacific against Japan. General Carl Spaatz, the Chief of Staff of the newly created Air Force, had served under General Eisenhower in Europe as Commanding General, US Strategic Air Forces.

The new "boss" of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was also a man with broad experience in military affairs. James V. Forrestal, who took office as the first Secretary of Defense on 17 September 1947, was a successful investment banker who had come to Washington as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1940. He became Secretary of the Navy in 1944 following the death of Secretary Knox. In these posts, he played a significant role in the building of the wartime Navy.

From Collaboration to Cold War

As the Joint Chiefs of Staff took up their duties in the new national defense establishment, conditions in the world confronted the United States with serious challenges. Two years after the surrender of Hitler's Reich, the victorious Allies had not yet been able to agree on peace terms for Germany or upon a political order for the liberated territories of Eastern Europe. To the contrary, the United States and the United Kingdom had engaged in an increasingly bitter struggle to prevent Soviet dominance on the European continent. Elsewhere in the world the end of World War II had not brought peace. China was wracked by civil war, the Indian subcontinent was the scene of communal strife between Moslems and Hindus, and Palestine was plagued by violent conflicts of its Arab and Jewish inhabitants against each other and against the British mandate authorities.

This was not the world order of cooperation under international law, free from spheres of influence, exclusive alliances, and balances of power, that the

United States had hoped to establish when the fighting ceased in 1945. American postwar policy, which had gradually taken form during the conflict, was based on the assumption that the three major wartime allies, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, shared interests in common to a sufficient degree to support a world order based on self-determination and democracy and regulated by an international organization of all peace-loving nations. To this end, the United States had taken the lead in forming the United Nations and in committing the "Big Three" powers, through the Declaration on Liberated Europe, to support the liberated peoples in creating democratic institutions of their own choice. The effect of these measures, as President Roosevelt expressed it in reporting to Congress on the Yalta Conference, was expected to be the "end of the system of unilateral action and exclusive alliances and spheres of influence and balances of power and all other expedients which have been tried for centuries—and have failed."[7]

A few months later, when President Roosevelt died, the policy was already beginning to prove unworkable and, as time passed, it proved to be increasingly unrealistic. In Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, disregarding its solemn pledges to support free elections and democratic institutions in the liberated countries of Eastern Europe, had chosen instead to seek to control them through communist-dominated puppet regimes. By the end of 1945, the Soviets had imposed their control over Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Albania, and Yugoslavia—a process facilitated by the presence of the Red Army in all these countries except the last.

These events caused American officials to begin to question the basic premise of US foreign policy as expressed by President Roosevelt after Yalta. Their fears were confirmed by Premier Stalin in a speech delivered in Moscow on 9 February 1946. This speech, as Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson described it, "stated with brutal clarity the Soviet Union's postwar policy." Finding the causes of World War II in the dynamics of capitalist imperialism, and the same forces still in control of the other major powers, Stalin concluded that a peaceful international order was impossible. He called, therefore, for the Soviet Union to prepare for any eventuality. The basic materials of national defense—iron and steel—must be trebled, and coal and oil, the sources of energy, doubled. Consumer goods, so desperately needed in Russia, must wait on rearmament.[8]

In response to a request for elucidation of this speech, George F. Kennan, the US Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union, cabled a long dispatch analyzing Soviet attitudes and behavior. He found that at the bottom of the Kremlin's attitude toward the outside world was a neurotic fear that reflected centuries of Russian insecurity. To the government, whether czarist or bolshevik, penetration by the Western World was its greatest danger. Mr. Kennan predicted that Soviet policy would use every means to infiltrate, divide, and weaken the West. To seek a *modus vivendi* with Moscow would prove chimerical, a process leading not to an end but only to a continuation of political warfare.[9] Mr. Kennan's message had a profound effect upon the attitudes of officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, but US policy remained unchanged until President Truman asked for aid to Greece and Turkey more than a year later.[10]

To carry on the policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union became increasingly difficult, however. After more than a year of painful negotiations, peace treaties were finally signed with the five lesser Axis powers (Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Italy, and Finland). But to obtain agreement, the United States and the United Kingdom had been obliged to agree to provisions such as heavy reparations that gave the Soviets an undue amount of continuing influence.

Of far greater concern to the United States than the status of Eastern Europe was an evolving struggle with the Soviet Union for the control of Germany. The United States had hoped to put a permanent end to the threat of German aggression by means of disarmament and demilitarization. To attain these objectives, the United States favored a politically decentralized Germany consisting of *Laender,* or states, exercising the normal functions of local government and a federal government empowered to deal with economic affairs on a nationwide basis but severely limited in other respects. It would specifically be denied any control of police or education. The United States also recognized that Germany should make reparation for the devastation caused by her aggression but should be left with an economy sufficient to maintain an average European living standard without outside aid. Some adjustment of Germany's eastern boundary was felt justified to compensate Poland for lands taken from her in the east by the Soviet Union.

Apparent agreement on these policies was attained by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union at Yalta and Potsdam. In practice, however, there was very little progress in carrying them out. By interallied agreement, Germany was divided into US, British, French, and Soviet zones for purposes of occupation, with policy coordination vested in an Allied Control Council consisting of the military governors of the four zones. From the beginning, agreements in the Allied Control Council were few and far between, and the occupying authorities of the Western zones were compelled to act on their own to avoid stagnation and breakdown. They introduced democratic political institutions, including free elections and guarantees of civil liberties, while the Soviet Union in its zone followed the now familiar lines that had been applied in Eastern Europe. The result was the emergence of two Germanies: a democratic west consisting of the US, British, and French zones; and a communist east consisting of the Soviet zone. This process was accelerated by the failure to coordinate the economies of the several zones. In the west, the absence of an interzonal flow of goods compelled the occupying authorities to subsidize their zones, a procedure they were unwilling to continue indefinitely. To ease this financial burden, the British and US Governments merged the economies of their zones on 1 January 1947. In the east, the Soviets nationalized the major industries and engaged in large-scale removal of industrial plants to the Soviet Union as reparations.

Any hope that these divisions could be healed by a peace settlement were quickly dashed when the foreign ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union met in Moscow in February 1947 to write a treaty. Agreement proved impossible on all the major issues. In the economic

field, the Soviets continued to demand heavy reparations and would agree to economic unity only in return for a share in the control of the Ruhr. The Western powers found these positions unacceptable. In the political field, all the powers agreed that before the conclusion of a peace treaty there should be a single German government capable of carrying out its terms. But they disagreed on its composition and duties. The Soviets, evidently confident of their ability through communist organization and penetration to turn a united centralized Germany to the east, proposed a strong, centralized government responsible for state security. The Western powers, because they feared that such a government could be captured and exploited by a totalitarian movement of the right or left, proposed a federal structure reserving to the *Laender* all but certain specified limited powers. There was also disagreement over Germany's future boundaries and the procedure for drafting a peace treaty.

The Moscow Conference was an important turning point. The irreconcilable positions taken by the US and Soviet delegations on every controversial point indicated that neither saw any possibility of a German or European settlement based on four-power agreement. After Moscow, the United States, together with Britain and France, turned to the task of reconstructing western Germany along their own lines, just as the Soviet Union had been doing for some time in eastern Germany.

In Asia, as in Europe, the United States was disappointed by the trend of events during the two years following World War II. United States policy was based on the assumption that peace and stability in Asia could be assured by a strong, united and democratic China which, as one of the great powers of the world, would play a constructive part in the work of the United Nations. But attainment of this goal proved far more difficult than its enunciation, for China was not united; a state of civil war prevailed between the legal government of Chiang Kai-shek and the communist forces of Mao Tse-tung. When World War II ended, there was a race between Chiang's forces and the communists for control of Japanese-occupied territory. The United States came to the aid of Chiang by sending occupation forces to North China and transporting Chiang's armies to key points. These actions, the result as much of the need to effect the surrender of the Japanese armies as of a deliberate policy of aiding Chiang at the expense of the communists, did nothing to restore the unity so necessary if China was to play her hoped-for role in the post-war period.

Hoping to rectify the situation, President Truman sent General George C. Marshall to China as his special emissary. General Marshall's mission was to seek a strong, united, and democratic China by broadening and democratizing the government of Chiang Kai-shek. To this end, General Marshall persuaded both the government and the communists to accept an armistice and to open negotiations on a broadening of the regime to include the communists and other non-government parties. In spite of some initial success, this effort soon collapsed. Fighting resumed, and the negotiations were broken off. General Marshall's mission ended in January 1947. In his final report, he blamed the "irreconcilable Communists" and the "dominant group of reactionaries" in the government for the failure of his efforts.

The efforts of communist parties to expand in Asia were not limited to the Chinese party of Mao Tse-tung but included the Soviet Union as well. The occasion for Soviet expansion arose from the occupation of Korea, a former Japanese territory now to become free and independent by virtue of a decision of the Allied powers at Cairo in 1943. The necessity to disarm and repatriate the Japanese forces in Korea led to a partition into Soviet and US occupation zones along the 38th parallel. To achieve freedom and independence, Korea would have to be unified, but efforts at unification, undertaken during 1946 by means of a joint US-Soviet commission, failed. Disagreement was ostensibly over what groups of Koreans, by virtue of their adherence to "democratic" principles, should be allowed to participate in the government of a unified Korea. The real issue, however, was that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union wished to see a unified Korea that was dominated by the other. By mid-1947, the United States Government was thus compelled to abandon hopes for collaboration with the communists and to adopt a policy of supporting and strengthening the anti-communist elements in China and Korea.

The challenges facing the United States loomed even larger as it became apparent that the United Kingdom, the staunch wartime partner, was no longer able to play the role of a great power. That nation depended for its world position on the solidarity of the Commonwealth and on the maintenance of a world-wide empire, linked together by strategic routes and strong points. By 1946 the British system had been gravely weakened. To fight the war, Britain had to liquidate many of its investments overseas and to incur heavy debts. Its industrial plant was run down and its people were exhausted. Faced by great problems at home, they no longer had the power to hold their empire together or to meet the responsibilities inherent in great power status. The liquidation of the empire was forecast by agreements to offer independence or dominion status to India, Burma, and Ceylon. The waning of British power was also reflected in decisions to surrender the Palestine mandate in the face of an increasingly bitter Arab-Jewish civil war, and to terminate aid programs to Greece and Turkey, which the British people could no longer afford.

Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan

This last decision was to lead to a major new departure in US foreign policy. The Greek Government was facing a serious communist insurgency supported by the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites. Turkey, while not directly threatened at the time, had been under varying degrees of Soviet pressure since 1945 and was therefore compelled to keep its entire army mobilized at great expense. President Truman now faced a fateful decision. As he and Secretary of State George C. Marshall explained to congressional leaders on 27 February 1947, Greece was in grave danger of falling under communist control, thus isolating Turkey which then might suffer a similar fate. Soviet influence might then extend throughout the entire Middle East and as far as India. The choice, as

Secretary Marshall put it, was between acting with energy or losing by default.[11] Following through on this assumption, President Truman appeared before a joint session of Congress on 12 March 1947 to request military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey.

The issue, however, was far larger than the fate of Greece and Turkey. Failure to maintain their freedom and independence, the President explained, would have a profound effect upon other countries struggling to maintain their freedom. The President then discussed the "broad implications" in the action he proposed. One of the primary aspects of American foreign policy, he said, was "the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion," an objective we could not attain unless we were willing to "help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes." It must therefore be "the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. . . . We cannot allow changes in the *status quo* in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration."[12]

The Truman Doctrine dealt with only a part of the problem of maintaining stability in Europe. There was also a severe economic crisis confronting the war-weakened countries of the continent. By March 1947, many European countries faced economic collapse, which would offer opportunities for communist political exploitation unless aid could be quickly furnished. On 5 March, Under Secretary of State Acheson asked the SWNCC to examine the whole question in consultation with the Treasury Department, thus setting off a series of studies, drafts, and proposals that finally resulted in a program for US economic aid to Europe. It was first announced by Secretary of State George C. Marshall in a commencement address at Harvard on 5 June. The plan, as unveiled by the Secretary of State, called for the provision of US aid to meet needs identified and presented to the United States by the European nations, preferably acting together.

The hardest issue to resolve in drawing up the Marshall Plan was whether or not to invite the Soviet Union to participate. The administration was anxious to avoid the appearance of dividing Europe by limiting the offer of aid to the democratic nations of Western Europe but feared that Soviet participation would make the program so expensive that Congress would reject it in its entirety. The solution was to offer aid to the Soviet Union but to require full disclosure of economic and financial conditions, a proposal that the Soviets would be unlikely to accept.

The Western European democracies quickly endorsed the Marshall Plan. The Soviet Union rejected it partly because of an unwillingness to make the required economic disclosures but also because of a desire to appear as the defenders of the East European satellites against American imperialists. A group of 16 European countries, meeting during the summer of 1947, prepared a joint economic recovery program. On the American side, the Truman administration prepared legislation for a comprehensive program. It was presented to Congress in December 1947; congressional approval was forthcoming in April 1948.[13]

"Playing with Fire. . . ."

In March 1947, when President Truman announced his determination to "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures," US military forces were in no condition to give this policy effective support. The United States was, as General Marshall later expressed it, "playing with fire while we have nothing with which to put it out." As the result of precipitous demobilization in response to irresistible public pressure, the victorious wartime forces had all but disappeared. Military manpower of the United States, which had totalled more than 12,000,000 on 30 June 1945, had dwindled to about 1,566,000 two years later. This number was divided among the Services as follows:

Army (excluding AAF)	683,837
Navy	484,025
Marine Corps	92,222
Army Air Forces	305,774
	1,565,858[14]

In terms of effective combat power, the decline was even more striking. On VJ-Day, US ground forces consisted of 91 Army and 6 Marine divisions, all at a high pitch of combat effectiveness. The Army Air Forces, on that date, had an inventory of 68,400 aircraft and a force structure of 218 groups. The Navy at its maximum wartime strength consisted of 8,165 vessels of all types and included 1,304 major combatant ships, of which 40 were carriers and 24 were battleships.[15]

By 30 June 1947, this once-mighty host had almost ceased to exist. Only 12 ground divisions, 10 Army and 2 Marine, remained, and all were understrength. All the Army divisions were committed to occupation duties, except for two divisions of the "general reserve" in the continental United States. They were so reduced in numbers that battalion training exercises were only possible by drawing on the entire personnel of the parent regiment. The Marine divisions were also greatly understrength and lacking in combat effectiveness. The Army Air Forces had dwindled to 38 groups, of which only 11 were operationally effective. Worse still, none of the 9 B–29 groups authorized for the Strategic Air Command—the units designated to carry out nuclear strikes—was fully manned or operational. The Navy had shrunk to a total fleet of 1,003 ships of which 289 were major combatant types, including 14 fleet carriers and 4 battleships.[16]

The military budgets for Fiscal Year (FY) 1948 offered little or no prospect of improvement in either the quantity or quality of the US armed forces. Prepared separately by the Service Departments without assistance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they provided new obligational authority totalling $9.757 billion, of which $3.935 billion was for the Navy, $4.562 billion was for the Army, and $1.260 billion was for the Air Force. The average personnel strength to be supported by these funds was 1,641,000, a significant decrease from the average strength of 2,108,000 men maintained during FY 1947.[17]

Compounding the problems of maintaining adequate US armed forces was a change in the source of military personnel. On 31 March 1947, Congress allowed the Selective Service Act, in effect since 1940, to expire. Henceforth, unless an alternative form of compulsory service could be found, the Armed Services would have to rely on voluntary enlistments. The Truman administration's substitute for selective service was universal military training, a program first proposed by General of the Army George C. Marshall in 1945 and adopted by President Truman shortly thereafter. As presented by him to Congress on 23 October 1945, it called for one year of military training for all men at age 18, or upon graduating from high school. Upon completion of their training, the men would become members of the general reserve, after which they would move into the secondary reserve. Congress was not enthusiastic about the proposal and never acted on it.[18]

President Truman, showing continuing interest in the subject, appointed a commission on 19 December 1946 headed by Dr. Karl Compton, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to study universal military training. The Commission's report, submitted on 29 May 1947, borrowed features from each of its predecessors. It called for compulsory military training of at least one year for all men at age 18, or upon completion of secondary school. The training was to be divided into two parts, the first six months being devoted to basic training, followed by one of the following options: enlistment in one of the Services for two years; a second six months training; enrollment in a national Service academy; enrollment in the National Guard or Organized Reserve; or enrollment in Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). A civilian commission was to be in overall charge of the program.[19]

Congressional reaction was again unfavorable, and the Compton Report was quietly buried. Fear of "militarism" and the estimated cost of the program, $1.75 billion a year, were two major obstacles to congressional acceptance. Another was the belief that universal military service would be unnecessary if adequate funds were voted for the military and the unification measure, then before Congress, were approved.[20]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, although they made no formal comment on the final report, did endorse the general concept of universal military training. Responding to a request for their views on the subject from Dr. Compton, they informed him on 17 January 1947 that, in their opinion, "an adequate system of universal training is necessary to insure the future security of the United States." Their opinion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, was based on their belief that a future war would be global in scale and, despite certain technical innovations, would require massive conventional military forces. In the future, the United States would no longer be able to count on allies to hold the line while the United States mobilized and trained its own forces. Armed forces that could be rapidly mobilized were therefore essential. And the more the regular establishment was reduced, the more necessary it was to have a large, well-trained and rapidly mobilizable reserve.[21]

Soviet military forces, by comparison, vastly exceeded those of the United States and any potential allies. According to the most recent estimate by the US

military intelligence community, the Soviet Union had about 4,750,000 men under arms in mid-1946. Of these, 3,800,000 were in the ground forces, 650,000 in the air forces, and 300,000 in the navy. Active ground combat units totalled about 150 divisions. Soviet air strength consisted of about 89,000 aircraft of all types, although many of these planes were believed to be obsolescent. Moreover, the Soviet Air Force was predominantly a tactical force. Its strategic arm, the Long Range Bomber Force, was deficient both in quality and quantity. The Soviet Navy was far weaker than the Soviet air and ground forces. It was believed to consist of 4 overage battleships, 9 cruisers, 55 destroyers, 42 escort vessels, and 132 ocean-going submarines.[22]

The absence of approved joint strategic and logistic plans was a further source of weakness in the US military establishment. Had the woefully weak US forces been called upon to counter Soviet military aggression in mid-1947, they would have had no strategic plan to guide their operations, no assessments of the forces needed to defeat the Soviet Union, and no plans for mobilizing personnel and materiel resources. A beginning had been made on these planning tasks, however. Acting on their own initiative, the Joint Staff Planners had proposed, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had begun, a series of strategic studies preliminary to developing a formal joint emergency war plan and industrial mobilization plans.

To rectify this military imbalance by establishing armed forces adequate to support President Truman's foreign policies of resistance to Soviet expansionism was the major objective of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the period of this volume. The disparity between commitments and military means weighed heavily on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and affected the nature of their response when they were called upon to advise the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense on the military aspects of foreign policy. These were tasks they undertook as members of the new national security team established by the National Security Act of 1947. They were thus simultaneously striving to attain the necessary levels of military preparedness and working out their relationships with the President, the NSC, the Secretary of Defense, and the Military Departments.

2

Countering Soviet Expansion in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean

US Policy toward the Region

At the same time that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were entering into the new institutional relationships established by the National Security Act, they were participating in a serious effort to resist Soviet expansionism. The area of concern was the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, where President Truman and his administration believed vital US interests were at stake, and where a Soviet-inspired challenge to those interests first developed. In Iran, Soviet troops had occupied the northern province of Azerbaijan during World War II and had only withdrawn in 1946 under intense pressure from the United States. Turkey had been confronted by Soviet demands for cession of two provinces that had formerly been within Czarist Russia and for a share of control over the Dardanelles, along with military and naval bases from which to exercise this authority. Italy contained a large and disciplined Communist Party which seemed on the verge of winning power at the ballot box. And Greece faced an active communist insurgency.

In these circumstances, President Truman had enunciated his famous "doctrine" on 12 March 1947, when he had declared, among other things, that "if Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East." These events, should they occur, would, in Mr. Truman's opinion, have worldwide consequences. "The disappearance of Greece as an independent state," he said, "would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and independence while they repair the ravages of war. . . . Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for

them but for the world. Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples striving to maintain their freedom and independence."[1]

Formal enunciation of US policy toward the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean did not come until November 1947, although the basic elements of it had already become apparent through actions concerning various parts of the region. This policy formulation was a product of the so-called "Pentagon Talks" between US and British civilian and military representatives but not including the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These talks took place as a result of US-British differences over the withdrawal of British troops from Greece and had as their purpose the resolution of differences and the development of a common policy towards the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean.[2]

The policy statement, approved by President Truman on 24 November 1947, had been prepared originally in the Department of State and introduced into the "Pentagon Talks" as the "American Paper." It was adopted by the NSC on 21 November. The statement said:

> The security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the Middle East is vital to the security of the United States....
>
> The security of the whole Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East would be jeopardized if the Soviet Union should succeed in its efforts to obtain control of any one of the following countries: Italy, Greece, Turkey, or Iran.
>
> ....it should be the policy of the United States... to support the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. As a corollary of this policy the United States should assist in maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Iran.
>
> In carrying out this policy the United States should be prepared to make full use of its political, economic, and, if necessary, military power in such manner as may be found most effective. Before resorting to the actual employment of force, the United States should exhaust political and economic means, including recourse to the United Nations. Any resort to force should be in consonance with the Charter of the United Nations and, so far as possible, in cooperation with like-minded members of the United Nations.[3]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not formally consulted on this policy statement, evidently because they had not been designated as members of or advisers to the National Security Council. Secretary Forrestal, however, referred it to them informally with a request for their views. This was a practice he was to follow throughout his term of office and reflected his own desire to call on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as his statutory "principal military advisers," for their views on national security policy.[4]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, replying on 19 November, agreed that the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and Near East was important to the United States but described it as of "critical" rather than "vital" importance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also warned of the consequences of military commitments to the region. "Any additional deployment of U.S. armed forces to this area will, in view of our

present extended position, automatically raise the question of the advisability of partial mobilization," they cautioned. And any deployment of "appreciable strength" would make partial mobilization a necessity.[5]

Initiation of Military Aid to Greece

The major testing ground for this policy was Greece, a country that had suffered major economic and political dislocations during World War II and was facing an active insurgency supported by neighboring communist states. At the end of World War II, the Greek Communist Party and its allies had believed, with good reason, that it could achieve political control of the country by means of insurgent operations that would open the way for a "people's democracy" similar to those in power in the Soviet satellites of Eastern Europe. Not only were the Greeks exhausted by war and occupation but many seemed sympathetic to the wartime communist-controlled National Liberation Front, believing that it would bring them long-overdue social and economic reforms. An abortive attempt to seize power by force during December 1944–February 1945 led only to further suffering and was crushed by Greek and British troops. A reaction set in which resulted in electoral victory for a conservative-royalist coalition. The communists, who had boycotted the elections, determined to resume the struggle by violent means, a course of action they were encouraged to pursue by support from the governments of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. Under the leadership of Markos Vafiades, the communists began guerrilla operations in March 1946 on a gradually escalating basis. In October, the Greek Communist Party publicly declared its alliance with the guerrillas.[6]

After the United Kingdom, in February 1947, announced that it could no longer provide financial support to the Greek or Turkish Governments, President Truman asked Congress to supply aid for Greece and Turkey in the amount of $400 million for the period ending 30 June 1948. By Public Law 75, Congress, on 22 May 1947, authorized the President to furnish assistance to Greece and Turkey under four categories:

1. by sending financial aid in the form of loans, credits, grants, or otherwise . . . ;

2. by detailing to assist these countries any persons in the employ of the Government of the United States . . . ;

3. by detailing a limited number of members of the military services or the United States to assist those countries, in an advisory capacity only; . . .

4. by providing for (a) the transfer to . . . those countries of any articles, services, and information, and (b) the instruction and training of personnel of those countries. . . .

The authorized funds were appropriated on 30 July. The administration earmarked $300 million for Greece and $100 million for Turkey. To provide immediate funding for aid to Greece, pending passage of this appropriation, Congress had earlier directed the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, in the authorization act, to advance up to $100 million.[7]

To administer US aid to Greece, the administration formed the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG), which operated directly under the Secretary of State. It was separate from the US Embassy in Greece, but the two organizations were expected to work in close collaboration. Mr. Dwight P. Griswold, a former governor of Nebraska and at that time a member of General Lucius Clay's military government staff in Germany, was named Chief of the Mission. Included in AMAG were Army and Navy Groups whose responsibility was to administer the provision of military and naval equipment and supplies to the Greek armed forces. They were not authorized to extend operational advice.[8]

On 15 July 1947, when Mr. Griswold arrived in Athens accompanied by a small staff, he found a country facing deteriorating economic conditions and increasing insurgency. At this moment, the military situation in Greece seemed to American observers to take a serious turn for the worse. Up to this time, insurgent activity had consisted of scattered raids and ambushes, but on 12 July a well-armed force numbering about 2,500 men crossed into Greece from Albania and attacked the town of Konitza. A second column of similar strength was also reported moving into Greece. Secretary of State Marshall viewed the situation as so serious that on 16 July, he described these events in a memorandum to President Truman, in which he judged that the purpose of the insurgents was to set up a "people's republic," or its equivalent, along the Greek border. "It would appear," he warned, "that the likelihood of civil war is considerable."[9]

The following day, Secretary Marshall sent a more detailed statement of the situation to Admiral Leahy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the Secretaries of War and Navy, describing, in addition to the attack on Konitza, a skirmish along the Greek-Yugoslav border in which the insurgents were supported logistically and by fire from Yugoslav territory. The Secretary of State pointed out, also, that because of the Soviet veto power, the United Nations might be incapable of action to protect Greek independence and territorial integrity. Secretary Marshall discussed the matter with President Truman the same day. They agreed that the Secretary of State would talk to Admiral Leahy and tell him informally that he and the President thought the Joint Chiefs of Staff should formally consider the matter immediately.[10]

The British Proposal for Troop Withdrawal

The US Government received a further shock on 30 July, when the British Chargé d'Affaires delivered a note to Secretary Marshall stating that his government had decided, because of financial difficulties and manpower shortages,

to withdraw its troops from Greece.[11] At this time, British troop strength in Greece totalled about 5,000, exclusive of the 1,100-man British Military Mission that was present to advise the Greek armed forces. The 5,000 troops comprised the 10th Infantry Brigade, with its combat strength of 3,500 deployed at Salonika, and 1,500 headquarters and supply personnel in Athens. The mission of the 10th Infantry Brigade was to represent the power of Great Britain and the Western democracies, to deter an attack on Greece by her communist neighbors, and to have a "stabilizing" effect on the internal Greek situation. The Brigade was not able, nor was it intended, to withstand an attack in force.[12]

The State Department made representations to Foreign Secretary Bevin in strong terms, urging that British troops remain in Greece until after the United Nations had completed an investigation then in progress of violations of the Greek border and until the US and UK Governments had engaged in a frank discussion of the consequences of troop withdrawals.[13] Mr. Bevin replied to Mr. Marshall on 20 August. He was willing to have the Greek situation discussed by the UK and US Chiefs of Staff, but he made it clear that it was essential for his government to withdraw its troops during the autumn season. He suggested that what was most necessary to stabilize the situation in Greece was an expansion of the Greek Army.[14]

The British Chiefs of Staff, on 29 August, supplied the US Joint Chiefs of Staff with further details of the British position presented by Mr. Bevin. Withdrawal of troops from Greece must be completed by 31 October, they said, and would therefore have to begin by the end of September. The offsetting buildup of Greek forces, they recommended, should be as follows: the Army from 120,000 to 150,000, thereby permitting the organization of 10 extra battalions; the Air Force from 22 to 36 squadrons (all flying British aircraft); the Navy by 6 fast patrol craft to be supplied by the United States.[15]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied that they considered that withdrawal by 31 October was ill-timed, entailed consequences of global significance, and could not be reconciled with the drastically changed conditions in Greece. The proposal to offset the withdrawal by enlarging the Greek Army was unacceptable. It would disrupt US supply plans and, more important, could not provide a substitute for the presence of British troops in Greece, which exerted a stabilizing influence out of all proportion to the size and cost of the commitment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore made an "urgent request" that withdrawal of British troops from Greece be postponed indefinitely, and that the British Government consider meeting its manpower limitations by reducing forces in other areas.[16]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also supplied to the Secretaries of War and Navy, at their request, a military evaluation of the consequences of a British withdrawal. British forces in Greece, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out, were symbolic of the determination of Great Britain and the Western democracies to ensure the continued independence of the Greek state. Their departure might be taken as an opportunity by Greek insurgent leaders to call for assistance from neighboring communist countries in defending the newly proclaimed "Free State of Northern Greece." The Greek Army could not cope with such a military threat. Thus there would be grave danger of a communist victory in Greece, an event that would

have drastically adverse effects on the military position of the United States and the Western democracies. Forces friendly to, or dominated by, the Soviet Union would be in a position to interdict shipping in the Mediterranean; Turkey would be outflanked and might be lost to the Western democracies; and Italy and Iran would be under similar pressures to loosen their ties with the West. In addition, resistance to communism would be seriously weakened throughout the non-Soviet world.[17]

On 10 September, the US Ambassador to the United Kingdom, speaking on instructions from the Secretary of State, stated all these arguments against withdrawal to Mr. Bevin and again urged that the British Government not withdraw its troops from Greece pending a full-dress review by the US and British Governments of Middle East policies. Mr. Bevin agreed to limit the immediate withdrawal to one battalion and to postpone the departure of the remainder of the brigade until 15 December. Secretary Marshall, on 13 September, reluctantly consented to this arrangement.[18]

The Chamberlin Mission

This temporary delay in the departure of British troops from Greece, while helpful, was not considered by US officials as sufficient action to counter a worsening situation. On 15 September, Mr. Griswold reported that increasing insurgent strength and activities required a greater concentration by AMAG on military problems. He called for transfer of $9 million from economic to military programs to finance continuation of a temporary overstrength of 20,000 men in the Greek Army until early January, and a permanent addition thereafter of 10,000 men. The effect would be to raise the total allotted to military assistance from the $157 million originally budgeted by AMAG to $168 million. The breakdown of this amount by Services was as follows: Army, $151 million; Air Force, $5 million; and Navy, $12 million. Mr. Griswold recommended also that the British, because they had forces in Greece, be requested to furnish operational advice to the Greek forces. If the British were unable or unwilling to undertake this task, the United States should do so, dispatching 125 to 150 officers for the purpose. The Department of State approved the proposed transfer of funds from economic to military programs.[19]

To gain a further insight into the military situation in Greece, the Department of State requested the War Department to send a mission to make an on-the-spot survey of local conditions and recommend prompt remedial action. The mission, headed by Major General S.J. Chamberlin, USA, arrived in Athens on 26 September and departed on 11 October. The members visited numerous points in the area of operations, talked with commanders and staffs of Greek army units, and conferred with all the principal US and UK representatives and key members of the Greek cabinet.

General Chamberlin submitted his report on 20 October. The struggle in Greece, he reported, was simply one phase in the "worldwide struggle between

the United States and the Soviet Union," conducted at present on the communist side by indigenous guerrillas but capable of support at any time by neighboring Soviet satellite states or by the Soviet Union itself. In these circumstances, General Chamberlin believed, US policy objectives were not stated with "sufficient breadth to guide the Department of the Army through successive situations pyramiding in seriousness." To remedy this deficiency, he assumed that the US objective was "to assure the survival of Greece as a fully independent democratic nation," first because of "our traditional policy of allowing or assisting any country to choose its own government free from coercion," and second because "totalitarian regimes imposed on the people of Greece by aggression undermine the security of the United States." To meet this assumed objective, in General Chamberlin's opinion, the United States had only two alternatives: to get out of Greece; or to stay and commit the means to win.

Turning to an estimate of the current situation in Greece, General Chamberlin assessed the insurgent force as consisting of some 17,000 "regular" troops, 5,000 partisans in Greece, and another 5,000 in neighboring countries. The recruitment rate he estimated at 1,000 per month. In quality, these forces were well trained and equipped with infantry weapons and ably and aggressively led through battalion level. But higher staffs were inadequate, there was a complete lack of aviation and artillery, and communications and logistics were weak.

To combat these insurgent forces, the Greek Government had at its disposal an army with a current authorized strength of 140,000 and consisting of 4 field and 3 mountain divisions. Personnel were generally well-trained but lacked offensive spirit. The larger units had not been adequately trained. A major operational liability of this army was deployment of more than half of its maneuver battalions on static or semi-static guard duty, thereby severely limiting its offensive capabilities. As a remedy for this situation, the Greek Government proposed to organize 100 home guard battalions to take over the security duties. The Royal Hellenic Air Force consisted of 5,772 personnel and 107 operational aircraft, including two squadrons of Spitfire fighters and one of Dakota transports. Qualifications, training and experience of pilots were excellent.

General Chamberlin believed that elimination or reduction of the insurgent forces to negligible proportions was essential to the success of the US economic aid program. But they could not be eliminated without a revitalization of the Greek National Army, a task that could be accomplished by three measures: (1) organization of a Home Guard, as already planned; (2) provision of high-level US operational guidance to overcome political influence on the Greek high command; and (3) assignment of US observers to lower echelons in order to overcome inertia and stimulate aggressive offensive action against the insurgents.

The US Army Group, Greece (USAGG), General Chamberlin warned, was not a suitable agency for furnishing operational guidance because it was a component of AMAG and was therefore not subject to control by the duly constituted US military authorities. A separate military agency was required, nominally responsible to the senior representative of the US Government in Greece but reporting directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

On the basis of these findings General Chamberlin made the following recommendations: that efforts be directed to obtaining a broad definition of US objectives in Greece at the highest level; that the United States approve and fund 50 Home Guard battalions; and that there be established in Greece a US Advisory and Planning Group under nominal control of the Ambassador but reporting directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This group would, upon request, furnish high-level military advice, coordinated with the British, to the Greek Government and its armed forces. It would also advise the US Ambassador, the Chief of the Aid Mission and the US Armed Forces. General Chamberlin recommended also that US observers, responsible to the Joint Advisory and Planning Group, be assigned Greek Army units with the mission of "energizing operational action, restoring the offensive spirit, and advising on planning and operations."[20]

On the initiative of the Acting Secretary of State, General Chamberlin's report was considered by the National Security Council on 27 October. The Council agreed that an advisory and planning group should be established to provide advice to the Greek forces from high command down to and including the division level. This group should be a part of AMAG but with direct communication to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In carrying out his advisory functions, the head of the group would for the most part be free to make military decisions on his own responsibility. However, military decisions involving "high policy" would be referred through the Chief of AMAG to the Ambassador. High policy matters were those involving political considerations, such as actions by US representatives, to bring about changes in the Greek cabinet or military high command; any proposals for substantial increases or decreases in the Greek armed forces; disagreements with Greek or British authorities that might impair cooperation between US, British, and Greek officials; major questions involving Greek relations with the UN or foreign nations; major questions of Greek policies of punishment or amnesties; and any matters relating to Greek internal politics.

The Council recognized also that the current aid program, scheduled to expire on 30 June 1948, could not assure the realization of US goals in Greece. Accordingly, the members agreed that the Secretary of State, subject to approval by the President, would make a strong recommendation to Congress at an appropriate time that assistance to Greece continue beyond the expiration of the current program.[21]

President Truman approved these recommendations on 3 November. Secretary Marshall asked Secretary Forrestal to take steps to form and dispatch the advisory group. Because it was to include representatives of all three Services, Secretary Forrestal delegated responsibility for its formation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[22]

Up to this point, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not been formally consulted on the matters discussed by General Chamberlin. The Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC), however, had undertaken on its own initiative to prepare recommendations as to the size, composition, terms of reference, and functions of the proposed advisory group.[23]

Upon receipt of Secretary Forrestal's directive, the Joint Chiefs of Staff completed the action begun by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee and, on 2 December, forwarded their recommendations to him. After minor amendment to accommodate the views of the Services, the Secretaries of the Army, Air Force, and Navy issued the recommended directive governing the establishment and operation of the Joint US Military Advisory and Planning Group in Greece (JUSMAPG) on 31 December. In conformity with the President's instructions, the JUSMAPG was made a component of AMAG but with the authority to report directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Director, JUSMAPG, was to be designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The principal functions of JUSMAPG were to formulate plans for the employment and coordination of the Greek armed forces and to furnish them and the Greek Government with operational advice. The JUSMAPG was also to advise the US Ambassador, the Chief, AMAG, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military situation in Greece and the employment of Greek military forces.[24]

In sending their recommendations to Secretary Forrestal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff nominated Major General William G. Livesay, USA, who was then Commanding General of US Army Group, Greece, as Director of JUSMAPG. Secretary of State Marshall concluded, however, that it was urgent to name a more impressive personality to head the US military program in Greece. With the concurrence of General Eisenhower, he recommended to the President that Major General James A. Van Fleet, "one of the outstanding aggressive fighting corps commanders of the campaign in Europe," be promoted to Lieutenant General and designated Director, JUSMAPG, and Commanding General, USAGG. With President Truman's approval, this appointment was made on 5 February.[25]

Action to support a substantial home guard to relieve regular Greek forces from static security duties was already under way when General Chamberlin submitted his report. On 29 October, the Department of State approved the application of $6 million in aid funds to support 32 National Defense Corps battalions in lieu of a 10,000-man increase in the regular army. And on 30 December the Department, acting on recommendations by General Livesay and the Department of the Army, approved support of an additional 68 battalions, for a total National Defense Corps of 100 battalions. The Department also, in a reversal of its earlier position, agreed to support a permanent increase of 12,000 men in the regular army. The cost of these increases, estimated at $15 million, was to be met by transferring funds from civilian projects.[26]

By February 1948, the administration judged the time appropriate to seek additional funds for Greece and Turkey and requested $275 million for the period ending 30 June 1949. Congress, on 3 April 1948, authorized this amount in the Greek-Turkish Assistance Act of 1948; however, only $225 million was appropriated. Of this amount, the administration allocated $150 million to Greece.

During the period in which these events took place there had been two changes in the membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Fleet Admiral Nimitz retired as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) on 15 December, to be replaced by Admiral Louis Denfeld. Unlike his predecessor, the new CNO had not achieved a great reputation during World War II as a combat or theater commander. He had served as Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for most of the war and com-

manded a battleship division for a short time near the end of that conflict. After the war, Admiral Denfeld returned to the Bureau of Personnel, where he served as Chief until March 1947; he then became Commander in Chief Pacific, a position he continued to hold until his appointment as CNO. On 7 February, General Eisenhower followed his colleague Admiral Nimitz into retirement, to be succeeded by General Omar N. Bradley. Known as the "G. I.'s General," the new Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) had been one of the outstanding combat commanders of World War II. He had commanded successively a corps, an army, and an army group in North Africa, Sicily, and Germany.[27]

NSC 5: The Question of Deploying US Forces to Greece

No amount of military advice, no matter how soundly based, was likely by itself to attain the goal sought by the United States in Greece—the establishment of a stable and prosperous democracy. The "American Paper" had stressed the strategic importance of Greece. In a report submitted to the Council on 6 January 1948, designated NSC 5, the NSC Staff proposed a wide variety of decisions and preparatory actions intended to protect the US interest in Greece. The major ones were the following: be prepared to send armed forces to Greece or elsewhere in the Mediterranean if necessary to prevent Greece from falling the victim to direct or indirect aggression; assign the Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM), responsibility for making recommendations direct to the US Government on overall military policy with regard to Greece and other communist-threatened areas in his theater, and on economic and political matters; direct him to coordinate military activities in the Eastern Mediterranean by advising and assisting the Chiefs of Mission in countries of the area; and appoint a single director of all US activities in Greece.[28]

In keeping with his usual procedure at that time, Secretary Forrestal made an "informal request" to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment. They responded on 6 January, objecting to the proposed new duties for CINCNELM as unsound and confusing because the resulting lack of clear lines of authority would be embarassing to all concerned. The naming of a single director responsible for all US activities in Greece, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated, was the "most logical step to improve our position in Greece at the present time. . . ."

Of greatest concern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff was the suggestion that US military forces might be dispatched to Greece. Acting on their own initiative, they had already directed a study of the problem by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) in connection with the British announcement of troop withdrawals. The conclusions of this study were that the United States was not capable of deploying sufficient armed forces to Greece to defeat a combined attack by Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. Any US force sent should therefore be small. It should be solely for the purposes of stiffening morale of the Greeks and of contributing to stability in areas where it was stationed.[29]

In replying to Secretary Forrestal on 6 January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff chose not to discuss the roles that US troops might play in Greece or the size of the force required to meet various contingencies. They limited their response to a repetition of the warning they had given on 19 November 1947 concerning the Middle East–Eastern Mediterranean area as a whole:

a. Any additional deployment of United States armed forces to this area will, in view of our present extended position, automatically raise the question of the advisability of partial mobilization, and

b. Any deployment of appreciable military strength in this area will make a partial mobilization necessary.[30]

Within the Department of State, there were those who seemed less hesitant than the Joint Chiefs of Staff about committing US forces to Greece. Mr. Loy Henderson, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, commenting on NSC 5 on 9 January to the Secretary of State, stated his conviction that a failure of the United States to convince the Soviet Union, its satellites, and the Greek people of its determination to prevent the Soviet conquest of Greece would lead to the most serious consequences. "Either Greece and the whole Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, not to speak of Europe, will be lost to the Western world," he wrote, "or the neighbors of Greece will have gone so far before realizing the extent of our determination that they cannot draw back and there will be the beginnings of a new World War." It was therefore essential that a decision be made at once that the United States Government would be prepared to send armed forces to Greece if that country was in "grave danger and . . . [if] the presence of our forces might save her." Among the possible missions for US troops would be to garrison or protect parts of Greece, to seal off certain valleys which hostile forces might use in entering Greece from abroad, or to carry out maneuvers designed to deter the northern neighbors of Greece from attempting an armed coup such as the sudden occupation of Thrace by Bulgarian troops.[31]

Secretary Marshall, however, felt that a decision on commitment of US troops to Greece was premature. His views were presented to the National Security Council by Under Secretary Lovett during debate on NSC 5 on 13 January. Before the matter could be decided, in Secretary Marshall's view, there would have to be a definition of the purpose of any action involving armed forces, an assessment of force and logistics requirements, and an estimate of the probable effects on US domestic economy and public opinion. A redraft of NSC 5, prepared by the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, was introduced in the meeting. It indicated the State Department view of the conditions that should be met before US military forces were sent to Greece. It would "have to be clear" that Greek independence could not be preserved without these forces; the forces to be sent must be capable of accomplishing the mission at hand; the size of the force must be carefully considered in the light of other commitments; and withdrawal of the force should be feasible within a reasonable time without prejudice to the objective for which it had been committed and without detriment to US prestige.

With regard to US representation in Greece, Mr. Lovett concluded that no changes were necessary. The Council agreed and deleted from NSC 5 the proposals for added responsibilities for CINCNELM and for appointing a single director for all US activities in Greece. The Council then returned the paper to the staff for revision in the light of the Policy Planning Staff version and the discussion in the meeting.[32]

The NSC Staff submitted its redraft, designated NSC 5/1, to the Council on 3 February. After rejecting termination of aid as unacceptable because of adverse political effects, the staff reiterated the conclusion in the initial draft: the policy of the United States should be to "make full use of its political, economic and if necessary, military power... to prevent Greece from falling under the domination of the USSR either through external armed attack or through Soviet-dominated Communist movements within Greece, so long as the legally elected government of Greece evidences a determination to oppose such communist aggression."

The uses of military power would include one or more of the following: deployment of a token force; commitment of available forces to take necessary action to defeat the communists in Greece; strengthening of forces in the Mediterranean outside Greece; or initiation of partial mobilization as an indication of determination to resist communist expansion.

The NSC Staff did not adopt the limitations on the use of military force proposed by the State Department Policy Planning Staff, nor did it accept the JCS view that deployment of more than token US forces to Greece would make partial mobilization necessary. Partial mobilization in the NSC Staff draft was a measure additional to force deployments and not a prerequisite to them. A decision to use military power, however, should await further expressions of view by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State, the National Security Resources Board, and the Central Intelligence Agency.[33]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, commenting on NSC 5/1 at Secretary Forrestal's request, informed him that the parts of the new paper having military implications were identical to the original in substance if not in words. Their views on it, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, therefore remained unchanged.[34]

This reiteration of views by the Joint Chiefs of Staff had no apparent effect; the National Security Council adopted the revised draft with only minor changes, none of which affected the matters of JCS concern. The President approved the conclusions of the revised paper, now designated NSC 5/2, on 16 February.[35]

Following President Truman's approval, the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council solicited the views of the appropriate departments and agencies on the commitment of US military forces to Greece, as called for by NSC 5/2.[36]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their reply on 19 April, not only reiterated the views they had expressed on NSC 5 and NSC 5/1 but also broadened the scope of their comments. "The overall world situation," they warned, "has deteriorated to such a degree as to dictate the necessity for strengthening immediately the potential of our National Military Establishment. Some form of compulsory military service will be required to attain additional strength and should be initiated at once."[37] It should, they added, be accompanied by increased appropriations necessary for "strengthening the potential of our National Military Establishment

in all respects" and by statutory authorization for civilian and industrial mobilization comparable to that in effect during World War II. Until these steps had been taken, the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned, every effort should be made to "avoid military commitment with implications extending to likelihood of major military involvement."

With respect to the situation in Greece, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended against the commitment of any US military forces there unless: (1) it was clearly understood by all concerned that the United States was ready and able to back them up to a reasonable extent; (2) intelligence indicated the Soviet Union or its satellites would not respond by overt military action; and (3) the United States had decided not to take military action elsewhere. To commit token forces would accomplish little; they could not be fully supported with currently available resources. The current aid program should suffice for the defeat of the communist guerrilla forces unless the Soviet Union or her satellites intervened with their armed forces. If by the end of the year the communists had still not been defeated, a decision could be made at that time whether to deploy US forces, taking into account the factors already listed.[38]

State Department representatives gave the opinion that the American people and Congress would support the employment of US forces in Greece if it had been already demonstrated to be in the national interest and in conformity with the basic principles of the United Nations.

The CIA judgment was that: a token force would be helpful but not decisive; a substantial force would assure the pacification of Greece and would probably not provoke the Soviet Union to open war; and the strengthening of US forces in the Mediterranean would ameliorate the situation in Greece to some extent and might cause the Soviets to reconsider their current policies. Partial mobilization, the CIA believed, would have no direct effect in Greece but would reassure friendly countries in Europe and the Middle East and might cause the Kremlin to reappraise its policies.

The National Security Resources Board agreed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that necessary statutory authorization for civilian and industrial readiness should be invoked as necessary.[39]

The expression of views on 19 April was one of the last JCS actions in which General Spaatz participated. He retired on 30 April and was replaced as Air Force Chief of Staff by General Hoyt S. Vandenberg. Like General Bradley, General Vandenberg had been an outstanding World War II combat commander. The two men had, in fact, been close associates in the campaigns in Western Europe, where Vandenberg's Ninth Air Force had given tactical support to Bradley's 12th Army Group.

Military Operations: Successes and Failures

By late May 1948, when the NSC Staff received these views, US officials took a much more optimistic view of the Greek situation than had been the case the

previous February when NSC 5/2 had been approved. At that time the Greek National Army, which was dispersed in static positions and seemed to be lacking in offensive spirit, was given little chance of success. In the ensuing months, however, the US aid program had, it appeared, achieved notable results.

This state of affairs to a large degree was the result of measures undertaken by JUSMAPG under the leadership of General Van Fleet. He had assumed his new duties on 24 February and quickly undertook a series of actions to improve the fighting qualities and tactics of the Greek armed forces. The day following his arrival, the National Defense Council met at General Van Fleet's request and, on his recommvndation, designated the Chief of the Greek National General Staff as Commander of the Greek National Army with broad powers to plan and conduct operations against the communist insurgents. By the end of March he and Mr. Griswold had persuaded the Greek Government to retire incompetent senior officers and promote deserving juniors. General Van Fleet also made frequent trips in the company of Lieutenant General Yiadis, the Greek Chief of Staff, to command posts in the field down to and including division level. During these trips and at every opportunity, he stressed the importance of seizing the initiative. The activation of the home guard battalions, or National Defense Corps, authorized the previous October, and their assumption of the mission of static defense, made regular army formations available for offensive operations.

To give form and direction to an offensive strategy, the JUSMAPG worked closely with the Greek general staff to draw up plans for a spring offensive and assigned advisers to Greek units down through division level to aid in carrying them out. Two major operations, DAWN and CROWN, comprised the spring offensive. The former, employing three divisions, was designed to envelop and destroy an insurgent force estimated at about 2,000 and located in the Roumeli area of east central Greece. The latter, a six-division operation, was directed against the main insurgent base area in the Grammos Mountains on the Albanian border.[40] By the end of March, General Van Fleet reported optimistically to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, unless the Soviet Union or its satellites intervened, the insurrection in Greece would be crushed by the end of the year.[41]

DAWN, which began on 15 April and ended on 20 May, was an auspicious beginning for the spring offensive. Greek National Army units achieved their objective of destroying enemy forces in the area, claiming to have killed, wounded, or captured a total of 2,602 enemy troops.[42]

Another cause for optimism was the failure of neighboring Soviet satellite states to provide aid to the Greek insurgents on the scale that their apparent preparations could have supported. This default, in the opinion of the NSC Staff, was probably a deliberate policy of the Soviet Union. It caused misgivings among the insurgents, by suggesting that the Soviet Government was merely exploiting them to impose economic attrition on the United States.[43]

In light of these favorable developments and of the views submitted by the departments and agencies, the National Security Council on 3 June concluded that the United States should not send armed forces of any size to Greece at that time, but that the Council should reconsider the question if the situation deteriorated. Decisions as to the strengthening of US forces in the Mediterranean area

and the initiation of partial mobilization should be made in the light of the world situation and not primarily as a response to the situation in Greece. President Truman approved these conclusions on 21 June.[44]

The operational forecasts underlying these policy decisions unfortunately proved overly optimistic, and by autumn of 1948 it was apparent that General Van Fleet's prediction of an end to the insurgency in 1948 would not be attained. CROWN, the operation intended to destroy the Grammos Mountain base area and thus break the back of the insurgency, jumped off on 16 June. Following about two months of hard fighting, the Greek National Army succeeded in occupying the entire area, but the insurgent forces retreated intact into Albania. After regrouping and receiving fresh supplies, they recrossed the border and established a stronghold near the border town of Vitsi. Attempts by the Greek National Army, undertaken during September and October, to reduce this position were repulsed. By October, offensive operations had halted.[45]

This was the state of affairs on the battlefield when Secretary of State Marshall visited Greece in mid-October. He found flagging morale among some members of the AMAG and in the Greek Army—the result of the failure of the CROWN operation and of the feeling that no conclusion to the insurrection was in sight so long as Albania and Yugoslavia offered sanctuary to the insurgents. The Greek troops were tired and despondent over the gloomy prospects for the future.

In these circumstances, Secretary Marshall gave his support to a proposal by General Van Fleet for an increase of 15,000 men in the Greek Army. This would be an "overage" and would not be used to form new units. It would permit the retirement of some older men and the relief of other men from combat duty, while at the same time avoiding the cost to the United States of equipping new units.[46]

The Department of State and the National Military Establishment having determined that funds were available from the existing appropriation for military aid to Greece, the 15,000-man increase in the Greek National Army was approved. The Royal Hellenic Air Force also received an increase of 700 officers and men.[47] These modest increases in the Greek Army and Air Force served to improve combat capability to some degree, but it was obvious that military victory over the insurgent forces was highly unlikely before the current US aid program expired on 30 June 1949. Clearly further assistance to Greece would be necessary if the US goals for that country were to be achieved.

Continuation of Military Assistance for Greece

Consideration of continued military aid to Greece began in October and looked beyond immediate needs of the counterinsurgency operations. On 15 October, the State Department member of SANACC recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be asked to define any long-range US strategic interests in the military establishments of Greece and Turkey that would justify military assistance to them for a period longer than the current emergency. This request was duly passed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[48]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, replying on 24 November 1948, pointed out that, so long as the Soviet Union pursued its expansionist policies, the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East was of critical importance to the United States. Greece and Turkey, because of their geographical positions, stood in the way of Soviet expansion southward into this region. To prevent Soviet control or domination of these countries therefore was "highly important" to US national security interests.

Greece, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, lacked the military and economic strength to withstand attack by the Soviet Union or her satellites, even if furnished considerable military aid. The long-range US strategic interest in the military establishment of Greece was therefore as follows:

> A Greek military establishment capable of maintaining internal security in order to avoid the Communist domination of Greece.[49]

General Van Fleet, meanwhile, had submitted alternate FY 1950 budgets for military assistance to Greece of $450 and $541 million. These figures did not find favor with the US Ambassador to Greece, Mr. Henry F. Grady. He saw them as an attempt to solve the insurgent problem simply by creating larger forces, an approach that he considered militarily ineffective and likely to impose an insupportable burden on the Greek economy. He recommended a maximum of $150 million. The Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and State also found General Van Fleet's budget unacceptable but raised the Ambassador's figure to $200 million.[50]

General Van Fleet prepared a budget in this amount, which was approved by Ambassador Grady and forwarded to Washington where it was approved by the Department of State, along with a similar submission by the Ambassador to Turkey for $100 million, for presentation to the Bureau of the Budget. The Department of State sought the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense in this program. Secretary Forrestal, however, first sought the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asking them to recommend the allocation of $300 million in aid for Greece and Turkey between the two countries and among their Armed Services.[51]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 20 December. They chose not to recommend a reapportionment of the total $300 million but accepted the State Department's allocation of $200 million for Greece and $100 million for Turkey. They recommended that the money for Greece be allocated as follows: Army, $165 million; Navy, $10 million; Air Force, $25 million. In submitting these figures, the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned that they were inadequate to maintain operations at their present scale.[52]

The military aid program for Greece was incorporated into a comprehensive one approved by the Truman administration early in 1949, in connection with the establishment of the North Atlantic Alliance. Guidelines for a single program embracing all aid recipients were laid down in February 1949 by an interdepartmental group known as the Foreign Assistance Coordinating Committee (FACC). It operated under the direction of a Foreign Assistance Steering Committee (FASC), consisting of Secretaries Marshall and Forrestal and Economic Coopera-

tion Administration (ECA) Administrator Paul Hoffman. Under the FACC proposals, countries scheduled for military assistance were grouped into three priority categories, and the amount of aid that each was to receive was defined broadly as "substantial," "limited," or "token." Greece was placed in Priority II as a recipient of "limited" aid, which was defined as the amount needed to ensure internal security and to enable the performance of limited military missions.[53]

Specific dollar amounts for each country in the FACC program were initially recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For Greece, they simply proposed the $200 million program they had recommended on 20 December 1948.[54] The JCS recommendations for all countries totalled almost $1.8 billion. The FACC reduced the total to $1.45 billion and, in the process, cut back Greece to $178.16 million, while allowing $102.3 million for Turkey.[55] The legislation finally enacted in October 1949 (the Mutual Defense Assistance Act) limited Greece and Turkey to a combined total of $211.37 million. At the request of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff allocated $130.05 million to Greece, dividing it among the Greek armed forces as follows: Army, $106.45 million; Navy, $7.9 million; and Air Force, $15.7 million.[56]

Final Victory in Greece

The major question raised by the reduction in the money sought for Greece by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was whether the Greek armed forces could defeat the insurrection without significant reinforcement. By late October 1949, when the military aid program for FY 1950 was finally approved, the issue had largely been resolved on the battlefield in favor of the government. But in the winter and spring of 1949, when the Truman administration was making its basic decision on the level of military aid to Greece, the outcome was still in doubt.

The British Government espoused the view that the Greek forces, at their existing size, could not defeat the insurgency. This view was expressed in a report by Field Marshal Sir William J. Slim, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, which was endorsed by the British Chiefs of Staff and the British Defense Committee. Field Marshal Slim maintained that an increase in the Greek armed forces was necessary because the alternative, an improvement in the quality of the existing forces, was not attainable. A large increase—from 8 to 14 or 15 divisions—had been recommended by the heads of the US and British Missions, but, General Slim recognized, was not feasible because of the reluctance of the United States to finance it. A modest increase, however, would provide the necessary margin for victory in 1949 to 1950. He recommended increases of one infantry division, two infantry pursuit groups, two fighter bomber squadrons and one reconnaissance squadron.[57]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, to whom the British Chiefs of Staff referred this document in the hope of obtaining US approval for its recommendations, found little merit in them. Replying on 11 May 1949, they countered that the proposed reinforcements were unnecessary, were too expensive, and would not become available

for operations until the summer of 1950. If external aid to the insurgents did not appreciably increase, the present Greek Government forces, under effective leadership, should be able to establish a reasonable degree of law and order within one year. The estimated cost of $43 million would probably not be acceptable to the US Government, and the new units could not be ready for combat until 1950.[58]

The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff proved not only correct but actually overly conservative. Under the leadership of Field Marshal Alexandros Papagos, a hero of World War II recalled to active duty and invested with broad powers over organization and operations, the Greek armed forces launched offensives, designated ROCKET and TORCH, that resulted in defeat of the communist insurgents by the end of August 1949. This was a landmark victory, involving the first postwar combat between communist and pro-Western forces. Several important factors contributed to the outcome. One was disaffection between communist and national elements within the ranks of the insurgents, which weakened their effectiveness. Another was the closing of the Yugoslav border in July 1949 by Marshal Tito as a consequence of his split with the Soviet Union and his expulsion from the Information Bureau of the Workers' and Communist Parties (COMINFORM).[59] But there can be little doubt of the enormous significance of the moral support and tangible assistance, economic and military, that the United States provided to the Greek Government during its most desperate period.

Strengthening Anti-Communist Forces in Italy

Unlike the situation in Greece where civil war was in progress, in the summer of 1947 the contest in Italy between communist and anti-communist groups was still being waged by legitimate political means. Nevertheless, the struggle between a powerful Italian communist element and more democratic political groups for control of the governmental machinery had become intense.

Alarmed at the situation, the National Security Council, at its first meeting on 26 September, directed its Staff to assess and appraise the position of the United States with respect to Italy. The Staff, in its report, NSC 1, submitted on 15 October 1947, found that Italy, because of its strategic position astride the lines of communication through the Mediterranean, was of primary security interest to the United States. To preserve this interest, the NSC Staff view was that the basic objective of the United States in Italy should be to preserve that country as an "independent, democratic state, friendly to the United States, and capable of effective participation in the resistance to communist expansion."

The Italian Government was ideologically inclined toward Western democracy, the NSC Staff reported, but it was weak and under continuous attack by a strong Communist Party which had been excluded from the government only the previous June. Resentful of this exclusion, the communists were exerting strong pressure to regain lost ground and to gain the ultimate goal of a communist Italy aligned with the Soviet Union.

Italian armed forces, while strong enough to prevent total communist seizure of power by force, might not be able to prevent communist control of the northern part of the country. United States and British occupation troops, which might serve to deter this result, were required by the peace treaty that had gone into effect on 15 September to withdraw by 15 December 1947.

To protect US security interests in Italy, the NSC Staff concluded, measures should be undertaken without delay. These measures should include various manifestations of political support and extensions of economic assistance to the present Italian Government or equally satisfactory successor governments. The NSC Staff also concluded that the US Government should assist the Italian armed forces by transferring military equipment to them.

In the event that a communist-dominated government came to power in all or part of Italy by illegal means, the United States should, among other measures, extend the strategic deployment of US armed forces in Italy and other parts of the Mediterranean. To facilitate this extension, the US should seek the use of Italian air and naval bases remaining under the control of a noncommunist government. Steps should be taken now to acquire use of the air bases for training.[60]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, to whom the Secretary of Defense referred NSC 1 on an informal basis, replied on 30 October that, while they were in general agreement with its military provisions, they felt it necessary to point out the limited capabilities of US military forces for action in the Mediterranean. There was no surplus of military equipment for transfer from US to Italian forces. There were only three divisions (two Marine and one Army) available for immediate deployment to meet additional requirements over and above present commitments (although another Army division could be made available in two or three weeks). The Navy and Air Force were in better shape, both having the capability of dealing with any opposition in the Mediterranean, unless opposed by major Soviet air strength. There was, in addition, a potential danger in committing US forces to action in the Eastern and Central Mediterranean unless the United States had first received assurance of passage through the Straits of Gibraltar.[61]

The NSC, on 14 November, adopted a version of NSC 1 revised to accommodate the JCS views at least in part. The new document, designated NSC 1/1, provided that assistance to the Italian armed forces would be limited to the provision of technical advice. The transfer of surplus equipment, which the JCS had said was not available, was no longer included. However, the Council agreed that the possibility of providing surplus equipment would be investigated further. The "extension of strategic disposition" of US forces cautioned against by the Joint Chiefs of Staff remained a part of the revised paper. The President approved the NSC conclusions and directed their implementation on 24 November.[62]

The further examination of the transfer of weapons and equipment from US to Italian armed forces began with the submission by the Italian military authorities of a list of the required equipment, which consisted of infantry items plus a limited number of armored cars and light tanks. Commenting on the matter, the US Ambassador in Rome advised the State Department that the equipment appeared to be necessary. According to Italian military sources, he said, the

communists were losing ground politically and were therefore preparing for action by force. The Italian Army and police were not equipped to deal with such a situation.[63]

The matter was studied by the SANACC, which, on 9 February 1948, submitted an interim report recommending that the President direct the transfer to Italy of all or part of the equipment requested by the Italian Government on a reimbursable basis. The National Security Council adopted this recommendation on 12 February and recommended to President Truman that he direct its implementation. The President approved the transfer on 13 February.[64]

The NSC Staff, meanwhile, had reassessed developments in Italy and on 10 February had issued a report for the Council (NSC 1/2) attributing the communist strength in Italy to the nation's economic distress. The Staff warned that failure to implement the European Recovery Program (ERP) before expiration of US interim aid on 31 March might lead to communist participation in the government after the April elections. Communist failure to achieve such an electoral success, combined with implementation of ERP, might induce the Soviet Government to order an armed insurrection in Italy as a final effort to prevent economic recovery under a Western-oriented regime.

Echoing the conclusions of the SANACC, the NSC Staff expressed doubt as to the ability of the Italian armed forces to cope with an insurrection because of deficiencies in arms and equipment. The Staff concluded, therefore, that everything feasible should be done to supply the necessary items and to furnish technical advice. In the event that the communists succeeded by force or other illegal means in gaining control of part of Italy, more drastic military measures would be required. It would then be necessary to strengthen the US military establishment, to reinforce US forces in the Mediterranean, and to be prepared to deploy forces to Sardinia, Sicily, or government-controlled portions of peninsular Italy upon request of the Italian authorities. These deployments should be subject to a JCS decision that they were militarily sound.[65]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, commenting on NSC 1/2 at the request of the Secretary of Defense on 19 February, advised him that shipments of US arms and equipment could not reach Italy before the April elections. Moreover, such shipments could only be made at the expense of the programs for Greece and Turkey. With regard to reinforcements for US forces in the Mediterranean, additional naval and air units could readily be deployed without a dangerous lowering of available reserve forces. Any further deployment of ground forces, however, would require a partial mobilization. Deployment of US forces to peninsular Italy, Sicily, or Sardinia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned, would entail serious risks of global warfare and should be preceded by complete mobilization.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, finally, warned against the over-commitment of US military resources. It was, they said, "unrealistic to conclude that the United States should . . . make full use of its military power to prevent Italy from falling under the domination of the USSR, unless the United States has available sufficient military forces to accomplish this objective." This was particularly true

because "identical conclusions have been approved concerning the use of these same limited forces in other areas to accomplish like objectives."[66]

The priorities for deliveries of military equipment had already been resolved in favor of Greece and Turkey before the two JCS memorandums were sent. Writing to Secretary Forrestal on 17 February, Under Secretary of State Lovett stated that, on the basis of information received from the Department of the Army that equipment could not arrive in Italy before the elections, there was no point in giving shipments to Italy before the elections, and there was no point in giving shipments to Italy priority over those to Greece and Turkey. But because of commitments to the Italian Government and the psychological importance to it of assurances of US assistance, the deliveries should be made as soon as possible without interfering with the programs for Greece and Turkey.[67]

In a subsequent study of the Italian situation (NSC 1/3, 8 March 1948), the NSC Staff looked at the political situation and considered the possibility that the communists might win "participation" in the Italian Government or even attain outright domination. On the basis of current trends in the electoral campaign, the first of these was judged as "not improbable." The second might be brought about through the usual communist methods of infiltration and domination of key ministries, the police, and the armed forces.

As military measures to deal with the first contingency, NSC 1/3 provided for reinforcing US forces in the Mediterranean, strengthening the potential of the US Defense Establishment, and delivering US military supplies only to noncommunist elements. Military measures to deal with the second contingency included further deployments to the Mediterranean, initiation of combined staff talks with selected nations, and a limited mobilization.[68]

Once again, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked to comment by the Secretary of Defense. They replied on 10 March 1948, confining their views to the military proposals. Problems involved in the deployment of additional forces to the Mediterranean or stationing them in Italy remained as stated in their views on NSC 1/2, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said. And mobilization, while desirable as a support for further ground force deployments to the Mediterranean, could not be expected to produce any substantial augmentation of combat strength for at least a year.

But Italy was only a part of an alarming worldwide situation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasized, that called for a prompt strengthening of the National Military Establishment, a condition that could only be achieved without long delay by some form of compulsory military service.[69]

The NSC adopted NSC 1/2 and 1/3 on 12 March, without revising either paper to accommodate JCS views except to specify that any deployment contemplated under the former would require partial mobilization. President Truman approved both papers on 15 March.[70] They apparently had little practical effect, except insofar as US policy furnished moral support that may have contributed to the decisive defeat of the Italian communists in the election of April 1948. It was not until more than a year later that military assistance for Italy became a reality under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, in which Italy was included along with other signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty.[71]

Aid to Turkey

Turkey, unlike Greece, was not in the throes of civil war. There was, therefore, no need to implement the Truman Doctrine by furnishing operational advice; the need was rather to strengthen Turkish armed forces through the provision of military supplies and equipment and the training of Turkish personnel. The first step in this program was the dispatch to Turkey of a survey team of Army, Navy, Air Force, and State Department personnel to advise the US Ambassador on the specific materiel requirements and organization of the Turkish armed forces, the training they should receive from the United States and the United Kingdom, and the nature and composition of any US mission required in Turkey. The decision to send the survey group was made by the Departments of State, War, and Navy, acting on the recommendations of SWNCC but without JCS participation.[72]

The group, headed by Major General Lunsford E. Oliver and Rear Admiral Ernest E. Herrman, arrived in Ankara on 22 May 1947 and spent more than a month surveying the Turkish military situation.[73] After receiving their conclusions, US Ambassador to Turkey Edwin C. Wilson reported to the Secretary of State on 15 July. The group believed that the Turkish forces, if rearmed with modern weapons, could probably hold off invading Soviet armies until British or American help arrived. The available funds (the $100 million authorized by PL 75) appeared insufficient to attain this result. However, the survey group submitted, and the Ambassador endorsed, a plan for using these funds, under which almost half ($48.5 million) would go to the Turkish Army; most of the rest would be divided among the other two services, with $10 million earmarked for road construction and improvement of arsenals. Separate Army, Navy, Air Force, and civilian missions were recommended to train the Turks in using and maintaining US equipment.[74] These recommendations met with the approval of the Departments of State, War, and Navy. The advisory groups, however, were consolidated into the American Mission for Aid to Turkey, with Ambassador Wilson as Chief.[75]

The activities of the military components of the Mission came under the general supervision of Major General Horace L. McBride, Chief of the Army Group, as Coordinator, Armed Forces Groups. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the concurrence of SWNCC, dispatched a letter to General McBride on 16 January 1948, instructing him to coordinate the activities of the three Service groups, each of which would advise and assist its corresponding component service in the Turkish armed forces. The object was to increase the effectiveness of the Turkish armed forces by ensuring proper utilization of the military equipment and supplies to be furnished under the aid program.[76]

To General McBride, these instructions seemed insufficient and on 19 February he asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for further guidance. He asked three questions: What part of the Turkish Armed Forces should the United States Mission plan to modernize with aid funds? How should these funds be apportioned among the Services? What priority should be given to financing highways, ports,

arsenals, and hydrographic surveys and mapping of bases for possible future use by the United States and its allies?[77]

For reasons not indicated in available sources, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not reply until 30 September 1948, when they informed General McBride that they were not in a position to tell him what portion of the Turkish armed forces should be modernized at US expense. This decision was one for the Turkish authorities, "assisted by broad guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the over-all apportionment of U.S. funds among the three services and aided further by advice from your Mission on the basis of your knowledge of local conditions, strategic considerations and other pertinent factors." The apportionment of funds should be substantially as follows: Army, 54 percent; Navy, 12.3 percent; and Air Force, 33.7 percent. Military aid funds should not be used for such projects as arsenal expansion or port and highway construction unless, in the opinion of the senior officer of the cognizant Service within the US Mission, such expenditure would make a greater military contribution than a similar expenditure for military equipment.[78]

With one exception, the details of provision of military equipment and training to the Turkish armed forces were carried out by the Service Departments without JCS participation. The exception was the establishment of a joint communications center for the Turkish armed forces, assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff because it required the participation of all the Services. Acting at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formed and instructed a survey party consisting of members nominated by the Services to study the matter. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the report of the survey party and transmitted its recommendations for the installation of communications facilities. These recommendations were approved by the Secretary of Defense.[79]

United States military assistance to Turkey was extended through 30 June 1949 by the appropriation of $225 million by Congress under the Greek-Turkish Assistance Act of 1948. Of this amount, $75 million was allocated to Turkey.[80]

When continuation of military assistance to Turkey through FY 1950 came under consideration, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were called upon to take an active part. It will be recalled that SANACC, on 15 October 1948, asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to define any long-term strategic interest the United States might have in the military establishments of Greece and Turkey that would justify continuing military assistance to them.[81] In their reply, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed the importance of retaining control of these two countries in friendly hands, so long as the Soviet Union persisted in its aggressive tendencies. Turkey, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded, had the capability, because of its "military potential,... high national spirit and geographic situation," to impose "appreciable delay and eventually, with continued U.S. aid, to offer strong resistance to invasion." The long-range US strategic interest in the military establishment of Turkey was, therefore, as follows:

A Turkish military establishment of sufficient size and effectiveness to insure Turkey's continued resistance to Soviet pressure; the development of combat effectiveness to the extent that any overt Soviet aggression can be delayed long

enough to permit the commitment of U.S. and allied forces in Turkey in order to deny certain portions of Turkey to the USSR.[82]

The Department of State, after consulting appropriate officers of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, requested that General McBride prepare a budget on the basis of an appropriation of $100 million. This budget was prepared, approved by the Ambassador to Turkey, and submitted to the Department of State, which accepted it as the basis for a request to the Bureau of the Budget in this amount. The Department requested the approval or recommendations of the Secretary of Defense on the proposal, as well as his recommendation on the allocation of the total sum among the Services.[83] Secretary Forrestal in turn passed this request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who endorsed the allocations recommended by General McBride and accepted by the Services. They accordingly recommended the following: Army, $54 million; Navy, $12.3 million; and Air Force, $33.7 million. These amounts, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out, were in the same percentages as had applied in the past fiscal year. Secretary Forrestal communicated his approval of these recommendations to the Secretary of State on 23 December.[84]

The two Departments were thus in agreement on the military assistance appropriations to be requested of Congress for FY 1950. President Truman was prepared to increase this amount. The consolidated aid program drafted in 1949 incorporated $102.3 million for Turkey. Congress, however, allowed only $211.37 million for Greece and Turkey combined, of which $130.05 million was allotted to Greece on recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[85] The remaining $81.12 million for Turkey was divided among the Services as follows:

Army	$41.90 million
Navy	8.84
Air Force	30.38
	$81.12 million[86]

Aid to Iran

In the postwar years Soviet pressure on Iran, an oil-rich southern neighbor of the Soviet Union that also bordered the oil-producing Middle East areas and the communications routes from Europe to South and East Asia, caused grave concern to the Truman administration. During World War II Soviet troops occupied the northern Iranian province of Azerbaijan. When they failed to leave after the war, a crisis developed because of American and British fears that the Soviet Union would attempt to control all of Iran and thereby threaten Turkey and the Arab Middle East. Faced with a united Anglo-American opposition in the UN Security Council, the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Iran.

To maintain a friendly and independent Iran became a goal of US foreign policy. One means taken to attain it was the furnishing of credit to Iran with which to purchase US surplus arms at prices substantially below replacement cost. This proposition was put to the Iranian Government on 26 November 1946 and

resulted finally in an agreement entered into on 20 June 1947 extending $25 million for this purpose.[87]

A decision to continue military aid to Iran and to place it on a grant basis was taken in connection with the consolidated military assistance program for FY 1950. The Foreign Assistance Coordinating Committee placed Iran in the second of three priority groups but proposed that it be granted only "token" military assistance, defined as aid sufficient to ensure the political orientation of the recipient towards the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, commenting at the request of the Secretary of Defense, found this program to be "generally sound" and offered various comments, none of which dealt with Iran.[88]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended specific military aid programs to the Secretary of Defense on their own initiative on 7 March. They found that Iran, because of her geographical position, would be of strategic importance to the United States in the event of war with the Soviet Union, and that the United States should maintain friendly relations with Iran, so as to stabilize the Iranian Government as a means to prevent communist encroachment. The long-range security objective of the United States should therefore be to supply the Iranian Army with such equipment and support "as would reasonably insure maintenance of internal security, a stabilized government, and the prevention of interference from outside forces, other than direct invasion." To this end, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the appropriation of $12.3 million for military assistance to Iran, divided among the Services as follows: Army, $10 million; Air Force, $2.3 million.[89]

The FACC increased the amount for Iran to $15.2 million in the consolidated $1.45 billion aid program that was approved by the administration in April 1949. Congress, however, provided only $211,370,000 to be shared by Iran along with Korea and the Philippines. Of this total, the Joint Chiefs of Staff set aside $10.45 million for Iran, of which $8.62 million would be for the Army and $1.83 million for the Air Force.

By the end of 1949, the US Government had reason to be satisfied that it had blunted Soviet expansionist drives in the Mediterranean and Middle East. In Greece the communist insurrection had been suppressed. In Italy the Communist Party had been defeated at the polls. In Turkey and Iran, modernization of their armed forces as a deterrent to Soviet pressures was under way. And these results had been achieved by a relatively small investment of US resources in military and economic assistance to the countries involved.

3

Palestine: US Middle East Policy at Cross Purposes

Palestine, an Arab country, was also the historic homeland of the Jews. It was a land with special importance to Christians and Moslems and, in more recent times, a scene of growing Arab nationalism. The question of its disposition in the postwar world was of a complexity that contributed much to negate the efforts of the United States to build an anti-Soviet buffer in the Middle East. By favoring the Jewish claim for a homeland in Palestine, the United States antagonized Arab opinion in spite of belated efforts to adopt a policy of "even-handedness" towards both groups. As a result, the Arab countries became increasingly hostile to the United States, and ultimately turned increasingly to the Soviet Union for military weapons and economic assistance.

Genesis of the Palestine Problem

The "Palestine problem" was essentially a conflict between Arabs and Jews for the same territory, a conflict that was exacerbated by the actions of the great powers and the disasters that befell the Jewish people during World War II. Until 1918, Palestine was a part of the Ottoman Empire; the population was predominantly Arab. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, anti-Semitic persecutions in Russia and elsewhere, plus the rise of the organized Zionist movement, brought about an increase in the pace of Jewish immigration to Palestine. The rising tide of Jewish immigrants created what was to become an irreconcilable conflict between rival Arab and Jewish communities, each attempting to establish a political state on the same territory.[1]

The victory of the Allied Powers in World War I ended Turkish rule over Palestine. It became a League of Nations mandate administered by the United Kingdom. The British had played the primary role in defeating the Turks, but

during the conflict they had made conflicting promises to the rival groups. To the Arabs they promised to support the independence of the former Turkish Asiatic provinces, except for those areas (Lebanon and Syria) claimed by France. To the Jews, by the so-called Balfour Declaration, they expressed sympathy for Jewish aspirations to reestablish a national home in Palestine. The charter of the League of Nations mandate specifically charged Great Britain with bringing about the establishment of a Jewish homeland.

During two decades of British rule, the conflict in Palestine was exacerbated. Jewish immigration and settlement accelerated, and Arab opposition to the Jewish presence crystallized into a Palestine Arab nationalist movement, which erupted into violence. In 1939, on the eve of World War II, the British issued a "White Paper" calling for the establishment of a joint Arab-Jewish state after 10 years, with limitations on Jewish immigration and land purchase during the interim. But this plan was unacceptable to the Jews and encouraged the Arabs to hold out for even greater concessions.

World War II, while it marked suspension of open hostilities in Palestine, immensely complicated the problem by creating vast numbers of displaced Jews in Europe, the victims of Hitler's policies and of the dislocations of war, to whom Europe no longer seemed to offer a congenial environment. The plight of these unfortunate refugees was to have a profound effect on US policy towards Palestine. Prior to 1945, the United States Government had not pursued an active Palestine policy, limiting its activity to general statements of sympathy with both sides. But in 1945, President Truman, moved by reports of the flight of Jewish refugees in Europe, urged British Prime Minister Attlee to admit 100,000 Jews to Palestine. Effective appeals by the Zionist organizations in the United States, combined with a general sympathy for the refugees, made President Truman's proposal popular with American citizens, who could perhaps hardly appreciate the possible effect of violent Arab hostility on the US strategic position in the Middle East. But it did not find favor with the British Government, which proposed instead an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. This body, duly constituted, submitted a report in which it rejected partition and proposed that Palestine should be neither an Arab nor a Jewish state; it should have the fullest measure of self-government consistent with the paramount principle that neither community should dominate the other. It also proposed continuation of the British mandate and admission of 100,000 Jews as soon as possible.

This plan was acceptable to President Truman, but he made no offer to share the task of implementing it. The omission did not find favor with Prime Minister Attlee, since the United Kingdom was not prepared to take on single-handedly the heavy burdens involved. An Anglo-American Cabinet Committee began meetings in London in July 1946 to consider implications of the plan. The result was the Morrison proposal for a federal Palestine of Jewish, Arab, and neutral provinces. The British Government announced its willingness to admit 100,000 Jews if both Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine accepted the Morrison Plan. But it was acceptable to neither. After further negotiations, the British in January 1947 made a final offer: a five-year British trusteeship with wide local autonomy; admission of 96,000 Jews for the first two years, after which the High

Commissioner would set the rate; independence if Arabs and Jews could agree; if not, the United Nations (UN) Trusteeship Council would be asked to propose a course of action.

When both Arabs and Jews rejected this plan, the British Government, having exhausted all alternatives, placed the problem before the United Nations on 2 April 1947. The General Assembly met in special session on 28 April to consider the British request. On 15 May the Assembly created the UN Special Committee on Palestine, composed of delegates from 11 minor states, to study the problem and make recommendations to the General Assembly. The Special Committee, reporting back on 31 August 1947, submitted a majority view recommending partition into separate Arab and Jewish states grouped into an economic union, and a minority position which called for a federal state consisting of Arab and Jewish provinces. The Special Committee report was placed on the agenda of the General Assembly for 16 September.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Oppose Partition

Within the US Government, opinions were divided on the solution to the Palestine problem. Elected officials tended to support partition, while the bureaucracy, military and diplomatic alike, were nearly unanimous in opposing it. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 10 October 1947, made their views unmistakably clear. Acting in the belief that the United States might be called upon to enforce partition, they volunteered a strong dissent to the Secretary of Defense. "A decision to partition Palestine, if the decision were supported by the United States," the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote, "would prejudice United States strategic interests in the Near and Middle East" to the point that "United States influence in the area would be curtailed to that which could be maintained by military force." There was also, they added, "grave danger that such a decision would result in... serious disturbances throughout the Near and Middle East.... As a consequence the USSR might replace the United States and Great Britain in influence and power throughout the area."

The strategic consequences of these adverse effects of the partition plan were outlined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with prophetic insight. Not only would a buffer area between the Soviet Union and "areas of great strategic importance to the United States and potential allies" be lost but access to vital supplies of oil in Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia would be prejudiced.[2] The result would be that, in case of war, the United States would have to fight an "oil-starved war" and would be incapable of "bringing to bear its maximum potential power against the USSR by hampering United States air and naval action, transportation ability and war production." It was therefore of "great strategic importance to the United States to retain the good will of the Arab and Moslem states. However, these states are strongly, if not violently, opposed to any solution of the Palestine problem involving partitioning of that state."

In the event that the General Assembly approved partition, as recommended by its Special Committee, the most desirable means of implementation would be

acceptance by Great Britain of sole responsibility for carrying it out. Other means, such as a multiple trusteeship including the Soviet Union or a bilateral US-UK trusteeship, the Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed as unacceptable. The former would "establish the interests of the USSR in the area"; the latter would require troop commitments that would "invalidate entirely current estimate of required strengths of the Army, Navy and Air Force," and would deprive the United States of the "extremely small strategic reserve it now possesses."[3]

Mr. Loy Henderson, Director of the State Department Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, had already expressed similar views to the Secretary of State on 22 September. Claiming to speak for "nearly every member of the Foreign Service or of the Department who has worked to any appreciable extent on Near Eastern problems," Mr. Henderson maintained that partition would undermine relations with the Arab world, would obligate the United States to contribute to its enforcement, and would be unworkable because it would not be acceptable to the Arabs.[4]

President Truman Decides for Partition

President Truman was not persuaded by these arguments. He recognized that, while the Jews generally favored the majority plan, the Arabs were extremely hostile to it. The proposed partition, however, calling as it did for economic union of the partitioned areas, could open the way for peaceful collaboration between the Arabs and Jews. Economic development under Jewish leadership could then be undertaken to the benefit of all inhabitants of the area, whether Jew or Arab. The partition plan would also redeem the pledge of the Balfour Declaration to establish the Jewish homeland and would rescue at least some of the victims of Nazism.[5]

So intense was Arab opposition to the partition plan that the Arab League Council instructed the governments of its member states to move troops to the Palestine border. President Truman learned of this development on 9 October 1947 but was undeterred; he ordered the Department of State to support the partition plan that was before the General Assembly.[6]

The General Assembly Votes for Partition

On 11 October, the Deputy US Representative informed the General Assembly that his government supported the basic recommendations of the partition plan but proposed certain modifications in detail. He also expressed the willingness of the United States to assist in the establishment of a constabulary for Palestine recruited on a volunteer basis by the UN.[7]

The Soviet delegate also announced that his government would support partition. Many ascribed this decision to a desire to diminish British influence in the

Middle East, which was predicated on friendship with the Arab states. The Soviets did not choose at this time, as they did later, to advance their interests by supporting the position of the Arab governments.

Following intensive maneuvering and debate, the General Assembly on 29 November 1947 voted 33 to 13 in favor of partition. The United States and the Soviet Union voted "yes." The United Kingdom abstained, and all six Arab States voted "no," giving some hint of troubles to come. Before the vote, six states that had indicated their intention to oppose partition were reportedly subjected to intensive lobbying from American sources.

The General Assembly plan called for division of Palestine into sovereign Arab and Jewish states, and a special internationalized Jerusalem as indicated on Map 1, all linked by an economic union. The proposed Jewish state was to encompass approximately 55 percent of the total land area and to contain a population of 498,000 Jews and 400,000 Arabs. The Arab state would have a population of 725,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews. The mandate was to terminate as soon as possible but not later than 1 August 1948; the new plan was to take effect by 1 October 1948. To supervise transition from mandate to independent status, a five-member Palestine Commission was established, composed of representatives of Denmark, Bolivia, Panama, Czechoslovakia, and the Philippines.

Any slim hope that partition might be accepted was immediately dashed when the Arab leadership condemned it and initiated guerrilla attacks on Jewish settlements. On 15 December, the British announced that the mandate would end as of 15 May 1948 but refused to cooperate with the UN Palestine Commission or even to allow it to enter Palestine until 1 May 1948. In these circumstances, the Commission, which had not been provided any means to enforce its decision, reported to the Security Council that it could not discharge its responsibilities.

The United States Advocates a UN Trusteeship

These developments provided an opportunity for those within the US Government who opposed partition to reassert their views and ultimately to achieve a reversal of policy. Secretary of Defense Forrestal addressed the subject in a paper stating that it would be unwise to allow the situation in Palestine to develop in such a way as to do "permanent injury to our relations with the Moslem world." He saw two potential danger points that might develop in the near future: a movement to give or sell arms to the Jews in Palestine; or pressures to force the United States to enforce the UN partition decision unilaterally. In view of these dangers, Secretary Forrestal proposed that the Secretary of State take up the matter with the President.

The Secretary of Defense showed this paper to Under Secretary of State Lovett on 21 January. Mr. Lovett agreed in general with the conclusions and in turn showed Secretary Forrestal a paper that had just come from the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. It concluded that the UN partition plan was not workable and that the United States should seek to have it withdrawn as soon as possible.[8]


PALESTINE
PLAN OF PARTITION
Recommended by
U.N. General Assembly
Jewish State
Arab State
City of Jerusalem
Railways
Scale of Miles
0 10 20 30 40 50
Beirut
LEBANON
SYRIA
Lake Tiberias
Jordan River
Pardess Hannah
Tel Aviv
Jaffa
Nablus
'Amman
Jerusalem
Mediterranean Sea
Dead Sea
Port Said
Rafah
Beersheba
Suez Canal
JORDAN
Negeb
Ismailia
EGYPT
N
Suez
0 20 40 60 80 100
Miles
Aqaba
Gulf of Suez
SINAI PENINSULA
Gulf of Aqaba
SAUDI ARABIA

Map 1

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, while they held similar views, chose not to reiterate them at this point, although Admiral Denfeld urged them to do so. On 7 February, he pointed out that the security situation in the Middle East was rapidly deteriorating and that the United States had already lost much good will among the Arabs by supporting partition. In response to the CNO's recommendation, the JSSC prepared a paper expressing the view that an effort by the United States to enforce the UN partition plan would lead to the results the United States should try to prevent: Arab hatred and consequent loss of oil; intrusion of the Soviets (under the cover of helping to enforce the UN plan); and a call on the United States to commit troops to Palestine. The Joint Chiefs of Staff chose not to forward these views but merely noted them.[9]

The Palestine Commission, in its first report to the Security Council on 16 February 1948, warned that, because of the disorders resulting from Arab refusal to accept partition, the General Assembly's resolution for partition could not be carried out without military force. Foreseeing that there would be a security vacuum when the mandate ended, the Commission urged prompt action by the Security Council to create a non-Palestinian security force.[10]

When the Security Council convened on 24 February, it had this report before it, as well as a request from the General Assembly to consider the Palestine situation as a threat to peace. The US Delegate, Ambassador Warren R. Austin, introduced a resolution endorsing the Assembly's action and establishing a committee of five permanent members to determine whether the existing situation in Palestine was a threat to peace. In this connection, he made a distinction between enforcing a political system, which the Council could not do under the Charter, and acting in the event of a breach of the peace, which it could do. The Security Council was cool to any enforcement of partition and rejected all the US proposals. The Council's only action was to request the permanent members to appeal for an end to violence in Palestine.[11]

By the time the Security Council met again on 19 March, the Truman administration had reversed its position. Ambassador Austin announced that his government now favored a temporary UN trusteeship over Palestine, since it had become evident that partition could not be carried out by peaceful means. He called on the Security Council to convene a special session of the General Assembly to establish a trusteeship. A resolution that he submitted for this purpose was approved by the Council.[12]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had not been consulted regarding the administration's decision to support trusteeship, but they found an opportunity to express their views on the military aspects of the new proposal shortly after it was introduced into the UN. On 2 April, the Secretary of State asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff three questions: (1) What outside military forces would be required to maintain law and order under a temporary trusteeship? (2) What nations should contribute forces and how large should each national contingent be? (3) What were the military implications of the introduction of this outside force?[13]

The State Department inquiry was discussed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary Forrestal on 4 April 1948. Mr. Dean Rusk, Director of State's Office of UN Affairs, explained that the trusteeship proposal assumed: (1) that responsible

Jewish and Arab leaders would accept it, and (2) that the United Kingdom would provide support. He warned that the proposal should be examined in relation to possible alternatives. Complete inaction by the United States might enable the USSR to capture control of Palestine, either by infiltrating trained terrorists or by capitalizing upon widespread violence. Should there be a prospect of wholesale slaughter of Jewish residents, the United States might be compelled to intervene under circumstances requiring a much larger force than that needed to support a trusteeship. Mr. Rusk pointed out also that the presence of US forces in Palestine would afford strategic advantages.

The JCS members agreed with Mr. Rusk that failure to support the trusteeship might present the United States with a much worse situation. However, they foresaw that an effective truce would probably prove impossible, owing to the actions of irresponsible elements on both sides. Maintenance of order would require a minimum of approximately 104,000 troops, and perhaps two or three times as many if a truce broke down completely. It was agreed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would prepare detailed force recommendations for submission direct to the President.[14]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted these recommendations the same day. They estimated the force requirements at 3 infantry divisions, 6 destroyers, and 4 reconnaissance and 1 troop carrier squadrons, for a total of 104,121 men. Accepting the Secretary of State's assumption that the British would be willing to cooperate, this force should be 45 percent US, 45 percent British, and 10 percent French. The military consequences of providing it would be serious. They included the necessity for a supplemental budget, partial mobilization, the loss of the general reserve for six months while new units were being formed, and a further over-extension of US forces.[15]

The Situation Deteriorates

The two months preceding the official end of the British mandate were taken up by UN debate on one hand and by increasing unrest in Palestine on the other. On 17 April 1948 the Security Council called for a cease-fire. Nine days later the Council set up a Truce Commission composed of the United States, France, and Belgium, the three countries not directly involved in the conflict having permanent consulates in Jerusalem.[16] These moves, however, proved ineffective in restoring calm. At the special General Assembly session devoted to Palestine, which lasted from 16 April to 15 May, it became clear that the Soviet Union still favored partition. The USSR was thus allied with the Zionists, who were strongly opposed to trusteeship in their desire for an independent Jewish state. The Arab countries were aligned with the United States in favoring trusteeship. These differences of opinion could not readily be reconciled or compromised, and time ran out before the General Assembly could decide what to do when the mandate ended.

In the military situation, the Arab forces appeared at first to have the upper hand during the winter of 1947 to 1948. An estimated 7,000 guerrilla fighters infiltrated Palestine to attack Jewish settlements, and Arab armies were obviously making preparations to invade. Violence took the form of acts of terrorism during a tense period of waiting for British withdrawal. But in April 1948, Jewish fighting forces secured some significant victories. These successes spurred the flight of Palestinian Arab refugees (eventually numbering over 900,000) from their homeland. Further victories placed the Jews firmly in control of the areas allotted to them by partition.

On May 1948 the Provisional Government of the Jewish territories, headed by Premier David Ben Gurion, proclaimed the existence of the state of Israel. Immediately upon being informed of this action, President Truman moved to extend *de facto* recognition of the new state, making the United States the first great power to do so. As he acknowledged, this gesture met with the strong disapproval of some career State Department officials.[17] It also startled the US delegation in the United Nations, which was in the midst of promoting temporary trusteeship.

Arab-Israeli War

The proclamation of Israel was the signal for invasion by the Arab League states. Due to many weaknesses, including lack of a unified command, these forces were not successful in seizing Israeli-held lands or in preventing the new part of Jerusalem from falling into Israeli hands. The Egyptians made probably the worst showing; the British-trained Arab Legion of Transjordan conducted itself best.

The General Assembly on 14 May 1948 had created the position of United Nations Mediator to cooperate with the Truce Commission established by the Security Council. Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden was appointed to the position. On 11 June he succeeded in concluding a four-week truce.[18] Numerous violations were charged, but there were no large-scale engagements. However, since no political settlement followed, fighting resumed when the truce expired. On 15 July 1948 the Security Council was able, by using threats of sanctions, to impose another truce, with no stated time limit.[19] This truce was violated even more frequently and disastrously than its predecessor, and attitudes on both sides became increasingly rigid. On 17 September, Count Bernadotte was assassinated in Jerusalem, apparently by Jewish extremists enraged by a new territorial settlement which he had proposed on the previous day.

Count Bernadotte's death produced a sense of shock among delegates to the UN in Paris, but it unfortunately did not foster an attitude of compromise among the conflicting groups involved in the Palestine crisis. The General Assembly, meeting from 21 September to 11 December 1948, made a few last attempts to impose a political solution of its own devising but without success. In mid-November the Security Council called for a general armistice, turning over to its

mediators and conciliators the task of ratifying the *de facto* military settlement which was by that time emerging in the Near East.

The last important political solution considered by the General Assembly was the Bernadotte Plan, made public on 16 September 1948. The Mediator's ideas came close to acceptance by the great powers in the UN, even as the Israelis moved militarily to forestall their execution in the field. Briefly, Count Bernadotte's recommendations included armistice and demilitarization; a territorial settlement giving Galilee to the Jews and the Negev to the Arabs; merger of central Palestine (previously captured by the Arab Legion) with Transjordan; internationalization of Jerusalem; and creation of a UN conciliation commission to work out a permanent accord. On 21 September 1948 Secretary of State Marshall endorsed this plan. Foreign Secretary Bevin did so shortly thereafter.[20]

However, events combined to defeat the Bernadotte Plan. Statements by President Truman in the final weeks of the 1948 campaign made observers doubt that the United States would forcefully support any solution that took some territory away from Israel. On the other hand, the Israeli Government acted on the assumption that the plan might be carried out. In late October and early November 1948, Israeli forces seized western Galilee and the Negev, routing Egyptian troops and creating a new military situation that was not likely to be reversed by UN resolutions or armistice negotiations. Finally, the Soviet General Assembly delegation stood behind partition and attacked the motives of the United States and Great Britain in their support of the Bernadotte Plan. The outcome was a resolution by the General Assembly on 11 December 1948 creating a Conciliation Commission to conduct peace negotiations, without attempting to suggest the form that a settlement should take.[21]

Meanwhile the Security Council had called on both sides to withdraw to positions on 14 October. This request had no effect. A call for armistice negotiations issued on 16 November was more influential, because it coincided with weaknesses and disunity among the Arab states. Egypt, perhaps because she had been most discouragingly defeated, was the first state to agree to negotiate with Israel through the mediation of Dr. Ralph Bunche, an American who had succeeded Count Bernadotte.

The negotiations were limited in scope, because the Arab states refused to recognize the existence of Israel, and because there were many issues that the Israelis declined to discuss except as an aspect of a permanent and formal peace settlement. Nevertheless, agreements regarding lines of demarcation, reduction of garrisons, demilitarization of some areas, and exchange of prisoners were concluded by Israel with Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Syria by July 1949. The territorial settlement reflected the military reality of early 1949, with Israel continuing to hold the Negev (except for the narrow Gaza strip along the southern coast), the northern part of Palestine (Galilee), and new Jerusalem, together with a corridor leading to that city.

With this phase of the settlement completed, attention turned to a conference set up by the UN Conciliation Commission at Lausanne. These meetings, lasting from late April until the end of 1949, were intended to seek a permanent peace settlement and to deal with the status of Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, and

other outstanding issues. Irreconcilable differences arose, however, and the conference ended without results.

International Peace Force for a Neutral Jerusalem

During these months of conflict and discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned primarily with the possible involvement of US armed forces in truce-keeping or security functions in Palestine. Any such involvement they consistently opposed, whether it took the form of an international police force in Jerusalem, recruitment and training of an international peace-keeping force for all of Palestine, or the assignment of US Marines as guards for US diplomatic posts.

The question of committing Americans for security duty in Palestine first arose on 25 June 1948. Secretary General Trygve Lie informed the US Representative to the UN that Count Bernadotte was attempting to negotiate the demilitarization of the city and therefore might require a 1,000-man guard force, to be contributed equally by the three nations comprising the Truce Commission. The Mediator was interested in securing a well-selected group of responsible men, preferably veterans.[22]

In reply, the Secretary of State proposed to agree to the Secretary General's formula for contributing the force and to advise him that he would have to recruit the US contingent himself. The United States Government would not do the recruiting, nor would it assign organized US units to UN guard duty; it would, however, assist the Secretary General in screening personnel and giving medical examinations.[23]

The Secretary of Defense found no objection to this proposed reply, except for the offer of assistance by US military authorities in processing recruits. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in response to a request from the Secretary of Defense for their views, agreed with the Secretary's objection. To process American recruits for the UN guard force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained, might easily lead to involvement of the US Military Services in matters of training, uniforms, equipment, or even transportation and support, with the result that the American contingent would come to be regarded as a US military force.[24] Under Secretary of State Lovett, on 20 July, informed the Secretary of Defense that the State Department accepted the JCS position.[25]

The neutralization of Jerusalem proposed in the Bernadotte plan of September 1948 provided an opportunity for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to modify these views. Believing that US acceptance of this plan constituted a commitment to establish some form of international police force in the city, the Acting Secretary of State asked the Secretary of Defense which type of force the US Government should support: a body made up of contingents supplied by certain governments; or one recruited by the UN Secretary General. Under the former method, it might be possible to exclude Soviet military units or Soviet nationals in the status of private citizens. Under the latter method, however, it was likely that a certain number of such nationals would be recruited for the force.[26]

PALESTINE 1949 Cease-Fire Boundaries

Map 2

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, to whom Secretary Forrestal referred the matter, expressed strong objections to the presence of either Soviet or US forces anywhere in Palestine. They therefore stated their preference for a Jerusalem police force recruited by the Secretary General, because Soviet personnel who might be recruited would enter Palestine as individuals and not as members of Soviet units. To include US citizens in such a force was "highly undesirable." This statement represented a stiffening of opposition by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the employment of Americans in Jerusalem in a peace-keeping role. Previously, they had merely opposed the processing of American volunteers by the US Armed Services.[27]

On the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense, the question of a neutral police force for Jerusalem was taken up by the NSC, which concluded there was no feasible way of providing such a force that would satisfy the security interests of the United States. The Council agreed that, if such a force were recommended by the UN General Assembly, it would be least objectionable to the United States if members of the force were recruited as individuals and excluded citizens of the United States and the Soviet Union. In any event, the United States should not accept a Jerusalem police force including armed force contingents of the United States, the Soviet Union, or Soviet satellites. President Truman approved these conclusions on 24 November 1948.[28]

However, the final Armistice Agreements, which left Jerusalem divided and firmly under the control of Jordan and Israel, effectively ended any prospect that an international police force would materialize for the city.

International Peace Force for Palestine

In the summer of 1948 a possibility arose that US forces might be requested to help enforce the Security Council cease-fire resolution of 15 July 1948, which had declared that failure to comply would be considered a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the UN Charter. This article empowered the Security Council to call on member states to contribute armed forces to maintain peace.

General Vandenberg, anticipating a UN call for troops for this purpose, feared that the United States, because of its policy of support for the United Nations, might not be able to avoid responding. Soviet forces might also become involved. He called upon his colleagues to determine the "least adverse solution" in the event that the United Nations voted to introduce military forces into Palestine.[29]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly addressed a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense on 19 August 1948, in which they strongly reiterated their view that neither US nor Soviet forces should be deployed to Palestine. The entry of Soviet forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated, would entitle the Soviet Union to land or sea lines of communications to its forces, thereby introducing Soviet forces into other Middle East areas and paving the way for Soviet domination of the region.

A commitment of US forces to Palestine would ultimately require the entire existing ground force reserve and would therefore make it impossible for the

United States to meet its vital commitments elsewhere, particularly in Berlin where the Soviet blockade required the United States to husband every available military resource. In these circumstances, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that "United States policy neither endorse nor permit a decision by the United Nations to employ military enforcement measures in Palestine."[30]

Secretary Forrestal forwarded these views to the National Security Council on 19 August. The Council discussed them the same day and agreed to hear State Department comments on them at its next meeting. These were presented by the Secretary of State 3 September. He agreed with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and stated that his Department had effectively blocked all attempts by the Soviet Union to establish a military presence in Palestine. This policy would continue, Secretary Marshall said, but he could not exclude the possibility that at some future date it might be necessary to use armed forces to protect vital US interests in the Middle East. Any such decision would, of course, have to be made by the President in the light of all existing circumstances, "including the availability of armed forces and our military commitments elsewhere." The Council noted these views but took no other action.[31]

Marine Guards for the Jerusalem Consulate

The JCS view expressed in regard to the assignment of Marine guards to the Jerusalem Consulate was a similarly cautious one. The Consulate had been almost in a state of siege since at least the date of the UN partition resolution. It had been bombed just after the announcement of US support of the resolution. On 10 December 1947, Consul General Robert B. Macatee reported again on the seriousness of the situation in Jerusalem, noting that even with 60,000 British troops still present in the country, cars owned by non-Arabs were stoned and fired upon and all other forms of travel were also hazardous. Mr. Macatee requested an independent guard force and a direct radio link with naval forces in the Mediterranean. On 31 December, he reported that the British no longer seemed capable of controlling violence and that the Consulate was only able to function due to the security zone maintained by the British.[32]

Conditions did not improve, and on 25 April 1948 Admiral Denfeld reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the State Department had indicated that it might request a reinforced Marine company—some 300 men—to guard the Jerusalem Consulate. Since this action might encourage other powers to introduce troops, Admiral Denfeld recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff study the implications of the proposal.[33] As a result, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 13 May, informed the Secretary of Defense that to introduce US forces, however small, into Jerusalem would create a dangerous situation. Arabs and Jews might interpret their dispatch as a sign of American intentions to enforce partition, with consequent heightening of hostility toward the United States. Sending Marines might also become the first step in a series of commitments; they could readily become involved in enforcing a truce, protecting Jerusalem, rescuing Europeans and

American nationals from danger, or maintaining communications and supply lines by means of armed combat. Soon, it was felt, a reinforced infantry division would have to be deployed, resulting in neglect of other responsibilities and depletion of reserves. A dangerous precedent, the sending of troops into a mandate, would also be set, and the Soviet Union would have every excuse to do likewise in the future. To avoid all these hazards, it would be preferable to withdraw US consular personnel if necessary.[34]

But on 28 June the new Consul General, John Macdonald, communicated to the State Department that the civilian guard detachment at the Consulate had proved "unsatisfactory, undisciplined and totally incapable. . . ." He urgently requested the detailing of 22 Marines before the four week truce ended. The Under Secretary of State on 1 July requested the National Military Establishment to provide these personnel, and also to assign 11 Marines to the new US Mission at Tel Aviv. In replying on 7 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated their previous reasoning and again suggested that withdrawing consular staff would be wiser "in view of the worsening world situation and the international appreciation of our current lack of military preparedness." In a letter to Under Secretary of State Lovett, Secretary Forrestal said that he was inclined to assign about a dozen Marines to Jerusalem but none to Tel Aviv. He thought that this matter was important enough to be considered in a Cabinet meeting. On 15 July, the President approved Mr. Forrestal's view and authorized a Marine guard of 13 in Jerusalem. This figure was later raised to 40 by a Presidential decision of 4 October because of increased terrorist activity.[35]

US Policy after the 1949 Armistice

The armistice agreements ending the Arab-Israeli conflict signed early in 1949 created a situation calling for a reappraisal of US policy. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this reappraisal began on 7 March 1949, when General Vandenberg pointed out to his colleagues that their position on Palestine, because it dealt primarily with a possible US involvement in a UN peace-keeping force, had now been overtaken by events. Israel, he said, had emerged as an independent state and as a military power in the Middle East second only to Turkey. It was possible that the United States, as a result of its support of Israel, might gain strategic advantages in the Middle East that would offset the effects of the decline of British power in that area. He requested, therefore, that the JSSC restudy US strategic objectives with regard to Israel and prepare a new statement of JCS views to be transmitted to the Department of State.[36]

The resulting study was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 6 May and sent to the Secretary of Defense with the request that he forward it to the Secretary of State. In this new study, the Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed the strategic importance of Israel entirely in the context of general war pitting the United States and its allies against the Soviet Union and its satellites. In such a situation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found Israel to be of little immediate value as a base area,

although its excellent air fields would be useful in the interdiction of Soviet lines of communication. Conversely, Soviet possession of the fields would seriously interfere with the operations of the United States and its allies. From the tactical point of view, Israel's territory and her combat-experienced forces would be an asset to either side in any contest for the control of the area. Israel, because of close ties to the United States, was considered to be generally pro-Western, although her announced policy was officially neutral. There was, however, an opportunity for communist infiltration through the immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Israel was also surrounded by defeated and still unfriendly foes and might, as an expedient, accept overtures from the Soviet Union.

On the basis of these considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that US security interests with respect to Israel were as follows:

(1) That Israel should be oriented towards the Western Democracies and away from the USSR;

(2) That Communist infiltration should be blocked and domination of Israel by the USSR should be prevented;

(3) That the differences between the new Israeli state and the neighboring Arab states should be reconciled at least to the extent that Israel and the Arab states would act in concert to oppose Soviet aggression; and

(4) That . . . it would be advantageous if British relations with Israel were such that a common approach could be taken by the United States and the United Kingdom in achieving mutual objectives with respect to Israel.[37]

Secretary Johnson approved the JCS recommendations and forwarded them to the Secretary of State. He also sent them to the National Security Council, with the recommendation that it develop an up-to-date policy towards Israel, reflecting the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the events of the preceding 12 months.[38]

The Department of State accordingly drafted a position paper which, after being modified in conference with representatives of the Department of Defense, was adopted by the NSC on 17 October 1948 as NSC 47/2. The President approved its conclusions on 20 October. By this action, the US Government adopted an "impartial but firm policy" towards Israel and the Arab states which would "instill moderation in both parties . . . and help to ensure that the competing nationalisms do not get out of hand." This policy was based on the following "fundamental propositions": that the political and economic stability and security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East were of critical importance to the security of the United States; that it was in the national interest to have the respect and, insofar as possible, the good will of all the peoples of the Middle East and their orientation toward the West and away from the Soviet Union; and that their differences should be reconciled at least to the extent that they would act in concert to oppose Soviet aggression. To attain these broad goals, the new policy called for asserting "constructive leadership" in the solution, on an impartial basis, of the economic, political, and social problems of the area.

A settlement of the Palestine problem, according to NSC 47/2, was to be sought primarily through the United Nations but also unilaterally and in conjunction with the United Kingdom. In the matter of Arab refugees who had fled Jewish-controlled areas during the fighting, the United States was prepared to encourage Israel to allow refugees to return, to encourage the Arab states to resettle those unwilling or unable to return, and to seek adequate compensation for them from Israel for their lost lands. In the matter of territories, the United States was prepared to assist the parties to reach a final settlement, accepting any solution they freely agreed to, but adopting the principle that Israel should make compensation for territories retained that were allocated to the Arab Palestine under the UN resolution of 29 November 1947. As for Jerusalem, the United States would support the principle of internationalization as defined in the General Assembly resolution of 11 December 1948.[39]

Military Assistance to Israel and the Arab States

The question of military assistance towards Israel and the Arab states was one of considerable delicacy. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this matter arose in connection with Israel on 22 March 1949, when the Israeli Foreign Minister informed the Under Secretary of State that Israel wanted to hire a limited number of US Army reserve or retired regular officers as advisers in military organization to the Israeli Army. The Secretary of Defense, to whom this request was referred, replied that, according to legal experts in the Department of the Army, the Israeli proposal was contrary to US law, and that any military assistance to Israel should be provided by a military mission consisting of regular officers on active duty.[40]

Secretary Johnson also considered it advisable to refer the Israeli request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They agreed that any advice provided should be through a formal military mission. They believed, however, that it would be inadvisable to establish such a mission so long as a risk of war between Israel and the Arab states continued to exist. The Israeli Army was not in dire need of foreign technical assistance, and the United States might become overtly involved if the Arab-Israeli conflict resumed after a US military mission had been established. And finally, US strategic interests in the Middle East would unquestionably suffer under these circumstances. Secretary Johnson forwarded these JCS views to the State Department, where they were presumably accepted; nothing more was heard of the matter.[41]

The question of supplying arms to Israel and the Arab states was reopened by the UN Security Council in a resolution of 11 August 1949, which lifted the embargo on shipments of arms to the belligerents in the Arab-Israeli conflict. At that time, the United States had taken the position in the Security Council that it would not "allow the export of arms which would permit a competitive arms race in the area" and would therefore limit arms exports to those needed for "legitimate security requirements." On 1 September President Truman, acting on a recommendation by Secretary Acheson, defined "legitimate security require-

ments" to mean "maintaining internal law and order by the Government concerned in the reasonable and legitimate exercise of constituted authority," and "providing for reasonable requirements of self-defense."[42] This position was incorporated in NSC 47/2, which stated that the United States should permit the export of "reasonable amounts of military material to Israel and the Arab states" within the scope of "legitimate security requirements" in order to promote "internal security as a basis for general security in the Near Eastern area."[43]

Under this policy, the Department of State, with Defense Department concurrence, granted a few export licenses for arms and equipment to both Israel and the Arab states. At first, arms purchases by all the states concerned were at a low level, but during the winter of 1950, the Israeli Government began gradually to increase its orders in the United States to include not only commercially available surplus munitions but also advanced weapons in use by US forces. This latter category included 63 tanks, 90 armored cars, 66 105mm and 155mm howitzers, 68 90mm antitank guns, 66 40mm and 90mm antiaircraft guns, and 18 jet aircraft. Because of the numbers and types of weapons on this list, the Munitions Board asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether provision of the weapons was justified under the President's guidelines.[44]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 5 May 1950 that, on the basis of available intelligence, an increase in the arms level of Israel was not necessary in order to ensure internal order or to provide an adequate defense. They were opposed, therefore, to the release to Israel of the equipment listed by the Munitions Board as being in excess of legitimate defense requirements. The JCS views were presumably accepted at higher levels.[45]

The Tripartite Declaration of 1950

This acquiescence in the British arms program for Egypt quite naturally aroused Israeli fears that the Arabs might attempt a "second round" of warfare against them. The Arabs, on the other hand, feared that continued Jewish immigration into Israel, combined with Israeli aggressiveness, would lead to efforts to incorporate all of Arab Palestine into Israel. To assuage these mutual fears, the Department of State proposed separate declarations by the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France, reaffirming their policies of support for the independence and territorial integrity of the states of the Middle East and announcing their intention to take action to oppose violation of frontiers of these states by external force. An appropriate occasion for issuing these declarations, the Department of State believed, would be the forthcoming tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting in London.[46]

Responding to a request from the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff vigorously opposed this proposal because it implied the use of armed forces by the signatories to preserve the integrity of Middle Eastern states. Such employment of US forces, regardless of the size of the initial commitment, must be regarded as the "probable genesis" of a series of US military deployments to

the area, which might limit the ability of the United States to live up to its military responsibilities in areas vital to US national security. These deployments might also be taken as an excuse by the Soviet Union or its satellites to move forces into the area and would open the way for possible Soviet dominance over it.[47]

These JCS dissents proved of no avail. At their meeting in London the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France issued a joint declaration on 25 May 1950 using the identical language of the State Department draft.

> The three governments, should they find that any of these [Middle Eastern] states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and without the United Nations, to prevent such action.

Arms shipments to Middle Eastern states would, however, continue, the signatories declared, because they recognized that the Arab states and Israel all needed to maintain a "certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring their internal security and their legitimate self-defense and to permit them to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole."[48]

4

The Berlin Crisis

The Foreign Ministers Fail at London

While the struggle against communist expansionism in the Mediterranean-Middle East area was at its height, a more serious Soviet challenge arose in Central Europe. The major confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union involved Berlin. The immediate disagreements concerned legal technicalities of occupation policy, but the underlying issue was control of the city, which was the principal battleground in the struggle to control Germany.[1]

Under agreements reached during World War II, Germany, following her unconditional surrender in 1945, was partitioned into four occupation zones administered by the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. The commanders in chief of the occupation forces of those four powers constituted an Allied Control Council, which exercised joint control over Germany. Berlin, although lying wholly within the Soviet occupation zone, was likewise under four-power rule administered by a body entitled the Kommandatura. The Commander of US Occupation Forces was General Lucius Clay, who was also Military Governor of the US zone of Germany and US Representative on the Allied Control Council. As Commander of US Forces in Europe (USCINCEUR), General Clay was responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Chief of Staff, US Army, who had been designated the JCS executive agent for the European Command. In matters relating to the occupation, General Clay dealt directly with the Department of the Army.[2]

Competition for control over Germany had been intensifying ever since the failure of the Foreign Ministers to agree on a German peace treaty at Moscow in March 1947 had revealed the seemingly irreconcilable views of the major powers on the future of Germany. The Ministers met again on 25 November 1947 in London to make another effort at drafting a German peace treaty. By the time the Conference adjourned *sine die* on 15 December, agreement on a treaty was even more remote than when it opened. The participants touched upon the whole

range of problems dividing east and west, but the key issue remained the future political alignment of Germany.

The principal stumbling block at London was the political structure of the German state to be created by a peace treaty. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov outlined a plan for a strong centralized German government: socialized basic industries, more thorough de-nazification, and demilitarization. He then attacked Western opposition to these measures as calculated to prevent German economic recovery and encourage German reactionary elements. Secretary of State Marshall, while agreeing that a centralized German government was necessary, insisted that it be both effective and genuinely democratic; it must provide for basic freedoms of the individual, which were nonexistent in the Soviet zone, and for the free flow of persons, ideas, and goods throughout the whole of Germany.

Subsequent discussions degenerated into a repetitive exchange of assertions, contradictions, and accusations, culminating on December 12 in a long and insulting attack on the Western powers by Mr. Molotov. The three Western foreign secretaries were now convinced that there was no possibility of agreement. They therefore agreed that Mr. Marshall should deliver a firm rebuttal to Mr. Molotov at the next session.

Secretary Marshall, in his statement delivered on 15 December, reviewed the major issues over Germany dividing the Soviet Union and the Western Allies. He placed primary emphasis on the relationship between economic and political factors. Agreement on economic principles, the Secretary maintained, was essential to the establishment of political unification. Soviet insistence upon reparations drawn from current production and in excess of the amounts agreed to at Potsdam, and exploitation of the industry of its zone by means of the organization of a gigantic Soviet trust had made it impossible for Germany to play a part in the recovery of Europe. In fact, these practices had greatly increased the need of Western Germany for outside aid supplied by the United States and the United Kingdom. If a peace treaty permitted these circumstances to continue, the resulting German government, in General Marshall's words, "would subtract from rather than add to a real union of the German people." Since the Soviets seemed unwilling to modify their stand, the Secretary concluded, it seemed impossible to make practical progress, and the Council of Foreign Ministers might now consider adjournment. The conference concluded after a harsh rebuttal by Mr. Molotov.[3]

Communist Coup in Czechoslovakia

Two months after the collapse of the London Foreign Ministers' Conference, events took an ominous turn in Central Europe. On 23 February 1948, a communist coup toppled the liberal democratic regime of Czechoslovakia and drew that country into the Soviet orbit. President Truman and his advisers placed an ominous interpretation on this event. The President, speaking to a joint session of Congress on 17 March, accused the Soviet Union of pursuing a "ruthless course of action" that had brought about the "tragic death of Czechoslovakia" and had

as its "clear design to destroy the independence and democratic character of the remaining free nations of Europe." Soviet pressure was now being brought to bear, the President continued, "on Finland, to the hazard of the entire Scandinavian peninsula. Greece is under direct military attack from rebels actively supported by her Communist-dominated neighbors. In Italy, a determined and aggressive effort is being made by a Communist minority to take control of that country. The methods differ," President Truman concluded, "but the pattern is all too clear."[4]

The immediate response by the Western powers was limited. On 26 February, the United States, Great Britain, and France joined in a public statement voicing their indignation and alarm "over developments which place in jeopardy the very principles of liberty to which all democratic nations are attached." This response perhaps did credit to their powers of observation, but it reflected their inability to alter the situation.

Consolidation of the Western Zones

With the breakup of the London Conference, the Western powers determined to push ahead with plans for organizing their own zones of Germany. On 23 February, representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, and France began discussions on Germany in London, and on 26 February, they were joined by representatives of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. At the conclusion of their first series of meetings on 6 March, they issued a communique announcing that the participating powers had in view "the necessity of ensuring the economic reconstruction of Western Europe including Germany, and of establishing a basis for the participation of a democratic Germany in the community of free peoples. . . ." To this end, the communique stated, the conferees had agreed that prompt action should be taken to coordinate the economic policies of the US, UK, and French occupation zones of Germany in such matters as foreign and inter-zonal trade, customs, and freedom of movement for persons and goods.[5] The Soviets reacted sharply to this Western initiative. They protested the convening of the London Conference in notes to Washington, London, and Paris and organized a rival conference of the Foreign Ministers of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia, who also delivered notes of protest to the three Western capitals.

The deteriorating relations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers also affected the work of the occupation machinery in Germany. From mid-January on, the atmosphere in the Allied Control Council steadily deteriorated until early March it had become impossible to reach agreement on even the most routine questions. The Soviet delegation seized upon every question on the agenda, no matter how simple, to launch violent propaganda attacks on the three other delegations. These diatribes concentrated on three main allegations: that the Western powers had violated agreements such as Potsdam; that the United States and the United Kingdom intended to disrupt quadripartite administration;

and that the three Western allies planned to use Berlin as a means of interfering in the affairs of the Soviet Union.[6] These activities reached a climax on 21 March when Marshal Vasily D. Sokolovsky, the Soviet Military Governor, walked out of the Allied Control Council, charging that action by the Western powers on German issues at London without Soviet participation had virtually destroyed the Council as an organ of four-power government of Germany.[7]

Restrictions on Access to Berlin

An event of far greater import occurred on 30 March when the Soviet authorities in Germany issued regulations governing lines of communications of the three Western powers with their occupation forces in Berlin. These new regulations were spelled out for the US authorities by General Mikhail S. Dratvin, the Soviet Deputy Military Governor in Germany, in a letter to Major General George P. Hayes, USA, the US Deputy Military Governor. Effective 1 April, General Dratvin wrote, US personnel travelling through the Soviet zone by rail or highway would be required to present documentary evidence of identity and affiliation with the Military Administration of Germany; military freight shipments from Berlin to the Western zones would require a Soviet permit; freight shipments from the Western zones to Berlin would have to be cleared by accompanying documents; and all baggage, except for personal belongings carried by individuals in private automobiles or railway passenger cars, would have to be inspected at Soviet checkpoints.[8]

The Soviets, by threatening the communication lines of allied forces in Berlin, were striking at an extremely vulnerable point of the Western position in Germany. By the terms of the World War II occupation agreements among the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union and France, Germany and Berlin had been divided among them into four zones for administration purposes. Berlin, although administered by all the occupying powers, lay some 110 miles within the Soviet zone.[9] The right of access by the Western powers to Berlin across the Soviet zone of occupation became, therefore, a matter of the greatest importance. Without it, the United States, Great Britain, and France could be squeezed out of Berlin by the simple Soviet action of closing the borders of the Soviet zone to Western traffic.

The Western powers' right of access to Berlin was implicit in the agreement that provided for the stationing of their forces in the city. Unfortunately no written agreement guaranteeing ground access was ever concluded. In talks between Marshal Georgi Zhukov, the Soviet commander in Germany, and Generals Lucius Clay and Sir Robert Weeks, representing the US and British commanders, to arrange for the movement of US and British forces into Berlin, a verbal understanding was reached that, as a temporary arrangement, the two Western powers would have the use of a major highway and a rail line.[10]

Access by air, however, had become the subject of written agreements among the occupying powers. Because of the need to provide flight safety over Berlin

and its approaches, the Allied Control Council had agreed, on 30 November 1945, to a system of air traffic control, including three air corridors linking Berlin with the Western zones.[11]

General Clay felt compelled to resist the restrictions announced by General Dratvin. The new Soviet regulation, he cabled General Omar N. Bradley, Chief of Staff of the Army, on 31 March, would "make impossible travel between Berlin and our Zone [by American personnel] except by air. Moreover it is undoubtedly the first of a series of restrictive measures designed to drive us from Berlin." He therefore proposed to tell the Soviet Deputy Commander that US train commanders would supply only a cargo manifest and passenger list, together with official orders, but would not submit to search by Soviet personnel. "It is my intent," he added, "to instruct our guards to open fire if Soviet soldiers attempt to enter our trains." [12]

In Washington, the announced Soviet restrictions were carefully studied by the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall, and Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett, acting for Secretary George C. Marshall who was attending the International Conference of American States in Bogota. It does not appear that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were consulted. The result of these deliberations in Washington was the following set of instructions, which was approved by President Truman and transmitted to General Clay by Secretary Royall in a telecon on 31 March:

> You are authorized to move trains as you see fit. It is considered important that the normal train guard be not increased and that they carry only the arms normally carried. Also that the Russians be not prohibited from taking actions which have been customarily followed. Furthermore, it is important that our guards not fire unless fired upon.[13]

To test Soviet intentions, General Clay dispatched a passenger train across the border without stopping for inspection by Soviet officials. The train proceeded some distance into the Soviet zone but was finally switched off onto a siding, where it remained for a few days before withdrawing ignominiously.[14]

Thereafter, personnel and baggage of the allies' garrisons no longer moved to and from Berlin by rail. During April the Soviets imposed further restrictions on rail communications between Berlin and the Western zones of Germany. On the 1st, they refused to allow mail cars carrying packages to leave Berlin for the West; on the 3rd they closed the Hamburg-Berlin and Bavaria-Berlin lines, requiring all freight to move to Berlin via Helmstedt; and on the 23rd, they suspended international train service from Berlin by refusing to attach the two international coaches to the interzonal train between Berlin and Osnabruck. Communications of the Western powers with Berlin were further impeded when the Soviets ordered the US and British telephone repeater stations maintained in the Soviet zone to be removed.[15]

The Soviets Blockade Berlin

In the midst of this Soviet harassment, the Western powers reconvened the six-power London Conference. On 7 June the conferees announced that they were preparing to summon a constituent assembly to draft a constitution for Western Germany. The prospect of a separate German political entity in the Western Zones must have alarmed the Soviets, but they did not react immediately.[16]

The three Western powers took a further step towards a separate West Germany on 18 June when they introduced a currency reform in their zones. This had long been planned by the Western governments as necessary to restoration of a healthy German economy. The Soviets had been invited to participate but had insisted on the right to print notes in their own zone. Unwilling to lose control of the volume of note issue, the Western powers determined to give up quadrilateral unanimity and introduce the currency in their own zones.

The Soviet response was immediate and strongly adverse. On 19 June, Marshal Sokolovsky issued a statement accusing the three Western powers of disrupting German economic unity and stating that the Soviet Union would not allow the new currency to circulate in Berlin. At a hastily arranged conference of financial experts of all four occupying powers on 22 June, the Western representatives offered to accept Soviet zone currency as the currency for all of Berlin provided that its issuance was under four-power control. Rejecting this bid, the Soviet Union on the same day declared the currency of the East zone to be the legal currency for Berlin. The Western powers thereupon announced that the new Western currency would be introduced into their zones of Berlin.[17]

The Soviet Union did not limit its response to economic countermeasures but immediately initiated a series of actions that within a few days was to constitute a nearly total isolation of Berlin from the Western world. On 19 June, Soviet authorities suspended all passenger train traffic between the Eastern and Western zones, restricted rail freight traffic from the West to Berlin to one train a day, and stopped all road traffic from the Western zones into the Soviet zone. That the Soviets meant business and were not merely bluffing was demonstrated on 21 June, when General Clay, after appropriate notification, ordered a US military freight train to proceed to Berlin via the regularly authorized line. At the checkpoint, Soviet officials refused to allow the train to pass, and when the US train commander attempted to force the train through, it was forced to withdraw because a section of rail had been removed.[18] These measures were followed two days later by a suspension of all rail and barge traffic into Berlin from the West and by the cutting off of electricity supplied to the Western sectors of Berlin by generators in the Soviet sector. Finally, on 24 June, the Soviets prohibited the distribution of supplies from the Soviet zone to the Western sectors of the city. Except for the air routes, Berlin was now totally blockaded.[19]

The Initial Western Response

General Clay, acting on his own initiative, responded on 24 June to the blockade by directing his air commander, Major General Curtis LeMay, USAF, to assign every available transport aircraft to carry supplies to the beleaguered city. The first aircraft landed in Berlin on the morning of 25 June.[20]

At national level, however, the appropriate responses to the Soviet actions were by no means clear. As an immediate reprisal, the Western powers suspended trade between their zones and the Soviet zone, thus depriving the latter of large shipments of coal and steel from the Ruhr.[21] However, there was neither an agreed long-range tripartite policy nor a presidentally approved unilateral US policy to meet the situation.

Six months earlier, in January 1948, the Army General Staff had completed a study of possible courses of action in the event of a Soviet effort to force the United States out of Berlin. Secretary Royall had forwarded the study to Secretary of Defense Forrestal merely for his information. Mr. Forrestal asked whether the study should be referred to the National Security Council so that a definite policy could be established but was informed by Mr. Royall that no such action was necessary because the Departments of State and the Air Force had concurred in the proposed courses of action. Secretary Forrestal did not pursue the matter further. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were never formally consulted.

The Army staff in its study made no attempt to assess the strategic importance of Berlin to the United States and its allies but limited itself to a consideration of the steps the United States might take to counter possible Soviet moves. Two courses of action appeared to be available to the Soviets to drive the Western powers out of Berlin: direct military action, which would result in war and would occasion a US response determined by issues larger than Berlin; and "administrative difficulties" which would be easy to apply, because access to Berlin was limited to one road, two railroads, and one air corridor. These "difficulties" might consist of such measures as harassment of communications and interference with utilities and would make life unpleasant for US forces. Or the Soviets might take the much more serious step of limiting the transportation of supplies to Berlin (perhaps arranging to feed the population from their zone). It would be impossible for the Western powers to supply the population of their sectors solely by air if ground supply channels from the Western zones were disrupted. If confronted by "administrative difficulties" of this nature, the Army staff concluded, the United States should make every effort to remain in Berlin, using all available means to supply the city, and should publicize the situation in order to place the blame, in the eyes of world public opinion, squarely on the Soviet Union.[22]

As the relations between East and West over Germany deteriorated during the winter and spring of 1948, the US Government made no preparations to deal with the situation. And when the crisis broke at the end of June, the Truman administration met it with a series of ad hoc improvisations. The elaborate machinery set up to deal with such situations under the National Security Act of 1947 was not brought into play until the middle of July, when the Berlin crisis

was first placed on the agenda of the National Security Council. Formal JCS involvement in the crisis also began at that time.

President Truman brought up the Berlin situation at a meeting of the Cabinet on 25 June and heard reports from Secretary Royall on the serious situation that was developing and on General Clay's emergency airlift.[23] Following the Cabinet meeting, the President engaged Secretaries Forrestal and Royall and Under Secretary Lovett in a fuller discussion of Berlin. They concluded that "determined steps" should be taken to remain in Berlin. The nature of these steps was not decided, but there was agreement not to pursue a proposal by General Clay for countermeasures outside Germany, such as closing US ports and the Panama Canal to Soviet shipping. These measures, it was felt, would be ineffective.[24]

One obvious "determined step" to remain in Berlin was taken on 26 June by President Truman when he directed that General Clay's improvised airlift be put on a regular basis and that every aircraft available to the European Command be pressed into service.[25] General Clay implemented this directive the same day, employing 70 C–47s, which provided a capacity to lift about 225 tons per day.[26]

The airlift as originally mounted was obviously an emergency measure of very limited capacity. Efforts to raise the blockade were therefore urgent, and to this end General Clay proposed both military and diplomatic moves. "I am... convinced," he informed Secretary Royall on 25 June, "that a determined movement of convoys with troop protection would reach Berlin and that such a showing might well prevent rather than build up Soviet pressures which could lead to war. Nevertheless I realize fully," he continued, "the inherent dangers in this proposal since once committed we could not withdraw." An effort at negotiation was also necessary. To this end, he proposed a conference with Marshal Sokolovsky to point out the seriousness of the situation and to suggest a practical solution to the currency problem. This approach would probably not work, General Clay admitted, but it could do no harm and would at least demonstrate a willingness to reach a solution and to prevent suffering by the German people.[27]

The next day, the British sought to employ the diplomatic approach. Their effort was in the form of a letter from General Sir Brian Robertson, the Military Governor in Germany, to Marshal Sokolovsky protesting his action in closing off the access routes to Berlin from the West. General Robertson's letter reflected a determination by the British to stand fast in Berlin. Although the British Government had not yet taken an official position, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin told US Ambassador Lewis Douglas that the Western powers should stand firm in Berlin because to abandon the city would have serious, if not disastrous, consequences in West Germany and throughout Western Europe. All available aircraft should therefore be assigned to the airlift.

Mr. Bevin also sought to revive the top-level military policy and planning institution that had worked so effectively in World War II. He proposed to call upon the Combined Chiefs of Staff to make a military appreciation arising from the Berlin situation, including an appraisal of the deployment of additional heavy bombers to Europe, and to join the military governors in Germany in a study of the logistics required to feeding the civilian population of Berlin. Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA, of the Army General Staff, who was

then in London, recommended that the US Government determine its basic political policy and submit it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their military appraisal and as guidance in forthcoming talks in the Combined Chiefs of Staff.[28]

General Clay endorsed the proposed air reinforcements. The Soviets, he advised General Bradley on 27 June, "are definitely afraid of our air might. Moreover, arrival of aircraft will be a deciding factor in sustaining allied firmness." General Clay recommended, specifically, increasing the B–29 force in Germany from a squadron to a group, deploying additional B–29s to England and possibly to France, and carrying out immediately the movement to Germany of a fighter group scheduled for August.[29]

It was now becoming apparent to high-level officials in Washington also that an appraisal of US policy was in order. To this end, Secretary Forrestal, Secretary Royall, Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan, Under Secretary Lovett, and General Bradley gathered in Secretary Royall's office on 27 June. Lieutenant General Lauris Norstad, the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, was also in attendance. Their discussion proceeded on the assumption that existing food stocks, plus the supplies that could be brought in by air, would avert serious food shortages for about 30 days. This period could perhaps be extended to 60 days if dried foods were used.

Three possible courses of action were discussed, as follows:

1. To make a decision now, in concert with the United Kingdom and France, to withdraw at an appropriate time in the future, presumably when a constituent assembly for a West German government was called on 1 September.

2. To decide now to employ all possible means to remain in Berlin, including the use of force to supply the city as a last resort after all diplomatic effort had failed.

3. To maintain the present "unprovocative but firm" stand in Berlin, using every diplomatic means to obtain recognition of the rights of the Western powers to be in Berlin while postponing the ultimate decision to remain in Berlin or to withdraw. To withdraw from Berlin, the conferees recognized, would damage US policy in Europe. To remain would be to invite recurring crises and frequent humiliation. To attempt to supply the city by force would run the risk of war.

Agreement on any one course of action proved impossible. It was decided that Secretaries Forrestal and Royall and Under Secretary Lovett would present the issues to President Truman the next morning.

While the conferees were unable to reach a decision on basic policy, they found merit in the suggestion that additional heavy bombers be deployed to Europe. They accordingly agreed to ask Ambassador Douglas to explore the possibility of basing two groups of B–29s in Britain. They also agreed that no useful purpose would be served by referring the Berlin question to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as proposed by Foreign Secretary Bevin. There was therefore no reason to follow up on General Wedemeyer's suggestion for a referral of the question to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in fact no such referral was made. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not to join in Berlin policy planning until 19 July and then they did so on their own initiative.[30]

On 28 June, Messrs. Forrestal, Royall, and Lovett met with President Truman in the White House. Mr. Lovett recited the details of the meeting of the previous

day and the alternative policies that had been discussed. When he raised the question of whether the United States would stay in Berlin, the President interrupted to say, as Secretary Forrestal recorded in his diary, "that there was no discussion on that point, we were going to stay period." Secretary Royall expressed some concern as to whether this matter had been fully considered, warning that the United States should not be committed to a position in which it might become necessary to "fight our way into Berlin." The President's rejoinder, again as recorded by Secretary Forrestal, was "that we would have to deal with the situation as it developed," but that the essential fact was "that we were in Berlin by terms of an agreement and that the Russians had no right to get us out by either direct or indirect pressure." Towards the end of the meeting, the President evidently had second thoughts about staying in Berlin at all costs. This was a tentative position, he said. A final decision would await further consideration of alternatives.

The President approved the recommendation of his Cabinet officers to deploy B–29s to Europe. He gave positive assent to the immediate dispatch of two squadrons to Germany, and he did not dissent when Under Secretary Lovett said that he assumed that two additional groups of the big bombers would go to England as soon as the British Government gave its consent. The President also acquiesced in General Clay's proposal for a conference with Marshal Sokolovsky.[31]

On the following day, 29 June, the British Government officially took a strong stand on Berlin. While it did not take as hard a line as President Truman's "we are going to stay, period," the British Government saw the confrontation in Berlin as a vital test of strength that the West could not afford to lose. The British Government felt that the airlift together with the deployment of heavy bombers would show the Soviets that Great Britain and the United States meant business and would hearten the continental countries, particularly France.[32]

Seeking to implement this strong governmental stand, the British Chiefs of Staff arranged a meeting between their representatives in Washington and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff to give urgent consideration to possible military measures that would enable the two governments to hold their positions in Berlin. The meeting, which took place on 30 June, failed to add any substantial measures to the airlift and bomber-deployment moves already being taken. The British delegation, headed by Admiral Moore, reported that the British Chiefs of Staff opposed any attempt to fight through to Berlin on the ground, a position with which Admiral Leahy said the US Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed because of the weakness of available US-UK forces. Admiral Moore announced that General Robertson had been instructed to reconnoiter additional troop locations in Germany as part of the war of nerves. He suggested that General Clay be given similiar instructions. Admiral Leahy and General Bradley objected to such a procedure on the ground the Soviets would recognize it as a bluff because they knew the United States had no more troops to send.

An exchange of information on aerial supply capabilities revealed that the two Air Forces could deliver 2,000 tons per day at the present level of operations. Of this amount, the Royal Air Force would fly about 750 tons, a figure that represented the maximum effort of which the British were capable. The British were prepared to take a strong position on any attempt to interfere with the airlift. The

Government had decided, Admiral Moore reported, to shoot down any balloons put up by the Soviets in the air corridors. The US Government had made no such decision, Admiral Leahy stated, but would probably exchange notes with the Soviet Government before authorizing attacks on balloons or other obstructions in the corridors.[33]

Diplomacy Fails

Efforts to resolve the crisis by diplomatic approaches, meanwhile, went forward between Military Governors in Germany and then at the governmental level in Washington, London, and Paris. Acting on instructions from Washington, General Clay arranged a meeting between Marshal Sokolovsky and the three Western Military Governors. The purpose of the meeting was to feel out Soviet intentions concerning Berlin. At the meeting, which took place on 3 July, Marshal Sokolovsky ascribed the interruptions of traffic to "technical reasons," and added that actions by the Western Allies at the London Conference had created "economic disorders" in the Soviet zone that had made it impossible to provide alternative routes. The three Western governors concluded that Marshal Sokolovsky's conduct reflected a decision by the Soviet Government that the question of access to Berlin would only be considered in connection with the entire German problem. Further action on their part, they decided, would serve no useful purpose.[34]

With the failure to find a solution at the local level, the three Western governments carried the issue directly to the Soviet Government. In notes delivered to the Soviet Ambassadors in Washington, London, and Paris, the three governments reasserted their rights to be in Berlin, demanded that the Soviets restore arrangements for the movement of freight and passenger traffic to Berlin in accordance with existing agreements, and offered to negotiate in Berlin any dispute arising out of the administration of the city once access had been restored. The reply, delivered on 14 July, reiterated that the blockade of Berlin had resulted from currency reform and from plans for a separate West German Government, both violations of the Potsdam Accord and other agreements on the occupation of Germany. The Soviet Government expressed a willingness to negotiate, but without preconditions, and only on the German question as a whole.[35]

The consensus in Washington and London now was that further efforts at negotiation should not be immediately undertaken, but that military measures such as the deployment of the B–29s to Britain and an increase in the airlift should be accelerated. Already, on 2 July the buildup of B–29s in Germany had been completed with the arrival of all elements of the 301st Bombardment Group.

On 14 July, the British Government agreed to the stationing of two B–29 groups in Britain. The NSC immediately agreed to send them, and by the end of the month the 28th and 307th Bombardment Groups completed movement to British bases. The B–29s were widely known as atomic bomb carriers, but, significantly, the 509th Bombardment Group, which still possessed the only atomic

capability, was not deployed to England; it remained at its home base in the United States.[36]

NSC Action 84: National Policy Reaffirmed

By mid-July, it was evident to President Truman and his principal advisers that a reexamination of available courses of action in support of the policy decision to remain in Berlin was in order. To this end, the President called General Clay and his political adviser, Robert D. Murphy, home for consultations. A series of meetings was held in Washington culminating in a session of the National Security Council on 22 July.

General Clay, reporting to the Council at President Truman's request, said he could supply the summertime needs of Berlin with an airlift of 3,500 tons per day, but that coal shipments required during the winter months would raise this figure to 4,500 tons. General Clay believed he could meet the lower figure with an additional 75 C–54s to supplement his existing fleet of 52 C–54s and 80 C–47s. General Vandenberg expressed reservations to the assignment of the additional 75 aircraft on the ground that it would disrupt the Air Transport Service and would expose the aircraft to destruction by the enemy in the event of war.

The President asked General Clay what risks would be involved in attempting to supply Berlin by armed convoys. The General, who had evidently modified his views on the subject since 25 June, replied that the Soviets would meet the convoys with armed force. The President asked whether he believed the Russians wanted war. General Clay answered that he did not believe so; rather they seemed to be trying to force the Western powers out of Berlin, either now or after winter weather forced a curtailment of the airlift. President Truman said the question then was how to remain in Berlin without risking all-out war. General Vandenberg repeated his fear that the concentration of enough aircraft to make the airlift effective would involve unacceptable risks. The President replied that the alternative was to attempt to resupply Berlin by ground convoy at the very great risk that Russian resistance would lead to war. The airlift, the President pointed out, would involve far less risk. He directed the Air Force to furnish all possible support to the airlift. General Vandenberg interjected at this point that an effective airlift would not be possible without additional airfields in Berlin, to which General Clay replied that he had already selected a site for an additional field to be built by German labor.[37]

At the conclusion of this meeting, the National Security Council formally reiterated the determination to remain in Berlin "in any event," approved construction of an additional airfield in Berlin, and assigned an additional 75 C–54s to the airlift, pending a future decision on even more planes for a larger effort.[38]

Implementation of the National Security Council's decisions followed quickly. On 23 July, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force ordered 9 Military Air Transport Service (MATS) squadrons (totalling 81 C–54 aircraft) to Germany and directed the establishment of a special task force under CINCUSAFE to direct the airlift. On 29 July, Airlift Task Force (Provisional) was activated, under the command of

Major General William H. Tunner. Tegel airfield, built from the rubble of Berlin by German men and women toiling day and night, opened officially on 7 December 1948.[39]

JCS 1907: The Joint Chiefs of Staff Join the Policy Debate

The National Security Council had taken its decisions of 22 July without formal participation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Individual members had attended the meeting and had participated in the discussion, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not as yet presented formal views on the situation in Berlin. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had not been inactive, however. Acting on the initiative of General Bradley, they had a paper on Berlin in preparation at the time the National Security Council made its decisions, though it did not reach the Council in time to influence these decisions.

General Bradley had addressed a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 17 July in which he dealt with many of the issues that faced the National Security Council on the 22nd. According to information supplied by General Clay, the Army Chief of Staff reported, the present airlift could not continue to meet the 3,000 tons of supplies required daily by Berlin. The present maximum combined US-UK lift was about 2,250 tons per day, of which 1,500 tons were carried by US aircraft. Over the long term, however, the average lift would decline to about 1,700 tons per day.

General Clay's proposal for opening ground access by armed convoys, General Bradley stated, had only a limited chance of success but might be necessary if political considerations required a long-term support of the present policy to stay in Berlin. The British military authorities, he reported, had considered the use of armed convoys but had reserved their position for governmental decision. The French were opposed.

General Bradley recommended, therefore, that General Vandenberg provide as many C–54s to the airlift as the Berlin airfields could handle; that the Department of the Army request additional funds to cover the costs; that the Joint Strategic Plans Committee revise war plans to allow for the possible loss of aircraft employed on the airlift; that the Secretary of Defense be requested to arrange with the Secretary of State to ask the British and French to give maximum support to the airlift and to join the United States in contingency planning for combined armed ground convoys; and that USCINCEUR be directed to prepare unilateral plans for the same purpose.[40]

General Bradley's memorandum, JCS 1907, was referred to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, whose report, submitted on the 19th, was then referred back to them, along with the original memorandum by General Bradley, for consolidation into a single document. This report was completed on the 21st and acted upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff the next day. Their recommendation to the Secretary of Defense that he forward their views to the National Security Council was not implemented until 26 July, too late to influence the Council's decision.[41]

In their memorandum of 22 July to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed a view similar to that of General Vandenberg regarding the airlift. They said that Berlin could be supplied by air indefinitely if a maximum effort was made but at the cost of seriously reduced capabilities to implement the air transport missions in war plans.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also stated that supply of Berlin by armed ground convoy was highly unlikely to succeed and could lead to major war involvement. Therefore they did not recommend it unless the following conditions had been met: every other solution to the Berlin situation had been tried or discarded; the operation appeared likely to succeed; the United States Government had decided that it would go to war if necessary to maintain its position in Berlin; and all possible time had been gained in order to prepare for war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did recommend combined contingency plans to be prepared at once for use in event the higher authorities decided to attempt supply of Berlin by the overland route, and they asked the Secretary of Defense to arrange with the Secretary of State for consultations with the British and French Governments on these plans.

The disadvantage of a continuing airlift and the hazard of attempting to supply Berlin by ground convoys led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to suggest political initiatives. "It is assumed," they wrote, "that diplomatic effort together with all possible counterpressure will continue to be used to arrive at peaceful solution to the Berlin problem. In this connection, it may not be altogether out of the question to consider... the possibility that some justification might be found for withdrawal of our occupation forces from Berlin without undue loss of prestige."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded their memorandum with a plea for a "decision now as to our future military course of action regarding Berlin," taking into account the shortcomings of air supply and the fruitlessness of armed ground supply attempts. If the decision was that US occupation troops would remain "in any circumstances short of war," and that an effort would be made "to supply Berlin by force if supply can be maintained in no other way," they recommended that: "(1) All possible time... be gained for preparation for the event of war by augmentation of the air supply method, and (2) full-out preparations for... war be inaugurated immediately."[42]

The Secretary of Defense forwarded the JCS views to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council on 26 July. He circulated them to members of the Council as NSC 24 on 28 July. At its meeting on 5 August, the Council noted this paper.[43]

Plans for Restoration of Ground Access

Secretary Forrestal, as requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asked Secretary of State Marshall to initiate discussions with the British and French Governments on combined planning for armed convoys to Berlin. In a letter dated 28 July, the Secretary of Defense stressed that this planning should be purely of a contingency nature and should not represent a decision by the US Government

to supply Berlin by force on overland routes. Such operations, the Secretary of Defense cautioned, should only be undertaken as a last resort after all other efforts to resolve the Berlin problem had failed.[44]

The Secretary of State, replying on 30 July, stated that governmental level negotiations were undesirable at present because of recent reconstitution of the French Cabinet, and suggested instead that the matter be taken up with the British in the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Secretary Forrestal, concurring with Secretary Marshall, asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to handle the matter in this way.[45]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly addressed their British opposite numbers on 18 August. They warned that armed convoys to supply Berlin might have to be employed as a last resort, so that plans should be prepared at an early date. The convoys should be composite and consist of US, UK, and French forces. But in view of the French political situation, added the Joint Chiefs of Staff, initial planning should be carried out by the US and British Commanders in Germany, who should not consult the French until authorized to do so.[46]

The British Chiefs of Staff replied on 27 August that they were still convinced that any attempt to force armed convoys into Berlin would be "militarily unsound and politically undesirable.... Whatever the conditions may become in the future, the fundamental impracticability of the proposals will remain." The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that it was useless to press the British Chiefs of Staff further. They therefore directed USCINCEUR to develop a plan for composite US-UK-French convoys but not to discuss it with the British and French Commanders. In response to this directive, USCINCEUR submitted "Plan: Task Force Truculent" on 8 September.[47]

New Diplomatic Initiatives

The US Government, meanwhile, remained determined to pursue a diplomatic solution to the Berlin crisis. Following receipt of the Soviet note of 14 July, high-level deliberations on the next step were conducted in Washington. As a result, President Truman decided on 20 July to make a direct approach to Premier Stalin before engaging in any further exchange of formal notes. This approach was to be on an agreed US-UK-French basis with the senior ambassador of the three powers in Moscow acting as the spokesman.[48]

The French and British Governments having agreed to a direct approach to Stalin, the Ambassadors of the three powers requested and were granted an interview with the Soviet Premier. The meeting took place on 2 August. United States Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith, speaking for the three Western powers, offered once again to negotiate the currency problem of Berlin or any question relating to Germany once the restrictions on access to Berlin had been removed. Stalin at first reiterated the Soviet contention that the restrictions on access had been made necessary by the decisions of the Western powers at the London Conference to establish a new German government at Frankfort and to introduce a special currency in Berlin. He then proposed a settlement on the following terms:

simultaneous introduction of the Soviet zone mark into Berlin to replace the western mark and removal of all restrictions on access to the city; dropping of the Soviet objection to the London decisions as a condition for settlement of the Berlin issues, but with the understanding that the Soviet Government was still strongly opposed to the implementation of the accords. The Western Governments accepted this proposal but on condition that the introduction of Soviet zone currency into Berlin be subject to effective quadripartite control.

Attempts by the three ambassadors to implement these decisions in conferences with Foreign Minister Molotov during the period 6–16 August ended in failure. The unwillingness of the Soviet Foreign Minister to accept four-power control over the currency in Berlin was the main point of disagreement. A second meeting with Stalin was therefore arranged, and a new agreement resulted. Restrictions on access to Berlin from the Western zones were to be removed, and the German mark of the Soviet zone was to be the sole currency for Berlin. Arrangements relating to the currency changeover were to be made by the four Military Governors, and were to ensure a "satisfactory basis for trade" between the Western zones and Berlin. This agreement was transmitted to the Military Governors for implementation.[49]

The Military Governors, meeting during the period 31 August to 7 September, were unable to carry out their assignment. The reason for this failure was the position of Marshal Sokolovsky, who soon made it clear that he was not prepared to honor the understandings reached in Moscow. During the course of the meetings, he took the position, in direct contravention of the directive from the four governments, that the proposed four-power financial commission should have no effective power to control the currency. He also tried to limit the removal of restrictions on access to Berlin to those imposed after 18 June, the date of the Western currency reform in Berlin. He later receded from his initial position on this point but continued to insist on a limitation of access by air to military aircraft. Commercial flights to Berlin, he insisted, would not be permitted. He contended further, again in contradiction to the directive, that the Soviet authorities had the sole right to control trade between Berlin and Western Germany and third countries. As a result, the talks ended without an agreed report to the four governments.[50]

Even before the final breakdown of the Military Governors' talks in Berlin, the US Government had decided upon its future diplomatic actions in the event the negotiations should fail. Meeting on 7 September, the National Security Council, with President Truman presiding, concurred in Secretary of State Marshall's proposal to "bring the disagreed issues to a definitive conclusion in Moscow and, if no satisfactory solution is reached, then to refer the Berlin situation to the United Nations Security Council. . . ."[51]

To implement this decision, the ambassadors of the three Western powers in Moscow delivered an aide-memoire to Mr. Molotov, pointing out the deviations by Marshal Sokolovsky from the quadripartite directive and asking whether the Soviet Government intended to live up to its terms. The Soviet Government replied on 18 September, denying the allegations of the Western powers and insisting that Marshal Sokolovsky had scrupulously observed the letter and spirit

of the quadripartite directive. Accusation and counteraccusation continued in an exchange of notes in which each side restated its position on the disputed points. The Western powers refused to accept any restriction on air traffic between Berlin and the Western zones and insisted that the four-power finance commission control the issuance of currency in Berlin. The Soviet Government maintained that commercial traffic on the air routes would have to be subjected to the same controls as railways, water routes, and highways; and that the powers of the finance commission should be, as stated in the directive of 30 August to the Military Governors, to implement currency issue measures rather than to control them.

Direct negotiations between the three Western powers and the Soviet Union had now apparently reached an impasse. The Foreign Ministers of the Western powers, meeting in Paris on 26 September, announced that they would now carry the Berlin question to the United Nations Security Council.[52]

US Policy Reappraised

The failure of diplomatic negotiations forced the US Government to reexamine its policy towards the Berlin crisis. Up to this point, the airlift had been supplying the city with its basic needs, and General Clay had reported that it could continue to do so if adequately reinforced. On 10 September he requested 116 additional C–54s—69 to be made available by 1 October and the remaining 47 by 1 December. In response, a decision was made to augment the airlift by 50 additional C–54s. On 24 September, General Clay pointed out that he needed the entire augmentation in order to build up a stockpile for the winter months and requested that his full original request be met.[53]

The National Security Council, however, felt that a major reappraisal of US policy in the Berlin crisis was called for before making a decision on the future of the airlift. Anticipating the breakdown of negotiations, the Council on 16 September had requested the Department of State to prepare a report on what position the US should adopt if the negotiations failed. In connection with this report, the Secretary of Defense was asked to supply an appraisal of the military implications of continuing the airlift through the ensuing winter. Secretary Forrestal, on 4 October, passed this request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for action.[54] An additional request for views on the airlift came to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 October, when the National Security Council requested them to recommend military actions against Soviet forces interfering with the airlift within or over the air corridors to Berlin.[55]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, replying to both requests in two memorandums to the Secretary of Defense on 13 October, repeated the reservations about long-term continuation of the airlift that they had offered the previous July. "It is the considered opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . ," they wrote, "that our present military power cannot effectively support the supply of Berlin by air lift on an indefinite basis without such a diversion of military effort as has affected and will continue progressively to affect seriously and adversely the ability of the

National Military Establishment to meet its primary national security responsibilities." Furthermore, added the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "the war possibilities inherent in the Berlin situation must not be ignored." However, "disregarding cost, both in money and in readiness for war emergency... air supply to Berlin can theoretically be continued indefinitely." And in view of the President's decision of 22 July "to remain in Berlin in any event," the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the airlift be augmented by 66 aircraft in addition to the 50 already furnished, in order to give General Clay the 116 that he had requested on 10 September.

This recommendation for an augmentation did not mean, however, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were prepared to accept the existing Berlin policy without question. To the contrary, they actively sought to have that policy modified. Taken literally, they said, the words "in any event" might be "construed to include the determination of the United States to remain in Berlin even if this course results in war. It appears possible that this construction... may not, however, have been definitely contemplated." This point should be clarified "beyond all doubt," and the "military implications and views inseparable from a determination to remain in Berlin and of extreme importance from the standpoint of national security [should] be included in such consideration."

These "military implications and views" were set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their formal recommendations:

> That there be full recognition of the facts that the Berlin airlift cannot be a permanent solution of the problem; that the USSR could by direct action adversely affect and quite possibly drastically reduce our supply of Berlin by airlift; that with increases in personnel and funds, and in the absence of direct action by the Soviets, the lift could be continued indefinitely; and that such direct Soviet action can in turn easily bring forth the necessity for decision by the United States as to whether or not the Berlin situation constitutes a war issue.
>
> That decision be reached now as to whether or not the added risk of war inherent in the Berlin airlift is acceptable.
>
> That, if decision is in the affirmative full-out preparations for the early eventuality of war be inaugurated immediately.
>
> That, if decision is in the negative, plans logically now be made and action taken leading to our withdrawal from Berlin....

But regardless of what the administration decided with respect to Berlin, the Joint Chiefs of Staff clearly realized that the military strength of the United States was not adequate to the demands of the nation's foreign policy. They accordingly recommended that efforts be continued to "strengthen our military capabilities in all respects in order that military support for our foreign policies may be available without undue weakening of our readiness for war emergency." And finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that steps be taken to offset the budgetary and personnel drains on the National Military Establishment resulting from the airlift.[56]

When they turned from these broad issues of policy to the specific question of measures to counter Soviet military interference with the airlift, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were even less sanguine. Because of the limited number of aircraft available, fighter patrols in the corridors, they believed, could be defeated by determined Soviet air action, and selective antiaircraft fire at Soviet planes violating air traffic rules would invite retaliation in kind. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended against both measures because of their ineffectiveness and because the Soviets would consider them as acts of war.

A possible course of action would be to issue warnings to the Soviets not to interfere with flights of the Western Allies to Berlin. These warning announcements could be (1) that fighters would escort transports if the latter were attacked, or (2) that any serious interference would be regarded as an act of war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned that making these announcements involved a risk of war. They accordingly recommended against them unless the US Government had decided that war "in the near future and for the Berlin cause is acceptable." They emphasized, however, that, from the military viewpoint, to start a war "in our present state of readiness and for the Berlin issue would be neither militarily prudent nor strategically sound. . . ."[57]

The two JCS memorandums of 13 October produced an immediate reaction, but not of the type anticipated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Far from bringing about a change in national policy, the JCS recommendations met a vigorous rebuff at a special session of the National Security Council on 14 October. Present were Under Secretary Lovett; Secretaries Forrestal, Royall, Symington, and Sullivan; the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the exception of Admiral Leahy; General Gruenther; the Executive Secretary of the NSC, Mr. Sydney Souers, and his deputy, Mr. James S. Lay. Secretary Royall and Under Secretary Lovett were the most vocal. Mr. Lovett insisted that the decision of 22 July to remain in Berlin "in any event" was made with full knowledge of the facts and was intended to stress that the United States would not be forced out of Berlin. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, he said, seemed to have a "case of the jitters," and their recommendations served no useful purpose except as a justification for additional military appropriations. To Secretary Royall, the Joint Chiefs of Staff seemed to be trying to "pass the buck." The tone underlying the JCS papers was unfortunate, particularly the passage dealing with the NSC decision to remain in Berlin "in any event."[58]

While Mr. Lovett and Mr. Royall reiterated the determination of the Truman administration not to be forced out of Berlin, neither attempted to answer the central question posed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Would the United States go to war to remain in Berlin? Their evasion suggested a policy of postponing decision until faced with necessity to fight or get out. To the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who would be responsible for planning operations should war come, such a postponement was understandably unsettling.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to withdraw both papers and, after further study, resubmit them in modified form. The National Security Council then proceeded to adopt the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an immediate reinforcement of the airlift. As approved by the President on 22 October, these measures were: to augment the airlift by 66 C–54s; to assure the necessary sup-

plies of aviation gasoline to support the airlift and to stockpile for emergency purposes; and to take the steps necessary to ensure adequate personnel and financial support for the airlift.[59]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their revised recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on 20 October; he sent them to the members of the National Security Council on the following day. In this revision, the Joint Chiefs of Staff still cautioned that the Berlin airlift could be continued indefinitely if enough resources were allocated to it but only at the cost of seriously degraded capabilities to meet primary national security responsibilities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also repeated their recommendation for an across-the-board military buildup to provide support for foreign policies, but they deleted their recommendations for an immediate decision whether Berlin was a war issue, together with the corollary recommendations to mobilize or withdraw.[60]

Failure at the United Nations

Efforts to solve the Berlin crisis by diplomacy in the United Nations, meanwhile, were to have no more success than earlier diplomatic efforts in Berlin and Moscow. The three Western powers referred the dispute to the United Nations on 29 September and, after some debate, the Security Council agreed to accept it. The neutral members then tried to find a formula acceptable to both sides. Their initial proposal called for simultaneous lifting of the blockade and introduction of the Soviet zone mark into Berlin. The Soviets accepted but the Western powers refused to discuss currency questions while the blockade was still in force. The neutrals then introduced a substitute proposal providing for a lifting of the blockade, followed, first, by a meeting of the four Military Governors to effect the substitution of the eastern for the western mark, and, second, by a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to discuss the whole German situation. The Western powers supported this proposal, but the Soviet delegate vetoed it on 25 October. The next step was a proposal for direct quadripartite talks, accepted by the Soviets but rejected by the Western powers, who could see no purpose in repeating the frustrations of Berlin and Moscow, and preferred to keep the question in the United Nations. After further discussions the four powers finally agreed to the appointment of a committee of experts to produce a solution to the currency problem to be put into effect simultaneously with the end of the blockade. The committee, established on 30 November 1948, finally reported in February 1949 that agreement was impossible and ceased its labors.[61]

The Blockade Is Lifted

With augmentations in C–54 aircraft, the effectiveness of the airlift steadily increased to the point where even the bad weather conditions of the winter

months could not prevent delivery of sufficient tonnage to keep the Berliners alive and warm and their economy functioning. It became possible to raise the daily tonnage requirement from an austere 4,500 tons to 5,600 tons, which permitted an increase in the daily ration from 1,600 to 1,880 calories.[62]

The citizens of the beleaguered city obviously had to sustain substantial hardships, but in spite of these privations, the morale of the Berliners remained high and their adherence to the Western powers unswerving. On 29 July 1948, the City Council ignored Marshal Sokolovsky's offer to feed the entire city and, after the communist-front Socialist Unity Party members had walked out, voted to condemn the Soviet blockade of the city as a crime against humanity. Communist-inspired mobs disrupted proceedings of the Council at its building in the Russian sector, whereupon it withdrew on 6 September to the British sector. Elections were scheduled to be held in Berlin on 5 December but were prohibited by Marshal Sokolovsky in the Soviet sector. In the other sectors, 86 percent of the electorate went to the polls and delivered an overwhelming majority to the anticommunist parties, thus demonstrating the substantial support of the Berlin population for the west and against the east.[63]

These developments probably had some effect in persuading the Soviet Government that the Berlin blockade could not prevent the development of a regime in the Western zone of Germany oriented to the West. In any event, Marshal Stalin, on 30 January 1949, in a matter-of-fact way, let it be known to an American journalist that the Soviet Government might end the blockade if the Western powers postponed establishment of a separate West German Government pending a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers and simultaneously ended the restrictions on trade with East Germany and East Berlin that had been imposed by the Western powers in reprisal for the blockade. The Soviet premier made no mention of the currency question as a prior condition for removing the blockade.

Discreet diplomatic inquiries revealed that the omission had been deliberate. Negotiations followed, and on 5 May the four governments concerned issued a communique announcing that the blockade of Berlin and the Western countermeasures against East Germany and East Berlin would end on 12 May, and that the Council of Foreign Ministers would convene 11 days later. The blockade was lifted on the day agreed upon, and the first trucks and trains to reach the beleagured city, decked with flowers, were greeted by a jubilant population.[64]

Even after the lifting of the blockade, the airlift remained in effect for a time. On 20 July 1949, General Bradley recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they seek authority of the National Security Council to phase out the airlift beginning on 1 August but under conditions that would permit its resumption in 90 days. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted this proposal and made suitable representations through channels to the National Security Council and the President, who approved the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 July 1949. On 30 September, the last C–54 took off for Berlin, thus ending the airlift.[65]

American leaders were convinced that their Berlin policies had successfully met the immediate Soviet challenge and had strengthened American prestige in Western Europe. "The Berlin blockade was a move to test our capacity and will to

resist," President Truman recalled in his memoires. "When we refused to be forced out of the city of Berlin we demonstrated to the people of Europe that with their cooperation we would act, and act resolutely, when their freedom was threatened." The airlift and the breaking of the blockade thus "proved a beacon light of hope for the peoples of Europe."[66] Secretary of State Dean Acheson agreed with the President that the airlift had been a success, but he cautioned that the lifting of the blockade had not solved the German problem. Whether a solution could be reached depended upon whether or not the Soviets were willing to accept the "progress the Western powers had made in their efforts to make West Germany a peaceful and constructive member of the community of free nations of Europe." Mr. Acheson's own view was that, with the blockade a failure, Stalin had lifted it "in order to carry on the war against a West German government by political means." In this prediction, Mr. Acheson proved to be correct.[67]

Contingency Planning for a Future Berlin Blockade

Even before the decision to terminate the airlift, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had initiated consideration of and obtained presidential approval for the course of action to be taken by the United States if the Soviets reimposed the Berlin blockade. On 13 May, General Bradley had proposed to his fellow chiefs that they study the subject and be prepared to make recommendations upon request. Before the Joint Chiefs of Staff could act, the National Security Council made such a request on 17 May. In response, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a resumption of the airlift and of economic reprisals against the Soviet zone of Germany. They reiterated their opposition to an attempt to force open ground access using ground convoys. They also opposed a "probe" of Soviet intentions by a ground force, a possibility suggested by the Secretary of State in the National Security Council on 17 May. Such a course of action would risk the loss of prestige and, if war resulted, would thrust upon the United States the blame for starting hostilities. These JCS views were accepted by the Acting Secretary of Defense and incorporated in a paper forwarded by him, with the concurrence of the Department of State, to the National Security Council on 1 June.[68]

The Secretary of State, in commenting on the JCS views, again suggested that an armed convoy be employed to determine whether the Soviets, after announcing a restriction of surface access to Berlin, would physically prevent vehicles from proceeding to Berlin. In response, the Joint Chiefs of Staff explained traffic would not be halted upon mere administrative notification by the Soviets that passage was restricted, but would continue until confronted by a physical barrier, an armed guard, or other evidence of force. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated their opposition to employing an armed convoy.[69] The National Security Council on 16 June adopted the policy recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the President approved them on the following day.[70]

The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Berlin Crisis

The airlift had thwarted Soviet attempts to force the three Western powers out of Berlin, but for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the course of events during the Berlin crisis had not been without frustrations. During the initial formulation of policy to meet the crisis, the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body had been largely ignored. In the only effort at contingency planning before the crisis began, by the Army Staff during January 1948, JCS participation had been specifically rejected. And during the initial stages of the blockade, while individual members participated in formulating policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not participate as a corporate body. Thus they had no collective voice in the initial decision to mount the airlift, or in the rejection of alternatives such as the abandonment of Berlin and the effort to break the blockade by force. In similar fashion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not consulted when the Truman administration reviewed its Berlin policy in late July. Once again, individual members participated, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not called upon for collective views. Not until the Joint Chiefs of Staff took the initiative and addressed the Secretary of Defense on 22 July 1948 did their views on Berlin policy matters reach high-level policymakers in the Truman administration. And on this first occasion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were too late to influence national policy. They were obliged to await a second reappraisal of policy, in October, before they were able to play a role in the formulation of policy.

One reason for the failure to consult the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at least at NSC level, may have been the fact that the National Security Act did not specify a relationship between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council. There was no statutory requirement for consultation. This deficiency was remedied in 1949, when the Act was amended to provide, among other things, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be "principal military advisors to the . . . National Security Council."

If the Joint Chiefs of Staff had encountered difficulties in presenting their views to the high levels in the Truman administration, they encountered similar problems in getting these views accepted once they had gained an audience for them. Their recommendation that the risk of war over Berlin be frankly faced and, depending on the decision, the necessary preparations be made either to mobilize or withdraw, was unfavorably received in the Council. Their plea for a strengthening of US military capabilities, regardless of the decision on Berlin, in order to bring US power in line with foreign policies, was effectively rejected when the administration decided not to seek significantly increased military appropriations for FY 1950.[71]

The apprehensions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, given the wide disparity between the Soviet Union and the United States in military strength, were understandable. They were seeking to avoid a military showdown where the Soviet Union would have every advantage. In this regard, they displayed a traditional military conservatism, in contrast to the President's policy of accepting a certain degree of calculated risk. Responsible as they were for the overall military security of the nation, they judged the Berlin situation in the light of their acute consciousness of the weakness of the forces available to support the proposed policies.

Germany Zonal Boundaries and Air Corridors

Map 3

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the effort to bring military planning into line with foreign policy commitments was to be a continuing struggle throughout the pre-Korean War period. It was to be waged in two areas: at home through unilateral efforts to build up the US military establishment; and abroad through collective security arrangements in the form of alliances and the extension of military aid to allies. These efforts are the subject of the ensuing chapters of this volume.

5

Key West and Newport: Roles and Missions

The National Security Act and Executive Order 9877

A major obstacle to the efforts of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to strengthen the US military establishment was continuing disagreement among the Armed Services over their roles and missions. The passage of the National Security Act of 1947, climaxing as it did a two-year struggle to "unify" the armed forces, was expected to clear the way for unified, and therefore efficient, planning and development of armed forces and strategy. But the expectations of the benefits to be derived from the National Security Act proved not to be fully realizable. Deep-seated disagreements over roles and missions still divided the Services and made effective planning extremely difficult, if not impossible. As Rear Admiral Cato D. Glover, the Deputy Director for Strategic Plans, explained to the Director, Joint Staff (Major General Alfred M. Gruenther, USA), on the completion of the first post-war emergency war plan in 1948:

> there are no splits involved. However, it should be understood that this paper employs the forces in being as of 1 July 1948 and that there are therefore no questions concerning justification for the forces. It is for this reason and this reason only that we are able to submit this Plan without a split.... We still have great difficulty putting out plans involving requirements for forces in the future which may establish the size and composition of the respective Services.[1]

The interservice differences had supposedly been resolved and the functions of the Services spelled out by the National Security Act of 1947 and its implementing directive, Executive Order 9877. The doctrine laid down by them based the functions of each Service generally on the geographical element in which they operated. Thus, the Army, according to the Act, was to be "organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land," the Navy for "prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea," and the Air Force for "prompt and sustained ... air operations."

It was recognized, however, that a Service in conducting operations in its assigned geographical element might also have to operate in other elements as well. The Army was therefore to include not only land combat and service forces but also "such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein." The Navy was to include such aviation as was organic to naval combat and service forces. This naval aviation was to "consist of combat and service and training forces" and was to include "land-based naval aviation, air transport essential for naval operations, all air weapons and air techniques involved in the operations and activities of the United States Navy, and the entire remainder of the aeronautical organization of the United States Navy, together with the personnel necessary therefor."

The Marine Corps, by virtue of its status as an amphibious force, did not fit neatly into a geographical environment. It was to "provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign." Other missions, more clearly identified with strictly naval operations, included the provision of security detachments on board naval vessels and at naval installations ashore. There was, finally, a catch-all provision that the Marine Corps would "perform such other duties as the President may direct."[2]

As a means to convert the provisions of the National Security Act into a directive to the Armed Services prescribing their primary functions and responsibilities, President Truman promulgated Executive Order 9877 on 26 July 1947, the same day he signed the National Security Act. By means of the Executive Order, the President not only directed the Armed Services to carry out the functions assigned to them by the National Security Act but also specified more precisely the functions each Service was to perform.

The mission of the Army was elaborated by the Executive Order to include the seizure or defense of land areas (including airborne and joint amphibious operations) as well as the occupation of land areas. The Navy's operations were to include control of vital sea areas, protection of sea lanes, suppression of enemy sea commerce, support of occupation forces as required, naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, protection of shipping, and seizure of those shore positions capable of reduction by "such landing forces as may be comprised within the fleet organization." The assignment of operational responsibilities to the Marine Corps was not further elaborated by the Executive Order. The responsibility of the Air Force was to include gaining and maintaining of general air supremacy, establishing local air superiority as required, conducting of strategic air warfare (including reconnaissance therefor), airlift and airborne support, air support to land and naval forces, and air transport operations except as provided by the Navy. In addition, each Service was responsible for conducting joint operations.[3]

The scope and functions of naval aviation and of the Marine Corps had been spelled out in the Act in more detail than those of the Army and Air Force at the insistence of certain members of the Congress. They had acted to guarantee the continued independence of naval aviation and to assure for the Marines a role in amphibious warfare such as they had played in World War II.[4]

Roles and Missions Disputes Renewed

That the allocation of functions in the National Security Act and Executive Order 9877 had not permanently stilled interservice rivalries became apparent during January 1948. The controversy that arose then stemmed from Navy claims to a role in strategic atomic warfare, assigned to the Air Force by the Act and Executive Order, and the predictable Air Force reaction. The Navy position was succinctly stated by Admiral Nimitz in his final report as Chief of Naval Operations, submitted prior to his retirement on 15 December 1947 but not made public until 6 January 1948. The US Navy, Admiral Nimitz maintained, held such complete control of the seas that it could operate carrier task forces off any shore. These forces were "capable of remaining at sea for months" and thus had "raised to a high point the art of concentrating air power within effective range of enemy objectives.... The net result is that naval forces are able, without resorting to diplomatic channels, to establish offshore anywhere in the world, air fields" that were "virtually as complete as any air base ever established. They constitute the only air bases that can be made available near enemy territory without assault and conquest." With these carrier task forces, the Navy of the future would be able to launch devastating atomic attacks against enemy vital areas.

Admiral Nimitz denied that he was disputing the role of the Air Force, but he emphasized that

> it is improbable that bomber fleets will be capable, for several years to come, of making two-way trips between continents... with heavy loads of bombs. It is apparent then that in the event of war within this period, if we are to project our power against the vital areas of any enemy across the ocean before beachheads on enemy territory are captured, it must be by... aircraft launched from carriers; and by heavy surface ships and submarines projecting guided missiles and rockets.[5]

The intention to press ahead with the creation of this "Navy of the future" became apparent when the Navy sought to include funds for a large, flush-deck carrier, capable of launching atomic bombers, in the budget for FY 1949. Admiral Louis Denfeld, who had succeeded Admiral Nimitz as Chief of Naval Operations on 15 December 1947, told a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on 17 February that this carrier was intended to "handle radically advanced types of aircraft required for planned operations and not capable of being operated from our present carriers." Vice Admiral John D. Price, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, explained further:

> The rapidly increasing size and weight of aircraft having greater range, speed, and bomb capacities, mean carriers of large size and greatly increased deck strengths. From these carriers we will be able to launch air attacks that can strike any target in the world, while maintaining the mobility and elusiveness of their floating base.[6]

Some Air Force officials, according to a report in the *New York Times*, became sufficiently worried by these developments to make representations to the Office of Secretary of Defense Forrestal, asking whether he would support any such innovation in the supposedly agreed relationships of the Navy and Air Force. Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan felt constrained to deny any intent to infringe upon the responsibility of the Air Force for strategic bombing.[7]

The Decision to Issue a New Roles and Missions Directive

Secretary Forrestal unwittingly brought the dispute among the Services over roles and missions to a head on 20 January 1948. On that date, he sent to the three Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment a redraft of Executive Order 9877, revised to eliminate certain minor differences in wording between its provisions and those of the National Security Act. Replies were to be made in time to permit the Secretary to submit his recommendations to the President on 1 February. The disparities between the two documents had come about because the draft Executive Order had originally been drafted at the same time as the Act but had subsequently been issued in some haste and hence failed to reflect changes in the legislation that was finally enacted.[8]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff referred Secretary Forrestal's request to an Ad Hoc Committee consisting of Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA, Lieutenant General Lauris Norstad, USAF, and Rear Admiral Charles W. Styer, USN. On 28 January, the Committee concluded that the proposed revision of Executive Order 9877 was, in many respects, more ambiguous in defining roles and missions than the original version. What was needed was not an executive order that merely reproduced the language of the Act, but one that provided clear-cut guidance by removing all misunderstanding as to the tasks of each Service. Limitations on "money, manpower and industrial capacity," said the Committee, made it "essential" to resolve the difficulties as a prerequisite to sound planning.

The Committee recommended, therefore, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be authorized to draft a complete revision of Executive Order 9877, instead of merely commenting on the Secretary's draft. As a means of expediting this revision, the Committee recommended that, pending a reply from the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee be directed:

(1) To submit no later than 23 February 1948 a new draft Executive Order based upon an agreed concept of operations, or

(2) Failing to reach agreement on a concept of operations, to submit a split paper which will state the controversial issues in such a manner as to enable the Joint Chiefs of Staff to:

(a) Resolve the disagreement, or

(b) Forward the matter to the Secretary of Defense or to the President for decision.

Admiral Styer, foreseeing that Secretary Forrestal might insist upon his original deadline, prepared a redraft of Executive Order 9877 and recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff forward it to the Secretary of Defense. Generals Wedemeyer and Norstad opposed this recommendation. They stated, further, that, although they had only been able to give Admiral Styer's draft a "cursory examination," they "definitely disagree[d] with certain specific statements made therein."[9]

Admiral Louis Denfeld, commenting on the Committee report on 30 January, informed his colleagues that, while he agreed with the considerations underlying the Committee's report, he did not approve of the recommended procedures. "Pressures from members of Congress, the press, and the public are such that this matter must be settled with the greatest expedition," Admiral Denfeld pointed out. The Admiral feared that "to refer the matter to another committee would simply result in the continuation and the extension of the disagreements which have already taken place in planning committees where the delineation of specific roles and missions are [sic] points of issue." He recommended therefore that the Joint Chiefs of Staff meet as soon as possible, each bringing his own proposed revision of the Executive Order, and attempt to resolve any Service disagreements. If they failed to agree, they should forward a statement of their disagreements to the Secretary of Defense for resolution.[10]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted neither the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee nor those of Admiral Denfeld. Meeting on 4 February, they concluded that a statement by the Secretary of Defense defining roles and missions would be preferable to an Executive Order. They therefore informed the Secretary on 6 February that they would submit such a statement to him with a recommendation that it be promulgated as a replacement for Executive Order 9877. To the Ad Hoc Committee they assigned the task of drafting the statement, with a deadline of 11 February.[11]

Secretary Forrestal, meanwhile, had received the comments of all three Service Secretaries on Executive Order 9877. Like the Ad Hoc Committee, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall was of the opinion that the redraft of Executive Order 9877 did not "solve or decrease the outstanding difficulties occasioned by differing views as to roles or missions and responsibilities, but . . . might well tend to increase these difficulties by the breadth and generalization of some of the language used." In particular, the portion dealing with the Navy and Marine Corps not only overemphasized their functions but also embodied general language "which might be construed to extend Naval functions clearly into the area of conflict with the other Departments." A resolution of the differing Service views was important, but must await "clarification of the respective roles and missions." Consequently, the Secretary of the Army recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be directed to forward, no later than 1 March 1948, their recommendations as to specific roles and missions of the Services; after approval by Secretary Forrestal, these recommendations should then become the basis for a redraft of the Executive Order to be prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[12]

Secretary of the Air Force Symington agreed with Secretary Royall's comments on the proposed redraft of Executive Order 9877. He recommended, however, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff proceed at once to draft a new version,

one that would "reflect a definite determination and delineation of the missions of the three armed Services." [13]

Replying to the three Service Secretaries on 3 February, Mr. Forrestal pointed out that, judging from the comments, any revision that would meet with unanimous approval would be extraordinarily difficult at present. This state of affairs the Secretary of Defense attributed "primarily" to the "fact that until the Joint Chiefs of Staff have completed their joint strategic plans, there is no solid foundation on which to base a meaningful assignment of roles and missions." Secretary Forrestal thus took the opposite view from that advanced by the Ad Hoc Committee, which had concluded that clarification of roles and missions must precede planning.

Secretary Forrestal agreed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the final statement of Service functions should be in the form of a directive from the Secretary of Defense rather than an Executive Order. His "present inclination," therefore, was "to do nothing about the Executive Order at the present moment, but to work towards a situation under which I will issue a directive simultaneously with a rescission of the Executive Order by the President." The Secretary made no formal reply to the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning their recommendation of 6 February. On 11 February, however, one of his Special Assistants, Mr. Marx Leva, forwarded to General Gruenther a copy of Secretary Forrestal's memorandum to the Service Secretaries and pointed out that Secretary Forrestal's proposed course was identical with that recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[14]

Deadlock in the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Ad Hoc Committee, meanwhile, had proceeded with the task of drafting a new statement of Service functions. Agreement on all issues could not be reached by the deadline of 11 February, but before that date the Committee had approved "in principle" a broadly-worded statement. Two areas of controversy remained, however. These were the Navy-Air Force disagreement over the role of carrier aircraft in strategic air operations, and a difference of opinion between the Army and the Air Force involving the conduct of air defense of land areas. The Committee hoped to submit its final report, with or without unanimous agreement, by 18 February.[15]

Subsequent efforts by the Committee to resolve these differences resulted in widening, rather than narrowing, the divisions among the Services. At a meeting on 10 February, the Committee directed its supporting Working Group to prepare a new draft "delineating more clearly the specific primary and secondary functions of each Service." But the result of the Working Group's efforts to attain this greater precision was to reopen the old Service splits, such as those concerning the roles of naval aviation and the Marine Corps, that had supposedly been resolved by the passage of the National Security Act.[16]

The Ad Hoc Committee and its subordinate Working Group struggled with these problems for the remainder of the month to no avail. Finally, on 3 March, the Committee gave up and submitted a draft statement that embodied a number of disputed provisions. The major differences revolved around one broad question: Was the Navy to have its own "army" and "air force" and to decide for itself how large they were to be and how they were to be used? On this question, the Army and Air Force stood opposed to the Navy.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were unable to resolve the broad issues. They did settle a lesser difference between the Army and Air Force over "collateral functions," when General Bradley agreed to accept General Spaatz' definition of the phrase. The Army position had been that such functions would "not constitute a requirement to provide forces additional to those necessary for the accomplishment of primary functions." The Air Force view, now accepted by the Army, was that such functions, "including . . . nature and extent and any requirements developed thereby, shall be as determined by the component charged with the primary function." Although the fact was not stated in its draft, the Army staff had been of the opinion that this Air Force view, now accepted by General Bradley, "appears to be extreme in that it could make each Service supreme judge in its field of primary responsibility. It is considered that the Joint Chiefs of Staff constitute a more appropriate final authority."[17]

When it became apparent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they could not agree on the major issues, they forwarded a split "functions" paper to Secretary Forrestal along with a position statement by each Service. They were, they said, "prepared to meet with the Secretary of Defense at his convenience for the purpose of explaining further the respective views" of the individual members.[18]

The approach taken by all three Services in presenting their views was to state what they considered to be the "fundamental issue" responsible for interservice disagreements, then to show how this applied to particular areas of operations and to specific passages in the draft statement of functions. To the Air Force, the question was

> whether we should have three Services, specialists in their normal fields, operating as a team of the National Military Establishment or whether the Services shall be free to duplicate, within each one of them, forces and equipment for which another Service has primary responsibility. The Air Force firmly believes that the three Services should operate as a balanced and integrated team.

To the Army, similarly, "maximum avoidance of duplication in operations" was the goal to be attained. It should be "insured by the use of that component [i.e. Service] which is already organized and equipped to perform the operations incidental (or secondary) to the main operations. No component should develop or maintain, on an appreciable scale, forces which already exist in another component." The Navy, on the other hand, held that "the effectiveness of our military establishment is best served through a full utilization and exploitation of the intrinsic capabilities and potentialities of the weapons of any Service, wherever such utilization and exploitation will contribute effectively to the attainment of

over-all military objectives." Specifically, there should be "no diminution in the current capabilities of Naval Aviation and the Marine Corps."

Navy participation in strategic air warfare was a major point at issue. The Air Force, supported by the Army, accepted the participation of Naval aviation units, whose normal primary function was to conduct operations at sea, in strategic air operations "whenever and wherever such use will result in increased effectiveness or economy." The "nature and extent" of these operations, however, should be determined by the Air Force as the Service having primary responsibility for strategic air warfare. Nor should the Navy engage in the "unnecessary, wasteful and confusing" practice of establishing unilaterally requirements for forces and equipment designed specifically to conduct such operations.

The Navy was strongly opposed to granting this "veto power" to the Air Force over the development of Naval forces having a strategic air capability. The Air Force view, the Navy maintained, was aimed specifically at curtailing the "supercarrier" program then in its initial stages. Carrier task forces possessed the unique capability to deliver bombing attacks on enemy targets on land from mobile bases using conventional or atomic weapons. They were, therefore, a "potentially valuable adjunct to the strategic air effort of land-based heavy bombers." Carrier task forces, in fact, might be more than a mere auxiliary; they might be the "only means by which this nation could retaliate promptly and effectively, should we be attacked, and the only means by which we could take early action to blunt the enemy's offensive . . . before our own war-making capacity could be seriously crippled." Heavy land-based bombers, the Navy claimed, had reached their practical limit in size and combat radius, compelling the Air Force to plan on one-way flights and unproven refueling techniques in order to "reach the enemy heartland from bases of which we can be assured."

The extent of Marine Corps combat operations on land was a second major issue dividing the Services. The Army, supported by the Air Force, maintained that in modern war the seizure, occupation, and defense of land areas would usually require joint operations involving two or more components. In an amphibious or airborne operation involving units as large as a division, the Army should properly furnish the land forces. "For the Navy to organize, equip and maintain Marine divisions, corps or larger units against such a contingency violates . . . the Congressional mandate for maximum integration of the Armed Forces, elimination of unnecessary duplication, and operation of forces under unified command," according to the Army view.

The Navy rejected these attempts to limit the size and role of Fleet Marine Forces. The functions paper should specify that Fleet Marine Forces would consist of "combined arms" and would conduct "such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign." This last phrase was defined by the Navy as "an operation or a connected series of operations . . . for the purpose of gaining, extending, or maintaining control of the sea."

As a doctrinal justification for its views, the Navy sought to define its operations as those "at or from the sea." This was an extension of the wording of the Act, which provided that the Navy should be organized, trained, and equipped for combat "incident to operations at sea." This phrase, the Navy maintained,

was not "sufficiently definitive, without further interpretation, to delineate the specific missions and tasks of naval forces." The Navy thus was advocating in this instance a liberal interpretation of the language of the Act, though elsewhere a major portion of its case rested upon a strict interpretation of the provisions of the Act that recognized the existence of the Marine Corps and of Naval aviation.

The passages dealing with collateral, or secondary, functions opened another area of contention. The Army and Air Force maintained that "forces developed to perform the primary functions . . . shall be employed to support and supplement the other components in carrying out their primary functions . . . whenever such participation will result in increased effectiveness and economy and will contribute to the accomplishment of the over-all military objectives." The Service having responsibility for a primary function would determine "the nature and extent" of collateral participation by the other Services as well as "any requirements developed thereby" for weapons or equipment for the Services furnishing collateral support. The Navy view was that all the Services should be assigned specific collateral functions for which they would be responsible without regard to the greater responsibilities of another Service for the same function. The extent of participation in a collateral function, as well as the equipment and weapons needed to discharge it, would be determined by the Service performing the collateral function. The Navy claimed the right, as part of its collateral functions, to "interdict enemy land and air power and communications through operation at and from the sea, . . . conduct carrier-based strategic air operations, . . . conduct close air support for land operations, [and] furnish aerial photography for cartographic purposes." [19]

Basic Roles and Missions Decisions: The Key West Agreement

In the hope of resolving the Service disagreements, Secretary Forrestal called a prolonged meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Key West Naval Base to thrash out the whole controversy and to decide "who will do what with what." If the Joint Chiefs of Staff failed to reach agreement, he informed a press conference on 10 March, "I shall have to make my own decisions." [20]

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff convened at Key West on 11 March, Secretary Forrestal announced a decision on one of the major controversies. The Navy would retain its air power, he said, and would be responsible for determining the means required to carry out naval air missions. But this authority could not be used to justify creation of a naval strategic air force. Strategic bombing was the responsibility of the Air Force. Both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, appeared to accept this ruling. Admiral Denfeld stated that the Navy had no intention of developing a separate strategic air force, and General Spaatz responded that the Air Force had no desire to deprive the Navy of its carriers.[21]

During ensuing sessions at Key West on 12, 13 and 14 March, followed by a final session in Washington on the 20th, Secretary Forrestal and the Joint Chiefs

of Staff worked out the principles that would govern Air Force-Navy relationships concerning strategic air operations. There was general agreement that the capabilities of naval aviation should be utilized to the maximum. Consequently, the Navy would be assigned essentially the collateral functions that it had sought: interdicting land communications and land-based air, providing close support to land operations, and participating in the overall air effort. Decisions regarding the extent of the use of naval aviation for these purposes would be made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting on recommendations of the Chief of Staff, US Air Force. The Chief of Naval Operations, however, was not to be denied the right to address the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any issue. Regarding collateral functions in general, it was agreed that, while these might be accepted as constituting additional justification for "stated force requirements," they would *not* be used "as the basis for establishing additional force requirements."

The size, composition, and functions of the Marine Corps, were settled at Key West largely on the basis of concessions by General Bradley. He dropped the Army's insistence on limiting Marine Corps units to less than division-size. The agreement reached was that there should be no attempt to abolish the Marine Corps or to restrict it unduly in the discharge of its functions. But to avoid unnecessary duplication, the Marine Corps, for present planning purposes, should not exceed four divisions or have a field unit headquarters higher than a corps.[22]

A memorandum formally recording these understandings, commonly known as the "Key West Agreement," was sent to the Secretary of Defense by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 29 April 1948. After amending one paragraph that dealt with research and development, the Secretary formally approved it on 1 July 1948.[23]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared a new statement of "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff" on the basis of the Key West Agreement and submitted it to the Secretary of Defense on 26 March. He approved it the same day and recommended to President Truman that he revoke Executive Order 9877 and direct the issuance of the new "Functions Paper" in its stead. President Truman accepted this recommendation on 21 April, and on the same day Secretary Forrestal issued the "Functions Paper" to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries.[24]

Any hope that the Key West Agreement would finally resolve the major issues dividing the Services was quickly dashed. Even while it was being worked out there were indications that the apparent agreement over air power by the Air Force and Navy was not the product of mutual conviction. On 16 March, General Spaatz informed Secretary Forrestal that the Air Force did not wholly agree with the decisions reached at Key West. The basic question, General Spaatz said, was whether there were to be two air forces, with separate and duplicating components such as training and service commands. Secretary Forrestal rejoined that the existence of the Navy's air arm had been recognized in the National Security Act; hence General Spaatz was proposing, in effect, that the Act be amended. He did not intend to be drawn into a discussion on this point, added the Secretary, "because we had a law that was given us by Congress and it was up to us to carry it out."[25]

Decision on Control of Atomic Weapons: The Newport Agreement

A more serious obstacle to interservice harmony was an issue not resolved at Key West—control of atomic weapons. One of the oral agreements reached there was that the Navy should not be denied the use of these devices. But even before the Key West Agreement had obtained final approval, General Spaatz stated his claim to exclusive control by the Air Force of all use of these dominant weapons by the Military Establishment. On 23 March 1948, he called upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend to the Secretary of Defense that the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, be designated as the executive agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "for directing and supervising the operational functions of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project." This organization had been formed early in 1947 by the Secretaries of War and Navy to assume responsibility for all participation by the armed forces in developing the military uses of atomic energy. As organized in March 1948, it was under the direction of all three Service Chiefs. This was a situation, General Spaatz maintained, that "could result in the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project receiving individual uncoordinated, and even conflicting requests and instructions," a condition inimical to the effective discharge by the Air Force of its assigned responsibilities for the conduct of strategic air operations.[26]

General Bradley, on 13 July 1948, informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he shared the concern expressed by the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, and concurred in his proposal for obtaining control over activities of the Armed Forces Weapons Project relating to strategic atomic air operations.[27]

Admiral Denfeld, however, objected that the Air Force proposal would deny the Navy essential support for atomic operations in support of naval operations. He maintained, in addition, that existing command relationships adequately supported strategic air operations by the Air Force.[28]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, meeting on 22 July, were unable to resolve these differences and accordingly agreed to forward the separate Air Force and Navy views to the Secretary of Defense. These views, forwarded on 28 July, elicited from the Secretary a request for the views of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Leahy, responding on 7 August, opposed the Air Force recommendation on the ground that it would "effectively and probably permanently transfer from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to one of its members, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, complete control of the preparation and use of all atomic weapons. . . ." General Bradley, in his reply of 3 August, reiterated his support of the Air Force position but in modified form. He now recommended that, pending completion of a study of command and control procedures by the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project be directed to report to General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, who had succeeded General Spaatz as Air Force Chief of Staff, for instructions on atomic aspects of HALF MOON, the current agreed emergency war plan.[29]

At the time Secretary Forrestal received these communications from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he had already had occasion to discuss the matter with the three

Service Secretaries. A meeting on 19 July had elicited from them the same positions as were currently being taken by the three uniformed Service Chiefs. Secretary Forrestal had suggested that the dispute might be settled by assigning the atomic bomb to the Air Force on the basis of dominant interest but with rights of appeal by the Navy to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense, and limiting Navy atomic air sorties to strategic targets assigned by the Air Force and targets of purely naval interest.[30]

Secretary Forrestal did not, however, act immediately along these lines. He chose instead to seek more information and, to this end, recalled General Spaatz and Admiral John H. Towers, former chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, to active duty. He directed them to "set down your fundamental concept of strategic warfare as it might have to be waged in the defense of the United States . . . I think it desirable to do two things: (1) point up the issues involved; (2) recommend the decisions which should be made on these issues."[31]

The two retired officers were no more successful in resolving the divergence of view than their colleagues on active duty had been. In their report to the Secretary of Defense on 18 August Admiral Towers held that operational control of . . . (atomic) weapons should not be vested in any one Service," and General Spaatz insisted that control "should be vested in the Chief of Staff of the Air Force acting as executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff."[32]

Faced with disagreement on the part of his principal military advisers, Secretary Forrestal once again called the Joint Chiefs of Staff into extended session outside Washington. From 20 to 22 August they met at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, and, as at Key West, reached agreement, at least temporarily. In a decision favoring the Air Force, it was agreed that, as an "interim measure," the Chief, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, would report to the Chief of Staff, US Air Force. But in line with the Army recommendation, "any decision concerning the permanent future organization for the control and direction of atomic operations" would be postponed until the Military Liaison Committee had completed its study. The Navy interest was protected to a degree by a supplement to the "Functions Paper" to the effect that, while each Service "must have exclusive responsibility for programming and planning" in the field of its primary missions, they must "take into account the contributions which may be made by forces from other Services."[33]

The Key West and Newport Agreements resolved some, but by no means all, of the interservice differences over their respective functions. But, as will be revealed in the ensuing chapters, the severe budgetary stringency imposed by President Truman on the Military Establishment served to reopen many of the disputes that had supposedly been settled by these agreements.

6

The FY 1949 Supplemental Budget: Initial Effort to Rearm

Communist expansionism in the Mediterranean and Czechoslovakia, coming on the heels of earlier evidence of Soviet imperialism (such as the reduction of Poland and the Balkan countries to the status of satellites), convinced the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a substantial degree of rearmament was imperative. Existing US military capabilities, they warned during the Berlin crisis, were not adequate to support foreign policies.[1] A stronger military establishment seemed clearly indicated in view of the aggressive foreign policy being pursued by the USSR.

But this imbalance between forces and commitments had become evident well before the crisis of 1948. In the immediate postwar years, US armed forces, short of both men and money, appeared woefully inadequate to protect the national interest. The shrinkage of the Army and Navy, which began as soon as World War II ended, continued. President Truman, in his budget for FY 1948, had sought to arrest the decline; in fact, he proposed a modest increase to an average manpower strength of 1,641,000 in FY 1948, as compared with the 1,566,000 in service on 30 June 1947. Congress, however, had reduced the President's budget request by almost 10 percent, from $9.647 billion to $8.751 billion.[2] Manpower objectives were accordingly reduced. Even so, however, they proved impossible to attain, owing to the expiration of selective service and the failure of Congress to enact the President's Universal Military Training (UMT) program. The Army, especially, was hard hit as discharges outran enlistments by a wide margin.[3]

The condition of the nation's armed forces was explained in detail by General Gruenther, Director of the Joint Staff, at a White House meeting on 18 February 1948. He presented the following figures to demonstrate the manpower shortage in the Services:

	Budget Authorization	*Actual Strength*
Army	560,000	552,000[4]
Navy	439,000	397,000
Marine Corps	87,000	79,000
Air Force	362,000	346,000
Total	1,448,000	1,374,000

General Gruenther stressed particularly the continuing decline in the strength of the Army, which, he forecast, would be short 165,000 men by the end of 1948. He cited the "possible explosive points in the world," listing Greece, Italy, Korea, and Palestine (the crises over Czechoslovakia and Berlin being as yet unforeseen). He pointed out that the employment of any force larger than a division would necessitate partial mobilization. The Navy's personnel situation he characterized as "acute," resulting in the immobilization of 107 ships, although it was anticipated that this situation would improve by 1 July 1948. The condition of the Air Force was "satisfactory," despite a small deficiency in manpower. Indeed, that Service had succeeded in increasing its unit strength to 55 groups by January 1948, as compared with 38 at the end of FY 1947.[5] In spite of General Gruenther's presentation, President Truman took no immediate remedial action.

Resumption of Selective Service

General Bradley, surveying the condition of the armed forces, proposed to his colleagues on 11 March 1948 that they urge the Secretary of Defense to seek resumption of selective service as the only way to meet manpower needs in the light of the world situation. He pointed out that present military manpower was well below the projected strength requirements of current joint war plans. Universal military training, he added, was at best a long-range solution which would not provide the necessary manpower in time.[6]

General Bradley's paper was taken up the following day at Key West, where the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense were deliberating on Service roles and missions. They agreed that it was now necessary to ask for an immediate resumption of selective service.[7]

President Truman accepted the recommendations of Secretary Forrestal and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and on 15 March informed the Secretary of his decision to "go all out" for selective service and UMT.[8] To give his remarks maximum impact, the President delivered them before a joint session of the two houses of Congress on 17 March. Stating that the United States had learned the "importance of maintaining military strength as a means of preventing war," he recommended the prompt enactment of UMT as the "only feasible means by which the civilian components of our armed forces can be built up if we are to be prepared for emergencies," and as "unmistakable evidence to all the world that our determination is to back the will to peace with the strength for peace." To restore the

regular forces to authorized strength until UMT became established, the President recommended the temporary reenactment of selective service legislation. The President also urged quick action on the European Recovery Program.

Congress responded with alacrity to the request for the reinstitution of the draft. On 12 June 1948, it passed the Selective Service Act of 1948, which President Truman signed into law on 24 June. Far from proving a temporary measure, however, the military draft was to remain in effect until 1973, a quarter of a century later.[9]

Proposals for a $3 Billion Supplemental Appropriation

Besides seeking to reinstitute conscription, the President also decided upon an immediate increase in military personnel to a total of 1,734,000 at a cost of $1.5 billion over the budget for FY 1949. The Service Departments indicated that they needed much more money, however. The President tentatively agreed to preparation of a program of $3 billion.[10]

The $3 billion proposal represented about a 30 percent increase in the new obligational authority the President had originally requested for FY 1949. These original figures were Army, $4.660 billion; Navy, $3.668 billion; Air Force, $1.469 billion; and OSD, $6.395 million, for a total of $9.803 billion. The Air Force figure provided only for the salaries of the Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Air Force and for procurement, maintenance, and operation of aircraft. Remaining Air Force fund requests were combined with those of the Army. This funding was intended to provide an average personnel strength of 1,423,427, of which 560,000 had been allocated to the Army, 417,589 to the Navy, 83,548 to the Marine Corps, and 362,290 to the Air Force. With this strength, it was planned to maintain 10 Army and 2 Marine divisions, 55 air groups, and 260 major combatant ships including 11 fleet carriers.[11]

Secretary Forrestal presented the $3 billion supplemental to Congress on 25 March. Appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, he called for "a balanced strength in manpower—on the ground, on the sea, in the air.... We need," he continued,

> a strong air force, capable of striking sustained blows far beyond the peripheral bases we now hold.... We need a ground force to protect our air bases.... [and] to seize and hold more distant bases—should the attack fall upon us—in order to take the war to the enemy and not suffer its ravages here in America.... We need a Navy capable of defending ... sea lanes ..., of developing antisubmarine warfare, of insuring the sea transportation of our manpower and our logistical supplies ... to distant points, and of assisting both attack and defense through air-sea power and amphibious operations.

To meet these needs, the Secretary pointed out, would require an increase in military manpower. He accordingly proposed a program divided into two parts. The first part, designed to provide for the immediate need to build up the regular

forces, would, by means of selective service, increase the Armed Services from their 1 March 1948 strengths as follows:

	Increase by	*From*	*To*
Army	240,000	542,000	782,000
Navy	63,000	397,000	460,000
Marine Corps	11,000	81,000	92,000
Air Force	35,500	364,500	400,000
Total	349,500	1,384,500	1,734,00

To finance these increases, Secretary Forrestal explained, would require $3 billion in additional obligational authority for FY 1949. Of this sum, $775,000,000 would be allocated to aircraft procurement and research and development for the Air Force and Naval aviation. The remainder of the $3 billion would be allotted to procurement, support, maintenance, and operations of the three Services.

The second part of the Secretary's program was designed to provide adequate reserves. It was to be achieved by building up the National Guard and the Reserve Corps by means of UMT. He made no request for additional funding, pointing out that the initial budget requests for FY 1949 included $500,000,000 to establish UMT.[12]

On 1 April, President Truman addressed a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives stating that he had authorized the Secretary of Defense to prepare detailed estimates for additional appropriations totalling $3 billion, and giving more detail on the allocation of this sum. The President's breakdown was as follows:[13]

1. Additional military personnel	$775,000,000
2. Aircraft procurement and research and development; Air Force	465,000,000
Navy	310,000,000
3. Maintenance and operation of facilities and equipment	860,000,000
4. Procurement and production	500,000,000
5. Research and development other than air, civilian components, administration, contingent expenses	90,000,000

Secretary Forrestal had already requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the allocation of the $3 billion. In a memorandum of 30 March, the Secretary requested their recommendations on the "basic principles and assumptions" to guide the Office of Budget of the Secretary of Defense in preparing tentative allocations.[14]

With this request, Secretary Forrestal brought the Joint Chiefs of Staff into the budgetary process for the first time. Before the passage of the National Security Act, the War and Navy Departments had budgeted separately for their own needs and without guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The two Departments had already submitted their budgets for FY 1949 to the Bureau of the Budget at

the time the new National Defense Establishment began to function. Consideration had been given, nevertheless, to JCS participation in the budgetary process for FY 1949. On 3 October 1947, an ad hoc budget committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Wilfred McNeil, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, and including representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Military Departments, discussed budget procedure under the newly enacted National Security Act, including the question of JCS participation in the preparation of the FY 1949 budget.[15] General Gruenther proposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that their participation be in the form of a presentation before the assembled appropriate congressional committees in support of the separate Service budgets. After some discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided on 19 February 1948 that they would participate in that manner, basing their testimony on joint intelligence estimates of enemy capabilities, since JCS strategic guidance had not been provided in the preparation of the budget.[16]

The JCS recommendations regarding the extra $3 billion for FY 1949 were transmitted on 16 April. In arriving at the requested "basic principles," they had felt it necessary to make them applicable to the total FY 1949 budget "in order to further the security of the Western Hemisphere and promote the development of its warmaking capacity." The guiding principles, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should be: to prepare for the implementation of emergency war measures through the maintenance of the regular forces in a high state of readiness, to support US foreign policy, to attain superiority in all fields of warfare by means of research and development programs, and to prepare for rapid industrial mobilization in the event of war.

With regard to the allocation of the money, the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated their understanding that $1.586 billion had already been allocated for aircraft procurement and personnel increases. This amount, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote, together with the sums provided by the regular FY 1949 budget, "would assist the armed forces in developing an improved state of readiness of their present forces." The balance of the $3 billion, therefore, should be for measures essential to effective implementation of emergency war plans, including maintenance of an effective intelligence organization and rehabilitation and maintenance of equipment and bases essential to mobilization. Any funds remaining after these needs were met should be devoted to increased research and development and industrial mobilization planning.[17]

The 70-Group Air Force

The prospect of an expanded military budget kindled hopes within the Services and among their congressional backers for achievement of the force structures each considered essential to national security. This development was most pronounced in the Air Force and centered on the desire of that Service to attain a strength of 70 groups. This was a goal that had its genesis in a study prepared

early in 1946 by the Air Staff of what was then the Army Air Forces as a blueprint for the postwar period.[18]

The 70-group objective received powerful support early in 1948 from a prestigious civilian panel—the President's Air Policy Commission. This body was appointed by President Truman on 18 July 1947 to make an "objective inquiry into national aviation policies and problems," including "the utilization of aircraft by the armed services." Named as Chairman of the Commission was Thomas K. Finletter, a prominent New York attorney, who had served in the Department of State briefly during World War II, though he had no background or experience in military aviation. Three of the other members, while distinguished in engineering, publishing, and finance, were similarly unfamiliar with the subject at hand. Only George P. Baker, a Harvard economist who had been vice-chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, had any direct experience in aviation.

The Commission opened its hearings on 8 September 1947 and closed them on 3 December. During that period it met more than 200 times and heard about 150 witnesses, including the Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and leaders of the aircraft industry and the scientific community. It also visited the major US aircraft factories and observed naval air operations aboard the carrier USS *Midway*.

The Commission submitted its report to President Truman on 30 December 1947. The defense of the United States "must be based on air power," the Commission concluded, because new aircraft and new weapons which could be delivered by air made possible a devastating attack upon the continental United States. A strong, well-equipped modern air force was therefore essential to defeat hostile air attack and to deal the aggressor a crushing counteroffensive blow. At present, the Commission conceded, potential enemies possessed neither the atomic weapons nor the means of delivery to launch a devastating air attack upon the United States, but scientific progress was so rapid in these fields that it would be imprudent, in the Commission's opinion, to assume in defense planning that such an attack would not be possible by the end of 1952. By that date, the Commission believed that the United States must have in being an Air Force consisting of a regular establishment of 70 groups (6,869 frontline aircraft), an Air National Guard of 27 groups (3,212 frontline aircraft), an adequately equipped 34-group Air Reserve, and a replacement reserve of 8,100 aircraft. An adequate defense against an enemy possessing atomic bombs and the means to deliver them in the United States would also require a Naval air arm consisting of 5,793 frontline planes, plus about 5,100 in support.

The buildup of air power must begin at once, the Commission concluded, and continue until 1952. Air Force appropriations for FY 1948 and FY 1949 should therefore be increased by $1.3 billion each year. Navy appropriations by FY 1948 should be increased by $192 million and $502 million for FYs 1948 and 1949, respectively. Appropriations for later years should be determined by a complete review of the Military Establishment, which the Commission recommended take place on 1 January 1950. The trend in defense appropriations, unless substantial economies could be realized by unification, would result in an $18 billion budget for FY 1952, the Commission predicted.[19]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in response to specific inquiries from the Commission, had produced two estimates of minimum air strength. The first, based on current intelligence calculations that the US monopoly on atomic weapons would last until 1952, was for a regular Air Force of 70 groups and 22 squadrons backed up by 27 National Guard and 8⅓ Reserve groups. A total of 20,599 aircraft, 12,441 in units and 8,158 in reserve, would be required. The Navy during the same period would require 14,474 aircraft. Problems of aircraft production, however, made it impracticable for the Air Force and Navy to attain the desired strength before 1 July 1952. The second estimate, for the period when a potential enemy possessed weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them on cities of the United States, was highly speculative and therefore should not be published. It was for an Air Force of 104⅓ regular, 28 National Guard, and 34 Reserve groups and a total of 43,499 aircraft, plus 17,472 aircraft for the Navy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in making these estimates of airpower requirements, stressed the need to make parallel expansions of other forces in order to maintain a balanced, effective military organization.[20]

The size of the Air Force became an issue during Secretary Forrestal's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 25 March on the proposed $3 billion increase in the FY 1949 military budget. On that occasion he was asked the cost of a defense establishment of balanced military forces including a 70-group Air Force. Secretary Forrestal replied that the total cost of such a force would amount to some $15 to $18 billion over and above the amounts requested for FY 1949.[21]

JCS Appraisal of the Impact of a 70-Group Air Force on Force Structure

Upon his return from Capitol Hill, Secretary Forrestal asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reexamine their previous position and to address the question of "the size of the military establishment that would be required if the 70-group program and all of the supporting elements were put into effect." The Joint Chiefs of Staff were to include supporting budgetary estimates and also to recommend whether the administration should now advocate such a program.[22] On 8 April, Mr. Forrestal rephrased his inquiry, indicating the specific questions that he wished to have answered as follows:[23]

1. Has re-examination of strategic plans resulted in affirmation of the previous plan submitted—namely, 70 groups for the Air Force and 14,474 planes for the Navy—To wit: That parallel expansion of other forces is necessary? If not, what modifications are recommended?

2. If the previous recommendations are affirmed, what is the appropriate size of the three Services?

3. In case sufficient funds cannot be obtained for the entire foregoing balanced force, what elements do the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend for activation and support, and in what priorities?

4. Do the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the request of the Air Force for a 70-group program, regardless of whether the Army and Navy receive increases?

5. Is there, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, any necessity for "war gaming" the plans presently recommend?

6. Should the administration, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, advocate the 70-group program, and, if so, should such advocacy include or exclude increases for the other Services?

Whatever the Joint Chiefs of Staff might recommend, Secretary Forrestal had evidently determined that some buildup in air power was urgently needed. On 8 April, the same day he posed his question to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary proposed to the House Appropriations Committee that all funds for aircraft procurement requested in the regular and supplemental budget requests for FY 1949 be considered as FY 1948 supplemental requests and be made available immediately for contract authorization. His purpose was to expedite the expansion of aircraft production.

In making this proposal, the Secretary pointed out that he was neither for nor against a 70-group Air Force. This neutral attitude was not, however, the case in Congress, where a bipartisan group headed by Representative Carl Vinson, the ranking minority member on the House Armed Services Committee, moved to add an additional $922 million for the 70-group Air Force. Secretary Symington and General Spaatz testified in its favor before the Committee. In spite of Secretary Forrestal's urging of an orderly buildup of air power, the House on 15 April added $822 million to Forrestal's aircraft procurement proposal and passed the whole by a vote of 343 to 3. But in final form the bill had been softened somewhat through the efforts of Representative John Taber, who had succeeded in amending it to stretch out the effective period to two years and to make the spending of the money dependent on a Presidential finding as to necessity.[24]

The answers to Secretary Forrestal's questions of 8 April were thus in danger of being at least partly overtaken by congressional action when the Joint Chiefs of Staff supplied them on 14 April. They were in the form of a report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee given to the Secretary informally to ascertain whether the answers supplied all the information required. Secretary Forrestal stated that it was his "understanding that this draft represents the unanimous opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." The draft, however, contained divergent Service views on two of the six questions.

In reply to the Secretary's first question, which dealt with the adequacy of their estimates for the Finletter Commission, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that further study demonstrated a need for D-day forces actually in excess of these estimated earlier. The procurement of reserve aircraft, however, might be deferred. They agreed also that expansion of air power to the stated goals (70 groups for the Air Force and 14,474 aircraft for the Navy) should be matched by a parallel expansion of surface forces.

Regarding the appropriate size of the Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded separate estimates from each Service of its "appropriate size . . . within a balanced military establishment," together with cost figures. The Army sought a strength of 837,000 with which to support 12 regular divisions, 13 full-strength National Guard divisions, and 25 Reserve divisions. The desired personnel strength was to be achieved by the end of FY 1950, the regular divisions would be ready by the end of FY 1949, and the Reserve and National Guard divisions by the end of FY 1952. The Navy sought strengths of 560,400 Naval and 108,200 Marine personnel by the end of FY 1950, with a fleet of 384 major combat ships, including 16 fleet carriers, by the same date. No force structure for the Marine Corps was indicated. The Army had prepared its own recommendations regarding the size of the Navy, and proposed a limit of 552,000 for the Navy and Marine Corps combined, with active fleet units in keeping with this figure. The Air Force desired a personnel strength of 502,000 with which to attain 70 groups by the end of FY 1953. Budget estimates to attain these force levels called for new obligational authority in the following amounts (millions):

	FY 1949	*FY 1950*	*FY 1951*	*FY 1952*
Army	$ 6,280	$ 7,207	$ 7,225	$ 7,335
Navy	7,579	7,965	7,965	7,965
Air Force	5,442	6,553	7,343	7,480
Total	$19,301	$21,725	$22,533	$22,780

The cost figures for FY 1949 exceeded the President's original budget by over $9 billion, or about three times as much as the supplemental appropriations request that had just been sent to Congress. It was therefore necessary to choose among Service programs, as Secretary Forrestal had requested in his third question, and indicate those to be supported with the limited funds available. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that rehabilitation of the aircraft industry and increases in the dangerously low personnel strength of the armed forces were urgent requirements. The $3 billion supplemental request allocated $1.586 billion for these purposes, leaving a balance of $1.414 billion. This amount, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out, was insufficient to give adequate and balanced support to the increases in personnel and aircraft that the $1.586 billion would provide. To support an Army of 780,000, a Navy-Marine Corps of 552,000, and an Air Force of 400,000, as called for in the supplemental budget request, would require, by individual Service estimates, the following additional amounts:

Army	$ 961,000,000
Navy	798,000,000
Air Force	906,916,000
Total	$2,665,916,000

The difference between this sum and the $1.414 billion balance was $1,251,916,000, which was the additional amount that would be required over and above the $3 billion supplemental.

In responding to the Secretary's request for their judgment on the 70-group Air Force program, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found themselves unable to reach agreement. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force maintained that a 70-group force was necessary to bring existing forces into balance. Some buildup of Army support was necessary to meet peacetime requirements, he conceded, and additional balanced expansion of all three Services within the limit of available funds was desirable after the 70-group goal had been attained.

The Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, on the other hand, were only prepared to support the Air Force request for 70 groups on condition that the Army and Navy received "commensurate" increases. An increase in the Air Force alone, they contended, would leave that Service "unable effectively to deploy—or employ—its aircraft against the enemy." This was the case because the limited range of available aircraft made it essential to seize and defend advanced operational bases—a task requiring adequate sea and ground forces.

With regard to war gaming of the recommended plans, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that it was desirable but not practicable because the forces in question were peacetime forces that did not entirely fit any existing plan. However, studies already completed demonstrated that, for a war in 1952 or thereafter, "the D-day requirement for forces will be considerably in excess of those forces herein proposed."

As for the Secretary's last question, regarding the nature of the military program that should be supported, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave it as their opinion, "based solely on military considerations," that "the Administration should advocate a balanced military establishment commensurate with the 70-group program for the Air Force." With regard to the phasing of this program, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized that non-military factors, such as the capability of the aircraft industry to expand, the impact on the national economy, and the risks that could be accepted in the light of changing world politico-military situations, would also have to be taken into account.

The apparent unanimity of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in recommending a "balanced military establishment commensurate with the 70-group program" concealed a disagreement over what constituted "balance." As the answers to the Secretary's fourth question revealed, the Air Force felt that an increase to 70 air groups was necessary to create balanced forces. The Army and Navy, on the other hand, believed that the Services were presently in balance and that an

increase in the Air Force would have to be offset by corresponding increases in the Army and Navy.[25]

Secretary Forrestal decided that the JCS replies, though generally satisfactory, did not provide enough advice regarding the disposition of supplemental funds. He accordingly asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make specific force recommendations to fit a $3 billion budget supplemental, as well as a hypothetical larger one of $5 billion.[26]

On 18 April, Secretary Forrestal learned from General Gruenther that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were meeting the next day "to go over the program of each Service, seventy-group wise, money-wise and every-wise." They were going to "find out and analyze, criticize and knock the—out of each other's budgetary programs." The Secretary determined, as he told Senator Chan Gurney, to "keep their noses in this until I get an answer that has some meaning to it. . . . because I do not want to go down there [to Congress] with speculative and unfirm answers."[27]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were joined by Secretary Forrestal in their deliberations on 19 April. It quickly became apparent that no agreement could be reached on a division of $3 billion. The Secretary then asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff how nearly they could reach their objectives with $3.5 billion. On this basis, agreement was reached on a program costing $3,481,000,000, which would provide the following personnel strengths by the end of FY 1949:

Army	790,000
Navy/Marines	552,000
Air Force	453,000
Total	1,795,000

Presidential Decision on the Supplemental Appropriation

On 21 April President Truman authorized Secretary Forrestal to have the Services prepare detailed estimates in support of the $3.481 billion program.[28] The approval implied by this action, however, was tentative; the program had still to be reviewed by the Bureau of the Budget.

Secretary Forrestal discussed the supplemental request with the Director of the Bureau, Mr. James E. Webb, on 6 May. The Bureau had by then reviewed the $3.481 billion program and reduced it to about $3 billion. Mr. Webb saw this request as presaging even larger ones in succeeding years, with the result that by FY 1952 the defense budget would approximate at least $18.2 billion, or $20 billion if prices continued to rise. The result would be a total Federal budget of $50 billion, an amount that, in Mr. Webb's opinion, was wholly unacceptable. He accordingly proposed a further reduction in the FY 1949 supplemental request to $2.5 billion, and a downward revision in force goals to the point where requests for new obligational authority could be held to $15.3 billion in FY 1950 and $15 billion in subsequent years.

Mr. Webb proposed to effect the reduction in the FY 1949 supplemental request by limiting the Air Force to a strength of 55 groups, deferring important elements of the Navy program, including procurement of aircraft and antisubmarine warfare components, and making some reduction in Army materiel support. Mr. Forrestal was willing to accept the reduction to $3 billion, but he demurred at any further cut, because he believed that the next 18 months to 2 years would prove a critical period in US-Soviet relations.[29]

The President announced his decision on 13 May, at a meeting of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. Reading from a memorandum that had been drafted by Mr. McNeil to the President's and Mr. Webb's specifications, Mr. Truman forecast that the $3.481 program would require about $15.5 billion in future years. A continuing level of about $15 billion, the President stated, was all the economy could stand, and unless there was a drastic deterioration in the world situation he did not intend to exceed that ceiling. To do so would be to end with a total national budget of about $50 billion, an amount that was several billion dollars more than estimated income at present tax rates. The result would be a resort to deficit financing, even with full employment and prosperity.

Even the $3 billion supplemental program of the Bureau of the Budget, the President said, was more than should be asked of Congress at present. But he was prepared to request it on condition that "administratively we do not, in the next eight months, create a military structure which would require in excess of approximately $15 billion for the next fiscal year. I do not want immediate action taken toward the activation of all the units contemplated—and by that I mean such things as Army training camps, Naval air stations and air groups." He was, in effect, willing to request the money but unwilling to let the Services spend it. In September, the President continued, there would be a review of the military program "to see if administratively we should not place a ceiling on our program at less than we contemplated in this supplemental."[30]

The President submitted his supplemental request to Congress the same day. He asked for $2.434 billion, which, added to the $725 million already requested for aircraft procurement on 8 April, totalled $3.159 billion in supplemental funds. Total requests for new obligational authority for FY 1949 thus became $12.962 billion (the original $9.803 billion plus the new item of $3.159 billion).[31]

Congressional Action on FY 1949 Appropriations

Congress had already indicated a desire to increase this amount by its action in adding to the administration's aircraft procurement bill. When legislative action on the military budget was completed, Congress had provided $13,942,102,023 in new obligational authority (including the $822 million already approved for aircraft procurement). Of the total, $3,061,307,200 was made available in FY 1948. The allocations to the Services were as shown below (in billions):[32]

	OSD	*Army*	*Navy*	*Air Force*	*Total*
Available FY 1948		$ .081	$ .935	$2.045	$ 3.061
Available FY 1949	$.007	4.136	3.989	2.748	10.880
Total	$.007	$4.217	$4.924	$4.793	$13.941

The figure approved by Congress exceeded the President's request by nearly $1 billion and in effect gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff more than they had agreed to accept, since the original supplemental figure of $3.48 billion, when added to the initial request of $9.8 billion, would have totalled only $13.3 billion. It was, however, less than the amount they believed necessary to support the force levels required by existing world conditions. Their search for a larger and more effective (and therefore more costly) military establishment was to continue through the preparation of the budgets for FYs 1950 and 1951.

7

The FY 1950 Budget: Rearmament Falls Short

Policy Guidance for the Budget

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, having failed to attain a level of military forces in keeping with national commitments through supplements to the FY 1949 budget, sought this goal through the regular military budget for FY 1950. President Truman's decision to limit this budget to $15 billion placed a ceiling on the means the Joint Chiefs of Staff could expect to be available for the attainment of their goal. However, new procedures were to give them a major voice in determining the size and character of military forces to be provided under this ceiling.[1]

From the outset, it was apparent that fiscal considerations would powerfully influence the budget for FY 1950, as they had the supplemental request for FY 1949 (described in the preceding chapter). On 20 March 1948, while the earlier budget was still under consideration, Secretary Forrestal and the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with Mr. Webb, of the Bureau of the Budget, to discuss plans for FY 1950. Secretary Forrestal put forth several preliminary estimates based on various manpower strengths. Mr. Webb judged that all would require deficit financing, which was contrary to the administration's current policy. He warned, moreover, that requirements for the European Recovery Program were deemed to take priority over any "substantial" military appropriations.[2]

The amount of money to be available for defense purposes in FY 1950 was announced by the President on 13 May 1948, at the same time that he laid down his decision limiting the Services to $3 billion in supplemental funds for FY 1949.[3] Nothing was to be done, he ordered, to create a "military structure" that would require more than $15 billion during the coming fiscal year. The President offered one concession to the Services, stipulating that the ceiling would be subject to review in December. Otherwise, his instructions were firm. Speaking as Commander in Chief, he concluded, he expected his orders "to be carried out wholeheartedly, in good spirit and without mental reservations."[4]

The President's decision was even more restrictive than it appeared, since the ceiling was expected to cover the cost of the strategic stockpile, which was later estimated at $600 million. In effect, therefore, the Services were limited to $14.4 billion in new obligational authority for 1950. The problem for the Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense, was to reconcile this predetermined ceiling with requirements based on military estimates.

The money requests of the National Military Establishment for FY 1950 constituted the first unified military budget ever prepared in the United States. As such they raised questions of procedures to be followed and of the responsibilities to be discharged by the various elements of the National Military Establishment and other elements of the national security machinery. Secretary Forrestal was particularly sensitive to the need for orderly budgeting procedures and was determined to assign major responsibilities in this field to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He had already called upon them for advice on both force structure and cost figures during the preparation of the FY 1949 supplemental requests. He had also insisted upon agreed recommendations. Both these practices were continued during preparation of the budget requests for FY 1950.

Mr. Forrestal's view of the military budget process extended beyond the National Military Establishment. Sound military plans, he believed, must be based on national policy guidance. To obtain this guidance, he addressed a memorandum to the National Security Council on 10 July 1948, pointing out that military planning presupposed determination by the appropriate authorities of potential threats to US national security. Such a determination must reflect US national objectives and should be based on collateral factors such as the psychological effects of varying degrees of military strength on potential enemies and on friends, as well as existing or probable international commitments. On the basis of approved objectives, it would be possible to determine the share of national resources to be allocated to military purposes and, within the limits of resources, the kinds of forces needed. At present, Soviet Russia was the only country likely to attack the United States in the next 10 years. Appraisals should therefore be made of the following possibilities: aggressive war by the Soviet Union; war started by Soviet miscalculation; and communist expansion by political or psychological means.

In view of these considerations, Secretary Forrestal saw an imperative need for a comprehensive statement of national policy, particularly as it related to the Soviet Union, to include an evaluation of risks, a statement of objectives, and an outline of measures to be taken to achieve them. The preparation of such a statement, in Secretary Forrestal's opinion, was clearly a function of the National Security Council, which, under the National Security Act, was responsible for "the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security." Since many of the basic issues involved concerned matters within the province of the Department of State, Mr. Forrestal suggested that State be asked to prepare an initial draft for use as a basis for discussion in the National Security Council.

Secretary Forrestal attached such importance to this project that he wrote a letter to President Truman describing it and recommending it be given the high-

est priority. The National Security Council accepted Secretary Forrestal's proposal and requested the Department of State to prepare a preliminary draft.[5]

The procedure envisioned by Secretary Forrestal was eminently logical. If followed, it would produce a military establishment closely attuned to national needs, as defined by higher authority. But it was not clear how this procedure was to be reconciled with the budget limit already laid down by the President—a limit based on considerations unrelated to "national security" as usually defined. Secretary Forrestal made no mention, in his memorandum to the Council or his letter to the President, of this incipient conflict.

The National Security Council had not been entirely idle in this field prior to this time. On 30 March 1948, the Council Staff, acting on its own initiative, had produced NSC 7, a paper entitled "The Position of the United States with Respect to Soviet-Directed World Communism." Describing the "ultimate objective" of the Soviet Union to be "domination of the world," the NSC Staff concluded that to frustrate the attainment of this goal was vital to the security of the United States. This could not be achieved by a defensive policy. The United States, therefore, must take the lead in organizing a worldwide counteroffensive to mobilize the free world against the danger of Soviet domination. To this end, the United States should take immediate measures at home, including some form of compulsory military service, to strengthen its military establistment, to maintain superiority in nuclear weapons, and to suppress domestic communists. Abroad, the United States should give general support to anticommunist countries, giving first priority to Western Europe, by adopting the European Recovery Program, endorsing the Western European Union, and helping to increase the military potential of member countries by providing machine tools, military equipment, and technical advice. The United States should also be prepared to take military measures in support of the Western European Union and other friendly nations in the event of unprovoked armed attack, to support underground movements behind the Iron Curtain, and to make US determination to resist aggression unmistakably clear so as to avoid accidental war through miscalculation.[6]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, to whom NSC 7 was referred by the Secretary of Defense on 1 April, replied that they were in general agreement with the analysis in the paper but wished to stress the importance of attaining sufficient armed strength before adopting measures that might result in military action against the Soviet Union. To this end, they expressly endorsed the suggestion for compulsory military service and called for increased military appropriations. They cautioned in particular against any kind of guarantee for the Western European Union, or message of resolve to the Soviet Union, without sufficient military strength to back them up. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also opposed diversion of resources to West European governments or East European undergrounds until US needs had been met. At their request, the Secretary of Defense forwarded the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the NSC. Action on NSC 7 was still pending when it was superseded by the project initiated by Mr. Forrestal.[7]

NSC 20/4: National Policy Guidance for the Military Budget

Acting in response to Secretary Forrestal's request of 10 July 1948, the Department of State forwarded a paper entitled "U.S. Objectives with Respect to Russia" to the Council on 18 August. This paper was prepared by the Policy Planning Staff, whose Director, Mr. George Kennan, was a leading specialist in Soviet affairs. Mr. Kennan's views on Soviet behavior had already had wide influence at high levels of the Truman administration and among the general public. In his message of 22 February 1946 from Moscow, Mr. Kennan had offered an interpretation of Soviet policy, based on his reading of Russian history, as implacably hostile to the Western democracies. To seek a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet regime, Mr. Kennan had argued, would prove a chimerical process leading not to an end but only to a continuation of political warfare.[8]

In a famous article entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" that appeared in the magazine *Foreign Affairs* for 1 July 1947 under the pseudonym "X," Mr. Kennan elaborated these views and outlined his recommendations for a suitable US policy. The "political personality" of Soviet power, Mr. Kennan wrote, was a product of Marxist ideology combined with circumstances. The situation that followed the Russian revolution, when the communists ruled as a tiny minority while beset with civil war and foreign intervention, made the establishment of dictatorial power necessary. The effort to consolidate their absolute power, which had not been fully realized, absorbed most of the attention of the communist rulers. It led them to suppress all opposition at home and to attempt to expand beyond Russia's borders in order to secure their power against the outside world.

The interrelationship of these forces of ideology and circumstance created a mentality dominated by certain concepts. The first was that of innate antagonism between capitalism and communism, which meant that the Soviet leaders could never assume a community of aims between their country and the capitalist powers. The second was that of the infallibility of the Kremlin; truth was considered to reside in the Communist Party and nowhere else. A third was tactical flexibility; the Soviet leadership, rather than invariably conforming to communist dogma, felt free to advance any particular thesis found useful at a given moment. These three concepts together, according to Mr. Kennan, made it impossible for Soviet leaders to be swayed by what Westerners regarded as logic; they could only be moved by actions. But since they believed that they represented the inevitable force of history, they felt no compulsion to accomplish their purposes in a hurry; they were prepared to accept temporary setbacks and to retreat in the face of superior force.

"In these circumstances," Mr. Kennan wrote, "it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant *containment* [italics supplied] of Russian expansive tendencies. . . ." This would be designed to "confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interest of a peaceful and stable world."

The possibilities for US policy were by no means limited to "holding the line and hoping for the best," Mr. Kennan maintained. The United States, he wrote,

has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.[9]

The State Department Policy Planning Staff, in the paper to the National Security Council, elaborated on this last point by proposing specific ways in which the United States could reduce Soviet power and induce the Soviet Government to change its approach to international relations. The basic objectives of the United States with respect to the Soviet Union were two: to reduce the power and influence of Moscow so that it no longer constituted a "threat to the peace and stability of international society"; and to bring about a "basic change in the theory and practice of international relations" by the Soviet Government. If these objectives could be achieved, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union would be reduced to "normal dimensions."

There were two spheres in which the power and influence of Moscow had been projected beyond Soviet borders. One was in the geographically contiguous "satellite" states of Eastern Europe, where the presence or proximity of the Red Army had been a vital factor in establishing and maintaining Soviet hegemony. The other was in countries more geographically distant from the Soviet Union where there were groups or parties that looked to Moscow for political guidance and gave to it, consciously or otherwise, their basic loyalty. In the second of these two spheres, a complete retraction of undue Soviet power should be possible without engaging the more vital interests of the Soviet Union. The same was largely true in the first sphere, except in cases where the Soviet Union had actually extended its boundaries since 1939.

The aims of US policy toward the Soviet Union should flow logically from the nature of the Soviet threat to the peace and stability of international society. The means to achieve these aims would naturally differ in peace and in war. In time of peace, the retraction of Soviet power and influence from the satellite states would be achieved by placing the "greatest possible strain on the structure of relationships by which Soviet domination . . . is maintained and gradually, with the aid of the natural and legitimate forces of Europe, to maneuver the Russians out of their position of primacy and to enable the respective governments to regain their independence of action." The offering of economic aid to the satellite countries under the Marshall Plan, thereby forcing the Soviets either to permit the satellites to develop ties with the West at the expense of exclusive relations with the Soviet Union, or to force them to reject the offered assistance at heavy economic sacrifices to themselves, was a case in point. The disaffection of Tito, to which the strain caused by the Soviet rejection of the Marshall Plan undoubtedly contributed, clearly demonstrated that it was possible for stresses in Soviet-satellite relationships to lead to disruption of Soviet domination.

To bring about the retraction of Soviet power beyond the satellite area was primarily a task of enlightenment through effective information policies. This was so because the Soviet hold over people in those countries rested for the most

part on the myth, carefully nurtured by communist propaganda, that Soviet power was in some way connected with ideals of liberalism, freedom, and economic security. By its very excesses, however, the Soviet system was vulnerable to be exposed and discredited.

The second major objective, namely to change the concepts of international relations prevalent in Moscow's governing circles, could only be achieved over a long period, Mr. Kennan believed. To change the basic political psychology of the present Soviet leaders was impossible. They could not be swayed by arguments, but they could be influenced by a concrete situation in which it was not in the Russian interest to emphasize conflict. If this situation could be maintained for a long enough period, it might permanently modify the outlook and habits of Soviet rulers.

In taking up the pursuit of US objectives in time of war, the Policy Planning Staff first dismissed those considered as infeasible. First, it would not be practical to occupy all of the Soviet Union and impose military government over it. Second, and in consequence of the first consideration, the Soviet leaders would probably not surrender unconditionally but would seek a compromise peace. There was no likelihood, however, that the United States could find an alternate Russian leadership that would be "democratic" in the US sense of the term. Even after a successful military conflict, the United States would probably be forced to deal, in one degree or another, with a regime of which it did not entirely approve.

The "possible and desirable" aims in the event of war with Russia, were, therefore, the same as the ones to be sought in time of peace. Their attainment after military defeat of the Soviet Union, however, would be assured. Communist regimes in satellite countries would be overthrown, and Soviet prestige and influence abroad would be destroyed.[10]

The Policy Planning Staff paper went to the NSC Staff, which prepared a draft for consideration by the National Security Council. Entitled "U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Threats to U.S. Security" and designated NSC 20/3, it contained all of the State Department's objectives and aims in slightly reworded form but omitted the supporting rationale. NSC 20/3 also contained an analysis of the Soviet threat to the United States which was different in form from but not inconsistent with the views in Mr. Kennan's paper.

"The will and ability of the leaders of the USSR to pursue policies which threaten the security of the United States," read NSC 20/3, "constitute the greatest single danger to the U.S. within the foreseeable future." The "will" of the Soviet leaders derived from the tenet of communist ideology that the Soviet Communist Party as the "militant vanguard of the world proletariat in its rise to political power" and the USSR as the "base of the world communist movement" would not be safe until the noncommunist nations had been so weakened that communist influence was dominant throughout the world. The "ability" rested upon a number of bases: the complete centralization of power in the USSR and throughout the communist world; the appeal of a "pseudo-scientific ideology promising panaceas," disseminated by modern totalitarian propaganda machinery; the highly effective techniques of subversion, infiltration and capture of political power; the intimidating effect of Soviet military power; instability in

European countries shaken by the war, and in colonial or underdeveloped areas on which these European areas depended for markets and raw materials; and the Soviets' ability to exploit the tolerance accorded communists and their dupes in democratic countries.

There seemed little prospect that any Soviet action short of war could endanger US security, now that political stability had been restored to the countries of Western Europe. The Soviet capabilities for threatening the United States by armed forces, however, were dangerous and immediate. According to present intelligence estimates, Russian military forces had the capability to overrun all of continental Europe and the Middle East as far west as Cairo within six months, to subject Great Britain to severe air and missile bombardment, to wage serious submarine warfare, and to launch a number of one-way bomber sorties against the United States. These capabilities would increase progressively, and by 1955 the Soviet Union would be capable of launching "serious" air attacks against the United States, employing atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. If the Soviet leaders were able to consolidate their control over Western Europe and integrate it into the Soviet system, they would have at their command a concentration of power that would pose an "unacceptable threat to the security of the United States." However, a rapid conquest of Eurasia would tax Soviet logistic facilities and severely strain the Soviet economy. If, at the same time, the Soviet Union was engaged in a war with the United States and was subjected to air attack, it might not be able to hold the seized territories.

In spite of these Soviet capabilities, the Soviet Union was not thought to be planning any military action that would involve the United States at present. War, however, might result from a local incident between Soviet and US forces or through a miscalculation by the Soviet Union of US resolve to resist further encroachments. In any event, the danger of war was sufficiently great to warrant timely and adequate preparation by the United States.

To counter these threats to US national security posed by the Soviet Union, NSC 20/3 adopted the Policy Planning Staff's objectives and aims in slightly modified language. A new note, however, was a caution against over-spending which, as already indicated, had become a matter of serious concern to the Truman administration. "In pursuing these objectives," read NSC 20/3, "due care must be taken to avoid permanently impairing our economy and the fundamental values and institutions of our way of life." There were two general objectives, to be pursued by the US Government in both peace and war:

To reduce the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national independence and stability of the world family of nations.

To bring about a basic change in the conduct of international relations by the government in power in Russia, to conform with the purposes and principles set forth in the UN charter.

The United States should seek to obtain these objectives "by methods short of war," as follows:

To encourage and promote the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present perimeter areas around traditional Russian boundaries and the emergence of the satellite countries as entities independent of the USSR.

To encourage the development among the Russian peoples of attitudes which may help to modify current Soviet behavior and permit a revival of the national life of groups evidencing the ability and determination to achieve and maintain national independence.

To eradicate the myth by which people remote from Soviet military influence are held in a position of subservience to Moscow and to cause the world at large to see and understand the true nature of the USSR and the Soviet-directed world communist party, and to adopt a logical and realistic attitude toward them.

To create situations which will compel the Soviet government to recognize the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present concepts and the necessity of behaving in accordance with precepts of international conduct, as set forth in the purposes and principles of the UN charter.

The attainment of these aims would require action in the military field. The passage on this subject furnished the most precise guidance contained in NSC 20/3 that the National Military Establishment could use for budgetary planning purposes. The passage reads as follows:

Develop a level of military readiness which can be maintained as long as necessary as a deterrent to Soviet aggression, as indispensable support to our political attitude toward the USSR, as a source of encouragement to nations resisting Soviet political aggression, and as an adequate basis for immediate military commitments and for rapid mobilization should war prove unavoidable.

To attain these aims would also require the United States to strengthen its economy; to assure internal security against sabotage, subversion, and espionage; to inform the US public fully of the threats to national security; to strengthen the orientation of non-Soviet nations towards the United States, and help them increase their economic and political stability and military capability. The United States should also seek to place the maximum strain on Soviet relations with the satellites.

In the event of war with the Soviet Union, US objectives should be to eliminate Soviet domination over areas outside the Soviet Union, and to destroy the structure of relationships by which Russian communist leaders dominated individuals or groups in countries not under communist control. It should also be an objective of policy to deny to any postwar Russian regime military power to engage in aggressive war, to prevent the reestablishment of anything resembling the present "iron curtain" restrictions on contacts with the outside world, and to deny to any surviving communist regime in Russia the capability to fight on even terms with any other regime on Russian soil. The United States, finally, should create postwar conditions that would prevent the development of power relationships dangerous to the security of the United States.[11]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in response to an informal request, gave the Secretary of Defense their views on NSC 20/3 on 15 November. They stated that they were in general agreement with it but wished to reiterate the great importance they attached to keeping military capabilities in balance with foreign commitments. They reminded the Secretary of views they had expressed on 2 November 1948. At that time they had said that "current United States commitments involving the use or distinctly possible use of armed forces are very greatly in excess of our present ability to fulfill them either promptly or effectively." To this warning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff now added the view that if adequate armament was deemed to be excessive in cost, as warned against in NSC 20/3, it would be "appropriate to take very careful account of the dangers inherent in undue disparity between our capabilities and our commitments." The memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was circulated to the National Security Council for consideration in connection with NSC 20/3.[12]

The National Security Council adopted NSC 20/3, after making an editorial change, as NSC 20/4 on 23 November; the President approved it on 24 November. Secretary Forrestal now had his comprehensive statement of national policy. But he received it too late to be of any value in preparing the National Military Establishment budget estimates for FY 1950, which was the purpose for which he had requested it. President Truman's approval of NSC 20/4 came only a week before the Secretary of Defense submitted his budget estimates to the White House.[13]

JCS Responsibilities for FY 1950 Budgetary Preparations

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized the need for participating in the preparation of the budget of the new National Military Establishment almost from its inception. The JCS role had been discussed by the ad hoc committee under Mr. McNeil that was appointed in October 1947, after the passage of the National Security Act.[14] Following a suggestion made during these discussions, General Gruenther on 23 October recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they prepare, by 1 January 1948, a strategic concept and outline a strategic war plan to serve as the basis for the budgets of the Services. These should be presented to the Bureau of the Budget about 1 June so that the Bureau's recommendations for appropriations would reflect the requirements of the armed forces. On the recommendation of General Bradley, this proposal was expanded to include a statement of military requirements, in order to provide the Services with a firm foundation for the preparation of their budget estimates. The statement of requirements was to be based on agreed strategic concepts, joint outline war plans, and current national security commitments and would include the following: a list of tasks and the priority of each; force requirements; and general strategic guidance for the development of military installations and bases. Since time was pressing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that the statement of requirements for FY 1950 be submitted not later than 15 April, and for subsequent years by January.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also agreed to submit to the Secretary of Defense by 1 June 1948 and each year thereafter a statement of the world strategic situation and basic military requirements, for his use in apportioning military appropriations. This statement would be revised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if necessary, by September and again in January for use by the Secretary of Defense and the military services in defending the budget estimates before the Bureau of the Budget and Congress.[15]

The orderly procedure adopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, designed to tailor the budget requests to previously agreed requirements, might, had it been carried out, have introduced some degree of harmony into the budget estimates of the National Military Establishment. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not complete their estimate of requirements by their self-imposed target date of 15 April. They did not approve the statement of requirements until 24 July. By that time the Services were far advanced in preparation of their own estimates, based on unilateral assumptions of strengths, major programs, and operational requirements, and in accordance with the normal budget timetable, which had begun in April.[16]

Secretary Forrestal, through informal discussions with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was aware of their study of military requirements. On 17 July he addressed a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff directing them, as his principal military advisers under Section 211 of the National Security Act, to submit "specific recommendations as to the relative readiness of the forces to be maintained during Fiscal Year 1950, i.e., the composition, size, organization and general deployment of the military forces, together with a statement as to the required major materiel programs and a statement of the required levels of operations, training, maintenance and construction. . . ."

All these estimates, the Secretary wrote, were to be "based on military requirements alone." However, as will be recalled, President Truman had already on 15 May established a ceiling of $15 billion (or, more precisely, $14.4 billion) on military obligations for FY 1950. Mr. Forrestal evidently anticipated that estimates prepared without concern for costs would exceed President Truman's budgetary limitation, for he directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to establish priorities and prepare revisions in basic plans by which major cost reductions could be accomplished if required.[17]

The JCS Estimate of Military Requirements

The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their statement of military requirements to Secretary Forrestal on 24 July. Time limitations and the absence of planning methods applicable to two or more military departments had prevented the preparation of a truly integrated joint requirements statement. As a result, the Joint Chiefs of Staff merely forwarded the unilateral estimates of the Army, Air Force, and Navy. A coordinated, jointly prepared budget estimate for all three Services would not be possible for FY 1950, they informed the Secretary. Their

eventual recommendations would of necessity be based upon a review of the completed Service budget statements.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff accompanied their statement of military requirements with a supporting appraisal of the world situation in terms of the menacing role of the Soviet Union and of the US policies dictated by that menace. This was the material that Secretary Forrestal hoped to persuade the National Security Council to provide in the form of definitive political guidance. His request, however, had not gone to the Council until 10 July, and its response would not be forthcoming until 24 November. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, were forced in effect to provide their own political guidance.

The basic fact of international political life, the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained, was that it was dominated by two irreconcilable great powers—the United States and the Soviet Union. The ultimate aim of the latter was to impose a communist dictatorship on the world; its immediate aim was to extend or consolidate control over adjacent areas, to seek the establishment of at least friendly, if not subservient, governments in states lying immediately beyond the adjacent areas. To achieve its goals the Soviet Union would employ all means short of war, using political and psychological war in its broadest sense.

Although, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Soviets intended to avoid a major war in the near future, they would strive for the maximum military buildup in the shortest possible time in order to further their goal of world domination. To this end, they were reorganizing their force structure, revising their tactical concepts, and striving to develop new weapons. Already the Soviets possessed the capability to overrun Western Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East; to launch large-scale air attacks against the United Kingdom; and to harass the continental United States by sporadic one-way air attacks.

To counter these Soviet military capabilities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed FY 1950 force levels recommended by the Services to serve as the base for a phased buildup (of unspecified size) to be completed by 1952. The resulting forces would be capable of meeting the initial requirements of a joint emergency war plan and would be adequate to meet existing military commitments in support of US national policies.

The force requirements stated by the Services for FY 1950 were as follows: Army, 12 regular, 34 National Guard, and 25 Reserve divisions; Navy, 993 active ships and 1,657 Reserve ships (of which 434 and 508, respectively, would be of major combatant types); Marine Corps, 2 divisions and 2 air wings; Air Force, 70 groups. To man these units would require the following personnel:[18]

	Regular	*Reserve and National Guard*
Army	947,000	1,137,000
Navy	519,196	1,555,000
Marine Corps	104,075	165,838
Air Force	502,000	140,500
	2,072,271	2,998,338

No cost figures accompanied the estimates of requirements by the Services. When completed later and submitted, they totalled some $30 billion for the three Departments: $12 billion for the Army, $10 billion for the Navy, and $8 billion for the Air Force.[19]

This total was more than twice the $14.4 billion allowed the Services under the established ceiling. The President's oral directive on this subject, laid down on 13 May, had in fact been reaffirmed in writing two months later.[20] The task now was to reduce the Service requirements so as to bring them within the established limit.

Secretary Forrestal had already discussed this problem with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 23 June 1948 they had agreed to assume responsibility for recommending the allocation of funds under the $14.4 billion ceiling. At his suggestion, each Service Chief appointed a senior officer as his full-time budget adviser. The officers named were General Joseph T. McNarney, USAF, Major General George J. Richards, USA, and Vice Admiral Robert B. Carney, USN. These officers became known collectively as the "McNarney Board" after their senior and most eloquent member.[21]

Search for a $14.4 Billion Budget: The Joint Chiefs of Staff Fail

During August and September, the newly appointed budget advisers strove valiantly to reduce the Service submissions to the President's ceiling. By simply paring the Services' force structure, they managed to attain a figure of $23,600,000,000. Unable to agree to further reduction, they passed the problem up to their respective Chiefs.[22] In defense of their recommendation for a budget of $23.6 billion for FY 1950, the budget advisers pointed out that merely to maintain the current readiness level would require $3.6 billion more than in FY 1949: $2.1 billion additional to finance the long-range aircraft procurement program, and $1.5 billion to cover rising operational and support costs. Thus the amount required merely to stay even would be $18.6 billion (the $3.6 billion additional plus the approximate current cost of $15 billion for all defense programs, including stockpiling). This sum, however, in the opinion of the budget advisers, would not buy "minimum necessary readiness." To attain it would cost an additional $5 billion, thus bringing the total needed for military purposes to $23.6 billion.[23]

The three Service Chiefs, sitting as uniformed heads of their respective Services and not as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with their budget advisers to cut the military budget to $15 billion on Saturday, 2 October. The meeting lasted all day and most of the night and resumed again on Sunday evening. Also present were Vice Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Vice Chief of Naval Operations; Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Director of Plans and Operations, Army General Staff; Lieutenant General Lauris Norstad, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Air Staff; and Major General Alfred M. Gruenther, Director, Joint Staff.

As a first approach, the group examined what General McNarney called the "unescapable overhead"—the items that would have to be provided under any

strategic concept. These items were considered to be research and development, intelligence, industrial mobilization, and stockpiling. General McNarney's proposal was to reduce the funding of these items as much as possible, then determine the forces that could be supported with the remainder of the $14.4 billion allocated for military purposes and the strategy these forces could support. The only positive result from the ensuing discussion was agreement to reduce the research and development budget from $790 to $550 million.

The group then turned to an examination of the basic missions under the current emergency war plan.[24] The missions included a strategic air offensive against the Soviet Union, the securing of essential sea lines of communications, defense of the continental United States, and the meeting of certain political commitments under treaties and World War II agreements to occupy Germany, Austria, and Japan.

As a minimum program for the strategic air offensive, General McNarney proposed to limit operations to strikes flown from Iceland and England employing six medium bombardment groups, six strategic reconnaissance groups, six penetration fighter groups, two strategic air squadrons (to transport bombs), and three supporting medium bombardment groups in the United States. In a foreshadowing of what was to become the major controversy in the deliberations on the budget, the Navy representatives resisted attempts to reduce the naval forces not assigned to maintain the sea lines of communications essential to the support of the strategic air offensive. Control of the sea, Admiral Carney maintained, was a worldwide problem and could not be subdivided.

Following inconclusive discussion of various wartime missions, General Bradley proposed the deletion of all operations from the Cairo-Suez area from the strategic offensive. He based his proposal on two grounds. First, the operations, which involved carrier activities, were budgeted by the Navy at $6.5 billion, an amount that was not feasible under a $14.4 billion budget. Second, naval operations in the Eastern Mediterranean were not tenable without a ground force, which would have to attain a size of six to eight divisions in the Cairo-Suez area by D plus three months to provide adequate defense. Admiral Denfeld objected strenuously to General Bradley's proposal, claiming that carrier operations in the Eastern Mediterranean were essential in order to evacuate American nationals from the area and to mount strategic air operations against the Soviet Union, thereby forcing the Russians to divide their retaliatory operations and making a knock-out blow against the United Kingdom impossible.

A sharp interservice debate ensued. Admiral Radford questioned the ability of the Air Force to deliver the atomic bomb with existing 300-knot aircraft. Admiral Denfeld suggested limiting the Army to forces needed to defend the United States and overseas air bases, and General Bradley refused to accept a budget allocating more money to the Navy than to the Army.

The group finally decided to adjourn for lunch and ask the Service planners to recommend, when the meeting reconvened at 1430, minimum force requirements, and the costs thereof, for the strategic concept in the emergency war plan. In the short time available to them, the planners were unable to recommend any significant cuts in the FLEETWOOD force tabs. They were accord-

ingly dismissed, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, their deputies, and advisers resumed their deliberations.

General Bradley accepted an Army force structure adequate only to carry on the occupation of Germany and Japan, defend the continental United States, and provide a minimum mobilization base. This concession made it possible to reach agreement, since the occupation forces in Germany and Japan had not been questioned. The major units to be maintained by the Army under this agreement are shown in the table. There were, in addition, miscellaneous combat and service units in the mobilization base.

Defense of the Western Hemisphere	
Divisions	2
Infantry	1
Airborne	1
Regimental combat teams	2
Anti-aircraft battalions	36
Japan-Ryukyus	
Divisions	4
Infantry	4
Germany	
Divisions	1
Infantry	1
Constabulary (3 armored cavalry regiments)	3
Totals	
Divisions	7
Regiments/regimental combat teams	5
Anti-aircraft battalions	36

General Vandenberg also showed a willingness to accept substantial reductions in the Air Force structure, with the result that agreement was quickly reached on the following major units:

Strategic Offensive	
Groups	20
Medium bomber	6
Penetration fighter	6
Day fighter	2
Heavy troop carrier	2
Strategic reconnaissance	4
Squadrons	2
Strategic air support	2
Defense of US and Alaska	
Groups	12
Fighter	10
Troop carrier	2

Germany	
Groups	3
Fighter	2
Transport	1
Far East	
Groups	6
Fighter	4
Light bomber	1
Transport	1
Totals	
Groups	41
Independent squadrons	2

Admiral Denfeld, however, claimed it was not possible to subdivide Navy missions and thus reduce them to the minimum essential wartime tasks. He insisted on retaining substantial carrier task forces even though operations in the Eastern Mediterranean had been deleted from war plans. The consequence was a split resulting in the submission of two Navy force structures as indicated in the following table:

	Navy	*Army-Air Force*
Major Combatant Ships	289	240
Fleet Carriers	(11)	(5)
Escort Carriers	(13)	(14)
Cruisers	(19)	(17)
Destroyers/D.Escorts	(166)	(124)
Submarines	(80)	(80)
Mine Craft	58	58
Patrol Vessels	50	50
Amphibious Vessels	85	85
Auxiliaries	268	259
	750	692

Even the adoption of this austere program would not bring the military budget within President Truman's ceiling. Costing of the austere force levels by the Military Departments produced a total of $16.5 billion for the Navy plan and $15.8 billion for the Army-Air Force plan, broken down as follows:

	Army-Air Force	*Navy*
Army	$ 5.1 billion	$ 5.1 billion
Air Force	5.5	5.5
Navy	5.2	5.9
	$15.8 billion	$16.5 billion

Under these circumstances, the Service Chiefs agreed to refer the problem to Secretary Forrestal for resolution of the split over naval forces and to inform him of their inability to recommend a budget within the $14.4 billion ceiling.[25]

The Secretary of Defense Takes a Hand

Secretary Forrestal, accompanied by Secretaries Royall, Sullivan, and Symington, met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their budget advisers and deputies on 4 October. General Gruenther opened the meeting with a presentation of the program developed by the military officers the previous day. As part of this presentation, Admiral Denfeld gave a spirited defense of the Navy position. Reading from a prepared statement, he attacked the Army-Air Force program for the Navy as a "basic departure" from the strategic concept approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and used as the basis for US plans and for planning talks with the Canadians and British. It would abandon the Mediterranean and offered no direct assistance to Western Europe.[26]

Admiral Denfeld did not limit his presentation to a critique of Army and Air Force proposals for the Navy. He also questioned the competence of the Air Force to proceed in the strategic offensive. The "unpleasant fact remains," he said, "that the Navy has honest and sincere misgivings as to the ability of the Air Force successfully to deliver the [atomic] weapon by means of unescorted missions flown by present-day bombers, deep into enemy territory in the face of strong Soviet air defenses, and to drop it on targets whose locations are not accurately known." It was therefore unsound, Admiral Denfeld maintained, to demobilize the existing Navy carrier force, which, from stations in the Mediterranean, could launch air strikes against the lines of communications of Soviet forces invading Western Europe.[27]

Secretary Forrestal responded to this statement by pointing out that it was not a question of scrapping the JCS concept of war because the issue to be resolved was not how to prepare to win a war in the immediate future, but what military forces could be supported under the $14.4 billion ceiling.

Fleet Admiral Leahy, who had not attended the previous day's session (since it had been a meeting of the Service Chiefs and not of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), proposed an alternative approach. What would be the objection, he asked, to telling the Services to cut their estimates by whatever percentage was necessary to reduce the whole National Military Establishment budget request to the imposed ceiling? "Instead of inventing a whole new concept of war," he said, "we tell the Military Services, 'This is all the money you can have. Do the best you can with it.'" Admiral Leahy's approach was not favored by the other conferees and was not pursued. Arguments against it were expressed by General Bradley, who pointed out first that there was no agreement among the Services on the proposed division of $23.6 billion. To impose a percentage cut would merely foster disagreement. The proper approach, he maintained, was to determine the priority of missions. Secretary Royall expressed a similar point of view

on this latter point. He pointed out that Admiral Leahy's plan would mean departing completely from the war plan.

After an extended but inconclusive discussion, Secretary Forrestal directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend the allocation of $14.4 billion among the Services, indicating clearly the consequences in terms of national defense, and then to recommend the forces that they considered necessary for national security, with an estimate of their cost. If he was convinced that $14.4 billion was inadequate, he said, he would recommend a higher figure to the President.[28]

On 5 October, Secretary Forrestal reported progress to date on the military budget to President Truman. The Secretary of Defense explained that a budget limited to $14 billion, which he would submit, would limit operations in war to retaliatory air strikes from bases in England. Action in the Mediterranean would not be possible. He also planned, the Secretary of Defense said, to submit a budget predicated also on holding lines of communications in the Mediterranean, which would probably be on the order of $18.5 billion. The President said he wished the second budget held in reserve because its presentation would be interpreted as a step toward preparation for war. Additional estimates, the President said, could take the form of supplementals, to be presented if and when conditions became more dangerous. Secretary of State Marshall, the President added, was being recalled to Washington from Europe to review the international situation.[29]

Admiral Leahy convened the Joint Chiefs of Staff the same day to carry out Secretary Forrestal's directive to distribute the allotted $14.4 billion among the Services. Like Secretary Forrestal, he had talked to the President that day, and had been told that that amount was "all we are going to get." He opened the meeting by repeating the proposal he had made in the meeting with Secretary Forrestal: "Why would it not be advisable . . . to just distribute the money among the Services?" General Bradley readily agreed that this would be relatively easy. "If we just come up and mathematically divide without considering all the forces—anybody could divide it by three." But to do so would be irresponsible. "I think it is up to us," he said, "to make a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense of the [division of] the 14.4 based on what we consider the relative importance of the three Services in fighting the war against Russia." General Vandenberg and Admiral Denfeld evidently agreed with their Army colleague, for the simple three-way division of available funds ceased to be a topic of discussion. Instead, the focus turned to ways of achieving further economies while still retaining the capability to carry out the minimum war plan previously agreed. At one point the Budgetary Assistants joined the meeting, but they had no acceptable solutions to offer. Finally, after several hours of fruitless discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave up their attempt to reach agreement and forwarded split views to the Secretary of Defense.

Admiral Leahy, General Bradley, and General Vandenberg recommended an allocation of $4.9 billion for the Army, $4.4 billion for the Navy, and $5.1 billion for the Air Force. Admiral Denfeld objected to this division pending examination of the details of its effect on the Navy. In submitting these recommendations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also reiterated their view that a budget of $14.4 billion was "insufficient to implement national policy in any probable war situation that can

be foreseen, and that supplementary appropriations will be essential in the fiscal year 1950."

Although they were unable to reach a meeting of the minds on allocation of $14.4 billion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did agree to cost out a strategy with a Mediterranean operation conducted as far east as possible under a ceiling of $17.5 billion for the total plan.[30]

Replying the same day, the Secretary of Defense called upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make further efforts to reach agreement. "I want to have it clearly established in your minds," he wrote, "that I am expecting a definitive recommendation from you, as an entity, as to the division of funds in the 1949–50 budget—specifically, as to the allocations to the respective services, under a ceiling of fourteen billion four million dollars." This must be done, the Secretary said, "*before* we talk of any larger amount."[31]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff tried and failed again to carry out Mr. Forrestal's instructions on 7 October. As a result, they forwarded separate views, as follows (figures in billions):

	CSA-CSAF	*CNO*
Army	$ 4.9	$ 4.9
Navy	4.4	4.9
Air Force	5.1	4.6
	$14.4	$14.4

In defense of his position, Admiral Denfeld said that he considered the division of funds recommended by the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff to be "unacceptable to the Navy as it will not keep a balanced Navy nor one in an acceptable state of readiness in the event of an emergency." General Bradley supported the Army position by rejecting the Navy plan to place a fleet in the Mediterranean without ground forces to hold bases. Without this mission, he held that the increase in Navy funds recommended by the Chief of Naval Operations could not be justified. General Vandenberg made no comment on the Navy position.[32]

Secretary Forrestal's reaction was that the budgetary efforts of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had "degenerated into a competition for dollars." He directed them to try again to agree to a $14.4 billion dollar budget. His examination of the data in earlier presentations, he said, indicated that it might be possible to support larger forces under the President's budget ceiling than the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought possible. He therefore proposed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider force levels higher than those used as the basis for their presentation of 7 October but not as high as those that were the basis for the $23.6 billion budget—levels that could be supported by a figure in the "general area" of $14.4 billion, though not necessarily that exact amount.[33]

The failure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to agree on force levels could not be allowed to bring the budget process to a halt. Secretary Forrestal accordingly directed the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to prepare preliminary "project estimates," using staffing, maintenance, and operations rates not in excess of the FY 1949 level.[34]

The JCS Budget Recommendations

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, meanwhile, turned their attention to their agreement of 5 October to develop a strategy that would be feasible under a ceiling of $17.5 billion (or $16.9 billion when allowance was made for the cost of the stockpile). On 14 October they instructed General McNarney, Admiral Carney, and General Richards to develop force requirements for such an alternative plan. As guidance, they approved a twofold strategic concept. The first part called for the following actions: maintain security of the Western Hemisphere and of vital lines of communications; defend the main Japanese islands; secure sources of vital raw materials; conduct a strategic air offensive employing both conventional and atomic weapons from the United Kingdom, Iceland, and Okinawa; and seize defensible and logistically supportable bases in the Mediterranean (possibly as far east as Tunisia) from which to launch initial air operations. The second part of the strategic concept called for fulfilling political commitments, maintaining appropriate bases in Alaska and Okinawa, and maintaining the mobilization base.[35]

At a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 15 October, Secretary Forrestal approved the development of an intermediate budget between the President's $14.4 billion and the $23.6 billion of the budget advisers. Such a budget could hardly provide forces adequate to defeat Russia, but it should yield a "possible force that could jump off if war came." The Secretary emphasized the importance of JCS agreement on an intermediate budget of this nature because it would have a

> tremendous effect for the country and a tremendous gain in stature for the JCS. . . . I think it is vitally important that the concept of the JCS not lose face in the country. I think it is a dangerous thing for the country if it does. You confess to some extent a confession of inability to get away from Service interests and look at the whole business in the light of what the national interest is.[36]

The intermediate budget had not been completed when Secretary Forrestal, on 29 October, wrote the Joint Chiefs of Staff to tell them that the "time has now come to announce a definite schedule for resolution of the 1950 budget problem." Not later than 8 November, the Secretary wrote, he wanted a "written statement . . . making agreed recommendations for allocation of both forces and funds within the fiscal limitations of $14.4 billion, or stating, if necessary, that you cannot reach an agreed recommendation. In either case," Mr. Forrestal continued, "I will make and announce to the Services the allocation on November 9." By 14 November, the Secretary directed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to recommend the additional allocation of forces and funds that should be made to the Services under a budget ceiling of $16.9 billion, accompanied by a statement of the resulting increases in capabilities and changes in strategy made possible by the higher figure. If agreement could not be reached, the Secretary wanted individual recommendations. In either case, he would announce the allocation of funds not later than 17 November.[37]

Mr. Forrestal's persistence finally paid off. On 8 November the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded agreed recommendations on the allocation of $14.4 billion to the Services, as follows:

Army	$ 4.8
Navy	4.6
Air Force	5.0
	$14.4

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were still unable to agree on the number of fleet carriers and carrier task groups to be included in the Navy force requirements. General Bradley advocated a single group of six ships, on the basis of careful evaluation in the light of possible enemy capabilities and US joint strategic plans. To provide a larger number, he maintained, would unbalance the overall force, giving the Navy a capability to conduct operations in which the other two Services could not participate. General Vandenberg maintained that the Navy should be allowed one task group of only four carriers. A balanced force capable of sustained operations in the Mediterranean, the mission for which additional carriers were intended, was not attainable with a budget limited to $14.4 billion, he believed, and there was therefore no point in providing more than four ships. Admiral Denfeld, in arguing for nine ships organized in two task groups, maintained that Naval forces should be the best attainable without regard to any particular area of operations. A force of nine carriers, he insisted, was not out of balance with the other Services.

The force structure to be supported by $14.4 billion was as follows:

Army	
Divisions	10
RCT	1
Cavalry Regiment	1
Artillery Battalions	10
AA Battalions	35
Tank Battalions	4
Engineer Battalions	6
Chemical Mortar Battalions	1
Navy	
Combatant Ships	282
Fleet Carriers	(9 Navy, 6 Army, 4 Air Force)
Light Carriers	(4)
Escort Carriers	(7)
Cruisers	(18)
Destroyers-Destroyer Escorts	(164)
Submarines	(80)
Other Ships	443
Mine and Patrol Craft	(99)
Amphibious vessels	(84)
Auxiliaries	(260)
Total	725

Air Force	
Heavy and Medium Bomb Groups	14
Strategic Reconnaissance Groups	6
Light Bomb Groups	1
Fighter Groups	20⅔
Tactical Reconnaissance Groups	⅓
Medium Troop Carrier Groups	2
Heavy Troop Carrier Groups	4
	48 groups
Emergency Rescue Squadrons	8
Strategic Support Squadrons	2
	10 squadrons

Personnel strengths to be supported by $14.4 billion, expressed in man-years, were as follows:

Army	677,000
Navy (including Marines)	526,880
Air Force	412,273
	1,616,153

In making these recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff once again expressed their unhappiness with the $14.4 billion ceiling. It was, they reiterated, "insufficient to implement national policy in any probable war situation that can be foreseen."[38]

Secretary Forrestal approved these recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 9 November. And true to his word to resolve any remaining differences, the Secretary ruled that the Navy would be authorized two task groups of eight carriers. This was a compromise decision that was closer to the views of the Navy than of the Army or Air Force.[39]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded to the second part of Mr. Forrestal's directive on 15 November, when they forwarded to him their recommendations for allocation of $16.9 billion:

Army	$ 5.575 billion
Navy	5.375
Air Force	5.950

With these funds, it would be possible to maintain forces consisting of 12 Army divisions, 319 combatant ships (including 10 fleet carriers), and 59 Air Force groups. Personnel strengths under the higher budget ceiling would be, in man-years, as follows:

Army	800,000
Navy	580,000
Air Force	460,000
Total	1,840,000

In spite of the increases in forces made possible by the additional $2.5 billion—2 divisions, 11 air groups, and 37 combatant ships, including 2 carriers—the Joint Chiefs of Staff were still unsatisfied. The additional financing, they said, "does not provide the balanced forces considered necessary... to assure adequately the national security in the current international situation."[40] Mr. Forrestal approved these recommendations on 17 November, on the understanding that the cost estimates were valid and the programs could be carried out within the recommended allocation of funds.[41]

Recommendations of the Secretary of Defense

Secretary Forrestal now had in hand the advice he had sought from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But before submitting his budget recommendations to the President and the Bureau of the Budget, he sought the views of Secretary of State Marshall on the current world situation. A previous attempt, at a meeting on 10 October, had been disappointing. Secretary Marshall had stressed the importance of furnishing military equipment to Western European nations. When Mr. Forrestal explained that he wanted to be able to submit a budget to the President stating the military needs of the country in the light of the current international situation, Mr. Marshall replied only that care must be taken to conserve US manpower and to take advantage of Western Europe's military potential. On 31 October, Mr. Forrestal wrote the Secretary of State, described the military budget situation, and asked three questions as follows:

1. Had the international situation improved sufficiently in the past year to warrant a substantial reduction in military forces planned for the end of the current fiscal year?

2. Had the situation worsened so that there should be an augmentation of the planned forces?

3. Or was the situation about the same?

Replying on 8 November, Mr. Marshall said that "we must expect for the current fiscal year a situation which is neither better nor worse than that which we have faced in 1948 insofar as it affects the ceiling of our military establishment.[42]

On 1 December, Mr. Forrestal sought more precise political guidance from the State Department, related to a specific dollar figure. In response to a telephone call from Under Secretary of the Army William H. Draper, Jr., Acting Secretary of State Robert Lovett approved inclusion in the budget recommendations of a statement to the effect that forces supportable by $16.9 billion would "provide a military posture and state of readiness better calculated... to instill the necessary confidence in democratic nations everywhere than would the reduced forces in a more limited budget."[43]

The view he had solicited from the State Department was evidently intended to support a decision already taken by the Secretary of Defense to recommend a military budget of $16.9 billion for FY 1950. On 1 December, he submitted a recommendation to this effect to President Truman, explaining that it represented a compromise between the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Forrestal reminded the President, did not believe they could safeguard the national security with the forces that could be maintained by the President's figure of $14.4 billion. The recommended compromise was justified in terms of "existing international conditions, . . . the impact of rising prices on the Military Establishment, . . . the fiscal impact of national security requirements, and the effect of such requirements on scarce materials and civilian production. . . ." The Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed on the division of $16.9 billion among the Services and on the forces each Service would maintain with its share of the funds. They did not believe that the $16.9 billion would provide the strength necessary for national defense under present international conditions. But Mr. Forrestal stated that he could not "conscientiously recommend a budget larger than $16.9 billion, unless the international situation should become more serious."[44]

President Truman's FY 1950 Military Budget

On 9 December, Secretary Forrestal, the Service Secretaries, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff briefed President Truman on the three alternative budgets and their effects on military capabilities. The President listened politely but was noncommittal. At the end of the short meeting (which lasted less than an hour), the $14.4 billion limit still stood. Indeed, the President gave no indication that he considered a decision necessary; his only comment on the presentation was that it was "very interesting." No doubt he regarded the size of the budget as having long since been settled.[45]

The President's commitment to the ceiling became apparent when he submitted his FY 1950 budget to Congress on 10 January 1949. His request for new obligational authority was in fact slightly below the ceiling. He asked for $13.399 billion for the three Service Departments: $4.498 billion for the Army, $4.347 for the Navy, and $4.554 for the Air Force. This sum, added to $830 million for contingent items to be distributed later among the Services and $11 million for OSD, brought the total to $14.240 billion. Reductions in the original $14.4 figure (made by the Bureau of the Budget) consisted primarily of $173 million deducted from the Navy's shipbuilding funds, with the remainder distributed among various supporting and operating programs. In spite of these reductions, the President proposed the same military personnel levels and force structure that, according to Mr. Forrestal's letter of 1 December, could be supported under a $14.4 billion budget. These figures were identical to the ones proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 November.[46]

The Budget before Congress

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in appearances before congressional committees, were not unanimous in supporting the President's budget. They expressed views ranging from positive agreement, through lukewarm endorsement as the best figure attainable, to outright disagreement. General Bradley testified that he was aware that the country "cannot afford to maintain over a long period of time the force that can assure a quick victory. However, we can afford, and must afford, sufficient forces in being, including the mobilization base and necessary reinforcements, to avert disaster in the event we are attacked." In this context, he supported the President's budget as "a very carefully thought out one, and one which did provide balanced forces which would avert disaster in case of an emergency." Admiral Denfeld was less positive. He refrained from endorsing it as providing adequate defense and stated merely that "the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that that was the best division of the funds that we could agree on. . . ." General Vandenberg "heartily" subscribed to a statement by the Secretary of the Air Force that about $15 billion would buy an adequate defense if the Air Force were given a larger share than that allowed under the budget. Under questioning, General Vandenberg stated that the Air Force would require an additional $2 billion if it was to provide "the minimum defense forces, as far as the Air Force is concerned," namely a 70-group Air Force.[47]

After extended debate, Congress, on 18 October 1949, made appropriations which resulted in new obligational authority of $13.912 billion to the Services for military purposes—some $500 million more than the President had requested. As indicated in the table, the sums allocated to the Army and Navy were reduced, while those for the Air Force were significantly increased:

	President's Request	*Congressional Appropriation*
Army	$ 4.498 billion	$ 4.420 billion
Navy	4.347	4.183
Air Force	4.554	5.309
OSD and Undistributed	.841	
	$14.240	$13.912

The addition to Air Force appropriations originated in the House and was intended to add an additional nine groups to Air Force strength. The President, however, refused to spend the entire sum and placed $735.7 million "in reserve."[48]

The funds made available would not support the minimum forces recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet national security requirements. Once again, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had failed to obtain the money needed to reach what they regarded as a necessary level of military preparedness. Their failure was, of course, attributable to policy choices dictated by considerations far beyond their control. President Truman was aware that foreign policy commitments required sound military support. But the cost of the forces deemed necessary for that purpose by the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have thrown the national

budget out of balance and forced the administration to resort to deficit financing or to higher taxes—both highly unpopular measures. Faced with such a choice, President Truman overruled his military advisers and accepted the calculated risk inherent in smaller military forces. His decision was implicitly endorsed by Congress, which sought to alter the administration's approved balance of forces but not to increase the total resources devoted to military security.

8

The FY 1951 Military Budget: Rearmament Is Cut Back

Initial Steps

From the outset of the budget cycle for FY 1951, it was apparent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that chances for attaining a higher level of military preparedness than in FY 1950 were extremely slim. President Truman, in his message to Congress on 10 January 1949 presenting his budget recommendations for FY 1950, said:

> I am convinced that we should plan our military structure at this time so as to insure a balanced military program in the foreseeable future at approximately the level recommended in this budget.[1]

In keeping with this view, the President indicated that the appropriation request for 1951 would not exceed the $15 billion allowed for FY 1950. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were informed of this decision on 24 January in a meeting with General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, former Chief of Staff, US Army, and World War II commander in Western Europe. General Eisenhower had retired and had become President of Columbia University, but he had been summoned from retirement to act as special adviser to President Truman and as presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary Forrestal hoped that the General would be able to guide the Joint Chiefs of Staff toward a settlement of the numerous issues that had divided them.

General Eisenhower's most important task, as he recalled it, was "to relate the strengths of our forces to the probable situations we might encounter in a war, and out of that to develop a budget that would be presented for fiscal year 1951." At the meeting on 24 January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that they would make no effort to submit a budget in excess of the President's ceiling, based purely on military requirements, as they had attempted for FY 1950.[2]

The role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in formulating the military budget for FY 1951 was the subject of discussion during January and February. Secretary Forrestal, who had given the Joint Chiefs of Staff a key role the previous year, proposed to continue this arrangement. To this end, he wrote them on 6 December 1948, giving them responsibility for "the early development of specific recommendations as to the composition, size, organization and general deployment of military forces, together with a determination of the major related materiel programs, the required levels of operations, training, maintenance, construction, etc." To aid them in this task, the Secretary suggested that they consider appointing a committee of senior advisers, comparable to those appointed in connection with the FY 1950 budget, but responsible collectively to the Joint Chiefs of Staff rather than individually to the Chiefs of the Services.[3]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that the budgetary responsibilities assigned by the Secretary had such "far-reaching implications" that they should not be delegated to subordinate advisers. Replying to Secretary Forrestal on 5 January 1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that they themselves planned to devote the necessary time to "determine the forces and related budgetary allocations with respect to over-all requirements and to stipulated National Military Establishment budget ceilings." The role of the Special Budgetary Assistants, they said, would be simply to recommend procedures to be followed in preparing Service budgets for FY 1951.[4]

Despite this latter statement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves spent a considerable time in discussion of procedural matters during January and February. They agreed on the need for realistic war plans as the basis for the budget and directed the preparation of a short-range plan based on the forces provided by the FY 1950 budget. However, the plan, entitled OFFTACKLE, was not finally approved until 8 December 1949, far too late to be of any value in the FY 1951 budget cycle.[5] The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed also on the desirability of a phased time schedule to guide budgetary planning (replacing the one they had approved earlier in connection with FY 1950).[6] However, they could not agree on the details and, on 3 March, referred the matter to their newly appointed Budget Advisory Committee, which consisted of Vice Admiral Robert B. Carney, Major General William H. Arnold, USA, and Lieutenant General Edwin H. Rawlings, USAF. The whole question was overtaken when General Eisenhower, on 28 February, initiated his own procedures for developing the military budget.[7]

Most of the subsequent activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the FY 1951 military budget were to be under the guidance of a new Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, who replaced Secretary Forrestal on 28 March. Mr. Johnson was a West Virginia lawyer, a past National Commander of the American Legion (1932–1933), former Assistant Secretary of War (1937–1940), and an active member of the Democratic Party who had earned President Truman's gratitude through his services during the 1948 election campaign.

General Eisenhower's first action in connection with the budget was to direct each Service Chief to prepare a rough outline of the forces and deployments required by his Service to support the "concept agreed upon at the most recent

meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."[8] The resulting estimates, presented at a JCS meeting on 2 March, were in some cases in excess of what General Eisenhower thought could be attained under existing budgetary realities. They also proved difficult to correlate because of the differing assumptions and procedures employed by the Services in preparing them. After extensive discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the Operations Deputies, assisted by their respective planners, would prepare a presentation that would show the force requirements for the individual Services, area by area, to accomplish each task, with the tasks arranged in order of priority. It was also expected that the Operations Deputies would "mesh [the] capabilities of one Service into those of another."[9]

At this stage of discussion, the Services were far apart. The divergence was attested by estimates prepared by each Service of its own needs and of those of the other Services. While there was general agreement on the order of magnitude of Army and Air Force requirements, those of the Navy were the subject of fundamental disagreement.

The estimates of Army needs varied by only ⅓ division, 1 independent regiment and 4 antiaircraft battalions, as shown in the table:

	Army/Air Force	*Navy*
Divisions	11	10⅔
Independent regiments	12	11
AAA Battalions	56	52

Divergences over Air Force requirements were somewhat greater and showed a three-way split, but even under the Navy estimate, which was the lowest, the Air Force still retained substantial striking power. The estimates were as follows (by groups):

	Air Force	*Army*	*Navy*
Heavy bomber	4	4	4
Medium bomber	16	12	9
Fighter and fighter/bomber	30	30	22
Other	21	21	13
	71	67	48

The Army and Air Force estimates of Navy requirements, however, struck a devastating blow at the Navy's offensive capabilities. Both Services proposed to eliminate all Marine Corps air units. The Air Force would also do away with all the fleet carriers, while the Army would leave only four of these ships on the active list. The following table illustrates these proposals:[10]

	Navy	*Army*	*Air Force*
Fleet carriers (CV-CVB)	10	4	0
Light and escort carriers	12	12	12
Other major combatant ships	333	269	254
Marine air squadrons	7⅔	0	0
Marine Battalion Landing Teams	11	6	6

"Red Bricks"

General Eisenhower then devised the so-called "Red Bricks System" in an effort to reconcile the Service differences. Service estimates were prepared and the lowest estimate in each force category was selected. The Air Force was thus tentatively assigned 48 groups; the Army, 10⅔ divisions, 11 independent regiments, and 52 antiaircraft battalions; and the Navy, 253 major combatant ships, but no large aircraft carriers.[11]

As could be expected, Admiral Denfeld took strong exception to "Red Bricks." At a JCS meeting on 5 May, he pointed out it would result in the entire elimination of fleet carriers and Marine aviation, 50 percent of the cruiser force, and 45 percent of the Fleet Marine Force. These deletions would create an unbalanced force incapable of carrying out functions prescribed in the Key West and Newport Agreements and would eliminate forces provided by the National Security Act. This situation had come about, the Chief of Naval Operations believed, because the "Red Bricks" system did not accord sufficient weight to the views of a Service Chief. He recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff rectify this situation by requiring written justification for any changes proposed by a Service Chief in another Service. With regard to the specific issues, Admiral Denfeld recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff immediately determine the number of attack carriers and Marine battalion landing teams and air squadrons, or else refer these questions to the Secretary of Defense.[12]

At the meeting on 5 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed Admiral Denfeld's views but were unable to resolve any of the issues he had raised. They agreed, however, to price the "Red Brick" forces. Estimates were then prepared by the Services, but they totalled substantially more than the ceiling amount the President had indicated he would accept. "Red Bricks" was consequently abandoned.[13]

The Four Estimates

General Eisenhower then adopted a new approach. He directed the Services to prepare force tabs under several dollar ceilings. To the Air Force he assigned four ceilings: $6 billion; $5.8 billion; $5.7 billion; and $5.6 billion. To the Army and Navy he assigned three ceilings but specified that one of these be submitted showing two variations: one with major units determined by the Service Chief; the other with major units as designated by General Eisenhower. For the Army, these figures were $4.8 billion, $4.4 billion, $4.6 billion and a force level of 10 divisions, and $4.6 billion with unspecified force levels. For the Navy, the figures were $4 billion, $4.4 billion, $4.2 billion limited to 5 fleet carriers, and $4.2 billion without limitation.

The Air Force, responding on 21 May, submitted the following estimates:

	1	*2*	*3*	*4*
Groups	61	58	55	57
Personnel	463,500	463,500	463,500	463,500
$ billions	6.0	5.8	5.6	5.7

With the exception of Number 3, the Air Force found that under all these estimates, in spite of minor deficiencies in necessary forces, essential strategic tasks called for by the Joint Chiefs of Staff could be carried out. Under Number 3, air defense forces in Great Britain would be so curtailed as to risk the loss of the island as a base for operations.[14]

The Army, responding on the 23d, submitted the following estimates but without evaluation:[15]

	1	*2*	*3*	*4*
Divisions	10⅔	9⅓	8⅓	9⅔
Personnel	677,000	635,000	600,000	600,000
$ billions	4.8	4.6	4.4	4.6

The Navy estimates, submitted on the same day, provided the following:

	1	*2*	*3*	*4*
Major combatant ships	283	288	288	295
(CV-CVB)	(8)	(8)	(8)	(5)
Personnel	488,729	513,682	513,682	502,338
$ billions	4.0	4.2	4.4	4.2

None of these estimates, in the opinion of the Chief of Naval Operations, was adequate to permit the Navy to carry out its assigned missions. Number 4, which provided only five fleet carriers, would make it impossible for the Navy to carry out certain of its essential D–day tasks or to provide close air support for amphibious operations during the first six months of the war. Number 1, which involved lesser cuts in combatant forces but not in fleet carriers, would reduce these forces below a level adequate to undertake, with an acceptable degree of risk, the D–day tasks of the Navy. Numbers 2 and 3, while they would maintain the combatant forces at desirable levels, required cuts in the shore establishment and mobilization base that would have an adverse effect on the Navy's capability to sustain operations.

There were, in Admiral Denfeld's opinion, even more serious inadequacies in General Eisenhower's "four estimates" approach than these shortages of funds. He felt so strongly on this point that he addressed a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense challenging the basic premise that an adequate military defense could be established by assigning arbitrary dollar ceilings. "Force needs," he wrote, "must be based on roles and missions, . . . jointly approved plans, and peacetime requirements. . . . Dollar needs," he continued, "cannot be readily established until forces are set up, supporting programs are screened, and program costs are screened." To achieve maximum efficiency and economy in this process, common budgetary standards were required for the Services and thorough review of their submissions should be carried out by the JCS Budget Advisory Committee. There was, finally, a "fundamental strategic principle" involved in General Eisenhower's allocation because the Navy, with worldwide D–day responsibilities, received the lowest amount.[16]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff deliberated on the "four estimates" at their meeting on 17 June. They heard a report by Vice Admiral Carney to the effect that the Army and Navy members of the Budget Advisory Committee doubted the value of the estimates for budgetary planning because the dollar ceilings appeared to have been arbitrarily selected and without a determination of the actual needs of the Services for operating forces.[17]

The Ike I and II Forces

The next development came when General Eisenhower assigned the Services specific force structures and set a ceiling of $14,050,000,000 on military spending. This figure had been arrived at by deducting $400,000,000 from stockpiling, $300,000,000 for construction, and $250,000,000 for retired pay from the initial figure of $15,000,000,000. General Eisenhower made no attempt to allocate the $14,050,000,000 among the Services, nor did he indicate a procedure for reducing individual Service estimates if they totalled more than this amount.

The force levels assigned by General Eisenhower to the Services, which became know as "Ike I," were as shown in the following table.[18]

Army		
Divisions		10⅔
Infantry	8	
Airborne	2	
Armored	⅔	
Regimental Combat Teams		3
Separate regiments		6
Infantry	2	
Armored cavalry	4	
Anti-aircraft battalions		46
Navy		
Major combatant ships		263
Fleet carriers	6	
Light and escort carriers	12	
Cruisers	15	
Destroyers and destroyer escorts	160	
Submarines	70	
Amphibious lift (divisions)		1½
Marine Battalion Landing Teams		6
Marine Air Squadrons		18
Air Force		
Groups		57
Heavy bomber	4	

Medium bomber	13
Light bomber	1
Fighter	24
Strategic reconnaissance	6
Tactical reconnaissance	1
Troop carrier	8

The Ike I forces represented a substantial gain for the Navy over the "Red Brick" forces, which would have entirely eliminated fleet carriers. By comparison with the FY 1950 budget, however, the Ike I forces would reduce fleet carrier strength by two ships. The Army force structure under Ike I remained substantially unchanged from "Red Bricks," and represented an increase over the 9 divisions provided in the budget for 1950. For the Air Force, Ike I provided increases over both "Red Bricks" and the 1950 budget, from 48 to 57 groups.[19]

"Flash" estimates by the Services of the costs of Ike I forces produced figures which resulted in a total $1,318,000,000 in excess of the ceiling imposed by General Eisenhower:[20]

Army	$ 4.530 billion
Navy	4.699
Air Force	6.139
Total	15.368
Ike I Ceiling	14.050
Excess	$ 1.318

On 20 June, the Budget Advisory Committee reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, on the basis of these "flash" estimates, the Ike I forces could not be under the ceiling without a substantial reduction in aircraft procurement.[21]

General Eisenhower then directed the Budget Advisory Committee to restudy aircraft procurement programs, annual flying hours and pilot procurement. The Committee was also to determine the cost of a force structure reduced from Ike I by the elimination of 1⅔ Army divisions and 4 antiaircraft battalions, 2 Navy carriers and 23 other combat ships, and 7 Air Force groups. At the same time, an administrative reserve ranging from $300 million to $600 million was to be set aside as a hedge against rising prices and Service reclamas.[22]

Despite these reduced force levels (which became known as the Ike II forces), the Services were unable to reach the budget limit set by General Eisenhower even without allowing for the administrative reserve. The Service estimates for the Ike II forces were as follows (in billions):

Army	$ 4.357
Navy	4.536
Air Force	5.460
	$14.353

The total exceeded by $303 million the limit of $14.050 billion set by General Eisenhower. The excess would of course be correspondingly increased if the administrative reserve were included.[23]

The Budget Advisory Committee, to whom the Service estimates were referred, was unable to agree on reductions to bring the total down to General Eisenhower's $13.450 billion ceiling. Each member submitted individual views in writing. Admiral Carney, addressing technical aspects, found that the Air Force, because it used planning factors at variance with those accepted by the Army, Navy, and Secretary of Defense, had estimated personnel, maintenance, and operations costs about $500 million too high. General Arnold, the Army member, generally agreed but was not prepared to accept Admiral Carney's exact figure without a thorough examination of the estimates. The Air Force member, General Rawlins, disagreed with his colleagues, claiming that the Air Force, as a new and expanding Service, could not be expected to use the same standards and planning factors as the long-established Services.

Admiral Carney then recommended that the allocation of funds should be: Army and Navy, Ike I; Air Force, Ike II. This would, in effect, grant to the Army and Navy the larger of the two alternative figures, while according the Air Force the lesser of the two. This allocation was necessary, Admiral Carney said, to "provide as strong an Air Force as can be bought and maintained without emasculation of required Army and Navy capabilities." General Arnold disagreed that any such emasculation would take place and recommended that the Navy and the Air Force prepare detailed budgets on the basis of Ike II. General Rawlins contended that Admiral Carney had demonstrated that an adequate Army, Navy, and Air Force, as presently conceived by the three Services, could not be achieved under present budget ceilings. In these circumstances, he maintained, first priority should be accorded to the Air Force, which, under accepted JCS strategic concepts, would be charged with accomplishing the highest priority tasks.[24]

Imposition of a $13 Billion Presidential Ceiling

At this juncture, when the Services were nearing agreement on the distribution of funds, President Truman threw into question all the partial agreements that had been so painstakingly negotiated. He announced that the ceiling on new obligational authority for military purposes would be reduced to $13 billion. This was some $1.4 billion less than the earlier tentative ceiling established in January, which had been used by all elements of the National Military Establishment for budgetary planning.[25]

For the administration, the $13 billion ceiling was considered imperative to meet national economic conditions. The tax structure, which Congress was believed unwilling to change, was expected to yield only about $38 billion in FY 1950. Of this amount, about $33 billion was allocated to national defense, payments to veterans, interest on the national debt, and other irreducible expendi-

tures. Thus only $5 billion would be left for all other programs, a sum that was obviously too small to meet domestic needs. Adjustments were therefore imperative to meet domestic and international responsibilities and to provide a level of expenditure for the National Military Establishment that could be sustained over the next 5, 10, or 15 years.[26]

President Truman announced the reduced ceiling at a White House meeting attended by the Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. General Eisenhower later testified before a subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee that he was not consulted about it in advance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, had furnished the Secretary of Defense their general view on the overall size of the military budget. The Secretary had requested them to do so pursuant to an agreement with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget that JCS views be supplied for his use in discussing FY 1951 budget ceilings with the President. The JCS view, transmitted on 18 May 1949, was that, because the "basic objectives and military capabilities" of the Soviet Union remained unchanged,

> it is mandatory... that adequate and appropriate military forces be maintained.... The same degree of security must be maintained and approximately the same budgetary level of expenditures for military purposes must be maintained for Fiscal Year 1951.... Minimum desirable security, from a purely military point of view, would require approximately 15 billion dollars.[27]

Secretary Johnson's Ceilings

Force structures and manpower strengths intended to reflect the newly announced $13 billion ceiling were set by Secretary Johnson on 5 July 1949. In making these decisions, the Secretary said, he had reviewed the several analyses prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the comments of the Budget Advisory Committee on them. His purpose was to "comply with mandatory instructions respecting the budgetary ceiling for 1951 and yet to give maximum consideration to the weight of professional opinion." To provide for this consideration, he specified that the forces and ceilings were "tentative only, and I shall be glad to consider modifications in them on the basis of recommendations from the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

The timetable and allocation of tasks set by the Secretary of Defense called for the Services to prepare detailed estimates in support of fund requests to support the designated forces and to submit them concurrently to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would then "make an analysis from a strategic viewpoint of the tentative forces... with a view toward the most effective utilization of the monetary ceilings prescribed." The Services would conduct the necessary studies as to the soundness of cost and related factors. Both tasks were to be completed and recommendations submitted to the Secretary of Defense by 1 August.

The tentative force structure, which was identical to Ike II except for the deletion of two Air Force fighter groups, called for 9 Army divisions, 48 Air Force Groups, and 238 major Navy combat ships, of which 4 were fleet carriers. Personnel ceilings, expressed in man-years, provided a total of 1,481,000, divided among the Services as follows: Army, 630,000; Navy, 435,000; and Air Force, 416,000. In a separate action, Secretary Johnson announced to the Services their allocations of the available $13 billion: $4.1 billion to the Army; $3.8 billion to the Navy; and $4.5 billion to the Air Force (the remaining $600 million being reserved for pay increases and for distribution by the Secretary).[28]

All three Service Chiefs took advantage of the Secretary's expressed willingness to consider modification in his tentative force allocation to recommend increases in the forces for their respective Services. As in the case of "Red Bricks" and the "Ike" forces, Admiral Denfeld entered the most vigorous dissent. He claimed that the Secretary's force structure for the Navy, which would cut carrier strength to 36.4 percent of the pre-November 1948 level (4 ships as compared with 11), would so reduce naval offensive power as to make it inadequate for sustained operations in the face of significant air opposition. The result would be seriously to limit the use of the seas by the United States; no longer could the Navy operate offensively or project elements of the Army and Air Force onto the Eurasian continent. In terms of strategic concepts approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it would be impossible to support the British in the Cairo-Suez area or to deny the Iberian peninsula and the northern littoral of the Mediterranean to Soviet forces, and availability of the United Kingdom as a base for offensive operations would be jeopardized because the Soviets, who would not be facing attack elsewhere, would be free to concentrate all their forces against it. To preserve the offensive capability of the Navy, Admiral Denfeld concluded, would require the addition to the Secretary's force levels of 4 fleet carriers, 15 destroyers, 1 Marine BLT, and 2 Marine air squadrons. These increases could be supported by an additional 10,000 military personnel and $110 million.

Lieutenant General Lauris Norstad, acting for and in the absence of General Vandenberg, stated that 67 groups were the minimum required to support the JCS strategic concept. The Air Force would not enter a reclama for additional forces, he said, but would merely request an additional 12,171 military personnel and $505 million to eliminate deficiencies in a 48-group Air Force. General Bradley limited his requests to one additional division to be organized without an increase in the allotted personnel ceiling, and $33 million to remedy equipment deficiencies in reserve forces and to enhance the research and development program.[29]

General Eisenhower, while he did not advocate the specific numbers recommended by the Air Force, supported the strategic concepts upon which that Service based its force level recommendations. Writing to Secretary Johnson on 14 July, he stressed the importance of a "known ability to deliver... [the atomic bomb] to targets as a deterrent to any potential aggressor who may be contemplating war as a solution to international problems." The financial stringency imposed by the budgetary ceiling meant, however, that resources would not be available to support the strategic doctrines of all the Services. "It was clear," Gen-

eral Eisenhower wrote, "that someone was going to have to suffer if we were going to retain respectable amounts of forces in those categories of greatest emergency value to us." In these circumstances, it became "more necessary than ever that such decisions as the Secretary of Defense finds it necessary to make in the shifting or transfer of funds tentatively allocated, and particularly in distributing amounts held in reserve, should take into consideration the great value of a known ability to deliver a sudden and powerful bombing offensive."[30]

General Eisenhower's memorandum was one of his last official acts as Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of Defense and presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 10 August, the President signed into law amendments to the National Security Act which, among other things, created the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His duties were to preside over the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to provide agenda for their meetings, and to inform the Secretary of Defense of issues on which the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not agree. To fill the new office of Chairman, President Truman named the Army Chief of Staff, General Omar N. Bradley, who assumed his new duties on 16 August 1949. His former position was then filled by General J. Lawton Collins, while General Eisenhower returned to civilian life.

The 1949 amendments to the National Security Act also extended the advisory functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to include the National Security Council, as well as the President and Secretary of Defense. This change gave legal status to the actual practice which had gradually developed since the original law was passed in 1947. Other provisions of the law redesignated the National Military Establishment as the Department of Defense, removed the Service Secretaries from membership on the NSC, and downgraded the status of their organizations from executive to military departments. The Secretary of Defense was now allowed a deputy secretary, three assistant secretaries, and a comptroller. Elaborate provisions for uniform budgeting and accounting procedures were also provided. These changes came too late, however, to affect the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in budgetary provision for FY 1951.[31]

In spite of the protests of the Service Chiefs, Secretary Johnson made only minor changes in his tentative budget decisions of 5 July 1949. On 15 August he informed President Truman of the highlights of his proposed budget. He justified a reduction in military manpower on the grounds that better materiel and training and economies resulting from unification would yield offsetting improvements in effectiveness. The establishment of NATO and the launching of military assistance to other countries would also, in effect, augment US military strength. At the same time, he acknowledged that economic as well as military factors had been taken into account. "The Department of Defense recognizes," he wrote, "the overriding necessity of keeping military costs within limits which will not endanger the fundamental soundness of our economy—one of our primary military assets."[32]

The budget estimates, as presented to the Bureau of the Budget in September, reflected further adjustments and granted force increases to the Navy consisting of two fleet carriers and about 25,600 personnel. These additions were, of course, substantially lower than those requested by the Navy. The Army and Air Force received neither additional personnel nor major units. The funding recom-

mended by Mr. Johnson for the Services, however, was slightly lower, even for the Navy, than the ceilings he had established on 5 July. These changes represented refinements made by the Budget Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Services. The military personnel and obligational authority recommended by Mr. Johnson were as follows:[33]

	Personnel		*Obligational Authority*
	Man-years	*End FY*	
Army	630,000	630,000	$ 4,096,400,000
Navy	460,605	446,740	3,781,300,000
Air Force	416,000	416,000	4,322,600,000
OSD			11,400,000
Retired pay			300,000,000
Public works			300,000,000
Contingent reserve			229,300,000
	1,506,605	1,492,740	$13,041,000,000

With these funds and personnel, Secretary Johnson planned to maintain military forces as follows:

Army		
Divisions		9
Infantry	6	
Airborne	2	
Armored	1	
Regimental Combat Teams		5
Separate regiments		7
Infantry	3	
Armored cavalry	4	
Separate combat battalions		84
Anti-aircraft	46	
Other	38	
Navy		
Major combatant ships		237
Battleship	1	
Fleet carriers	6	
Light and escort carriers	8	
Cruisers	12	
Destroyers and destroyer escorts	140	
Submarines	70	
Other ships		414
Total ships		651
Amphibious lift (divisions)		1½
Marine Battalion Landing Teams		6
Marine Air Squadrons		20

Air Force		
Air Groups		48
Heavy bomber	4	
Medium bomber	11	
Light bomber	1	
Fighter	20	
Strategic reconnaissance	5	
Tactical reconnaissance	1	
Troop carrier	6	
Separate squadron		13

The President's Budget Requests

In the ensuing four months, the budget was further discussed by Secretary Johnson with the Service Departments and with the President. Refinements were made in both funding and force structure. As a result, the budget that was sent to Congress by President Truman on 9 January 1950 provided an additional division for the Army and another fleet carrier for the Navy.

The figures submitted by the President provided obligational authority for the Services as follows: Army, $4.018 billion; Navy, $3.881 billion; Air Force, $4.433 billion, making a total of $12.3 billion. These funds were to support a military establishment with an average strength of 1,507,000 men, of which 630,000 were allocated to the Army, 461,000 to the Navy, and 416,000 to the Air Force. The major forces to be supported under this budget included 10 Army divisions, 238 combatant ships including 7 fleet carriers, and 48 Air Force Groups of which 15 consisted of heavy and medium bombers. A request for $800 million for Department of Defense activities, when added to the Service figures, brought the total to $13.1 billion—slightly over the ceiling. An additional $600 million was sought for stockpiling, making a total of $13.7 billion in obligational authority for all national defense purposes. However, the President asked only $12.8 billion in new obligational authority, the remainder to be carried over from prior years. Expenditures for national defense purposes in 1951 were estimated at $13.545 billion.[34]

The President's requests, if approved, would have reduced by 44,456 the number of military personnel on active duty on 31 December 1949. But it was not to apply uniformly to all the Services: the Air Force actually stood to gain slightly, while the Navy/Marine Corps would lose more heavily than the Army. The following table compares the FY 1950 manpower objectives with actual strength as of 31 December 1949:[35]

	1950 *Budget*	Dec 1949 *Actual*
Army	630,000	641,225
Navy/Marine Corps	461,000	496,945
Air Force	416,000	413,286
Total	1,507,000	1,551,456

The President's requests were, however, overtaken by events before they could be enacted into law. Even as the budget went to Congress, the administration, alarmed by the trend of world conditions, was beginning a comprehensive reexamination of US policies in relation to available military power. The conclusion that emerged from this study was that more money was needed for defense. The document embodying this conclusion (NSC 68) was not approved until after the Korean War broke out in June 1950. However, in April, while the budget was pending before Congress, the administration sent in a request for an additional $350 million for procurement of aircraft and ships. Congress had not completed action on the budget when the Korean War began. Thereafter the original budget was swamped by greatly increased supplemental requests intended to meet the immediate emergency and also to raise the overall level of US military preparedness.[36]

9

Strategic Planning

The Origins of Planning

Preparation of joint strategic war plans was a primary task assigned by the National Security Act to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These plans would guide the employment of US forces in war. They were expected also to provide the basis for industrial mobilization planning and for preparation of budgetary requests. To Secretary Forrestal, the completion of joint strategic plans was of capital importance. The lack of such plans, he said, had been a "source of embarrassment to all of the Departments before Congress this year."[1]

Strategic planning had been in progress in the Joint War Plans Committee (later the Joint Strategic Plans Group) since March 1946. At first, their efforts were limited to the preparation of strategic studies of particular areas or of specific military problems. These studies were known collectively as the PINCHER series. On 16 July 1947, the Joint War Plans Committee concluded that this series, though not completed, had progressed far enough to justify the preparation of a joint war plan for the initial stages of a war beginning within the next three years.[2] The Joint Staff Planners concurred in this judgment, and, on 29 August, directed the Joint War Plans Committee to prepare joint war plan BROILER for hostilities forced upon the United States by Soviet aggression within the next three years. The Joint War Plans Committee was to assume that atomic weapons would be used by the United States, and that the United Kingdom and Canada would be allies of the United States. The basic strategy would be to secure bases in North America, the United Kingdom, and the Cairo-Suez area and to launch a strategic air offensive against the Soviet Union. The forces needed to perform these tasks were to be calculated by the Joint War Plans Committee, starting with estimates of available forces as of 1 March 1948 supplied by the Services. The problem of meeting deficiencies in these requirements was deferred until later stages in the planning process.[3]

The Joint Strategic Plans Committee (which replaced the Joint Staff Planners under the National Security Act) recognized that BROILER would not be adequate as a basis for mobilization planning, and accordingly, on 20 November directed the Joint Strategic Plans Group to develop for this purpose a joint outline plan for war against the Soviet Union during 1955. The plan was also to establish a basis for estimating aircraft requirements as requested by the Finletter Commission. Like the short-range BROILER, the guidance for the new long-range plan, designated CHARIOTEER, assumed the loss of Western Europe and the need for a massive atomic strategic air campaign launched from peripheral bases.[4] CHARIOTEER, as submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 5 December, addressed only the immediate problem of aircraft requirements. The time-consuming task of preparing a basis for mobilization planning was deferred by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee for later development. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved CHARIOTEER as a basis for planning on 10 December but relegated it to second priority below BROILER, which was to be the primary planning task.[5]

BUSHWHACKER, a war plan with a D-day of 1 January 1952, was drafted by the Joint Strategic Plans Group early in 1948 and submitted to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee on 8 March.[6] The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, never acted on BUSHWHACKER, perhaps because their attention was now devoted to the short-range plan.

On 11 February, the Joint Strategic Plans Group submitted BROILER to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee. On 10 March, the Committee presented the plan in outline form to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who approved this abbreviated version for "planning purposes." A week later the Committee submitted a slightly revised version, designated FROLIC, for submission to the Secretary of Defense. It included a paragraph explaining that objectives were necessarily limited because the plan was based on forces available on D-day, supplemented only by those that could be mobilized during the first year of hostilities.[7]

The planners had had no authoritative political guidance (such as was later to be provided by the National Security Council) either for BROILER or for FROLIC. In its absence, they assumed that the objectives of a war would be to compel Soviet withdrawal at least to the 1939 boundaries and to ensure that the Soviet Union would abandon its policies of political and military aggression. The wide disparity in ground forces between the Soviet Union and the Western powers compelled the planners to accept the loss of Western Europe and the Middle East in the early phases of a war. A ground offensive to recover this territory could not be mounted before D+10 months. The US strategy therefore was to secure the Western Hemisphere, together with three bases from which to launch a strategic air offensive employing atomic weapons. The British Isles and Okinawa appeared in both plans as locations for two of these bases. As for the third base, BROILER stated a preference for Cairo-Suez, with Karachi as the alternative in the event the preferred area could not be held; in FROLIC, however, the alternative, Karachi, was listed as the single choice. In any case, it was expected that by D+10 months, forces would be available to begin ground operations to recover the Middle East and its great resources of oil and to seize additional

bases for offensives. The nature of the final operations against the USSR could not be predicted at that time.[8]

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff had given qualified approval to the original brief of BROILER, FROLIC became a matter of discussion among them. Admiral Leahy, in approving BROILER, had made it clear that his action did not necessarily indicate approval of the use of atomic bombs.[9] His implied reservation regarding the strategy underlying both plans was set forth more clearly and at greater length by Admiral Denfeld, who, in a memorandum to his colleagues on 6 April, argued at some length against what he regarded as excessive reliance upon an atomic offensive. His comments were directed toward FROLIC but were equally applicable to BROILER.

Admiral Denfeld judged FROLIC unsatisfactory except to meet an immediate emergency. He contended that the strategy embodied in FROLIC was completely at variance with US foreign policy and national objectives. It abandoned Western Europe to the Soviets without a struggle, thus in effect handing over the manpower, resources, and industrial capacity of the region for use against the United States; it accepted almost certain loss of the Mediterranean Sea; and it left the oil producing areas of the Middle East inadequately defended.

Moreover, continued Admiral Denfeld, the success of the strategy was doubtful. The atomic offensive would have to be carried out at extreme ranges and against heavy opposition. If not successful, it would lead to the loss of so much territory, so many strategic positions, so many allies, so many resources, and so much time that ultimate victory would be extremely uncertain. It was, he said, a strategy that overemphasized Soviet capabilities and underestimated those of the United States. A preferable and realistic strategy, Admiral Denfeld maintained, would be to concert with European powers to establish a defense along the Rhine. A strategy aimed at retaining part of Western Europe now appeared to be attainable as a result of several actual or prospective developments: the creation of the Western Union military alliance by Great Britain, France, and the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxenburg); the stiffening attitude of the Scandinavian countries toward their Soviet neighbor; and the augmentation of US military strength that was being considered by the administration at that time.[10]

General Spaatz pointed out that FROLIC had been intended precisely for the limited purpose (short-range emergency planning) for which Admiral Denfeld had admitted it to be acceptable. He agreed, however, that it should not be approved in its present form, because revisions could be expected as a result of "current planning conversations." When it had been revised and resubmitted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should approve it and should then initiate additional emergency planning, taking into account actions taken to augment US military strength, increased capabilities of Western European nations and their will to resist communist penetration, and up-to-date estimates of Soviet capabilities.[11] In the end, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took no formal action on FROLIC.

HALFMOON/FLEETWOOD: The First Joint Emergency War Plan

Although BROILER was never transmitted to the Services as a planning guide, it provided a focus for discussion in tripartite staff conversations by the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada several weeks after it was approved. Planning officers from the three countries met in Washington from 12 to 21 April 1948. They approved an outline emergency war plan, with the short title HALFMOON, as a basis for the development of "unilateral but accordant" plans in each country. HALFMOON was an abbreviated version of BROILER, modified to broaden the list of countries expected to be allied against the Soviet Union and to substitute, at British suggestion, a base in the Cairo-Suez area for Karachi. The latter, however, was retained as an alternative by the United States. The planners incorporated from BROILER the assumptions regarding war objectives, since no other guidance was available.[12]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved HALFMOON "for planning purposes" on 19 May. In doing so, they rejected the recommendation of the JSPC that it be accepted as the "primary" short-range plan. They took this action on the suggestion of Admiral Leahy, who questioned the wisdom of placing sole reliance on the atomic bomb at a time when there was no assurance that its use would be authorized.[13]

With the completion of HALFMOON, the Joint Chiefs of Staff achieved at last a goal they had been seeking for more than two years. The military departments and the unified and specified commanders now had authoritative joint guidance upon which to base their own plans. On 22 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed them to bring their plans into consonance with HALFMOON (or FLEETWOOD, as it was renamed a month later).[14]

HALFMOON was for a war forced upon the United States by aggressive actions of the Soviet Union during FY 1949. The objectives, as taken from BROILER and approved by the tripartite planners, were to compel the Soviet Union to withdraw to its earlier boundaries and to abandon an aggressive course of conduct. It was assumed in HALFMOON that the British Commonwealth, France, the Benelux countries, and the countries of the Western Hemisphere would be allies of the United States, and that Turkey, Spain, Norway, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen would become allies of the United States if attacked by the Soviet Union. The plan assumed, further, that the United States would employ atomic bombs and that the Soviet Union would do the same if such weapons became available. According to US intelligence estimates, however, the Soviet Union would not possess atomic bombs in FY 1949.

The Soviets, according to HALFMOON, were expected to launch concurrent or successive offensives aimed at the destruction or neutralization of all allied forces on the Eurasian land mass and the seizure of the Middle East oil resources. They would also attempt to neutralize the British Isles and all other areas from which the Western powers might strike swiftly and effectively at the USSR.

To counter these Soviet attacks, HALFMOON provided for operations designed to secure vital home and base areas and lines of communications

(LOCs), to mount an air-atomic offensive against vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity, and to regain Middle East oil for use during later phases of the war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had recognized that failure to provide for assistance to Western European countries and to assure the defense of Middle Eastern oil resources was a major flaw of the plan, but shortage of forces left no alternative.

The strategic air offensive was to be initiated by D+15 days from three points—the United Kingdom, Cairo-Suez, and Okinawa—by medium bombers of the Strategic Air Command. The bombing effort would be relatively evenly distributed among these bases, with two groups each operating from the United Kingdom and Okinawa, and one group operating from Cairo-Suez. By D+12 months, the strategic bombing force was to grow to a total of one heavy bomb group flying from bases in the United States and ten medium groups: five at Cairo-Suez, three in the United Kingdom, and two on Okinawa.

Bases and home areas to be defended included the Western Hemisphere, the United Kingdom, and the Cairo-Suez area. US forces totalling the equivalent of five and two thirds divisions and six fighter groups, and Canadian forces consisting of a brigade group and two light bomb squadrons would defend the Western Hemisphere. British forces, consisting primarily of 24 fighter squadrons and 20 antiaircraft artillery regiments, would constitute the defenses of the United Kingdom. The defense of the Cairo-Suez base area would also be a British responsibility and would be entrusted to one and one third ground divisions and nine aircraft squadrons.

The maintenance of lines of communication would be a responsibility of the allied navies. The line running through the Mediterranean was the only one considered to be in danger. Enemy action might close it by D+6 months. As a result, the preponderance of heavy naval units was assigned there. Of the six US fleet carriers deployed on D-day, four would operate in the Mediterranean, where their mission would be to gain air superiority and to interdict those lines of communication supporting enemy forces as they advanced south by land towards the Mediterranean. By D+12 months this carrier force would swell to 20 out of 24 ships in service.

Because no serious effort would be made to hold Western Europe, allied occupation forces would immediately fall back to the Rhine. Thereafter, they would offer what resistance they could to advancing Soviet armies while withdrawing to French and Italian seaports for evacuation.

The defensive action in the Far East would be along the Bering Sea-Japan Sea-Yellow Sea line and would include the defense of Japan and the Ryukyus. US forces in Korea would be withdrawn, but those in China would remain in place, redeploy to more tenable locations, or be withdrawn, depending on the circumstances.

By D+6 months, Soviet advances were expected to require reinforcement and counteraction by the United States and its allies to defend vital base areas. British forces in the United Kingdom, faced by a large buildup of Soviet air forces in Western Europe, would require additional fighter aircraft and antiaircraft artillery. The Cairo-Suez base, under threat of attack by advancing Soviet armies, would also require additional forces. The minimum reinforcement to become available was two US infantry divisions and six and two thirds fighter groups.

By D+12 months, the limit of operations and force buildup projected in HALFMOON, the United States was expected to have mobilized, in addition to forces already deployed, approximately 11 divisions plus air groups totalling about 1,344 aircraft. Possible missions for these forces, according to HALFMOON, were to reopen the Mediterranean and to regain Middle East oil.

A major ambiguity in HALFMOON concerned the role of Navy carriers in the strategic air operations. This was to be a major cause of misunderstanding between the Services throughout 1948 and 1949. Navy participation in strategic operations could be justified by two brief passages in the plan. The first was a statement in the description of the initial air offensive, to the effect that "Carrier task groups will supplement and support the air offensive to the extent practical consistent with their primary task." The other, which described measures to be taken to secure the Cairo-Suez base area, provided that heavy US carrier task forces operating in the Mediterranean would be used "primarily for offensive missions in securing and maintaining air superiority over the LOCs and in interdiction of enemy LOCs." The Navy, as already noted, allocated four of its fleet carriers available at D-day to the Mediterranean. It was not apparent from HALFMOON how broadly the Navy viewed its responsibility for "supplementing and supporting" the strategic air attack. That was to become clear later, when budgetary restrictions necessitated curtailment of carrier forces and led to a major confrontation between the Navy and the Air Force.[15]

TROJAN: Blueprint for Strategic Bombing

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a new short-range Joint Emergency War Plan on 28 January 1949. Designated TROJAN, it was an updated version of FLEETWOOD, and differed primarily by the addition of an annex outlining the proposed atomic offensive. A broad range of industrial facilities in 70 Soviet cities comprised the target list. Twenty of these cities, including Moscow and Leningrad, were considered first priority targets. To destroy all targets on the list, the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated, would require a total of 133 atomic weapons, of which eight would be dropped on Moscow and seven on Leningrad. The first strike should be launched by D+9 days and should consist of 20 to 25 bombs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that the existing stockpile, combined with the anticipated production rate during the first two months of war, would supply enough bombs to support these operations.[16]

Delivery of the atomic offensive called for by TROJAN would be carried out by the same types of forces as provided by FLEETWOOD: B–29 and B–50 medium bombers flying from the United Kingdom, Cairo-Suez, and Okinawa; and B–36 heavy bombers flying from the continental United States. Deployment of strategic air forces would be as follows:

	D-day	*D+12 months*
US		1 heavy group
UK	3 medium groups	4 medium groups
Cairo/Suez		4 medium groups
Okinawa	1 medium group	2 medium groups[17]

Other differences between the two plans were slight. In the intelligence appraisal, TROJAN added Italy, Greece, the Philippines, Portugal, Ireland, Iceland, Switzerland, and South China to the list of probable US allies in FLEETWOOD. TROJAN, in an apparent reaction to the establishment of Israel and the first Arab-Israeli war, was less sanguine than FLEETWOOD on the probable attitude of the Arab states in a war situation. The new plan said merely that they would be "less ill-disposed" to the United States and Britain than to the Soviet Union, whereas FLEETWOOD had asserted that the Arabs would ally with the United States if attacked by the Soviet Union.

With regard to US operations, TROJAN differed from FLEETWOOD primarily by the assignment of US National Guard units to Malta, Gibraltar, and North Africa to guard the line of communications through the Mediterranean, and by a reassessment of Navy mobilization capability which resulted in lowering the estimate of active fleet carriers on D+12 months from 24 to 14.[18]

OFFTACKLE: Making Strategy Conform to Capabilities

During deliberations on the military budget for FY 1950, held during the autumn of 1948, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had concluded that their current strategy could not be implemented with the forces that could be generated under the stringent spending ceilings ordered by the President. They accordingly directed, on 28 January 1949 at the time they approved TROJAN, that a new short-range emergency war plan be prepared, based on forces expected to be available under the President's budget estimates for FY 1950.[19] The Joint Strategic Plans Group undertook the task but soon disagreed over several basic questions: the degree of reliance to be placed on strategic bombing, the importance of the United Kingdom as a base for operations, and the participation of carrier aircraft in the strategic air attack.[20]

Before these issues could be resolved, planning efforts took a somewhat different direction under impetus from General Eisenhower, in his capacity as Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[21] On 25 February, General Eisenhower assigned the Operations Deputies a measure of responsibility for strategic planning. At the same time, he provided them with a "policy memorandum" setting forth US wartime objectives in Western Europe. This document declared that:

The security of the United States requires the pursuance of a definite policy to insure, at the earliest possible moment, the holding of a line containing the West-

ern Europe complex preferably no farther to the west than the Rhine. The logical extension of this line involves the United Kingdom on the left flank and the Cairo-Suez [area] on the right flank.

Recognizing that the Rhine could not be held with the forces then available, General Eisenhower called for plans to be drawn so that a "substantial bridgehead" might be held in Western Europe, or if even this more limited objective was not possible, to provide for a "return, at the earliest possible moment, to Western Europe, in order to prevent the communization of that area with long term disastrous effects on U.S. national interests."

In supplementary oral instructions to the Operations Deputies, General Eisenhower listed three essential tasks: to ensure the integrity of the United Kingdom; to ensure US entry into the Western Mediterranean; and to hold a position in the Middle East area. In addition to these tasks, General Eisenhower said, he wanted attention given to the following "MUSTS": security of the United States, Iceland, and Greenland; and protection of lines of communication to the United Kingdom, Straits of Gibraltar, Alaska, South America, Okinawa, and Japan.[22]

As a result of this initiative by General Eisenhower, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a new directive to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee on 26 April 1949. A joint outline emergency war plan was to be prepared covering the first two years of a war beginning on 1 July 1949, based on forces available under the FY 1950 budget. The overall concept, as before, would combine a strategic offensive in Western Eurasia with defense in the Far East. However, the new guidance laid down by General Eisenhower was to be incorporated into the plan.[23]

The new plan, designated OFFTACKLE, was more than seven months in preparation. Resolution of wide-ranging Service disagreements proved time-consuming. By 3 September 1949 the one remaining issue was the size of Navy carrier forces. All Services agreed to a buildup of fleet carriers to 10 ships by D+18, but the Navy wanted to increase the number to 16 by D+21, while the Army and Air Force insisted upon a maximum of 10. With regard to light and escort carriers, the Army and Air Force maintained that two ships were sufficient, while the Navy wanted to build up to 15, for use in support of amphibious operations in the Mediterranean, by D+24. The Secretary of Defense resolved the dispute in favor of the Army and Air Force.[24]

Another round of planning conferences with the British and Canadians, lasting from 26 September through 4 October, further delayed final approval of OFFTACKLE, which, in draft form, was used as the basis for discussion. The conferees were unable to agree on a specific plan, but they did adopt a strategic concept for 1950 and 1951 (essentially that in OFFTACKLE) to be used in individual national plans.[25] OFFTACKLE then underwent final revision and was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 December 1949, replacing TROJAN.[26]

This was the first strategic plan to be based on political guidance from the National Security Council. NSC 20/4, approved by the Council and the President in November 1948, had ruled out initiation of military action by the United States against the Soviet Union. "We should endeavor to achieve our general objectives by methods short of war," NSC 20/4 stated, and even though war might "grow

out of incidents between forces in direct contact," it would result because the Soviet Union might be tempted to "take armed action under a miscalculation of the determination and willingness of the United States to resort to force in order to prevent the development of a threat intolerable to U.S. security."[27] NSC 20/4 thus provided authoritative support for an assumption that had been incorporated into all the draft plans beginning with BROILER, namely, that if a war took place it would be as a result of the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union or its satellites.

From NSC 20/4, the Joint Chiefs of Staff learned also that they would not be required to plan military operations that would bring about unconditional surrender by the Soviet Union, nor would they be required to prepare for military occupation and government of Soviet territory. This guidance, however, was of little use to them in preparing OFFTACKLE, which dealt only with the initial stages of a war.

OFFTACKLE in most of its major provisions was similar to TROJAN, the plan it superseded. Both plans called for a strategic offensive in Europe and a strategic defensive in the Far East. The strategic offensive, during the early stages of the war, would consist entirely of strategic air operations against the Soviet Union employing atomic and conventional bombs. In the new plan, however, the objectives of this operation had been broadened and made more ambitious. In OFFTACKLE, the air offensive was to "destroy" vital elements of the Soviet warmaking capacity, rather than merely to be directed "against" them as in TROJAN. OFFTACKLE also included, as a new objective, the "retardation" of Soviet advances in Western Europe.

To accomplish these missions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted a more ambitious target plan than the one provided for TROJAN. The new targeting plan, which had been prepared by the Air Force, was aimed at accomplishing the following objectives: disruption of Soviet industry; elimination of the political and administrative controls of the Soviet Government over its people; undermining the will of the Soviet Government and people to continue the war; and disarming of the Soviet armed forces. These objectives were to be achieved by inflicting critical damage on petroleum refineries, electric power plants, submarine construction facilities, high octane aviation gasoline production facilities, and other war-supporting industries.

To carry out this bombing campaign would require the dropping of 292 atomic bombs and 17,610 tons of conventional bombs during the first three months of operations, to be followed by continuing attacks to deliver 246,900 tons of conventional weapons by D+24 months. Delivery of these bombs by the specified method of attack was designed to provide 85 percent probability of complete destruction of the key industrial targets listed for atomic attack.

The results of these operations, in terms of the Soviet warmaking capacity, would be to bring about immediate stoppage of major portions of the principal war-supporting industries through the loss of electric power, the extension and prolongation of those stoppages by major destruction to other war-supporting industries, and the creation of chaos and possible panic among the labor force.

Moreover, the strategic air operations were expected to retard the Soviet advance into Western Europe by curtailing supplies of petroleum products, air-

craft engines, tanks, self-propelled guns, motor vehicles, and other items. Loss of most new production of these materials, plus the disruption of mobilization and a possible loss of morale, would force the Soviet high command to reassess the strategic situation with immediate though unpredictable consequences for current military operations.[28]

Units available for the strategic air offensive were slightly augmented for OFFTACKLE over those provided for TROJAN in spite of an overall drop in Air Force groups. Both plans allotted 11 groups to the strategic offensive, but the OFFTACKLE force included 2 heavy groups by D+12, double the number of TROJAN.

In the deployment of bomber groups, the principal change as compared with TROJAN was that none were allotted to the Cairo-Suez area, which had been abandoned as a launching point for the strategic air offensive. Defense of the region was regarded as beyond the capability of US forces and was accordingly left to the British. The strategic air forces that had been assigned to Cairo-Suez under TROJAN were redistributed by allocating one medium bomb group to the United Kingdom and the remaining three to Northwest Africa. The overall deployments plan was as follows:

	D-day	*D+12 months*
US	1 heavy group	2 heavy groups
UK	2 medium groups	5 medium groups
NW Africa	—	3 medium groups
Okinawa	1 medium group	1 medium group

The weakness of the United States in ground forces, which necessarily limited initial offensive operations to air attack, also meant that the United States could do little to aid the Western European nations in defending their territories, despite the newly concluded North Atlantic Alliance. The importance of denying Western Europe to the Soviet Union was recognized in the plan, in accord with General Eisenhower's instructions. A continuing policy to develop, along with the nations of Western Europe, the capability to hold a defense line no farther west than the Rhine was accorded the utmost importance. However, since forces available during 1950–1951 would not be sufficient for the task, two alternatives were considered: (1) holding a substantial bridgehead north of the Pyrenees; or if this proved impossible, (2) the earliest possible return to Western Europe. Available forces were believed inadequate for the first alternative, and the second would probably have to be adopted.

To facilitate their return to Western Europe, the United States and its allies would have to hold the United Kingdom and the Western Mediterranean area, including Gibraltar, as bases and staging areas. The United Kingdom, which was also to be the primary base for the strategic bombing campaign, was believed to be readily defensible by British forces, reinforced by modest US antiaircraft and fighter strength.

Ability to defend the Western Mediterranean, however, was more in doubt. Northwest Africa was considered relatively secure from Soviet attack. The

Iberian Peninsula, on the other hand, was vulnerable, although it appeared likely that the Soviets would observe Spanish neutrality. Should they choose to invade Spain, the major defensive line would probably be in southern Spain along the Guadalquivir River and Sierra Nevada Mountains, so as to ensure retention of Gibraltar and the western entrance to the Mediterranean.

Reentry into Western Europe, according to the estimate in OFFTACKLE, would not be possible before approximately D+24 months. By that time the necessary forces, totalling some 41 US divisions and 63 tactical air groups, would have been generated. The exact tactical pattern could not be set in advance, but it was expected to resemble that of World War II, with invasion forces reentering Europe from the United Kingdom and from North Africa.

The strategic defensive in the Far East, as contemplated in OFFTACKLE, would have as its major objectives the continued availability of Okinawa as a base for military operations and the defense of Japan. To attain these objectives would also require the retention of Formosa, the Philippines and the other Ryukyus Islands. These tasks would have to be carried out by the forces in the area on D-day, namely four divisions, seven tactical air groups, and ten cruisers and destroyers. There was no provision for retaining a foothold on the Asian continent. Such operations were not considered feasible with available forces.[29]

Planning for the Longer Term

As an "emergency" plan, OFFTACKLE, like its predecessors, was designed for execution in the immediate future and therefore reflected limitations based on existing forces. It was thus comparable to the later Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). "Midrange" planning, intended to guide future decisions on budgets and force levels before the outbreak of war (eventually institutionalized in the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan), was represented during 1947–1949 by the abortive BUSHWHACKER, which never reached the JCS agenda. No further efforts in this direction were attempted until 1950.[30]

The problem of long-range planning had been dealt with in 1947 in the preparation of CHARIOTEER, which, however, had been limited in scope and purpose. In 1948 the Joint Chiefs of Staff undertook to prepare a complete long-range war plan, looking eight years into the future. On 16 August they appointed an ad hoc committee to draft a plan for a war beginning on 1 July 1956 (later advanced to 1 January 1957). The outline plan submitted by the committee on 31 January 1949 embodied a basic strategy similar to that in HALFMOON and FLEETWOOD, except that it provided for a defense along the Rhine and the Alps; this provision, however, was contingent upon the furnishing of adequate US military assistance to the countries of Western Europe. The Joint Chiefs of Staff examined this plan and instructed the committee to develop it in more detail. An expanded version was accordingly submitted on 19 December 1949. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff never acted on it, and it was withdrawn in February 1951, being completely out of date by then.[31]

COGWHEEL: Strategic Basis for Mobilization Planning

A primary function of joint strategic plans was to provide the basis for mobilization planning. Force level projections incorporated in each plan were expected to guide the Services in preparing detailed plans for mobilization. The Munitions Board, a creation of the National Security Act of 1947 (successor to the Army-Navy Munitions Board of World War II) reviewed mobilization plans for logistic feasibility in connection with its responsibility for the "military aspects of industrial mobilization."

Prodded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Services undertook mobilization planning in 1947. They computed mobilization requirements on the basis of general guidance supplied by the Joint Logistics Committee. The stated requirements, however, when reviewed by the Munitions Board, far exceeded what was expected to be available.[32] The Chairman of the Munitions Board advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff in January 1948 that realistic mobilization planning must await the completion of a strategic plan.[33]

Following their approval of HALFMOON, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a brief of the strategic concept of the plan and the force tabs to the Munitions Board to serve as a basis for mobilization planning. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized that this material was of limited value to the Munitions Board because it only projected force buildups and deployments through D+12. They therefore agreed to provide additional guidance as soon as practicable on deployments through D+24 months.[34]

Secretary Johnson was also aware that something better than HALFMOON was needed. Writing to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 23 July, he informed them that the lack of suitable guidance was hampering the Munitions Board in its plans for industrial mobilization. He requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit an acceptable plan by 1 September 1948.[35]

In response to the Secretary's request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff produced and distributed COGWHEEL, a brief of a short-range emergency plan for the first two years of a war forced upon the United States by the Soviet Union on 1 July 1949. This plan was in consonance with HALFMOON for the first year of war. For the second year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff simply extended its concepts and force requirements. The result, they believed, was a "representative phased deployment of U.S. armed forces which might reasonably be achieved during the first 24 months of war commencing 1 July 1949." The force levels were projected as follows:

	D	*D+12*	*D+24*
Army (divisions)	20	40	80
Air Force (groups)	66	103⅓	186
Navy (combat ships)	510	1,785	2,976
(carriers)	(11)	(16)	(25)[36]

On one point in COGWHEEL the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not agree and forwarded split views to the Secretary of Defense. At issue was whether to start construction of three new flush-deck attack carriers (designated CVX) on D-day. The

Chief of Naval Operations argued in favor of starting these ships "to cover the exigencies of later developments" and because carrier air forces provided the backup which gave the strategic air operations a reasonable chance of success. The Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff contested this point of view. They claimed that the Navy had sufficient carriers (active and reserve) for assigned missions, and that the new ships could not be completed before D+30 at the earliest; by which time the Air Force would be fully deployed and capable of performing its missions without the assistance of Navy aircraft from the new carriers.[37]

COGWHEEL merely provided the strategic basis on which the Services could draft their short-range mobilization plans. Before such planning could begin, additional guidance to the Services of a logistical nature would be required. In a memorandum of 6 December 1948 to the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force and the Chief of Naval Operations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed them to develop their own logistic and mobilization plans, to compute their own requirements and to submit them to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review.[38]

Before these requirements could be developed, the Munitions Board cast doubt on the basis on which they were being computed. The Board had undertaken its own analysis of the resources necessary to support COGWHEEL and on 17 February 1949 submitted an interim report in which it concluded that, even if all required manpower and material were available, there would be a 40 percent shortage of new production aircraft during the first 24 months after D-day.[39]

To meet this and other inadequacies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Services to prepare revised estimates of their mobilization capabilities and force readiness as of 1 July 1949. These were to be used by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee in revising COGWHEEL. General Eisenhower's guidance for emergency war plan OFFTACKLE was also to be reflected in the revision.[40]

Before the revision of COGWHEEL could be completed, the Munitions Board submitted its final report on the feasibility of the plan as originally submitted. The findings were not encouraging: requirements for manpower, manufacturing capacity for munitions, construction, and copper and aluminum exceeded the resources expected to be available to the National Military Establishment. In the manpower area, the requirements for inductees for the first nine months exceeded the rate at which Selective Service could process them, and the buildup for military personnel from all sources was probably faster than the National Military Establishment could digest. These factors suggested a slower rate of buildup through M+9 months. From M+12 on, the total manpower requirements would exceed supply by an increasing amount. At M+12, the shortage would be 270,000, by M+24 it would be 4.2 million, and by M+36 it would reach 4.7 million. From these figures, it was evident that the proposed intake of military personnel could not be attained without jeopardizing the supporting productive effort by the civilian economy. A scaling down of military manpower requirements was therefore in order.

The indicated materiel shortages, which included tanks, aircraft, and ship components, could be reduced by such measures as the use of substitutes and an increase in war reserve stocks. Scaling down of manpower requirements would also reduce these shortages, but some further steps, such as rephasing

the activation of units or reducing manning and equipment levels, appeared to be necessary.[41]

The Munitions Board evaluation was further evidence of the inadequacy of COGWHEEL. General Vandenberg proposed that the revised version of that plan already in preparation by the Joint Logistics Plans Committee be held up while the Committee undertook to analyze the effects of the shortages cited by the Board and the Services revised their force estimates. On the recommendation of General Collins, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 6 October 1949 rejected this proposal. General Collins reasoned that most of the logistic deficiencies had already been identified and taken into account in OFFTACKLE, which was already available in draft and was being used by the Joint Logistics Plans Committee.[42]

A "joint mobilization plan," JCS 1725/47, was completed by the Joint Logistics Plans Committee in August 1949. The purpose was to lay down joint policies regarding materiel procurement, stock level maintenance, use of manpower, and various other logistical matters to guide the Services. Strategic guidance in JCS 1725/47 had been drawn from COGWHEEL, although the revision of that plan was not yet complete.[43] During JCS discussion of this plan, Admiral Denfeld challenged the use of a war plan as a basis for mobilization planning. Greater flexibility would result, he thought, if the Services were simply assigned broad tasks and functions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff rejected this view and decided that strategic guidance for mobilization planning would still be in the form of a joint outline war plan, which would include a phased deployment of forces. Instead of being derived from the current emergency plan, however, it was to be typical of strategic plans which the Joint Chiefs of Staff might adopt for operational use in the ensuing three years. As a concession to Admiral Denfeld, they agreed that in cases where a Chief of Service felt the force deployments in the mobilization plan did not adequately reflect the roles and missions of his Service, he should propose suitable modifications of the plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As interim guidance pending completion of a new plan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Services to use COGWHEEL, adapted to bring it into consonance with their capabilities as of 1 July 1949. Deployments projected for mobilization planning purposes through D+24 months should not exceed those of OFFTACKLE. The Joint Chiefs of Staff then approved JCS 1725/47 and directed the Services to use it.[44] As an interim measure pending completion of detailed statements of requirements by the Services based on the new guidance, the Munitions Board decided to base its planning on 50 percent of the requirements generated by COGWHEEL.[45]

STRAIGHTEDGE, the proposed replacement for COGWHEEL, was delayed and did not reach the Joint Chiefs of Staff until January 1951. At that time, they rejected it on the ground that the current Joint Emergency War Plan, REAPER, contained all necessary guidance for mobilization planning. A special plan for that purpose was therefore unnecessary.[46]

10

Challenges to Strategy

Reservations Concerning Emergency War Plans

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had completed an emergency war plan in line with existing capabilities (OFFTACKLE), but the pressures of fiscal stringency had forced them to make hard choices. Faced with an insufficiency of funds to support all the desirable forces, they had chosen to fund them on a priority basis, providing first for those most necessary at the outset of war. The result was to place main reliance for offensive action on the Strategic Air Command employing atomic weapons in strategic bombing of the Soviet Union and to restrict the Army and Navy to the roles of securing bases and maintaining lines of communications. Funding for carrier task forces and ground combat divisions was accordingly restricted.

These strategic choices by the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not go unchallenged. There was an understandable concern on the part of the Navy over the curtailment of funds for naval forces. But others with no personal or institutional interest in competing strategies or military forces also felt some misgivings over the emphasis on strategic nuclear bombing at the expense of other forms of warfare.

Secretary Forrestal was a leading skeptic where heavy reliance on strategic bombing was concerned. "I do not believe that air power alone can win a war," he wrote on 27 October 1948. In fact, he considered it impossible to predict the "form and character" of any future war. War planning was "largely an intellectual exercise" in which the planners tried to estimate the nature of a war against possible enemies who usually refused to oblige by playing the script written for them.[1]

Holding these views, Secretary Forrestal was naturally concerned over the prospect of committing billions of dollars to aircraft procurement without first ascertaining whether the aircraft could perform their assigned missions. On 22 September 1948 he had proposed to General Gruenther a war game to test the capabilities of strategic bombers to attack industrial targets in the United States. A few days later he expressed his doubts to Secretary Symington as to whether

the Air Force could deliver the atomic bomb on target. The Air Force Secretary responded by a memorandum dated 5 October stating the view of General Vandenberg that he was "absolutely certain . . . the bomb could be dropped where, how and when it was wanted."[2]

Mr. Forrestal was evidently not satisfied with the response, for on 23 and 25 October he addressed memorandums presenting the problem to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Since our current war plans contemplate the early initiation of a powerful strategic air offensive against vital elements of Soviet war-making capacity," he wrote, "I desire that you make an evaluation of the chances of success of delivering this effort." He also directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to evaluate the effect on the war effort of the USSR, to include an appraisal of the "psychological effects of atomic bombing on the Soviet will to wage war."[3]

To conduct the study of the effects of atomic bombing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff appointed an ad hoc interservice committee under the chairmanship of Lieutenant General H. R. Harmon, USAF. Responsibility for assessing the capabilities for delivering the bomb to the target they assigned to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.[4]

The Harmon Report: Evaluation of the Effects of Atomic Bombing

The Harmon Committee submitted its report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 May 1949. It was an evaluation of the initial, or atomic, phase of TROJAN, based on the assumptions that a circular error probability (CEP) of 3,000 feet would obtain and that current intelligence reports were "appropriate bases" for the evaluation.[5] The Committee concluded that physical damage to installations, personnel casualties suffered in industrial communities, and other direct or indirect cumulative effects would result in a 30 to 40 percent reduction in Soviet industrial capacity. Of particular importance, damage to the petroleum industry would be severe. Personnel casualties, the Committee concluded, might run as high as 6,700,000, of whom 2,700,000 would be killed, out of a population in the target areas of 28,000,000. For the survivors, the problems of carrying on would be vastly complicated by destruction of large numbers of homes.

These atomic attacks would not affect the capability of Soviet armed forces to advance rapidly into selected areas of Western Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East, but their capability to sustain these advances would progressively diminish because of inability to resupply. Petroleum products would dwindle rapidly and supplies would become critical for all branches of the armed forces. Logistic support generally would be handicapped by disruption of plans, impairment of controls, and damage to industry and transportation. The overall result would be to force the Soviet high command to reappraise its strategic position and probably to limit, postpone, or abandon certain campaigns.

There were certain adverse effects from the US viewpoint. Atomic bombing, psychologically, would unify the Soviet people and stiffen their will to resist and

would lead the Soviet Government to retaliate with all the force at its disposal. On balance, however, the Harmon Committee concluded that "the atomic bomb would be a major element of Allied military strength in any war with the USSR." It would constitute "the only means of rapidly inflicting shock and serious damage to vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity." Early employment would "facilitate greatly the application of other Allied military power with prospect of greatly lowered casualties.... From the standpoint of our national security, the advantages of its early use would be transcending. Every reasonable effort should be devoted to providing the means to be prepared for prompt and effective delivery of the maximum numbers of atomic bombs to appropriate target systems."[6]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 28 July 1949, forwarded the Harmon Committee report to the Secretary of Defense, along with a memorandum indicating their general concurrence with its conclusions and offering additional comments. The 30 to 40 percent reduction in Soviet industrial production to be expected as a result of atomic attack was a valid measure of overall damage, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed, but did not reflect completely the dislocations that could be expected. "Certain target systems...,"they wrote, "such as the petroleum industry, would receive appreciably greater damage. Furthermore, this magnitude of the destruction and the brief time span in which it occurs should retard Soviet recuperative action to an indeterminate but considerable extent." Employment of atomic weapons by the United States would admittedly lead the Soviet Union to retaliate to the fullest possible extent; however, the Soviets could in any case be expected to use all their available mass destruction weapons whatever the United States did. As to the psychological effects, the Harmon Committee's conclusion, while probably the best estimate generated to date, should be regarded only as an informed opinion on an "admittedly abstruse and controversial matter." Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out, the Harmon Committee evaluation was predicated upon successful delivery of the atomic offensive, a subject that was being examined separately.[7]

JCS Disagreement over Delivery Capabilities

General Vandenberg, to whom the Joint Chiefs of Staff had assigned responsibility for examination of delivery capabilities, had assured his colleagues on 21 December 1948 that the strategic air offensive could be carried out as planned. Soviet air capabilities, offensive or defensive, were not highly regarded. The Soviets' antiaircraft artillery was believed ineffective above 25,000 feet, their all-weather fighter force was insignificant, and their radar was incapable of providing sufficient early warning for effective fighter attacks. As for their offensive strength, Air Force estimates showed that it was unlikely that the Soviets would be able, through air attacks of their own, to render untenable the bases required for the US strategic attack.[8]

Admiral Denfeld, however, was not entirely convinced by General Vandenberg's analysis. He pointed out that the dearth of reliable intelligence pertaining to current Soviet technical accomplishments and military capabilities had led his Air Force colleague to draw conclusions "predicated on assumptions not supported by known facts." The air offensive based on this insufficient intelligence would, however, expend a quantity of atom bombs that would "represent a very substantial portion of our natural resources for waging war." Therefore, in his view, the risks involved and the probable degree of success in launching this offensive should receive searching, careful, and impartial appraisal. To this end, he recommended that the Air Force study be given an overall review by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee and that its intelligence assumptions be examined by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).[9]

To General Vandenberg, Admiral Denfeld's remarks seemed to imply that the Air Force was incompetent to plan strategic bombing and to challenge its right to do so as provided by the Key West Agreement. He reminded his Navy colleague that the Air Force had practiced strategic bombing successfully during World War II and had since refined it on the basis of extensive tests. The analysis of enemy capabilities and intentions, he continued, was based on estimates prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee. If, after careful review of the implications of his remarks, the Chief of Naval Operations still questioned the capability of the Air Force to judge the feasibility of one of its primary missions, he should state his specific objections to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[10]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were unable to resolve the dispute between Admiral Denfeld and General Vandenberg and on 17 February forwarded split views to the Secretary of Defense. General Bradley endorsed the views expressed by General Vandenberg. Both, however, agreed to make their conclusions of the intelligence data in the Air Force report subject to an analysis by the Joint Intelligence Committee. Admiral Denfeld, while restating his earlier views, agreed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should continue to base their planning on the prompt initiation of a strategic air offensive, although he was not prepared to agree that a "powerful strategic air offensive can be delivered as planned if such statement is considered to convey a high degree of success in delivery on assigned targets. . . . The risks as now estimated to exist are acceptable for present planning purposes only."[11]

Admiral Denfeld's dissent was symptomatic of a deepening concern with the role of the Navy in military strategy and its position in the National Military Establishment. During the preparation of the military budget for FY 1950, Admiral Denfeld and other Navy representatives had strongly resisted Army and Air Force efforts to reduce the Navy's carrier force, claiming an important role for it in the overall strategy for war against the Soviet Union, including the strategic air offensive. Admiral Denfeld now extended the Navy's argumentation beyond a defense of Navy force structure to a questioning of the validity of the strategic air offensive.[12]

The Joint Intelligence Committee, on 3 March 1949, upheld Admiral Denfeld's judgment. The Committee concluded that the Air Force study oversimplified the intelligence presented and ignored some pertinent information. Its overall assess-

ment of Soviet air defenses was generally accurate, but available information was so scanty that it was entirely possible that Soviet capabilities had been underestimated. Moreover, intelligence did not support the forecast in the study that destruction of the 70 primary targets would reduce Soviet industrial output by 50 percent (a figure that exceeded the estimate of the Harmon Committee) or the conclusion that an attack on a target would necessarily lead to its destruction.[13] The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly directed the Joint Intelligence Committee to prepare a joint intelligence estimate which could be used to evaluate the chances for success of the strategic air offensive. They also directed the newly established Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG), on the basis of this intelligence assessment, to evaluate the "weapons aspects" of the air offensive plan.[14]

The Joint Intelligence Committee completed its estimate on 25 August. It did not offer an overall appraisal of Soviet air offensive and defense capabilities but merely recited the numbers, types, and performance capabilities of equipment believed to be in Soviet operational units. The data presented did not differ substantially from those presented by General Vandenberg on 21 December 1948, except in Soviet bomber forces available to attack the United Kingdom between D-day and D+10. The JIC estimated these forces to be 150 four-engine bombers and 1,000 light bombers, in contrast with the 100 heavy and 520 light bombers estimated by General Vandenberg to be available on D-day.[15]

The JIC report went to the WSEG, as previously directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Before that group could complete its study of the feasibility of the strategic air offensive, however, public criticism of existing military policies by senior naval officers brought into the open the whole dispute over strategy, force levels, and roles and missions. The result was a public debate culminating in sensational hearings before the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives.

Cancellation of the Carrier USS *United States*

The immediate cause for the open dissent by high-ranking Navy officers was the cancellation of the "super carrier," the USS *United States*, by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson on 23 April 1949. This action was taken to be symptomatic of the "anti-Navy" military policies represented by recent strategic and budgetary decisions. The super carrier was a major element in the Navy's postwar program. It was designed to advance the art of carrier warfare and also was to give the Navy a "piece of the action" in atomic warfare. Flag officers commanding carrier task forces in the later stages of World War II had strongly urged the construction of carriers larger than any in commission or planned, to accommodate larger aircraft. After the war, Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, who became Deputy Chief of Naval Operations in 1945, approved a plan for a flush-deck carrier capable of handling aircraft large enough to carry the atomic bomb. Funds to begin construction of a ship of this new type were included in the Navy Department appropriations requests for FY 1949.[16] Since the military budgets for FY

1949 were prepared independently by the Service Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had no opportunity to express their views on the super carrier.

In their statement of aircraft requirements submitted to the Finletter Commission in December 1947, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had included large carriers among Navy force requirements.[17] The Acting Chief of Staff, US Air Force, setting forth the Air Force position, had limited his approval of the JCS submission to the "over-all aircraft figures" as representing "reasonable estimates as to the air requirements for our national security." He could not approve it in detail, he said, because of "unresolved points," and because differing Air Force and Navy organization and computation methods precluded the preparation of a "precise, integrated statement of requirements." As a result, "much if not most" of the data presented reflected "individual service approaches to the problem." Although he did not mention the large (CVX) carrier, his reservations at least cast doubt on the extent to which the JCS memorandum to the Finletter Commission could be construed as indicating approval of this ship.[18]

The big new carrier received attention also during the Key West Conference on 11 to 14 March 1948, but the record of what was decided there is unclear. The only reference to this ship in JCS files occurs in a memorandum for record prepared by General Gruenther, the Director of the Joint Staff. According to this document, the subject came up in connection with "collateral functions" of the Services. General Gruenther wrote:

> One illustration that was brought out in connection with requirements for the execution of collateral functions was the construction of a large carrier. . . . it was assumed that the Navy might not be able to establish a requirement for the carrier solely on the basis of its naval functions. A consideration of its purely naval function, plus the contribution which it could make to strategic air warfare, might be enough to warrant its construction.[19]

Although General Gruenther referred merely to a "large" carrier, there can be little doubt that the "super" carrier was meant. The discussion did not indicate a formal JCS position in favor of the new ship, but it might be construed as implying tacit approval, since the issue appeared to be how to rationalize a decision in favor of construction.

Secretary Forrestal, in reporting to President Truman on the Key West meetings on 15 March 1948, listed, among other agreements reached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the following: "Navy to proceed with development of 80,000-ton carrier and development of HA [high altitude] aircraft to carry heavy missiles therefrom."[20] Later, however, in discussing with reporters the outcome of the conference, the Secretary said that the super carrier might be built "if so decided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff," implying that the issue remained open.[21]

The question entered the arena of public controversy on 14 May 1948, when Admiral Denfeld told a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee that, at the Key West conference, "the Joint Chiefs of Staff said they would go along with it [the supercarrier] because it was in the President's program, and had been approved by the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense. It was not discussed at great length, but it was tacitly approved by all the mem-

bers there." The Chief of Naval Operations also described the action taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff the preceding December in response to the request of the Finletter Commission, but he did not mention the reservations expressed by the Air Force.[22]

Admiral Denfeld's version of these events was disputed a few days later by General Spaatz. Addressing the National Press Club on 25 May, the recently retired Air Force Chief of Staff denied that the Air Force had approved the Navy's plan to build a super carrier. In response to questions, he said specifically that the Air Force had not approved it in the paper that went to the Finletter Commission.[23]

It was against this background that the Secretary of Defense requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to clarify their views on the subject. Meeting on 26 May, they addressed the question: "Do the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve construction of the so-called 6A carrier?" Admiral Leahy, Admiral Denfeld, and General Bradley replied in the affirmative, but General Vandenberg declined to give his assent. "Approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of a project of this magnitude," he stated, "requires a thorough examination of its military characteristics and usefulness.... I have had no opportunity to reach conclusions on these points. The 1949 budget," he reminded his colleagues, "was prepared and submitted on a unilateral basis. It was not coordinated or examined in detail by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Hence, I cannot at this time approve or disapprove one particular part of the budget of one Service without the thorough consideration of the programs and budget requirements of all three Services." The Joint Chiefs of Staff reported these views to the Secretary of Defense on 28 May.[24]

Congress, evidently deciding that the case for the big new carrier was conclusive—including as it did support by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and three of the four members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—provided funds for the first year of construction in the Navy Department appropriation for FY 1949. And on 18 February 1949, the Navy ceremoniously laid the keel for the USS *United States* at Norfolk.[25]

At this point, prospects for the development of the new carrier looked favorable. However, events were soon to take a different course under the direction of the new Secretary of Defense, Mr. Louis Johnson, who took office on 28 March 1949, a little more than a month after the laying of the keel of the USS *United States*. Unlike his predecessor, Mr. Forrestal, who had strongly advocated construction of the new ship, Mr. Johnson professed to have no firm notions about it one way or the other. He discussed it briefly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Key West on 11 April. On the following day he was asked about the carrier at a press conference in Washington and replied that he would make a statement on the subject in due course.[26]

Mr. Johnson evidently concluded at this time that he should reexamine the decision of his predecessor approving construction of the carrier. His reasons for making this reexamination are not stated in available sources, but the budgetary stringency ordered by the President for both FY 1950 and FY 1951 probably had much to do with it. In any event, on 15 April he addressed a letter to General Eisenhower stating that he wished "the benefit of the judgment of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff... [on] the proposed aircraft carrier... USS *United States*." He asked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff hold as many meetings as may be required "for the purpose of discussing this particular subject."

In this letter, Mr. Johnson stressed that he had an open mind concerning the ship and in fact knew little about it. "I have no preconceived notions with respect to this carrier," he wrote, "and I have not as yet formed any opinion as to whether or not its construction should go forward.... I have not attempted to go deeply into the matter myself and shall not attempt to... until such time as I have received the views of the Chiefs."[27]

A major share of the burden for deciding the fate of the big ship therefore came to rest on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At General Eisenhower's suggestion, they took up the matter without waiting for him to return to Washington from Augusta, Georgia, where he was vacationing. They met on 19 April but, finding themselves hopelessly divided, agreed to submit separate views to the Secretary of Defense.[28]

Admiral Denfeld, in a memorandum dated 22 April 1949, strongly urged the Secretary to continue to support construction of the USS *United States*. The ship, he said, was necessary "to meet requirements for jointly agreed naval responsibilities" and had been supported by three of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, the Bureau of the Budget, the President and Congress solely on the basis of its value in performing these missions. However, all the authorities were "cognizant of its potential application as a mobile base for aircraft capable of carrying the atomic bomb."

The size and design of the new carrier were necessary to operate heavier aircraft of superior performance and large numbers of small aircraft, particularly fighters; to provide essential antiaircraft armament, radar, communications equipment, armor, and compartmentation; and to carry fuel essential for prolonged operations. Existing carriers could not be modified to make them comparable to the USS *United States*.

The qualities of the new ship, Admiral Denfeld maintained, would "facilitate greatly the accomplishment of specific naval tasks of any strategic concept which is likely to be adopted." The tasks included: assuring control of the sea; attacks on submarines, their facilities and construction yards; mining of coastal waters; direct attacks on enemy air and ground forces in areas near the sea; support of US air and ground forces in amphibious or airborne operations; and finally, other operations including the use of "the heaviest atomic bomb prospectively available, if directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or higher authority."[29]

General Bradley, replying the same day, took the opposite view from Admiral Denfeld. He concluded that it was "militarily unsound to authorize at this time the construction of additional aircraft carriers or to continue expenditures on the USS *United States*." The primary task for which the super carrier was designed, namely to employ heavy, long-range bombing aircraft, had been assigned to the Air Force as a primary function. As the Air Force was fully capable of performing this function, there was no need for a heavy aircraft carrier to share in it nor was there any need for such a ship to maintain the control of vital sea areas and lines of communication, which were the primary functions

assigned the Navy by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Soviet Union was not a sea power of consequence except in submarines, and the existing US naval forces, reinforced by the navies of Great Britain and other allies, would be more than adequate to deal with the Soviet undersea threat. There was therefore no justification for diverting scarce resources from other programs intended to create balanced land, sea and air forces.[30]

General Vandenberg, in his reply dated 23 April, opposed the super carrier on similar grounds. He, too, maintained that it was not needed for heavy bombardment, that existing ships were adequate to perform the purely naval missions of controlling the seas, and that therefore expenditure of funds on the super carrier was unwarranted.[31]

Admiral Denfeld, acting in his capacity as senior member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, forwarded these memorandums to Secretary Johnson on 23 April.[32] Mr. Johnson, having seen draft copies, was already familiar with their contents and had shown them to President Truman. He had also discussed the matter with General Eisenhower by telephone. As a result, the Secretary of Defense had already decided to cancel the super carrier and had obtained President Truman's approval for the action when he received Admiral Denfeld's memorandum of 23 April enclosing final statements of the JCS members. After ascertaining that the memorandum contained nothing new, he telephoned the President to inform him of the fact, released to the press a notice of the cancellation, and sent a memorandum to the same effect to the Secretary of the Navy.[33]

At the time, Secretary Sullivan was in Texas on a speaking engagement. He hastened back to Washington and submitted his resignation to President Truman. His reasons, as stated in a letter to Secretary Johnson, were that the ship was considered to be of highest priority in the Navy and, more important, that the arbitrary manner of its cancellation, without consultation with the Secretary of the Navy, was "unprecedented" and might have "far-reaching" consequences. His resignation was accepted.[34]

The cancellation of the USS *United States* released some $130 million for other projects in FY 1950. Acting Secretary of the Navy Dan A. Kimball recommended to Mr. Johnson that some of these funds be spent for the conversion of existing ships, principally two *Essex* class fleet carriers which were to be adapted to handle jet aircraft. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, to whom the Secretary of Defense referred this recommendation, were no more able to agree to the conversion of two *Essex* class carriers than they had been on the construction of a super carrier. Once again, the Chief of Naval Operations encountered united opposition from the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff. They argued that the Navy had no need for the ships, which would be capable of handling 52,000 pound aircraft. The Navy already had three heavy carriers in service and three more under construction, a number General Bradley considered to be sufficient. General Vandenberg maintained that even this number was excessive. Both agreed that the funds saved by cancellation of the USS *United States* should be returned to the national economy, or, if this was not feasible, be spent on anti-submarine warfare.

Admiral Denfeld urged the conversion of the two ships so they would be able to handle the new fighters and attack bombers coming into service with the fleet. Failure to convert the two ships would limit them to use with obsolescent aircraft. There was no intention, he said, to employ them for heavy bombers. The conversions were not intended to increase the number of modern carriers currently in active status; the purpose was to add to the pool of ships available in the event of mobilization. To convert a carrier required two years. A decision against the proposed conversions would therefore limit the Navy carrier force to six ships during the first two years of war.[35]

Secretary Johnson, in contrast to his action on the super carrier, supported the Navy on the ship conversions. After considering the JCS memorandum of 13 June and hearing the views of the Services at a meeting of the War Council, he announced his approval of the conversion on 21 June. This decision, he added, had already been approved by the President.[36]

Navy Charges against the B–36

The opening round in what was to become a public challenge by members of the Navy Department against the recent strategic and budgetary decisions was fired by Mr. Cedric Worth, civilian assistant to the Under Secretary of the Navy. He prepared an anonymous document charging that the Air Force B–36 bomber was a "billion dollar blunder," a mediocre aircraft incapable of performing its combat role effectively. It was only kept in production because the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Air Force had a financial interest in it, and because they owed personal and political favors to Mr. Floyd Odlum, head of Consolidated-Vultee Aircraft, the company that was manufacturing the B–36.[37]

The big bomber was a tempting target for Navy salvos. It had come to symbolize for the Navy critics what they considered to be over-reliance on an unsound military policy—strategic atomic bombing—and a resulting curtailment of Navy programs. Action taken by the Air Force some months before to increase procurement of B–36s now was viewed by the Navy critics as confirming their fears.

The design of the B–36 dated back to 1941. A production order for 100 had been let in 1943, but actual production did not begin until after World War II ended. The first models encountered design deficiencies, but these were overcome, and the Air Force, after considering a cancellation of the program, decided to continue production. Production models of the B–36 were beginning to enter the Air Force inventory by the middle of calendar year 1948.

Here matters stood in December 1948 when the President decided to limit the Air Force to 48 groups during FY 1950. There were then 59 active groups in the Air Force, with 7 more scheduled to be activated by 30 June 1949. The Air Force convened a board of general officers to plan the necessary reduction from 59 to 48 groups. Their recommendation, made on 6 January 1949, was to deactivate 11 groups, all but one of which were tactical, and to cancel procurement of aircraft

of various types at a saving of $269,761,000 from the supplemental FY 1948 aircraft procurement funds. To maximize the capabilities of the remaining 48 groups, the Board recommended the expenditure of $172,949,000 of the savings for 39 additional B–36B and RB–36B aircraft with which to convert two SAC medium bomb groups to heavy bombers.[38]

The Secretary of the Air Force approved these recommendations and on 28 January requested the Secretary of Defense to allocate the necessary funds. He in turn sought the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who replied on 21 February that they had no objection in view of assurances by the Air Force Chief of Staff that there would be no change in the "strategic concept or basic composition of the forces concerned. . . ."[39]

The Air Force had made a public announcement on 17 January that the additional B–36s would be procured. This action served to further Navy suspicions that the Air Force was attempting to "railroad" through the purchase of the aircraft. As Admiral Radford later testified before the House Armed Services Committee, the Air Force "placed Mr. Forrestal and the Chief of Naval Operations, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the anomalous position of either going along with the Air Force plans or of repudiating them after they had been announced to the public and to the aircraft industry."[40]

The Air Force recommended, and the Secretary of Defense approved, still another purchase of 36 B–36s on 14 April 1949. As in the case of the previous procurement authorization, this one involved no additional money and no increase in the total aircraft inventory, nor did it alter the force structure of the Air Force. Unlike the previous action, it did not result in an increase in the number of active heavy bombardment groups. All that was involved was the cancellation of procurement of B–54 aircraft, considered by the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), to be inferior to the B–36, and the enlargement of the existing four heavy bomber groups from 18 to 30 aircraft to accommodate the additional B–36s. The only participation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this transaction was to "note" it at the request of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, an action taken on 9 April.[41]

The Decision of Congress to Investigate

A copy of Mr. Worth's document was placed in the hands of Congressman James Van Zandt, a champion of Navy interests who demanded that the charges be investigated. Accordingly, the House Armed Services Committee, headed by Congressman Carl Vinson, launched an investigation.[42]

The Committee met on 9 June 1949 and adopted an agenda that ranged beyond the specific charges made by Mr. Worth and into major questions of strategy, roles and missions, and unification. It was as follows:

1. Establish the truth or falsity of all charges made by Mr. Van Zandt and others the committee may find or develop in the investigation.

2. Locate and identify the sources from which the charges, rumors, and innuendoes have come.

3. Examine the performance characteristics of the B–36 bomber to determine whether it is a satisfactory weapon.

4. Examine the roles and missions of the Air Force and Navy (especially Navy aviation and Marine aviation) to determine whether or not the decision to cancel the construction of the aircraft carrier USS *United States* was sound.

5. Establish whether or not the Air Force is concentrating upon strategic bombing to such extent as to be injurious to tactical aviation and the development of adequate fighter aircraft and fighter-aircraft techniques.

6. Consider the procedures followed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the development of weapons to be used by the respective Services to determine whether or not it is proposed that two of the three Services will be permitted to pass on the weapons of the third.

7. Study the effectiveness of strategic bombing to determine whether the Nation is sound in following this concept to its present extent.

8. Consider all other matters pertinent to the above that may be developed during the course of the investigation.[43]

The hearings on these matters were divided into two separate phases. Inquiry into items one and two, having to do with the validity and source of the Worth charges, constituted the first phase and took place daily from August 9 through August 12 and August 22 through August 25. They resulted in complete exoneration of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force and their subordinates. "There has not been," the Committee concluded, "... one iota, not one scintilla of evidence offered ... that would support charges or insinuations that collusion, fraud, corruption, influence, or favoritism played any part whatsoever in the procurement of the B–36 bomber." The remaining items, which dealt with broad issues of strategy and unification of the Armed Services, occupied the Committee's time from 6 through 21 October. It was this phase that aired the Navy challenge to the JCS strategic concepts and to the functioning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[44]

The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Hearings

The individual members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting in their capacity as professional heads of their respective Services, played a prominent part in both phases of the hearings. General Bradley, the newly appointed Chairman, testified also, but as an individual and not as a spokesman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During their testimony, the members described past actions, positions, and

procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but again they were expressing individual views and not the corporate views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Participation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the hearings as a corporate body was limited to furnishing the congressional committee with a written answer to item number seven on its agenda, having to do with the effectiveness of strategic bombing. This item was the subject of investigation during the second phase of the hearings.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff became involved in preparing an answer to this question as a result of a directive of 13 June from the Under Secretary of Defense, who, concerned about the broadened scope of the congressional investigation, directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present their views to the War Council. At the same time they were to consider the extent to which JCS papers and methods of operation should be made public. The Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the matter on 21 June and decided to present their views to the War Council, which was scheduled to meet the next day.[45]

At the War Council meeting on 22 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Secretary Johnson that their only concern was with the Committee's item seven, having to do with the effectiveness of strategic bombing and its place in current strategy. To answer questions on this topic, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed, would lead to the revelation of classified information that should be withheld in the interests of national security. General Bradley proposed that Congressman Vinson be asked to withdraw the item, but General Vandenberg made the point that, even if this were done, the subject was sure to be brought up by some Committee member during the hearings. He suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff furnish the Committee a strong statement that, in their collective judgment, the present concept of and reliance on strategic bombing was sound. Such a statement, he believed, would be acceptable to the Committee and would preclude later detailed probing into the matter by its members.

Secretary Johnson then asked each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether he favored the current concept of and reliance on strategic bombing. All replied in the affirmative, including Admiral Denfeld. After some further discussion, the Secretary directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a statement as proposed by General Vandenberg.[46]

The statement, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 16 July and delivered to Mr. Vinson, was a ringing endorsement of the strategic concept in the current joint war plan TROJAN. "The Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed," read the statement, "that in the initial phases of a war the greatest possible advantage will accrue to the United States through the prompt launching of a strategic bombing offensive against the enemy's war-making potential. . . ." This position had been arrived at after "exhaustive study" and the preparation of strategic studies and joint plans for national defense. All the plans called for the employment of strategic bombing, a concept which had been tested through joint studies and found to "offer the most effective methods of securing our national defense. . . . The Joint Chiefs of Staff separately and jointly are of the firm opinion that the concept of strategic bombing, and the extent of its employment as now planned, are sound."[47]

Service Preparations for the Hearings

The individual Services, not the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provided the bulk of the testimony during the B–36 hearings. Their preparation for the task showed a marked contrast. The Air Force established a special office under W. Barton Leach, a reserve colonel in the Air Force and a Harvard Law School professor with wide government experience. Secretary Symington and General Vandenberg gave Mr. Leach and his group their full support.

The Navy preparations were assigned to career Navy line officers of OP 23, the Organizational Policy and Research Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, which was headed by Captain Arleigh A. Burke. OP 23 was an existing organization that had other functions and could provide only limited support for Navy witnesses. Secretary Mathews and Admiral Denfeld did not concern themselves directly with the preparations. Leadership of the effort was provided by Admiral Arthur W. Radford, the former Vice Chief of Naval Operations and current Commander in Chief, Pacific, who had been recalled to Washington to testify at the request of Congressman Vinson.[48]

Admiral Denfeld, although he did not participate actively in preparing the Navy's case, later testified that he fully supported the "broad conclusions" of the Navy witnesses. Secretary of the Navy Mathews read Admiral Radford's prepared statement the day before it was delivered but did not give it his official approval.[49]

The procedure for presenting testimony adopted by Admiral Radford and his associates emphasized a "team" approach of the type often used in military briefings. Admiral Radford led off with a broad overview of the case. Subsequent witnesses produced and developed evidence to support specific points introduced by Admiral Radford. These witnesses fell into two categories: relatively junior officers testifying as technical experts on aerial warfare and aircraft performance; and senior officers who dealt with broad questions of policy and strategy. This latter group included officers from the retired list who had exercised high command in World War II and immediately thereafter, as well as officers on active duty who were currently occupying major command positions in the Navy. The retirees included Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, former Commander in Chief (COMINCH) and CNO; Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, former CNO and CINCPAC; and Fleet Admiral Willian F. Halsey and Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, who had commanded the huge fleets, built around fast carrier task forces, that ranged the Pacific during World War II. The active duty officers included the current Chief of Naval Operations and three officers serving as the commanders of unified and specified commands: Admiral Radford, CINCPAC; Admiral William H. P. Blandy, Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT); and Admiral Richard L. Conolly, Commander in Chief, Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM).

The Navy Challenge to Strategy

The case against strategic atomic bombing consisted of two charges. First, the operations as conceived could not be carried out with available aircraft. Sec-

ond, the results would be antithetical to stated war aims of the United States. In making these arguments, the Navy witnesses examined only intercontinental operations employing the B–36, although current war plans placed primary reliance on B–29s and B–50s flying from bases in the United Kingdom and Okinawa. Admiral Radford provided an explanation for this concentration on the B–36. It had become, he said, in the minds of the American people,

> a symbol of a theory of warfare—the atomic blitz—which promises them a cheap and easy victory if war should come.... Since the B–36 does symbolize this theory, this plane has attained an importance out of proportion to the real issues involved.... For this reason, it is better that we first consider the capabilities of the B–36 in order to make a more objective analysis of the theories of warfare which will be presented later.[50]

The concentration on the B–36, however, introduced an element of artificiality into the discussion of strategic atomic bombing. Admiral Radford and his associates went to great lengths to discredit a strategy that, although widely advocated by unofficial spokesmen for the Air Force, had never been proposed officially by that Service nor approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[51]

To determine whether the B–36 was a satisfactory weapon, according to Admiral Radford, would first require an answer to the question: "Can the B–36 be intercepted and destroyed in unacceptable numbers?" The answer was "Yes," if the bomber was unescorted by fighters. The evidence to support this conclusion was given by technical experts who testified that aircraft in service or soon to be introduced into service with the Fleet could easily track and destroy a B–36 flying at 40,000 feet even at night. They based their opinions on actual intercepts under test conditions and on extrapolation from the results of daylight raids against Germany by B–17s during World War II.[52] None of the witnesses attempted to hypothesize the conditions to be encountered by American bombers attacking the Soviet Union in 1949, as had been done, for example, in the Air Force study of delivery capabilities in December 1948.[53] In that study, the Air Force had taken into account the factors that currently limited the effectiveness of Soviet antiaircraft defense. The Navy witnesses, on the other hand, spoke in terms of weapons that could, because of the state of the art, be assumed to be available to the Soviet Union at that time or in the near future.

The second question to be answered in evaluating the B–36, as set forth by Admiral Radford, was "... if the B–36 reaches a target can it hit what needs to be hit from high altitude?" The answer to this question was "No."[54] The evidence, again, came from testimony by a technical witness, Commander Eugene Tatom, a radar specialist. He described the difficulties involved in bombing by radar and visual sighting from high altitude, as illustrated by errors made by the Eighth Air Force in bombing Germany during World War II. He also described the characteristics of the atomic bomb, contending that, while it was completely devastating in the immediate vicinity of its burst, it was limited in its area of destruction. Precision bombing was therefore essential, but, judging from the experience of World War II, unattainable. There could thus be no assurance of destroying a particular target from 40,000 feet, the altitude at which the B–36 was to operate,

except through saturation bombing. This would unavoidably cause heavy loss of life and destruction of surrounding areas.[55]

This saturation bombing, the Navy officers maintained, did not support the policies, objectives, and commitments of the United States. This part of the case was presented by Rear Admiral Ralph A. Ofstie, formerly a member of the Joint Strategic Bombing Survey and currently a member of the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission. He argued that, since war was an instrument of national policy, the method of waging it should be adjusted to policy objectives. The greatest defect of strategic bombing as currently planned was that it was not related to policy. It would not contribute to the defense of Western Europe. It would result in the wholesale extermination of civilians, an outcome that was contrary to fundamental American ideals and would therefore be opposed by the American people on moral grounds. And it would wreak vast damage on the physical structure of civilization, thereby placing in jeopardy the attainment of a stable postwar world economy, which was essential to the achievement of the stated American aim of a lasting peace and prosperity for all the peoples of the world.[56]

The Navy's Alternate Strategy

If area bombing employing atomic weapons was not a strategy that would serve the national interest, what did the Navy witnesses propose in its place? Their answer to this question derived from their identification of strategic objectives to be attained in a war with the Soviet Union, of the tactics to be employed to achieve them, and of the forces needed to put the tactics into effect.

Strategic objectives were not developed in detail by the Navy witnesses, who devoted most of their attention to tactics and types of forces. Admiral Ofstie presented the most complete identification of strategic objectives, which he listed as defense of Western Europe, defense of allied bases, and control of the sea. The importance of the last item in Admiral Ofstie's list, as might be expected from naval officers, was stressed by all the witnesses who addressed strategic questions. The necessity to control the seas was not a controversial matter. It had been endorsed by the leaders of all Services and had been incorporated in the strategic plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It became apparent during the hearings that the real area of disagreement between the Air Force and Army and their Navy critics concerned the application of air power to a land war in Western Europe. The Navy witnesses maintained that air power to be effective should be employed tactically in support of the armies of Western European countries and in strikes on the advancing Soviet armies and their vulnerable lines of communications. Without strong tactical air support the Western European armies could not successfully oppose major enemy ground attacks. These enemy armies, before launching an offensive, would be well-stocked, manned, and prepared to fight for a long time without

replenishment from production lines at home. But as they advanced, their lengthening lines of communication would become increasingly vulnerable to air attack. The defending forces should therefore concentrate on the advancing enemy forces themselves and on their vulnerable lines of communication. They should strike at rail lines, bridges, supply depots, and advancing columns of enemy troops.

These forces required to implement these tactics, the Navy witnesses maintained, were tactical air forces—light bombers and fighter-bombers capable of precision attacks on rail lines, marshalling yards, bridges, storage dumps, and troop columns. Both Air Force and Navy aircraft should be employed in these attacks. Aircraft operating from carriers would be especially valuable where land bases were limited or unavailable.

The heavy long-range strategic bomber could not perform these essential tactical missions efficiently. The Air Force, therefore, should not be allowed to "put its eggs in one basket" by overemphasizing procurement of the heavy bomber at the expense of tactical bombers and fighters.[57]

The Challenge to Strategy: Views of Admiral Denfeld

The last witness for the Navy was Admiral Denfeld, who faced a real dilemma. As Chief of Naval Operations, he had sat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and had approved Joint Emergency War Plans HALFMOON/FLEETWOOD and TROJAN, both of which provided for air operations employing the atomic bomb and carried out by the Strategic Air Command as the only major offensive action in the early stage of war. He had also approved the purchase of additional B–36s in February and April 1949 and had joined with the other chiefs in their strongly worded endorsement of strategic bombing for the Armed Services Committee in June. But as uniformed head of the Navy he was faced with a revolt of major proportions against these very strategic concepts by many influential admirals on both the active and retired lists.[58]

Admiral Denfeld's dilemma was reflected in his testimony. At the outset he generally endorsed the views expressed by the Navy witnesses. "I fully support the broad conclusions presented to this committee by the naval and marine officers who . . . preceded me," he informed the Committee. The consensus of these witnesses, as already pointed out, had been that strategic bombing as conceived by the Air Force was a mistake, and that it should be replaced by a tactical air offensive aimed at enemy forces in the field and their lines of communication. In support of this position, Admiral Denfeld now testified before the Committee that the "early air offensive . . . must be directed with far greater precision and selectivity than the bombing effort in the last war." The delivery of this offensive, furthermore, was "not solely a function of the United States Air Force. This country's total military air power is the combined air strength of the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps."

Having stated in general terms his adherence to the position of the Navy witnesses, Admiral Denfeld appeared to draw back. He described the questions referred to the WSEG and the Harmon Committee as essential to an evaluation of strategic atomic bombing. At the time of his testimony, only the Harmon Committee had completed its work. Admiral Denfeld testified that he concurred in its conclusions, a position that would seem to contradict his earlier statements. The Harmon Committee, it will be recalled, had concluded that every effort should be made to deliver the atomic bomb to appropriate targets. And if the WSEG findings were essential to an evaluation of strategic atomic bombing, then it would seem premature to support the views of those who had, in effect, already rejected it.

In dealing with purely naval matters, Admiral Denfeld faced no such dilemma. He had consistently championed a strong Navy with a large modern carrier component and had resisted every effort to cut back naval forces whether in the Joint Chiefs of Staff or in Defense Department budget preparations. As a witness before the Armed Services Committee, he continued to press this case. He took particular pains to counter the arguments made by General Bradley and General Vandenberg in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and advanced by them and other Army and Navy spokesmen in other forums, that the weakness of Soviet sea power diminished the need for a strong US Navy. There was, he testified, a "steady campaign to relegate the Navy to a convoy and antisubmarine service, on the grounds that any probable enemy possesses only negligible fleet strength." This was a misconception. "After the possibility of naval action has been eliminated . . . ," he told the Committee, "the need for a powerful fleet is in nowise lessened. . . . The Navy's ultimate function in war is to exert the steady, unrelenting pressure of our Nation's military might against the homeland of an enemy." To illustrate, he pointed to the example of the Okinawa operation of World War II, "where the largest fleet of warships in history was essential to victory, long after the Japanese Fleet had been largely annihilated."[59]

The Defense of Approved Strategy

The task of countering the Navy contentions on strategy fell primarily to General Bradley and General Vandenberg.[60] Strategic bombing, because it had been singled out by the Navy for attack, was the major topic of their rebuttal. General Bradley found justification for it in general terms on the ground that "any damage you can inflict upon the war-making potential of a nation, and any great injury you can inflict upon the morale of that nation contributes to the victory." It would have particular importance, he felt, during the early stages of war, when it would "affect an enemy's ability to prosecute a war and give us some needed time to mobilize our resources."[61] General Vandenberg pointed out that strategic bombing was a way to save American lives. "A prime objective of this country," he said, "must be to find a counterbalance to the potential enemy's masses of ground troops other than equal masses of American and Allied ground troops. No such balancing factor exists other than strategic bombing."[62] Both

Generals agreed, however, that strategic bombing alone could not win a war. They denied Admiral Radford's charge that war plans were based exclusively on the "so-called atomic blitz" and stated that a war with Russia would ultimately be won on the ground.

Both Generals also made particular efforts to rebut the Navy contention that strategic bombing was not feasible. They defended strategic bombing in general and the B–36 in particular. In addressing the first topic, they relied heavily on the experience of World War II. General Bradley maintained that the air offensive "had a decisive effect on the ultimate ability of the allies to defeat Germany in a shorter time, saving many, many lives." And General Vandenberg reminded the Committee that "no bombing mission set in motion by the Army Air Force in World War II was ever stopped short of its target by enemy opposition."[64]

Their defense of the B–36 consisted of assertions that the plane had been judged and found acceptable by officers with long experience in strategic bombardment. "I think the country should know," said General Vandenberg, "that the officers who are in charge of the strategic bombing program... have heard [the Navy assertions]... and have concluded that the assertions are unfounded. The men who have arrived at that conclusion are the most experienced men in the world in conducting long-range operations."[65] And General Bradley pointed out that the Navy had no direct experience with the big bomber. "No Navy pilot has flown a B–36," he said, "nor have [Naval officers] participated in tests with this bomber."[66]

General Bradley took particular pains to answer the charges that the Navy had been so reduced that its offensive power had been destroyed. Employing the same arguments that he had advanced in JCS deliberations on the matter, General Bradley insisted that the Navy was adequate to perform its assigned missions of keeping open sea lanes by combatting enemy fleets which were weak in surface vessels but strong in submarines. The Navy arguments for more large carriers, however, had not been based on the need for "action against a Russian fleet," or even against "the menace of the submarine," but on an alleged need "to attack land targets and to oppose hostile air in limited areas for a limited time. This," he concluded, "is not the Navy's primary mission." Such a capability "would be nice to have," but "it cannot be furnished without reducing the strength of either the Army, the Air Force, or the Navy's ability to perform its primiry mission of keeping the sea lanes open."[67]

Criticism of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Navy witnesses had attributed the faulty strategic decisions to misapplications of the unification law. Admiral Denfeld, who summed up the Navy case on this subject, cited a number of examples. One was the premature announcement by the Air Force in January 1949 that additional B–36s would be procured, before the matter had been studied by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Secretary of Defense. Another was Secretary Johnson's abrupt reversal of the decision

to build the super carrier, on the basis of a new vote in the Joint Chiefs of Staff during which General Bradley had shifted his position. Admiral Denfeld had received a copy of the press announcement of the cancellation just forty minutes after he delivered to the Secretary the JCS memorandum of 23 April on the subject.[68]

The 1950 budget was another source of complaint. Under that budget, Admiral Denfeld charged, the Navy's combat forces had, for the first time, been determined by "arbitrary decision." His objection was to the procedure introduced by Secretary Forrestal, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff were required to determine the composition of military forces under an imposed monetary ceiling. The result had been the establishment of strategic priorities that dictated a reduction in Naval ship strength below the level deemed prudent by Navy leaders.[69] Thus the Navy had been denied the opportunity of earlier years to "construct the best possible Navy with the funds appropriated by Congress." The situation had been made worse, according to Admiral Denfeld, by the fact that the Navy had recently been directed to make a further cut below the amount already requested of Congress for FY 1950. The impact of this last-minute reduction had not been discussed with Naval authorities, nor had the proposal been placed before the JCS Budget Advisory Committee.

The budgetary decisions and the cancellation of the super carrier, according to Admiral Denfeld, reflected a developing cleavage within the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which the Navy was opposed by the other two Services. Most of the issues involved the Navy's air arm, the future of which was thus gravely imperilled, although the need for Naval aviation had been recognized by Congress in the National Security Act of 1947.

Admiral Denfeld's conclusion was that the 1947 law "has not yet begun to function as the Congress intended." He proposed several remedies. Each Service, within the limitations of its budget, should be permitted to "design and develop its own weapons." In the "present stage of unification," it should be recognized "that the views of a particular service are entitled to predominant weight in the determination of the forces needed by that service to fulfill its missions." Finally, the "scope and activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" should be limited to "those specifically mentioned in the National Security Act," and the law, as well as the Key West Agreement on roles and missions, should be supported "literally."[70]

Implicit in these latter remarks was Admiral Denfeld's own interpretation of the National Security Act. Others, however, might contend that the law could be "literally" interpreted as assigning to the Joint Chiefs of Staff some of the very power that the Chief of Naval Operations wished to reserve to the Services. One of the duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as set forth in the law was to "review major materiel and personnel requirements of the military forces, in accordance with strategic and logistic plans." Was a combat vessel of the magnitude and importance of the USS *United States* a "major materiel requirement" as contemplated by this provision of the law? Secretary Johnson evidently believed that it was. Secretary Forrestal seems to have thought so too, as indicated by his remarks to the press on the subject after the Key West conference. And both obvi-

ously regarded the review of force levels, in connection with the budget process, as an entirely legitimate field of activity for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Committee Findings

The hearings on unification and strategy conducted by the House Armed Services Committee had aired serious charges by Navy officers against the judgments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on broad issues of national military policy and against the decisions of the President and Secretary of Defense on those issues. As a political body, the Committee quite correctly refrained from attempting to resolve professional military disagreements. The Committee also avoided making judgments on specific weapons systems. It held that "the Nation must rely upon the judgment of its professional leaders in their respective fields in matters of this nature—and that the Nation's leaders in respect to weapons of the Air Force are the leaders of the United States Air Force.... The Nation's leaders in respect to naval weapons are the leaders of the United States Navy." The Committee therefore proposed no interference with the B–36 program. It deplored the manner in which the USS *United States* had been cancelled, but decided not to recommend resumption of construction in view of budgetary limitations and the pressure of other shipbuilding programs.

Turning to matters of Defense organization, the Committee indicated its approval of the concept of unification and, by implication, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, added the Committee, the JCS structure, as presently constituted, did not "insure at all times adequate consideration for the views of all Services." It proposed therefore to sponsor legislation to require rotation of the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff after a two-year term, and to add the Commandant of the Marine Corps as a member.[71]

Relief of Admiral Denfeld

While the reaction of the House Armed Services Committee to the charges made by Navy officers was relatively mild, the administration responded with greater severity. This was to be expected, because it was the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President that had been challenged when virtually the entire high command of the Navy had taken their case to Congress and to the public. The action taken was to replace Admiral Denfeld as Chief of Naval Operations, who, by order of President Truman, was transferred to other duties on 27 October 1949. Secretary of the Navy Mathews had requested the transfer because his relations with Admiral Denfeld had deteriorated to the point where it was extremely difficult for them to work together. "A military establishment is not a political democracy," the Secretary said. "Integrity

of command is indispensable at all times. There can be no twilight zone in the measure of loyalty to superiors and respect for authority existing between various official ranks."[72] To replace Admiral Denfeld, President Truman named Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, who assumed his new duties on 2 November 1949.

The WSEG Report

A definitive answer to divergent Service views on strategy and weapons was hardly to be expected from any source. The establishment of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, however, raised the prospect that the extent of disagreement might eventually be narrowed by application of the techniques of scientific analysis. "It is our hope, through the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, to bring the capabilities of various weapons . . . out of the area of interservice controversy and into the area of fact," said Secretary Johnson, during the Committee hearings.[73]

The WSEG report on the US capability to deliver an atomic offensive, which had been some months in preparation, was finally submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 February 1950. The Group had assumed a target date of 1 May 1950 in order to reflect current US capabilities. The WSEG had also found it necessary to overcome a serious deficiency in intelligence data by hypothesizing two sets of Soviet air defense capabilities: a lower level, and a higher one reflecting possible improvements in anticipation of a war in 1950. The two estimates did not necessarily bracket the actual Soviet capabilities.

Assuming that Soviet capabilities did not substantially exceed the higher level, WSEG concluded the atomic phase of the strategic air offensive called for by OFFTACKLE could be carried out if certain deficiencies in US forces were rectified. These deficiencies included a shortage of medium bomber bases in the United Kingdom and inadequate defenses for existing bases; conflicting claims on airlift, which threatened to limit the number of transport aircraft available to support the strategic air offensive; and a shortage of aviation fuel stocks in operating areas. The conventional phase of the attack was not feasible, however, because of logistic difficulties and expected bomber losses.

If the deficiencies were overcome, WSEG estimated that about 70 to 85 percent of the atomic bomb carriers would succeed in dropping their bombs in the target areas. Each bomb was capable of destroying from one-half to two-thirds of an industrial target. Bomber losses to be expected in these operations would be about 30 percent in night operations and 50 percent in attacks carried out in daylight. The WSEG concluded that, in the interests of national security, action should be taken to correct the grave deficiencies in intelligence of enemy capabilities and to re-examine the OFFTACKLE target list in view of the infeasibility of carrying out the conventional phase of the bombing plan.[74]

The WSEG report, although it shed considerable light on the feasibility of the strategic air offensive, did not provide a final answer to the question posed by Secretary Forrestal in October 1948 regarding the wisdom of giving primary emphasis to atomic bombing. The question had, however, been overtaken by

budget decisions that, by cutting conventional forces to the bone, effectively dictated a nuclear strategy in the event of war. The WSEG study was referred to the Air Force for use in correcting the deficiencies in strategic forces and in reviewing operational plans. WSEG was given the further task of applying the conclusions of its study to the findings of the Harmon Committee—in short, of refining the estimates of the impact of strategic bombing on the Soviet war effort.[75]

Whether the WSEG report, if submitted earlier, could have headed off the confrontation between the Navy and the Air Force may be doubted. In any case, it had come too late to do so. It assumed significance, however, as part of the continuing effort to keep US military strategy abreast of the requirements of the national policy of containment.

11

Collective Defense of the Atlantic Community

The Brussels Pact

The Soviet seizure of Czechoslovakia and the blockade of Berlin, climaxing other aggressive Soviet actions in the postwar period, provided the stimulus for a drastic alteration in US foreign policy. The traditional avoidance of "entangling alliances" gave way to a search for security through collective arrangements with like-minded nations. The North Atlantic Treaty and its accompanying military aid program were the result. As President Truman recalled in his memoirs, "Russia's toughness and truculence in the Berlin matter had led many Europeans to realize the need for closer military assistance ties among the Western Nations, and this led to discussions which eventually resulted in the establishment of NATO. Berlin had been a lesson to all." [1]

The idea of a defensive alliance among anticommunist nations had first been proposed by Winston Churchill in 1946 in his famous "iron curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri. The Canadian Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Louis St. Laurent, had expressed similar views in a speech before the UN General Assembly in September 1947.[2]

The first concrete step in the development of the Atlantic alliance came in the winter of 1948, when the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg joined together in a treaty of mutual defense, signed in Brussels on 17 March. The train of events leading to the Brussels Treaty had been set in motion by British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin on 22 January. In a speech in the House of Commons he proposed bilateral agreements linking Great Britain with Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, similar to the Dunkirk Treaty of March 1947 between Britain and France. The Benelux countries felt, however, that the Dunkirk formula was inadequate because it was designed to guard against German aggression and not against the Soviet Union, which they considered to be the main threat. They proposed instead the multilateral form that was ultimately

adopted. The Czech coup, coming in late February, served to remind the negotiators of their common danger and helped bring their labors to quick fruition.[3]

By the terms of the Brussels Treaty, its signatories agreed to give all possible military aid to any one of them that might be attacked, to coordinate their economic activities, and to foster popular understanding of the principles forming the basis of their common civilization. A Consultative Council, so organized as to function continuously, was set up, consisting of the Foreign Ministers of the signatories. It was supported by a Permanent Commission, made up of the four Ambassadors in London together with a British official having ambassadorial status. The organization was known as the Western European Union (WEU).[4]

The Brussels Treaty did not identify the power or powers from whom an attack might come. That the Soviet Union was the potential aggressor was made clear during the negotiations. Foreign Secretary Bevin, in his speech in the House of Commons on 22 January, pointed out that the actions of the Soviets since World War II had "revealed a policy... to use every means in their power to get Communist control in Eastern Europe, and, as it now appears in the West as well. It matters little how we temporize, and maybe appease, or try to make arrangements.... These developments... point to the conclusion that the free nations of Western Europe must now draw closely together."[5]

The US Reaction to the Brussels Pact

The British proposal for an alliance with France and the Benelux countries was known to the US Government before it was publicly announced. In a letter forwarding an outline of Foreign Secretary Bevin's plan, the British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel, expressed the hope that it would meet with the approval of the US Government.[6] After consulting President Truman, Secretary Marshall replied that the initiative Mr. Bevin was taking would be "warmly applauded in the United States. I want him to know that... I wish to see the United States do everything which it properly can in assisting the European nations in bringing a project along this line to fruition."[7]

Encouraged by this response, Mr. Bevin sought further support for the Western European alliance. Lord Inverchapel told Under Secretary of State Lovett frankly that, in Mr. Bevin's view, the proposed treaties could not be effective without assurance of US support for the defense of Western Europe. Mr. Bevin did not expect a specific commitment of US forces to operate on the continent of Europe, but he hoped for a general agreement by the United States with Great Britain to go to war with an aggressor.

The US view, as stated by Mr. Lovett, was that no military commitment by the United States could be undertaken until the European nations had entered into binding agreements among themselves. In addition, Congress had reached a crucial state in its deliberations on the European Recovery Program, and any suggestion of new and extensive military commitments might have an adverse effect upon them.[8]

The signing of the Brussels Treaty on 17 March satisfied the basic condition for US participation in European defense planning. In these circumstances, President Truman included in his address to Congress on the same day the statement that the signing of the treaty was a development that "deserves our full support. I am confident that the United States will, by appropriate means, extend to the free nations the support which the situation requires. I am sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them to protect themselves."[9]

Efforts to specify the "support which the situation requires" began with the submission by the Department of State to the National Security Council Staff of a paper on the US position toward the WEU. With minor amendments, which were concurred in by representatives of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the National Security Resources Board, it was designated NSC 9, placed on the National Security Council agenda and circulated to the Council members.

The principal conclusion in NSC 9 was that military as well as economic support from the United States for the anticommunist nations of Western Europe would be required if they were to resist Soviet aggression. But the United States should not become a party to the Brussels Treaty. It should, rather, begin a procedure aimed ultimately at achieving a larger collective defense agreement, embracing the entire North Atlantic area.

The first step towards this goal would be to ask the signatories of the Brussels Treaty whether they would enter into such an agreement. It should include Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, and Italy. If the Brussels powers agreed, the necessary diplomatic approaches would be made to the prospective members by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.

Assuming the success of these steps, the President would then declare that any hostile action in the North Atlantic area against one of the Brussels Treaty signatories would be regarded by the United States as an attack on itself, to be dealt with under Article 51 of the UN Charter (which established the right of self-defense for member nations). He would at the same time offer to extend similar support to any other Western European country that acceded to the Brussels Treaty. Pending agreement among the Brussels Pact nations on collective defense measures, the United States would decide what steps to take unilaterally.

The United States would then invite all of the above-named powers, and in addition Canada, Eire, and Portugal, to a conference for the purpose of drawing up a collective defense agreement for the North Atlantic area. This agreement should apply to the continental territory of any party in Europe and America, any territory in Europe occupied by the forces of any party, all islands in the North Atlantic, and the waters thereof, including the air above them. Acts of aggression against any member within this area would be considered as aggression against all. Until implementing agencies had been set up and the means for joint action had been worked out, each party would determine for itself the necessary measures to fulfill the obligations of the Agreement. As a means to achieve some measure of mutual security as rapidly as possible, military conversations should be held between the United States and the present and future

members of the Western Union on the subject of coordinated military production and supply.[10]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their views on NSC 9 to Secretary Forrestal, at his request, on 23 April and asked him to transmit them to the National Security Council. They appreciated the need for a policy of collective defense as embodied in NSC 9, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, but they were concerned that the United States might make commitments in excess of its military capabilities. Every effort should therefore be made to avoid "commitment with implications extending to likelihood of major military involvement," unless preparatory measures were taken first. These measures should include, as a minimum, "increased military manpower... and increased appropriations necessary for strengthening the potential of our National Military Establishment in all respects" and statutory authorizations for industrial mobilization of the type employed in World War II. These measures should be devised to meet "at least requirements for effective emergency action and [should] be so planned that it will be practicable to extend their scope to all-out war effort without avoidable delay." The Joint Chiefs of Staff were particularly concerned lest the United States surrender freedom of action in determining its global strategy in order to obtain reciprocal military support. They opposed any agreement that would have such a result.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked to be allowed to examine the proposed defense agreement before commenting definitively. By way of provisional comment, they objected that the North Atlantic area was not clearly defined in NSC 9. They objected also to the inclusion of islands in the North Atlantic not belonging to any party to the agreement and to the inclusion of the waters of the North Atlantic and the air over them. Such provisions would increase the possibility of war without the sanction of international law. A provision for consultation among all parties in the event that any party felt its territorial integrity or political independence to be threatened also drew criticism from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the ground that consultation might lead to requests for military actions for which the United States was not prepared.

With regard to the proposal for coordination of military production and supply with the Brussels powers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that, as a practical matter, "coordination" meant provision of arms aid by the United States to the other nations. This was desirable, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized, but should not be allowed to interfere with the satisfaction of US arms requirements. The United States should also avoid the distortion of strategy that might result if arms aid were granted solely to meet foreign needs and without regard to strategic plans.[11]

The Western European powers, meanwhile, were seeking an early start of military collaboration with the United States. On 17 April, the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and France sent a message to Secretary of State Marshall urging the United States to take the initiative and begin military talks with WEU representatives in Washington.[12]

The Truman administration was reluctant to begin negotiations without congressional approval. To this end, Secretary of State Lovett had opened discussions on 18 April with Senator Vandenberg, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela-

tions Committee, with a view to obtaining congressional support for the policies in NSC 9. Senator Vandenberg agreed to try to have his committee report out a resolution stating that it was the sense of the Senate that the United States should enter into regional security arrangements. Final agreement on procedures was reached on 27 April at a meeting between Secretary Marshall, Under Secretary Lovett, Senator Vandenberg, and the Republican foreign policy adviser, Mr. John Foster Dulles. They agreed that the State Department would produce a short draft resolution for introduction in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Vandenberg and Mr. Dulles were opposed to the convening of a large international conference to draft an Atlantic Defense Agreement. To do so, they argued, would lay the United States open to charges that it was undermining the United Nations by encouraging regional pacts. To meet this objection, the conferees agreed that, once the Senate had approved the resolution, the State Department would arrange for the Brussels Pact powers to consult on matters concerning international peace and security.[13]

To accommodate these decisions, the NSC staff produced a new version of NSC 9. The new policy paper, NSC 9/2, concluded as follows:[14]

1. A resolution should be worked out with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee along the lines of an annexed draft setting forth the "sense of the Senate" that the United States should pursue association "with such regional and other collective arrangements, based on self-help and mutual aid, as affect its national security."

2. After introduction of the resolution, the State Department, in reply to the message from the French and British Foreign Ministers, should indicate that the United States was now willing to participate in military talks scheduled by the five powers to take place in London. The United States was prepared to concert military plans against Soviet aggression in Europe and to coordinate military production and supply.

3. At the London military talks, representatives of the National Military Establishment should make clear to the Brussels powers that, to receive US arms aid, they must satisfy two conditions: a. they must first plan their coordinated defense with the means presently available; and b. they must then determine how their collective military potential can be increased by coordinated production and supply, including standardization of equipment. The United States would then be prepared to consider their requests for necessary supplementary assistance but would expect as much reciprocal assistance from them as possible.

4. The Department of State should discuss with the member nations of the Brussels Pact, the possibility of enhancing the security of Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, Italy and Portugal through some form of association with the Brussels treaty system or otherwise.

5. The Department of State should seek Canadian participation in the London military talks.

6. If, as a result of diplomatic talks with the Brussels powers, the US Government became convinced that some further political commitment was necessary to bolster public confidence in Western Europe, it should discuss with the Brussels powers and Canada some form of association along the lines of the Senate resolution.[15]

Once again the Secretary of Defense asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit comments, which they did on 17 May. NSC 9/2, the Joint Chiefs of Staff observed, appeared to have been written on the assumption that the United States would support the Western Union and other related free world countries. As evidence, they noted that the draft resolution had already been given to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee where it was under active consideration.

The problem to be addressed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded, was therefore to determine the steps the United States should take to increase the confidence of the Western European powers in their ability to defend themselves and to deter the Soviet Union from acts of aggression. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the role of US military representatives at the London military talks be clearly stated to be "on a non-membership basis." This change in language should make clear the firm intent of the United States not to be committed to any agreement that might adversely affect its world strategy through grants of military assistance. It should also preclude being drawn into any command arrangement that could be expanded prematurely into an allied military council for global strategy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also recommended an amendment to NSC 9/2 to permit expansion of the Brussels Treaty to include Spain and the Western Zones of Germany and Austria.

Turning their attention finally to the provision of NSC 9/2 for a formal association of the United States with the Brussels Pact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that they "do not disagree." But any such association reinforced the view repeatedly stated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for "United States military strength appropriate to our national policy and for every effort to avoid military commitment... unless preceded by at least the degree of military strengthening that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended."[16]

The National Security Council considered NSC 9/2 on 20 May, noted the proposed Senate resolution, and approved in principle the proposed course of action. The Council decided to review its actions after receiving the report by the Foreign Relations Committee and in the light of the JCS comments.[17]

The State Department accordingly prepared a revised paper, NSC 9/3, but by the time it was finished on 28 June, the Senate had already approved the resolution. Designated Senate Resolution 239 and passed on 11 June, this document became popularly known as the "Vandenberg Resolution" in honor of its sponsor. The operative language, so far as US participation in collective defense was concerned, was as follows:

> Resolved... that the President be advised of the sense of the Senate that this government... should... pursue... within the United Nations Charter... association of the United States, by Constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security.[18]

NSC 9/3 acknowledged the Senate's action by stating that Resolution 239 should be "implemented to the fullest extent possible." Two of the JCS recommendations—one calling for considering the extension of the Brussels Pact to

Spain and the Western Zone of Austria and Germany, the other providing for a strict definition of the terms of US participation in the London military talks—were accepted. In other respects, NSC 9/3 was identical to NSC 9/2.[19] The National Security Council adopted NSC 9/3 on 1 July 1948; the President approved it on 2 July.

US Participation in Brussels Pact Military Planning

As a result of the President's approval of the recommendations in NSC 9/3, the National Military Establishment became directly involved in the military affairs of the WEU. Acting on the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Forrestal dispatched a seven-man joint mission headed by Major General Lyman Lemnitzer, USA, to London to attend sessions of the WEU Military Committee.[20]

As guidance for the US delegation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff laid down basic considerations to govern US military cooperation in both strategy and logistics. The current strategy of the WEU, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out, was to fight "as far east in Germany as possible" so as to keep the Soviets away from the borders of the member states until American reinforcements could arrive. But the US delegation was to state frankly that initially American military support would be limited to forces already in Europe when hostilities began and to strategic air forces. The delegation was to encourage the development of short- and long-term strategic concepts based on the assumption that significant additional US forces would not be deployed to Europe except possibly in the late stages of the war. The continental powers should nevertheless be encouraged to plan, even in the short term, a denial of Western Europe to Soviet occupation. Given a reasonable time for capabilities to be brought into harmony with intentions, this course of action would be of substantial security benefit to the United States. It was well within the capabilities of the Western European nations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated, to fill the military vacuum in Western Europe within a very few years. In the logistics sphere, the Joint Chiefs of Staff limited their instructions to standardization of equipment. Standardization should be sought, they said, using US equipment as a basis.[21]

At the same time, another aspect of US military collaboration in Western Europe, the coordination of US and British troop movements in Germany in the event of hostilities, was under bilateral US-British discussion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff Committee had been considering command relationships on a worldwide basis in conjunction with the emergency war plan HALFMOON, which had been approved by the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada.[22]

To the Joint Chiefs of Staff, agreement on overall command responsibility for US and British occupation forces in Europe in the event of war was of immediate concern. At a meeting with the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff (BCS) in Washington on 16 June, both sides had accepted the Rhine as the initial defense position in Western Europe and agreed that the withdrawal of forces to

that line and the subsequent battle should be controlled by one headquarters. They agreed also that French forces should be included in a common plan of action.[23] On 23 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, suggesting that, if an American officer was desired as commander in chief, General Clay should be named to the post. He should have a British air officer as his deputy and French and American commanders for the ground and air forces respectively. General Clay would be responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to which a French member would be added.[24]

At a meeting in Washington on 13 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that General Clay should not be appointed to the proposed position of Supreme Commander because, as the BCS representatives pointed out, he was fully occupied with his duties as military governor. Moreover, to appoint any US officer to such a position at that time would occasion political difficulties. It was agreed, therefore, that a French officer should be designated as temporary Allied Commander in Western Europe. Meanwhile a Supreme Commander and a deputy (one British, the other American, as decided later) would be appointed on a standby basis. The appointments would become effective on the outbreak of hostilities, at which time the French officer would step down to the position of commander of allied land forces.

Regarding command at a higher level, the British proposed a tie-in with the Western European Union, since the alliance among Britain, France, and the Benelux countries would come into play as soon as British forces in Germany were attacked. They suggested that the WEU Chiefs of Staff, with an accredited US representative, constitute a body to whom the Supreme Commander would be responsible. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted this proposal in principle, subject to the stipulation that the WEU Chiefs of Staff would in turn be responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, who would maintain overall direction of the military effort.

As for subordinate commanders, the British proposed that the air commander be British rather than American, because the Royal Air Force would be intimately concerned in the organization and training of the air forces of the WEU countries. They suggested also that a French naval officer be named Flag Officer, Western Europe, with the primary responsibility to organize port facilities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to these proposals.[25]

Meeting at Newport, Rhode Island, on 20 to 22 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense refined these plans further. An allied Commander in Chief for Western Europe, either a British or French officer with an American deputy, should be designated at once, they concluded. Acceptable candidates for Commander in Chief, were Marshal Alphonse Juin, Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, and Field Marshal the Viscount Alexander of Tunis. Either General J. Lawton Collins or General Lucius Clay should be named as deputy. In other respects, the command relationships would be the same as those proposed to the British on 13 August. President Truman approved these recommendations on 23 August, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed them to the British Chiefs of Staff the next day. The US Government also notified the Chiefs of Staff of the Western Union Nations, then meeting in London, of its decision.[26]

The WEU Chiefs of Staff readily agreed to all aspects of this command relations plan except for the nationality of the Commander in Chief. French hopes that the United States might be persuaded to accept the top post delayed decision until late in September, when the US delegate to the Military Committee informed the French delegate that the US position would not be changed. The Western Union Defense Ministers then adopted a British proposal to form a Western Union Commanders in Chief Committee, with a British officer as chairman. The membership of this body, as announced on 5 October, was Chairman, Field Marshal Montgomery; Air Commander in Chief, Air Marshal Sir James Robb; Land Commander in Chief, General Jean Lattre de Tassigny; Flag Officer, Western Europe, Vice Admiral Robert Jaujard.[27]

The function of the Commanders in Chief Committee was limited to the preparation, in consultation with the three Western Military Governors in Germany, of plans for meeting both the immediate and long-range Soviet threats to Western Europe. On or before the outbreak of war a supreme allied commander, having operational control over all allied forces made available by governments, would be appointed. Prior to that time, operational control would reside in the three Military Governors in Germany or other authorities designated by governments.

General Clay, commanding US forces in Germany, was instructed by the Department of the Army to make available to the Commanders in Chief Committee any pertinent war plans prepared by his headquarters and to be prepared to relinquish responsibility for overall emergency planning to the Commanders in Chief Committee when it was ready to assume responsibility for planning. At the appropriate time, and in consonance with the overall plans of the Commanders in Chief, General Clay was to issue the necessary instructions to his forces to ensure coordinated action in the event of war.[28]

In accordance with the original US-UK proposals on command relationships, the Defense Ministers of the Western European Union agreed to form a Chiefs of Staff Committee, on which all five member nations would be represented, and to invite US participation. The invitation was issued on 14 October and was favorably received by the Department of State, with the understanding that the United States would function in a non-membership status. Secretary Forrestal favored this position, but before taking a definitive stand he asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their views. They replied on 13 December that they favored participation on a non-membership basis, as proposed by the Department of State, and wished to nominate Lieutenant General Clarence R. Huebner, USA, the Deputy US CINCEUR, for the position. Secretary Forrestal accepted this proposal and forwarded it with his endorsement to the Department of State, where it was also approved. Official acceptance of the WEU offer was transmitted on 23 December.[29]

Field Marshal Montgomery attacked the problems confronting him in his new position with his customary vigor, and by the end of January 1949 had produced an outline plan for defense of Western Europe in the short term. In keeping with earlier concepts, it called for defense on the Rhine. Forces expected to be available as of 1 July 1949, the effective date of the plan, were 10 divisions (or their equivalent) including 950 tanks and 395 aircraft. They would face Soviet forces consisting of 25 divisions including 5,000 tanks and supported by 2,000 aircraft.

US occupation forces in Germany, 1⅓ divisions and 175 aircraft, were included in the tabulation of friendly forces and were assigned missions as a reserve under the plan.[30]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff found this plan to be "generally in accord with US strategic concepts" but concurred in the objections raised by the US European Command to the provision calling for the employment of US forces as a reserve for allied forces deployed along the Rhine. General Huebner, acting on guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, communicated these views to the Western Union Chiefs of Staff when they took up the plan on 23 March 1949. Transfer of command over US forces could not take place until they had moved west of the Rhine, and even after command had passed, they must serve as an entity in their own sector under American command. They would, therefore, not be available as a reserve.[31]

Negotiating the North Atlantic Treaty

President Truman, by approving NSC 9/3, had committed the United States to discussions with representatives of the Brussels Pact signatories and to exploration of the possibility of bringing other European nations into some form of association. To this end, Under Secretary of State Lovett began conversations in Washington with the Ambassadors of the Brussels Treaty nations and Canada on 6 July 1948. During these talks, Mr. Lovett explained that the United States could make no formal military commitments without full bipartisan approval, which could not be obtained until after the presidential elections. He pointed out further that no US commitment could be made definitive or be implemented without congressional action in accordance with the Constitution. Nevertheless, he was successful in persuading the other participants to proceed with military talks without seeking a formal US commitment. They stressed, however, the need for such a commitment at the earliest possible time in order to strengthen morale in Western Europe. Indeed, some idea of the nature of the relationship contemplated under the Vandenberg Resolution was essential before the European countries could consider further steps in military collaboration.

Given suitable assurances on this score, the conferees readily reached agreement on the desirability of close and continuing cooperation among the nations having a primary interest in the security of the North Atlantic area. On 10 September they recommended to their respective governments the establishment by treaty of a North Atlantic Security Arrangement including the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. They recommended also that some means be found to associate Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, and Italy with this Security Arrangement. Eventually, but not at present, the relationship of Western Germany and Spain to the Arrangement would have to be determined.[32]

By the end of October the Governments of Canada and the Brussels Treaty countries had accepted these recommendations, and Under Secretary Lovett and

the Ambassadors of the other countries had designated a Working Group which began drafting a treaty. Within two months the members of the Group had reached agreement on all but a few points and had produced a draft treaty encompassing the areas of agreement. On 24 December they forwarded the draft and a statement of the disagreements to their respective governments and asked for further instructions.

The draft treaty provided that the signatories would consider an attack against any one of them within the treaty area as an attack against all and would take whatever action was necessary to assure the security of the North Atlantic area.[33] To this end, the parties would consult together whenever, in the opinion of any one of them, the "territorial integrity, political independence or security" of any one of them was threatened, or whenever there was a threat to or breach of the peace. They would also seek to strengthen their capacity to resist aggression through continuous self help and mutual aid. To facilitate the implementation of the treaty, the draft called for the creation of a Council on which all parties would be represented. The Council would set up necessary subsidiary bodies, particularly a defense committee which would recommend measures to implement the mutual assistance and mutual defense provisions of the treaty.

The Working Group recommended that invitations to join the treaty be issued to Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Ireland, and Portugal, and that Sweden be informed indirectly that an application to join would be favorably received. Greece and Turkey could hardly be admitted to an Atlantic Pact, but they (and perhaps also Iran) should be given assurances that their security was "a matter of concern."

The Working Group had been unable to agree on two major issues: whether to include French North Africa, and whether to invite Italy to adhere to the treaty. The first of these disagreements saw France and Great Britain pitted against the others. On the second issue, France stood against the British representatives (joined by those of Canada) in favoring Italian membership. The Benelux nations, while recognizing that something should be done to strengthen ties between Italy and the Western powers, were inclined to oppose Italian membership in the treaty. US representatives took a similar position and favored some form of Italian association (not necessarily membership) with both the Atlantic and Brussels treaties.[34]

As part of the review process within the US Government, the Acting Secretary of State asked the Secretary of Defense for comments on the Working Group report. Secretary Forrestal decided that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would speak for the National Military Establishment. He accordingly asked them for their views.[35]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in comments submitted to the Secretary of Defense on 5 January, reiterated the position they had expressed in commenting on NSC 9 on 23 April and NSC 9/2 on 19 May 1948. They said:

> The idea of collective defense embodied in the proposed North Atlantic Pact is an essential feature of a United States policy directed toward preservation of our national security; and

Consummation of the proposed pact will emphasize the need for military strength appropriate to the world situation and to the commitments implicit in the pact. . . .

While agreeing . . . with the idea of collective defense embodied in the proposed pact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that its scope should not be such as to result in undue disparity between our commitments and our present and prospective strength.

To keep commitments within capabilities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested a careful examination of the wording of the articles calling for consultations and for mutual assistance in case of armed attack. In the former article, the term "territorial integrity," the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained, could be interpreted to include colonies of the signatories. The call for consultation, because it was not limited, could apply in case of aggression anywhere. The scope of this article, therefore, should be "no broader than it is at present and, preferably, . . . should be restricted. In any case there should be clear understanding that consultation is not in itself a commitment to military action." The provision for mutual assistance was generally commendable but was so phrased that the term "armed attack" might be construed as applying to internal as well as external assaults. "From the military viewpoint, so broad a provision is open to question," they argued, "in that the intention of the pact as a whole is taken to be the development of collective defense against external aggression and, further, in that the limitation of mandatory commitment, where reasonably practicable, is good business in terms of future military contingencies."

The machinery proposed to implement the treaty the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered generally satisfactory, except that the authority delegated to the proposed defense committee was too sweeping. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that this committee be empowered to recommend only general, rather than detailed, measures for implementation.

With regard to the divergencies in the draft, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended against including North Africa in the treaty area. To do so, they said, would unnecessarily and dangerously broaden US commitments. Italy, they felt, could make no military contribution to the Atlantic Treaty but could help strengthen the Brussels Treaty, owing to its central location with respect to Europe and the Mediterranean.[36]

Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who had succeeded General Marshall on 21 January 1949, wisely decided to seek approval of key senators before the treaty was signed, since it would eventually go to the Senate for ratification. To this end, he consulted closely on the draft with Senators Tom Connally and Arthur Vandenberg of the Foreign Relations Committee, while at the same time working on the draft treaty with appropriate foreign ambassadors. The Senators proved to be reluctant to enter into binding commitments, while the Ambassadors, quite naturally, sought as firm a commitment from the United States as possible. The final compromise that emerged in the key Article 5 provided that an attack against any

of the parties would be considered an attack against them all, to be met by each of them by "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force."[37]

The recommendations of the Working Group concerning the membership of the proposed alliance occasioned considerable discussion at governmental level. Some problems were resolved though compromises. Thus French support for the admission of Norway was gained through agreement to include Algeria in the treaty area. (The rest of French North Africa—Tunisia and Morocco—was excluded). Once Norway applied and was accepted, Denmark and Iceland followed suit. The adherence of Portugal was unanimously desired, but that nation was reluctant to join a treaty from which Spain, owing to strong objections from many of the members, was rigidly excluded. Eventually the Portuguese agreed to join after they had satisfied themselves that the North Atlantic Treaty was not incompatible with their existing treaty obligations toward Spain. There were two refusals. Sweden preferred to remain strictly neutral; Eire refused to join so long as northern Ireland remained separate.

Italy proved to be a special case. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff had pointed out, she was not a North Atlantic State and was not expected to make a substantial military contribution. Secretary of State Acheson argued successfully, however, that political considerations dictated the admission of Italy. As a former enemy state without connections with Western Europe or North America, he argued, Italy might suffer from an isolation complex, and with its large communist party, fall victim to seduction from the Soviet bloc.[38]

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington on 4 April 1949 by the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Within five months it had been ratified by the parliaments of the member countries. The US Senate approved the treaty by a vote of 83 to 13 on 21 July after extensive hearings.

General Bradley was the only member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to testify during the hearings. He gave a ringing endorsement to the treaty as a means to gain the added military strength of a highly industrialized people totaling 300 million. But he chose not to express the concern felt by the Joint Chiefs of Staff over the inability of the United States to honor the new treaty commitments or to advocate increased military spending for the purpose of bringing military capabilities in line with the commitments.[39]

The basic core of the North Atlantic Treaty was Article 5:

> The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently... each of them... will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking... individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area.

To provide the necessary strength to give meaning to Article 5, Article 3 provided that:

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

The mutual guarantees provided by Articles 3 and 5 were strengthened by Article 4:

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 6 defined the NATO Area:

For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the occupation forces of any party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.

Machinery for implementing the Treaty was provided by Article 9:

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. . . . The Council shall set up subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.[40]

Determining the Military Structure of NATO

Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty was to be of primary concern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the first year of their dealings with NATO. This was to be expected, because planning for mutual defense could hardly take place before the necessary military agencies had been established.

Even before the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed a staff study of the proposed military organization for NATO. On 31 January, General Bradley had pointed out that the defense committee envisioned under the treaty was of obvious interest to the National Military Establishment. Consequently, he recommended that the JPC study "the organization and responsibilities of this committee and its subordinate elements and comment upon their relation to instrumentalities already established under the Brussels Pact as well as their relation to other similar organizations already established by our Government."[41]

Early in their deliberations, the JSPC received the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on NATO military organization. In a paper dated 18 March and transmit-

ted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the 24th, the British Chiefs of Staff expressed a strong preference for Anglo-American domination of the NATO military structure, necessarily to be achieved by indirect rather than direct methods.

Should war come, said the British Chiefs of Staff, there were three ways of providing higher military direction. The first was through the present Combined Chiefs of Staff, advised by an Allied Military Council on which all the nations would be represented. Although most satisfactory to the United States and the United Kingdom, this concept would not be acceptable to France and possibly to other nations. Another method would be to place nominal higher direction in some form of Chiefs of Staff organization having a larger membership. Under this arrangement, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and UK Chiefs of Staff would have to cooperate closely so that the larger Chiefs of Staff organization did in fact take the decisions previously agreed to by the British and the Americans. A third method would be to add France to the existing Combined Chiefs of Staff, an unacceptable method because the other nations would then demand admission.

In peace, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty would be concerned with coordination of strategy between various theaters, a matter having to do primarily with allocation of resources. This coordination could be achieved either by vesting responsibility in the Combined Chiefs of Staff (the preferable solution) or in a North Atlantic Chiefs of Staff including representatives of all member states. As in the wartime situation, adoption of the larger Chiefs of Staff organization would require close Anglo-American coordination to achieve the results desired by the United States and the United Kingdom.

The British Chiefs of Staff reluctantly concluded that the only acceptable form of organization would be an Atlantic Pact Chiefs of Staff Committee on which all the major Atlantic powers were represented. But as agreement on overall strategy in this Committee would be most unlikely, it would be necessary to decentralize responsibility as much as possible by means of regional chiefs of staff subcommittees. These sub-regions would be Western Europe, Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean, and Scandinavia. The existing Western European Union organization, but with full US and Canadian participation, would be responsible for Western Europe. Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States would be responsible for planning and operations in the Atlantic. The Norwegians and Danes, advised by US and UK representatives, would be responsible for the defense of Scandinavia. The Mediterranean would be solely a US-UK responsibility; it would be inadvisable to include France and Italy in defense planning, though admittedly they had interests in the area.[42]

Following the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the British Chiefs of Staff communicated modified and more restrictive views on North Atlantic military organization to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. The British Chiefs now proposed an Atlantic Pact Chiefs of Staff Steering Committee in place of the Chiefs of Staff Committee formerly proposed. Membership in the Steering Committee would be limited to the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and France. Subordinate to the Steering Committee there would be only two regional subcommittees; the WEU Chiefs of Staff Organization, responsible for Western Europe, and an Atlantic Defense Organization, responsible for planning the defense of the North

Atlantic Ocean and consisting of representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and France. Representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of other member states would be consulted whenever the interests of their countries were directly affected.[43]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in making their own recommendations on NATO military organization to the Secretary of Defense on 23 June, modified the approach recommended by the British. They proposed to allow all members of the alliance a voice in high level military policymaking, and all the countries directly concerned a role in appropriate regional planning bodies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also realized that effective military planning would require strong guidance from a group of limited membership. In particular, the United States, as the principal contributor, would have to give "vigorous leadership" required to make the military provisions of the Treaty effective.

While recognizing the need for serving the interests of the member states, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also recognized the need for protecting the national interests of the United States. The military organization, they said, should reserve for the United States the "choice of its strategic course and maximum freedom of action in its execution." And as the principal contributor, the United States should control the allocation of its military resources to the other NATO nations.

To give effect to these principles, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a defense organization for NATO as follows. (The top two echelons were provided specifically by the Treaty, but their military functions had not been spelled out.)

1. The North Atlantic Council, which should establish a suitable military organization for conducting military operations.

2. The North Atlantic Defense Committee, consisting of defense ministers of all member nations, whose functions would be to recommend to the Council a suitable military organization to plan and conduct military operations.

3. The Defense Committee Executive and Steering Group, consisting of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, whose duties would be to supervise the implementation of Defense Committee policies and to submit broad questions of security policy to the Committee for approval.

4. The North Atlantic Military Advisory Council, consisting of military representatives of all member nations, whose duties would be to advise the Defense Committee and give general policy guidance and information of a military nature to the Military Steering and Executive Group.

5. The Military Advisory Council Steering and Executive Group, consisting of the Military Advisory Council representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, which would direct the North Atlantic Military Staff, coordinate plans drafted by the regional planning groups and, when authorized, take executive action in the name of the Council.

6. The North Atlantic Military Staff, consisting of a US director and an integrated staff, which would prepare outline defense plans (together with force and supply requirements) and would review plans submitted by the regional groups, preparing recommendations to go to the Steering and Executive Group of the Military Advisory Council.

7. The North Atlantic Military Supply Board, consisting of representatives of all signatory powers under a US Chairman, which would advise the Defense Committee on military supply problems and give guidance, in accordance with established policy, to member nations on the military supply efforts.

If these agencies were to function effectively, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed, they would have to be supported by bodies specifically designed to prepare detailed defense plans for the major regions of the Treaty area. Each of the bodies would consist of the Chiefs of Staff (or their representatives) of all countries having a direct interest in a particular region. As a practical matter, maximum use should be made of existing institutions, namely the Canada-US Military Cooperation Committee and the Western European Union Chiefs of Staff Committee. The United States, as the major supplier of military equipment, should be represented on all regional groups.

Under these guidelines, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the formation of five regional planning groups: The Canada-US Group; the Western European Group, consisting of the members of the WEU; the Northern European Group, including Norway and Denmark; the Western Mediterranean Group, made up of Italy, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States; and the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada as full-time members and with provision for participation by France, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, and Portugal on special planning issues, as appropriate.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Secretary of Defense forward their views to the Secretary of State and that they be authorized to hold informal discussions with the British and French Chiefs of Staff.[44]

The Secretary of Defense, before completing his own review of the JCS recommendations, forwarded them to the Secretary of State on 29 June and received a generally favorable reaction on 22 July. In some areas, however, the Secretary of State believed there was room for improvement: the Steering and Executive Group of the Defense Committee was unnecessary and should be deleted; the Military Supply Board should be assigned responsibility for all NATO finance and economic functions; and the Steering and Executive Group of the Military Advisory Council should be enlarged, for political reasons, by the inclusion of Canada. Moreover, the matter of a military command organization, raised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in discussing the functions of the North Atlantic Council and the Defense Committee, needed further clarification. Obviously it would be necessary to appoint a supreme commander for all Atlantic Pact forces. However, Secretary Acheson thought that consideration of this subject could well be postponed while the Defense Committee addressed more pressing problems.[45]

Commenting on these State Department views to the Secretary of Defense on 2 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to delete the Steering and Executive Group of the Defense Committee. However, they opposed the addition of Canada to the Military Advisory Council Steering Group, considering that such representation was undesirable from the military point of view. The assignment of additional functions to the Military Supply Board should await further study by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and the Munitions Board in which the State Department views would be taken into account.[46]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff toured Western Europe during early August to ascertain the views of military authorities of the other members of NATO on military organization. They consulted the Chiefs of Staff of nine countries and discovered that only two of them, the British and French, had given extensive consideration to the problems involved. All nevertheless had definite views on many of the major organizational issues.[47] While they accepted the JCS plan in general, most national military leaders expressed some degree of disagreement over some or all of the following points: composition of a steering and executive group of the Military Council; the desirability of a military staff; the location of the steering group and the military staff; and the composition of regional groups.

There were five different positions on the composition of the steering group. The US position—that the membership should be limited to the United States, United Kingdom, and France—found favor also with the United Kingdom, Denmark and Portugal. France favored the addition of Canada, thereby making four members. Norway favored three members but preferred Canada to France. The Benelux countries wanted five members, including a Benelux and a Northern European representative, in addition to the United States, the United Kingdom and France. Italy expressed no preference for a specific number but insisted upon Italian membership.

The question of a military staff found the United Kingdom at odds with the other member nations. The former favored a very small staff—one that would in fact amount to a mere "secretariat." Under this plan, most staff work would be done by national staffs. All the other countries save Portugal, which expressed no opinion, preferred a full-fledged military staff, though they disagreed on its composition. France, Norway, and Luxembourg wanted all 12 signatories represented, while the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark preferred a limited membership. Italy also desired a limited participation but, again, insisted on membership for itself.

The primary point at issue regarding the regional groups had to do with the extent of US participation. Both the French and British Chiefs of Staff held that Western European military planning would never be realistic until the United States participated directly. The British, in particular, were insistent that the United States participate fully in *all* regional groups.[48]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, reporting their findings to the Secretary of Defense on 22 August, concluded that certain modifications in their previous position were necessary but that they should "hold the line" against some of the changes advocated by the other members of the alliance. They were adamant in wanting the Steering and Executive Group limited to three members, though they agreed that provision should be made for consultation with other signatory nations by means of accredited missions or representatives. Limited membership was necessary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained, for purposes of efficiency, while the

provision for consultation should help satisfy the desires of the other members for participation.

With regard to the regional planning groups, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended certain modifications in proposed membership. Portugal would be dropped from the Western Mediterranean Group, and the United States and the United Kingdom, instead of being full members, would merely participate "as appropriate." On the North Atlantic Group, France would become a full member and Belgium and the Netherlands would participate as appropriate. On the Western European Group, the United States, then functioning only in observer status, would increase its role to "participation as appropriate." Thus the United States would be able to exercise the necessary leadership in military planning for Western Europe without becoming so involved that the European powers would relax their own efforts.

The position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a military staff for the Steering and Executive Group had undergone considerable change. In their recommendation of 23 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had seen the need for a combined and integrated staff headed by a Director to coordinate the voluminous details of planning accomplished by each regional planning group. They now endorsed the British plan for a small secretariat. To gain acceptance by the other nations, it would be necessary to use the title "military staff," but the organization should be kept small in size and limited in function.[49]

The signatory powers had agreed, at the time of signing the North Atlantic Treaty, to convene a working group in Washington to draw up recommendations for establishing the machinery called for by the treaty. This body began its work on 23 August; its recommendations were to go before the North Atlantic Council at its first meeting, scheduled for 17 September. The US delegation to the Working Group included representatives of the Department of State, the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Munitions Board.[50]

The US position on the military machinery, developed by the US delegation for introduction into the Working Group, displayed a predominant JCS influence. Although there were extensive changes in organization and in wording, the US position paper called for the creation of the machinery advocated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 23 June and 22 August.

The Working Group labored until 12 September in a vain attempt to reach agreement on the implementing machinery for the North Atlantic Treaty. On that date, with the Council meeting due to open in only five days, the Working Group gave up and submitted a split report to the member governments.

Of major concern to the European signatories was the part to be played by the United States in planning the defense of Europe. The ambiguous phrase "participation as appropriate" in the US draft proved unacceptable. The United Kingdom took the lead in urging the United States to play a larger role. On 29 August, the UK Chiefs of Staff informed their representatives in Washington that they

were "firmly of the opinion" that the United States should become a full member of the Western European Group and thereby carry a full share in planning the defense of the key region in the whole system. Failure to do so might undermine the Western European regional group.[51]

The US delegation agreed to replace the phrase "participation as appropriate" with a statement that the United States was "ready to participate fully in the planning." This substitution did not entirely resolve the matter, and the British Chiefs of Staff on 7 September asked for clarification of the new language. Did it mean that the United States would be represented on an equal basis in regional meetings of Defense Ministers or Chiefs of Staff? Would US representatives on regional groups speak with the full authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and would they reveal the full extent of US contribution to the defense of the region?[52] The US reply, worked out by the delegation to the Working Group, was to substitute for the existing language the equally ambiguous sentence: "The United States has been requested and has agreed to participate actively in the defense planning as appropriate."[53]

This substitution proved unacceptable not only to the British representative on the Working Group but to the representatives of Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, and Portugal as well. The result was that they all reserved their positions on the new US language in the final Working Group report.

Another major split arose over Italian insistence on membership on the Standing Group and on the Western European Regional Planning Group. In support of their position, the Italians argued that theirs would be the second largest army in Europe and that the defensive position in Western Europe would be a continuous, or at least a connected, line stretching from the North Sea to the Adriatic.[54]

The issue of the size of the staff for the Standing Group was postponed for later determination. The final report said that the Defense Committee and its "subsidiary bodies" should make "such arrangements for their staff and secretarial services as they consider necessary, bearing in mind the desirability of restricting as far as possible the number of persons so employed."

In most other respects, the Working Group recommendations did not differ substantially from the US position. Major changes in the military structure devised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff included two changes in designation and two changes in the composition of regional groups. The Military Advisory Council became the Military Committee, and its Steering and Executive Group became the Standing Group. The United Kingdom became a full member of the Northern European Group, and all signatory nations except Luxembourg and Italy became full members of the North Atlantic Ocean Group.[55]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on their own initiative, reviewed the Working Group report, and on 16 September informed the Secretary of Defense that, because it did not differ materially from their position on the subject, it was acceptable as the basis for establishing the military organization to implement the North Atlantic Treaty.[56]

The Anglo-American differences over US participation in regional groups were resolved in direct negotiation between Secretary of State Acheson and Foreign Secretary Bevin on 14 September. Mr. Bevin, while recognizing political

and military difficulties involved, expressed the hope that the United States would take "as active a part as possible" in the work of the regional groups and be represented by high ranking officers who could speak authoritatively for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Acheson replied that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not be expected at this time to define "participation as appropriate" or to express complete views on war strategy. The unwillingness of the United States to commit forces piecemeal did not imply any dodging of responsibility. Mr. Bevin then accepted a formula developed at working level the previous day as "not all that he would desire" but as "the best we could give."[57] The formula, intended as an informal understanding between the two governments and not to be included in the formal description of the North Atlantic Treaty machinery, was as follows:

> The United States will appoint representatives to play an active role in the work of the three European Regional Planning Groups within the limits of the policy of the United States Chiefs of Staff, and it is hoped that their work will lead to the further development of policy by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as may be necessary.[58]

Secretary Acheson also dealt successfully with the issues raised by Italy. Both the United States and the United Kingdom opposed Italian membership on the Standing Group, and Secretary Acheson agreed to attempt to persuade the Italians not to press their claim. Judging by the fact that the final agreement did not grant the Italians what they wanted, Mr. Acheson was evidently successful in his efforts.[59]

Once the divergencies had been resolved, the North Atlantic Council moved swiftly to establish implementing machinery to carry out the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty. On 17 September, the Council approved an amended Working Group report, issued an implementing directive to the Defense Committee, and directed the Working Group to recommend suitable machinery to deal with military production and supply as an integral part of the defense of the North Atlantic area and with financial and economic factors affecting the development and implementation of military plans. As approved by the Council, the military machinery of the Alliance consisted of the following:

1. The Defense Committee, composed of one representative of defense minister rank from each party and charged with recommending measures to implement Articles 3 and 5 of the Treaty.

2. The Military Committee, to be established by the Defense Committee and consisting of one respresentative at Chiefs of Staff level from each party. It would provide general guidance to its Standing Group and would recommend to the Defense Committee military measures for the unified defense of the North Atlantic Area. (Iceland, which had no military establishment, might, if it so desired, be represented by a civilian official.)

3. The Standing Group, composed of one representative each from France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It was to act as an executive for the Military Committee and as such would give specific guidance to the Regional Planning Groups and coordinate and integrate regional defense plans.

4. Five Regional Planning Groups, responsible for developing plans for individual areas. The titles of these groups (which indicated their area of responsibility) and the members of each were as follows:

a. Northern Europe: Denmark, Norway, and the United Kingdom;

b. Western Europe: Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom;

c. Southern Europe-Western Mediterranean: France, Italy, and the United Kingdom;

d. Canada-United States;

e. North Atlantic: all parties, except Italy and Luxembourg.

The United States agreed to "participate actively in the defense planning as appropriate" of all regional groups of which it was not a full member. Canada accepted a similar status on the Western European Group.

To give proper representation to the views of parties not members of the Standing Group, the North Atlantic Council established the right of any party whose forces, facilities or resources were involved in a regional plan to participate in its review by the Standing Group. Moreover, regional plans might be presented for review by any member of the responsible planning group (not necessarily one who was also on the Standing Group). Similar authority for all parties was also made applicable to the work of the Regional Planning Groups.[60]

Two of the regional planning groups were created from existing bodies: the Chiefs of Staff Committee of Western European Union became the Western Europe Group; the Canada-US Cooperation Committee became the Canada-US Group. The others were organized specifically to discharge functions in support of the North Atlantic Treaty. To coordinate US participation on the three European regional groups, the Joint Chiefs of Staff established the JCS Joint Representatives, Europe, consisting of CINCEUR, CINCNELM, and CINCUSAFE. They represented the United States on the Western, Southern Europe-Western Mediterranean, and Northern Groups respectively. To provide the necessary staff support for their representatives, the Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Joint American Military Advisory Group Europe, which was also to support the US Military Representative for Military Assistance in Europe.[61]

Action to provide a logistic agency in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was taken by the Defense Committee at its first meeting on 5 October. The resulting North Atlantic Military Production and Supply Board, which had been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff when presented to them in draft form, was a body on which all parties were represented at subministerial level. Its functions were to review the availability of supplies to meet requirements and recommend ways to remedy any deficiencies. It was also to promote more efficient production methods.[62]

Military Planning Begins

The newly-formed military components of NATO moved quickly to plan for the defense of the North Atlantic area. At its first meeting, on 5 October, the

Defense Committee directed the Military Committee to have the Standing Group submit a "broad concept for the overall defense of the North Atlantic Area" in order to ensure early completion and integration of regional defense plans.[63]

To assist the Standing Group deliberations on the subject, the Joint Chiefs of Staff supplied the US representative, General Bradley, with a draft "concept" paper which, with minor modifications, was accepted by the British and French representatives on 10 October and referred to their respective Chiefs of Staff as SG 1. The Military Committee, after study of the document by national staffs, approved it with minor modifications on 6 December and issued it as DC 6/1. The North Atlantic Council approved it on 6 January 1950.

By agreement with the Department of State and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the concept paper was also judged, when approved by the North Atlantic Council, to meet the requirements of military aid legislation for release of $900,000,000 when the President was satisfied that NATO was undertaking coordinated defense planning.

The concept paper laid down certain basic principles: mutual cooperation in defense against armed attack; contributions from each nation, in accordance with its situation, responsibilities and resources; military buildup without endangering economic recovery; coordinated military force in accordance with a common strategic plan; assumption by each nation of the tasks for which it was best suited; and a successful defense at the least cost in manpower and resources. These principles gave rise to two objectives: to coordinate the military and economic strength of the alliance as a deterrent to attack; and to develop plans to be applicable in the event of war. To achieve these objectives, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed certain basic undertakings: assure the capability for strategic atomic bombing (essentially a US responsibility, with other nations assisting "as practicable"); arrest and counter enemy attacks as soon as practicable, relying at first primarily on European ground forces, tactical air forces, and air defense; secure and control essential sea and air lines of communication, relying primarily on US and UK forces; secure essential ports, air bases, and main base areas; and mobilize according to war plans. This concept paper had been kept purposely vague because of the "political and security implications" attendant upon its consideration by the Defense Committee and the North Atlantic Council and its use to meet provisions of military aid legislation.[64]

To provide a suitable basis for regional planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed, would require more detailed guidance than was provided by DC 6/1. They therefore approved strategic guidance designed as a basis for the "medium term," which was defined as beginning on 1 July 1954. The Joint Chiefs of Staff assumed that the Soviet Union would attack the NATO nations and attempt to reach the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. A further assumption was that atomic weapons would be used by both sides.

According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the objectives of the NATO nations in such a war were basically defensive. The allied nations should seek to defeat the Soviet Union and its allies to the extent necessary to assure the integrity of the NATO nations. This would entail eliminating Soviet domination over non-Soviet states, preventing the Soviet Union and its satellites from interfering in the inter-

nal affairs of other countries, and ensuring that the Soviet regime (or its successor after the war) complied with the principles of the UN charter and was not powerful enough to launch an aggressive war.

The specific tasks that the Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned to the various Regional Planning Groups were essentially defensive. Of key importance was the retention of "those base areas and . . . sea areas essential for offensive operations, including those required for launching and supporting air offensive operations." Other major tasks were to hold the line of the Rhine, together with a defensible Scandinavian bastion and as much of Italy as possible, and to defend trans-Atlantic communications.[65]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff amended their guidance paper to accommodate the views of the State Department and of Major General J. H. Burns, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for political-military matters. Most of the changes had to do with political planning assumptions, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff readily accepted. There was one of major military significance that was proposed by General Burns. The assumption that the United States would use atomic bombs was by no means justified in view of the fact that the President had not yet reached a decision on the subject. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the objection and changed the assumption from "will be used" to "may be used."[66]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their guidance to the US representative on the Standing Group on 16 November. Using the US paper as the basis, the Standing Group prepared a draft and forwarded it to governments for comment. The Standing Group version (SG 13) differed from the JCS document primarily by requiring short-term as well as medium-term planning, and by deleting war objectives, which were to be determined by governments.[67]

After having received the comments of all nations except Italy and Portugal, the Standing Group staff incorporated them into a new version designated SG 13/9. The defense policy laid down in SG 13/9 was to deter Soviet aggression against NATO, but if deterrence failed, to defend the treaty areas as far forward as possible on the ground and at the same time launch air attacks on the Soviet Union employing atomic bombs. Special emphasis was to be placed on the defense of Europe, since its loss might doom efforts to defend NATO territories as a whole. Regional planning groups were instructed to plan for war beginning on 1 January 1954 (the mid-range plan) and also for defense of the area with forces expected to be available on 1 September 1950 (the short-term plan). The mid-term plan, with an estimate of necessary forces, a time-phased buildup program to attain them, and a statement of difficulties expected at the end of the first phase (1 January 1951), was to be submitted to the Standing Group by 1 March 1950.[68]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after incorporating the views of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of State, furnished guidance defining the US position to the US representative for use in Standing Group deliberations on SG 13/9. For the most part, this guidance consisted of minor clarifications. However, it was made clear that all NATO responsibility for strategic air operations should be deleted from SG 13/9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered these operations to be primarily a US responsibility. Also, at the behest of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff indi-

cated a preference for 1 July 1954 as the planning date for the medium-term plan, in order to conform to US fiscal year planning.[69] The Standing Group, after receiving these and other comments on SG 13/9, issued revised strategic guidance to the Regional Planning Group on 4 January 1950.[70]

To assure that US representatives on Regional Planning Groups would reflect current US strategic policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff dispatched copies of OFFTACKLE, the current Emergency War Plan, to the JCS Joint Representatives, Europe, and the US Representatives to the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group and the Military Committee. Force deployments set forth in OFFTACKLE, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed, would be used as guidance for the probable employment of US forces in the short-term only, pending development of increased allied capabilities.[71]

Even before the Standing Group issued its strategic guidance, the regional groups had begun planning in conformity with instructions from the Defense Committee that they were to begin operating not later than 1 November 1949.[72] Receipt of the planning guidance facilitated the work, and by 1 March the regional plans had been submitted and integrated by the Standing Group into a Medium Term Defense Plan.

The purpose of the plan was to provide a basis for determining minimum force requirements for the defense of the treaty nations. This was a primary objective, the Standing Group said, in view of the present inadequate state of their defenses. The target date chosen for the plan was 1 July 1954.

The overall strategic aim set forth in the plan was, in the event of an attack by the Soviet Union and her allies, to destroy their will and capabilities to wage war by a strategic offensive in Western Eurasia. This was conceived as a task to be accomplished in four phases:

Phase 1—From D-Day to the stabilization of the initial Soviet offensive, to include the initiation of the allied air offensive;

Phase 2—From stabilization of initial Soviet offensive to allied initiation of major offensive operations;

Phase 3—Allied initiation of major offensive operations until Soviet capitulation was obtained;

Phase 4—Final achievement of Allied war objectives.

The Plan, however, addressed only Phase 1. The strategy to be employed was to contain the initial Soviet offensive on the following positions: the Rhine-Ijssel line in Western Europe, as already provided by WEU plans; the Italo-Austrian Alps and the Isonzo in southern Europe; along the Kiel Canal and northern Norway if possible, but around certain key base areas in any event, in northern Europe. To support this defense, control of North Atlantic sea and air lanes and North American sources of reinforcement would have to be assured by local air defense and defense of Portugal, Greenland, Iceland, the Azores, and the Faroes against sea-borne raids. The strategic air offensive, which by previous agreement had been made a unilateral US responsibility, was not detailed in the Plan.

To mount the defense of all these positions and territories was calculated to require 90 divisions and 259 battalions and brigades of ground troops,

1,705 antiaircraft batteries, 2,856 ships, and 8,820 aircraft (exclusive of the needs of North America which were not computed). The distribution by regions was as follows:[73]

	W. Eur.	S. Eur.	N. Eur.	NA Ocean	Total
Ground Forces					
Divisions	54	21	14	1	90
AA Btrys	1,241		275	189	1,705
Brigades	6			1	7
Battalions	160	91		1	252
Naval Forces					
Combat ships	10	225	34	810	1,079
Others	600	723	307	147	1,777
Air Forces					
Aircraft	5,864	1,688	718	550	8,820

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after reviewing the Plan, informed the US representative on the Standing Group that the Plan advocated highly unrealistic force requirements that could not be attained by the European members of the Alliance by June 1954. The financing and equipping of these forces would be largely a responsibility of the individual member nations, but even the combined resources of all the NATO countries would probably not be sufficient to raise the forces called for within the prescribed period. In these circumstances, force requirements of the magnitude proposed would almost certainly cause a congressional reaction in the United States that would make the enactment of any more military assistance programs impossible. A more realistic plan for FY 1954 was needed—one that would reflect estimates of forces likely to be available. The regional groups should be requested to develop such a plan as a matter of highest priority.

The Air Force representative on the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, which had conducted the initial review of the Plan, had taken exception to certain language that, in his view, seemed to imply that strategic air forces might be diverted to support ground operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly stipulated that nothing in the Plan was to be construed as implying a commitment to use the US Strategic Air Command in a ground support role without specific US approval.[74]

Despite these JCS comments, the Military and Defense Committees, at meetings on 28 March and 1 April, gave their general approval to the Medium Term Plan. They agreed that the force requirement figures represented a first estimate of what was necessary to provide the North Atlantic Treaty area with a reasonable degree of security by 1954 and accepted them as the basis for a progressive buildup of the North Atlantic Defense Forces. To attain these force levels, the Defense Committee recognized, would require a major increase of individual and collective military establishments. The Committee therefore directed the Military Committee, through the Standing Group, to invite the nations to study the extent

to which they planned to increase their forces in order to reach the military strength necessary to defend the Treaty area.

At the same time, the Defense and Military Committees recognized that the estimates of requirements might well be reduced as the result of further study. The Military Committee accordingly instructed the Standing Group to issue necessary guidance for such revisions to the Regional Planning Groups.[75] These revisions had not yet been completed when the outbreak of the Korean War drastically changed the framework of NATO planning.[76]

12

Military Assistance for NATO Countries

From the earliest consideration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it was apparent that for NATO to be effective the United States would be required to provide large grants of military assistance to its European members. Because of heavy war damage, the industrial complex of Europe, once a major contributor to the industrial production of the world, was incapable of producing the quantities of weapons needed to arm the forces of the Western European countries against Soviet attack. Since the United States was the only source of large-scale armaments within the alliance, an orderly system for providing them became highly desirable. The provision of military assistance to the European members of NATO was integrated into a larger program involving assistance to countries around the globe.

Since the end of World War II, the United States had provided military aid in varying quantities to individual countries that were either directly threatened by communist aggression, such as Greece, Turkey, China, Iran, and the Philippines, or were located in areas where the United States had a political interest, as was the case in Latin America. This aid had been furnished either by special appropriations by Congress or in the form of surplus equipment under the Surplus Property Act.[1]

Formulating the Policy

Consideration of a comprehensive aid program had been under study by subcommittees of the SWNCC late in 1947 and early in 1948 without conclusive results. In March 1948, the National Military Establishment and the Department of State hastly drafted an addition to the European Recovery Program bill, then under consideration by Congress, which would have granted broad authority to the President to distribute military aid. This Title VI was presented by Secretaries Forrestal and Marshall to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Proposals for

new legislation to appropriate $750,000,000 for an interim military aid program were also discussed, but both proposals were dropped so as not to defer passage of the European Recovery Program bill.[2]

Interest in the program remained alive, however, and the subject came before the NSC on 14 June in the form of a report prepared by the NSC Staff on its own initiative. In this report, designated NSC 14, the Staff concluded that certain nations, whose security was vital to the United States, should be granted military assistance in order to defend themselves against Soviet aggression. The United States should therefore:

a. Enact legislation which will broaden the authority of the President to provide military assistance for foreign states. . . .

b. Under this authority, appropriate funds for military assistance to selected non-communist nations in Western Europe and the Middle East to meet urgent requirements consistent with an overall program.

Any grant of military aid should be consistent with US strategy and should not jeopardize the fulfillment of US materiel requirements as determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It should provide a continuing supply of spare parts and replacements and should not endanger the economic stability of the United States or of recipient countries.

Recipient countries should provide as much in self-help and mutual assistance as possible. To this end, they should be encouraged to integrate their arms industries, standardize weapons production on US types, and compensate donor nations as much as possible. First priority in the granting of military aid should go to countries of Western Europe.[3]

Prior to consideration by the National Security Council, NSC 14 was referred by the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review. In reply the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary on 7 July 1948 that the report was "consistent with policies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff previously furnished. . . ."[4] The NSC, after making a minor amendment, adopted the report under the new designation NSC 14/1 on 1 July; the President approved it on 10 July 1948.[5]

The NSC, meanwhile, had sketched out the first steps for the provision of military aid to Western European countries. US policy toward the Western European Union, as set forth in NSC 9/3 (approved by President Truman on 2 July), envisioned that the distribution of US materiel assistance would follow the pattern of the European Recovery Program. The US representatives taking part in WEU military talks should state the following conditions to be met by the European countries:

(1) They must first plan their coordinated defense with the means presently available, (2) they must then determine how their collective military potential can be increased by coordinated production and supply, including standardization of equipment, (3) we would then be prepared to consider and screen their estimates of what supplementary assistance from us was necessary, (4) we would expect reciprocal assistance from them to the greatest extent practicable, and (5) legislation would be necessary to provide significant amounts of military equipment

but the President would not be prepared to recommend it unless the foregoing conditions have been met.[6]

The State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC) undertook to establish criteria for processing requests from foreign countries for US military aid. A subcommittee of SANACC produced a report recommending a far-reaching system of priorities. The subcommittee's proposals covered the entire globe and listed 57 countries, of which 20 were allotted an order of priority and were listed for either "substantial" or "limited" assistance. The remaining 37 were included because the subcommittee concluded that all "free" countries should be eligible for "token" assistance, without regard to priorities. SANACC established seven priorities, as follows:[7]

Priority	*Country*	*Category of Aid*
1	Benelux	Substantial
	Canada	
	France	
	United Kingdom	
2	Greece	Limited
	Italy	
	Turkey	
3	Denmark	Limited
	Norway	
	Portugal	
	Spain	
	Sweden	
4	Iran	Limited
	India	
	Pakistan	
	Saudi Arabia	
5	China	Limited
6	Mexico	Limited
	Brazil	
7	South Africa	Limited

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, commenting on this plan on 1 November, viewed with concern the inclusion of so many countries. They realized, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, that no actual recommendation had been made to grant aid to any countries and that the "substantial" category was found to be justified only for the six member states of WEU. Nevertheless, continued the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

even consideration of substantial military aid for six countries, limited aid for sixteen other countries, and token aid for thirty-seven more can result, in terms of granted requests, in tremendous commitments. There cannot be too much emphasis, therefore, on the necessity for the most careful consideration of the great potential over-all scope of military aid commitments in relation to our

national financial and industrial limitations and our own military requirements before specific decisions are made.[8]

The subcommittee's report, though finally approved by SANACC in March 1949, was overtaken by events.[9] It did, however, provide the basis for the military aid program adopted by the Truman administration for FY 1950, as described in a subsequent portion of this chapter.

JCS Doubts: US vs NATO Rearmament

President Truman, by approving NSC 14/1, had established as national policy that grants of military aid to foreign governments "should not jeopardize the fulfillment of the minimum materiel requirements of the United States armed forces, as determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." This statement did not, however, totally allay fears that the provision of military aid to foreign governments would be at the expense of the buildup of US military forces. Addressing his colleagues in a memorandum written on 13 July, General Vandenberg expressed misgivings about US involvement with the Western European Union, which, he said, would inevitably generate pressure on the United States to furnish emergency supplies of military equipment, as well as long-term assistance in military reconstruction.

Under normal peacetime conditions, General Vandenberg stated, the economic burden of trying to rearm both the United States and Western Europe would be insuperable. He therefore recommended a staff study to provide the basis for an accurate military assessment of the entire policy of association with collective security arrangements called for by NSC 9/3. This study should be in two parts. First, the JSSC should answer three questions: (1) Was war with the Soviet Union so imminent that US aid could not be given to the Western European countries in time to be effective? (2) If not, would the allocation of US resources to the buildup of Western European forces contribute more to US security than the total application of those resources to US rearmament? (3) How much should the United States contribute to potential allies at the expense of its own rearmament program? Second, the Joint Logistics Plans Committee (JLPC) should determine what weapons might be provided the Western European Union from current US stocks in an emergency.[10]

The JSSC, reporting on 5 August, concluded that there would be time to give military aid to the Western European Union but that it should be limited to amounts that would not prevent the timely completion of the US rearmament program.[11] General Vandenberg found this report to be unsatisfactory because it failed to provide a means for determining US needs. He suggested that the United States might better serve its security interests by curtailing its own requirements in order to make a larger contribution to the revitalization of the military power of the WEU. It was apparent that the "fundamental problem of overall security" should be restudied. He recommended, therefore, that the JSSC

report be returned for reexamination of the relationship between US rearmament and that of the allies.[12]

General Bradley found himself in agreement with General Vandenberg regarding the allocation of resources to US military forces and to those of the WEU. "It would seem a great mistake," he said, "to concentrate our entire resources on a United States rearmament program in the belief that such action alone will contribute most to our national security. . . . it would be harmful to arrive at any decision at this time which would preclude aid to Western [European] Union on the basis that your complete emphasis should be placed on preparation of our own forces for war."[13]

The JSSC submitted their revised study on 12 November. The basic question of how far the United States should contribute to allies at the expense of its own rearmament, the Committee said, had already been resolved at higher levels by NSC 14/1, which had specified that "minimum materiel requirements" of US armed forces should not be jeopardized by foreign military assistance. All that remained, therefore, was to determine these requirements. The JSSC defined them as the amount required to equip the forces in COGWHEEL, the current emergency war plan being used by the Services for mobilization planning.[14]

Once again, General Vandenberg found the efforts of the JSSC to be deficient. He pointed out that COGWHEEL had set US force levels that probably could not be attained in view of present and prospective budgetary limitations. To pile military assistance on top of the requirements of COGWHEEL would risk the economic, and therefore the military, security of the United States. As a "tentative and preliminary" alternative, General Vandenberg proposed that the minimum US requirement be defined as the materiel needed to acquire and support forces for an atomic offensive, to meet occupation commitments, to provide a "platform" for mobilization, to maintain lines of communication, and to provide initial air defense of the United States.[15]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, meeting on 11 January 1949, agreed to reject COGWHEEL as a basis for determining minimum US materiel requirements. Instead of approving any substitute criteria, however, they decided to judge each request for aid on an individual basis. To this end, they assigned the Joint Munitions Allocation Committee responsibility for processing requests and recommending to the Joint Chiefs of Staff what materiel should be furnished, either from existing stocks or from new procurement. The Committee was to establish a pricing policy for items taken from existing stocks and was also to recommend priorities for providing requested equipment. Recommendations for grants of aid were to be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC) for comments on the strategic implications of furnishing the requested materiel.[16]

Any hope that surplus US equipment would make a substantial contribution to European rearmament had already been dashed. The JLPC, reporting on the subject on 30 December, enclosed lists of available equipment drawn up by the Services and concluded that the items would, by themselves, be of little value in establishing effective Western European military forces. They could, however, supplement equipment on hand or to be procured from European or US sources. The Committee concluded also that a long-range military aid program would

benefit the United States by making the recipient nations better able to resist communist aggression, by expanding the US arms industry, and by encouraging standardization of weapons among potential allies. Because of the costs involved and the inadequacy of US surplus stocks to meet foreign needs, the Committee concluded that an appropriation by Congress would be required. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, while agreeing with the Committee that a long-range program would be advantageous, decided to defer further action pending clarification of detailed studies and actions then underway in various government agencies.[17]

The European Response

While the Joint Chiefs of Staff were grappling with the relationship of foreign military aid to US rearmament, the US Government had stated its terms for granting such aid, and the European countries were attempting to respond. On 22 July 1948, Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, the US delegate, delivered the terms called for by NSC 9/3 to the delegates of the Western European Union gathered in London for military talks. General Lemnitzer suggested that the Western European Union nations complete the necessary plans and appraisals and submit their requests for US military aid in time to permit authorizing legislation to be introduced into Congress in January 1949.[18]

By mid-October, it was apparent to the WEU Military Committee that the time-consuming task of preparing supply requests, taking into account the commitments of member countries outside Europe and the force requirements of WEU commanders, could not be completed in time to meet the goal suggested by General Lemnitzer. The Committee recognized, however, that some statement of the needs of member countries was essential. It adopted, therefore, a British proposal for an interim supply plan based on an already prepared computation of forces to be maintained in the "next year or so." Under the British plan, the Western European Union would inform the US Government of the following: progress in planning the defense of Western Europe with the means now available; progress made in standardizing equipment, coordinating production, and pooling resources; the estimate of forces to be maintained in the immediate future both in being and mobilizable by M+90 days; the extent to which these forces could be equipped from present indigenous stocks and new production without interfering with economic recovery; the amount of outside assistance needed; and the amount of such assistance that could be obtained from sources other than the United States.[19]

On 25 October, the Department of the Army, as Executive Agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, informed the US delegate to the Western European Union that the original terms were still sound and must be adhered to in principle. At the same time, it appeared likely that the administration would submit a military aid program for FY 1950 to Congress once the Western European Union had submitted its coordinated requirements for materiel. The interim solution offered by the British would therefore be of considerable assistance in obtaining an "authentic

and realistic" statement of Western European Union requirements. Such a statement should assign priorities to the assistance requested.[20]

The "interim supply plan" delivered to Washington in November 1948 consisted of four parts: an informal list of materiel deficiencies; MC (49)1, consisting of a brief and generalized statement of Western European Union defense policy, a generalized statement of deficiencies, and a listing of intraservice priorities; MC 49/5, including a listing of inter-service priorities; and FC(48) 23, summarizing forces mobilizable during 1949.

The objective of Western European Union Defense Policy as defined in MC(49)1, was to convince the Soviet Union that "war would not pay," an objective that could be attained by three principal methods: (1) by counteracting Russian subversion; (2) by open determination of the five Western European Union powers to undertake a common defense of their territories; and (3) by building military strength so as to present Russia with tangible evidence that the five powers could defend themselves and attack an aggressor at once with "powerful and effective" weapons. In the event of attack, the vital strategic interests of the WEU would be to hold the enemy as far to the east in Germany as possible, to defend Western European Union countries against air and airborne attack, to defend the Middle East as an offensive base, to defend North Africa, and to control sea communications.[21]

To carry out this military policy, the five WEU nations had the following forces in being as of the beginning of 1949:

Army	
Divisions	10
Independent Brigades/Regiments	32
Independent Battalions	9
Artillery/AA Regiments	95
Navy	
Battleships	3
Carriers	11
Cruisers	19
Destroyers	61
Frigates	78
Submarines	41
Minesweepers	75
Air Force	
Fighters	497
Bombers	192
Reconnaissance	96
Maritime (other than Naval)	34
Transports	289

Within 90 days of mobilization, the WEU powers would be able to mobilize from their own resources the following additional forces:

Army	
Light Infantry Battalions	3
Light Infantry Companies	25
Navy	
Battleships	4
Carriers	4
Cruisers	15
Destroyers	70
Frigates	136
Submarines	38
Minesweepers	180
Air Force	
Fighters	160

There were, in addition, personnel to form 8 additional divisions, 5 brigades, 4 armored regiments, 10 artillery regiments, 7 anti-tank regiments, and 3 infantry battalions if equipment for them could be supplied.[22]

Even in the forces listed as "in being," there were serious deficiencies in equipment.[23] The military authorities of the Western European Union planned to remedy these deficiencies from any outside sources that became available according to a priority list in seven stages. As the first priority, ground forces in being would be brought to a state of combat readiness, air forces would receive combat and training aircraft and radar equipment, and navies would receive spares for US equipment presently installed on minesweepers. As the second priority, first-priority army units would get two months supply backing, and air forces would get airfield construction equipment and maintenance equipment for combat aircraft. The third priority would consist of equipment and two months' backing for army units mobilizable by M+90. The fourth priority would consist of spare parts for US equipment on naval vessels not provided in the first priority. The fifth priority would consist of remaining maintenance for army forces, and war reserves of aircraft for three months at war wastage. The sixth priority would provide for naval escort forces, and the seventh, for all remaining naval needs.[24]

On 11 February 1949, after examining the "interim supply plan," the Joint Chiefs of Staff set a price tag of $995,647,000 on the amount of military assistance to be furnished Western European Union countries. This amount was divided among the Services as follows: Navy, $113,028,000; Army, $730,652,000; and Air Force, $151,967,000. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also concluded that the statement of Western Union Defense Policy was "basically sound and is in general consonance with the Joint Chiefs of Staff strategic thinking."[25]

Preparing the Military Assistance Program

By the time the "interim supply plan" arrived in Washington, the Truman administration had decided to submit a comprehensive military assistance program to Congress along with the North Atlantic Treaty. To guide the preparation of this program, Secretaries Forrestal and Marshall and ECA Administrator Paul Hoffman constituted themselves a Foreign Assistance Steering Committee (FASC) to meet when necessary to consider matters requiring their personal approval or referral to the President. The daily work became the responsibility of a subordinate interdepartmental group, the Foreign Assistance Coordinating Committee (FACC), composed of representatives of the three members of FASC.[26] Responsibility for administering the program was assigned to the Secretary of State.[27]

Secretary Forrestal's representative on FAAC, and also his special assistant for Military Assistance Programs, was Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA. Announcing General Lemnitzer's appointment on 6 January 1949, the Secretary of Defense called attention to the wide range of problems FAAC would have to deal with and asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Chairmen of the Munitions Board, the Research and Development Board, and the Military Liaison Committee for Atomic Energy to name representatives to assist General Lemnitzer. The Joint Chiefs of Staff named Major General Alfred M. Gruenther, the Director, Joint Staff, to represent them.[28] Originally, General Lemnitzer intended to consult these representatives only occasionally and on specific issues, but by the end of January they were functioning as a working group jointly with State Department and ECA experts assisting FACC representatives of those agencies.[29]

On 7 February, the working group completed drafts of two papers: FACC D–3, defining basic policies underlying military assistance programs; and FACC D–3/1, applying these policies to produce general guides for programing, a priority list of recipients of military aid during FY 1950, and indications of US objectives with respect to these recipients. The next day, the Secretary of Defense referred both papers to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Secretaries, and the Chairman of the Munitions Board for comment prior to consideration of the papers by FACC and ultimate forwarding to FASC.[30]

In FACC D–3, the working group proposed that the military assistance program cover direct and indirect costs of aid furnished to regularly constituted and recognized armed forces, to include finished military materiel, raw materials and machinery for production of military materiel in foreign countries, technical assistance and training of armed forces, and reimbursement for costs arising out of diversion of resources to military programs. Requests for this aid, the working group recommended, should be judged primarily by the resulting contribution to the security of the United States. Other criteria should be the effects on the economy of the United States and the recipient countries, consistency with US strategy and noninterference with US military buildup, effectiveness in strengthening recipient military forces, willingness of recipients to contribute to their own defenses and to cooperate with allied countries, and effectiveness in maintaining peace.

Priority among approved recipients should be determined by their strategic value to the United States, their proximity to the Soviet Union, and the nature of any commitments already provided. In accordance with current national policy, Western Europe should be granted primacy. Specific commitments had been made to Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Korea. Other countries that must be considered were Canada, Mexico, and Brazil, with which the United States had current military understandings, and the signatories of the Rio de Janeiro Treaty. In addition, provision should be made for token assistance to Thailand looking toward the Western orientation of that country.[31]

In applying the principles of FACC D–3, the working group designated the countries that should receive aid in FY 1950, assigned each to one of three priority categories and indicated in general terms the amount of aid each should receive: "substantial," which was the amount needed to ensure internal security, discourage aggression, delay invasion, and make a maximum contribution to an allied war effort; "limited," the amount needed to ensure internal security and to perform limited military missions consistent with US plans; and "token," or enough to ensure political orientation toward the United States. The resulting classification was as follows:

Group I	*Amount of Aid*
Western European Union	Substantial
Canada	Substantial
Denmark (if a member of NATO)	Limited
Italy (if a member of NATO)	Limited
Norway (if a member of NATO)	Limited
Portugal (if a member of NATO)	Token
Turkey	Substantial
Group II	
Austria	Limited
Greece	Limited
Iran	Token
Saudi Arabia	Token
Group III	
Korea	Token
American Republics	Token
Philippines	Token
Thailand	Token

The working group recommended that, in addition to allocations to specific countries, there should be a general contingency fund, to be administered at the broad discretion of the President. Any necessary aid for China should come from this fund.[32]

On 21 February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense the working group proposals were "generally sound." They singled out for endorse-

ment the statements in FACC D–3 that military aid should be used primarily to strengthen US security and that it should be on a reciprocal basis as far as possible. They likewise concurred "strongly" with the suggestion in FACC D–3/1 that funds be programmed for China, in case any opportunities for exploitation became evident in that country. But they cautioned against over-extending the aid program at the expense of high-priority countries.[33]

The fleshing out of the bare bones of the FACC's basic principles to form a specific and detailed military assistance program for FY 1950 was a task assumed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on their own initiative. On 14 March, they submitted an overall foreign military assistance program for FY 1950 to the Secretary of Defense for use in preparation of military assistance legislation and budgetary planning. Their program, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded, was adequate for budgetary planning but not for supply action. Military missions or staff conversations should therefore be used to determine detailed requirements as soon as possible. The program could be carried out without diminishing the ability to implement current emergency plans, although there would be a short-term reduction in the capability for carrying out operations envisaged for the later stages. The overall capability of the United States and her allies to meet Soviet aggression, particularly in the long run, would, however, be enhanced.

For Western Europe, the Joint Chiefs of Staff incorporated into their worldwide program the recommendations for WEU countries that they had approved on 11 February 1949 under the "interim supply plan." Then, following the recommendations of FACC, they added programs for Italy, Norway, Denmark, and Portugal—all prospective members of NATO—and Austria. They stipulated, however, that assistance to prospective NATO members would be reduced or eliminated if those countries failed to join the alliance. The JCS program for Western Europe was as shown in the table.

Prospective NATO	*Army*	*Navy*	*Air Force*	*Total*
WEU	$730,652,000	$113,028,000	$151,967,000	$995,647,000
Denmark	31,500,000	5,000,000	—	36,500,000
Italy	24,000,000	10,000,000	26,000,000	60,000,000
Norway	37,800,000	5,000,000	6,000,000	48,800,000
Portugal	8,000,000	1,000,000	—	9,000,000
				$1,149,947,000
Other				
Austria	112,000,000	—	—	112,000,000
				$1,261,947,000

The overall JCS program, which, except for the deletion of Saudi Arabia and Thailand, followed the FACC recommendations for participants and groupings, was as follows:

Group I	
Western Union	$ 995,647,000
Denmark	36,500,000
Italy	60,000,000
Norway	48,800,000
Portugal	9,000,000
Turkey	100,000,000
	$ 1,249,947,000
Group II	
Austria	$ 112,000,000
Greece	200,000,000
Iran	12,300,000
	$ 324,300,000
Group III	
Korea	$ 20,000,000
Latin America	86,060,400
Philippines	5,890,000
	$ 111,950,400
Contingency Fund	$ 100,000,000
TOTAL	$ 1,786,197,400[34]

The JCS program was forwarded by the Secretary of Defense to FACC, where it was used to develop a coordinated interdepartmental program for presentation to the Bureau of the Budget and Congress.[35]

The President, on 20 April, fixed the amount to be requested of Congress for the FY 1950 military assistance program at $1,450,000,000. This represented a reduction of slightly more than $336,000,000, or about 20 percent, in the amount recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The FACC adjusted to this cut by eliminating the programs for Latin America and Portugal and making a drastic reduction in the amount allocated for Austria. The programs for Atlantic Pact countries were only slightly affected. Programs for the Western European Union countries and Italy were reduced, but those for Norway and Denmark were increased. Details are shown in the following table.[36]

	(Millions)
A. Atlantic Pact Countries	
I. Arms, Equipment, and Training	
1. Western Union	$ 801.60
2. Denmark	48.92
3. Norway	79.72
4. Italy	44.19
II. Estimated US financing of increased military production and indirect impact costs	155.00
Total Atlantic Pact Countries	$1,129.43
B. Other Participating Countries	
5. Turkey	102.30
6. Greece	178.16
7. Austria	11.62
8. Iran	15.20
9. Korea	10.98
10. Philippines	5.74
Sub-total	$ 324.00
Less: Pipeline supplies financed with FY 49 funds	-19.96
Total, other participating countries	304.04
C. Emergency Fund	50.00
D. Estimated costs of administration	11.37
Sub-total	$1,494.84
E. Non-reimbursement to NME for surplus equipment included in country programs	-44.84
Total Program on Obligation Basis	$1,450.00

The Military Assistance Program in Congress

On 25 July, the same day he affixed his signature to the North Atlantic Treaty, President Truman informed Congress that there was a need for $1,450,000,000 for military assistance. Of this sum, $50,000,000 had already been requested for aid to Greece and Turkey under existing authorizations, making the request for new authorization $1,400,000,000. This sum was needed, the President said, primarily to assist the Western European nations in providing themselves with adequate

defenses against Soviet aggression. He did not propose, Mr. Truman said, that "specific sums be committed in advance to particular countries. Rather, the President should be able to make allocations as circumstances require." There was also a need, he added, for coordinating the various grants of military assistance so as to make them "adaptable in . . . administration to the operation of our foreign policy." To this end, he proposed to include existing programs for Greece, Turkey, and the Philippines and new ones for Korea and Iran in a single unified program.[37]

The President's decision to request broad discretionary authority to allocate the requested funds as he saw fit proved to be a serious tactical blunder. This plan was immediately attacked by both Democrats and Republicans. Even such stalwart supporters of the President's foreign policy as Senators Vandenberg and Connally opposed the proposed grant of discretionary authority. As a result the administration hastily drafted a substitute and introduced it into Congress on 5 August.[38]

The new bill, HR 5895, specified a division of the $1.4 billion military aid authorization into three broad categories. Title I allocated $1,160,990,000 to parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, provided that such grants were consistent with the common defense of the treaty area and furthered the defense plans of NATO. Title II called for an authorization of $211,370,000 to Greece and Turkey, and Title III, of $27,640,000 to Iran, Korea and the Philippines. The discretionary authority requested in the original bill survived in the revision in the form of authority for the President to use up to five percent of funds under any title for any other title, but such a shifting of funds would have to be reported to the Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees of Congress.[39]

Hearings on the revised legislation took place between 8 and 19 August before the combined Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. General Bradley, speaking for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assured the senators that, on the basis of his recent consultations with European chiefs of staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were convinced that the defense plans of the Western European Union were sound. They were in accordance with US strategic thinking and were well adapted to serve as a basis for NATO planning. There was an upsurge in morale in Western Europe, General Bradley reported, and a determination to pursue collective defense planning. Arms aid, however, was essential to make this planning a reality. Collective defense was also essential to the United States, General Bradley concluded. To continue to seek national security on a unilateral basis would exhaust US moral and material resources.[40]

It soon became apparent that Congress had misgivings about the overall size of the program as well as the allocation of funds between countries. On 15 August, the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved $1,160.9 million for NATO countries of Western Europe, but three days later the whole House dealt a blow to administration hopes by cutting this sum in half before passing the bill 238 to 122. Efforts to restore the deleted funds in the Senate were partially successful, and on 22 September the House enacted a measure authorizing a total of $1,314,000,000 for all countries. The House accepted the Senate version on 26 September, and President Truman signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 on 6 October. An appropriation bill, granting the identical amount in the authorization act, was passed by Congress on 20 October and signed by the President on the 28th.[41]

The $1,314,010,000 made available by the Act was divided among three groups of countries, as follows: Title I (NATO countries), $1,000,000,000; Title II (Greece and Turkey), $211,370,000; Title III, $27,640,000 for Iran, Korea, and the Philippines, plus $75,000,000 for the "general area" of China. However, the Act stipulated that only $100 million of the NATO appropriation could be spent until the President approved NATO defense plans.[42]

Reprogramming Military Assistance

Adjustment of the administration's original military assistance program was begun even before Congress had completed action on the legislation. Acting in anticipation of congressional cuts, the Secretary of Defense directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 16 September to realign their program according to terms of reference prepared by FACC. These terms of reference established a ceiling of $900,000,000 for end items of military equipment for Title I countries and $100,000,000 for industrial production in Western Europe. The following directions were laid down: No country would be deleted from Title I; as much aid as possible was to be retained for France; and the programs for Norway and Denmark were to be reduced less in proportion than those for WEU countries (taken as a whole) and for Italy.[43]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their revised military assistance program to the Secretary of Defense on 23 September.[44] The total was $1,128,760,000, of which $891,500,000 was for Title I countries; $211,170,000 for Title II countries; and $26,090,000 for Title III countries. Title I funds were allocated to countries and services as indicated in the table.

JCS Recommendations for Allocation of FY 1950 Map Funds under FACC—Directed $900,000,000 Ceiling[1]
(In millions)

Country	*Army*	*Navy*[2]	*Air Force*	*Total*
France	$504.220	$ 40.050	$22.290	$566.560
Belgium	68.432	7.470	.660	76.562
Netherlands	16.106	31.570	2.890	50.566
Denmark	31.258	8.280	6.7604	6.298
Norway	49.769	15.490	8.940	74.199
Italy	24.486	7.570	7.470	39.526
United Kingdom			37.480	37.480
Luxembourg	.309			.309
	$694.580	$110.430	$86.490	$891.500

1. (U) Annexes A, B and C to Encl C to JCS 1868/111, 20 Sep 49, as amended by Dec On, 22 Sep 49, CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 29.

2. Total of this column adjusted by prorating $1.15 million for training, which, in the original, is not allocated to individual countries.

To attain these reduced figures, the Army had eliminated all items of equipment programmed for forces mobilizable between M-Day and M+90 and as replacements for one year's peacetime attrition. It had also deleted one-half of the items programmed as two months' combat replacements and one-fourth of the two month combat supply of ammunition. The resulting savings amounted to $93,790,000. The Navy eliminated 12 mine sweepers, 20 landing craft and miscellaneous items for a saving of $15,910,000. The Air Force eliminated vehicles and personal flying equipment totaling $210,000. Total savings were thus $109,910,000.

With the reduced funds, the Joint Chiefs of Staff still expected to attain an operationally ready ground force of 14 divisions for NATO countries—9 French, 1 Belgian, 2 Norwegian, and 2 Danish. They also planned to remedy equipment deficiencies on minesweepers and to supply training and transport aircraft and spaces and maintenance for them.[45]

Presumably the JCS program was approved, although Secretary Johnson's response is not documented in available records. In any case, the establishment of an international army for the defense of Western Europe—a task beyond the resources of the European countries themselves—was now in prospect. Its creation was to prove slow and difficult, but a beginning had been made by the end of 1949.

13

The Communist Victory in China

On 8 December 1949, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the remnants of his Nationalist Government fled from mainland China to set up their capital on Taiwan. This event dramatized the victory of Mao Tse-tung's communists, an occurrence that drastically altered the global balance of power and called for a major realignment of US policy. In the three years before the fall of China, officials of the US Government, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had been primarily concerned with the danger posed by Soviet expansion in Europe and the Middle East.[1] They now had to face the consequences of the Communist victory on the Chinese mainland.

Background: US China Policy after World War II

After the defeat of the Japanese in Asia during World War II, the United States had hoped that China could emerge from the chaos of war as a strong, unified, democratic nation and take the place of Japan as a powerful stabilizing force in the Far East. In anticipation of the role China was expected to play in the postwar world, the United States had successfully advocated its membership on the United Nations Security Council, an action that prematurely conferred major power status on the weak Chinese state.

To support the policy of building China into a major power, the United States had continued to supply military aid, begun during World War II, to Chiang Kai-shek's government. The Lend-Lease Program in China was extended beyond 30 June 1946, the cut-off date for other countries. Supplies were transferred to the Chinese to continue the war-time program intended to equip 39 Chinese divisions and 8⅓ air groups. Equipment was also provided to the Chinese Navy, while Congress enacted legislation authorizing the transfer of 131 surplus naval vessels to Chinese ownership. Other provisions of US military aid to China included the sale of excess US Army stocks in west China and the abandonment

of 6,500 tons of ammunition by US Marines when all but a small contingent at Tsingtao withdrew from north China in the summer of 1947.[2]

The United States also continued to provide economic assistance to the Chinese Nationalists in the form of grants, credits, and surplus property sales. This assistance was furnished directly by extending the Lend-Lease Program of World War II and also through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and the Export-Import Bank.[3]

The obstacles to the fulfillment of the US vision for China were enormous. The people, impoverished by the war, existed on the edge of subsistence, and the economy suffered from an accelerating inflation. The Nationalist Government of China, headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, was inefficient, lacked popular support, and was replete with graft and corruption. It also faced an armed insurrection by the Communists.

This rival party had common origins with the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), but the two parties had split in 1927. During World War II, however, the Communists had cooperated with the government and the United States in the fight against Japan. After the war the Communists retained the areas they had recovered from the Japanese. Widely dispersed in guerrilla bands throughout northern and central China, they held a geographic advantage over the government, whose control was only secure in the southern part of the country. Also to their advantage, the Communists had the popular support of the rural poor, who were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the Kuomintang. When the Communists sought to extend the area under their control, their dispute with the Kuomintang became a full-fledged civil war.[4]

To end this civil strife and bring about the unification of China by peaceful and democratic methods, President Truman sent General of the Army George C. Marshall to China as his Special Representative. Arriving in China in December 1945, General Marshall immediately began strenuous efforts to bring about a cease-fire and a genuine political settlement. At first it seemed he would succeed. In order to help stop the fighting, an embargo on US arms shipments to the Kuomintang was put into effect on 29 July 1946. But by the end of the year, General Marshall realized that his efforts were doomed, and he requested his own return to the United States. On 28 March 1947,[5] the embargo on the sale of arms to China was lifted.

In the year and a half following the end of World War II the Nationalist forces appeared to be gaining the upper hand in the civil war. By the end of 1946, they had made significant gains in north China and had deployed large forces to assert control over Manchuria. In these efforts they had been indirectly assisted by the United States, which transported Nationalist troops northward to reoccupy areas held by the Japanese and deployed its own Marine forces to north China to assist the Nationalist troops in repatriating the Japanese armies. The Communists, who were themselves receiving from the USSR Japanese arms captured by Soviet forces in Manchuria, at first made little effort to contest the northward movement of the Nationalists. Early in 1947, however, this situation changed. Taking advantage of the overextension of Nationalist forces in Manchuria and northern China, the Communists struck successfully at isolated

garrisons. Nationalist forces fought badly in these engagements, and their morale appeared to US observers to be deteriorating.[6]

It was in these circumstances that the Joint Chiefs of Staff first expressed formal views on the growing Communist strength in China. Addressing the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on 9 June 1947, they warned that Soviet domination of China, because it would probably give the USSR hegemony over all of Asia, would be a major threat to US security interests. This was a state of affairs that could in all probability not be prevented unless the United States gave military assistance to the Nationalist government sufficient to enable it to resist Communist attack. The Joint Chiefs of Staff conceded that much of the aid already sent to China, because it had been given piecemeal, had been absorbed by the Nationalist government without any noticeable effect. They maintained, however, that "carefully planned, selective and well-supervised assistance," limited largely to ammunition and spare parts, would "facilitate the military development which appears essential for the unification and stabilization of China." A "relatively small" investment in ammunition and replacement parts for US equipment already supplied the Nationalists would, they believed, "enable the National Government to establish control over areas now under [C]ommunist control."[7]

The Wedemeyer Mission

Secretary of State Marshall agreed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the situation in China was critical and was rapidly deteriorating. He did not wholly accept their conclusions, but agreed that a reexamination of policy was in order. To this end, he called in Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, the former Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek and Commanding General, US Forces China Theater, and asked him to head a fact-finding mission to China. A draft directive to General Wedemeyer, bearing the concurrence of the Secretaries of War and Navy, was submitted by Secretary Marshall on 8 July to President Truman, who approved it the following day.

By the terms of this directive, General Wedemeyer was to "proceed to China without delay for the purpose of making an appraisal of the political, economic, psychological and military situations—current and projected." He was to make clear to Chinese leaders that "the United States Government can consider assistance in a program of rehabilitation only if the Chinese Government presents satisfactory evidence of effective measures looking towards Chinese recovery and provided further than any aid which may be made available shall be subject to the supervision of representatives of the United States Government."[8]

General Wedemeyer and his team, consisting of advisers for military, economic, and political affairs, arrived in Nanking, the Nationalist capital, on 23 July. They spent a month visiting Nanking, Shanghai, Peking, and other major cities from Mukden in the north to Canton in the south. They interviewed Chinese officials and ordinary citizens, as well as foreigners living in China.[9]

Reporting to President Truman on 19 September, General Wedemeyer described the military situation in China as grave. Communist forces, he reported, held the tactical initiative in Manchuria and north China, where the Nationalist position was growing increasingly precarious. A continuation of this trend could lead to establishment of a Soviet satellite government in Manchuria and ultimately to a Communist-dominated China. To rectify this situation, unfortunately, the US Government had no choice but to work through the present "corrupt, reactionary and inefficient" Chinese Nationalist Government. The Nationalists should be offered "moral, advisory and material support," and should be encouraged to improve the internal political situation through reforms. China should be allowed to purchase military equipment and supplies from the United States. Immediate assistance should be given to the Chinese in obtaining ammunition. General Wedemeyer also recommended the prompt completion of the 8⅓ Air Group Program, begun during World War II, and the transfer of additional ships to the Chinese Navy as rapidly as personnel could be trained to operate them. He also suggested that US military advice and supervision be extended below the General Staff level to the combat units, but that US advisers be kept outside of actual zones of operation.

General Wedemeyer stipulated, however, that this assistance be contingent on Chinese cooperation. He recommended that:

China inform the United Nations promptly of her request to the United States for increased materiel and advisory assistance.

China request the United Nations to take immediate action to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Manchuria and request that Manchuria be placed under a Five-Power Guardianship or, failing that, under a Trusteeship in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

China make effective use of her own resources in a program for economic reconstruction and initiate sound fiscal policies leading to reduction of budgetary deficits.

China give continuing evidence that the urgently required political and military reforms are being implemented.

China accept American advisors as responsible representatives of the United States Government in specified military and economic fields to assist China in utilizing United States aid in the manner for which it is intended.[10]

The General's recommendation regarding Manchuria amounted to a proposal that a friendly government be stripped of some of the territory legally under its control. The dangers of publicizing such a suggestion were obvious. The circulation of the Wedemeyer report was therefore restricted to the President, the Secretary of State, and a few other officials.[11]

The China Aid Act of 1948

The question of implementing General Wedemeyer's recommendations was taken under advisement by the Department of State, where immediate attention was given to the military and financial proposals. On 2 November Secretaries Forrestal and Marshall, meeting as the Committee of Two, concurred on certain interim provisions of military assistance. They agreed that surplus US munitions should be transferred to China from the Marianas and perhaps also from the Philippines. The 39-division program for the Nationalist army had been completed, but the transfer of equipment for the 8⅓ air groups should be expedited. Secretary Marshall promised to study the possibility of further aid. He told Secretary Forrestal that

> apparently everyone is in agreement that we wish to prevent Soviet domination of China and that we wish to do something to provide for a stable government there, but there is no unanimity on the way in which assistance can be rendered.[12]

The limited measures approved by the Committee of Two could be taken under existing legislative authority. In considering further steps during the ensuing weeks, the administration realized that China's financial situation had grown so desperate that emergency economic aid must take precedence over military assistance. On 18 February 1948, President Truman asked Congress to provide $570,000,000 in economic assistance for China for a 15-month period ending 30 June 1949. Of this amount, $510,000,000 would cover the financing of essential imports for China, including cereals, cotton, petroleum, fertilizer, tobacco, pharmaceuticals, coal, and repair parts for existing capital equipment. The remaining $60,000,000 would finance selected reconstruction projects in areas sheltered from military operations. None of this money was to be used for military assistance.[13]

The members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, many of whom advocated military as well as economic aid for China, questioned Secretary Marshall on the efficacy of the new program. Representatives Lawrence H. Smith, from Wisconsin, and Walter H. Judd, from Minnesota, both asked Secretary Marshall specifically if the plan would assist the Chinese military effort. Secretary Marshall answered both Representatives in the affirmative and told Representative Judd that by eliminating many of the economic burdens, the proposed plan gave the Nationalist Government the "capability of purchasing things they need for the military effort if they wish to do so."[14] This assurance, however, did not entirely satisfy the Congressmen. In executive session, Secretary Marshall pointed out that considerable aid had already been given to the Kuomintang since V-J Day, and that no amount of military assistance, short of overt US intervention, would be sufficient to enable Chiang Kai-shek's forces to destroy the Communists.[15]

During March both the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations drew up substitute legislation to assist China. The House measure authorized two sums, one of $420 million for economic aid, another of $150 million for military aid to be supervised by a US mission. The

Senate bill authorized $463 million, of which, $364 million would be for economic aid and the remainder would be set aside for whatever the President might decide (presumably including military aid, which, however, was not specifically mentioned). A conference bill reconciled the two versions generally in favor of the Senate. The compromise measure was passed by both houses of Congress and signed by the President on 4 April 1948. Known as the China Aid Act of 1948, it authorized $338 million for economic aid and $125 million for special grants to the Chinese Government on such terms as might be determined by the President of the United States. It was assumed the special grants would be used for the purchase of military supplies. Of the total sum of $463 million authorized, however, only $400 million (including the $125 million for special grants) was actually appropriated; it was to be available until 2 April 1949.[16]

The Chinese immediately made it clear that they intended to use the entire $125 million for military purposes. The President granted broad authority to the Secretary of State to allocate the money. He imposed no restrictions upon the use of it, and therefore left it available for the purchase of military supplies.[17]

During the evolution of the China Aid Act, the National Military Establishment had favored inclusion of military aid. The question arose when the NSC Staff was preparing a position paper on short-term aid to China. Representatives of the Department of State and the National Security Resources Board proposed that the United States provide only limited economic assistance. The representatives of the Services believed that:

> The United States should furnish *limited economic and military assistance* to the National Government of China on a scale sufficient to retard economic and military deterioration and provide that Government with an opportunity to stabilize its internal political and military situation.[18]

At the request of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff commented on the NSC paper. "It would be unwise," they believed, "to extend economic aid to China without the military assistance which will provide the National Government some means with which to improve the present situation of internal conflict." The views they had submitted on 9 June 1947, in favor of limited and carefully supervised military aid, remained valid.[19] The NSC Staff paper was never acted on by the Council; it was overtaken by the passage of the China Aid Act, which, as already pointed out, made possible a certain amount of military assistance to China.

The position of the Nationalist Government, however, continued to deteriorate. As early as 26 July 1948, less than three months after the passage of the China Aid Act, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall, in a memorandum to the NSC, asked whether it was advisable to continue sending military aid to China. If present trends continued, he wrote, the Nationalist Government might collapse and be replaced by separatist regional regimes. He outlined four possible courses of action the United States might follow.

1. US aid might be increased to the maximum. This, however, would undoubtedly overextend US resources.

2. US aid might be withdrawn, but then the Nationalist Government would most certainly fall.

3. US aid might be continued on the basis of programs already authorized. This would buy time for the Nationalists.

4. US aid might be shifted from the Nationalist to other regimes. This, however, would be contrary to present US policy.

Commenting on the Secretary of the Army's alternatives, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the third one. They again argued for "carefully planned, selective and well-supervised assistance," which, they emphasized, must include military equipment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that no matter how unfavorable the ultimate developments in China might be or how impossible it would be to forestall the final outcome indefinitely, the "BUYING OF TIME within reason" would constitute "true economy in terms of our national security." The National Security Council took no action on Secretary Royall's proposals at that time.[20]

JUSMAGCHINA

Machinery for administering US military aid to China was already in existence. The US military advisory effort in China had begun during World War II. Following the conflict, the United States at first continued to furnish advice through the Headquarters, US Forces China Theater. After this headquarters closed down, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the establishment of an advisory mission in China. The President approved this recommendation, and in February 1946 the War and Navy Departments established Advisory Groups in that country.

The mission of the Army Advisory Group was to advise and assist the Chinese Ground Forces in providing properly trained, organized, and equipped ground forces for combat operations. At first the Group was limited to giving advice and assistance relating to the organization and functioning of the Chinese Ground Forces Headquarters and to the establishment and operation of schools. It could not make recommendations concerning the organization or the equipping of ground forces units, nor could it be directly involved in their training. These restrictions were subsequently relaxed to allow Army advisers to furnish some advice to ground forces below headquarters level and to participate in various Chinese training centers.[21]

The Air Division of the Army Advisory Group was established to assist in the modernization of the Chinese Air Force and to provide the Chinese technical

advice on the maintenance and operation of the 8⅓ group air force programmed for China. The Naval Advisory Group was authorized to assist the Chinese Government in naval matters, to train Chinese crews for the US naval vessels transferred to China under the Lend-Lease Program and later under PL 512, and to render technical advice in relation to the operation and maintenance of these ships.[22]

Consolidation of the two Groups into a single one to furnish coordinated advice was a logical step but was delayed by administrative difficulties. Congress enacted a law authorizing the Naval Group, but failed to pass similar legislation for the Army or the Air Force, thus leaving the two groups on a different legal basis. Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall suggested on 7 February 1948 that the two groups be integrated under a "coordinator." To the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this step did not go far enough. They consulted the Judge Advocate Generals of the Services, who gave their opinion that the President had authority to establish a "joint" advisory group, in the proper sense of the term, under a declared state of national emergency (which still existed even though World War II had ended). On 11 June 1948, therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Forrestal a draft directive, to be issued by the Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, for a Joint United States Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) to the Republic of China.

The mission of this body, as recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would be to

> assist and advise the Chinese Government in the development of modern armed forces for the fulfillment of those obligations which may devolve upon China under her international agreements, including the United Nations, for the establishment of adequate control over liberated areas in China, including Manchuria, and Formosa, and for the maintenance of internal peace and security.

To achieve this mission, JUSMAG would give technical, but not operational advice to the Head of the Chinese Government and would assist and advise all Chinese armed forces and logistics organizations in matters pertaining to training, organization, and equipment. Members of JUSMAG were specifically enjoined from participation in operations in combat areas.[23]

Secretary Forrestal approved the JCS recommendations, but before he could consult with Secretary Marshall on the proposed directive, the nature of the advisory effort in China was discussed in another context. On 11 June, the Secretary of State met with Mr. Royall, General Bradley, General Wedemeyer, and other State and Army Department officials to consider testimony to be given before the Congressional Committees concerning use of the money made available under the China Aid Act. Of major concern was how to assure that US aid was effective. In this connection, Major General David Barr, Chief of the Army Advisory Group, had recommended placing US advisers with selected Chinese Army headquarters in the field. Secretary Marshall feared that such a practice would result in the United States "getting-sucked in." General Wedemeyer was inclined to agree. He recalled that he had found the Chinese extremely reluctant to take advice. Although a year earlier he had recommended putting advisers with Chi-

nese units in the field, he no longer considered it advisable to do so; the only result, he feared, would be to enable the Chinese to blame the United States for "the final debacle." The conferees generally agreed that the Advisory Group should exert every effort to make certain that supplies were delivered where they would do the most good. No attempt should be made, however, to exercise supervision below the level of higher Chinese headquarters; to do so would expose the US advisers to possible involvement in military operations.[24]

Following these discussions, Secretary Marshall approved the draft directive for JUSMAGCHINA subject to certain changes. The mission of the new group, as stated in the draft, was set forth in language drawn in part from the Presidential order of 1946, which was no longer appropriate and might be read as committing the United States to intervene in the Chinese civil war. The Department of State suggested the following revised statement of mission, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted:

The mission of JUSMAGCHINA will be to assist and advise the Chinese Government in the development of modern armed forces for the purpose of enabling China to create a national military establishment in keeping with its national defense needs and to fulfill its obligations as a member of the United Nations.

The Department of State desired that the functions of the various Service Advisory Divisions be limited to advice and assistance in organization and training; they should not become involved in the provision of equipment. The Department also objected to the implication that the United States would assist in operation of procurement in China and recommended that the term "advise" rather than "advise and assist" be used in this instance. The Department of State had no objection to US Naval officers assisting in the instruction and training of Chinese crews at sea or in port.[25]

The directive establishing JUSMAGCHINA was issued on 17 September.[26] The Group was to have a personnel strength of not more than 1,000, and was to include Army, Navy, and Air Force Advisory Divisions, a Joint Advisory Council, a Joint Planning Staff, and a Joint Secretariat. US advisers were specifically forbidden to engage in operations in combat areas. JUSMAGCHINA was formally activated on 1 November 1948 under the direction of General Barr, who had been nominated for the position by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Barr also continued to head the Army Advisory Group (which now became the Army Advisory Division).[27]

The establishment of JUSMAGCHINA came too late, however, to stave off disaster by modernizing Chiang's crumbling military forces. The steady worsening of the Nationalists' position allowed JUSMAGCHINA only a few months of existence. The well-planned Communist offensive of late 1947 and early 1948 isolated the Nationalist troops in three Manchurian strongholds—Chinchow, Mukden and Changchun. The cities had to be supplied by air and proved impossible for the Government to hold. On 14 October 1948 Chinchow fell to the Communists; four days later Changchun was captured; and finally, on 2 November 1948, Mukden, the capital of Manchuria, came under Communist control. The failure

of the Manchurian campaign cost the Kuomintang 300,000 troops and was a severe blow to their morale.[28]

The battle then shifted southward to the vicinity of Hsuchow (Tungshan), an important junction of north-south and east-west railway lines. Nationalist forces, trapped and surrounded, tried without success to withdraw. The city itself fell to the Communists on 15 December 1948. By the time the Hsuchow campaign was over a few weeks later, the Nationalists had lost another 200,000 troops. More important was the fact that all of China north of the Yangtze was, for practical purposes, in Communist hands. The Nationalists held control south of the river, but their prospects of retaining it appeared highly uncertain at best.[29]

During the fighting around Hsuchow, the headquarters of JUSMAG at Nanking immediately south of the Yangtze, was threatened by the Communist forces. On 2 November, the day after JUSMAGCHINA was formally established, all members of the Joint Advisory Council and the Ambassador to China agreed that no additional military personnel should be moved into the command. US personnel earmarked for JUSMAG were diverted to other assignments. Soon the need for evacuating JUSMAG personnel became evident, and large numbers of advisers were withdrawn to Tokyo. A token group remained in China for a time, but by the end of January 1949 it too had been withdrawn. JUSMAGCHINA continued formally in existence until 3 March, when its operations were suspended.[30]

The Withdrawal from Tsingtao

The deterioration of the military posture of the Nationalist Government at the beginning of 1949 endangered the US Naval and Marine Corps personnel at Tsingtao. These US forces served in an advisory capacity to the Chinese naval training base and naval installations located there. As a major port and naval base, Tsingtao, on the Shantung peninsula, was an alluring objective for the Chinese Communists. By its capture they could push the last contingent of US forces out of China. As early as May 1948 the Office of Naval Intelligence concluded that the Chinese Communists, who were already threatening the Shantung peninsula, were capable of bringing increasing pressure on Tsingtao and probably would do so that summer.

In view of the serious threat of attack by Communist troops, the Commander, Naval Forces Western Pacific (COMNAVWESPAC), Admiral Oscar C. Badger, delineated to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Denfeld, four possible courses of action for the defense of Tsingtao.

A. Assist Nationalist forces in defense of the city and essential suburban facilities.

B. Defend installations essential to the United States without other local participation.

C. Prompt evacuation of US personnel and forces with covering action by US forces only as necessary.

D. Evacuation immediately of US shore establishment and noncombatants retaining US Forces afloat in this vicinity.

Admiral Badger did not consider it advisable to withdraw US troops from the city at that time. To do so would cause "permanent damage to the U. S. position in the Orient and to the Nationalist situation affecting all of North China." He therefore rejected courses C and D. Course B he deemed militarily impractical and likely to engender hostility toward the United States. His choice was for course A, although it would require (1) negotiations with the Chinese Government, which had the responsibility for protecting foreign lives and interests, and (2) an increase in the size of the US garrison at Tsingtao.[31]

Acting on the recommendation of Admiral Denfeld, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised the Secretary of Defense that US forces in Tsingtao were threatened by an imminent attack from Communist forces and that the Chinese Nationalists were not able to discharge their responsibilities for defending foreign lives and interests there. Whether or not to withdraw US forces was a question of policy, they pointed out, which should be promptly considered by the National Security Council. Meanwhile, they had directed COMNAVWESPAC, at his own suggestion, to assist Chinese Nationalist forces in defense of the city if it were attacked.[32]

This instruction to Admiral Badger was viewed with alarm in the Department of State. Acting Secretary Robert A. Lovett warned Secretary Forrestal that the United States might end up assuming unilateral responsibility for defending all or part of Tsingtao. He suggested that Admiral Badger at once seek clarification of Chiang Kai-shek's intentions toward the city and make it unmistakably clear that the basic responsibility for defending it rested with the Chinese Government. If the Communists evidenced an intent to attack Tsingtao, Mr. Lovett recommended that Admiral Badger evacuate all dependents and withdraw from exposed positions. Should it become evident that the Nationalists could not defend the city, then US personnel should be entirely withdrawn. He suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff revise their instructions to COMNAVWESPAC in line with the above comments, pending the formulation of a definite policy by the National Security Council.[33]

These views were accepted only in part. On 14 June 1948 the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the concurrence of Secretary Forrestal, authorized Admiral Badger to evacuate US personnel and forces from Tsingtao if the situation appeared serious enough to warrant such action. The rest of Mr. Lovett's suggestions were laid aside to await NSC consideration of the matter.[34]

The NSC Staff reviewed the situation of US forces at Tsingtao and submitted a split report. The Department of State desired that withdrawal of US forces begin at once; the Service representatives wanted it postponed until an attack became imminent.[35] It does not appear that this report was ever discussed by the NSC. However, the Council considered the situation at Tsingtao on 15 July 1948 and postponed action on the grounds that any change in the US position at Tsingtao might adversely affect the crisis over Berlin, where the Soviet blockade of the Western zones was only a few weeks old.[36] During the months that followed, the Council again failed to act, perhaps because of the State-Defense split. At length

on 7 October 1948, the members agreed that, for the time being, the instructions given COMNAVWESPAC by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 June 1948 would remain in effect. No change would be made in them without prior consultation between Defense and State, pending consideration by the NSC of a forthcoming report on the entire question of US policy toward China. Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would furnish COMNAVWESPAC with any additional units that he might need to carry out these instructions.[37]

Fortunately the situation at Tsingtao remained quiet throughout the summer of 1948. Chiang Kai-shek in fact seized the opportunity to try to repair his fortunes in Shantung and nearby regions. In August 1948 he requested that arms and ammunition, paid for out of the $125 million made available under the China Aid Act, to be shipped through Tsingtao to General Fu Tso-yi, who remained in command of a large force in Hopeh province, north of Shantung. This request was endorsed by the US Ambassador to China, J. Leighton Stuart, as well as by General Barr and Admiral Badger.[38]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, who received Chiang's proposal through Admiral Denfeld, considered it militarily sound, as well as allowable under the guidelines laid down by the President for the use of the $125 million. Secretary Forrestal concurred and apparently obtained the President's approval. However, the materiel arrived too late to retrieve the situation in north China. Shipments began in November 1948 and continued until March 1949.[39]

In September 1948 the Communists seized Tsinan, the capital of Shantung. The Nationalists were left with the city of Tsingtao and its immediate environs, and the situation of the US forces there assumed a new urgency. Acting Secretary of State Lovett pointed out that this new situation necessitated a revision of Admiral Badger's instructions. The problem now, in Mr. Lovett's opinion, was to extricate the US command while at the same time minimizing the loss of prestige. He recommended immediate evacuation of dependents from Tsingtao and transfer of shore-based activities to shipboard, while at the same time strengthening US defenses of the city in the hope of deterring an attack.[40]

The matter was referred to President Truman, who decided, on the basis of advice from Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) representatives in China, that the situation was not yet beyond hope. He "suggested" that the withdrawal from Tsingtao not take place at that time, and that aid to the Nationalist forces in northern China be expedited.[41] The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly prepared, and Secretary Forrestal approved, new orders to COMNAVWESPAC, which were transmitted on 22 October. He was now authorized to use his forces for the protection of US interests and for the maintenance of order in connection therewith, within the perimeter of Tsingtao. He was to be prepared to evacuate dependents and other foreigners at his discretion. US forces, however, would be evacuated only on order of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[42]

The latitude allowed Admiral Badger under these instructions alarmed Ambassador Stuart, who warned that they appeared to increase the likelihood of a clash between US and Communist forces. Acting Secretary Lovett, sharing his concern, wished to be "informed promptly" of the actions that Admiral Badger planned to take.[43] The Admiral himself interpreted the directive in a restrained

manner. He told the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 2 November 1948 that, if a Communist threat materialized, he intended to establish contact with the Communist commander in order to prevent fighting. He would also try to arrange an agreement between the Communists and Nationalists; the outcome of this effort would determine whether evacuation would begin.[44]

Nevertheless in Washington the situation was considered urgent enough to justify a special meeting of the National Security Council, even in the absence of the President, who had gone home to Missouri to vote in the election. The Council tentatively approved the course of action that had been recommended by Mr. Lovett. COMNAVWESPAC should be instructed to evacuate US dependents and, "in so far as practicable," to liquidate shore-based activities or transfer them to shipboard. At the same time, steps should be taken, at the discretion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to strengthen the defensive position of the forces at Tsingtao. This decision was subsequently approved by the President.[45]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly instructed Admiral Badger on 6 November to maintain readiness to withdraw from Tsingtao while at the same time continuing to reinforce the defenses there. The garrison would be temporarily reinforced by Marines from Guam, they told him. Dependents should be evacuated, and any change in the situation should be reported at once. In the event of a sudden attack or local uprising, Admiral Badger was authorized to use his forces for the protection of US lives and property.[46]

A month later Chiang Kai-shek decided to close down the Chinese naval installations in Tsingtao and relocated them to Amoy, farther south on the mainland, and Taiwan. Obviously the United States could no longer base its naval forces in Tsingtao after the Nationalists left. A potentially dangerous situation could therefore be terminated, since US forces could be withdrawn without loss of prestige. Acting Secretary Lovett, on learning of Chiang's decision, recommended to the NSC the following course of action:

1. Admiral Badger should proceed energetically to evacuate dependents and surplus material and to liquidate shore-based activities. He should be directed at this time to withdraw his forces when it becomes publicly known that Chinese naval training installations will be removed from Tsingtao or as soon thereafter as may be feasible without jeopardizing plans for the evacuation of Americans in China. Public intimation of his intention should be avoided until the Chinese intention to transfer their installations becomes publicly known in order that his withdrawal may be attributed to the Chinese move rather than vice versa.

2. The existing program for training units of the Chinese Navy should be suspended upon the removal of the Chinese naval training base from Tsingtao.

3. American naval forces should not be established at this time either on Taiwan or at Amoy.[47]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with the second and third of Mr. Lovett's recommendations. With reference to the first, they informed the Secretary of Defense that the evacuation of dependents and surplus material and the liquida-

tion of shore-based activities were already in progress. All naval forces were prepared to evacuate on 10 days' notice. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the timing of the withdrawal announcement as proposed by Mr. Lovett. They suggested that announcement originate from the Department of State and be a matter of decision by that Department and the Department of the Navy.[48]

Mr. Lovett's conclusions, as supplemented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were endorsed by the NSC Staff on 23 December 1948. At the same time, the Staff recommended that withdrawal of shore-based activities from Tsingtao not be construed as a decision that US naval forces would withdraw from Chinese waters. The NSC adopted the Council's report; the President approved it the following day.[49]

A Policy of Reality for China

By the end of 1948 the destruction of Nationalist forces in northern China and the seizure of the major cities north of the Yangtze had so altered the situation that a reexamination of US policy was clearly necessary. The outcome of this reexamination was NSC 34/1, approved by President Truman in February 1949. Actually, however, the new policy paper was the culmination of actions initiated by Secretary Forrestal more than a year earlier.

The Secretary of Defense had suggested in January 1948 that the Department of State prepare a report for the NSC on future US policy toward China. Accordingly, the Policy Planning Staff of the Department, headed by Mr. George Kennan, undertook a comprehensive and scholarly study of all phases of the current situation in China, beginning with the history of that country. Their voluminous report was completed in October 1948 and turned over to the NSC. The general conclusion was that, although traditional US objectives toward China were valid, they were not attainable within the foreseeable future. The outcome of the civil war, and hence China's future, were being decided by forces far beyond the control of any foreign country, and no amount of US aid could retrieve the fortunes of the Nationalists. The United States should, therefore follow a pragmatic course of action in China, as follows: (1) continue for the present to recognize the Nationalist Government as constituted; (2) make the decision regarding the recognition of any other government only after the actual fall of the Nationalists; and (3) if possible, prevent China from becoming an "adjunct of Soviet politico-military power."[50]

This draft was intensively discussed within the administration during the ensuing two months, apparently at levels higher than the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At issue was the nature of the guidance to be drawn from the conclusions implicit in the State Department analysis. Secretary Forrestal believed that the NSC should approve a paper that would prescribe rather specific guidance for the new Far Eastern situation. Officials of the Department of State, especially Mr. Kennan, believed that any guidance must be broad and flexible, since the situation was fluid and the United States could do little to influence it at the moment.[51]

The Council finally approved a broad statement of policy that generally reflected the thinking of the Department of State. The members reaffirmed the objective of a unified, stable, and independent China but recognized that this was hardly to be achieved in the present situation. Immediate US policy, therefore, should aim at preventing China from becoming an adjunct of Soviet power. In order to do so, the United States should "exploit opportunities in China while maintaining flexibility and avoiding irrevocable commitments to any one course or to any one faction." At the same time, the United States should relegate China to a relatively low priority—lower than that of other areas "where the benefits to U.S. security are more immediately commensurate with the expenditure of U.S. resources." The President approved this statement of policy on 4 February 1949.[52]

Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who replaced Secretary Marshall in January 1949, was especially eager to extricate the United States from involvement in China. Writing later, he thus described the situation in China at the time of his accession:

> In Asia the effort to restore a Chinese society and state based upon an amalgamation of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang and Mao Tse-Tung's Communists had failed, and Chiang was in the last stages of collapse. I arrived just in time to have him collapse on me.[53]

Shortly after he took office, Secretary of State Acheson presented a new analysis of the Chinese situation to the NSC. It was occasioned by the continuing success of the Communists and the rising influence of the Kremlin in China. Power had clearly passed to the Chinese Communists, who would eventually take over all or most of China. The Nationalist Government might survive in south China or Taiwan, but at best as a local regime.

Secretary Acheson recommended that the United States continue its traditional policies of friendship for the Chinese people and respect for the territorial independence and administrative integrity of China. The United States should continue to recognize the Nationalist Government until the situation was further clarified, but also maintain, in so far as feasible, official contact with all elements in China. Political and economic measures should be seized upon to exploit any rifts between the Chinese Communists and the Soviets. For the most part, however, the United States would have to rely on "indigenous Chinese elements" in combatting Kremlin influence; these should be given cautious clandestine support. The NSC accepted Secretary Acheson's recommendations without alteration and forwarded them to the President, who directed their implementation on 3 March 1949.[54]

At the same time, the President and the Council adopted another set of recommendations drafted by the Department of State regarding the use of trade as a weapon to minimize Soviet influence over Communist China. The principal conclusion was that, in order to lessen China's dependence on the Soviet Union, the traditional Chinese commerce with Japan should be cautiously encouraged. At the same time, it was stressed that nothing of direct military value should be sent to Communist China, and that shipments of industrial equipment should be carefully screened to make certain that critical items were not transshipped through China to other parts of the communist world.[55]

The Question of Continuing Aid to Nationalist China

Implicit in the decisions reached by the President and the National Security Council early in 1949 was that no further purpose would be served by providing military assistance to the Nationalist Government. Shipments were still being made under the China Trade Act under which funds would be available until 2 April 1949. Any effort to continue assistance beyond that date appeared futile. But the administration's efforts to terminate the military aid program for Chiang encountered determined opposition from the congressional "China Bloc."

The advisability of continuing shipments of military materiel to the Nationalists had been questioned by Secretary Forrestal in December 1948. Two months earlier, when it appeared that all might not be lost for the Nationalists in north China, President Truman had directed that shipments of arms and ammunition be expedited. Secretary Forrestal now pointed out that the situation had changed and that new guidance was needed to answer the question: Should the National Military Establishment continue to provide assistance to Nationalist China?[56]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, to whom Secretary Forrestal's memorandum had been informally referred for comment, answered the Secretary's first question in the negative. In a reversal of their previous position, they now viewed the situation in China as irreparable and doubted that providing further military equipment to the Chinese Nationalist Government would buy any more time. "It might, in fact, have the opposite result," they wrote, "in that such equipment might pass into the hands of victorious Communist forces." On the other hand, they did not believe that the Nationalist Government should be deserted "at the eleventh hour." They accordingly recommended that:

1. The military aid program should be continued for the present.

2. Emphasis on its priority and tempo should be relaxed.

3. Upon actual collapse of the Chinese Nationalist Government delivery should be suspended.

4. Resumption of delivery to appropriate regional regimes should be subject to determination at a later date and in the light of developments subsequent to the collapse of the Chinese National Government.[57]

The NSC withheld a decision on the question and sought the advice of the Director, JUSMAGCHINA, and the US Ambassador at Nanking.[58] General Barr's view was that the loss of all of China to the Communists appeared to be merely a matter of time. "Only a policy of unlimited United States aid, including the immediate employment of United States armed forces to block the southern advance of the Communists," which he "emphatically" did not recommend, "would enable the Nationalist Government to maintain a foothold in southern China against a

determined Communist advance." On the other hand, General Barr believed that abrupt withdrawal of aid might lead to severe criticism of the United States. Like the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he recommended a middle course, as follows:

1. Military and economic aid to Taiwan and to China south of the Yangtze should continue as long as any considerable portions of these areas were held by the Nationalist Government.

2. Every effort should be made to avoid having any considerable stockpile of military supplies designated for the Nationalists where they would be likely to fall into the hands of the Communists. Specifically, military and economic aid supplies then enroute or at checkpoints should be dispatched to Okinawa or other suitable places for onward routing in accordance with the situation.[59]

On the other hand, Ambassador Stuart warned that the continuing delivery of munitions under the China Aid Act was inextricably involved in future US policy toward China. Even to divert shipments to Taiwan was premature, since it was expected that Chiang would continue resistance from southern China for some time. To stop shipments at that time would inevitably be taken as a confirmation of the belief that the United States was through with Generalissimo Chiang and would discourage those both within and outside the Nationalist Government who desired to continue resisting communism.[60]

The NSC discussed the subject again on 3 February 1949. Secretary Forrestal reported that approximately 50 percent of the $125 million worth of supplies authorized under the China Aid Act had already reached China, while 15 percent were currently being delivered. A decision on the remaining 35 percent, he said, was urgently needed.[61]

The Council agreed that the President, after consulting congressional leaders, should suspend further shipments of military supplies to China, since the equipment could no longer be used effectively by the Nationalist and might well fall into hostile hands.[62] The President accepted this advice and conferred with key members of Congress. He found that some of them earnestly desired to help Generalissimo Chiang. Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, who was present, forcefully opposed the President's plan to suspend military shipments. If assistance were withdrawn just as the Nationalist Government was about to fall, the United States would "never be able to shake the charge that we are the ones who gave poor China the final push into disaster." His opposition, and that of others, evidently had some effect. The President decided that shipments should not be suspended, but that no effort should be made to expedite them.[63]

Even this decision drew criticism from some of Chiang's supporters in Congress and from some elements of the press, who believed that US assistance could still be effective. In February 1949, 51 Republican Congressmen asked the President to appoint a commission to survey the situation in China. Secretary Acheson met with them and sought to make clear the difficulties of charting a course of action at that time. "When a great tree falls in the forest," he said, according to his later account, "one cannot see the extent of the damage until the

dust settles." The latter phrase was promptly leaked to the press and led to charges that the administration had no policy except to mark time.[64]

A bill introduced by Senator Patrick McCarran of Nevada proposed $1.5 billion in loans to China for military and economic purposes. As spokesman for the administration, Secretary Acheson, opposing the bill, informed Senator Tom Connally, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, that the United States had already supplied over $2 billion worth of aid to China since V-J Day. Further assistance could not retrieve the situation unless accompanied by armed intervention. The Secretary asked only that Congress permit the use of any unobligated appropriations left over from the China Aid Act after the expiration date of 2 April 1949. In the end, Congress accepted this request and authorized the President to use the unexpended funds until 15 February 1950 to assist those areas of China free from communist domination. The McCarran bill was defeated.[65]

The $2 billion figure mentioned by Secretary Acheson included both military and economic aid furnished directly in grants and credits to the Nationalists. It did not include assistance provided through the United Nations, or the more than $1 billion worth of surplus property sold to the Nationalists at a cost of only $232 million. The table[66] on the following pages presents details of assistance furnished by the United States from V-J Day to 31 March 1949.

Foreign Economic and Military Aid Authorized for China
from V-J Day to 31 March 1949

I. US Government Grants and Credits

Grants:	(millions)
Lend-Lease	$513.7
Military aid under Sino-American Cooperative Organization Agreement	17.7
US contribution to UNRRA China program	474.0
US share of UNRRA contribution to BOTRA	3.6
Ammunition abandoned and transferred by US Marines in north China (over 6,500 tons) (no estimate of value available)	
Transfer of US Navy vessels (PL 512) (valued at procurement cost)	141.3
US foreign relief program	46.4
ECA program	275.0
$125 million grant under China Aid Act of 1948	125.0
Total Grants	$1,596.7

Foreign Economic and Military Aid Authorized for China
from V-J Day to 31 March 1949
(Continued)

Credits:	(millions)	
Lend-Lease	$181.0	
Lend-Lease "pipe line" credit	51.7	
Export-Import Bank credits	82.8	
Surplus property sales for credit:		
Sale of excess stocks of US Army in west China	20.0	
Dockyard facilities sales	4.1	
Civilian surplus property transfers (under August 30, 1946, bulk sale agreement)	55.0	
Maritime commission ship sales	16.4	
Total Credits	$411.0	
Total Grants and Credits		$2,007.7
II. Other Foreign Grants and Credits		
Balance of UNRRA China program	$184.4	
Balance of UNRRA contribution to BOTRA	1.4	
Canadian credit	60.0	
Total other Foreign Aid		245.8
Total US Government and Foreign Grants and Credits since V-J Day		$2,253.5

III. US Government Surplus Property Sales

	Procurement cost (millions)	Agreed realization to US (millions)
Sales of excess stocks of US Army in west China	(Not available)	$ 20.0
Dockyard facilities sales	(Not available)	4.1
Civilian surplus property transfers (under August 30, 1946, bulk sale agreements)	$ 900.0	175.0
Maritime commission ship sales	77.3	26.2
Military surplus property transfers	100.8	6.7
Total Surplus Property Sales	$1,078.1	*$232.0

*Includes $95.5 million to be paid on credit terms as indicated in above under *Credits*.

The contest between the administration and the "China Bloc" continued during the evolution of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. This legislation had its origin in the recommendations of an interdepartmental working group known as the Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee (FACC), which drew up guidelines for a coordinated military assistance program for FY 1950 and a list of proposed recipients. China was not on the list, but the FACC suggested that a contingency fund be established from which the President might make an allocation to that country if such action appeared to be in US interests. This suggestion was strongly endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They prepared a worldwide aid program reflecting the FACC guidelines in which they recommended a contingency fund of $100 million.[67]

The administration's aid program, based on JCS recommendations and totaling $1.45 billion, was sent to Congress on 25 July 1949 with a request that the President be allowed complete discretion in allocating the funds to individual countries.[68] At once Chiang's supporters opened their campaign to make certain that Nationalist China was included. A proposal to add $200 million for that purpose was defeated in the House of Representatives, along with another that would have given $75 million to China and $25 million to Southeast Asia. In the Senate, however, Chiang's cause fared better. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, after considerable debate, amended the President's program to set aside $75 million to be used for the "general area of China." This amendment was included in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 as finally approved by Congress in September. The President signed the new law on 6 October—only five days after Mao Tse-Tung had proclaimed the establishment of a People's Republic in China.[69]

In anticipation of the congressional action, Major General Lyman Lemnitzer, USA, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Military Assistance Programs, asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to "study the military problems involved in aiding China and the determination of a plan and program for that aid." The Joint Chiefs of Staff, while preparing their reply, had before them a request from the Chinese Nationalist Government for military assistance in the amount of $287 million along with a military plan of action, which had been submitted to the US Government on 15 August and which had been referred to them for comment. The Nationalist plan was to employ their remaining forces (amounting to 94 divisions, at least on paper) to hold the western regions of China lying beyond mountain barriers and the islands of Taiwan and Hainan, while hoping eventually to mount an offensive.[70]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff saw no more reason to expect US military aid to be effective than they had in December 1948. They advised the Secretary of Defense that, although the items requested by the Nationalists were available, it would do no good to supply them. The Nationalist Government's plans were wholly impractical. The defensive line was much too long, and the Communists had now acquired a numerical advantage along with their marked superiority in tactics, logistical support, command arrangements, and morale. The Nationalist Government did not have a unified command, an effective overall program of defense and attack, or a practical plan of coordinating military action. These JCS

opinions were forwarded by the Secretary of Defense to the NSC, which evidently accepted them, since the Chinese request went no further.[71]

The Final Collapse of the Nationalists

The year 1949 saw the final expulsion of the Chiang regime from the mainland of China. The Communists' anticipated invasion of southern China began on 21 April 1949, when their forces crossed the Yangtze river at several points. Three days later they occupied Nanking, the Kuomintang capital. The Nationalist Government fled southward to Canton on the coast.

The presence of the Nationalists in Canton raised the prospect of a new international crisis. Canton, at the upper end of a broad bay, was flanked by the Portuguese colony of Macao and the British colony of Hong Kong. If the Chinese Communists attacked the new Nationalist capital—which appeared very likely—the fighting could easily extend to these foreign colonies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff studied the situation in June 1949 at the suggestion of General Bradley. Their opinion was that the United States should not contribute forces for the defense of Hong Kong and Macao unless it was willing to accept the risk of a major military involvement in China or possibly a world war. The Secretary of Defense forwarded these views to the NSC.[72]

The feared attack on Hong Kong did not materialize even after Canton fell to the Communists on 16 October. What was left of the Nationalist Government moved to Chungking, in the safety of the southwestern mountains. Far to the north in Peking, on 1 October 1949, the existence of the People's Republic of China had already been proclaimed by Mao Tse-tung.[73]

Meanwhile, the Nationalist Government had announced the establishment of a blockade covering most of the Chinese coast. The United States did not recognize the port closure and US ships continued to enter Chinese harbors. Several US merchant vessels visited Shanghai and were intercepted and delayed under the threat of violence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not wish to commit themselves to the military protection of US shipping in Chinese waters. In December 1949 they recommended to the Secretary of Defense that he draw the attention to the awkward position in which the Department of Defense was placed because of the lack of policy clarification. This JCS recommendation, however, was overtaken by events. Driven out of Chungking, the Nationalists moved their government to Taipei in December 1949, and their futile "blockade" was lifted in order to concentrate on the defense of Taiwan.[74]

A final report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by General Barr, Director, JUSMAGCHINA, provided a lengthy epitaph upon the defeat of the Nationalist regime. He made it clear that Chiang's failure was in no way attributable to lack of US military assistance. "The Nationalist military collapse," he wrote, "stemmed primarily from a weak and unstable government which was overcentralized; which had little or no popular support; and which had as a primary interest the protection of the privileged class."[75]

The first military blunder committed by the Chinese Nationalists, in General Barr's opinion, was their concentration on the military reoccupation of the areas formerly held by the Japanese. Also, instead of being content to strengthen their hold on north China, they tried to extend their control to Manchuria. Strategically, the Chinese Nationalists had attempted to dig in behind the city walls, waiting for relief that never came. Their desire to save face and show valor prevented them from executing strategically necessary retreats.

There was little cooperation among the Services and the old military men, familiar with the Army, had little knowledge of the newly-formed Air Force or Navy. The Chinese Air Force, consisting of 8⅓ groups, was far in excess of what the Chinese economy could afford. It was looked upon as a prestige symbol and such care was taken not to lose men or equipment that military effectiveness was sacrificed.

General Barr listed a number of handicaps that had hampered the US advisory effort. It had lasted little more than two years, during which the civil war had greatly intensified and the economic problems of the government (notably inflation) had grown increasingly serious. The Chinese military services were rivals rather than collaborators. General Barr's performance as Director of JUSMAG had suffered because he had to serve simultaneously as Chief of the Army Advisory Division. Finally, US advisers had been forbidden to enter combat areas or to give operational advice. Perhaps the only way that the United States could have achieved its goal would have been for its "advisers" to take command of Nationalist forces.[76]

In the aftermath of the Nationalist withdrawal from the mainland, Secretary of State Acheson sought to impress the public with the fact that the defeat of the Nationalists stemmed from inherent military, political, and social weaknesses that were beyond the power of the United States to remedy. Discussing the situation in Asia before the National Press Club on 12 January 1950, he described the situation of Chiang at the end of World War II, when he had "emerged as the undisputed leader of the Chinese People," with "overwhelming military power, greater military power than any ruler had ever had in the entire history of China." His only opposition were the Communists, "up in the hills, ill-equipped, ragged, a very small military force." Four years later, Chiang's support had "melted away," and he had become "a refugee on a small island off the coast of China with the remnants of his forces." In his judgment, the Secretary continued:

> What has happened . . . is that the almost inexhaustible patience of the Chinese people in their misery ended. They did not bother to overthrow this government. There was really nothing to overthrow. They simply ignored it throughout the country. . . . They completely withdrew their support from this government, and when that support was withdrawn, the whole military establishment disintegrated. Added to the grossest incompetence ever experienced by any military command was this total lack of support both in the armies and in the country, and so the whole matter just simply disintegrated. . . .
>
> The Communists did not create this. . . . But they were shrewd and cunning to mount it, to ride this thing into victory and into power.[77]

The Issue of Taiwan

From his last stronghold on Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek continued to insist that the Nationalists constituted the rightful government of all China. But the ability of the Nationalists to maintain themselves on the island, after an unbroken succession of defeats on the mainland, was extremely doubtful. Moreover, the exact political status of Taiwan was in doubt. The Cairo Declaration of December 1943 had provided for the return of the island to China, but the matter had not yet been settled by a peace treaty with Japan. Legally, therefore, Taiwan remained a part of the Japanese Empire.

In the latter part of 1948, when the final defeat of the Nationalists could be foreseen, Acting Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett had requested that the NSC prepare an appraisal of the strategic implications to the security of the United States should Taiwan come under an administration "susceptible to exploitation" by the USSR. In preparation for their appraisal, the NSC requested that the Secretary of Defense furnish the Council with the JCS views.[78]

On 24 November 1948 the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their reply. The control of Taiwan by Kremlin-directed Communists, they concluded, would be "seriously unfavorable." An enemy on Taiwan could dominate the sea routes from Japan to the Malay area and strike at the Ryukyus and the Philippines. Also, Taiwan normally produced a surplus of food and raw materials upon which Japan was partially dependent, and the loss of these surpluses might produce instability that would jeopardize the US position in Japan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that diplomatic and economic measures be undertaken to ensure that Taiwan would remain under an administration friendly to the United States. No mention was made of military measures. The Secretary of Defense forwarded the JCS views to the NSC.[79]

A more specific plan for keeping Taiwan out of Communist hands was suggested to the NSC by the Department of the Navy. Since the Nationalist Government was expected to fall very shortly, the only way that US strategic interests could be maintained on Taiwan was for the United States to get a foothold on the island at the earliest possible moment. Specifically, Admiral Badger, COMNAVWESPAC, who was then preparing to evacuate Tsingtao, should move to Taiwan along with the Chinese Navy. Then the United States would be ready to assume control of the island when Chiang's government finally collapsed. United States control over Taiwan would be temporary, pending a UN plebiscite to determine the wishes of the Taiwanese.[80]

The Department of State position, furnished to the NSC, accepted the basic goal set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, namely, denial of Taiwan to the Communists. Because of the uncertainties of the situation, however, the Department did not recommend that the United States support a Chinese Nationalist regime on the island as the recognized Government of China. To do so, "would increase risks of immediate local instability, provide the most fertile environment for the growth of Communism, greatly complicate our position on the mainland and hamstring our tactical flexibility toward China proper." The Department recommended a flexible US attitude toward Taiwan until the situation developed "to

the point where we know what governing groups we will have to deal with in Formosa." At that time, the United States should "seek to develop and support a local non-Communist Chinese regime which will provide at least a modicum of decent government for the island." It should be made clear to this government that continuing US support would depend upon its effectiveness and its responsiveness to the needs of the Taiwanese. The Navy suggestion that the United States assume control of Taiwan was opposed by the Department. Communist domination of the island could best be achieved by isolating it from the mainland, rather than by unilateral US assertion of responsibility.[81]

The policy statement (NSC 37/2) adopted by the National Security Council on 3 February 1949, and approved by President Truman the following day, was based largely on the proposals of the Department of State. While recognizing the importance of the island to the United States, the NSC rejected the establishment of a US military foothold on the island and recommended an attitude of cautious reserve combined with an effort to influence the government of Taiwan. The major provisions of the new policy were as follows:

a. The US has no desire to see chaos on the mainland spread to Formosa and the Pescadores;

b. The US had not been impressed by Chinese administration on the islands and believed that if there is continued misrule the Chinese authorities would inevitably forfeit the support of world opinion which might be expected to swing in favor of Formosan autonomy;

c. US support for the governing authorities of Formosa will inevitably depend in a large measure upon the efficiency of their regime and the extent to which they are able to contribute toward the welfare and economic needs of the Formosan people and permit and encourage active Formosan participation in position of responsibility in Government;

d. The US cannot remain unconcerned over possible developments arising from the influx of large numbers of refugees from the mainland and the consequent effects, including the increasing burden on the island's economy, and is disturbed at the indication of the Chinese belief that the building up of military strength on Formosa will in itself provide an effective barrier to Communist penetration;

e. The U.S. expects that the lessons to be drawn from developments on the mainland and from previous Formosan reactions to Chinese rule will not be overlooked by the Chinese authorities in dealing with the problems of the island and with the Formosan people.[82]

A few days later Secretary Acheson requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff give the NSC their recommendations on the military measures that might be employed in the event diplomatic and economic steps proved insufficient to achieve US objectives in Taiwan.[83] In their response, on 10 February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not recommend the use of any overt military force in Taiwan. They did, however, cautiously recommend military support for the objectives set

forth in NSC 37/2. This support should consist of the stationing of a few fleet units at suitable ports in Taiwan. However, there should be no commitment to employ forces. Available US military strength had to be held in readiness to protect areas more vital to US security.[84]

A specific procedure for implementing NSC 37/2 was suggested by Secretary Acheson. He recommended that the United States immediately send a high-ranking official to Taiwan who would explain the US position. He would ask for suitable assurances that the Taiwanese Government would observe the conditions stipulated by the United States. On receipt of these assurances, he would at once draw up plans (assisted by the ECA) for the promised economic aid program.[85]

The recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State were incorporated by the NSC Staff into a supplement to NSC 37/2, which was discussed by the Council on 3 March. Secretary Acheson objected that the JCS proposal to station fleet units off Taiwan would hamper the success of US diplomatic and economic efforts. Further, any use of military power short of "complete blockade and occupation" would not prevent a Communist takeover of Taiwan. Since the situation in Taiwan might change momentarily, however, the possible need to use military force should always be kept in mind. The Council adopted Mr. Acheson's views. It also accepted his recommendation that the US send a high-ranking official to Taiwan. The President approved the NSC conclusions.[86]

The Secretary of State also told the NSC that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not given a clear answer to the Council's earlier request for an estimate of the strategic consequences of the fall of Taiwan to the Communists. The Council requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to clarify their views and, in particular, to state whether or not they recommended military intervention in Taiwan.[87]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 22 March that they did not believe

> that the strategic importance of Formosa justifies overt military action at this time or in the event that diplomatic and economic steps prove insufficient to prevent Communist domination so long as the present disparity between our military strength and our global obligations exists. There can be no categorical assurance, however, that other future circumstances, extending to war itself, might not make overt military action eventually advisable from the over-all standpoint of our national security.[88]

After April 1949, when the Communist forces breached the line of the Yangtze, the flight of Chiang's followers to Taiwan increased. On 4 August the Department of State, in a memorandum to the NSC, pointed out that the arrival of additional Nationalist troops and officials on Taiwan had accelerated inflation and threatened to contribute to further economic disintegration and popular unrest. The influx of troops had swelled the military establishment, but their loyalty was uncertain. There appeared to be a real hazard that Taiwan might pass under Communist control as a result of widespread troop mutinies or of clandestine agreement between Communist emissaries and some of the Nationalist commanders. The control of the island's destiny was in the hands of the same corrupt and incompetent rulers who had squandered US aid on the main-

land. In these circumstances, there could be no assurance that economic and diplomatic efforts alone would keep Taiwan out of Communist hands. The Department of State therefore recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide a new strategic estimate. Specifically, the question to be answered was: Assuming that in the absence of military measures Taiwan would sooner or later come under Communist control, did the Joint Chiefs of Staff regard the island as being of sufficient military importance to the United States to justify its occupation by US military forces?[89]

In reply, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed their previous expressions regarding the strategic importance of Taiwan, but they again declared that military action was not justified "so long as the present disparity between our military strength and our global obligations exists." They underscored their comment by noting that the disparity might well increase "as a result of budgetary limitations and the commitments implicit in the North Atlantic Treaty." Military action in concert with other nations, with or without the approval of the United Nations (a possibility that had been suggested by the State Department memorandum), they also viewed unfavorably, for the resulting commitment appeared to differ little from what would be involved in a unilateral action. Still, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued in effect their broader reservation that future circumstances might make the dispatch of forces to the Taiwan area advisable.[90]

On 6 October the Department of State presented a reexamination of the US position on Taiwan for the approval of the NSC and the President. Accepting an estimate by the CIA, the Department expressed the fear that if the United States furnished only economic and diplomatic aid, Taiwan would be in Communist hands by 1950. Also accepting the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that military action was not justified "in view of the disparity between military strength and obligations," the Department concluded that present policy should be continued but with modifications to assure a more efficient use of the then existing Nationalist economic and military resources. Additional US aid should be made dependent on the reform of the Nationalist Government, but an enlarged program of military and economic aid was rejected, as was the establishment of a US Advisory Group. The Department of State recommended that the US Government convey these views to Chiang Kai-shek.[91]

The Council approved the Department of State's recommendation with minor changes in the suggested statement to Chiang Kai-shek. The revised statement made it clear to the Generalissimo that

> the U.S. Government does not intend to commit any of its armed forces to the defense of the Island. It is concerned, however, lest the chaos of the mainland spread to Taiwan and believes that a higher level of political and economic well-being must be provided if serious unrest is to be avoided.... The resources of the Island, together with the material assets available to the Chinese administration are believed to be sufficient to enable that administration substantially to improve conditions through its own efforts.... While the U.S. Government will continue to furnish economic assistance to Taiwan under existing legislation, the provision of any additional aid will depend upon the further performance of the Chinese administration on Taiwan.

Secretary Acheson requested that the US Consul General at Taipei convey these US sentiments to the Generalissimo personally.[92]

Although policy toward Taiwan appeared to have been settled, the danger to the island continued to trouble the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In December 1949 the Chief of Staff of the Army, General J. Lawton Collins, proposed that the Joint Strategic Survey Committee consider military measures, short of the dispatch of a major force, that might be implemented to enhance the security of the island. The JSSC studied the matter and drew up a report which was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. The salient feature of this report was that the time had come to resume military aid to Chiang's government. The Joint Chiefs of Staff said:

1. A modest well-directed and closely supervised program of military aid to the Chinese Nationalist Government in Taiwan would be in the security interest of the United States.

2. A modest program of military aid to the Chinese . . . Government in Taiwan should be integrated with a stepped-up political, economic, and psychological program pursued energetically in extension of present United States programs there. . . .

The Joint Chiefs of Staff went on to point out:

that the recommended action with respect to Formosa is a part of the overall problem of resisting the spread of Communist domination in East Asia. It is recognized that this is a piecemeal approach . . . but it is likewise a matter of urgency. These separate but related projects point up the necessity of early determination of an overall program for the solution of the major problem.[93]

These JCS views were considered by the NSC on 30 December 1949 in connection with a review of US policy towards Asia as a whole, which had been undertaken six months earlier. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in commenting on the draft of the policy paper, had recommended that the $75 million made available for the "general area of China" by the Mutual Defense Assistance Act be programmed immediately, although they did not mention the Chinese Nationalists in this connection. The Council accepted this recommendation but rejected the proposal in the JCS memorandum to supply military aid to Chiang. The general policy approved by the Council called for continued recognition of the Nationalist Government until the situation was further clarified. The Chinese Communist regime should not be recognized until it was clearly in the interest of the United States to do so. The United States should not provide military or political support to non-communist elements in China unless they could offer effective resistance to the Communists. In addition, the United States should exploit any rift between the Soviet Union and Communist China by political and psychological means and should prevent the Soviet Union and its satellites from obtaining supplies through China.[94]

President Truman approved the policy statement (NSC 48/2) on 30 December 1949, and on 5 January 1950 he announced publicly the immediate consequences as they applied to the Chinese Nationalists:

> the United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa. In the view of the United States Government, the resources on Formosa are adequate to enable them to obtain the items which they might consider necessary for the defense of the Islands. The United States Government proposes to continue under existing legislative authority the present ECA program of economic assistance.[95]

The "hands-off" attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists lasted until June 1950, when North Korean armored forces crashed across the 38th Parallel and seemed likely to bring about a further alteration of the balance of forces in eastern Asia. A new policy toward Taiwan then appeared advisable, as part of a general strengthening of the US position in the Far East. The recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for military aid to Chiang was ultimately approved, while the interposition of the US Seventh Fleet in the Straits of Taiwan effectively placed the island under US protection.[96]

14

Consequences of the Communist Victory in China on US Far East Policy

Reassessment of Policy toward the Far East

The fall of mainland China into hostile hands had not been foreseen in 1945. The US strategic outlook in Asia at that time had been based on the expectation that a China, friendly to the United States, would become a strong stabilizing influence in the Far East. When it became obvious that this would not happen, US policy toward Asia underwent a change to adapt it to the new reality. With the vast land mass of China under Communist rule and Chiang Kai-shek in control of only a few of the many islands off the east Asian coast, much greater importance was now attached to those places in the Far East where the United States still retained a foothold. These places were Japan (with the Ryukyu Islands) and the Philippine Islands, where the United States had forces stationed, and southern Korea, where a friendly government, established under UN auspices, was receiving US support.

Japan: Preparations to End the Occupation

In 1945, following the final conquest of Japan in World War II, the United States set about to replace the defeated military dictatorship with a demilitarized state that was also a political and economic democracy. The decision to do so had been made by the major wartime allies at the Potsdam Conference. To establish the semblance of allied control they later created an international administration through the Far East Commission (FEC), representing 11 allied nations, and the Allied Control Council on which the four major powers were represented. However, the United States, as the power chiefly responsible for the defeat of Japan, effectively reserved for itself the control of the vanquished state, which it exer-

cised through General MacArthur in his role as Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP).

Acting with his customary vigor, General MacArthur proceeded to enact measures designed to root out militarism from Japanese life, to install democratic political institutions, and to break up the concentrations of economic power. Within two years the occupation authorities had disarmed Japan, tried and convicted a number of leaders of war crimes, "purged" from public life additional thousands identified with the aggressions of militarism, abolished the divine status of the Emperor, established a new constitution, held elections for national and local governments, begun to break up the great family trusts or Zaibatsu, and redistributed vast acreages to the peasants who worked it.

In March 1947, General MacArthur announced that Japan was now ready for a peace treaty. The objectives of the occupation, he said, had been largely achieved. Japan's war-making power and potential had been destroyed, the framework of democratic government erected, reforms essential to the reshaping of Japanese lives and institutions to conform to democratic ideals instituted, and a peacefully inclined and responsible government installed.

The Department of State, where the question of a Japanese peace treaty had been under study for some time, agreed with General MacArthur that an early treaty was desirable and, on 11 July, dispatched invitations to the 10 other member governments of the FEC for a peace conference convening on 19 August. However, Chinese and Soviet objections on voting procedures put an end to plans for an early conference.[1]

Active consideration of a Japanese peace treaty led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to raise once again the subject of the disposition of formerly Japanese-controlled islands. Reiterating views stated on 21 October 1946, they recommended that the United States retain control of the Ryukyu Islands south of latitude 29° north (including the important island of Okinawa), the Nanpo Shoto Islands south of Sofu Gan (also known as the Bonin and Volcano Islands, containing the island of Iwo Jima), and Marcus Island, farther to the east. These islands had belonged to Japan before World War II. The United States was administering them, but their future status had not yet been determined. The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that they be placed under UN strategic trusteeships administered by the United States, as had already been done for the former Japanese Mandated Islands in the Pacific. Control of these islands was essential, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, because control of the Pacific both for defensive and offensive operations, a vital element in the ultimate security of the United States, depended upon a suitable base system. Okinawa, in particular, was a "key base of primary importance" in the US base plan because it was located in a "controlling position in the Northwest Pacific area." It was the only base, other than Japan proper, from which, in the event of war, US forces "could be projected by air into the Asiatic territory of our potential enemy." Conversely, hostile control of the Ryukyus would enable an enemy to dominate the Northwestern Pacific and to threaten the US defense of the Philippines as well as the US line of communications to China.[2]

By October 1947, doubts began to be expressed within the US Government concerning the wisdom of concluding an early peace treaty. The result was a

reappraisal of US policies towards Japan. The immediate impetus for this reappraisal came from the Department of State, where there was concern over the broad influence exercised on foreign policy by US military governors in the defeated Axis countries. What began as an effort by the Department of State to reassert its proper role quickly broadened into an examination of the future of Japan and of the power position of the United States in the Far East.

The reevaluation of policy began in the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, when its chief, Mr. George Kennan, became concerned over the consequences of an early Japanese peace treaty. In a paper submitted on 14 October, the Policy Planning Staff concluded that resolution of some of the major issues depended upon further information that could be obtained only in Tokyo. Nevertheless, it was possible to reach some preliminary conclusions. In particular, the Staff believed that there were "great risks in an early relinquishment of Allied control" over a Japan which, it believed, would be politically and economically unstable if "turned loose and left to its own devices" at the present stage. Nevertheless, the occupation was, in many ways, entering a period of diminishing returns, and the US Government was committed to peace discussions through the invitations it had issued to other nations. But these discussions should be kept "exploratory and non-binding" until the US Government had reached firm decisions on the basic issues involved.[3]

Realizing the need for personal consultation with General MacArthur before proceeding with a peace treaty, Secretary of State Marshall sent Mr. Kennan to Japan accompanied by Brigadier General C. V. R. Schuyler, USA, representing the National Military Establishment. They held a series of conferences at Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), headquarters in Tokyo from March 1 to 11, 1948. General MacArthur, while he readily admitted the difficulties inherent in the early achievement of a peace treaty, urged that the United States continue to press for it. An acceptable treaty, in General MacArthur's view, would provide for the guarantee of Japan's continued neutrality and territorial integrity by the four major powers adhering to the Moscow communique and for the withdrawal of occupation forces as soon as possible after the treaty went into effect. The treaty should prohibit Japan from maintaining armed forces except for civil police, a small constabulary, and a minimum coast guard. Present US occupation forces should remain in Japan until an acceptable treaty became possible.

Regardless of the terms and timing of a Japanese peace treaty, General MacArthur believed, the United States should retain military base rights in the Ryukyu Islands. These base rights, particularly on Okinawa, were essential to US security interests in the Far East. Development of these bases should proceed on an urgent basis. Under no circumstances should the Ryukyus revert to Japan.[4]

Upon his return to Washington, Mr. Kennan submitted a report which, after minor modification by the NSC Staff, was placed on the Council Agenda as NSC 13/1. In this document, Mr. Kennan proposed, and the NSC Staff agreed, that the United States should not press for a Japanese peace treaty at the present time, because of the disagreements on the subject among the interested countries and also because of the "serious international situation created by the Soviet Union's policy of aggressive Communist expansion." The US Government should, how-

ever, remain ready to proceed with the negotiations for a treaty if the Allied Powers could agree to acceptable voting procedures.

Until a treaty went into effect, US forces should remain in Japan. A final US position on post-treaty security arrangements for Japan should be deferred until the peace negotiations were about to begin, and should then be based on the conditions prevailing at the time.

The retention of military bases in Japan or formerly Japanese-controlled territory was of major importance to the United States. A decision to retain long-term control of the Ryukyus south of latitude 29° north should be made now and ultimately confirmed by international sanction in appropriate form. Development of bases on Okinawa should proceed at once. Naval base facilities at Yokosuka should be developed so as to make it possible to retain them on a commercial basis after a peace treaty went into effect. However, final decision as to retention of Yokosuka as a US naval base should not be made until the US Government determined the ultimate needs for Japanese military security.[5]

Prior to consideration by the Council, Mr. John H. Ohly, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, referred NSC 13/1 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Responding on 29 September, they addressed two points: the retention of military base sites; and the future contribution of Japan to US national security. On the first point, they reiterated their recommendation for retention of Marcus Island and the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan as well as the Ryukyus south of latitude 29° north. This control, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended, should be at least as explicit and firm as that obtaining under US trusteeship over the former Japanese mandates. On the second point, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the policy of Japanese demilitarization be given "careful scrutiny" when negotiations for a peace treaty passed beyond the preliminary stages. "The present situation and its evident trend," they wrote, "make it readily predictable that it may well become extremely important to our national security for Japan to be capable of providing some degree of military assistance to the United States, at least to the extent of Japan's own self-defense."[6]

On 7 October the NSC adopted NSC 13/1 with the exclusion of the paragraph relating to military base sites, which was deferred for later consideration. The Council's version was approved by the President two days later as NSC 13/2. Final decision on policy regarding bases in the Ryukyus and other areas came on 5 November 1948, when the President approved retention of bases in the Ryukyus south of latitude 29° north and, as recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of Marcus and the Nanpo Shoto Islands south of Sofu Gan. A new version of the paper, incorporating this decision, was then issued as NSC 13/3.[7]

The question of a peace treaty with Japan, which had been a major issue dealt with in NSC 13 and its several modifications, assumed new importance to the Department of State in the spring of 1949. Writing to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council on 23 May, Acting Secretary of State James E. Webb said that the question might arise in several ways: friendly allies might press for a peace settlement; the Soviet Union might take the initiative and present a draft treaty; or it might be in the US interest to move ahead with a peace settlement. A reevaluation of the adequacy of NSC 13/3 was therefore desirable.

This was a responsibility of the NSC, Mr. Webb acknowledged, but in order to undertake initial studies, the Department of State needed a current strategic evaluation from the National Military Establishment. Some of the questions to be answered were as follows: Was possession of US bases in Japan regarded as essential? If so, what bases? If it should prove impracticable or impossible to obtain bases on the Japanese main islands, would bases in the Ryukyus, along with others in or near the Pacific, meet essential needs?[8]

The Executive Secretary of the NSC, Mr. Sydney W. Souers, referred the State Department request to the Secretary of Defense, who in turn sent it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the preparation of a strategic evaluation of US security needs in Japan.[9] The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 10 June. Their views were forwarded to the National Security Council and were circulated as NSC 49.

In response to Mr. Webb's specific questions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated the need for the retention of the islands listed in NSC 13/3. They now added a positive requirement to retain base rights at Yokosuka, formerly judged in an undetermined category, because Okinawa was not entirely suitable for a year-around naval base.

Turning to broad strategic questions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ascribed the importance of Japan to her manpower and industrial potential, which could be exploited by any controlling power; also to her geographic position dominating the exits and entrances of the Sea of Japan, the East China and Yellow Seas, and, to a lesser degree, the ports of Asia north of the Shanghai-Woosung area. If controlled by the USSR, Japan could be used as a base for aggressive action directly against US bases in the Western Pacific, as well as against the Southeast Asia region. Conversely, US control of Japan would deny this opportunity to the USSR, and, in the event of war, would provide strategic outposts enabling the United States to control or neutralize use of the Sea of Japan and the Yellow and East China Seas. In addition, Japan would provide staging areas from which to project US military power against Soviet territory in Asia.

The geographic importance of Japan to the United States was enhanced by her inclusion in a chain of islands offshore from the Asian mainland. The military position of the United States in the Far East with relation to the Soviet Union required retention of at least the present degree of control over this island chain. In the event of war, it would constitute a strong strategic outpost line, but it would lose much of its value and might even prove untenable if any major portion of it, such as Japan, was not available at the beginning of hostilities.

Recent communist victories in China, where Mao Tse-tung's forces had crossed the Yangtze and captured Nanking, made Japan of even greater strategic importance to the United States. The orientation of Japan towards the United States was therefore vital. Japanese internal security was more important than ever, and a Japanese capability for self-defense must be developed against the possibility that the Soviet Union, having exhausted other means, might seek to seize the islands by force.

With these points in mind, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, they were of the opinion that a peace treaty would be premature. The "continuing Soviet policy of aggressive communist expansion" made it "essential that Japan's democracy and

western orientation first be established beyond all question." If peace negotiations were to be undertaken in the near future, the following safeguards should be included: prior assurance of Japanese stability, democracy, and Western orientation; existence of Japanese security forces capable of maintaining internal order and guarding against sabotage; ready plans for limited Japanese armed forces that could be implemented before the departure of occupation forces or in war emergency; and a gradual withdrawal of occupation forces when conditions permitted and with no deadline set for their departure.[10]

Reactions by the NSC or any of its members to the JCS views were not forthcoming immediately. The Department of State, where Mr. Kennan's views apparently no longer prevailed, was now inclined to proceed with a treaty subject to resolution of the procedural problems involved: the choice of a suitable negotiating forum (preferably the Far Eastern Commission) and the devising of regulations that would make it impossible for any single participating nation to obstruct agreement, while at the same time protecting US interests. Secretary of State Acheson, meeting in London on 13 September, discussed with British Foreign Secretary Bevin the problems of negotiating a treaty. The United States believed that by seeking prior agreement with the United Kingdom and the other Commonwealth nations, procedural problems about a draft treaty would be easier to solve. Mr. Bevin offered the good offices of his government in securing an acceptable treaty. If the United States would submit its draft of a treaty, he would seek to line up the support of the Commonwealth governments at a conference to be held in January 1950.[11]

Mr. Acheson briefed President Truman and Mr. Stephen T. Early, Under Secretary of Defense, on these talks on 16 September. At the President's suggestion, it was agreed that, as a first step toward preparation of a peace treaty, the Department of State would formally ask the Department of Defense for a statement of the essential security requirements of the United States in a peace settlement with Japan.

This request was forwarded to Secretary Johnson on 3 October by Acting Secretary of State James Webb. A prompt reply was needed, he indicated, because the problem of a Japanese peace treaty was "of considerable urgency." At the same time, to provide "helpful background thinking" on the relation between political and military considerations, the Acting Secretary forwarded his Department's comments on the JCS views set forth in NSC 49.

The Department of State, because of its reading of the political factors, was not persuaded by the arguments advanced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff against a peace treaty with Japan in the near future. More than two years earlier, the State Department pointed out, the US Government had decided to proceed with a peace treaty with Japan, but efforts by the United States to achieve this objective were frustrated by disagreement among the Far Eastern Commission powers on procedures for a peace conference. A peace treaty seemed even more desirable now. Japan, having benefited from two more years of occupation, had achieved greater political and economic freedom and more thorough assimilation of the reform programs.

Continuation of the occupation, on the other hand, would encounter serious difficulties. The Japanese favored a treaty; continued occupation would be resented and would inhibit the development of the self-reliance needed to cope with serious economic problems under an occupation regime. And almost all other countries on the Far East Commission were bringing pressure on the United States, as the leading occupying power, to bring about a peace treaty.

The United States, the Department of State agreed, should not conclude a peace treaty to the detriment of its own security interests, but the recent conversations between Mr. Bevin and Secretary Acheson offered a hope that friendly FEC countries would assist in the search for a treaty favorable to US strategic interests. As to the provisions of such a treaty, State Department personnel were in general agreement with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although disagreeing on some of the details of implementation. Continued stationing of US forces in Japan after a peace treaty entered into force was admittedly desirable, but it should be provided for by a separate bilateral US-Japanese agreement rather than by the peace treaty. To assure acceptance of the treaty by the other powers, however, the United States should be willing to set a definite date for the withdrawal of US forces, provided satisfactory alternative security arrangements had been established for Japan by that date. Constitution of Japanese internal security and defense forces also found favor with the Department of State. Provisions for defense forces in the treaty, however, would surely lead to its rejection by the other powers, who feared a resurgence of Japanese militarism. A preferable tactic in these circumstances would be to incorporate Japanese demilitarization in the treaty but to provide for reexamination of the matter by the signatories after a stipulated period of time.[12]

The State Department letter set off a flurry of activity in the Department of Defense. Under Secretary of the Army Tracy S. Voorhees, whom the Secretary of Defense had named on 3 August 1949 as his deputy for occupied areas, discussed the matter with General Bradley and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials. He also asked General MacArthur to provide a staff officer familiar with his views to take an active part in the preparation of Defense Department positions on a Japanese treaty.[13]

On 1 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the JSSC to reexamine the JCS position on a Japanese treaty, taking into account NSC 49/1 and "existing and foreseeable world conditions." The JSSC was also to review the JCS position on base requirements in Japan.[14] In the course of its deliberations, the JSSC consulted Colonel C. Stanton Babcock, the liaison officer sent to Washington at Mr. Voorhees' request. Colonel Babcock said that General MacArthur favored a peace treaty as the best means for attaining US objectives in Japan. Under a treaty, Japan should ideally be given a truly neutral status comparable to Switzerland, but if this was not possible, the United States should guarantee Japanese security through a separate bilateral agreement, which should also provide for stationing US military forces in Japan. With regard to Japanese armed forces, General MacArthur favored a constabulary, including a coast guard but not a navy or an air force, to maintain internal order.[15]

On 30 November, the JSSC completed a lengthy study (JCS 1380/75) in which they recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to oppose a peace treaty at the present time. The continued communist successes in China, the JSSC pointed out, were bringing about a rapidly deteriorating strategic situation in the Far East, thereby enhancing the importance of US control of the island bases. The Soviet Union could not be expected to agree to a treaty that would allow US control to continue.[16]

In preparing JCS 1380/75, the JSSC had informally consulted Under Secretary Voorhees and other officials in the Department of the Army. On 3 December Mr. Voorhees' deputy, Major General Carter B. Magruder, wrote the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointing out that even though the JSSC recommendations, if ultimately approved, would put the Defense Department on record as opposing a treaty, it was still necessary to prepare for the opposite contingency—namely, that the US Government would decide to proceed with the treaty.[17] General Magruder accordingly asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their views on military requirements in Japan that should be safeguarded by a treaty. The JSSC was entrusted with the preparation of a reply to this request.[18]

On 22 December 1949 the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Johnson a memorandum responsive both to the State Department letter of 3 October 1949 and General Magruder's request of 3 December. They recapitulated their views on the inadvisability of a peace treaty and on the nature of US requirements for military forces and bases in Japan. Taking note of the "unsettled political and military conditions . . . in the Asian continental areas near Japan" and the "highly unstable political and military situation in Taiwan and in southeast Asia," the Joint Chiefs of Staff defined as follows the minimum US requirements in the islands of the Japanese Empire:

a. The United States to be the only foreign power which would have military forces and base rights in any of the Japanese islands to the southward of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands;

b. Arrangements whereby the United States strategic trusteeship over the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Islands would not be disturbed by any provision of the treaty;

c. The United States to secure exclusive long-term strategic control of the Ryukyu Islands south of latitude 29° north, Marcus Island, and the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan; and

d. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would expect that the United States forces to be stationed in Japan would be somewhat less than at present and that bases would be required:

(1) On Okinawa, together with such other facilities in the areas delineated in subparagraph *c* above as are deemed essential by the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

(2) At Yokosuka, as a protected naval base (NSC 13/3 and NSC 49); and

(3) In the four main islands of Japan, Army and Air Force bases generally as at present.

It appeared certain, however, that these requirements could not be met under a peace treaty at the present time. No treaty would be acceptable unless the Soviet Union and Communist China were parties, and there was little likelihood that they would agree to one that met US military requirements. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed their view that "negotiations now, leading toward a peace treaty with Japan, are still premature." Should this view be overruled, they asked that they be allowed to collaborate in the formulation of any treaty provisions having military implications. Secretary Johnson forwarded this JCS statement, with his concurrence, to the Secretary of State and the National Security Council.[19]

The question of the treaty thus remained open as 1949 drew to a close. The Department of State had in fact completed a draft treaty in 1949 and had twice revised it, partly to incorporate the comments of General MacArthur. Under Secretary Voorhees took the draft to Tokyo in December 1949 and showed it to the General, who remained of the opinion that the Japanese people had earned the right to a peace settlement.[20] Secretary Acheson was nonetheless fully aware of the importance of the considerations set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In a confidential memorandum to the British Ambassador, explaining why the United States could not now accept Mr. Bevin's offer to enlist the help of the Commonwealth Countries in January 1950, he set forth the dilemma: To remove US forces from Japan would be most unwise in the present world situation, yet it was hardly to be expected that the Soviet Union or Communist China would accept a treaty that left them in place. "We intend to continue to work intensively at formulating a definite United States Government position," was the best that he could promise.[21]

Little progress was made until after the outbreak of the Korean War, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff modified their position. Eventually, contrary to US expectations, the Soviet Union did in fact agree to a settlement that allowed the United States to retain forces in Japan and the Ryukyus.[22]

The Philippines: Base Rights and Military Assistance

Relations between the United States and the newly established Republic of the Philippines were based upon sentimental as well as practical considerations. Through more than three decades of rule, the United States had prepared the islands for complete independence. As a result, when the Philippines fell under Japanese control a few months after Pearl Harbor, the majority of Filipinos firmly resisted incorporation into Japan's "Co-Prosperity Sphere." Following the US reconquest of the islands in 1944–1945, they were granted independence on schedule on 4 July 1946. The new Republic could be regarded as evidence of US good faith and willingness to eschew imperialism.

World War II had amply demonstrated both the strategic importance of the Philippine Islands and their inability to defend themselves. A continuing US military presence was therefore in the interests of both countries. By an agreement of 14 March 1947, the Philippine Government granted the United States the right to retain Clark Air Force Base, Fort Stotsenburg, Camp John Hay, and Subic Bay Naval Base, together with some minor installations, for 99 years.[23]

In March 1948 Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall suggested that these bases be abandoned. He believed that they were not essential and feared that their presence might be exploited by the Philippine Government to make exaggerated claims upon the United States. Besides, he pointed out, there had been repeated acts of violence by Filipinos against US military personnel stationed at these bases. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, urged that the bases be retained. Bases in the Philippines, they said, would be essential so long as US Naval and Air Forces operated in the Western Pacific; they were strategically located on the southern flank of the western base system and could exert a "decisive strategic influence" in Asia and the Southwest Pacific. There were other possible base sites, the Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged, but the complete abandonment of those in the Philippines would, in addition to being strategically unsound, probably be viewed by the Philippine Government as a step toward repudiation of signed agreements and might cause it to turn to another country for military assistance and support. Such a development would not, in their opinion, be in the security interests of the United States. The JCS views were evidently accepted at higher level; the United States made no move to abandon its Philippine bases.[24]

Some months later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were afforded an opportunity to reiterate and elaborate these views when President Truman directed a study of US policy toward the Philippines. On 4 May 1949, in a statement prepared for use at a cabinet-level meeting at the White House, they assessed the strategic value of the Philippines to the United States primarily in terms of military bases needed to assure the control of the Pacific that was so important to the ultimate security of the United States. This control, the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained, was dependent upon an adequate base system. Control of the Philippine Islands, because of their location on the southern flank of the westernmost primary US base system, would, in the event of war, exert great strategic influence in Asia and the islands of the Southwest and Western Pacific.

Recent events on the Asiatic mainland, including the communist victory in China and insurrection in Southeast Asia, accentuated the importance of Philippine bases. There was now no prospect for alternative installations in China, and there was also a distinct possibility that potential base sites in Southeast Asia might be lost as well. If Taiwan, the fate of which was hanging in the balance, should pass into hostile hands, the importance of the Philippines would be further enhanced. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded, therefore, that the United States should act to maintain its present base rights in the Philippines and should do nothing to weaken them.[25]

The White House discussion of policy toward the Philippines took place on 13 May 1949. The only decision reached, apparently, was that the Department of

State would prepare a statement of the problems involved in US-Philippine relations. This statement was circulated ten days later. In it, the State Department cited a growing feeling on the part of Filipinos that the United States was losing interest in their country. To remedy this situation, it was proposed that the United States continue military assistance to the Philippines and issue a statement reassuring the Philippine Government as to US intentions. Such a statement would specifically announce that the US Government planned no further troop withdrawals from the islands and would explain the place of the Philippines in US strategic planning.[26]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly drafted an affirmation that the US military interest in the Philippines was "strong and durable," that the strategic importance of the islands was "not open to question," and that the United States did not intend to withdraw its forces. Whether or not this statement was given to the Philippine Government is not indicated in available sources. But its intended purposes were in some measure served when President Elpidio Quirino of the Philippines visited Washington in August 1949 and received assurance of US economic support. Moreover, tangible evidence of continuing US interest was provided by the US program of military assistance to the islands.[27]

Military aid to the Philippines had begun immediately upon the granting of independence, having been written into law as a consequence of the special responsibility felt by the United States toward the new nation. The "Republic of the Philippines Military Assistance Act," signed by the President on 26 June 1946, provided for the instruction and training of military and naval personnel of the Republic of the Philippines; the maintenance, repair, and rehabilitation of military or naval equipment in the possession of the Philippines; and the transfer to the Philippines of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, provided that such action was consistent with the military and naval requirements of the United States and with the national interest. To administer this aid, small Army and Navy advisory and training units were set up in the Philippines. To fund this legislation, Congress authorized an amount not to exceed $19,750,000 for fiscal year 1947.[28]

Force level recommendations to govern the Philippine military assistance program were laid down by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in March 1946.[29] They were reaffirmed on 12 April 1947, when the program was restudied in connection with a reduction in the strength of US forces in the Philippines. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a Philippine army of approximately 33,000; an air force of one composite group (about 2,000 men), consisting of two fighter squadrons supplemented by one troop carrier, one liaison, and one training squadron; and a navy of some 1,800 men equipped with patrol and amphibious craft. The United States should furnish equipment for this force, provide training for Philippine military personnel at US establishments, and establish an advisory group in the Philippines. These recommendations were approved by SWNCC on 28 May 1947.[30]

Some of the JCS recommendations had already been incorporated into a military assistance agreement signed by the two governments on 21 March 1947. It provided that the United States would establish a Joint Military Advisory Group in the Philippines and would provide assistance to the Philippine Armed Forces

in the form of training and materiel. The agreement was to be effective for a five-year period retroactive to 4 July 1946.[31]

The military advisory group called for by this agreement was established by the Service Secretaries at the request of Mr. Forrestal on 11 December 1947. Entitled Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) Philippines, it had a strength of 58 and was organized into Army, Navy, and Air Force groups. Because the Army group was the largest, its chief also served as chief of the JUSMAG, with the chiefs of the other groups as his deputies. This organizational arrangement had been recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in response to a request from the Secretary of Defense.[32]

When the Truman administration decided upon a coordinated program of worldwide military assistance early in 1949, the desirability of including the Philippine Republic was never questioned. The Foreign Assistance Coordinating Committee (FACC), in its initial recommendations in February 1949, included the Philippines among those countries to receive "token" aid (the amount needed to ensure political orientation toward the United States) in FY 1950.[33]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, responding on 21 February 1949 to a request from the Secretary of Defense, stated their general approval of the FACC program. On 14 March, acting on their own initiative, they recommended $5,890,000 in military aid to the Philippines, divided as follows: Army, $3,340,000; Navy, $750,000; and Air Force, $1,800,000. These amounts, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, were intended to permit the Philippines to maintain internal security, to encourage their orientation toward the United States, and to provide military bases in the event of an emergency.[34]

On 21 April 1949, President Truman decided that $1,450,000,000 would be requested of Congress for military assistance in FY 1950. The FACC allocated this amount among prospective recipients, designating $5,740,000 for the Philippines, or $150,000 less than the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended. The President submitted his request on 25 July, and Congress appropriated $1,314,000,000 on 20 October. Of this amount, $27,640,000 was allocated under Title III to the Philippines, Iran, and Korea.[35]

To bring programs into line with this reduced congressional appropriation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reduced the military assistance allocation for the Philippines to $5,410,000, divided as follows: Army, $2,940,000; Navy, $930,000; and Air Force, $1,540,000. These amounts were approved by the Secretary of Defense.[36]

Korea: Support for a Divided Country

In the aftermath of World War II, the former Japanese possession of Korea was occupied by US and Soviet troops. The victorious allies had originally agreed that Korea would ultimately become a unified and independent country, but the rivalries of the Cold War resulted in a permanent division along the 38th parallel into a Soviet-dominated north and a south under US influence. Efforts to

reunify the country by big-power negotiation and UN action having failed, the US Government resolved to withdraw from Korea but to continue support to South Korea within practicable and feasible limits as a means to minimize the adverse effects of withdrawal. A South Korean government elected under UN auspices took office on 15 August 1948; US occupation forces withdrew on 30 June 1949.[37]

An important factor leading to this US withdrawal was the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, solicited by the Department of State, that the United States had little interest in maintaining its present troops and bases in Korea, where they would be a liability in the event of war. In this eventuality, they could not be maintained there without substantial reinforcement. Moreover, any US offensive operations on the Asian mainland would probably bypass Korea. The occupation force of approximately 45,000 men in Korea could better be used to remedy military manpower shortages in areas of greater strategic significance.[38]

The policy of limited support for South Korea extended to the provision of a degree of assistance for a modest military force. This force was created in 1946 as a "constabulary" and ultimately grew into a military establishment of nearly 100,000 men. Equipment for this force came originally from US surplus stocks but later was provided by grant aid provided under Title III of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. Of the $27,640,000 appropriated by Congress for Title III, $10.23 million was made available on JCS recommendation for Korea. These funds were to support an army of 84,000, the function of which would be to maintain internal security.[39]

Development of a Regional Policy

As the preceding narrative has indicated, US policy in Asia and the Western Pacific evolved on a piecemeal basis during 1947–1949, each country being dealt with separately. Secretary of Defense Johnson considered this "day-to-day, country-by-country approach" to be insufficient in the face of the continuing advance of communism throughout the world and particularly in China. United States actions in Asia, he believed, should be "part of a carefully considered and comprehensive plan" oriented toward the policy of containment. On 10 June 1949, therefore, he recommended that the NSC reappraise policies toward individual countries and consider courses of action that could be fitted into an overall policy for the entire Far East.[40]

In response, the NSC Staff submitted a report to the Council (NSC 48/1) in which they concluded that basic US security objectives with respect to Asia were as follows:

a. Development of the nations and peoples of Asia on a stable and self-sustaining basis in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

b. Gradual reduction and eventual elimination of the preponderant power and influence of the USSR in Asia to such a degree that the Soviet Union will not be capable of threatening from that area the security of the United States or its friends and that the Soviet Union would encounter serious obstacles should it attempt to threaten the peace, national independence and stability of Asiatic nations.

c. Prevention of power relationships in Asia which would enable any other nation or alliance to threaten the security of the United States from that area, or the peace, national independence and stability of the Asiatic nations.

In pursuit of these objectives, the NSC Staff concluded, the United States should encourage noncommunist forces to take the initiative in Asia by forming a regional association and should assist it, if invited, under conditions that would serve US interests.

The United States should also take whatever steps were "practicable" to develop and strengthen the area against communist external aggression or internal subversion. One such step should be to strengthen the US military position with respect to Japan, the Ryukyus and the Philippines. Others included provision of military assistance to Asiatic countries most directly threatened and developing multilateral arrangements to combat internal subversion. The possibility of a regional collective security arrangement should be viewed with sympathy by the United States, although its feasibility appeared doubtful. Meanwhile, however, special arrangements with certain particularly friendly countries, notably the Philippines, should be explored; for example, a Joint Philippine-United States Defense Board might be established. In South Korea, existing military and economic aid programs should be continued, and the elected government of the Republic of Korea should be given political support.

Continuing diplomatic recognition of the Nationalist Chinese Government on Taiwan was urged in NSC 48/1. However, the existing disagreement between State and Defense over the advisability of military aid to the Nationalists was reflected in the paper.[41] The question of a peace treaty with Japan was set aside as being already under separate consideration.

For Asia as a whole, according to NSC 48/1, the United States should seek to promote political and economic progress and should try to resolve the conflict between colonialism and nationalism in such a way as to satisfy nationalist aspirations while minimizing the strain on colonial powers who were also US allies. Particular attention should be paid to Indochina, where the French should be persuaded to build up the popular following of anticommunist nationalist leaders.[42] The problems of the new Republic of Indonesia also demanded attention; the object should be to assist it in maintaining its freedom in the face of internal and external communist pressures.[43]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, to whom Secretary Johnson had referred the NSC Staff paper, advised him on 29 December that, while they agreed generally with its statement of basic security objectives, they were of the opinion that they did not go far enough. The "initial fundamental objective," the Joint Chiefs of Staff

wrote, was to strengthen noncommunist nations militarily. To this end they proposed the following additional basic security objective:

> Development of sufficient military power in selected noncommunist nations of Asia to maintain internal security and to prevent further encroachment by communism.

The basic steps enumerated by the NSC Staff to attain these objectives, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed, were too general in nature. "The situation in Asia," they wrote, "has developed to the point where concrete . . . action is required. . . ." To this end they recommended certain changes in wording intended to give the paper a more positive ring. Specifically, they proposed that the $75 million appropriated under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 for the "general area of China" be programmed without delay.[44]

Regarding the possibility of collective security arrangements among noncommunist nations of Asia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were skeptical. Such arrangements, they said, were premature because of the political, military and economic instability of the Asiatic nations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were particularly opposed to a special US-Philippine Defense Board. The United States would be handicapped by the collaboration in military planning implicit in such an arrangement and would also face excessive demands for military assistance. The special arrangement with the Philippines would also serve as a precedent for other nations to seek similar relationships.[45]

The NSC, meeting on 30 December, accepted these JCS views and incorporated them in a revised policy paper, designated NSC 48/2. President Truman approved this the same day. In doing so, however, he withheld judgment on the expenditure of the $75 million in aid funds. "A program will be all right," he said, "but whether we implement it depends on circumstances."[46] A few days later, in a public statement on the Chinese situation, the President made it clear that none of the $75 million would be allotted to the Chinese Nationalists.[47] Subsequently, at the request of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed that this money be allocated as follows: Indochina, $15 million; Indonesia, $5 million; Thailand, $10 million; contingency reserve, $45 million. However, these funds were never spent.[48]

The overall US response to the changed situation in the Far East, as it evolved during 1947–1949 and was summed up in NSC 48/2, was to focus its strategy on its bases in the western Pacific while attempting to stay clear of military involvement on the mainland. The importance of what was later called the "offshore island chain"—the principal islands bordering the east coast of Asia—had been pointed out by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and accepted by the President and the National Security Council. In these islands, the United States, as a naval and air power, had a vital interest, to be defended militarily if necessary. This interest had in fact been underwritten in Joint Emergency War Plan OFFTACKLE, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved on 8 December 1949. This plan provided that, in the event of general war, the United States, remaining on the defensive in the Far East, would attempt to hold Japan, the Ryukyus, the

Philippines, and also Taiwan. No attempt was to be made, however, to maintain a foothold on the mainland.[49]

The nature of the US interest in the Far East was publicly expounded by Secretary of State Acheson on 12 January 1950, in an address before the National Press Club in Washington. He described the US "defensive perimeter" in the Pacific as running from the Aleutians to Japan, thence through the Ryukyus to the Philippines. He left no doubt that the United States would if necessary fight to defend this line. "There is no intention of any sort," he said, "of abandoning or weakening the defenses of Japan." The Ryukyus "must and will be held," while "an attack on the Philippines could not and would not be tolerated by the United States." He did not include Taiwan in the perimeter, since the United States was at that time maintaining a carefully correct position in the Chinese civil war. But he did devote some attention to the military security of "other areas in the Pacific." Obviously, he pointed out, these could not be guaranteed against an attack. Should such an attack occur, "the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations."[50]

Six months later, when the Republic of Korea was attacked by her northern neighbor, Secretary Acheson's critics read into this speech an implied assurance to North Korea that aggression could be undertaken with impunity. Whatever the justice of this accusation, the Communist Bloc powers must have been aware of the apparent US intention to write off South Korea if it were attacked. In fact, however, the United States responded to the Korean crisis in a manner wholly in accord with the Secretary's remarks about "other areas" in the Far East. Since it quickly became clear that the South Koreans themselves could not withstand the invasion, the United States rallied to their support, acting under the UN Charter and with the assistance, materiel or moral, of a large part of "the entire civilized world." The result was three years of bloody conflict in Korea. When it was concluded by an armistice in July 1953, the United States for all practical purposes withdrew once more to the "offshore island chain," while retaining troops in South Korea as part of a UN force intended to guard against a renewal of aggression.

15

The Soviet Atomic Explosion and Its Consequences

The Soviet Union Detonates a Nuclear Device

On 3 September 1949, an Air Force WB–29 weather reconnaissance plane on routine patrol from Japan to Alaska picked up signs of radioactivity that slightly exceeded the intensity necessary to constitute an official alert. A second measurement by the same aircraft recorded a greater level of intensity. On the chance that the Soviet Union might have detonated a nuclear device, the Air Force dispatched aircraft to sample the air in various parts of the Pacific. Other routine flights, meanwhile, were picking up evidence of abnormal radioactivity over the Pacific.

Within four days, laboratory analysis of the samples had revealed that the radioactivity was the result of nuclear fission. As additional samples came in, radiochemical analysis began to supply more detailed information of the event, and by 14 September most of the officials concerned at the Air Force Long Range Detection Center and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) were convinced that the Soviets had conducted an atomic test. Interpretation of the scientific evidence, however, was a highly sophisticated process in which disagreement was possible.

The Atomic Energy Commission appointed a panel of distinguished scientists to review the evidence. This group, under the chairmanship of Dr. Vannevar Bush and including Dr. Robert Oppenheimer, Dr. Robert F. Bacher, and Admiral William L. Parsons, met on 19 September. After a thorough briefing on all the evidence by experts from the Atomic Energy Commission and other government laboratories, the committee reached the unanimous conclusion that the observed phenomena were "consistent with the view that the origin of the fission products was the explosion of an atomic bomb."

President Truman was informed of the committee's findings that evening by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense Johnson, and Under Secretary

Stephen Early. They urged him to make a public announcement of the Soviet achievement at once. The Atomic Energy Commission made a similar recommendation the next day. The President, after a full review of the evidence with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 21 September, agreed that the fact of the Soviet atomic explosion should be made public. He briefed Senator Brian McMahon, Chairman of the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, on 22 September and on 23 September he issued a statement to the press announcing the Soviet accomplishment. To minimize public alarm, the President stressed the fact that the event had been long expected.[1]

The Soviet atomic explosion symbolized the end of the American monoply of weapons of mass destruction. Summing up the military implications of Soviet possession of atomic weapons for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Intelligence Committee pointed out that

> with the growing atomic capabilities of the Soviet Union for attacking the United States, the time is fast approaching when both the United States and the Soviets will possess capabilities for inflicting devastating atomic attacks on each other.... A tremendous military advantage would be gained by the power that struck first.... Such an attack against the United States might well be decisive by reducing the atomic offensive capability, possibly to a critical degree, and destroying the capability for mobilizing and carrying on offensive warfare.[2]

United States officials had long recognized, of course, that the monopoly of atomic weapons would eventually be broken, but there had been a tendency to postpone actions that would be necessary when the Soviet Union became a nuclear power. The test explosion served as a reminder that these decisions could not be postponed indefinitely, and that the United States faced the necessity of taking positive steps in order to maintain a position of military superiority over the Soviet Union.

Reevaluation of Intelligence Methods

Of particular concern with regard to the Soviet atomic explosion of August 1949 was the fact that it occurred nearly a year earlier than the most pessimistic American intelligence estimate assigned for it. The official estimate of Soviet nuclear capability at the time of the Soviet explosion was a statement by scientists from the three Service intelligence staffs, which was approved informally by the Joint Intelligence Committee on 22 March 1948. The statement was as follows:

1. It is believed that the Soviet Union does not possess atomic bombs now.

2. It is estimated that:

   a. The earliest date by which the Soviets may have exploded their first test bomb is mid-1950.

b. The probable date by which the Soviets will have exploded their first test bomb is mid-1953.

c. Based on a mid-1950 test explosion, the greatest possible number of bombs in the Soviet stockpile in mid-1955 is about 50.

d. Based on a mid-1953 test explosion, the probable number of bombs in the Soviet stockpile in mid-1955 is about 20.[3]

Following the Soviet atomic explosion, the Joint Intelligence Committee revised upwards its estimates of the Soviet atomic bomb stockpile. The Committee now believed that the Soviet Union would have 10 to 20 bombs by mid-1950, 25 to 45 by mid-1951, 45 to 90 by mid-1952, 70 to 135 by mid-1953, and 120 to 200 by mid-1954.[4]

There was, of course, a valid question whether these revised estimates were any more accurate than the ones they superseded, particularly because the intelligence basis for both was essentially the same. The need for better intelligence of Soviet atomic developments, therefore, became a matter of major concern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Initiated on 17 September 1947 as an Air Force responsibility, the current system of surveillance, designated the Long-Range Detection Program, was limited to detection of atomic explosions by radiological means. In August 1948, the Air Force proposed to supplement this program during FY 1949 with methods intended to detect explosions by their seismic and acoustic effects. These methods, however, were still experimental, and their reliability was a matter of dispute among scientists of the Research and Development Board (RDB).[5] This body sought guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the relative importance of the various approaches to detection; the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in turn, looked to the Board for a technical evaluation of the feasibility of each. Disagreement within the Joint Chiefs of Staff also delayed a decision on the expanded Air Force program. At one point, General Bradley contended that the Air Force was relying too heavily on the untried seismic and acoustic methods at the expense of conventional intelligence. Finally, on 28 March 1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to advise the RDB that, while an adequate intelligence system was of the utmost importance, the research needed to make it effective involved technical considerations that they were not competent to judge. It would be desirable, they said, to have the system in operation by mid-1950, but since they had been informed that this date could no longer be met, then it should be put into effect as soon as practicable and should subsequently be improved as more reliable methods became available.

During their deliberations on the atomic surveillance system, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had also foreseen an eventual need for methods of ascertaining the size of the Soviet atomic stockpile. General Vandenberg judged this to be as important as detecting a nuclear explosion. General Bradley foresaw that the question of the production rate might soon become of "critical" importance. He implied that conventional methods of intelligence had more to contribute than the advanced

scientific gadgetry envisioned in the Air Force plan. In the end, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff laid the problem aside and ignored it in their memorandum to the RDB. After all, there was at that time no reason to believe that the Soviets had a "stockpile."[6]

As a result of delays in instituting what the Air Force regarded as a complete detection system, there was in operation in August 1949 only an "interim" system consisting of patrolling aircraft equipped with filters for collecting air samples, plus a handful of acoustic stations operated by the Army Signal Corps. Nonetheless, this system sufficed not only to detect the Soviet atomic explosion, but to verify that it had involved a weapon (as distinct from an accidental explosion of an atomic pile), to conclude that plutonium had been used, to establish within one day the date of origin of the fission products, and to establish a location "somewhere over the northern part of the continent of Asia."[7]

The Soviet accomplishment pointed out the need for much broader and more precise information on atomic energy developments within the Soviet Union. The initial assignment of responsibility to the Air Force had been limited to the detection of atomic explosions. Since the ability of the USSR to detonate a weapon had been proven, the task now was to follow the inevitable unfolding of Soviet nuclear development. The Director of Central Intelligence, writing to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 October, pointed out that the Soviet nuclear explosion called for a reevaluation of the Long-Range Detection Program. He recommended a program of technical surveillance that would yield the following types of information (listed in order of importance): the type of weapons tested; the time and place of nuclear explosions; and the location of nuclear processing plants. Except for the last of these, conventional intelligence methods were likely to yield relatively little information. General Vandenberg informed his colleagues on 2 November that the Air Force detection program, if suitably expanded, could respond effectively to all four of these requirements. He urged that the directive to the Air Force be revised accordingly.[8]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 20 January 1950, agreed to the necessity for improved intelligence of Soviet atomic activities. They singled out the rate of weapons production as the most important element of information needed for national defense planning. Determining the location of processing plants for target planning was next in importance. Knowledge of the time and place of future explosions would be of value in contributing to other elements of intelligence, and particularly in detecting the explosion of a thermonuclear (fusion) weapon. They accordingly requested the Research and Development Board to determine what was needed to create an adequate detection system. Meanwhile the Air Force was to continue research and development in this field.[9]

The Research and Development Board, at a meeting on 5 April 1950, continued this delegation of authority, making the Department of the Air Force responsible for specific research programs recommended by a panel of the RDB. Results from this research were not significant prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, but the expanded detection system, using seismic and acoustic as well as radiological means, was ultimately to prove of great value.[10]

The Effect on Strategic Plans

At the time the Soviet atomic test was detected, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee was at work on emergency war plan OFFTACKLE.[11] The draft current in early September stated: "Intelligence estimates indicate that the USSR will have no atomic bombs available in fiscal year 1950." The next draft, circulated on 25 October, cited intelligence estimates that the Soviets would have a maximum of 10 atomic bombs by the beginning of 1950 and 30 by the end of the year. Also, the assumption was made, subject to later reappraisal, that atomic weapons would be used by both sides in a conflict.

These passages from the 25 October draft were incorporated into the final version of OFFTACKLE, which otherwise was not affected by the Soviet nuclear explosion. The allocation of tasks made no provision for defense against the Soviet nuclear capability, and the forces allocated to air defense of North America had not been increased as compared with earlier drafts.[12]

Expansion of Fission Bomb Production

The explosion of an atomic device by the Soviet Union gave new importance to the continuing US program for the development and production of atomic bombs. Production of atomic weapons was the responsibility of the Atomic Energy Commission, created by statute in 1946, which controlled and operated all facilities for producing fissionable materials. Requirements for weapons were formulated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and transmitted to the AEC through another statutory body, the Military Liaison Committee, made up of representatives from all three Services.

The existing production program dated from a JCS statement of requirements of 17 December 1947.[13] At that time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff foresaw a need for atomic bombs of the type dropped on Nagasaki. The SANDSTONE tests, conducted during April and May 1948, added significant advances to atomic weapon technology. Three new weapons, designated X-Ray, Yoke, and Zebra, were tested. The first two released nearly twice as much energy (41 and 43 KT, respectively) as the 22 KT of the Nagasaki model.

In response to a request from the Atomic Energy Commission, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated their requirements for the new model bombs. The estimates were derived from the work of an ad hoc committee appointed for the purpose by the Chief of Staff, Air Force, at the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and were based on a study by the Air Staff of the 70 primary targets of the TROJAN plan.[14]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 June 1949 submitted a supplemental report to the Atomic Energy Commission projecting atomic bomb requirements up to 1 January 1956. They did not, however, specify a breakdown of this total by types of weapons; instead, they set forth requirements in terms of fissionable material to allow for technical improvements in weapons design.[15]

This new statement was a significant departure by the Joint Chiefs of Staff from previous practice in determining atomic bomb production. Formerly, they had tailored their requests to production capabilities of the Atomic Energy Commission, but now they presented military requirements based on estimates of actual wartime needs. To meet these new requirements, however, was beyond the production capability of the Atomic Energy Commission. Expansion of production facilities would, of course, cost money, a matter of major concern under the strict budgetary limitations imposed by President Truman. Before making a decision, therefore, the President ordered, on 26 July 1949, a thorough study of plans for producing atomic weapons and fissionable materials. To perform this study, the President called upon Secretary Johnson, Secretary Acheson, and Mr. David Lilienthal, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, appointing them as a Special Committee of the National Security Council.[16]

The Special Committee, reporting to the President on 10 October, concluded that the accelerated atomic energy program recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was "necessary in the interests of national security." The recent atomic explosion by the Soviet Union, the Committee said, "increases the urgency with which the proposed program should be undertaken and executed." The acceleration, however, was worthy of approval without regard to the Soviet accomplishment. The new program "should be clearly understood," the Committee reported, "to be a projection of previous plans . . . rather than as a counterdevelopment to the Soviet explosion."

The "developments, events, and considerations" that had led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend the expanded program were set forth by the Committee as follows:

1. Analysis of SANDSTONE results indicating additional operational applications of atomic weapons.

2. Preliminary estimates that atomic bombs could be used economically against small targets.

3. Expanding supplies of raw materials and more efficient use of them.

4. Continued international tension, pointing to the need to remove constraints imposed by limited numbers of weapons.

5. The uncertainty of relying on expansion of production after hostilities began.

6. The failure of UN efforts to control atomic energy, combined with the realization that the US atomic monopoly would soon be lost.

The Committee went on to observe that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed the program necessary to improve US military posture for both deterrence and defense, that the Atomic Energy Commission had concluded that the program was technically feasible, and that the Department of State had found no reason to anticipate an adverse international reaction, particularly in view of the Soviet

atomic explosion. Moreover, the Committee believed, the program was consonant with NSC 20/4, which had called for the development of a level of military readiness that could be maintained as long as necessary. The case for accelerated production, therefore, was compelling. The Committee added a caution that the increased expenditures required for the purpose should not be at the expense of other national security programs.[17]

The report of the Special Committee had been drafted by an interdepartmental working group. The extent of JCS participation in the process is not indicated in available records, but the group obviously had access to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary Johnson was a vigorous defender of the interests of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and had successfully contested the right of the other Committee members to review the bases for the JCS estimate of requirements.[18] The Joint Chiefs of Staff had, in fact, seen the report in draft form and found their views so faithfully represented that their formal comments were unnecessary.[19]

The President, on 19 October, approved the Special Committee's conclusions and ordered the necessary increases in atomic energy production. Paraphrasing the views attributed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the report, he summed up the advantages of the accelerated program as lower unit cost of weapons, increased military effectiveness, decreased logistical and manpower requirements, and greater flexibility in military operations. At the same time, he pointed out, these benefits would have "far-reaching implications" in military policy. He therefore asked Secretary Johnson to provide information on three points: the changes in strategic planning that would result from expanded atomic production; the operational assumptions that underlay the need for the expanded production; and the means by which the utilization of the increased quantities of atomic weapons would be integrated into the total strategic plan. Secretary Johnson passed this request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[20]

On 2 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their answers to the President's questions to the Secretary of Defense. The accelerated atomic energy program would have no effect on the current emergency war plan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, and would not become a factor in US strategy "prior to the period envisaged in our present long-range planning" (presumably meaning up to January 1956, the target date for their expansion program). Eventually, accelerated production would make possible faster research and development of new weapons and would permit some innovation in strategy. But without an increased supply of fissionable material, research could only be achieved by diverting resources from production of current models of atomic bombs.

The force requirements for emergency war plans would not be affected by accelerated atomic bomb production, the Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned. These requirements were the minimum necessary to support basic undertakings. They were already at levels involving serious risks and should not be reduced if lack of funds for atomic production forced economies in other areas.

The operational assumptions underlying the need for an accelerated atomic energy program, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, were the need to preserve the nuclear deterrent now that the Soviets were developing atomic weapons, and the desirability of increased flexibility in use of atomic weapons resulting from a

plentiful supply. As for the integration of additional weapons into strategy, this was a matter for later determination. At present, the heavy bomber was the principal means of delivering the atomic weapon. New military applications of atomic energy (such as warheads for guided missiles) might evolve from research and would be incorporated into strategic plans as they became available.[21]

Continental Air Defense

A larger supply of atomic weapons could be expected to strengthen the nuclear deterrent or, if war came, to make possible a much wider and more devastating strategic offensive. The accelerated production program was therefore fully in line with the well-known adage, "the best defense is a good offense," to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff subscribed.[22] Indeed, budgetary austerity had virtually dictated a strategy built around that principle.[23]

At the same time, it was obviously necessary to prepare for the day when the hypothetical enemy would be in position to launch the same sort of attack against the United States. Consequently, buildup of conventional air defense was listed as a priority task in all the Joint Emergency War Plans approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the end of World War II. But in the fall of 1949, the means to accomplish this task were practically nonexistent. Only 23 interceptor squadrons were assigned to air defenses. The Army had only 30 antiaircraft artillery battalions for the continental United States and Alaska. Moreover, there was no overall command of antiaircraft artillery, although Air Force defense units had all been placed under the Continental Air Command. The aircraft control and warning system, too, was in a rudimentary state, with only a handful of radars of World War II type.[24] "With the United States defenses against air attack in the state they are today," General Vandenberg informed his colleagues on 16 November, "almost any number of Soviet bombers could cross our borders and fly to most targets in the United States without a shot being fired at them."[25]

Because resources were limited, and because the danger of a Soviet attack was not yet serious, the Joint Chiefs of Staff focused their attention on the provision of an early warning and control system for the continental United States and Alaska and the preparation of a defense plan.

The attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was first drawn to the early warning problem on 1 July 1948, when Secretary Forrestal asked their views on an ambitious proposal on the subject by the Air Force. Termed SUPREMACY, it called for the ultimate establishment of 374 land-based radar stations in the United States and 37 in Alaska, at a cost of $388 million for the initial installation and $83 million a year for operations and modernization after installations were completed. It was designed to provide complete 24-hour per day coverage of the entire Alaskan coastline. In the United States, it would provide similar coverage of the entire West Coast and the northern boundary, the major portion of the East Coast, and all vital interior targets.[26]

Legislation authorizing this had been introduced in May 1948, but Congress adjourned before considering it, thereby delaying congressional action until the following January at the earliest. Before that date, Secretary Forrestal informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 July, he wished their views on the proposed legislation because the Navy, as well as the Air Force, would be involved in the program. The Secretary wanted an evaluation of the program in terms of its need, cost, effectiveness, and relative importance, together with suggestions for possible modifications that might reduce the cost.[27]

Responding on 20 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the installation of a modified warning and control system, sufficient to protect against attacks on Alaska and the northeastern United States by Soviet bombers flying one-way missions. The cost of installation, spread over a five-year period, would average less than 1 percent of the 1949 military budget. It would constitute the first step toward the more comprehensive system that would be required by 1953, when, as a result of the growth of Soviet offensive strength, air defense would assume a priority second only to the strategic retaliatory force.

The revised system prepared by the Air Force and recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff would establish a warning and control system in increments. It called for a first installment that would provide, with equipment on hand or under procurement and within the presently authorized troop basis, an extremely limited air defense for the Continental United States and Alaska at an initial cost of $70 million plus $9.3 million for annual maintenance. The second installment, to be initiated in FY 1950, would require new procurement and would strengthen the protection of vital areas minimally covered in the initial installment. Four Navy radar picket ships, to be used primarily to test equipment, would be included. The initial cost of the second installment would be $52.9 million plus $2.15 million for annual maintenance. The completion of both installments was necessary to provide minimum coverage for the United States and Alaska and to provide a model system for testing new equipment and techniques. Further expansion and improvement of the system could be determined in the light of operational experience, technological developments, and additional intelligence.[28]

Legislation authorizing the initial phase of this program, to include 75 radar warning stations, at a cost now revised upward to $85.5 million, was passed by Congress and was signed into law by the President on 30 March 1949. The Air Force requested a supplemental FY 1949 appropriation to provide these funds, but Congress rejected it and authorized instead the utilization of $50 million from the total Air Force appropriation for FY 1950. Before these funds could be spent, however, the Bureau of the Budget would have to reapportion the Air Force funds for FY 1950. Even as late as January 1950, however, the Bureau had not approved the reapportionment, and consequently nothing had been accomplished except selection of some radar sites.[29]

As part of their study of air defense systems the Joint Chiefs of Staff had also considered the possibility of a unified command for the forces defending the continental United States. The matter was not deliberated with any degree of

urgency, however, in view of the fact that no serious enemy attack on the North American continent was anticipated until 1952 at the earliest. On 4 February they considered a split report on the subject by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee in which the Army and Air Force members recommended the establishment of a unified Continental Defense Command, while the Navy member recommended that separate air and ground commands be formed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 19 February 1948, rejected both proposals. They agreed to establish instead a Continental United States Defense Planning Group, with its function limited to the preparation of plans.[30]

The Planning Group submitted a Basic Defense Plan for the continental United States to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 23 November 1949. According to this plan, the Soviet Union possessed an immediate capability to make limited attacks on the continental United States employing submarines, airborne troops, and some 150 Tu–4 bombers (comparable to the USAF B–29) making one-way flights. From 10 to 30 atomic bombs were expected to be available to the Soviets in 1950, as estimated in the current war plan, OFFTACKLE. Key US military and industrial facilities to be defended were listed. Missions were assigned in broad terms only.[31]

This was the state of affairs in late November 1949, nearly three months after the Soviet atomic explosion had been detected. It was not until 22 November that the Joint Chiefs of Staff took steps to appraise the effects of the Soviet accomplishment on existing air defenses. On that date they responded to an urgent plea by the Air Force Chief of Staff for a project to improve the technical capabilities of air defense, comparable to the Manhattan Project that developed the atomic bomb during World War II. The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt this action was premature and, on 20 December, directed instead that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force explain current US air defense capabilities, indicate what improvements could be made with present resources and recommend actions for increasing them. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also informed the Research and Development Board, on 21 December, that air defense was now elevated to the highest degree of strategic importance.

The Air Force presentation, made to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 2 March 1950, was forwarded to the Research and Development Board on 8 March, with a request for a determination of "all new actions possible to improve the technology of air defenses." The Research and Development Board replied on 3 April that they were delaying action on this request pending completion of a study of air defense by WSEG. The WSEG study was completed after the outbreak of the Korean War and influenced subsequent continental defense planning.[32]

In addition to recommending a speed-up in air defense research and development, General Vandenberg also sought increased funding for the early warning system. It will be recalled that Congress had authorized the expenditure of $50 million out of regular Air Force FY 1950 appropriations in a congressionally authorized system estimated to cost $85.5 million by the time of completion in 1952. On 23 November General Vandenberg recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they approve his request to Congress for the immediate appropriation of the remaining $35.5 million required for this program so that it could be com-

pleted as soon as possible. The Joint Chiefs of Staff gave their approval to this proposal on 24 January 1950. The Air Force included these funds in its appropriation requests for FY 1951, which were approved after the outbreak of the Korean War.[33]

By making maximum use of its available resources, however, the Air Force was able to throw together a temporary radar network known as LASHUP. In June 1950 it consisted of 49 stations in the continental United States and Alaska.[34]

One additional effort to strengthen the defenses of the continental United States was initiated by General Collins. In reaction to General Vandenberg's gloomy picture of the state of US air defenses, the Army Chief of Staff renewed the suggestion that a unified command be established for the defense of the United States. His colleagues, however, persuaded General Collins on 30 December 1949 to withdraw his recommendation pending further studies. The Continental Defense Command did not finally come into being until 1954.[35]

Proposals for Development of Fusion Weapons

The various steps described above—strengthening of continental air defense, stepping up production of fissionable materials, improving intelligence methods, and reviewing strategic war plans—were responses to the threat implicit in the Soviet nuclear explosion. But these measures seemed inadequate to meet the new Soviet challenge. A far more dramatic and substantial response seemed to be called for; one that would assure to the United States the continuance of a commanding superiority in nuclear weapons.

To many, the "super" (thermonuclear or fusion) weapon seemed the answer. From the earliest days, nuclear scientists (including the Soviets) had recognized that a thermonuclear reaction could produce enormously greater releases of energy than a fission reaction. In 1942, a group of physicists led by Dr. Robert Oppenheimer had discovered the theoretical possibility of a weapon based on the fusion of very light elements. They analyzed the relative advantages of using various combinations of the hydrogen isotopes, deuterium and tritium, for this purpose. But the temperatures required to initiate such a reaction were so enormous that they could only be generated by a fission bomb. Consequently, the thermonuclear project was given a low priority during World War II. Dr. Edward Teller and others, however, continued to study the fusion problem.

By the autumn of 1949, the search for the "super" was still in its infancy. Theoretical physicists and mathematicians had developed a mathematical method for describing the interactions of heavy nuclei in the thermonuclear process, but the necessary computations awaited the completion of an improved computer then under construction. These were important steps towards defining the problem, but the scientists were obviously a long way from knowing whether man could produce the thermonuclear reaction, and even farther from knowing how to do it.[36]

In the days following the Soviet nuclear explosion, the possibility of pushing development of the new, thermonuclear weapon, and thus achieving a "quantum

jump" that would preserve the US lead, inevitably came to the fore. The subject was discussed on 29 September at a meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. Plans already formulated by the AEC for testing the principle of fusion were described by the general manager of the Commission, Mr. Carroll L. Wilson.[37]

It was against this background that a member of the AEC, Mr. Lewis L. Strauss, recommended to his colleagues on 5 October that an intensive effort, of the magnitude of the original Manhattan Project if necessary, be launched to develop the "super." As a first step, he recommended immediate consultation with the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, to ascertain the views of the members on how to proceed most expeditiously.[38]

Meanwhile Drs. Ernest O. Lawrence and Luis Alvarez, at the AEC Radiation Laboratory of the University of California at Berkeley, had also reached the conclusion that the "super" would be an appropriate response to the Soviet achievement. They consulted Dr. Edward Teller and others at Los Alamos, where the consensus was that the first step should be the construction of a large heavy-water reactor for the production of tritium. On a visit to Washington, they conferred with Mr. Robert LeBaron, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, and Senator Brian McMahon, Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. The Senator was particularly impressed by the arguments of the scientists and became an outspoken advocate of the fusion weapon.[39]

The General Advisory Committee discussed the proposed new weapon during three days of intensive debate (28 to 30 October), during which the Joint Chiefs of Staff were consulted. The members concluded, on technical and moral grounds, that they could not approve it. A successful "super," they believed, would probably require large amounts of tritium, which in turn would necessitate enormous reactor capacity. Moreover, development of the weapon was still in its infancy; the necessary theoretical design studies had not yet been completed or tested. As for the probability of success, the Committee's best estimate was that "an imaginative and concerted attack" would have a "better than even" chance of producing a weapon of some kind within five years. But even assuming that a "super" could be built, the Committee members saw strong moral objections. There was no theoretical limit to its size. Clearly such a weapon could not be restricted to use against strictly military targets and would make possible a policy of exterminating civil populations. Nor was it needed for national security. By the time the Soviets attained an atomic attack capability, the US stockpile of fission weapons would be sufficient to permit an adequate reprisal.

But was it advisable for the United States to foreswear the development of the new weapon without some sort of reciprocal assurance? The Committee members gave different answers to this question. A majority, of whom Drs. James B. Conant and J. Robert Oppenheimer were the most prominent members, felt that the United States should make a complete, unconditional, and unilateral renunciation of any intention to develop fusion weapons. A minority, consisting of Drs. Enrico Fermi and Isidor Rabi, proposed that the United States join in a pledge

with the other nations in the world renouncing these weapons. A pledge, they felt, unsupported by any form of international control, would be acceptable.[40]

The Atomic Energy Commission, after considering the report of its Advisory Committee, found itself unable to reach agreement and, on 9 November, reported split views to the President. The report, as background for the recommendations, set forth the following conclusions: that the "super" was probably feasible but would take three years to develop; that it would have unlimited power; that the general principles of the reaction were well known; and that to beat the Soviets in a race for the weapon would require an all-out effort that would disrupt existing projects and could not be kept secret. On the basis of these considerations, Commissioners David E. Lilienthal, Sumner Pike, and Henry A. Smyth recommended against development of the "super" at that time. Commissioner Strauss, joined by Commissioner Gordon Dean, favored a secret diplomatic approach to the Soviet Union to explore the possibility of international control. If that approach failed, the President, with the approval of the Department of Defense, should announce his decision to proceed with the fusion weapon. The individual Commissioners elaborated their views in separate letters to the President.[41]

JCS Recommendations for Development of Fusion Weapons

The adverse recommendation by the Atomic Energy Commission brought the Joint Chiefs of Staff officially into the debate over the "super" for the first time. On 10 November, they directed the JSSC to study the question and submit recommendations on the subject. Subsequently, a report by members of the Military Liaison Committee was substituted, with the concurrence of the JSSC, and submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 17 November.[42]

The report was based on the available scientific literature and interviews with responsible officials in the atomic energy program. On the basis of this evidence, the authors of the study reported a consensus of the scientific community that a thermonuclear or fusion weapon was feasible and could be developed in prototype form in three years. The lower limit of energy release for this weapon would be somewhere between 1,000 KT and 10,000 KT. There was no theoretical maximum yield. A 1,000 KT weapon, according to available information, would destroy an area of 65 square miles, while the area of destruction for a 10,000 KT weapon would be 300 square miles. In comparison, the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, with its 15 KT yield, had destroyed an area of 4 square miles. At a minimum, therefore, the "super" would be the equivalent of nine atom bombs of the latter type. Accurate cost figures for the fusion bomb were not available, but its development was certain to cost a great deal and to divert facilities and materials from research and development for other military and peacetime applications of atomic energy. The development of a delivery vehicle was also a problem but was considered less difficult than the development of the weapon itself.

Turning to the military applications of the thermonuclear weapon, the authors of the study pointed out that, because there were only four Russian cities with an

area greater than 62 square miles, its offensive uses were limited. But by a judicious combination of fission and fusion weapons tailored to the nature of the targets, waste of fissionable material (through "overkill" by thermonuclear weapons too big for the targets) could be avoided. Use of thermonuclear weapons would also reduce the delivery effort.

Defensively, the "super" was primarily a weapon of retaliation. There were, however, other defensive factors involved. The United States was far more vulnerable to nuclear attack than the Soviet Union, owing to the fact that there were many more cities with areas greater than 65 square miles in the United States than in the Soviet Union. To defend all these cities would seriously strain the defense capabilities of the United States.

There was in addition a significant psychological effect to be expected from a thermonuclear explosion in war. If the Soviet Union were to develop the weapon before the United States, the effect on the American people would be profoundly demoralizing and would have "grave political repercussions" that might raise serious questions concerning the continued unity of spirit, confidence and determination of the western nations. Such a situation would be intolerable, and the need to avoid it far outweighed any social, psychological or moral objection to the development of thermonuclear weapons.[43]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after considering this report, accepted its conclusions. On 23 November 1949 they recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the US military position with respect to the proposed thermonuclear weapon be as follows:

a. Possession of a thermonuclear weapon by the USSR without such possession by the United States would be intolerable.

b. There is an imperative necessity of determining the feasibility of a thermonuclear explosion and its characteristics. Such determination is essential for US defense planning, preparations for retaliation, and direction of research. It will have a profound effect on policy in the field of international affairs.

c. If a thermonuclear weapon is determined to be feasible, the following additional considerations pertaining to military requirements are currently evident:

(1) Possession of such weapons by the United States may act as a possible deterrent to war.

(2) Possession of such weapon by the United States will provide an offensive weapon of the greatest known power possibilities thereby adding flexibility to our planning and to our operations in the event of hostilities.

d. The cost in money, materiels, and industrial effort of developing a thermonuclear weapon appears to be within the capabilities of the United States. Available information indicates that such a weapon may likewise be within the capability of the USSR.

e. It is reasonable to anticipate, and in some cases it is known, that a number of thermonuclear weapons can substitute for a greater number of fission bombs. Further, the thermonuclear weapon promises in the high ranges of energy release to be more efficient in utilization of available ore and production capacity per unit area of damage.

f. The foregoing considerations decisively outweigh the possible social, psychological and moral objections which may be considered to argue against research and development leading to a thermonuclear weapon by the United States.

g. Any decision or actions pertaining to the United States' effort to develop a thermonuclear weapon or any determination of its feasibility constitute a military secret of the highest classification. It should be possible to maintain secrecy on a subject of such importance to the security of the United States.

h. A unilateral decision on the part of the United States not to develop a thermonuclear weapon will not prevent the development of such a weapon elsewhere.[44]

President Truman, meanwhile, had reactivated the Special Committee of the National Security Council in order to resolve the conflicting recommendations. On 19 November he directed Secretaries Johnson and Acheson and Commissioner Lilienthal to "analyze all phases of the question including particularly the technical, military, and political factors, and make recommendations as to whether and in what manner the United States should undertake the development and possible production of 'super' atomic weapons. . . ."[45]

To prepare the necessary staff studies, a Working Group of representatives of the three agencies was convened on 28 November under the direction of Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council. The Defense Department representation consisted of Dr. LeBaron, Lieutenant General Norstad, Major General Kenneth D. Nichols and Rear Admiral T.B. Hill, both of the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not represented on the Working Group, but their views, as expressed in the memorandum of 23 November, were accepted verbatim as the initial position by the Defense members and introduced into the deliberations of the Working Group on 16 December.[46]

The Special Committee met on 22 December in what developed into an inconclusive head-to-head confrontation between Secretary Johnson and Mr. Lilienthal on the basic issues referred to the Committee. Mr. Johnson insisted that the issues were narrow and technical, having to do only with the value of the "super" bomb as a weapon. On this score, he said, all in the Department of Defense were agreed that potential military uses justified going ahead with a development program. Only if the Soviet Union agreed to the US plan for international control of atomic energy would the Defense Department agree to forego the "super" bomb. Mr. Lilienthal insisted on the importance of the moral issue. The "purpose and course of mankind" were tied to the decision. It was inconceivable not to consider what Secretary Johnson disparagingly referred to as "philosophy." The dis-

cussion came to no conclusion, and owing to what Secretary Acheson later referred to as the "acerbity of Louis Johnson's nature," the Committee did not meet again except to approve its final report to the President. Its work was conducted instead through individual conferences, with Secretary Acheson taking the lead in seeking a compromise of conflicting views.[47]

An important item in these deliberations was an elaboration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of their views on the thermonuclear bomb. The presentation of these views was triggered by a further exposition of opposition to the super by the General Advisory Committee of the AEC at its regularly scheduled meeting held from 1 through 3 December. After a thorough reexamination of the positions taken at the previous meeting, all the members were satisfied with their previous views on the super bomb; none of them wished to alter the statement of views in the report of 30 October. Some of them, however, felt it advisable to forward further comments. These took the form of letters from Drs. Buckley, Rowe, Fermi, and DuBridge, and a memorandum by the Secretary, Dr. Manley.

Dr. Buckley reaffirmed his opposition to the super on the basis of four arguments: we do not know whether we can build it; if successful, it will cost at least a billion dollars for a complete weapons system and will divert considerable fissionable material from the production of fission bombs; moreover, it would not add very substantially to our military effectiveness; finally, if we can build one, so can the Russians. Under these conditions, a "crash" program to build the super would be a mistake. Nevertheless Dr. Buckley believed that research into thermonuclear reactions should be encouraged. Results of these studies should make possible a sound policy decision on future development of thermonuclear weapons.

Dr. Rowe also failed to perceive any military advantages in the super bomb, and in addition advanced psychological and moral arguments against it. A crash program might foster the delusion that the United States possessed an ultimate weapon and lead to neglecting the improvement of existing weapons. A democracy could not be strengthened by possession of a super bomb.

Dr. Fermi limited his opposition to the super to technological arguments. He assumed that with presently available air carriers the practical limit was a bomb whose explosive energy was the equivalent of 1,000 present fission bombs (40 million tons of TNT). It was believed that such a weapon would produce severe damage over an area of 10 miles in radius—enough to destroy the largest city in the world. However, 30 fission bombs would produce the same result, and in any case there were very few Soviet targets large enough to require such destructive force. Moreover, each super bomb would require enough fissionable material to make about four fission bombs plus an amount of tritium that would make four plutonium bombs. Hence the damage inflicted per pound of fissionable material was only three to four times greater for a fusion than for a fission bomb. As to the military uses, Dr. Fermi admitted a peculiar advantage in destroying heavy buildings. Tactical uses were also a possibility—a single explosion could wipe out an entire division—but required further exploration. There was also the possibility of offensive use against the United States. This would demand attention

to defensive measures because possession of the super would be no defense and would not increase retaliatory power very significantly.

Dr. Manley attempted to clarify the reasons underlying the Committee's rejection of a super bomb development program. The declared national policy of the United States, he pointed out, was to eliminate atomic bombs as instruments of war, and although this goal had not been achieved, there was no compelling reason to make it more difficult by undertaking to develop fusion bombs. There was still an opportunity to "limit the totality of war by refusing to introduce this new and more devastating application of nuclear science and in so doing to hold some measure of hope before the people of the world that atomic bombs also may be removed from the armaments of nations."

In support of his view that there was no "military necessity" for the super bomb, Dr. Manley contended that fission bombs could achieve much the same effects. Taking into account cost factors and the nature of prospective targets, the advantage of the fusion over the fission bomb was reduced to a factor of 2–5, rather than 100–1000 indicated by their relative energy releases. Further, the super would, over a period of time, add only a relatively small increment to the total strength represented by the anticipated atomic bomb stockpile.

Development of super bombs by the United States would also stimulate similar Soviet development, continued Dr. Manley, through the inevitable leaks of information, and the encouragement that American successes would give for the ultimate success of a rival program. If the Soviets succeeded in developing the fusion weapon, possession of the weapon by the United States would provide no defense against it. Even the deterrent effect would not be significant in view of the expected size of the atomic stockpile, which would be a sufficient deterrent by itself by the time the Soviets had acquired a fusion bomb capability. Finally, diversion of resources to the super bomb might prevent development of weapons showing a greater military potential.[48]

Dr. DuBridge elaborated his views in a letter to Mr. Lilienthal dated 5 December. An American program to develop the super, he thought, would stimulate a possible enemy to do the same. Hence, the new weapon would have little value unless possession of it "would so greatly increase our retaliatory power that it would be a decisive deterrent." This, according to Dr. DuBridge, was clearly not the case, for the reasons already stated by Dr. Fermi and Dr. Manley. A better use of resources would therefore be to undertake an "all out" development of defenses against the super. Dr. DuBridge also argued at length against the new weapon on psychological, diplomatic, and moral grounds.[49]

On 14 December, these views of the General Advisory Committee (GAC) and its individual members were referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Dr. Robert LeBaron, Deputy to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy Matters. Noting that the GAC members had devoted themselves almost exclusively to the military aspects of the weapon, he asked the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for use in preparing the Defense Department position in the Special Committee of the National Security Council.[50]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 13 January. Rather than responding separately to all the individual issues raised by each member of the General Advisory

Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consolidated the points raised into what they conceived to be the major issues.

The key question was whether the United States should seek to develop a super bomb on a "crash" basis. The Joint Chiefs of Staff answered this question in the negative, since the technology involved was unproven. At the same time, however, they urged that the following "minimum effort" be undertaken for the development of a thermonuclear weapon:

> (1) Determination of the technical feasibility of a thermonuclear explosion as a matter of top priority.
>
> (2) Studies of the necessary delivery vehicle and ordinance problems would proceed concurrently with (1) above and should not necessarily await trial of a thermonuclear assembly.
>
> (3) Decisions pertaining to the production of thermonuclear weapons in any quantity should be deferred pending further determination of the ultimate feasibility of a thermonuclear explosion and the feasibility of an appropriate weapon carrier.

There were sound military reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained, for proceeding with this program. Mere knowledge by a potential enemy that the United States was developing a thermonuclear weapon would be a deterrent to aggression. There was, of course, the danger that knowledge of a US program might help a potential enemy to develop a super of its own, but failure of the United States to proceed with a super bomb program would not deter a possible enemy from seeking its own thermonuclear weapon. "Research in this field will continue," they pointed out, "regardless of United States decision, since such research is a normal and logical atomic development."

Assuming successful development of a thermonuclear weapon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conceived of it primarily as an offensive weapon that might possibly be decisive if properly used. They denied that it should be considered as something more than a strictly military weapon because it could conceivably be used to lay waste large areas. They did not intend to "destroy large cities *per se;* rather only to attack such targets as are necessary in war in order to impose the national objectives of the United States upon an enemy." They considered it possible that the new weapon might increase US retaliatory power "to the extent that it would be decisive." However, they added, they did not view the thermonuclear bomb solely as a means of retaliation.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff rejected the view that resources devoted to the super bomb could be better expended on defense. While recognizing a need for balance between offensive and defensive forces, they pointed out that "defense alone cannot bring about a favorable decision" in modern war. However, the thermonuclear weapon would have a defensive value in the broadest sense, as a deterrent to war. It might also have considerable tactical value in certain situations for use against massed enemy forces. The problem of delivery seemed unlikely to be substantially more difficult than for the fission bomb.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff conceded that a program to develop the thermonuclear weapon would be costly in terms of money, in consumption of fissionable materials, and in absorption of technical skills and industrial capacity. However, these costs appeared to be within the capability of the United States without materially interfering with improvement of existing weapons and other means of defense.

Diplomatic considerations involved in the decision were, as such, outside the field of JCS responsibility, but some of these had military implications. National policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out, was a function of military capability and would be materially strengthened by adding the fusion weapon to the nation's arsenal. Conversely, the United States would be in an "intolerable position" if it did not possess the weapon while a potential enemy did. Voluntary renunciation would be "foolhardy altriusm" and would probably lead to "major international realignments" to the disadvantage of the United States. Nor could the Joint Chiefs of Staff see any reason for postponing the project while other nations were consulted, except perhaps those that had been associated with the Manhattan project (i.e., the United Kingdom and Canada).

The thermonuclear weapon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized, would have an important psychological effect. Citizens of a country threatened by the weapon would bring great pressure to bear on governments to provide defenses for the areas where they lived and worked, with the result that resources would be so diverted to defensive requirements as to jeopardize offensive forces.

Turning finally to the moral question, the Joint Chiefs of Staff denied that possession of the super bomb would be so abhorrent to Americans and other peoples of the world as to undermine US world leadership. On the contrary, those who looked to the United States for leadership would expect her government to take all necessary steps to preserve it, including development of the thermonuclear bomb. In the final analysis, the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained, it was "folly to argue whether one weapon is more immoral than another. For, in the larger sense, it is war itself that is immoral, and the stigma of such immorality must rest upon the nation which initiates hostilities."[51]

General Bradley briefed the Joint Congressional Committee on this report on 20 January. The members agreed that possession of the super was so vital to national security that the necessary additional facilities should be built even before the feasibility tests were under way. A copy of the JCS report was provided to the White House by Secretary Johnson, who had become impatient with the inability of the Special Committee of the NSC to reach agreement.[52]

The decision of the Joint Congressional Committee in favor of the thermonuclear weapon was not altered by a meeting of Committee members with the AEC on 27 January 1950. By this time, however, the existence of the debate within the administration had leaked to the press, and the issue was a matter of public discussion. A number of prominent figures spoke out, urging the nation to go ahead with the new weapon. They included Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, a highly regarded "elder statesman" who had helped to draft the US plan for international control of atomic energy in 1946; Congressman Carl Vinson, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee; Senator H. Styles Bridges, a member of the corre-

sponding committee in the Senate; Senator Tom Connally, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; and Dr. Harold C. Urey of the University of Chicago, an internationally known chemist and holder of the Nobel Prize. President Truman was asked about the subject at a press conference on 27 January 1950. He replied that he was not yet ready to announce a decision, implying that he would do so in the near future.[53]

Secretary Acheson meanwhile had continued his efforts to steer the Special Committee toward a decision. He succeeded in achieving a compromise between Secretary Johnson and Mr. Lilienthal. The AEC Chairman remained convinced that a hasty affirmative decision would commit the United States, perhaps irrevocably, to an excessive reliance on military power. But he was willing to lend his name to a recommendation to investigate the feasibility of a thermonuclear reaction, provided that actual production of weapons was postponed pending a far-reaching review of military and foreign policies. Such a review should include consideration of the possibility of reopening discussion of international control of atomic energy.[54]

Decision to Develop Fusion Weapons

The Special Committee of the National Security Council met on 31 January to consider a State Department draft encompassing the understanding already reached. In addition to the Committee members, the following were in attendance: the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Stephen Early, and Secretary Johnson's assistant, Major General James H. Burns; Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary of the NSC, and his assistant, Mr. James S. Lay; Dr. Henry Smyth, the scientist member of the AEC; and Mr. Robert LeBaron, Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee to the AEC. The discussion was prolonged and intense, despite the preliminary agreement on the general outlines of a compromise.

The State Department draft contained the following recommendations:

(a) That the President direct the Atomic Energy Commission to proceed to determine the technical feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon, the scale and rate of effort to be determined jointly by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense; and that the necessary ordnance developments and carrier program be undertaken concurrently;

(b) That the President defer decision pending the reexamination referred to in (c) as to whether thermonuclear weapons should be produced beyond the number required for a test of feasibility;

(c) That the President direct the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union.

(d) That the President indicate publicly the intention of this Government to continue work to determine the feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon, and that no further official information on it be made public without the approval of the President.[55]

The first of these recommendations was thus in conformance with the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that "the determination of the technical feasibility of a thermonuclear explosion . . . be undertaken at this time." The second, however, which reflected Mr. Lilienthal's views, introduced a new basis for postponing a decision on production. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had urged that the decision be based entirely on a demonstration of feasibility, and they had indicated in their memorandum of 13 January that possession of thermonuclear weapons was desirable on strategic grounds. Secretary Johnson shared their views; he proposed that the second recommendation be deleted. Eventually the other two Committee members agreed, although Mr. Lilienthal did so with the utmost reluctance; he apparently concluded that events had now moved so far that a formal dissent on his part was useless.

Immediately after finishing their own meeting, the Special Committee members adjourned to the White House to present their report. When they did so, Mr. Lilienthal was given an opportunity to make another plea for delay in the decision. President Truman replied that the pressure of public discussion made it impossible to put off a decision while the matter was studied at length in the Executive Branch.[56]

The President's decision was made public the same day. His brief announcement, which gave no hint of the intensive debate that had preceded it, read as follows:

> It is part of my responsibility as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces to see to it that our country is able to defend itself against any possible aggressor. Accordingly, I have directed the Atomic Energy Commission to continue its work on all forms of atomic weapons, including the so-called hydrogen or superbomb. Like all other work in the field of atomic weapons, it is being and will be carried forward on a basis consistent with the overall objectives of our program for peace and security.
>
> This we shall continue to do until a satisfactory plan for international control of atomic energy is achieved. We shall also continue to examine all those factors that affect our program for peace and this country's security.[57]

Simultaneously the President moved to carry out the remainder of the recommendations of the Special Committee. He directed Secretaries Acheson and Johnson to reexamine US national objectives and strategic plans in the light of estimated Soviet capabilities, present and future, to produce fission and fusion weapons.[58] The result of this reexamination was NSC 68, completed in April 1950, which cast doubt upon the adequacy of available US military means in relation to commitments and, by implication, challenged the wisdom of the budgetary policies pursued by President Truman for the several years preceding. A decision on NSC 68 hung in the balance in June 1950, when the outbreak of the Korean War completely altered the assumptions underlying the administration's policies and triggered the expansion of US military forces long considered essential by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[59]

Appendix I

Actual Military Strength 30 June 1947–31 December 1949[1]

	Total	*Army*	*Navy*	*Marine Corps*	*Air Force*
30 Jun 47[2]	1,565,858	683,837	484,025	92,222	305,774
31 Dec 47[2]	1,383,125	559,226	401,989	83,242	338,668
30 Jun 48[2]	1,424,027	552,239	401,787	83,609	386,392
31 Dec 48[3]	1,603,332	677,199	429,031	86,128	410,974
30 Jun 49[3]	1,591,232	658,694	430,580	84,471	417,487
31 Dec 49[4]	1,525,068	638,824	395,997	79,291	410,956

1. Excludes officer candidates and reserves on active duty in connection with reserve affairs.
2. *First Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1948*, p. 141.
3. *Second Report of the Secretary of Defense. FY 1949*, pp. 318–320.
4. *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1 Jan–30 Jun 50*, pp. 206–207.

Appendix II

Department of Defense, New Obligational Authority for Military Purposes, FY 1948–1951

(billions of dollars)

	1948[1]	*1949*[2]	*1950*[3]	*1951*[4]
OSD	—	.007	.011	.011
Army	4.562	4.217	4.420	4.018
Navy	3.935	4.924	4.183	3.881
Air Force	1.260	4.793	5.309	4.433
Total	9.757	13.941	13.923	12.343

1. *First Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1948*, p. 36.
2. *Second Report of the Secretary of Defense, FY 1949*, p. 93.
3. Hearings, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1951*, Defense Subcom of H. Com on Appropriations, 81st Cong, 2d sess, pp. 106, 293, 1313, 1769.
4. Ibid., pp. 106, 196, 1216, 1726. These figures are the President's requests. Final congressional action on Defense appropriations for FY 1951 was not completed during the period covered by this volume.

Appendix III

Principal Civilian and Military Officers

President and Commander in Chief	
Harry S Truman	12 Apr 45–20 Jan 53
Department of State	
Secretary of State	
George C. Marshall	21 Jan 47–20 Jan 49
Dean G. Acheson	21 Jan 49–20 Jan 53
Department of Defense	
Secretary of Defense	
James Forrestal	17 Sep 47–27 Mar 49
Louis A. Johnson	28 Mar 49–19 Sep 50
Under Secretary of Defense	
Stephen T. Early	02 May 49–09 Aug 49
Deputy Secretary of Defense	
Stephen T. Early	10 Aug 49–30 Sep 50
Secretary of the Army	
Kenneth C. Royall	17 Sep 47–27 Apr 49
Gordon Gray	20 Jun 49–11 Apr 50
Secretary of the Navy	
John L. Sullivan	18 Sep 47–24 May 49
Francis P. Matthews	25 May 49–30 Jul 51
Secretary of the Air Force	
W. Stuart Symington	18 Sep 47–24 Apr 50
Joint Chiefs of Staff	
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief	
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy	20 Jul 42–21 Mar 49
Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of Defense	
General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower	11 Feb 49–14 Aug 49

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

General of the Army Omar N. Bradley	15 Aug 49–14 Aug 53

Chief of Staff, US Army

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower	19 Nov 45–07 Feb 48
General Omar N. Bradley	07 Feb 48–15 Aug 49
General J. Lawton Collins	16 Aug 49–14 Aug 53

Chief of Naval Operations

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz	15 Dec 45–15 Dec 47
Admiral Louis Denfeld	15 Dec 47–02 Nov 49
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman	02 Nov 49–22 Jul 51

Chief of Staff, US Air Force

General Carl Spaatz	01 Mar 46–30 Apr 48
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg	30 Apr 48–30 Jun 53

Commander in Chief, Alaska

Major General Howard A. Craig, USAF	01 Jan 47–17 Oct 47
Lieutenant General Nathan F. Twining, USAF	17 Oct 47–01 Jul 50

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

Admiral William H. P. Blandy, USN	01 Dec 47–01 Feb 50

Commander in Chief, Caribbean

Lieutenant General Willis D. Crittenberger, USA	01 Nov 47–28 Jun 48
Lieutenant General Mathew B. Ridgway, USA	28 Jun 48–01 Oct 49
Lieutenant General Horace L. McBride, USA	01 Oct 49–01 Apr 52

Commander in Chief, Europe

General Lucius D. Clay, USA	15 Mar 47–23 Aug 49
General Thomas T. Handy, USA	23 Aug 49–01 Aug 52

Commander in Chief, Far East

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, USA	01 Jan 47–11 Apr 51

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Admiral John H. Towers, USN	01 Jan 47–28 Feb 47
Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, USN	28 Feb 47–12 Jan 48
Admiral Dewitt C. Ramsey, USN	12 Jan 48–30 Apr 49
Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN	30 Apr 49–10 Jul 53

Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command

General George C. Kenney, USAF	14 Dec 46–19 Oct 48
General Curtis E. LeMay, USAF	19 Oct 48–01 Jul 57

Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean

Admiral Robert L. Conolly, USN	23 Sep 46–01 Nov 50

Appendix IV

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AEC	Atomic Energy Commission
AMAG	American Mission for Aid to Greece
BCS	British Chiefs of Staff
BOB	Bureau of the Budget
BOTRA	Board of Trustees for Rehabilitation Affairs (UN)
CEP	Circular error probability
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINCFE	Commander in Chief, Far East
CINCLANT	Commander in Chief, Atlantic
CINCNELM	Commander in Chief, Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCSAC	Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COMINCH	Commander in Chief
COMINFORM	Information Bureau of the Workers' and Communist Parties
COMNAVWESPAC	Commander, Naval Forces Western Pacific
CSA	Chief of Staff, Army
ECA	Economic Cooperation Administration
ERP	European Recovery Program
FACC	Foreign Assistance Coordinating Committee
FASC	Foreign Assistance Steering Committee
FEC	Far East Commission
FY	Fiscal Year
GAC	General Advisory Committee
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
JLPC	Joint Logistics Plans Committee

JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSPC	Joint Strategic Plans Committee
JSSC	Joint Strategic Survey Committee
JUSMAG	Joint United States Military Advisory Group
JUSMAPG	Joint US Military Advisory and Planning Group in Greece
LOCs	Lines of Communication
NME	National Military Establishment
NSC	National Security Council
RDB	Research and Development Board
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
SANACC	State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee
SCAP	Supreme Commander Allied Powers
SWNCC	State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
UMT	Univeral Military Training
UN	United Nations
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
USAGG	US Army Group, Greece
WEU	Western European Union
WSEG	Weapons Systems Evaluation Group

Notes

Chapter 1. A New Era Begins

1. PL 253, 80th Congress.

2. These developments are more fully treated in (U) JCS Hist Div, *Major Changes in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942–1969*, pp. 1–18.

3. Senate Rpt No. 239, 21 Apr 47; House Rpt No. 961, 16 Jul 47, both 80th Cong, 1st Sess.

4. PL 253, sec 211.

5. PL 253, sec 202.

6. (C) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, "Interim Terms of Reference for SANACC," 3 Jun 49, Encl to (C) JCS 1224/8, 6 Jun 49, CCS 334 SANACC (12–19–44) (1) sec 5.

7. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 4 Mar 45, p. 361.

8. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation, My Years in the State Department* (1969), p. 150. Stalin's speech is described by Acheson, loc. cit., and by Kennan in msg to SecState, 12 Feb 46, in Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, vol. VI, *Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union* (1969), pp. 694–696. The text is in Desp, Moscow 2442 to State, 12 Feb 46, State Dept files.

9. (U) Msg, Moscow 511 to State, 22 Feb 46, *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. VI, pp. 696–709.

10. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 151. Walter Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries* (1951), p. 140. George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925–1950* (1967), p. 294.

11. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (1952), pp. 338–339.

12. *Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S Truman, 1947*, (1963), pp. 176–179.

13. Because the Marshall Plan dealt exclusively with economic aid, the Joint Chiefs of Staff played no role in its preparation or implementation. For an account of these matters, see Herbert Feis, *From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945–1950* (1970), pp. 227–264, and Harry B. Price, *The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning* (1955).

14. Walter Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 373. *First Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1948*, p. 141.

15. Robert R. Palmer, Bell S. Wiley and William R. Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops* (1948), p. 492. Alfred Goldberg, ed., *A History of the United States Air Force, 1907–1957* (1957), pp. 105, 112. Hearings, *Navy Department Appropriations for 1947*, Navy Subcom of H. Com on Appropriations, 79th Cong, 2d sess, p. 39.

16. *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army, 1948*, pp. 19, 35, 52, 65, 66. Goldberg, *History of the United States Air Force*, pp. 105, 112. *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Air Force, 1948*, pp. 4, 131. "Status of Fleet Marine Force Ground as of 31 July 1947," Hist Br, HQ USMC. *Naval Vessels Register*, 1 July 1947, NavShips Pub No. 18–1–8.

17. Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending 30 June 1949, pp. 633–634. "Annual Budget Message to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1948," 8 Jan 47, text in *Public Papers, Truman, 1947*, p. 64. *First Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1948*, p. 36.

18. Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War, in *The War Reports of General of the Army George C. Marshall, General of the Army H. H. Arnold, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King* (1947), p. 292. *NY Times*, 24 Oct 45, p. 3 (text of Truman statement). C. Joseph Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon, *American Military Policy Since 1775* (1955), pp. 446-448.

19. *A Program for National Security, Report of the President's Commission on Universal Training* (1947).

20. Bernardo and Bacon, *American Military Policy*, p. 450.

21. (U) Memo, CofS to CINC of the Army and Navy to Secy, JCS, 4 Jan 47, Encl to JCS 1737, 6 Jan 47; (U) Ltr, Pres to Dr. Compton, 17 Jan 47 (derived from JCS 1737/1 as amended by JCS 1737/2); CCS 320.2 (5–1–45) sec 1.

22. (C) JIS 80/26, 9 Jul 46, CCS 092 USSR (3–27–45) sec 8.

Chapter 2. Countering Soviet Expansion in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean

1. *Public Papers, Truman, 1947*, p. 179.

2. (U) Dept of State Memo, "Chronological Summary of Correspondence and Exchanges of Views Leading up to the Discussions with the British on the Middle East . . .," n.d., Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947*, vol. V, *The Near East and Africa* (1971), pp. 488–496.

3. (U) Dept of State Memo, "The American Paper," n.d.; (U) Memo, ActgSecState to Pres, 24 Nov 47; *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V., pp. 575–576, 623–624.

4. Secretary Forrestal had actually begun this practice on 30 October 1947 with regard to NSC 1. See below, p. 35.

5. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Document Resulting from Conversations with the British in Regard to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East," 19 Nov 47 (derived from JCS 1819), CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sec 1.

6. Doris M. Condit et al., *Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict*, vol. II: *The Experience in Europe and the Middle East* (1967), pp. 499–503.

7. PL 75 and PL 271, 80th Cong, 1st sess. *Public Papers, Truman, 1947*, p. 179. Dept of State, *First Report to the Congress on Assistance to Greece and Turkey* (November 1947), p. 1.

8. *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V, pp. 202, 219–224, 226–231.

9. (U) Memo, SecState to Pres, 16 Jul 47, *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V, pp. 237–238.

10. (U) Memo prepared in Dept of State, n.d., no originator but drafted by SecState, *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V, pp. 238–242. Original sent to ADM Leahy, fn 2, p. 242. The author has been unable to find any evidence of JCS action on the matter in JCS files.

11. (U) Note, British Chargé d'Affaires to SecState, 30 Jul 47, *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V, p. 268.

12. (U) JCS 1801/1, 30 Aug 47, CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 5.

13. (U) Msgs, State 3304 and 3305 to London, 1 Aug 47; London 4214 and 4320 to State, 3 Aug 47, 9 Aug 47; *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V, pp. 273–275, 277–278, 289–290.

14. (U) Note, UK Foreign Secy to SecState, n.d. but delivered 20 Aug 47, *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V, pp. 301–302. (U) Ltr, ActgSecState to SecWar, 27 Aug 47, App A to JCS 1801, 28 Aug 47, CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 5.

15. (TS) CCS 972, 29 Aug 47, same file.

16. (TS) CCS 972/1, 3 Sep 47, same file.

17. (U) Memo, JCS to Secs War and Navy, "Military Implications of Withdrawal of British Troops from Greece and Italy," 2 Sep 47 (derived from JCS 1801/1), same file. (U) Ltr, Secs War and Navy to ActgSecState, 5 Sep 47, *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V, pp. 327–329.

18. (U) Msgs, State 3883 to London, 8 Sep 47; London 4892 to State, 10 Sep 47; London 4952 to State, 12 Sep 47; State 3988 to London, 13 Sep 47; in *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V, pp. 330–332, 334–335, 337. The full-dress review of US-UK Middle East policies took place in Washington between 16 and 30 October 1947 and were known as the Pentagon Talks. No common US-UK understanding was reached. The US position presented during the talks has been described on p. 15 above. See *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V, pp. 485–626.

19. (U) Memo by BG C.V.R. Schuyler, "Meeting with State Department Representatives to Discuss the Greek Situation," 17 Sep 47, *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V, pp. 344–346. Dept of State, *First Report to Congress on Assistance to Greece and Turkey*, pp. 13–14.

20. (U) Memo by BG C.V.R. Schuyler, 17 Sep 47, *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V, pp. 344–346; (TS-GP 3) Rpt, MG S. J. Chamberlin to CSA, "The Greek Situation," 20 Oct 47, CCS 092 (8–22–46) BP 1.

21. (U) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, "Extension of Operational Advice to the Greek Armed Forces," 30 Oct 47, *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V, pp. 391–395.

22. (U) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, 4 Nov 47, quoted in ibid., pp. 393, fn 4, (TS) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 7 Nov 47; (TS) Memo, SpecAsst to SecDef to DJS, 10 Nov 47, CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 9. The substance of the SecState letter is published in *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V, p. 393, fn 4.

23. (TS) PM-604 to CAPT T. B. Neblett, COL W. P. Greenfield, LTC S. E. Crawford, 29 Oct 47, same file, sec 8.

24. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 2 Dec 47, "Proposed Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group in Greece," 2 Dec 47 (derived from JCS 1798/3) same file, sec 9; (U) Directive, Secs A, AF, N, "Directive Governing the Establishment and Operation of the Joint U.S. Military and Advisory Group in Greece," 31 Dec 47, Encl to JCS 1798/5, 7 Jan 48, same file, sec 10.

25. Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948*, vol. IV, *Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union* (1974), pp. 36–37.

26. (U) Msgs, State GAMA 379 to Athens, 29 Oct 47; State GAMA 718 to Athens, 30 Dec 47; *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V, pp. 390, 478.

27. PL 472, 3 Apr 48 and PL 793, 28 Jun 48; 80th Cong, 2d sess.

28. (U) NSC 5, 6 Jan 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. IV, pp. 2–7.

29. (U) JCS 1798/1, 15 Oct 47, CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 8.

30. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Greece," 6 Jan 48 (derived from JCS 1826/1), CCS 092 Greece (12–30–47) sec 1 (*Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. IV, pp. 8–9).

31. Memo, Dir NE and African Affairs to SecState, 9 Jan 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. IV, pp. 9–14.

32. "Draft Report by the National Security Council on the Position of the United States with Respect to Greece" (Policy Planning Staff Redraft, January 10, 1948); Memo, Dir, Policy Planning Staff, 13 Jan 48; NSC Action No. 22, 13 Jan 48; *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. IV, pp. 24–26, 27–28.

33. (TS) NSC 5/1, 2 Feb 48, Encl to JCS 1826/3, CCS 092 Greece (12–30–47) sec 1.

34. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Greece," 11 Feb 48 (derived from JCS 1826/4), same file.

35. NSC 5/2, 12 Feb 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. IV, pp. 46–51.

36. (TS) Memo, ExecSecy NSC to JCS, 24 Feb 48, Encl to JCS 1826/7, CCS 092 Greece (12–30–47) sec 2.

37. President Truman, acting on the advice of the JCS, had requested Congress to reinstitute Selective Service on 17 March. This was in response to the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, which was doubtlessly a major aspect of the deterioration of the world situation the JCS were now referring to. See Ch. 4 for a discussion of these events, and Ch. 6 for the resumption of Selective Service.

38. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Position of the United States with Respect to Greece," 14 Apr 48; (TS) Memo, SecDef to NSC, same subj, 19 Apr 48 (both derived from JCS 1826/8); same file.

39. (TS) NSC 5/3, 25 May 48, same file. (Printed in *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. IV, pp. 93–95, with omission of the CIA comments).

40. (U) JUSMAPG Op Rpt 6, 25 Mar 48, CCS 092 (8–22–46) BP 2.

41. (U) Ltr, Dir, JUSMAPG to Dir, P&O USA as Exec Agent for JCS, 31 Mar 48, same file, sec 11.

42. (U) JUSMAPG Op Rpts 10–15, same file.

43. (U) NSC 5/3, 25 May 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. IV, pp. 93–95.

44. (TS) NSC 5/4, 3 Jun 48; (TS) Memo, ExecSecy for NSC, same subj, 21 Jun 48; same file.

45. (U) JUSMAPG Rpts to JCS: 19, 24 Jun 48, CCS 092 (8–22–46) BP 2; 28, 27 Aug 48; 35, 15 Oct 48; 36, 22 Oct 48; 37, 29 Oct 48; same file, BP 3.

46. (U) Memo, SecState to ActgSecState, 20 Oct 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. IV, pp. 162–165.

47. (U) Memo, ActgSecState to SecDef, 22 Oct 48; (U) Memo, SecDef to ActgSecState, 23 Oct 48; (U) Msg, State 1321 to Athens, 31 Oct 48; *Foreign Relations 1948*, vol. IV, pp. 167–168, 171–172, 178–179.

48. (TS) Memo, ExecSecy SANACC to Secy, JCS, SANACC 358/7, 15 Oct 48, Att to (TS) JCS 1798/13, 15 Oct 48, CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 14.

49. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Decision on Long-Range U.S. Military Interests in Greece and Turkey," 24 Nov 48 (derived from JCS 1798/14), same file, sec 15.

50. (U) Msg, AMAG 1652 to State, 22 Nov 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. IV, pp. 187–191. (S) Msg, Dept of Army to USAGG, WAR 80149, 24 Nov 48, CCS 092 Greece (12–30–47) sec 15.

51. (S) Ltr, Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey to SecDef, 10 Dec 48; (S) Memo, OSD (W. J. McNeil) to JCS, 14 Dec 48 (App and Encl to JCS 1704/13, 16 Dec 48); same file.

52. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Greek-Turkish Aid for 1950," 20 Dec 48 (derived from JCS 1704/14) same file, sec 16.

53. (U) FACC D–3/1, 7 Feb 49, App B to JCS 1868/57, 9 Feb 49, same file, sec 18. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Basic Statement of United States Policy Concerning the Foreign Military Assistance Program," 21 Feb 49 (derived from JCS 1868/49), same file, sec 19. See Ch. 12 for a full account of the comprehensive military aid program for FY 1950.

54. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Foreign Military Aid Program," 14 Mar 49 (derived from JCS 1868/62), CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 21.

55. (U) Memo, SpecAsst to SecDef for MilAsst to DJS, et al., 27 Apr 49, Encl to JCS 1868/73, 29 Apr 49, same file, sec 24.

56. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Reprogramming the FY 1950 Foreign Military Assistance Program," 23 Sep 49 (derived from JCS 1868/111), CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 29.

57. (U) Rpt on Greece by C.I.G.S., n.d., App to Encl B to JCS 1704/19, 3 May 49, same file, sec 24.

58. (U) SM–859–49 to Reps of UK COS, 11 May 49 (derived from JCS 1704/19), same file, sec 25.

59. Dept of State, *Eighth Report to Congress on Assistance to Greece and Turkey, for the Period Ending 30 June 1948;* Condit, *The Experience in Europe and the Middle East*, pp. 499–519.

60. (TS) NSC 1, 15 Oct 47, Encl to JCS 1808, 16 Oct 47, CCS 092 Italy (10–2–47) sec 1.

61. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy," 30 Oct 47 (derived from JCS 1808/2), same file.

62. (TS) NSC 1/1, 14 Nov 47, Encl to JCS 1808/4, 19 Nov 47, same file. (TS) NSC Action No. 9, 14 Nov 47. The Council's agreement to investigate the question of military equipment is documented in (TS) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, 9 Feb 48, Encl to JCS 553/14, 13 Feb 48, CCS 400 Italy (9–30–43) sec 12.

63. (S) Msg, US Mil Att Rome MAR 345 to SecDef, 7 Dec 47, Ann B to App to JCS 553/14; (TS) Msg, Rome 3957 to State, 7 Dec 47, Ann A to App to JCS 553/14; CCS 400 Italy (9–30–43) sec 12.

64. (TS) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, 9 Feb 48; (TS) SANACC 360/1, 9 Feb 48, Encl and App to JCS 553/14, 13 Feb 48; (U) Memo, ExecSecy NSC to Pres, 12 Feb 48, App to JCS 553/17, 16 Feb 48; (U) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, 13 Feb 48, Encl to JCS 553/17; same file.

65. (TS) NSC 1/2, 10 Feb 48, Encl to JCS 1808/9, 11 Feb 48, CCS 092 Italy (10–2–47) sec 1.

66. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy," 19 Feb 48 (derived from JCS 1808/10), same file, sec 2. On the same day, the JCS expressed these same views concerning the delivery date of military equipment to Italy and the need for establishing priorities among deliveries to Greece, Turkey and Italy in a memorandum to the SecDef giving views on SANACC 360/1; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Provision of U.S. Equipment to the Italian Armed Forces," 19 Feb 48 (derived from JCS 553/18), CCS 400 Italy (9–30–43) sec 12.

67. (TS) Ltr, USecState to SecDef, 17 Feb 48, same file.

68. (TS) NSC 1/3, 8 Mar 48, Encl to JCS 1808/12, 8 Mar 48, CCS 092 Italy (10–2–47) sec 2.

69. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy in the Light of the Possibility of Communist Participation in the Italian Government by Legal Means," 10 Mar 48 (derived from JCS 1808/14), same file. Selective Service was reinstituted on 24 June 1948. See Ch. 6.

70. (TS) JCS 1808/17, 16 Mar 48; (TS) JCS 1808/15, 15 Mar 48; (TS) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, 15 Mar 48, Encl to JCS 1808/18, 16 Mar 48; same file.

71. These events are related in Chs. 11 and 12.

72. (U) SWNCC 358/1, approved by SWNCC 12 May 47; (U) Msg, State 264 to Ankara, 15 May 47; *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V, pp. 153–156, 172–173.

73. Ibid., pp. 173, 193–194.

74. (U) Rept of the United States Ambassador Concerning Assistance to Turkey, 15 Jul 47, *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V, pp. 233–236.

75. (U) SWNCC 358/2, approved by SWNCC 23 Jul 47; (U) Msg, State 514 to Ankara, 3 Sep 47; *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V, pp. 255–258, 325–326.

76. (U) SM–9479 to Coordinator, Armed Forces Groups, COMAT, 16 Jan 48 (derived from JCS 1704/5), CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 9.

77. (U) Memo, Coordinator, Armed Forces Groups, American Mission for Aid to Turkey to JCS, 19 Feb 48, Encl to JCS 1704/7, same file, sec 10.

78. (U) SM–11000 to Coordinator, Armed Forces Groups, American Mission for Aid to Turkey, 30 Sep 48 (derived from JCS 1704/8), same file, sec 14.

79. (C) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 28 Jul 48, Encl to JCS 1876/3, 29 Jul 48; (TS-GP 3) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Establishment of a Military Communications Control Center in Turkey," 7 Oct 48 (derived from JCS 1876/4); (C) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 9 Oct 48, Encl to JCS 1876/6, 12 Oct 48; (C) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Report of On-Site Survey Committee . . . ," 18 Apr 49 (derived from JCS 1876/8); (U) Memo, JCEC to Secy, JCS, 21 Apr 49; CCS 311 Turkey (12–3–47) sec 1.

80. PL 472, 3 Apr 48, and PL 793, 28 Jun 48, 80th Cong.

81. See above, p. 29.

82. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Decision on Long-Range U.S. Military Interests in Greece and Turkey," 24 Nov 48 (derived from JCS 1798/14), CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 15.

83. (S) Ltr, Co-ordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey to SecDef, 10 Dec 48, App to JCS 1704/13, same file. The request for $100 million for Turkey was to be submitted to the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) as part of a single request of $400 million for Greece and Turkey. See above, p. 31.

84. (S) Memo, OSD (W.J. McNeil) to JCS, 14 Dec 48, Encl to JCS 1704/13, 16 Dec 48, same file; (U) JCS 1704/14, 20 Dec 48; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Greek-Turkish Aid for 1950," 20 Dec 48 (derived from JCS 1704/14), same file, sec 16. (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 23 Dec 48, cited in *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. IV, p. 216, fn 1.

85. Above, p. 31.

86. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Reprogramming the FY 1950 Foreign Military Assistance Program," 23 Sep 49 (derived from JCS 1868/111), CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 29.

87. Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947*, vol. VII, *The Near East and Africa* (1969), fn 20, p. 546. *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V, Editorial Note, p. 916.

88. (U) FACCD–3/1, 7 Feb 49, App B to JCS 1868/57; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Basic Statement of United States Policy Concerning the Foreign Military Assistance Program," 21 Feb 49 (derived from JCS 1868/59), CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 19.

89. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Programs for Foreign Military Assistance," 14 Mar 49 (derived from JCS 1868/62), same file, sec 21.

Chapter 3. Palestine: US Middle East Policy at Cross Purposes

1. Information regarding the historical background of the Palestine situation and political developments in Palestine during 1947–1949 has been drawn from the following unclassified works. John C. Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs, 1947–1948* (1949), pp. 305–332; *The United States in World Affairs, 1948–1949* (1949), pp. 375–400; and *Defense of the Middle East* (1958), pp. 11–99. Jacob C. Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine* (1950); *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, vol. II, *1914-1956*, pp. 13–17, 25–26, 106–111, 218–226, 234–235, 281–295, 308–311; and *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (1969), pp. 357–379. George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs* (1962), pp. 372–438. Jacob Robinson, *Palestine and the United Nations* (1947). Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1949*, pp. 396–413.

2. The "areas of great strategic importance" were not identified by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "The Problem of Palestine," 10 Oct 47 (derived from JCS 1684/3), CCS 092 Palestine (5–3–46) sec 3.

4. (U) Memo, Dir NEA to SecState, 22 Sep 47, *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V, pp. 1153–1158.

5. Harry S Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope* (1956), pp. 156–157.

6. Ibid., p. 155.

7. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 19 Oct 47, pp. 761–762.

8. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 359–360.

9. (U) Memo, CNO to JCS, 7 Feb 48, Encl to JCS 1684/8, 9 Feb 48; (TS) JCS 1684/9, 17 Feb 49, and Dec On 26 Feb 49, CCS 092 Palestine (5–3–46) sec 3.

10. *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1947–48* (1949), p. 256.

11. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 7 Mar 48, pp. 294–297. *United Nations Yearbook, 1947–48*, pp. 404–407.

12. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 28 Mar 48, pp. 402–408. *United Nations Yearbook, 1947–48*, pp. 407–411.

13. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 2 Apr 48, Encl B to JCS 1684/13, 4 Apr 48, same file, sec 4.

14. (TS) Draft entry for Mr. Forrestal's Diary for 4 Apr 48, transcript of Forrestal Diary, JCS Hist Div.

15. (U) Memo, JCS to Pres, "Provision of US Armed Forces in Palestine," 4 Apr 48 (derived from JCS 1684/13), same file.

16. *United Nations Yearbook, 1947–48*, pp. 412–416.

17. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 164.

18. *United Nations Yearbook, 1947–48*, pp. 279–281, 429–431.

19. Ibid., pp. 435–441.

20. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 3 Oct 48, pp. 436–440.

21. *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948–49* (1950), pp. 172–176.

22. (TS) Msg, USUN 817 to State, 25 Jun 48, App B to JCS 1898, 29 Jun 48, CCS 092 Palestine (5–3–46), sec 5.

23. (TS) Draft Msg, SecState to USUN, App A to Encl B to JCS 1898, 29 Jun 48, same file.

24. (TS) Memo, SpecAsst to SecDef to JCS, 28 Jun 48, Encl B to JCS 1898, 29 Jun 48, same file. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "United Nations Guards for a Demilitarized Jerusalem," 6, 7 or 8 Jul 48 (derived from JCS 1898). This memo, approved by the JCS on 6 Jul 48 by the Dec On JCS 1898, cannot be located in JCS files. Evidence that it was received by the SecDef no later than 8 Jul is contained in the Encl to JCS 1898/2, which is a memo from SecDef to SecState, dated 8 Jul 48. It quotes extensively from the JCS memo approved on 6 Jul.

25. (U) Ltr, USecState to SecDef, 20 Jul 48, App to JCS 1898/2, 26 Jul 48, same file, sec 6.

26. (TS) Ltr, ActgSecState to SecDef, 18 Oct 48, App to JCS 1684/21, 19 Oct 48, same file, sec 7.

27. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Provision of a Military Police Force for Jerusalem," 29 Oct 48 (derived from JCS 1684/22 as amended by JCS 1684/23 and /24), same file.

28. (TS) NSC 27/3, 16 Nov 48, Encl to JCS 1684/26, 19 Nov 48; (TS) N/H JCS 1684/26, 29 Nov 48, same file.

29. (U) Memo, CSAF to JCS, 16 Jul 48, Encl to JCS 1684/16, same date, same file, sec 5.

30. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "US Military Point of View for the Eventuality of United Nations Decision to Introduce Military Forces into Palestine," 19 Aug 48 (derived from JCS 1684/17) same file, sec 6. The blockade of Berlin is the subject of Ch. 4.

31. (TS) NSC 27, 23 Aug 48; (TS) NSC 27/1, 3 Sep 48; same file.

32. (U) Msg, Jerusalem 589 to State, 10 Dec 47; Airgram, Jerusalem A–274 to State, 31 Dec 47; *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. V, pp. 1307–1309, 1322–1328.

33. (U) Memo, CNO to JCS, 25 Apr 48, Encl to JCS 1877, same date, CCS 092 Palestine (5–3–46) sec 4.

34. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Marine Guards for the American Consulate in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv," 13 May 48 (derived from JCS 1877/1), same file.

35. (U) Msg, Jerusalem 990 to State, 28 Jun 48, quoted in Encl to JCS 1877/3, 30 Jun 48; (TS) Ltr, USecState to SecDef, 1 Jul 48, App to JCS 1877/4; (TS) Memo, SpecAsst to SecDef to JCS, 1 Jul 48, Encl to JCS 1877/4; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Marine Guards for the American Consulates in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv," 7 Jul 48 (derived from JCS 1877/5); (TS) Ltr, SecDef to USecState, 8 Jul 48; (U) Memo, SpecAsst to SecDef to SecNav, 15 Jul 48, Encl to JCS 1877/6, 16 Jul 48; CCS 092 Palestine (5–3–46) sec 5. (TS) Memo, SpecAsst to SecDef to SecNav, 4 Oct 48, Encl to JCS 1877/7, 5 Oct 48, same file, sec 7.

36. (U) Memo, CSAF to JCS, 7 Mar 49, Encl to JCS 1684/27, 8 Mar 49, same file.

37. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "United States Strategic Interests in Israel," 9 May 49 (derived from JCS 1684/28), same file, sec 8.

38. (TS) NSC 47, 16 May 49, same file.

39. (TS) NSC 47/2, 17 Oct 49 (Approved by Pres 20 Oct 49), same file.

40. Ltrs, USecState to SecDef, 30 Apr 49, and ExecSecy to SecDef to USecState, n.d., App and Ann to App A to JCS 1892/14, 2 May 49, same file, sec 7.

41. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Provision of American Technical Assistance in the Organization and Training of the Israeli Army," 20 May 49 (derived from JCS 1892/15); (U) Ltr, SecDef to ActgSecState, 3 Jun 49, Encl to JCS 1890/16, 7 Jun 49, same file, sec 8.

42. (U) Memo, SecState to Pres, 1 Sep 49, App to JCS 1684/33; (U) Memo, ExecSecy to SecDef to JCS, 21 Sep 49, Encl to JCS 1684/33; same file.

43. (TS) NSC 47/2, 17 Oct 49 (approved by Pres, 20 Oct 49), same file.

44. (U) Memo, Staff Director, Mun Bd to JCS, 5 Apr 50, Encl to JCS 1684/39, 11 Apr 50, same file, sec 9.

45. (U) SM–959–50 to Chm, Mun Bd, 5 May 50 (derived from JCS 1684/42), same file.

46. (S) FMD D–3a, 28 Apr 50, Encl B to JCS 2127, 2 May 50, same file.

47. (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Near Eastern Security, " 4 May 50 (derived from JCS 2127), same file.

48. "Tripartite Declaration Regarding Security in the Near East," Dept of State *Bulletin*, 5 Jun 50, p. 886.

Chapter 4. The Berlin Crisis

1. Unless otherwise indicated, information in this chapter regarding political developments is taken from Feis, *From Trust to Terror*, pp. 275–284; Peter Calvocoressi, *Survey of International Affairs, 1947–1948* (1952), pp. 238–242; and W. Phillips Davison, *The Berlin Blockade* (1958).

2. The division of Germany into occupation zones is shown in Map 3 (see p. 81).

3. Dept of State, *Germany, 1947–1949, The Story in Documents* (1950), pp. 192–195. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 28 Dec 47, pp. 1244–1249.

4. *Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S Truman, 1948* (1964), p. 183. General accounts of the Czech crisis may be found in Calvocoressi, *Survey of International Affairs, 1947–1948*, pp. 153–157; Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs, 1948–1949*, pp. 104–105.

5. Margaret Carlyle, ed., *Documents on International Affairs, 1947–1948* (London, 1952), p. 559.

6. (U) Airgram, US POLAD, Germany A–182 to State, 3 Mar 48, in Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948*, vol. II, *Germany and Austria* (1973), pp. 878–879.

7. (U) Msg, US POLAD, Germany 651 to State, 20 Mar 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. II, pp. 883–884 describes the meeting. The text of a prepared statement by Sokolovsky is in Carlyle, *Documents on International Affairs, 1947–1948*, pp. 574–575.

8. (U) Ltr, Soviet DepMilGov Germany to US DepMilGov Germany, 31 Mar 48, Encl to (U) Memo, SecA to SecDef, 1 Apr 48, CCS 381 (8–20–43) sec 16.

9. (U) Protocol on Zones of Occupation and Administration of the "Greater Berlin" Area, 12 Sep 44, and Amendment thereto, 14 Nov 44, in *Documents on Germany, 1944–1961*, S. Com on Foreign Relations, 87th Cong, 1st sess, pp. 1–4.

10. (U) GEN Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (1950), pp. 25–26; (U) "Notes of Conference between Marshal Zhukov . . . , General Clay . . . , and General Weeks, June 29, 1945," Dept of State, *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. III, *European Advisory Commission; Austria; Germany* (1968), pp. 358–359.

11. (U) Minutes of 13th Mtg, Allied Control Council, 30 Nov 45, *Documents on Germany*, pp. 48–49.

12. (U) Msg, OMGUS Berlin to Army Security Agency, 311200Z Mar 48, CM IN 4565, CCS 381 (8–20–43) sec 16.

13. (U) Record of Telecon, SecA and USCINCEUR, 31 Mar 48, Encl to (U) Memo, SecA to SecDef, 1 Apr 48, same file.

14. Clay, *Decision in Germany*, p. 359.

15. Dept of State, *The Berlin Crisis*, p. 3.

16. Calvocoressi, *Survey of International Affairs*, pp. 242–243. Communique, London Six-Power Conference, in Carlyle, *Documents on International Affairs, 1947–1948*, pp. 554–574.

17. Feis, *From Trust to Terror*, pp. 337–338. Calvocoressi, *Survey of International Affairs, 1947–1948*, p. 243.

18. (U) Msg, US POLAD Germany 1420 to State, 21 Jun 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. II, pp. 911–912.

19. *The Berlin Crisis*, pp. 4–5.

20. Clay, *Decision in Germany*, p. 366.

21. Davison, *The Berlin Blockade*, p. 101. Feis, *From Trust to Terror*, pp. 341–342. *NY Times*, 26 Jun 48, p. 1.

22. (TS) Memos, SecA to SecDef, 5 Jan 48; SpecAsst to SecDef to SecA, 12 Jan 48; SecA to SecDef, 19 Jan 48, and Encl thereto; DA file OSA 091 Germany (1–5–48), National Archives.

23. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 123.

24. (U) Memo for Record, ChDir Central European Affairs, Dept of State, 28 Jun 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. II, pp. 928–929.

25. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 123.

26. (U) Msg, US POLAD Germany 1487 to State, 26 Jun 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. II, pp. 918–919.

27. (U) Msg, CINCEUR to DA, 25 Jun 48, CC 4875, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. II, pp. 917–918.

28. (U) Msg, London 2822 to State, 26 Jun 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. II, pp. 921–926.

29. (TS-EYES ONLY) Msg, CINCEUR to DA, 271240Z Jun 48, CM IN 5329, CCS 381 (8–20–43) sec 17.

30. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 452–454. (TS "State-National Defense Meeting for the Purpose of Determining the U.S. Position Regarding the Occupation of Berlin," Encl to Memo, Pres to SecA, 29 Jun 48, DA File OSA (Germany) (6–29–48), National Archives.

31. (TS) Memo, SecA to CSA, 28 Jun 48, DA files, OSA 091 Germany (8–10–48), National Archives. *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 454–455.

32. (U) Memo, UK Jt Services Mission to DJS, 30 Jun 48, RDC 5/3, transmitting a msg from BCOS to USJCS, CCS 381 (8–20–43) sec 17.

33. (U) Memo, UK Jt Services Mission to DJS, 29 Jun 48; (U) Memo, UK Jt Services Mission to DJS, RDC 5/1, 28 Jun 48; (TS) Memo for Record, RADM C. D. Glover, "U.S. Chiefs of Staff Meeting with Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff . . . , 30 June 1948," 8 Jul 48; same file.

34. (U) Msg, SecA to USMG, Germany, 28 Jun 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. II, pp. 929–930. (U) Msg, US POLAD Germany 309 to Paris, 4 Jul 48, ibid., pp. 948–950, transmitting text of tripartite Mil Governors Rpt of Mtg with Sokolovsky.

35. (U) Note, Soviet Ambassador to SecState, 14 Jul 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. II, pp. 950–953, 960–964.

36. (TS) Memcon, SecState, USecState, UKAmb, 14 Jul 48, CCS 381 (8–20–43) sec 17. NSC Action No. 77, 14 Jul 48, as cited in *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. II, p. 965, note 4. (TS-RD) R.D. Little, *The History of Air Force Participation in the Atomic Energy Program, 1943–1953*, vol. II: *Foundations of an Atomic Air Force and Operation Sandstone, 1946–1948* (Air University Historical Liaison Office), p. 234.

37. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 123–126; Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (1964), pp. 316–318; Clay, *Decision in Germany*, p. 368; NSC Action No. 84, 22 Jul 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. II, p. 977; (U) Msg, State 2819 to London, 20 Jul 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. II, p. 971.

38. NSC Action No. 84, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. II, p. 977.

39. (U) Msg, CSAF to JCS, 50339, 23 Jul 48, Encl to JCS 1907/4, 27 Jul 48, CCS 381 (8–20–43) sec 17. Goldberg, *History of the United States Air Force*, pp. 235–237.

40. (U) JCS 1907, 19 Jul 48, CCS 381 (8–20–43) sec 17.

41. (U) JCS 1907/2, 19 Jul 48; (U) SM–10514 to JSSC 20 Jul 48; (U) JCS 1907/3, 21 Jul 48; same file.

42. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "U.S. Military Courses of Action with Respect to the Situation in Berlin," 22 Jul 48 (derived from JCS 1907/3), same file.

43. (U) Memo, SecDef to NSC, "U.S. Military Courses of Action with Respect to the Situation in Berlin," 26 Jul 48, same file. (TS) NSC Action No. 87, 5 Aug 48.

44. (U) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 28 Jul 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. II, p. 994.

45. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Planning for Composite Armed Convoys to Supply Berlin," 30 Jul 48, Encl to (TS) JCS 1907/5, 2 Aug 48, CCS 381 (8–20–43) sec 18.

46. (TS) CCS 983, 18 Aug 48, same file.

47. (U) CCS 983/1, 27 Aug 48; (U) JCS 1907/7, 11 Sep 48; (U) Memo, CSA to Secy JCS, "Plan for the Supply of Berlin by Armed Convoy," 28 Sep 48, and Encl thereto: CINCEUR Plan: T F TRUCULENT, 8 Sep 48; same file.

48. Msg, State 2819 to London, 20 Jul 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. II, pp. 971–973. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not participate formally in the decision.

49. *The Berlin Crisis*, pp. 17–42, and *Documents on Germany*, pp. 210–212.

50. *The Berlin Crisis*, pp. 42–43. (U) Msgs, US POLAD Germany to State, 2240, 4 Sep 48, 2251 and 2254, 7 Sep 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. II, pp. 1118–1122, 1132–1140.

51. (TS) NSC Action No. 109, 7 Sep 58.

52. *The Berlin Crisis*, pp. 44–56.

53. (U) Msg, CINCEUR to DA, CC–6050, 231745Z Sep 48, CM IN 4309 (citing msg, CINCEUR to DA, CC–5895, 10 Sep 48, CM IN 1792, which has not been seen), CCS 381 (8–20–43) sec 18. Available sources do not indicate who made the decision.

54. (TS) NSC Action No. 113 *b*, 16 Sep 48. (U) Ltr, ActSecState to SecDef, 1 Oct 48; (U) Memo SpecAsst to SecDef to JCS, 4 Oct 48; Encls to (U) JCS 1907/8, 5 Oct 48; CCS 381 (8–20–43) sec 18.

55. (TS) NSC Action No. 125 *a*, 7 Oct 48. (C) Memo, ExecSecy NSC to JCS, 7 Oct 48, Encl to (C) JCS 1907/10, 8 Oct 48, CCS 381 (8–20–43) sec 18.

56. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Implications Involved in Continuing Operation of the Berlin Airlift," 13 Oct 48 (derived from JCS 1907/9, 6 Oct 48); (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Measures Appropriate in the Event of Soviet Interruption of the Berlin Airlift," 13 Oct 48 (derived from JCS 1907/11, 11 Oct 48); CCS 381 (8–20–43) sec 18. Because both these memos were subsequently recalled and destroyed, the texts cited here are the ones found in JCS 1907/9 and JCS 1907/11, as amended by the respective Decision On. Evidence that the memos were forwarded to the SecDef is in the Decisions On JCS 1907/9 and JCS 1907/11.

57. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Measures Appropriate in the Event of Soviet Interruption of the Berlin Airlift," 13 Oct 48, cited in preceding note.

58. (TS) Memo for Record by General Gruenther, "Meeting of the National Security Council, 1430 hours, 14 October," 25 Oct 48, same file, sec 19. Mr. Lovett's remarks were perhaps influenced by the fact that the FY 1950 budget was at that time under intensive discussion (see Ch. 7).

59. (C) NSC Action No. 131, 14 Oct 48; (C) Memo, Pres to ExecSecy NSC, 22 Oct 48, Apps to JCS 1907/18, 27 Oct 48, same file.

60. (TS) Memos, JCS to SecDef, "Military Implications Involved in Continuing and Augmenting the Operation of Airlift to Berlin" and "Military Measures Appropriate in the Event of Soviet Interruption to the Berlin Airlift," both dated 20 Oct 48, Enclos "A" and "B" to JCS 1907/17, 21 Oct 48, same file.

61. Calvocoressi, *Survey of International Affairs, 1947–48*, pp. 247–250.

62. Goldberg, *History of the United States Air Force*, pp. 237–241.

63. Calvocoressi, *Survey of International Affairs*, pp. 250–251.

64. Feis, *From Trust to Terror*, pp. 354–356. Davison, *The Berlin Blockade*, pp. 272–273.

65. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Phase Out of the Berlin Airlift," 21 Jul 49 (derived from JCS 1907/34, 20 Jul 49); (C) NSC 24/4, 25 Jul 49, App to JCS 1907/35, 26 Jul 49; (C) NSC Action No. 236, 28 Jul 49, and (C) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, 28 Jul 49, both Encls to JCS 1907/36, 29 Jul 49; CCS 381 (8–20–43) sec 22. Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949*, vol. III: *Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria* (1974), pp. 839–840. Goldberg, *History of the United States Air Force*, p. 241.

66. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 131.

67. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 274.

68. (U) Msg, Paris DELSEC 1784 to State, 22 May 49; (U) JCS 1907/27, 25 May 49, and Encls and Apps thereto; (U) SM–990–49 to AsstSecA, 27 May 49; (S) NSC 24/2, 1 Jun 49; CCS 381 (8–20–43) sec 21. *Foreign Relations, 1949*, vol. III, pp. 818, 821–824.

69. (TS) Memo, AsstSecA to JCS, 9 Jun 49, Encl to JCS 1907/29, 10 Jun 49; (U) SM–1123–49 to AsstSecA, 16 Jun 49 (derived from JCS 1907/30), 10 Jun 49; same file. These communications passed to and from the Assistant Secretary of the Army, who acted in the matter as deputy for the Secretary of Defense.

70. (S) NSC 24/3, 14 Jun 49; (S) NSC Action No. 225, 16 Jun 49; (S) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, 17 Jun 49; Encls to JCS 1907/33, 18 Jun 49, same file, sec 22.

71. The FY 1950 budget is treated in Ch. 7.

Chapter 5. Key West and Newport: Roles and Missions

1. (U) Memo, Dep DJS for Strat Plans to DJS, 13 Mar 48. CCS 381 USSR (3–2–46) sec 12.

2. PL 253, 80th Cong.

3. EO 9877, 26 Jul 47.

4. For full discussion of these developments, see MAJ Laurence J. Legere, Jr., USA, "Unification of the Armed Forces" (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1950), pp. 186–361.

5. *NY Times*, 7 Jan 48, p. 1. Text in CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 6.

6. Hearings, *Department of the Navy Appropriation Bill for 1949*, Navy Subcom of H. Com on Appropriations, 80th Cong, 2d sess, pp. 132, 813. For the later controversy over the construction of this "super carrier," see Ch. 10.

7. *NY Times*, 6 Feb 48, p. 46.

8. (U) Memo, SecDef to Secs A, AF, N, and JCS, 20 Jan 48, Encl to JCS 1478/20, 22 Jan 48, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 6. Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces," pp. 352–355.

9. (U) JCS 1478/21, 28 Jan 48, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 6. The Committee, because it had focused its attention on bringing about a reexamination of the roles and missions disagreements, had not undertaken to spell them out or to propose resolutions for them. There were, however, some clues as to the nature of these disagreements in the Committee's report. But as the conflicting views of the Services were later aired in great detail, these fragmentary indications have been omitted here.

10. (U) JCS 1478/22, 30 Jan 48, same file.

11. (U) Dec On JCS 1478/20, 4 Feb 48, same file. (C) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Redraft of Executive Order 9877," 6 Feb 48; (C) SM–9563 to LTGs Wedemeyer and Norstad and RADM Styer, 5 Feb 48; same file, sec 7.

12. (U) Memo, SecA to SecDef, "Redraft of Executive Order 9877 Pertaining to Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces," 29 Jan 48, DA files, P&O 320 (29 Jan 48).

13. (U) Memo, SecAF to SecDef, no subj. 29 Jan 48, same file. The response of the SecN was not available to the author.

14. (C) Memo, SpecAsst to SecDef to DJS, 11 Feb 48, with Encl (Memo, SecDef to Secys of Army, Navy, AF, 3 Feb 48), CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 7.

15. Memo, Dir P&O to CSA, "Report of Progress . . . by the Ad Hoc Committee . . . ," 10 Feb 48, same file.

16. (U) Memo for GEN Wedemeyer, "Divergent Views on Roles and Missions," 16 Feb. 48, signed CVRS (BG Cortlandt VanRenesselaer Schuyler, Senior Army Member of the Working Group), DA files, P&O 320 (n.d.) FW 31/37, National Archives.

17. (U) "Specific Comments on Important Paragraphs in the Ad Hoc Committee Paper of 27 February," 1 Mar 48, no originator or addressee, DA Files, P&O 320 (n.d.) FW 31/37, Encl 2. (C) Drafts, "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," 16 Feb and 25 Feb 48, the first in DA file P&O 320 (n.d.) FW 31/37, the second (bearing handwritten corrections reflecting intensive discussion) in CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 7.

18. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces," 8 Mar 48, same file.

19. (U) Draft "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," and appended Army, Navy and Air Force views thereon, all Encls to (C) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces," 8 Mar 48, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 7.

20. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 389–390.

21. (U) "Notes for Friday—Opening of Meeting," 11 Mar 48, Encl to (Mins of) "Meeting, Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1500 Hours, 20 March 1948," CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 7.

22. (U) (Mins of) "Meeting, Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1500 Hours, 20 March 1948"; (U) Draft Memo for Rec, DJS, "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," 26 Mar 48 (Encl to DM–16 to JCS Members, same date); same file.

23. (U) JCS to SecDef, "Key West Conferences," 29 Apr 48, same file. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Memorandum for the Record on the Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," JCS 1478/24, 7 Jul 48, same file, sec 9.

24. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," 26 Mar 48, same file, sec 7. (U) Ltr, Pres to SecDef, 21 Apr 48; (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS and Secs A, N, AF, 21 Apr 48, both Atts to JCS 1478/23; same file, sec 8.

25. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 395–396.

26. (TS) JCS 1854, 23 Mar 48, CCS 471.6 (8–15–45) sec 9. Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, *A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission*, vol. II, *Atomic Shield, 1947/1952* (1969), pp. 131–132. On 23 Mar 48, Admiral Leahy criticized the CSAF proposal on the grounds that it ignored the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not been authorized to use atomic weapons. GEN Spaatz thereupon made minor changes in the wording of his proposal while pointing out that the criticism was not relevant to his purposes.

27. (TS) JCS 1854/4, 13 Jul 48, CCS 471.6 (8–15–45) sec 11. The CSA proposed, and CSAF agreed, that the change could be made by a simple amendment to the AFSWP charter and would not require a special directive, such as General Spaatz had originally proposed. (TS) Memo, CSAF to SecDef, n.d., Encl to (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Control and Direction of Strategic Atomic Operations," 28 Jul 48, same file.

28. (TS) JCS 1854/5, 17 Jul 48, same file.

29. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Control and Direction of Strategic Atomic Operations," 28 Jul 48; (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, same subj, 2 Aug 48; (TS) Memo, C of S to CinC to SecDef, 7 Aug 48, Encl to DM–58 to SecDef, 9 Aug 48; (TS) Memo, CSA to SecDef, "Control and Direction of Strategic Atomic Operations," 3 Aug 48, Encl to SM–10621, 4 Aug 48; same file. EWP HALF MOON is discussed in Ch. 9.

30. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 464.
31. Ibid., p. 468.
32. Ibid., pp. 475–476.
33. (TS) Memo for Rec, John H. Ohly, 23 Aug 48, summarizing decisions reached at Newport, Forrestal Diary transcripts, JCS Hist Div (partly quoted in Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 476–477). (U) Supplement to "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff" (the "Newport Agreement"), 21 Aug 48, (U) JCS 1478/26, same date, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 10. Texts of the Key West and Newport Agreements were published in *Army and Navy Journal*, 3 Apr 48, pp. 807 ff, and 28 Aug 48, p. 1435.

Chapter 6. The FY 1949 Supplemental Budget: Initial Effort to Rearm

1. See, for instance, (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Implications Involved in Continuing Operation of the Berlin Airlift," 13 Oct 48 (derived from JCS 1907/9, 6 Oct 48), CCS 381 (8–20–43) sec 18.
2. *NY Times*, 28 Jul 47, p. 10. The distribution of the $8.751 billion was as follows: Army, $4.653 billion; Navy, $3.269 billion; Air Force (not yet separated from the Army), $829 million. For the President's original budget request, as well as the strength of the Services on 30 June 1947, see Ch. 1, pp. 11–13.
3. *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army, 1948*, p. 6.
4. The manpower situation in the Army was in fact far worse than indicated in this table. The administration had evidently cut back the authorized strength to reflect the shortage of men or money, or both. The objective considered necessary by the Department of the Army was 667,000, ibid.
5. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 374–377. For the Air Force unit strength in January 1948, see *First Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1948*, p. 67.
6. (U) JCS 1849, 11 Mar 48, CCS 320.2 (5–1–45) sec 1. Joint war plans are discussed below (Ch. 9).
7. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 393. On 14 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally approved JCS 1849 and informed the Secretary of Defense of their decision. This was apparently merely an administrative step to complete action on the paper, because they had already given the Secretary their recommendation on 12 March.
8. Ibid., p. 394.
9. *Public Papers, Truman, 1948*, pp. 185–186.
10. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 436.
11. *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1949*, pp. 633–636, 640. Hearings, *Military Functions, National Defense Establishment Appropriations Bill for 1949*, Subcom of H. Com on Appropriations, 80th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 28, 55. Hearings, *Department of the Navy Appropriations Bill for 1949*, Subcom of H. Com on Appropriations, 80th Cong, 2d sess, p. 131.
12. *NY Times*, 26 Mar 48, p. 3. *First Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1948*, p. 141. The $500 million for UMT was in addition to the $9.803 billion requested for the Services and OSD in the original budget.
13. *Public Papers, Truman, 1948*, p. 198.
14. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 30 Mar 48, Encl B to JCS 1796/11, 7 Apr 48, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 8.
15. (U) Memo for Rec, DepDJS, no subj., 3 Oct 47, same file, sec 6.
16. (U) JCS 1800/1, 23 Oct 47; (U) JCS 1800/2, 17 Nov 47; (U) JCS 1800/4, 16 Dec 47; (U) JCS 1800/5, 7 Jan 48; (U) Dec On JCS 1800/5, 19 Feb 48; same file.
17. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Allocation of Fiscal Year 1949 Budget Increases," 16 Apr 48 (derived from JCS 1796/11), CCS 452 US (8–1–47) sec 5.
18. Goldberg, *History of the United States Air Force*, p. 106.
19. *Survival in the Air Age, A Report by the President's Air Policy Commission* (1948), pp. 3–36.
20. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Present and Future Aircraft Requirements of the Armed Services," 11 Dec 47, and Encl "Letter to the President's Air Policy Commission" (both derived from JCS 1796/6, 10 Dec 47), CCS 452 US (8–1–47) sec 3.
21. OSD Press Release, 25 Mar 48, App to JCS 1796/10, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 8.
22. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 27 Mar 48, Encl to JCS 1796/10, 1 Apr 48, same file.
23. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 8 Apr 48, Encl to JCS 1796/12, 9 Apr 48, same file.
24. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 412–416, 418. The testimony by Spaatz and Symington before the House Armed Services Committee, which had the appearance of an appeal to Congress over the head of their lawful superior, may not have been in direct contradiction of his wishes. See the Diary entry for 19 April 1948, where Forrestal records: "I said General Spaatz and Mr. Symington would have to decide for themselves later on as to the testimony that they would give on this other subject [the $822 million addition to the Supplemental Appropriation bill]."

25. (U) JCS 1796/14, 11 Apr 48; (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 17 Apr 48, Encl to JCS 1796/16, 19 Apr 48; CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 8.

26. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 17 Apr 48, Encl to JCS 1796/16, 19 Apr 48, same file.

27. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 417.

28. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 418. *NY Times*, 22 Apr 48, p. 13 (text of Forrestal testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee).

29. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 429–430.

30. Ibid., pp. 435–437.

31. (U) Ltr, Pres to Speaker of the House, Transmitting Supplemental Appropriation Estimates for the National Military Establishment, 13 May 48, *Public Papers, Truman, 1948*, p. 255.

32. (U) *Second Report of the Secretary of Defense, FY 1949*, p. 93.

Chapter 7. The FY 1950 Budget: Rearmament Falls Short

1. Warner Schilling, "The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950," in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets* (1962), is an account of the preparation of the FY 1950 budget based entirely on published sources. It is particularly useful for a description of prevailing public and congressional opinions against which the budget was shaped, and makes it clear that the President's policy of rigid fiscal limits on defense spending commanded widespread approval.

2. "Luncheon Meeting Called by SecDef," 20 Mar 48, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 7.

3. See Ch. 6.

4. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 435–437. See Ch. 6, pp. 109–110.

5. (TS) Memo, SecDef to ExecSecy NSC, "Appraisal of the Degree and Character of Military Preparedness Required by the World Situation," 10 Jul 48; (TS) Ltr, SecDef to Pres, 10 Jul 48; both circulated as (TS) NSC 20, 12 Jul 48, and Encl to (TS) JCS 1903, 13 Jul 48; CCS 381 (5–13–45) sec 3.

6. (TS) NSC 7, 30 Mar 48, Encl to JCS 1860, 1 Apr 48, CCS 092 USSR (3–27–45) sec 27.

7. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Soviet-Directed World Communism," 16 Apr 48 (derived from JCS 1860/1, as amended by Dec On, and JCS 1860/2, 3, 4), same file. (TS) Memo, SecDef to ExecSecy NSC, 17 Apr 48, same file, sec 28.

8. See Ch. 1, p. 6.

9. (George F. Kennan), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. XXV, No. 4 (July 1947), pp. 566–582.

10. (TS) Policy Planning Staff, Dept of State, "U.S. Objectives with Respect to Russia," Encl to NSC 20/1, 18 Aug 48, Encl to (TS) JCS 1903/1, 27 Aug 48, CCS 381 (5–13–45) sec 3.

11. (TS) Draft Rept by NSC, "U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security," 2 Nov 48, Encl to (TS) NSC 20/3, 2 Nov 48 (JCS 1903/3, 5 Nov 48), CCS 381 (5–13–45) sec 4.

12. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security," 15 Nov 48 (derived from JCS 1903/4, 8 Nov 48); (TS) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, same subj, 16 Nov 48; same file. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Existing International Commitments Involving the Possible Use of Armed Forces," 2 Nov 48 (derived from JCS 1881/1), circulated to NSC as NSC 35, CCS 370 (5–25–48) sec 2.

13. (TS) NSC 20/4, 23 Nov 48; (TS) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, "U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security," 26 Nov 48, CCS 381 (5–13–45) sec 4.

14. See Ch. 6, p. 107.

15. (U) JCS 1800/1, 23 Oct 47; JCS 1800/2, 17 Nov 47; JCS 1800/5, 7 Jan 48; CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 6.

16. (TS) JCS 1800/8 and Dec On, 20 and 24 Jul 48; same file. Hearings, *National Military Establishment Appropriations Bill for 1950*, Subcom of H. Com. on Appropriations, 81st Cong, 1st sess, Part III, pp. 39–42 (hereafter, H. Hrgs, *NME Appropriations for 1950*).

17. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 17 Jul 48, Encl to JCS 1800/7, 20 Jul 48, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 9.

18. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Formulation of the FY 1950 Budget for National Defense," 24 Jul 48 (derived from JCS 1800/8 and 1800/9), CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 10. Navy manpower figures represent average strengths; those for the other Services a single figure for FY 1950, which the source did not identify as "beginning," "average," or "end."

19. H. Hrgs, *NME Appropriations for 1950*, Part I, pp. 16–17; Part II, pp. 15–17; Part III, pp. 38–42.

20. The validity of the ceiling was affirmed in a memo from the Director, BOB, to SecDef on 16 Jul 48 and in a letter from the President on 26 Jul 48. Hearings, *National Military Establishment Appropriations Bill for 1950*, Subcom of S. Com on Appropriations, 81st Cong, 1st sess, p. 16; *National Security Organization, A Report with Recommendations*, prepared for the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (1949), p. 38.

21. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 450. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Formulation of the FY 1950 Budget for National Defense" 24 Jul 48; (U) Ltr, CNO to VADM Robert B. Carney, 31 Jul 48, Ser 154P00; (U) Memo, CSA to MG George J. Richards, "Designation of Authority," 6 Aug 48; CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 10.

22. H. Hrgs., *NME Appropriations for 1950*, Part I, p. 17.

23. (U) "Analysis of the Armed Services 1950 Budget," n.d., no author, CCS 370 (8–19–45) B.P. 2.

24. This was FLEETWOOD. See Ch. 9.

25. (TS) JCS Transcript of Mtg, 2 Oct 48, at 0930; (TS) Rec of Mtg, 3 Oct 48; CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 10, pt 1. (TS) "Tentative Allocation Under Special Concept," Tab to "Secretary of Defense Budget Meeting with the Three Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," 4 Oct 48, same file, BP 2.

26. Admiral Denfeld was evidently referring to FLEETWOOD, but he overlooked the fact that that plan did not envision direct defense of Western Europe. See Ch. 9.

27. These Navy views of strategy were to become a matter of public controversy and congressional inquiry during the summer and fall of 1949 in the "B–36 versus Super-Carrier" dispute. See Ch. 10.

28. (TS) "Secretary of Defense Budget Meeting with the Three Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," 4 Oct 48, CCS 370 (8–19–45) BP pt 2.

29. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 498.

30. (TS) Minutes, JCS Mtg, 5 Oct 48, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 10, pt 1. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Budget for Fiscal Year 1950," 6 Oct 48, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 10.

31. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, "1949–50 Budget," 6 Oct 48, same file.

32. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Memorandum dated 6 October 1948 from the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1949–50 Budget," 7 Oct 48, with Encls (Memos, CSA, CSAF, CNO to SecDef, 7 Oct 48) same file.

33. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, no sub, 8 Oct 48, same file.

34. (U) Memos, SecDef to Secs Army, Navy, Air Force, no sub, 14 Oct 48, same file.

35. (TS) SM–110–72 to GEN McNarney, MG Richards, VADM Carney, 14 Oct 48 (derived from JCS 1800/12), CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 10.

36. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 502–506.

37. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 29 Oct 48, Encl to JCS 1800/13, 30 Oct 48, CCS 370 (8–19–45), sec 11.

38. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Allocation of Funds for 1950 Budget," 8 Nov 48, Encl to JCS 1800/14, same file. The only evidence that this memo was actually sent is in the reply thereto cited in fn 39, below.

39. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Allocation of Funds for 1950 Budget," 9 Nov 48, Encl to JCS 1800/15, same file.

40. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Allocation of Funds for FY 1950 Budget," 15 Nov 48 (derived from JCS 1800/17), same file.

41. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 17 Nov 48, Encl to JCS 1800/19, 18 Nov 48, same file.

42. (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 31 Oct 48, Dept of State, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. I, pp. 644–647. (TS) Msg, SecState in Paris to ActSecState, 8 Nov 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. I, p. 655. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 500–502.

43. (TS) Ltr, SecDef to Pres, 1 Dec 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. I, pp. 669–672.

44. (TS) Ibid.

45. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 536.

46. H. Hrgs, *NME Appropriations for 1950*, Part I, pp. 13, 18, 20.

47. H. Hrgs, *NME Appropriations for 1950*, Part III, p. 43; Part II, pp. 103–105; S. Hrgs, *National Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1950*, pp. 80, 90.

48. *Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1951*, Subcom of H. Com on Appropriations, 81st Cong, 2d sess, pp. 293, 1313, 1769. (Hereafter S. Hrgs, *DOD Appropriations 1951.*)

Chapter 8. The FY 1951 Military Budget: Rearmament Is Cut Back

1. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S Truman, 1949* (1964), p. 56 (hereafter cited as *Public Papers, Truman, 1949*.

2. S. Hearings, *DOD Appropriations 1951*, p. 680. GEN Eisenhower's appointment was officially announced on 11 Feb 49, after he had already begun his duties (*NY Times*, 12 Feb 49, p. 1). From the beginning, GEN Eisenhower was referred to, and addressed as, "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," though he did not formally bear the title. The former presiding officer, ADM Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief (see Ch. 1), was no longer an active participant in JCS affairs; his health was failing and he retired shortly thereafter.

3. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 6 Dec 48, Encl B to JCS 1800/24, 13 Dec 48, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 12.

4. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Organization for Formulation of Future Budgets of the National Military Establishment," 5 Jan 49 (derived from JCS 1800/24), same file, sec 13.

5. OFFTACKLE is discussed in Ch. 9.

6. See Ch. 7, p. 122.

7. (U) JCS 1800/27, 7 Jan 49; (U) JCS 1800/29, 21 Jan 49; (U) JCS 1800/31, 8 Feb 49; (U) Memo, DCOS Ops USAF to DCNO (Ops), DCOS (P&P) USA, 7 Feb 49; CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 13. (U) JCS 1800/32, 11 Feb 49; (U) JCS 1800/36, 3 Mar 49; same file, sec 14.

8. GEN Eisenhower was probably referring to the Joint Emergency War Plan TROJAN, which the JCS had approved on 28 January 1949. This plan is discussed in Ch. 9.

9. (U) Memo, D. E. (Dwight Eisenhower) to GEN Bradley, ADM Denfeld, GEN Vandenberg, 28 Feb 49; (U) Memo, Secy, JCS to DJS, "Highlights of JCS Meeting After Your Departure," 2 Mar 49; CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 14.

10. (U) Table entitled "Recapitulation," 5 Jul 49 unidentified but evidently prepared (perhaps in OSD) as a summary of successive FY 1951 budget proposals, same file, sec 18. The estimates summarized above occupy the first three columns of this table. It is not clear whether they were a product of the JCS decision of 2 Mar 49 or whether they are the ones prepared as part of the "Red Brick" system described below.

11. The "Red Brick" estimates are listed in the fourth column of the table cited in the preceding note. Additional information about the "Red Brick" system is given in ADM Denfeld's memo cited in the next note. The origin of the nickname "Red Bricks" is not explained in available sources.

12. (U) Memo, CNO to JCS, Ser 00075P03, 4 May 49, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 15.

13. (U) Memo, GEN Eisenhower to SecDef, 14 Jul 49, same file, sec 18.

14. (U) USAF, Office of Comptroller, "Estimates #l, #2, #3, #4," 21 May 49, same file, sec 17. This document and the one cited in the following note are attached to the CNO memo of 23 May 49 cited in fn 16.

15. (TS) Dept of Army, "Preliminary Estimates FY 1951," 23 May 49, same file.

16. (U) Memo, CNO to SecDef, Ser 0045P04, 23 May 49, same file.

17. (U) Memo, Chm, BAC to GEN Eisenhower, Ser 3021P04, 15 Jun 49; (U) Handwritten office memo, DJS to GEN Eisenhower, 15 Jun 49; (U) Memo, Chm, BAC to DJS, Ser 00049P94, 20 Jun 49; same file, sec 18.

18. (U) Memo of Understanding, JCS BAC, 18 Jun 49, same file. The relationship of the "Ike I" forces to the "four estimates," and the extent to which they are to be attributed to General Eisenhower individually rather than to the Joint Chiefs of Staff collectively, cannot be determined from available sources.

19. (U) Table, "Recapitulation," 5 Jul 49, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 18.

20. Ibid.

21. (U) Memo, Chm, JCS BAC to DJS, Ser 00050P04, 20 Jun 49, same file.

22. (U) Memo, GEN Eisenhower to Chm, JCS BAC, 21 Jun 49, same file.

23. (U) Memo, Chm, BAC to GEN Eisenhower, Ser 0003029P04, 27 Jun 49, same file.

24. (U) Memos, Chm, JCS BAC to GEN Eisenhower, Ser 0003029P04, 27 Jun 49; Army Member JCS BAC to GEN Eisenhower, "Evaluation of Forces Ike I and Ike II," 27 Jan 49; Air Force Member JCS BAC to DJS, "Air Force Comments on Evaluation of Forces Ike I and Ike II," 27 Jun 49; same file.

25. Testimony of SecDef and GEN Eisenhower, S. Hrgs, *DOD Appropriations 1951*, pp. 2–3, 680–681.

26. (U) Statement by Dir BOB in "Discussion Following Budget Presentation," 21 Oct 49, CCS 370 (8–15–45) sec 20.

27. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Requirements for Fiscal Year 1951," 18 May 49, same file, sec 17; S. Hrgs, *DOD Appropriations, 1951*, pp. 680–681; Hearings, Military Situation in the Far East, S. Com on Armed Services and Foreign Affairs, 82d Cong, 1st sess, pt 4, pp. 2597–2598. The date when the new ceiling was announced is unknown, but it must have been in late June or early July 1949.

28. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, Secys Army, Navy, Air Force, "Preparation of Fiscal Year 1951 Budget, 5 Jul 49, same file, sec 18. Testimony of GEN Eisenhower, S. Hrgs, *DOD Appropriations for 1951*, pp. 681–682.

29. (U) Memo, Secy JCS to SecDef, "Forces for Fiscal Year 1951 Program," 2 Aug 49, and Encls thereto: Memo, CNO to SecDef, 27 Jul 49; Memo, CSA to SecDef, 30 Jul 49; Memo, DCOS, Ops, USAF to SecDef, n.d.; CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 18.

30. (U) Memo, GEN Eisenhower to SecDef, no title, 14 Jul 49, same file.

31. PL 216, 81st Congress. For the background of the law and the JCS role in its formulation, see (U) JCS Hist Div, "Major Changes in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," 1942–1969, pp. 21–27. See also Walter Millis, *Arms and the State* (1958), pp. 233–234.

32. (U) Ltr, SecDef to Pres, 15 Aug 49, Encl to Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Budget Estimates for Fiscal Year 1951," CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 19.

33. (TS) Memo, W.J. McNeil to CJCS et al., 20 Sep 49, Encl to JCS 1800/56, 22 Sep 49, same file.

34. Harry S Truman, Budget Message to Congress, *Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S Truman, 1950 (1965)*, pp. 61-63. Hearings, *Defense Department Appropriatons for 1951*, Defense Subcom of H. Com on Appropriations, 81st Cong, 2d sess, pp. 106, 196, 1216, 1726.

35. Figures for December 1949 are taken from *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1 Jan–30 Jun 50*, p. 206.

36. These events are fully recounted in Chs. 1 and 2 of *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1950–1952*.

Chapter 9. Strategic Planning

1. Quoted in (U) JCS 1800, 27 Aug 47, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 6.

2. (C) JWPC 496, 16 Jul 47, CCS 381 USSR (3–2–46) sec 6.

3. (C) PM–573 to JWPC, 29 Aug 47, same file.

4. (TS) JSPC 846/6, 20 Nov 47, CCS 452 US (8–1–47) sec 1. For the Finletter Commission and the JCS response thereto, see Ch. 6.

5. (TS) JSPC 846/6, 20 Nov 47, same file. (TS) JSPC 499/2, 3 Dec 47, same file, sec 2. Notices of decision, 5 and 10 Dec 47, same file.

6. (TS) JSPC 500/2, 8 Mar 48, CCS 381 USSR (3–2–46) sec 11.

7. (TS) JSPG 496/4, 11 Feb 48, same file, sec 10. (TS) JCS 1844, 9 Mar 48; (TS) JCS 1844/1, 17 Mar 48; same file, sec 12; (TS) JCS Agenda, 10 Mar 48; (TS) Memo for Record, no subj, 10 Mar 48; Jt Sect File, Decisions–JCS, 29 May 1947 thru Dec 1949.

8. (TS) App to Encl to JCS 1844/1, 17 Mar 48, same file, sec 12. (TS) JSPG 496/4, 11 Feb 48, same file, sec 10.

9. (TS) Memo for Record, Secy, JCS, "1844/1," 5 Apr 48, CCS 381 USSR (3–2–46) sec 13.

10. (TS) JCS 1844/2, 6 Apr 48, CCS 381 USSR (3–2–46) sec 13.

11. (TS) JCS 1844/3, 27 Apr 48, same file. General Spaatz was evidently referring to the combined US-UK-Canada staff conference that began on 12 April, as described in the ensuing paragraph.

12. (TS) JSPC 877, 22 Apr 48, same file.

13. (TS) JCS 1844/4, 6 May 48 and Dec On, 19 May 48, same file. (TS) JCS 1844/6, 13 May 48, same file, sec 15. An elaborated but basically unchanged statement of strategy taken from BROILER was added to HALFMOON on 28 Jul 48 by JCS 1844/10, 18 Jun 48 and Dec On, 28 Jul 48, same file, sec 17.

14. (TS) JCS 1844/13, 21 Jul 48, and Dec On, 22 Jul 48, same file, sec 18. (TS) SMs–10545 to CSA, 10546 to CNO, 10547 to CSAF, all 24 Jul 48, same file, sec 19. (TS) Corrig, to JCS 1844 series, 28 Oct 48, same file, sec 23.

15. The major debate over strategic concepts is taken up in Ch. 10.

16. (TS-RD) JCS 1974, 13 Dec 48 and Dec On, 23 Dec 48, CCS 373.11 (12–14–48) sec 1. The atomic annex to TROJAN was completed before the basic plan.

17. (TS) App C to JCS 1844/32, 29 Dec 48, CCS 381 USSR (3–2–46) sec 26.

18. (TS) JCS 1844/32, 29 Dec 48 and Dec On, 28 Jan 49, same file, sec 26. The establishment of Israel and the first Arab-Israeli war are treated in Ch. 3.

19. (TS) SM–169–49 to JSPC, 31 Jan 49 (derived from Dec On JCS 1844/32, 28 Jan 49), CCS 381 USSR (3–2–46) sec 28. The FY 1950 Military budget is treated in Ch. 7.

20. (TS) JSPC 877/39, 26 Jan 49, same file, sec 27. (TS) JSPC 877/43, 15 Feb 49; (TS) JSPC 877/44, 16 Feb 49, same file, sec 29.

21. GEN Eisenhower's role is explained in Ch. 8.

22. (TS) Memo, DJS to GENs Wedemeyer and Norstad and ADM Struble, 25 Feb 49, and Att thereto, same file, sec 30.

23. (TS) SM–734–49 to JSPC, 26 Apr 49 (Encl to JCS 1844/37, 27 Apr 49), same file, sec 31.

24. (TS) Memo, CJCS to SecDef, "Split Views on New Emergency War Plan," 3 Sep 49; (TS) DM–187 to JCS, 6 Sep 49; (TS) Memo, CNO to SecDef, Ser 000480P30, 8 Sep 49; same file, sec 38. (TS) JSPC 877/58, 10 May 49; (TS) JSPC 877/59, 26 May 49; same file, sec 32. (TS) JSPC 877/61, 10 Jun 49, same file, sec 33. (TS) JSPC 877/65, 15 Jul 49, same file, sec 34. (TS) JSPC 877/66, 5 Aug 49, same file, sec 36.

25. (TS) ABC 109, 3 Oct 49, same file, sec 39. (TS) JSPC 877/75, 12 Oct 49; (TS) JSPC 877/77, 25 Oct 49; same file, sec 40.

26. (TS) JCS 1844/46, 8 Nov 49, and Dec On, 8 Dec 49, same file, sec 41.

27. (TS) NSC 20/4, 23 Nov 48, CCS 381 (5–13–45) sec 4. This paper is treated in detail in Ch. 7.

28. (TS-RD) JCS 2056, 31 Aug 49, CCS 373.11 (12–14–48) sec 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff tentatively approved this Air Force target plan on 24 October 1949 subject to further study by the Joint Intelligence Committee. The Committee concluded that the plan was "satisfactory"; the Joint Chiefs of Staff "noted" this conclusion on 1 December 1949 and thus in effect approved the plan. (TS-RD) Dec On JCS 2056, 24 Oct 49; (TS) JCS 2056/3, 23 Nov 49, and Dec On, 1 Dec 49, same file.

29. (TS) JCS 1844/46, 8 Nov 49, and Dec On, 8 Dec 49, CCS 381 USSR (3–2–46) sec 41.

30. For the origin of the JSCP and the JSOP, see *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953–1954*, vol. IV, Ch. 6, and vol. V, Ch. 4.

31. (TS) SM–10701 to Ad Hoc Com (RADM M. B. Gardner, USN, MG Richard C. Lindsay, USAF, and BG Robert M. Bathurst, USA), 16 Aug 48 (derived from JCS 1920), CCS 381 USSR (3–2–46) sec 20. (TS) JCS 1920/1, 31 Jan 49, same file, sec 28. SM-833-49 to Ad Hoc Com, 6 May 49, same file, sec 31. (TS) JCS 1920/5, 19 Dec 49, and N/H of same, 13 Feb 51, same file, BP pt 3.

32. (U) Memo, Chm, Mun Bd to JCS, 12 Nov 47, Encl to JCS 1725/13, 14 Nov 47, CCS 004.04 (11–4–46) sec 7.

33. (U) Memo, Chm, Mun Bd to JCS, 21 Jan 48, Encl to JCS 1725/14, 23 Jan 48, same file.

34. (TS) Memo, JCS to Chm, Mun Bd, "Strategic Guidance for Industrial Mobilization Planning," 28 Jun 48 (derived from JCS 1725/19), same file, sec 9.

35. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 23 Jul 48, Encl to JCS 1909, 24 Jul 48, same file.

36. (U) JCS 1725/22 and Dec On, 3 Sep 48, CCS 004.04 (11–4–46) sec 11.

37. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Completion of Joint War Plan as Basis for Short-Range Mobilization Planning," 14 Sep 48 (derived from JCS 1725/25), same file, sec 12. One CVX "super carrier" was already under construction and became a major bone of contention in 1949, as described in Ch. 10.

38. (U) SM–11369 to CSA, CSAF, CNO, Chm, Mun Bd, 6 Dec 48 (derived from JCS 1725/27), CCS 004.04 (11–4–46) sec 14.

39. (U) Memo, Chm, Mun Bd to JCS, 17 Feb 49, Encl to JCS 1725/34, 19 Feb 49, same file, sec 15.

40. (U) SM–736–49 to CSA, CSAF, CNO, 27 Apr 49, and (U) SM–737–49 to JSPC, 27 Apr 49 (both derived from JCS 1725/42, same date), same file, sec 16.

41. (U) Memo, Dir, Statt, Mun Bd to JCS, 6 Jul 49, Encl to JCS 1725/45, 9 Jul 49, same file, sec 18.

42. (U) JCS 1725/48, 9 Aug 48; (U) JCS 1725/53, 31 Aug 49, and Dec On, 6 Oct 49, same file, sec 19.

43. (U) JCS 1725/47, 2 Aug 49, CCS 004.04 (11–4–46) BP pt 1–B.

44. (U) JCS 1725/62, 13 Oct 49, same file, sec 20. (U) JCS 1725/68, 9 Dec 49; (U) JCS 1725/70, 30 Dec 49, and Dec On, 20 Jan 50; same file, sec 21. (U) Dec On JCS 1725/47, 20 Jan 50, same file, BP pt 1–B. (C) SM–174–50 to CSA, CNO, and CSAF, 25 Jan 50, same file, sec 21.

45. (U) Ltr, Chm, Mun Bd to Secys Army, Navy, Air Force, "Accelerated Production Planning," 1 Feb 50, same file.

46. (TS) JCS 1725/103, 19 Jan 51 and Dec On, 29 Jan 51, same file, sec 31.

Chapter 10. Challenges to Strategy

1. "General Notes on the Question Naval Air—Air Force," 27 Oct 48, Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 513–514.

2. Ibid., p. 493. The war games were never held.

3. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 23 Oct 48, Encl to JCS 1952, 25 Oct 48; (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 25 Oct 48, Encl to JCS 1953, same date; CCS 373 (10–23–48) sec 1.

4. (TS) JCS 1952, 25 Oct 48; (TS) JCS 1953, 25 Oct 48, as amended by Corrigendum, 13 Jan 49, same file.

5. The intelligence in question consisted of agreed British-American estimates of Soviet capabilities and intentions, of Soviet economic strength and industrial position provided by the CIA, and of target information furnished by the Air Intelligence Division.

6. (TS) JCS 1953/1, 12 May 49, same file, BP 1.

7. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Evaluation of Effect on Soviet War Effort Resulting from the Strategic Air Offensive," 28 Jul 49 (derived from Dec On JCS 1953/1), same file, sec 4.

8. (TS) JCS 1952/1, 21 Dec 48, CCS 373 (10–23–48) sec 1.

9. (TS) JCS 1952/2, 11 Jan 49, same file.

10. (TS) JCS 1952/3, 21 Jan 49, same file.

11. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Evaluation of Current Strategic Air Offensive Plans," 17 Feb 49, (derived from JCS 1952/1), same file.

12. The Navy based its case at this time solely on military feasibility of the strategic air offensive. Political and moral questions would be raised at a later date after further budget cuts had resulted in additional reductions in Navy programs. See below, p.186.

13. (TS) JCS 1952/4, 3 Mar 49, CCS 373 (10–23–48) sec 2.

14. (TS) JCS 1952/7, 7 Apr 49, and Dec On, 14 Apr 49, same file. (U) Memo, DJS to Dir, WSEG, "Projects for Consideration by the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group," 15 Apr 49, CCS 334 WSEG (2–4–48) sec 2.

15. (TS) JCS 1952/8, 25 Aug 49, CCS 373 (10–23–48) sec 5.

16. (U) Ltr, SecDef to Congressman William E. Hess, 15 May 48, Encl to Ltr, SecDef to GEN Eisenhower, 15 Apr 49, CCS 561 (5–26–48). Paul Y. Hammond, "Super Carriers and B–36 Bombers, " in Harold Stein, ed., *American Civil-Military Decisions* (1963), pp. 468–470. See also Ch. 5, pp. 94–95.

17. A table appended with the JCS submission listed four large carriers (designated CVX), of which one was indicated as already in commission and the other three as "building."

18. (C) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Present and Future Aircraft Requirements of the Armed Services," 11 Dec 47 (derived from JCS 1796/6); (U) JCS 1796/7, 10 Dec 47; CCS 452 U.S. (8–1–47) sec 3. The Finletter Commission is discussed in Ch. 6.

19. (U) Memo for Record, MG Alfred M. Gruenther, "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," 26 Mar 48, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 7.

20. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 393. The tonnage of the super carrier was variously given as 65,000 or 80,000, the two figures presumably representing "standard" and "full load" displacement, respectively.

21. Hammond, *Super Carriers and B–36 Bombers*, p. 475.

22. (U) Hearings, *Sundry Legislation Affecting the Naval and Military Establishments*, H. Com on Armed Services, 80th Cong, 2d sess, pp. 6860, 6892–6893.

23. Typewritten account of speech by GEN Spaatz, apparently copied from a newspaper or perhaps intended as a press release, Att to office memo, "B" to MG Gruenther, 26 May 48, CCS 561 (5–26–48). The account of this speech in *NY Times*, 26 May 48, p. 50, is shorter and devotes most of its attention to the remarks of GEN Vandenberg, who spoke at the same meeting.

24. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Construction of 6A Carrier," 28 May 48, CCS 561 (5–26–48). The significance of the designation "6A" is unexplained. On 27 May President Truman told Admiral Leahy that he was under the impression that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved the super carrier in connection with the 1949 Service budgets. He added that "he had recently called in those fellows [the Joint Chiefs of Staff] on this business of presenting a united front to these questions and that he expected that that would be done." (U) Memo, Secy, JCS to DJS, 27 May 48, same file.

25. Hammond, *Super Carriers and B–36 Bombers*, pp. 481–482. Walter Millis, *Arms and the State* (1958), p. 240.

26. Testimony of Louis Johnson, Hearings, *National Defense Program, Unification and Strategy*, H. Com on Armed Services, 81st Cong, 1st sess, p. 619.

27. (U) Ltr, SecDef to GEN Eisenhower, 15 Apr 49, CCS 561 (5–26–48).

28. (U) Memo, GEN Eisenhower to GEN Bradley, GEN Vandenberg, ADM Denfeld, GEN Gruenther, 20 Apr 49; (U) Memo, CSA to SecDef "Construction of the Super Aircraft Carrier USS *United States*," 22 Apr 49; same file.

29. (U) Memo, CNO to SecDef, "The USS *United States*," 22 Apr 49, same file.

30. (U) Memo, CSA to SecDef, "Construction of the Super Aircraft Carrier USS *United States*," 22 Apr 49, same file.

31. (U) Memo, CSAF to SecDef, "The CVA–58 Project," 23 Apr 49, same file.

32. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 23 Apr 49, same file.

33. Johnson Testimony, H. Hrgs, *National Defense Program, Unification and Strategy*, pp. 619–620. (U) Memo, SecDef to SecNav, 23 Apr 49, CCS 561 (5–26–48).

34. Ltr, SecNav to SecDef, 26 Apr 49, in H. Hrgs, *National Defense Program, Unification and Strategy*, pp. 622–623.

35. (U) Ltr, ActgSecNav to SecDef, 4 May 49, Encl to (U) Memo, W. J. McNeil to JCS, 16 May 49; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Modification of Navy Shipbuilding Program for FY 1950," 10 Jan 49; CCS 561 (5–26–48).

36. (U) Memo, SecDef to Secs Army, Navy, Air Force, and JCS, "Modification of Navy Shipbuilding Program for Fiscal Year 1950," 21 Jun 49, same file.

The War Council, set up by the National Security Act of 1947, consisted of the Secretary of Defense as Chairman, the Service Secretaries, and the Service Chiefs. In the 1949 Amendments to the Act, the name was changed to Armed Forces Policy Council and the JCS Chairman was added as a member.

37. The Worth document is printed in Hearings, *Investigation of the B–36 Bomber Program*, H. Com on Armed Services, 81st Cong, 1st sess, pp. 15–20. See also the account in Hammond, *Super Carriers and B–36 Bombers*, pp. 496–498.

38. (U) H. Hrgs, *Investigation of the B–36 Bomber Program*, pp. 42–88.

39. (U) Memo, SecAir Force to SecDef, 28 Jan 49, App A to JCS 1979, 3 Feb 49, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 13; (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 12 Feb 49, Encl to JCS 1979/2, 14 Feb 49; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Release of Funds to the Department of the Air Force," 21 Feb 49 (derived from JCS 1979/3); same file, sec 14.

40. H. Hrgs, *The National Defense Program, Unification and Strategy*, pp. 47–48; H. Hrgs, *Investigation of the B–36 Bomber Program*, p. 19.

41. H. Hrgs, *Investigation of the B–36 Bomber Program*, pp. 88–90, 479. (U) JCS 1979/4, 4 Apr 49, and Dec on, 9 Apr 49, CCS 370 (8–19–45) sec 14.

42. Hammond, *Super Carriers and B–36 Bombers*, p. 497; House Resolution 234, 81st Cong, 1st sess, 8 Jun 49.

43. Report No. 1470, "Investigation of the B–36 Bomber Program," H. Com on Armed Services, 81st Cong, 2d sess, p. 2. (Hereafter, *B–36 Report*.)

44. *B–36 Report*, p. 33

45. (U) Memo, Sec, OSD Staff Council to DJS, 13 Jun 49; (U) Memo for Record, DepSecy JCS, "Congressional Investigation of the B–36 Program," 21 Jun 49; CCS 373 (10–23–48) sec 2.

46.(U) Undated extract of Minutes of War Council, filed under date 17 June but evidently of the meeting of 22 June, same file. See (TS) Memo for Record, "Congressional Investigation of the B–36 Bomber Program," 23 Jun 49, same file, which states that JCS "agreed that General Gruenther should prepare a suggested answer to question #7 of the Vinson questionnaire, which the Chiefs were directed to prepare following discussion of the overall problem at the War Council meeting of 22 June."

47. (U) SM–1344–49 to ADM Denfeld, GEN Bradley, GEN Vandenberg, 16 Jul 49, same file. For evidence that the JCS statement was delivered to the House Armed Services Committee, see H. Hrgs, *Investigation of B–36 Bomber Program*, p. 170, and *National Defense Program, Unification and Strategy*, p. 453.

48. Hammond, *Super Carriers and B–36 Bombers*, pp. 498, 505–506.

49. H. Hrgs, *The National Defense Program, Unification and Strategy*, pp. 2–3, 350.

50. H. Hrgs, *The National Defense Program, Unification and Strategy*, pp. 41–42.

51. For unofficial examples of extreme Air Force partisanship, see a group of three articles by William Bradford Huie in *Reader's Digest*, Dec 48, Jan 49, and Mar 49 (reprinted in H. Hrgs, *Investigation of B–26 Bomber Program*, pp. 579–591). On the effect of partisan Service publicity in exacerbating the Navy-Air Force disagreement, see Hammond, *Super Carriers and B–36 Bombers*, passim, esp. pp. 491–492.

52. Testimony of CPT F. M. Trapnell, LCDR E. W. Harrison, CDR W. I. Martin, CDR W. N. Leonard, and Mr. A. Hyatt, H. Hrgs, *The National Defense Program, Unification and Strategy*, pp. 132–166.

53. See above, pp. 173–174.

54. H. Hrgs, *The National Defense Program, Unification and Strategy*, p. 42.

55. Ibid, pp. 166–170.

56. Ibid., pp. 183–189.

57. Ibid., pp. 39–349, passim.

58. Admiral Denfeld's testimony is given in ibid., pp. 349–364.

59. H. Hrgs, *National Defense Program, Unification and Strategy*, pp. 350–353. ADM Denfeld was followed to the witness stand by GEN Clifton B. Cates, Commandant, USMC, who expressed similar views.

60. GEN Collins also testified, but he devoted his testimony largely to refuting the charge that the Army was trying to destroy the Marine Corps. Ibid., pp. 543 ff.

61. Ibid., pp. 522, 523.

62. Ibid., p. 456.

63. Ibid., p. 522.

64. Ibid., p. 457.

65. Ibid., pp. 456–457.

66. Ibid., p. 524.

67. Ibid., p. 528.

68. Secretary Johnson had, however, seen the memorandum in draft and had discussed the matter with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. See above, p. 179.

69. See Ch. 7.

70. H. Hrgs., *National Defense Program, Unification and Strategy*, pp. 356–361.

71. Report, *Unification and Strategy*, H. Com on Armed Services, H. Doc 600, 81st Cong, 1st sess, pp. 53–56. Eventually, in June 1952, Congress enacted legislation conferring upon the Commandant, US Marine Corps, co-equal status with the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the consideration of matters that directly concerned the Marine Corps. Rotation of the JCS Chairmanship was not made the subject of legislation, though it has been generally followed in practice.

72. *Public Papers, Truman, 1949*, pp. 535–536.

73. H. Hrgs, *National Defense Program, Unification and Strategy*, p. 614.

74. (TS) JCS 1952/11, 10 Feb 50, CCS 373 (10–23–48) BP 2C.

75. (TS) JCS 1953/6, 6 Mar 50 and Dec On, 24 Apr 50; (TS) JCS 1952/13, 30 Oct 50; same file, sec 6.

Chapter 11. Collective Defense of the Atlantic Community

1. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 130.

2. Lord Ismay, *NATO, The First Five Years, 1949–1954*, p. 7.

3. (U) Memo, Dir, EUR to SecState, 19 Jan 48, quoting Belgian Premier Spaak; (U) Msg, Paris 219 to State, 19 Feb 48, quoting Benelux note replying to British-French proposal; (U) Ed. Note summarizing a ltr, French Foreign Min to US SecState, 4 Mar 48, describing effects of Czech coup; Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948*, vol III, *Western Europe* (1974), pp. 6–9, 26–29, 38. Ismay, *NATO, The First Five Years*, p. 8. Peter Calvocoressi, *Survey of International Affairs, 1947–1948* (1952), pp. 107–108.

4. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs, 1947–1948* (1952), pp. 225–230.

5. *Documents on International Affairs, 1947–1948*, pp. 202–210.

6. (U) Ltr, UK Amb to SecState, 13 Jan 48, and Encl thereto: "Summary of a Memorandum Representing Mr. Bevin's Views on the Formation of a Western Union," *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol III, pp. 3–6.

7. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 243. (U) Ltr, SecState to UK Amb, 20 Jan 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol III, pp. 8–9.

8. (U) Dept of State Memcons, UK Amb and USecState, 27 Jan 48, 6 Feb 48; (U) Ltrs, USecState to UK Amb, 2 Feb 48, UK Amb to USecState, 6 Feb 48; *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol III, pp. 12–14, 21–23, 17–18, 19–20.

9. *Public Papers, Truman, 1948*, p. 184.

10. (U) NSC 9, 13 Apr 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. III, pp. 85–88.

11. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "The position of the United States with Respect to Support for Western Union and Other Related Free Countries," 23 Apr 48 (derived from JCS 1868/1); (TS) Encl and App to JCS 1868/1, 17 Apr 48 as amended by Dec On, 22 Apr 48; CCS 092 W. Eur. (3–12–48) sec 2.

12. (U) Msg, UK Foreign Secy and French Foreign Min to SecState, 17 Apr 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol III, p. 91. Acheson had succeeded Marshall as Secretary of State on 21 January 1949.

13. (U) Dept of State Memcon, Lovett, Marshall, Vandenberg, Dulles, 27 Apr 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol III, pp. 104–108.

14. NSC 9/1, an earlier revision, was overtaken by these events and was withdrawn.

15. (U) NSC 9/2, 11 May 48, CCS 092 W. Eur. (3–12–48) sec 2.

16. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Support for Western Union and Other Related Free Countries," 19 May 48 (derived from JCS 1868/6); (U) Encl to JCS 1868/6, 17 May 48; same file.

17. (U) Note by ExecSecy to NSC, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Support for Western Union . . . ," 28 Jun 48, same file, sec 3.

18. Senate Resolution 239, *Congressional Record*, vol. 94, pt. 6, 11 Jun 48, p. 7847.

19. (U) NSC 9/3, 28 Jun 48, App to Encl to JCS 1868/10, 3 Jul 48; *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol III, pp. 140–141.

20. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 25 Jun 48, Encl to JCS 1868/7, 28 Jun 48; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "U.S. Military Representation with the Five-Power Permanent Military Committee," (derived from JCS 1868/9), 1 Jul 48; (U) N/H, JCS 1868/9, 7 Jul 48; (TS) Dec On JCS 1868/11, 8 Jul 48; CCS 092 W. Eur. (3–12–48) sec 3.

21. (TS) SM–10447 to US Reps Attending London Five Power Military Talks on the Western Union of Nations (derived from JCS 1868/11), 9 Jul 48, same file, sec 4.

22. See Ch. 9.

23. (TS) MemCon, US JCS to Reps UK COS, 16 Jun 48, CCS 092 W. Eur. (3–12–48) sec 2.

24. (U) Att to DM–48 to Secy, Br Jt Svcs Mission, 23 Jul 48, same file, sec 4.

25. (U) Aide Memoire, UK CofS to US JCS, "Command Relationships," n.d., Encl to Memo, Secy, JCS to GENs Wedemeyer and Norstad and ADM Struble, same subj, 14 Aug 48; (U) Encl to SM-10699 to JCS, 16 Aug 48; same file, sec 5. (U) Telcon, DATT 1084, SecA, CSA, USCINCEUR, 25 Aug 48, same file, sec 6.

26. (U) Memo for Record, OSD, "Newport Conference—Decisions with Respect to Command," 23 Aug 48; (TS) Memo, SecState to Pres, "Western Union Organization of Defensive Forces," 23 Aug 48; (U) Memo, Pres to SecState, 23 Aug 48; (U) SM-10762 to Secy, Br Jt Svcs Mission, 24 Aug 48; CCS 092 W. Eur. (3-12-48) sec 5. (U) Telcon DATT 1084, SecA, CSA, USCINCEUR, 25 Aug 48, same file, sec 6.

27. (U) Msgs, DELWU 40 to DA, 5 Sep 48, CM IN 963, same file; DELWU 54 to DA, 25 Sep 48, and DELWU 60 to DA, 29 Sep 48, same file, sec 8. Calvocoressi, *Survey of International Affairs, 1947–1948*, p. 113.

28. (U) Msg, DA WARX 90395 to CINCEUR, 062341Z Oct 48, same file, sec 9.

29. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 26 Oct 48, w/Encl (Encl and App to JCS 1868/26), same file. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "United States Participation in the Permanent Western Union Chiefs of Staff Committee," 13 Dec 48, (derived from JCS 1868/33), same file, sec 12. (TS) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 23 Dec 48, Encl to JCS 1868/43, 3 Jan 49, same file, sec 14.

30. (TS) Army Gen Staff, P&O Div, "Brief of Outline of Short-Term Plan (1 July 1949) for Defense of Western Europe (WE/HQ/1/147, 25 Jan 49)," Encl to (TS) Memo, OSD (LTC Twitchell) to GEN Gruenther, "Outline of Short-Term Plan for Defense of Western Europe," 7 Mar 49, CCS 092 W. Eur. (3-12-48) sec 17.

31. (TS) JCS 1868/63, 8 Mar 49, same file. (TS) Memo, OSD (LTC Twitchell) to DJS, "Outline of Short-Term Plan for Defense of Western Europe," 18 Apr 49, same file, sec 20.

32. (TS) Memo, ActgSecState to ExecSecy, NSC, "Developments with Respect to Western Union," 5 Nov 48 (Encl to JCS 1868/28, 10 Nov 48), same file, sec 10. For a fuller account of the initial negotiations, see (U) records of "Washington Exploratory Talks on Security," evidently prepared by DepSecState, summarizing meetings held on 6–9 Jul 48. *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol III, pp. 148–160, 163–182; also (TS) document, "Washington Exploratory Conversations on Security," n.d. (filed under date 9 Jul 48, in same file), which records a general preliminary agreement reached by the delegates.

33. Two alternative definitions of the "North Atlantic Area" were incorporated into the draft, reflecting the unresolved dispute over the inclusion of French North Africa (see text below); according to one definition, the area would include northwestern Africa and the western Mediterranean. Both definitions, however, were less inclusive than the one in NSC 9 to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had objected. Neither made any reference to islands, and both specified the Tropic of Cancer as the southern limit of the waters and the air of the North Atlantic Area.

34. (TS) Memo, ActgSecState to ExecSecy, NSC, 5 Nov 48, cited in fn 32. (U) Rpt of Working Group on Washington Security Talks, 24 Dec 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. III, pp. 333–343.

35. (TS) Ltr, ActgSecState to SecDef, 28 Dec 48, App to Encl B to JCS 1868/40; (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 30 Dec 48, Encl B to JCS 1868/40; CCS 092 W. Eur. (3-12-48) sec 10.

36. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "North Atlantic Pact," 5 Jan 49, (derived from JCS 1868/40), CCS 092 W. Eur. (3-12-48) sec 14.

37. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 276–277, 280–282.

38. Ibid., pp. 277–279.

39. Hearings, "North Atlantic Treaty," S. Com on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong, 1st sess, pt 1, pp. 285–295.

40. Ismay, *NATO, The First Five Years, 1949–1954*, pp. 12–19.

41. (U) JCS 1868/53, 1 Feb 49, CCS 092 W. Eur. (3-12-48) sec 15 A.

42. (TS) UK CofS C.O.S. (49) 92, 18 Mar 49, Encl to Memo, Secy, Br Jt Services Mission RDC 5/76 to DJS, 24 Mar 49, same file, sec 18.

43. (TS) Encl to Memo, Secy, Br Jt Services Mission RDC 5/85 to DJS, 10 May 49, same file, sec 21.

44. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Proposed Military Organization Under the North Atlantic Treaty," 23 Jun 49 (derived from JCS 1868/87), same file, sec 23.

45. (U) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 29 Jun 49, Encl to JCS 1868/89, CCS 092 W. Eur. (3-12-48) sec 24; (TS) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 22 Jul 49, Encl B to JCS 1868/93; same file, sec 25.

46. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Proposed Military Organization under the North Atlantic Treaty" (derived from JCS 1868/93), 2 Aug 49, same file.

47. The other nation, Iceland, had no military forces.

48. (U) JCS 1868/100, 18 Aug 49, as amended by Dec On, 19 Aug 49, same file, sec 26.

49. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Proposed Military Organization under the North Atlantic Treaty," 22 Aug 49, (derived from JCS 1868/100), same file.

50. (TS) Ltrs, SecState to SecDef, 15 Aug 49; SecDef to SecState, 18 Aug 49; Encls to JCS 1868/101, 23 Aug 49; (TS) DM–183 to GENs Bradley, Vandenberg and Collins and ADM Denfeld, 23 Aug 49; same file. Ismay, *NATO, The First Five Years*, p. 23.

51. (TS) Extract from Msg, UK CofS to Br Jt Services Mission, 29 Aug 49, CCS 092 W. Eur. (3–12–48) sec 27.

52. (S) Memo, Secy Br Jt Services Mission to DJS, RDC 5/109, 7 Sep 49, same file.

53. (S) Memo, ADM Glover to GEN Gruenther, "Atlantic Pact Military Program," 7 Sep 49, same file.

54. (TS) Dep of State Memcon, Achilles, Unger, Luciolli, "Italian Views on the Pact Organization," 23 Aug 49, same file, sec 26.

55. (S) IGPO D–5, Draft No. 2, "Report of International Working Group on North Atlantic Treaty Organization," 12 Sep 49, Encl "A" to JCS 1868/104, 13 Sep 49, same file, sec 28.

56. (TS) JCS 1868/104, 13 Sep 59, and Dec On, 16 Sep 49; (S) JCS 1868/109, 17 Sep 49; CCS 092 W. Eur. (3–12–48) sec 28.

57. (TS) Dept of State Memcon, Bevin, Acheson and others, "Conversation with Mr. Bevin on North Atlantic Pact," 14 Sep 49, same file.

58. (S) Memo, North Atlantic Treaty Team to ADM Davis, "Extract from Aide Memoire discussed with Mr. Achilles Yesterday," 14 Sep 49, same file.

59. (TS) Dept of State Memcon, Bevin, Acheson, and others, "Conversation with Mr. Bevin on North Atlantic Pact," 14 Sep 49, same file.

60. (U) NAC Council D-1/1, D-1/2, D-1/3, all 17 Sep 49, Encls to JCS 1868/122, 29 Sep 49, CCS 092 W. Eur. (3–12–48) sec 29.

61. (U) JCS 1868/135, 27 Oct 49, and Dec On, same date, same file, sec 33.

62. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Draft Terms of Reference for North Atlantic Military Production and Supply Board" (derived from JCS 1868/127), 4 Oct 49, same file, sec 30. (TS) No originator, "Background on North Atlantic Treaty Organization," n.d. [ca. 8 Dec 49], same file, sec 37.

63. (TS) Document ca., 8 Dec 49, cited in last note. (U) No originator, "Subjects Proposed for Discussion by the Defense Committee, North Atlantic Treaty Organization," 2d draft, 26 Sep 49, App and Ann to JCS 1868/118; (U) JCS 1868/118, 27 Sep 49 and Dec On, 29 Sep 49, same file, sec 29. (C) DM–203 to JCS, 30 Sep 49; (U) JCS 1868/128 (Red Band), 3 Oct 49; same file, sec 30.

64. (TS) JCS 1868/130, 3 Oct 49, and Dec On, 11 Oct 49, CCS 092 W. Eur. (3–12–48) sec 31. (TS) Encl B to JCS 1868/136, 15 Oct 49; (U) JCS 2073, 18 Oct 49; MC 3, 19 Oct 49, same file; sec 32. (TS) JCS 2073/1, 22 Nov 49, same file, sec 35; (U) JCS 2073/2, 13 Dec 49, same file, sec 37. (TS) NAC, Summary Report of 3d Session, 11 Jan 50, same file, sec 39.

65. (TS) JCS 1868/136, 15 Oct 49, and Dec On, 25 Oct 49, same file, sec 32.

66. (TS) DM–226 to GENs Bradley, Vandenberg, Collins, ADM Sherman, 2 Nov 49, CCS 092 W. Eur. (3–12–48) sec 33A. (TS) N/H of JCS 1868/136, 8 Nov 49, same file, sec 32.

67. (TS) SG 13, Encl B to JCS 1868/169, 28 Dec 49, CCS 092 W. Eur. (3–12–48) sec 38. Encl B is SG 13/9, the revision of SG 13 incorporating national comments. But as these comments are indicated as "line-in, line-out" changes on the original text, it is possible to reconstruct SG 13 from it. SG 13 itself cannot now be located.

68. (TS) SG 13/9, Encl B to JCS 1868/169, 28 Dec 49, same file.

69. (TS) SM–2700–49 to US Rep SG, NATO, 30 Dec 49, same file, sec 39 (derived from JCS 1868/169, same file, sec 38).

70. (TS) SG 13/16, 4 Jan 50, originally Encl to JCS 2073/3, 16 Jan 50, same file, sec 40, but subsequently destroyed. Final changes made by the Standing Group in SG 13/9 are therefore impossible to determine.

71. (U) Msg, JCS to JCS Jt Rep EUR et al., WARX 98910, 26 Jan 50 (derived from JCS 2073/4), same file, sec 40.

72. (U) Ltr, CNO to AsstSecState (EUR), 21 Oct 49, same file, sec 32.

73. (TS) NATO Medium Term Defense Plan, 1 Jul 54, n.d., Encl to (TS) Memo, LTG Crittenberger to DJS, 3 Mar 50, CCS 092 W. Eur. (3–12–48) sec 42.

74. (TS) Memo, JCS to SG, NATO, "North Atlantic Treaty Organization Medium Term Defense Plan, 1 July 1954, Parts I and III," 22 Mar 50 (derived from JCS 2073/8), same file, sec 43.

75. (TS) Dept of State Paper, FMD B-2/2, 1 May 50, same file, sec 45; (TS) Draft Directive by SG to Reg Plan Grps, 3 May 50, App to Encl to JCS 2073/20, 8 May 50, same file, sec 46.

76. See Chs. 7–10 of *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1950–1952*.

Chapter 12. Military Assistance for NATO Countries

1. (U) NSC 14, 14 Jun 48, Encl B to JCS 1868/8, CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 12. DA, OCMH, MS, Byron Fairchild, "The US Army and the Military Assistance Program," Ch. 9, pp. 25–28.

2. Fairchild, "US Army and the Military Assistance Program," Ch. 9, pp. 23–25.

3. (U) NSC 14, 14 Jun 48, Encl B to JCS 1868/8, CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 12.

4. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 1 Jul 48 (derived from JCS 1868/8), 30 Jun 48, same file.

5. (TS) NSC, "Policies of the Government of the United States . . . Relating to the National Security, vol. I, 1947–1948," pp. 37–39, CCS 334 NSC (9–25–47) BP 1.

6. (U) NSC 9/3, 28 Jun 48, *Foreign Relations, 1949*, vol III, pp. 140–141. This paper is treated in more detail in Ch. 11.

7. (TS-GP 1) SANACC 360/11, 18 Aug 48, Encl to JCS 1925, 20 Aug 48, CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 13.

8. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Aid Priorities," 1 Nov 48 (derived from JCS 1925/1) same file, sec 14.

9. (TS-GP 1) SANACC, Decision Amending SANACC 360/11, 15 Mar 49, same file.

10. (U) JCS 1868/13, 12 Jul 48, CCS 092 W. Eur. (3–12–48) sec 4.

11. (U) JCS 1868/16, 5 Aug 48, same file, sec 5.

12. (U) JCS 1868/18, 3 Sep 48, same file, sec 6.

13. (U) JCS 1868/20, 17 Sep 48, same file.

14. (U) JCS 1868/29, 12 Nov 48, CCS 092 W. Eur. (3–12–48) sec 10. For COGWHEEL, see Ch. 9.

15. (U) JCS 1868/42, 31 Dec 48, same file, sec 14.

16. (U) Dec on JCS 1868/29, 11 Jan 49, same file, sec 10. (TS) SM–79–49 to JMAC and JSPC, 13 Jan 49, same file, sec 15.

17. (U) JCS 1868/39, 30 Dec 48, and Dec On, 11 Jan 49, same file, sec 13.

18. (TS) SM–10447, 9 Jul 48 to US Reps London Five Power Talks (derived from JCS 1868/11); (TS) Msg, DELWU 4 to DA, 23 Jul 48, CM IN 4940; CCS 092 W. Eur. (3–12–48) sec 4. (U) Msg DELWU 80 to DA, 21 Oct 48, same file, sec 9.

19. (U) Msg, DELWU 80 to DA, 21 Oct 48, same file.

20. (TS) Msg, WAR 91426 to DELWU, 25 Oct 48, same file.

21. (U) Extract from MC(491)1, 17 Jan 49, in App C to Encl A to JCS 1868/58, 9 Feb 49, CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 18. MC(49)1 was not available to the author.

22. (U) FC(48)23, 23 Nov 48, quoted in App B, Encl A, JCS 1868/58, same file. FC(48)23 was not available to the author.

23. The "informal list of deficiencies" and the "generalized statement of deficiencies" in MC(49)1 were likewise unavailable; hence, no description of materiel shortages is possible.

24. (U) MC(49)5, 13 Jan 49, quoted in App A, Encl A, JCS 1868/58, CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 18.

25. (U) JCS 1868/58, 9 Feb 49, and Dec On, 11 Feb 49, same file.

26. Fairchild, "US Army and the Military Assistance Program," p. 45.

27. (U) Ltr, Pres to SecState, 13 Apr 49, App A to JCS 1868/72, CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 24.

28. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS et al., 6 Jan 49, Encl to JCS 1868/47, 7 Jan 49, CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 16. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Foreign Military and Economic Aid Programs." 14 Feb 49 (derived from JCS 1868/49), same file, sec 18.

29. Fairchild, "US Army and the Military Assistance Program," p. 46.

30. (U) Memo, SpecAsst to SecDef to JCS, et al., 8 Feb 49, Encl to JCS 1868/57, 9 Feb 49, CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 18.

31. (U) FACC D–3, 7 Feb 49, App A to JCS 1868/57, 9 Feb 49, same file.

32. (U) FACC D–3/1, 7 Feb 49, App B to JCS 1868/57, 9 Feb 49, same file.

33. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Basic Statement of Policy Concerning the Foreign Military Assistance Program," 21 Feb 49, (derived from JCS 1868/59), same file, sec 19.

34. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Foreign Military Aid Program," 14 Mar 49 (derived from JCS 1868/62), CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 21.

35. (S) FACC D–7/1, 5 Mar 49; same file, sec 20. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 17 Mar 49, Encl to JCS 1868/64, same date, same file, sec 21. (U) Encl B, JCS 1868/111, 20 Sep 49, same file, sec 29.

36. (U) Memo, SpecAsst to SecDef for Mil Asst to DJS, et al., 27 Apr 49, Encl to JCS 1868/73, same file, sec 24.

37. "Special Message to the Congress on the Need for a Military Aid Program," 25 Jul 49, *Public Papers of the Presidents: Truman, 1949* (1964), pp. 395–400.

38. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1949*, pp. 79–84.

39. HR 5895, 81st Cong, 1st sess, 5 Aug 49.

40. Hearings, "Military Assistance Programs," S. Coms on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, 81st Cong, 1st sess, pp. 88–91.

41. Calvocoressi, *Survey of International Affairs, 1949–50,* pp. 140–141.

42. PL 328 and PL 430, 81st Cong.

43. (S) Memo, ExecSecy to SecDef to JCS, 16 Sep 49, Encl to JCS 1868/110, 17 Sep 49, CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 28.

44. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Reprogramming the FY 1950 Foreign Military Assistance Program," 23 Sep 49 (derived from JCS 1868/111), CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 29.

45. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Reprogramming the FY 1950 Foreign Military Assistance Program," 23 Sep 49 (derived from JCS 1868/111), same file, sec 29.

Chapter 13. The Communist Victory in China

1. The events summarized in this section are fully described in *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1945–1947.*

2. Dept of State, *United States Relations with China* (1949), pp. 939–972.

3. Ibid., pp. 225–226, 360–367. Details of US military and economic aid to China are shown below, in the Table on pp. 252–253.

4. Chih-Pu Liu, *A Military History of Modern China, 1927–1949* (1956), p. 228.

5. *US Relations with China,* p. 356. Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941–1950* (1963), pp. 428, 453.

6. *US Relations with China,* pp. 311–317.

7. (U) Memo, JCS to SWNCC; "United States Policy Towards China," 9 Jun 47 (derived from JCS 1721/4), CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 7, pt 1, also in Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1947,* vol. VII, *The Far East: China,* (1972), pp. 838–848.

8. (U) Memo, SecState to USecState, 2 Jul 47; (U) Memo, LTG Wedemeyer to SecState, 2 Jul 47; (U) Memo, Dir, Off Far Eastern Aff to SecState, 6 Jul 47; (U) Memo, SecState to Pres, 8 Jul 47; "Directive to General Wedemeyer," sgd Harry S Truman, 9 Jul 47; *Foreign Relations, 1947,* vol. VII, pp. 635–641.

9. *US Relations with China,* pp. 764, 824.

10. (U) Memo, LTG Wedemeyer to Pres, 19 Sep 47, and Encl thereto ("Report to the President"), *US Relations with China,* pp. 764–814.

11. Acheson, *Present at the Creation,* p. 304; *US Relations with China,* p. 260.

12. *Foreign Relations, 1947,* vol. VII, pp. 908–912.

13. *US Relations with China,* pp. 371–387, 981–985. Hearings, *Foreign Policy for a Post-War Recovery Program,* H. Com on Foreign Affairs, 80th Cong., 1st sess, pt 2, pp. 1545–1547.

14. H. Hrgs, *Foreign Policy for Post-War Recovery Program,* pp. 1562–1569.

15. *US Relations with China,* pp. 380–384.

16. *US Relations with China,* pp. 387–390, 991–993; Title IV of PL 472; PL 793; 80th Cong.

17. Ltr, Chinese Amb to SecState, 2 Jun 48, Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948,* vol. VIII, *The Far East: China* (1973), pp. 80–83. *US Relations with China,* pp. 946–950.

18. (TS) NSC 6, 26 Mar 48, CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 7, pt 1. The italics are those of the author.

19. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Position of the United States Regarding Short-Term Assistance to China," 1 Apr 48 (derived from JCS 1721/8), same file, sec 7 pt 2.

20. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Possible Courses of Action for the United States with Respect to the Critical Situation in China," 5 Aug 48 (derived from JCS 1721/11; circulated as NSC 22/1, 6 Aug 48), same file.

Secy Royall's memo and the JCS comments were referred to the NSC Staff in connection with the problem of US forces in Tsingtao, which is discussed later in this chapter.

21. Ibid., pp. 346–347. (S) "Final Report of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of China," 27 Feb 49, Annex II, p. 1, CCS 452 China (4–3–45) BP pt 1.

22. (S) "Final Report of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of China," Annex III, p. 1, same file. *US Relations with China,* pp. 341–343.

23. (U) Ltr, SecArmy to SecDef, 7 Feb 48, Encl to JCS 1330/23, same date, CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 8. (U) JCS 1330/27, 27 May 48, same file, sec 9. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Proposed Directive Governing the Establishment and Operation of the Military Advisory Group in China," 11 Jun 48 (derived from JCS 1330/27) same file, sec 10.

24. Memo of Conversation by SecState, 11 Jun 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948,* vol. VIII, pp. 90–99.

25. Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946,* vol. X, *The Far East: China,* (1972) pp. 822–823. (S) JCS 1330/32, 23 Jun 48, and Dec On, 14 Jul 48, CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 10. Memo, Ch, Div CA to Dir, OFEA, 15 Jun 48; Memo, BG Carter to DJS, 16 Jun 48; *Foreign Relations, 1948,* vol. VIII, pp. 257–259, 265–266.

26. Approval of the President may be assumed but is not documented in available records.

27. (S) JCS 1330/32, 23 Jun 48, and Dec On, 14 Jul 48; (S) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 24 Sep 48; CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 10. *US Relations with China*, p. 340.

28. Liu, *A Military History of Modern China*, pp. 257–260.

29. Ibid., pp. 260–264.

30. (TS) Msg, JUSMAGCHINA, CYF 562 OAGB to JCS, 2 Nov 48, CM IN 173, CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 11. (S) "Final Report of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of China," Annex VII, pp. 3–6, same file, BP pt 1; (U) Msg Dir, JUSMAGCHINA ZX 42027 to JCS et al., 3 Mar 49, same file, sec 12.

31. (U) Msg, COMNAVWESPAC to CNO, 030045Z May 48, Encl A to JCS 1330/25, 11 May 48; (TS) Memo for Info, OCNO, "Military Situation in Shantung Province, China," 5 May 48, Encl C to JCS 1330/25; same file, sec 9.

32. (TS) JCS 1330/25, 11 May 48; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Action by US Forces at Tsingtao in Defense of US Lines and Property" (derived from JCS 1330/26), became NSC 11, 24 May 48; same file.

33. Ltr, ActgSecState to SecDef, 28 May 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. VIII, pp. 316–317.

34. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Action by U.S. Forces at Tsingtao in Defense of U.S. Lives and Property," 10 Jun 48 (derived from JCS 1330/29); (U) Msg, JCS WAR 83805 to COMNAVWESPAC, 14 Jun 48; CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 10. Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 17 Jun 48, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. VIII, pp. 319–321.

35. (TS) NSC Staff Study, undated but attached to draft of "Oral Statement by ExecSecy, NSC," 13 Jul 48, evidently prepared for NSC meeting of 15 Jul 48, CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 10.

36. (TS) NSC Action No. 79, 15 Jul 48. For the Berlin blockade, see Ch. 4.

37. (TS) NSC Action No. 127, 7 Oct 48. The Council's reference was to the study that became NSC 34/1 (see below).

38. (U) Msg, COMNAVWESPAC to CNO, 240715Z Aug 48, App to Encl to JCS 1721/13, 30 Aug 48; (U) Msg, COMNAVWESPAC to CNO, 090855 Jul 48, Ann A to App to Encl to JCS 1721/13, 30 Aug 48; (U) Msg, COMNAVWESPAC to CNO, 160609Z Jul 48, Ann B to App to Encl to JCS 1721/13, 30 Aug 48; (U) Memo, CNO to JCS, "Military Aid for Chinese Armies," 28 Aug 48, Encl to JCS 1721/13; CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 7 pt 2. *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. VIII, pp. 139–142, 169–172.

39. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Aid for Chinese Armies," 9 Sep 48 (derived from JCS 1721/14); (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, same subj, 13 Sep 48, Encl to JCS 1721/15, 15 Sep 48; (U) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 17 Sep 48, App to JCS 1721/16, 24 Sep 48; CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 7 pt 2. *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. VIII, pp. 167–169, 174. *US Relations with China*, p. 973.

40. (TS) NSC 11/1, 19 Oct 48, CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 10.

41. Memo, Pres to SecDef, 18 Oct 48, *Foreign Relations 1948*, vol. VIII, p. 181. An informal handwritten record of a meeting of Forrestal, Lovett, and the Service Secretaries, apparently held on 22 Oct 48, in CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 10, records a statement by Secretary Forrestal, apparently referring to this memorandum: "Pres[ident] desires his memo be interpreted as a firm desire to stay in Tsingtao."

42. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Proposed Change in Directive to COMNAVWESPAC," 20 Oct 48, Encl to JCS 1330/38; (U) Msg, JCS to COMNAVWESPAC, 22 Oct 48 (derived from JCS 1330/39), CM-OUT 91322; CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 10.

43. *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. VIII, pp. 332–334.

44. (TS) Msg, COMNAVWESPAC to CNO, 020917Z Nov 48, CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 11.

45. (TS) NSC Action No. 139, 3 Nov 48. (TS) "Notes on 26th NSC Meeting Held 3 November 1948," unsigned, CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 11. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 517–518.

46. (TS) Memo, NSC to SecDef, Encl B to JCS 1330/42, 9 Nov 48; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "The Tsingtao Situation," 6 Nov 48 (derived from JCS 1330/42); (U) Msg, JCS WARX 92155 to COMNAVWESPAC, 6 Nov 48; CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 11. *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. VIII, pp. 335–336.

47. NSC 11/2, 15 Dec 48, in *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. VIII, pp. 339–342.

48. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "US Armed Forces at Tsingtao," 20 Dec 48 (derived from JCS 1330/45), CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 11.

49. (TS) NSC 11/3, 23 Dec 48; (TS) Memo, ActgExec Secy to NSC, "NSC 11/3," 27 Dec 48, same file. (TS) Memo, SecState to ExecSecy, NSC, 4 Feb 49, Encl to JCS 1330/48, 8 Feb 49; (TS) ActgSecState to ExecSecy, 6 Jun 49, Encl to JCS 1330/50, 9 Jun 49; same file, sec 12.

50. (S) NSC 34, 13 Oct 48, CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 7 pt 2. The original draft by the Policy Planning Staff (minus the long historical background) is in *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. VIII, pp. 146–165.

51. For evidence of the above two points of view, see *Foreign Relations, 1948*, vol. VIII, pp. 185–189, 208–212, 214–215.

52. (U) NSC 34/1, 11 Jan 49, *Foreign Relations, 1949*, vol. IX, pp. 474–475. (U) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC 4 Feb 49; same file, sec 7 pt 3.

53. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 257.

54. (U) NSC 34/2, 28 Feb 49; (U) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, 3 Mar 49; CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 7 pt 3.

55. (U) NSC 41, 28 Feb 49; (TS) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, 3 Mar 49; same file.

56. (U) NSC 22/2, 15 Dec 48, same file.

57. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Current Position of the United States Respecting Delivery of Aid to China," 16 Dec 48 (derived from (TS) JCS 1721/17), 15 Dec 48, same file.

58. (TS) NSC Action No. 159, 16 Dec 48.

59. (TS) Msg, JUSMAGCHINA CYF 871 OAGA to DA, CM IN 10376, 18 Dec 48, CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 7 pt 3.

60. (TS) Msg, AMB Nanking 2575 to SecState, 18 Dec 48, Encl to Memo from Dept of State to ExecSecy, NSC, 24 Dec 48, "Current Position of the U.S. Respecting Delivery of Aid to China," same file.

61. (TS) NSC 22/3, 2 Feb 49, same file.

62. (U) NSC Action No. 180, 3 Feb 49, described in *Foreign Relations, 1949*, vol. IX, pp. 482–483.

63. (U) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, 8 Feb 49, *Foreign Relations, 1949*, vol. IX, pp. 486–487. Bradford Westerfield, *Foreign Policy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbor to Korea*, (1955) p. 346.

64. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 306.

65. *US Relations with China*, pp. 405–409, 1053–1054. Westerfield, *Foreign Policy and Party Politics*, pp. 347–350.

66. *United States Relations with China*, pp. 405–406.

67. See Ch. 12, pp. 231–234.

68. *Public Papers, Truman, 1949*, pp. 395–400.

69. Westerfield, *Foreign Policy and Party Politics*, pp. 356–358. *NY Times*, 16 Aug 49, p. 1; 19 Aug 49, p. 1; 10 Sep 49, p. 1; 13 Sep 49, p. 1. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 24 Oct 49, p. 603.

70. (U) Memo, OSD to JCS, "Military Assistance Bill," 13 Sep 49, Encl to JCS 1868/107, 15 Sep 49; (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, "Military Aid to China," 8 Sep 49, Encl to JCS 1721/36, 10 Sep 49; CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 7 pt 5.

71. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Aid to China," 6 Oct 49 (derived from (TS) JCS 1721/37); (TS) Memo, SecDef to ExecSecy, NSC, 18 Oct 49, Encl to JCS 1721/38, 20 Oct 49; same file.

72. (U) Memo, CSA to JCS, "Implications of a Possible Chinese Communist Attack on Foreign Colonies in South China," 10 Jun 49, Encl to JCS 1330/51, 13 Jun 49; (U) Memo, CNO to JCS, same subj, 30 Jun 49, Encl to JCS 1330/54, 28 Jul 49; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 15 Jul 49 (derived from JCS 1330/52), circulated as NSC 55, 26 Jul 49; CCS 452 China (4–3–45) sec 12.

73. Liu, *Military History of Modern China*, p. 269. Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China* (1970), p. 731.

74. (C) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Plans of the American President Lines to Send Passenger Ship to Shanghai," 25 Aug 49 (derived from JCS 1330/55); (U) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 27 Aug 49, Encl to JCS 1330/57, 29 Aug 49; (U) N/H of JCS 1330/57, 22 Sep 49; CCS 425 China (4–3–45) sec 12. (U) Memo, CNO to JCS, "Trade with Communist China," 16 Nov 49, Encl to JCS 2083/1, 23 Nov 49, same file, sec 7 pt 6. (U) Memo, SecNav to SecDef, "US Policy with Respect to Visits by US Merchant Ships into Communist-held Areas of China," 26 Oct 49, App to Encl to JCS 1330/60, 21 Nov 49; (U) Draft Memo, JCS to SecDef (not sent), Encl to JCS 1330/61, 30 Nov 49, and Dec On, 1 Dec 49; same file, sec 13. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 11 Jul 49, pp. 34–35. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, p. 731.

75. (TS) "Final Report of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of China," 27 Feb 49, p. 9, CCS 425 China (4–3–45) BP pt 1.

76. Ibid., pp. 5, 11.

77. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 23 Jan 50, p. 113.

78. (S) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to SecDef, "Strategic Importance of Formosa," 5 Nov 48, App to Encl to JCS 1966, 9 Nov 48, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 1.

79. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Strategic Importance of Formosa," 24 Nov 48, (derived from JCS 1966/1), same file. *Foreign Relations, 1949*, vol. IX, pp. 261–262.

80. (TS) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, 5 Jan 49, and Encl thereto, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 1.

81. (U) NSC 37/1, 19 Jan 49, *Foreign Relations, 1949*, vol. IX, pp. 270–275.

82. (TS) NSC 37/2, 3 Feb 49; (TS) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, 4 Feb 49; same file.

83. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, "The Strategic Importance of Formosa," 7 Feb 49, Encl to JCS 1966/5, 7 Feb 49, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 1.

84. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "The Strategic Importance of Formosa," 10 Feb 49 (derived from JCS 1966/6), same file. (U) NSC 37/3, 11 Feb 49, *Foreign Relations, 1949*, vol. IX, pp. 284–286.

85. (U) NSC 37/4, 18 Feb 49, *Foreign Relations, 1949*, vol. IX, pp. 288–289.

86. (U) NSC 37/5, 1 Mar 49. (U) NSC Action No. 189, 3 Mar 49.

87. (U) NSC Action No. 189, 3 Mar 49. (U) "Statement by the Secretary of State at the 35th Meeting of the NSC," *Foreign Relations, 1949*, vol. IX, pp. 294–296.

88. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, Strategic Importance of Formosa," 22 Mar 49 (derived from JCS 1966/11), CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 1.

89. (U) NSC 37/6, 5 Aug 49, *Foreign Relations, 1949*, vol. IX, pp. 369–371.

90. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Formosa," 17 Aug 49 (derived from JCS 1966/17), CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 1. Circulated in NSC 37/7, 22 Aug 49, *Foreign Relations, 1949*, vol IX, pp. 376–378.

91. (U) NSC 37/8, 6 Oct 49, *Foreign Relations, 1949*, vol. IX, pp. 392–397.

92. (C) Msg, SecState to Consul General at Taipei, 28 Oct 49, *Foreign Relations, 1949*, vol. IX, pp. 401–493.

93. (U) JCS 1966/22, 7 Dec 49, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) sec 2; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Possible United States Military Action Toward Taiwan Not Involving Major Military Forces," 23 Dec 49 (derived from JCS 1966/24, 19 Dec 49), same file, sec 3. (U) NSC 37/9, 27 Dec 49, *Foreign Relations, 1949*, vol. IX, pp. 460–461.

94. (U) NSC 48/2, 30 Dec 49. This paper is discussed in detail in Ch. 14.

95. (U) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, "The Positions of the United States with Respect to Asia," 30 Dec 49, same file. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 16 Jan 50, p. 79. The President's statement apparently precluded the possibility of allocating to the Nationalists any of the $75 million made available in the MDAA for the "general area" of China. See Ch. 14 for the disposition of this money.

95. See *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, vol. III, *The Korean War*.

Chapter 14. Consequences of the Communist Victory in China on US Far East Policy

1. Memo, POLAD in Japan to SecState, 21 Mar 47; Memo by GEN MacArthur, "Drafts of Chapter V and Chapter VI of a Peace Treaty with Japan . . . ," 21 Mar 47; Annex to Dept State Memcon on Japanese Peace Treaty, 1 Jul 47; Memo, DepDir, FE to USecState, 2 Aug 47; Dept State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947*, vol. VI, *The Far East* (1972), pp. 452–456, 467–469, 476–477. Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs, 1947–1948*, pp. 160–167.

2. (U) Memo, JCS to Secs War and Navy, "Review of United States Control Needed over the Japanese Islands" (derived from JCS 1619/24), 13 Sep 47, CCS 360 (12–9–42) sec 30.

3. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925–1950*, pp. 369–370. Memo, Dir, Planning Staff, Dept State to SecState 14 Oct 47, and Ann thereto: PPS/10, "Results of Planning Staff Study of Questions Involved in the Japanese Peace Settlement," 14 Oct 47, *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. VI, pp. 536–543.

4. (C) Memo, BGEN C.V.R. Schuyler to SecDef, "Report of the National Military Establishment Representative on Conference in Tokyo, March 1–11, 1948," 3 Apr 48, CCS 383.21 Japan (3–13–15) sec 18.

5. (TS) NSC 13, 2 Jun 48; (U) NSC 13/1, 24 Sep 48; same file, sec 19.

6. (U) Memo, SpecAsst to SecDef to DJS, "NSC 13/1," 24 Sep 48; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Recommendations with Respect to United States Policy toward Japan," 24 Sep 48 (derived from JCS 1380/44); same file.

7. (U) NSC 13/2, 7 Oct 48, Encl B to JCS 1380/47, 20 Oct 48; (U) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, 5 Nov 48, Encl to JCS 1380/50, 10 Nov 48; (U) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, 22 Nov 48, Encl to JCS 1380/51, 24 Nov 48; same file, sec 20. (TS) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, 4 Feb 49, Encl to JCS 1380/57, 5 Feb 49; (TS) NSC 13/3, 6 May 49, Encl to JCS 1380/62, 9 May 49; same file, sec 21.

8. (TS) Memo, ActgSecState to ExecSecy, NSC, 23 May 49, Encl to JCS 1380/63, 25 May 49, CCS 383.21 Japan (3–13–45) sec 21.

9. (TS) Ltr, ExecSecy, OSD, to JCS, 27 May 49, Encl to JCS 1380/64, 28 May 49, same file.

10. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Strategic Evaluation of US Security Needs in Japan" (derived from JCS 1380/65), 10 Jun 49; (TS) NSC 49, 15 Jun 49; same file, sec 22.

11. (TS) Memo of Conversation, SecState and others with British Foreign Minister, "Far East," 13 Sep 49, CCS 388.1 Japan (9–1–47) sec 1.

12. (TS) Ltr, ActgSecState to SecDef, 3 Oct 49, Encl to JCS 1380/78, 20 Dec 49, CCS 388.1 Japan (9–1–47) sec 1. Available records do not clearly establish whether this version of the State Department view was sent to the NSC. A greatly abbreviated version, labelled as comments on the JCS views on the subject, was distributed to the NSC on 4 October 1949 as (TS) NSC 49/1, CCS 383.21 Japan (3–13–45) sec 23. This paper disputed the JCS position on a treaty on the ground that Japanese democracy, an expressed goal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was unattainable without a peace settlement. However, the JCS views regarding the importance of Japanese internal security and of the development of Japan's capacity for self-defense were endorsed.

13. (U) Memo, ActgSecArmy to SecDef, "Proposed Negotiations for Treaty Relative to Japan," 14 Oct 49, CCS 388.1 Japan (9–1–47) sec 1.

14. (U) SM–222 to JSSC, 2 Nov 49, same file.

15. (U) Transcript of JSSC Meeting, 10 Nov 49, same file.

16. (U) JCS 1380/75, 30 Nov 49, same file.

17. (U) Memo, MG C.B. Magruder to JCS, 3 Dec 49, Encl to JCS 1380/76, 3 Dec 49, same file.

18. (U) JCS 1380/77, 10 Dec 49, CCS 388.1 Japan (9–1–47) sec 1.

19. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Japanese Peace Treaty," 22 Dec 49 (derived from JCS 1380/79); (U) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 23 Dec 49, Encl to Memo, ExecSecy OSD to NSC, same date (Encls A and B to JCS 1380/80); same file, sec 2.

20. (TS) JCS 1380/83, 9 Feb 50, CCS 388.1 Japan (9–1–47) sec 2. (TS) "Summary of General MacArthur's Opinions on a Japanese Peace Treaty . . . ," 14 Dec 49, Tab 2 to (TS) Memo, MG Magruder to SecDef, 5 Jun 50, OCJCS File, 092.2 Japanese Peace Treaty.

21. (S) "Copy of informal memorandum handed by Secretary Acheson to British Ambassador," marked "Personal and Confidential," 24 Dec 49, CCS 388.1 Japan (9–1–47) sec 2. Attached to (U) Memo, MG Burns to DJS, 28 Dec 49, which indicates that both Burns and GEN Bradley had approved Secretary Acheson's memo before it was given to the Ambassador.

22. See Ch. 13 of *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1950–1952*, for the evolution of the Japanese peace treaty of September 1951.

23. *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1775* (Dept of State Publication 3257, 1948).

24. (U) Memo, SecArmy to SecDef, 4 Mar 48, Encl to Memo, SpecAsst to SecDef to JCS, 7 Apr 48 (Encl and App to JCS 1027/10, 9 Apr 48), CCS 686.9 Philippines (11–7–43) sec 7. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Retention of US Military Installations in the Philippines," 13 Jul 48 (derived from JCS 1027/12), same file, sec 8.

25. (U) Memo, ExecSecy to SecDef to JCS, 27 Apr 49, Encl to JCS 1519/22, 28 Apr 49; JCS 1519/23, 29 Apr 49, and Dec On, 4 May 49; CCS 686.9 Philippine Islands (11–7–43) sec 9.

26. (S) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 23 May 49, App to JCS 1519/27, 10 Jun 49, same file, sec 10.

27. (U) JCS 1519/28, 23 Jun 49, same file. (U) Memo, JCS to SecArmy, "United States Policy Toward the Philippines," 22 Jul 49 (derived from JCS 1519/30); (U) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 16 Sep 49, Encl to JCS 1519/32, 20 Sep 49; same file, sec 11. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 22 Aug 49, pp. 276–277.

28. "Republic of the Philippines Military Assistance Act," PL 454, 79th Congress. PL 663, 79th Congress.

29. (U) SM–5233 to SWNCC, 12 Mar 46 (SWNCC 276, 13 Mar 46), CCS 686.9 Philippine Islands (11–7–43) sec 4.

30. (U) SWNCC 340/1, 11 Dec 46, same file. (U) SM–7976 to SWNCC, 12 Apr 17 (derived from JCS 1519/4); (U) Dec on SWNCC 276/3, 14 Apr 47; same file, sec 5.

31. "Agreement . . . on Military Assistance to the Philippines," *United States Statutes at Large*, vol 61, pt 3, pp. 3283–3288. *NY Times*, 22 Mar 47, p. 8.

32. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Establishment and Operation of the Joint US Military Advisory Group to the Republic of the Philippines," 3 Nov 47 (derived from JCS 1519/7); (U) Msg, GSUSA WARX 92466 to CINCFE, 16 Dec 47; (U) Memo, SecDef to Secs A,N,AF, "Establishment and Operation of the Joint US Military Advisory Group for the Republic of the Philippines," 6 Nov 47; CCS 686.9 Philippine Islands (11–7–43) sec 6.

33. See Ch. 12.

34. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Basic Statements of Policy Concerning the Foreign Military Assistance Program" (derived from JCS 1868/59), 21 Feb 49, CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 19. (TS-Gp 3) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Foreign Military Aid Program," 14 Mar 49 (derived from JCS 1868/62), same file, sec 21.

35. "Special Message to the Congress on the Need for a Military Aid Program," *Public Papers, Truman, 1949*, pp. 395–400. PL 430, 81st Cong.

36. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Reprogramming the FY 1950 Foreign Military Assistance Program," 23 Sep 49 (derived from JCS 1868/111), CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 29. (U) JCS 1519/34, 5 Nov 49, CCS 686.9 Philippine Islands (11–7–43) sec 11.

37. Developments concerning Korea during this period are treated in detail in *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, vol III, *The Korean War*, Ch. 1.

38. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Importance of Korea" (derived from JCS 1483/44), 25 Sep 47, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) sec 13.

39. PL 430, 81st Cong. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Reprogramming the FY 1950 Foreign Military Assistance Program," 23 Sep 49 (derived from JCS 1868/111), CCS 092 (8–22–46) sec 29.

40. (U) NSC 48, 10 Jun 49, CCS 092 Asia (6–25–48) sec 1.

41. See Ch. 13.

42. Indochinese affairs are developed in detail in (TS) JCS Hist Div, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam: History of the Indochina Incident, 1940–1954.*

43. (U) NSC 48/1, 23 Dec 49, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 2.

44. See Ch. 12 for the MDAA of 1949.

45. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia," 29 Dec 49 (derived from JCS 1992/7), CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 2.

46. (U) NSC 48/2, 30 Dec 49; (U) Memo ExecSecy to NSC same date (Encls A and B to JCS 1992/8, 5 Jan 50); CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 3.

47. *Public Papers, Truman, 1950*, pp. 11–12. See Ch. 13.

48. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Program of Assistance for the General Area of China," 20 Jan 50, (derived from JCS 1721/43), CCS 452 China (4-3-45) sec 7, pt 7.

49. OFFTACKLE is discussed in detail in Ch. 10.

50. Dept of State *Bulletin*, 23 Jan 50, pp. 111–118.

Chapter 15. The Soviet Atomic Explosion and Its Consequences

1. Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, *A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission*, vol II, *Atomic Shield, 1947/1952* (1969), pp. 362–368; Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, pp. 306–308. David E. Lilienthal, *Journals*, vol II, *The Atomic Years, 1945–1950* (1964), pp. 569–572; *Public Papers, Truman, 1949*, p. 485.

2. (TS) JCS 2081/1, 13 Feb 50 and Dec On, 21 Feb 50, CCS 471.6 USSR (11-8-49) sec 2.

3. (TS) App to JCS 1942/3, 31 Dec 48, CCS 471.6 (8-15-45) sec 13A. CIA representatives attended meetings at which this statement was prepared but did not participate in the decision.

4. (TS) JCS 2081/1, 13 Feb 50, CCS 471.6 USSR (11-8-49) sec 2.

5. The Research and Development Board, created by the National Security Act of 1947, was responsible for coordinating research and development among the Military Departments and for recommending an integrated program of military research and development.

6. (TS-RD) Memo, Dir, RDB to JCS, 28 Sep 48, Encl to JCS 1942, 4 Oct 48, CCS 471.6 (8-15-45) sec 12. (TS-RD) JCS 1942/1, 6 Nov 48, same file, sec 13. (TS) JCS 1942/3, 31 Dec 48; (TS) JCS 1942/4, 1 Feb 49; same file, sec 13A. (TS-RD) JCS 1942/6, 23 Mar 49; (TS-RD) JCS 1942/7, 28 Mar 49; (TS-RD) SM-545-49 to Chm, RDB, 28 Mar 49; same file, sec 14.

7. (TS-RD) FY 49 Ann Rpt, MLC to SecDef, 1 Aug 49, same file, BP 4; (TS-RD) App B to JCS 1942/14, 3 Nov 49, same file, sec 17.

8. (TS) Memo, Dir, CIA to JCS, 28 Oct 49, Encl to JCS 1942/13, 31 Oct 49; (TS-RD) JCS 1942/14, 3 Nov 49; CCS 471.6 (8-15-45) sec 17.

9. (TS-RD) JCS 1942/16, 4 Jan 50 and Dec On, 20 Jan 50; (S-RD) SM-171-50 to CSAF, 25 Jan 50; (TS-RD) SM-172-50 to Chm, RDB, 25 Jan 50; same file, sec 18.

10. (S) Memo, RDB to JCS, 18 Apr 50, Encl to JCS 1942/18, 21 Apr 50, same file, sec 19; (TS-RD) 2d Rpt, Jt Panel on Tech. Obj. I0-7, "A Review of the USAF Research and Development Programs on Long Range Detection for Fiscal Years 1950 and 1951," 20 Mar 50, same file, BP 4.

11. See Ch. 9.

12. (TS) JSPC 887/71, 26 Aug 49, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) sec 38. (TS) JSPC 887/77, 25 Oct 49, same file, sec 40. (TS) JCS 1844/46, 8 Nov 49 and Dec On, 8 Dec 49, same file, sec 41.

13. (TS-RD) Memo, JCS to Chm, AEC, "The Production of Fissionable Material," 17 Dec 47 (derived from JCS 1745/5); (TS-RD) JCS 1745/7, 16 Dec 47, and Dec On, 17 Dec 47; CCS 471.6 (8-15-45) sec 8.

14. (TS-RD) SM-78-49 to Chm, MLC, 13 Jan 49 (derived from JCS 1823/11), same file, sec 13A. For TROJAN, see Ch. 9.

15. (TS-RD) SM-1100 to MLC, 14 Jun 49 (derived from JCS 1823/14), same file, sec 15.

16. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, pp. 182–183. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 304.

17. (TS-RD) Rpt, Spec Com, NSC to Pres, 10 Oct 49, Tab to JCS 1823/16, 28 Oct 49, CCS 471.6 (8-15-45) sec 17. For NSC 20/4, see Ch. 7.

18. Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, pp. 365, 370.

19. (TS-RD) Encl B to JCS 1823/19, 8 Nov 49, as amended by Dec On, 1 Dec 49, CCS 471.6 (8-15-45) sec 17A.

20. (TS-RD) Ltr, Pres to SecDef, 19 Oct 49; (TS-RD) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 25 Oct 49; App and Encl to JCS 1823/16, 28 Oct 49; same file, sec 17.

21. (TS-RD) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Implications of the Accelerated Atomic Energy Program," 2 Dec 49, (derived from JCS 1823/19), same file, sec 18.

22. The Joint Chiefs of Staff quoted this maxim in their memorandum of 13 Jan 50, cited below, in which they urged a program for development of a thermonuclear weapon.

23. See Chs. 6 through 9.

24. (S) NORAD Hist Ref Paper No. 9, "Seventeen Years of Air Defense," 1 Jun 63, pp. 1–5; (U) *Second Report of the Secretary of Defense, FY 1949*, pp. 142–143.

25. (U) JCS 2084, 16 Nov 49, CCS 373.24 US (9–8–49) sec 1.

26. (U) Encl B to JCS 1899/2, 29 Sep 48; (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 1 Jul 48, Encl to JCS 1899, 3 Jul 48; CCS 413.44 (7–1–48) sec 1.

27. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 1 Jul 48, Encl to JCS 1899, 3 Jul 48, same file.

28. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Radar Fence Program," 20 Oct 48 (derived from JCS 1899/2), same file.

29. (U) JCS 1978/2, 6 May 49, same file; (U) JCS 1899/6, 17 Jan 50, same file, sec 2. (U) Rpt, CSAF to SecAF for FY 49, in *Second Report of the Secretary of Defense, FY 1949*, p. 270.

30. (U) JCS 1259/56, 23 Jan 48, and Dec On, 19 Feb 48, CCS 381 US (5–23–46) sec 4. (U) JCS 1259/62, 20 Mar 48, and Dec On, 7 Apr 48, same file, sec 6.

31. (U) JCS 2086, 23 Nov 49, same file, sec 6; (TS) Basic Plan for the Defense of the Continental United States, 15 Nov 49, same file, BP 1. The plan, as revised, was not approved by the JCS until 26 Oct 51. (TS) 2086/1, 5 Apr 50, and Dec On, 29 Oct 51, same file, BP 1A.

32. (U) JCS 2084, 16 Nov 49, and N/H, 23 Nov 49; (U) JCS 2084/1, 1 Dec 49, and Dec On, 20 Dec 49; (U) JCS 2084/3, 3 Mar 50; (TS) JCSM–454–50 to Chm, RDB, 8 Mar 50; (U) Memo, Chm, RDB to JCS, 3 Apr 50, Encl to JCS 2084/7, 5 Apr 50; CCS 373.24 US (9–8–49) sec 1. (U) JCS 2084/12, 12 Jul 50, same file, sec 2.

33. (U) JCS 1899/4, 23 Nov 49, and Dec On, 24 Jan 50; (U) JCS 1899/6, 17 Jan 50; CCS 413.44 (7–1–48) sec 2. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Air Force, in *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1 Jan–30 Jun 50*, pp. 150–151.

34. Goldberg, *History of the United States Air Force*, pp. 130. (S) *Seventeen Years of Air Defense*, pp. 2–5.

35. (TS) JCS 1259/179, 21 Dec 49, and N/H, 30 Dec 49, CCS 381 US (5–23–46) sec 12.

36. Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, pp. 59, 376.

37. Ibid., pp. 371–372.

38. Memo, Strauss to Commissioners, 5 Oct 49, text in Lewis L. Strauss, *Men and Decisions* (1962), pp. 216–217. The General Advisory Committee was created by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 to provide scientific and technical advice to the AEC. The membership in 1949 consisted of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer (Chairman), Oliver E. Buckley, James B. Conant, Lee A. DuBridge, Enrico Fermi, Isidor I. Rabi, Hartley Rowe, Glenn T. Seaborg, and Cyril S. Smith, with John H. Manley as Executive Secretary.

39. Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, pp. 375–377.

40. Ibid., pp. 381–384.

41. Ibid., pp. 390–391. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 308.

42. (TS) Memo, JSSC to Secy, JCS "Study on the United States Military Position with Respect to the Development of the Thermonuclear Bomb," 14 Nov 49; (TS-RD) SM–2351–49 to CJCS, CSA, CSAF, CNO, 17 Nov 49; CCS 471.6 (12–19–49) sec 1.

43. (TS-RD) Rpt to JCS, United States Military Position with Respect to the Development of the Thermonuclear Weapon," n.d., Encl to SM–2351–49, 17 Nov 49, same file. Because of the highly classified nature of this paper, it was reproduced on buff paper and bore no JCS number.

44. (TS-RD) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "The United States Military Position with Respect to the Development of the Thermonuclear Weapon," 23 Nov 49, same file.

45. (TS) Ltr, Pres to SecDef and SecState and Chm, AEC, 19 Nov 49, Dept of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949*, vol I, pp. 587–588. Key portions of the text of this letter also appear in Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 309.

46. (TS) Memo, "The Military Implications of Thermonuclear Weapons," n.d., *Foreign Relations, 1949*, vol I, pp. 604–610. Circulated by the Defense members at a meeting of the Working Group on 16 Dec 49.

47. Lilienthal, *The Atomic Years*, pp. 613–614. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 348.

48 (S) Rpt, GAC to AEC, 3 Dec 49 and annexes thereto: (S) Ltr, O.E. Buckley to J.R. Oppenheimer, 3 Dec 49; (S) Ltr, H. Buckley to J.R. Oppenheimer, 3 Dec 49; (S) Ltr, E. Fermi to J.R. Oppenheimer, 3 Dec 49; (S) Working Memo, Sec, GAC to GAC, 3 Dec 49; CCS 471.6 (12–14–49) sec 1.

49. (S) Ltr. L.A. DuBridge to J.R. Oppenheimer, 5 Dec 49, Encl to AEC 262/9, 14 Dec 49, same file.

50. (S-RD) Memo, Dep to SecDef(AE) to JCS, 14 Dec 49, Encl B to JCS 2096, 9 Jan 50, same file.

51. (TS-RD) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Request for Comments on Military Views of Members of General Advisory Committee," 13 Jan 50 (derived from JCS 2096), CCS 471.6 (12–14–49) sec 1.

52. Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, pp. 401–402. Acheson, *Present at the Creation.*, p. 348.

53. Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield.*, pp. 394–395, 404–405. *NY Times*, 28 Jan 50, pp. 1, 6; 29 Jan 50, p. 1. *Public Papers, Truman*, 1950, p. 135.

54. Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, pp. 403–404. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 348.

55. Lilienthal, *The Atomic Years*, p. 624.

56. Ibid., pp. 623–632, Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 348–349. Hewlett and Duncan, *Atomic Shield*, pp. 406–408. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 309.

57. *Public Papers, Truman*, 1950, p. 138.

58. (U) Ltr, Pres to SecDef, 31 Jan 50, App to Encl "D" to JCS 2101/1, CCS 381 US (1–31–50) sec 1.

59. For NSC 68, its background, and its disposition, see Chs. 1 and 2 of *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1950–1952.*

Bibliographic Note

This history is based primarily on the official documents contained in the master records files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Other sources include the records maintained in the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by agencies of the Joint Staff. Research also extended to certain records of the Services. The volumes published by the Department of State in the *Foreign Relations* series were invaluable in illuminating diplomatic aspects of national security policy; some of these had not been published at the time this volume went to press and are cited in galley-proof form.

During the period of this volume the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were organized under a case file system that had been in continuous use since 1942. This system is identified by the prefix CCS (for Combined Chiefs of Staff) attached to each file folder title. Within each footnote, the file location is the last element given. When several documents are cited, all those contained in a single footnote "sentence," closed by a period, are to be found in the records file given at the end of the sentence. "Same file," rather than "Ibid.," is used for repeated, successive references to the same file.

Some documents are cited without a file reference. These include types that are widely distributed and that may be located without reference to the JCS files, such as Records of NSC Actions. Documents of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its predecessor, the Western European Union (WEU), are normally procured through the NATO subregistry system. The research for this volume, however, disclosed that some of the important early documents of WEU and NATO are apparently no longer in existence.

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