A War Like No Other: The Constitution in a Time of Terror

A WAR LIKE NO OTHER

ALSO BY OWEN FISS

The Law As It Could Be

A Way Out: America’s Ghettos and the Legacy of Racism

A Community of Equals

The Irony of Free Speech

Liberalism Divided

The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court: Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State, 1888–1910

The Civil Rights Injunction

© 2015 by Owen Fiss and Trevor Sutton

All rights reserved.

No part of this book may be reproduced, in any form, without written permission from the publisher.

Requests for permission to reproduce selections from this book should be mailed to: Permissions Department, The New Press, 120 Wall Street, 31st floor, New York, NY 10005.

Published in the United States by The New Press, New York, 2015

Distributed by Two Rivers Distribution

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Fiss, Owen M., author.

A war like no other: the constitution in a time of terror / Owen Fiss, Trevor Sutton.

pagescm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-62097-098-0 (e-book)1. Terrorism—Prevention—Law and legislation—United States.2. United States. Constitution.3. Civil rights—United States.4. War on Terror, 2001–2009.I. Sutton, Trevor, editor.II. Title.

KF9430.F572015

344.7305'32517—dc23

2014050102

The New Press publishes books that promote and enrich public discussion and understanding of the issues vital to our democracy and to a more equitable world. These books are made possible by the enthusiasm of our readers; the support of a committed group of donors, large and small; the collaboration of our many partners in the independent media and the not-for-profit sector; booksellers, who often hand-sell New Press books; librarians; and above all by our authors.

www.thenewpress.com

Composition by dix!

This book was set in Fournier MT

Printed in the United States of America

10987654321

To

Aharon Barak

Always an Inspiration

CONTENTS

Foreword by Trevor Sutton

Part I: An Unfolding Perspective

Chapter 1: In the Shadow of War

Chapter 2: The War on Terror and the Rule of Law

Chapter 3: The Perils of Minimalism

Chapter 4: Aberrations No More

Chapter 5: Law Is Everywhere

Part II: The New Normal

Chapter 6: Imprisonment Without Trial

Chapter 7: Torture and Extraordinary Rendition

Chapter 8: Criminalizing Political Advocacy

Chapter 9: Warrantless Wiretapping

Chapter 10: The Targeted Killing of Alleged Terrorists

Notes

Index

FOREWORD

Trevor Sutton

September 11, 2001: a day that changed everything. This has been a common mantra of government agencies and the media in assessing the effects of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Some have described the attacks as changing the way the United States assesses and responds to threats to its national security. Others have gone further to suggest that the attacks changed the relationship between the United States and the world in a more general sense.

More than a decade after September 11, such views may seem overblown. The past two presidential elections—to say nothing of congressional midterm and state races—were perceived to have turned more on differences in the candidates’ domestic policy agendas than matters of national security or foreign policy. Moreover, the winding down of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the death of Osama bin Laden, the Obama administration’s declaration of a pivot or rebalance toward Asia, and the challenge posed by an expansionist Russia all suggest a return to a more traditional national security strategy, one in which the threats posed by international terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda—and more recently ISIS—are no longer the primary drivers of American foreign policy.

There is one area, however, where the legacy of September 11 has proven unusually enduring: the law. While the threat of terrorism may no longer dominate debate in Congress or command daily headlines as regulary as it once did, the legislative enactments and judicial decisions passed in response to the counterterrorism policies of the Bush and Obama administrations continue to cast a long shadow over many areas of the law, including constitutional jurisprudence. Freedom of speech and association; due process; habeas corpus; the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement; even the prohibitions on torture and extrajudicial killings—the law governing these constitutional principles looks vastly different in 2015 than it did in the summer of 2001.

The essays in this volume chronicle the reactions of one scholar, Professor Owen Fiss of the Yale Law School, to the counterterrorism practices of the Bush and Obama years. The volume begins in 2003—in the early days of the Iraq War, before the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, and before Barack Obama or John Roberts had risen to national prominence. From this point of embarkation, Fiss surveys and assesses the major legal controversies of the following decade, from Guantánamo to drones, with a particular focus on the constitutional dimensions of the disputes. Linking all the essays is Fiss’s sustained concern for the offense done to the Constitution by the political branches in the name of public safety, and the refusal of the judiciary to hold those branches accountable. As Fiss observes, practices that at first seemed like temporary excesses of the Bush administration have become entrenched legal doctrines perpetuated by President Obama and enshrined in judicial opinions. How these constitutional aberrations outlasted the political climate that created them constitutes the central narrative of this volume.

In some respects, this is an unlikely book. Before 2003, Fiss, a scholar of equal protection, civil procedure, and free speech, had not published on topics relating to national security or the laws of war. That he would write ten essays relating to the fight against international terrorism over the next decade was not to be expected.

Fiss was not alone in embarking on a new project of legal analysis after September 11. The legal questions raised by the Bush administration’s response to the attacks were terra incognita for nearly all legal academics and jurists. Cases that were obscure for all but law-of-war specialists—Ex Parte Milligan, Ex Parte Quirin, In Re Yamashita, Johnson v. Eisentrager—suddenly assumed burning importance, and questions that seemed like academic speculation—the reach of due process on the battlefield; the limits on executive detention outside the formal territory of the United States—were now being litigated in federal courts.

For Fiss, it was natural that the judiciary’s duty to embody and apply public reason in the domestic context, a responsibility Fiss has argued for over the past forty years, could extend to the national security sphere. In vital respects, the legal issues raised by the War on Terror are about process—process not only in the conventional sense of rules that govern legal and administrative proceedings but also in the more profound sense of the bulwarks that stand between the individual and the awesome power of the state. Behind the major national security cases of the post–September 11 era—Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, and Boumediene v. Bush—was the question of what role, if any, the judiciary should have in mediating the relationship between the Bush administration and those suspected of plotting or facilitating terrorism. Nested within this question was another inquiry, one that would continue to trouble courts into the Obama presidency: When does the judiciary’s responsibility to defend fundamental rights take precedence over the executive’s expertise in national security and foreign relations?

In Fiss’s view, the major victories in the legal battle over the fight against terrorism were pyrrhic. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Hamdi, Hamdan, and Boumediene, along with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, gave as much to the executive branch as they took away, and left many vital questions unanswered—for example, whether the use of military commissions to try detainees off the battlefield violated constitutional due process. These deficiencies have been compounded by the actions of the lower courts, which have handed the government victory after victory in suits alleging torture, warrantless surveillance, and extrajudicial killings. To an even greater degree than in the era of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, the actions of the judiciary in the post–September 11 era have fallen short of the law as it could be, to borrow the title of Fiss’s 2003 book.

Each of the chapters in this book is preceded by a short comment in which I identify the political and historical context of the essay that is the source of the chapter. The essays in Part I are meant to be read in sequence. They reflect Fiss’s evolving appraisal of the legal implications of the United States’ fight against terrorism and his dismay that the figure who seemed best poised to repudiate the policies of the Bush era, Barack Obama, ultimately acted to perpetuate them.

In the Shadow of War, the first essay of the volume, is an adaptation of a speech delivered at the University of Miami on the eve of the Iraq War. It captures the anxiety and uncertainty felt by many in the legal community during the early years of the Bush administration, when it seemed as if the judiciary might grant the government virtually limitless power to prosecute its War on Terror. But the essay also documents an unusual moment in time, when it seemed possible to imagine a vindication of fundamental rights more sweeping than that which the Supreme Court ultimately delivered.

The War on Terror and the Rule of Law and The Perils of Minimalism both take as their subject the adequacy of the Supreme Court’s response to the Bush administration’s counterterrorism policies. Instead of heralding these decisions as vindications of constitutional rights, as many did, Fiss assesses them with a more critical eye. He examines how these decisions fell well short of their potential by failing to address or reach a consensus over crucial constitutional questions and by putting undue focus on technical issues at the expense of constitutional rights. As The Perils of Minimalism in particular argues, the consequences of these modest rulings can be inadvertently momentous, as with Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Court in Hamdan, which, by failing to condemn the use of military tribunals as running afoul of due process, implicitly endorsed them as constitutionally sound.

Aberrations No More reflects a turning point in Fiss’s thinking and expresses a profound disappointment. The essay evaluates the ways in which President Obama has failed to live up to the promise of his campaign to make a clean break with the national security policies of his predecessor. In his refusal to prosecute those who facilitated torture during the Bush administration, his endorsement of military commissions, and his perpetuation of the practice of imprisonment without trial, Obama transformed what could have been a lamentable but isolated chapter in American history into an enduring debasement of the Constitution.

Law Is Everywhere completes the sequence by proffering a counterexample to those who claim that there is no satisfying way to balance fundamental rights against public safety. The essay celebrates the career of Aharon Barak, Israel’s most famous legal mind and a former president of its Supreme Court. Fiss examines several of Barak’s most powerful opinions—in particular a decision affirming the legality of the targeted killing of suspected terrorists but placing limits on its use—to illustrate how basic principles of fairness and humanity can flourish in even the most dire security environments.

In Part II, Fiss deepens his inquiry by addressing specific practices and policies implemented during the war against terrorism. Imprisonment Without Trial discusses one of the most hotly debated issues of the post–9/11 era: prolonged detention of alleged terrorists without charging them with a crime or placing them on trial. The essay continues many of the themes explored in the first half of the book, in particular the failure of the Obama administration to firmly repudiate the practices of the Bush administration that threatened what Fiss calls the principle of freedom.

Torture and Extraordinary Rendition looks at the practice of extraordinary rendition, under which individuals suspected of terrorist affiliations are kidnapped and handed over to foreign governments for torture-based interrogation. Although many believe this practice has stopped under Obama, his administration has nonetheless chosen to defend the practice in federal court, to great success. In Fiss’s view, the lower courts’ assent to the government’s position—effected through various doctrines of abstention—represents an abdication of the essential duty of the judiciary to hold the political branches accountable to the Constitution.

Criminalizing Political Advocacy focuses on a single case, Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder, in which the justices decided by a 6–3 vote to uphold a statute criminalizing political advocacy for foreign organizations that the secretary of state had designated as supporters of terrorism. For Fiss, the decision represents a break with the strong tradition rooted in the landmark 1969 case Brandenburg v. Ohio that seeks to protect political advocacy. The decision illustrates the corrosive effect of the specter of terrorism on constitutional liberties, even those that are relatively remote from the day-to-day prosecution of the War on Terror.

Warrantless Wiretapping was published before Edward Snowden’s revelations of widespread NSA surveillance, yet the essay remains relevant for those seeking to understand how the current scandal came to pass. The essay traces how Bush’s and Obama’s counterterrorism policies led to the enlargement of the surveillance state in a way that made the more recent NSA scandal all but inevitable. In particular, Fiss notes that two components of the 2008 amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act—the enabling of blanket authorizations for electronic surveillance and the elimination of the FISA judge’s authority to scrutinize the factual basis for a warrant application—permitted a pattern of conduct that violated the Fourth Amendment rights of millions of people.

The final piece, The Targeted Killing of Alleged Terrorists, is the only essay in this volume that has not been previously published in some form. It examines the judiciary’s refusal to judge a controversial counterterrorism policy, one that the Obama administration has expanded far beyond anything contemplated by President Bush: the use of drones to kill alleged extremists. In Fiss’s view, this policy puts in jeopardy values even greater than those vindicated in Hamdi and Boumediene: the constitutional guarantee against execution without trial. In this sense, the essay is a coda to the disappointment expressed in Aberrations No More.

These ten essays take up disparate topics, but they share a number of key themes. The most important of these is the centrality of constitutional norms to all of Fiss’s arguments. While many of the legal controversies discussed in the book involve the meaning of statutes and international conventions (particularly those that seek to regulate the conduct of the executive during wartime), for Fiss these instruments embody and are backstopped by the rights and privileges found in the Constitution itself. No statute or treaty can abrogate the constitutional principles that Fiss identifies in the essays, such as the principle of freedom or the prohibition of torture.

The essays are also emphatic in their insistence that the judiciary hold the political branches accountable to the Constitution despite the extraordinary circumstances of the war against terrorism. The framework set out by Fiss recognizes the constitutional authority of the government to conduct war, but it also accepts that the Constitution places limits on the way that war may be waged. In Fiss’s view, there is one Constitution in war as well as in peace.

Further, the constitutional limits placed on the government in prosecuting the War on Terror are not necessarily those applicable to more conventional wars. Fiss recognizes that the campaign to defeat al-Qaeda and its allies is a war, but he also cautions that it is an unusual war, one that has no clear temporal or geographic limitations. Thus, the prerogatives of belligerents in a traditional war, such as the right to hold enemy combatants until the termination of hostilities or place them on trial before military commissions, must be adjusted to fit the circumstances of a war that may continue indefinitely.

The constitutional norms propounded in these essays are understood by Fiss to be binding on United States officials wherever they act and against whomever they act—even if those acts occur outside the United States and affect only noncitizens. Although these norms may have different meanings in different settings, they are applicable everywhere. This vision of the Constitution shares much with that expressed by Justice Brennan in his dissent in the 1990 case United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, which is examined in several of the essays.

The essays are also unified by a rejection of the tenets of a school of jurisprudence known as minimalism, which has become increasingly popular in legal circles. Fiss makes his case against minimalism most strongly in The Perils of Minimalism, where he objects to the limited nature of the Supreme Court’s ruling on the use of military commissions to try suspected terrorists. Yet the essence of his critique—namely, that a preoccupation with technical distinctions at the expense of fundamental values can prolong and legitimate unconstitutional practices—is of more general application. For example, it guides Fiss’s opposition to the judicial response to claims of targeted killings and extraordinary rendition filed against U.S. officials.

Finally, although the legal dimensions of the War on Terror are often perceived as affecting only those accused or suspected of terrorist activities, in Fiss’s view the character of American society itself is also at stake. As Fiss observes repeatedly in Criminalizing Political Advocacy and Warrantless Wiretapping, an analysis of the war’s effects on freedom of speech and the right to privacy, when the Constitution is degraded in the name of public safety, the rights of all those subject to the authority of the United States government are at risk.

Despite their concerned tone, the message of all these essays is fundamentally one of hope. Through the example of Aharon Barak, Fiss remains committed to the belief that a well-functioning democracy can defeat even the most dangerous of foreign threats without compromising its most cherished values. Fiss, like Barak, is steadfast in his belief that the challenges intrinsic to the fight against terrorism should never cause us to lose sight of the principles that make us great.

A WAR LIKE NO OTHER

PART I

AN UNFOLDING PERSPECTIVE

Prologue to Chapter 1

Trevor Sutton

The federal judiciary’s response to the Bush administration’s prosecution of the War on Terror was one of the most closely watched and hotly debated topics in American public life of the previous decade. Today, after extensive litigation in federal courts, including several major Supreme Court decisions concerning the president’s power to conduct war and defend the nation, a consensus of sorts has developed around a few basic—albeit vague—principles: the executive cannot act with unfettered discretion in seeking to eliminate terrorist threats; some constitutional rights operate outside the territorial United States; citizens and noncitizens alike should be afforded some measure of due process in determining their legal status under the laws of war.

It is tempting to view this hard-won consensus as self-evident and inevitable—that is, to conclude in hindsight that under no circumstances was the Supreme Court going to allow the executive to do whatever it wanted in the name of national security. But when the initial essay in this book, In the Shadow of War, first appeared in 2003, less than two years after the September 11 attacks, the major legal battles of the Bush years had barely begun, and their outcome was far from obvious. Although the nation later soured on the Bush administration’s handling of the Iraq War, in 2003 political opposition to the president’s policies was feckless, where it existed at all. The Senate, with a Republican majority, had authorized the Iraq War with a vote of 98–2. It had passed the USA PATRIOT Act by similar margins a year and a half earlier. The war in Afghanistan remained popular, and the president himself enjoyed approval ratings north of 70 percent in some polls.

In the Shadow of War reflects the anxiety and uncertainty felt by many in the legal community during the early years of the Bush administration. The essay was originally delivered at a symposium at the University of Miami, shortly after the start of the Iraq War, at a time when the federal judiciary was only beginning to grapple with the basic dilemmas posed by the administration’s treatment of enemy combatants. On fundamental questions—for example, what sort of due process is required in order to classify someone as an unlawful enemy combatant? what is the legal status of Guantánamo? what is the extraterritorial reach of the writ of habeas?—judges appeared prepared to defer to the Bush administration’s sweeping claims that the exigencies of war trumped the judiciary’s historical responsibility to police executive action.

Yet if it was not obvious in 2003 that the pendulum would swing back toward judicial oversight of the president’s wartime powers, nor was it obvious that the pendulum would stop where it did—further in the direction of civil liberties than the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, discussed in the essay, but short of where many, including Owen Fiss, would have hoped. In Hamdi and Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court made clear that it was not giving President Bush a blank check, to borrow Justice O’Connor’s famous phrase, but it did leave a very high balance in the executive’s account. By contrast, even in the heated months leading up to the invasion of Iraq, some American jurists were prepared to give a more full-throated defense of the Bill of Rights than that offered by the Hamdi and Boumediene Courts. Of particular note, in the 2003 case Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, the Sixth Circuit rejected as unconstitutional a directive ordering the closure of all immigration proceedings deemed of special interest to the fight against terrorism. With unusually sweeping language, the Sixth Circuit sternly admonished the Bush administration for seeking to uproot people’s lives, outside the public eye, behind closed doors, adding, Democracies die behind closed doors.

As bombs dropped on Baghdad, there was hope in some quarters that the Supreme Court would proceed from principles similar to those expressed in the Detroit Free Press decision in assessing the lawfulness of the administration’s counterterrorism policies. As the remaining chapters in this book will illustrate, such optimism was not rewarded.

Chapter 1

IN THE SHADOW OF WAR

On March 21–22, 2003, a symposium was held in Florida on my work. The symposium was sponsored by the University of Miami and was organized by Professor Irwin Stotzky, a true friend and an organizational wizard. He decided to hold the meetings not in the law school itself but nearby at the Biltmore Hotel in Coral Gables. The Biltmore is a magnificent hotel built in the 1920s and partakes of the elegance of that era. It is a National Historic Landmark, set among grounds and courtyards lush with palm trees and crowned by a bell tower that is a replica of the famed Giralda of Seville.

The glamour of the setting added to the joyousness of the occasion. It also introduced an element of unreality to what we were doing. For two full days we were ensconced in the beauty of the Biltmore, talking about issues of great importance to me and, presumably, to the academics present—school desegregation, free speech, civil procedure, and the history of the Supreme Court. Reason reigned supreme, lightened by the camaraderie among the participants and the presence of my family. The world, however, was in a very different place. It was dark and tragic. On Wednesday, March 19, only two days before, the United States had invaded Iraq.

The war was on our minds. One of the panelists, Aharon Barak, was unable to travel to Coral Gables from Israel because of the outbreak of the war. His absence was a constant reminder of the events occurring in Iraq. Moreover, all of us carried within ourselves the tragic losses of September 11 and knew full well the significance of the ongoing War on Terror. We were also mindful of the war in Afghanistan. It had begun in October 2001, shortly after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and though the Taliban had already been ousted and the Northern Alliance had assumed power, sporadic fighting continued, as did the search for the leadership of al-Qaeda.

Although everyone at the symposium was aware of these developments, they were not publicly discussed. Neither the war in Iraq nor that in Afghanistan, nor even the War on Terror, was the subject of any of the panels or formal presentations, perhaps because the issues they raised seemed far removed from my teaching or scholarship. Yet I felt the need to break this unwitting pact of silence and used—seized?—the opportunity given to me in closing remarks for that purpose. For me, the Iraq War was a gross violation of international law and put into bold relief the disregard for the law that has so marked the post–September 11 era.

International law is a fragile enterprise. Based part on custom, part on the consent given in treaties, and part on the actions and the processes of international organizations, the authoritative character of international law, as both a descriptive and a normative matter, is always in dispute. Yet the rules regarding the use of force seem clear. The Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the United States and thus binding on it as a treaty, prohibits the use of force with two exceptions, one for self-defense¹ and the other when the Security Council determines that the use of force is needed to secure world peace. The Afghanistan war may have been consistent with the Charter, but this could not be said of the war that had just begun in Iraq.

Although the Security Council adopted a resolution condemning the September 11 attacks and in general terms affirmed the right of self-defense, it did not in so many words authorize the United States to invade Afghanistan either to overthrow the Taliban or to suppress al-Qaeda.² The defense of the legality of the war had to be based on the right of self-defense. The United States determined that al-Qaeda was responsible for the attacks of September 11 and that the war against Afghanistan, then controlled by the Taliban, was justified because of the symbiotic relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

By permitting the use of force for self-defense, the Charter creates a measure of unilateralism. Power is vested in an individual nation-state to determine whether it has been attacked, who is responsible for the attack, and even whether the relation between a state and some terrorist organization, such as al-Qaeda, is such as to justify an armed attack against another state. Only the strong are truly able to enjoy the freedom to make these judgments and to decide whether to use armed force, instead of less violent and more targeted alternatives, in response to an aggressive attack.

Law requires impersonality in order that the applicability of norms not turn on the personal identity of the subject, but every system of law operates in a way that allows the rich and powerful greater enjoyment of protected rights than that experienced by the poor and weak. Consider, for example, the provisions of the Bill of Rights guaranteeing free speech or the assistance of counsel. We may seek to enhance the prerogatives of the poor or weak in order to minimize the difference in the experience of these rights, but such an endeavor is driven more by egalitarian concerns—everyone should enjoy the blessings of liberty—than by a belief that these reforms are required to turn the First or Sixth Amendment into law.

In the domestic sphere, independent tribunals, backed by the power of the state, have the authority to determine whether an act of violence that is justified in the name of self-defense fully respects the bounds of that right. Such an institutional arrangement is lacking in the international sphere. This distinguishes the law of the nation-state from that of the world community, but it does not mean that the United Nations Charter and international conventions are not law. In the international context, law consists of the norms and principles that a nation-state is duty bound to respect and obey, and in the case of the Charter this duty arises from the solemn consent given to it by a nation-state. Those aggrieved by an alleged violation of the Charter may not be able to turn to an independent tribunal to determine whether those norms have been fully respected; nor can they rely on some world police to enforce a judgment of such a tribunal. But they can address the world community and demand that it make a judgment for itself and, if appropriate, impose on the party violating those norms whatever sanctions lie within the community’s lawful grasp. Sometimes the only sanction may be shame. The responsibility devolves on each of us, as members of the world community, to make a disinterested judgment as to whether the norms of the Charter have been honored.

Understanding law in these terms, I venture to say that a strong—and, in my view, a convincing—case could be made for the legality of the war in Afghanistan. No such case, however, could be made for the war in Iraq. The invasion of Iraq was not precipitous. It was the product of a long and sustained buildup, and in the course of that buildup various defenses were offered on behalf of the use of force. None was persuasive. On occasion, the legality of the war was defended on the basis of a series of Security Council resolutions. The first, adopted in 1990, authorized the use of force against Iraq to eject it from Kuwait.³ The second, adopted in 1991, imposed a disarmament obligation on Iraq after it was in fact ejected from Kuwait and a cease-fire was instituted.⁴ The third—Resolution 1441, adopted in the fall of 2002—declared that Iraq remained in material breach of its disarmament obligations.⁵ It also gave Iraq a final opportunity to comply with those obligations and warned Iraq of serious consequences if it did not comply.

Warning of serious consequences is not, however, the same as authorizing the use of military force against Iraq, either by the United States or by any other nation. It also seems far-fetched to assume that the determination in Resolution 1441 that Iraq was in material breach of the disarmament obligations imposed by the second resolution revived the authorization of force contained in the first resolution, since that resolution authorized the use of force only to eject Iraq from Kuwait. Bent on war, the United States sought yet another resolution to authorize the invasion of Iraq. Once it became clear that it would not obtain this authorization, the United States proceeded without Security Council approval and invaded Iraq.

Unlike the Afghanistan war, the invasion of Iraq could not be justified as falling