

E-voting on DELA

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Backend

Plan

- ❖ Our goals
- ❖ Main cha(lle)nges
- ❖ Evaluation
- ❖ Future work

Plan

- ❖ Our goals
 - **Project requirements**
 - Background
- ❖ Main changes
- ❖ Evaluation
- ❖ Future work



Project requirements


Security:

- Transparency/Auditability
- Resilience
- Vote secrecy
- Data integrity
- Availability


Roles:

- Admin
- Voters

Execution:




Plan

- ❖ Background
 - Project requirements
 - **Background**
 - Dela & smart contract
 - DKG
 - Neff Shuffle
 - ❖ Main changes
 - ❖ Evaluation
 - ❖ Future work
- 

Background: Dela & Smart contract


```
proc CreateElection:  
  if CreateElectionTx:  
    make(Election)  
  exit
```

reads from




Dela

Background: DKG




Background: Neff Shuffle




Background: All together

Tools:
DKG
Neff Shuffle


Smart contract methods




Plan

- ❖ Our goals
- ❖ Main changes
 - **DKG** 
 - One DKG instance per election
 - Persistence of DKG credentials
 - Neff Shuffle
 - Election format
- ❖ Evaluation
- ❖ Future work


DKG: One DKG instance per election (1/3)



DKG: One DKG instance per election (2/3)



DKG: One DKG instance per election (3/3)



DKG: Persistence of DKG credentials

```
type DKGService struct {  
    electionID    ID  
    pubKey        PubKey  
    secretPartKey PrivKey  
    rpc           RPC  
    factory       serde.Factory  
}
```




Plan

- ❖ Our goals
- ❖ Main changes
 - DKG
 - **Neff Shuffle**
 - Security issue
 - Election format
- ❖ Evaluation
- ❖ Future work



Neff shuffle: Security issue

We want enough nodes to make a shuffle:




Algorithm:

1. All nodes shuffle the ballots and submit the result
2. One shuffle is accepted.
3. Start in 1 again but with the new shuffled ballots as input and without the node who made the accepted shuffle. Until enough shuffles are accepted.

Solution

- The nodes have to **sign** their shuffle
- **Refuse** shuffle if the node already has achieved one




Plan

- ❖ Our goals
- ❖ Main changes
 - DKG
 - Neff Shuffle
 - **Election format**
 - Ballot size
 - Sequence shuffle
 - Election configuration
- ❖ Evaluation
- ❖ Future work




Election format: Ballot Size

- kyber can only encrypt plaintexts < 29 bytes
→ split plaintext into **chunks**



Election format: Ballot Size

- Type refactoring
- Adaptation of the protocols



Election format: Sequence shuffle

- Shuffle of ElGamal sequences
- Recent feature of kyber*

Encrypted Ballots

Ballot 1

$$\begin{pmatrix} \boxed{\text{[]byte}(X_{1,1}, Y_{1,1})} & \cdots & \boxed{\text{[]byte}(X_{1,k}, Y_{1,k})} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \boxed{\text{[]byte}(X_{N_Q,1}, Y_{N_Q,1})} & \cdots & \boxed{\text{[]byte}(X_{N_Q,k}, Y_{N_Q,k})} \end{pmatrix}$$

Input of the shuffle of sequence

$$\begin{pmatrix} \boxed{X_{1,1}, Y_{1,1}} & \cdots & X_{N_Q,1}, Y_{N_Q,1} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ X_{1,k}, Y_{1,k} & \cdots & X_{N_Q,k}, Y_{N_Q,k} \end{pmatrix}$$

Ballot 1

Layout of the ElGamal pairs in memory. (X_{ij}, Y_{ij}) is the j^{th} pair of the i^{th} ballot.

Election format: Proving a shuffle of sequence

- The prover needs a **random** vector from the verifier
 - Problem of verifiable randomness
- The prover uses a **semi-random generator** to get the vector on its own

Election format: Election configuration (1/2)

- Bigger Ballots → More complex polls!
- 3 Types of Questions:
 - Ranked
 - Select
 - Open text
- A Subject groups multiple questions and sub-Subjects such that the Layout is fixed

```
type Configuration struct {  
    MainTitle string  
    Scaffold []Subject  
}
```


Election format: Election configuration (2/2)

Rank your favorite foods:

1. Chocolate
2. Caramel
2. Raspberry
2. Orange
3. Licorice

Choose one hot drink:

- Cappuccino
- Latte
- Hot chocolate
- Espresso
- Flat White

Write down your name:

First name

Last name

```
type Rank struct {  
    ID ID  
  
    Title    string  
    MaxN    uint  
    MinN    uint  
    Choices []string  
}
```

Plan

- ❖ Our goals
- ❖ Main changes
- ❖ Evaluation
 - **Correctness**
 - Performance
- ❖ Future work



Evaluation: Correctness

	cothority	last semester	now
Smart contract	37	87	76
DKG	65	90	88
Neff Shuffle	65	93	88

Test coverage evolution (%)


+ New integration tests added very recently

Evaluation: Performance (1/3)

- Focus on **shuffling** and **decryption**
- Parameters:
 - Number of nodes
 - Number of ballots in election
 - Size of ballots


Evaluation: Performance (2/3)

- Shuffle time is **linear** in number of nodes
- well...
- Number of chunks is fixed at 3 per ballot




Evaluation: Performance (3/3)

- Linear in log-log scale, hence decryption time is a **power law** of number of ballots
- Number of nodes fixed at 7
- Pairs = Chunks



Plan

- ❖ Our goals
- ❖ Main changes
- ❖ Evaluation
- ❖ **Future work** 
 - Stability
 - Decryption
 - Linking the backend and frontend

Future work: Stability

- More tests
- In more exotic situations
- With more nodes/ballots

Future work: Decryption

- Transparency
- Speed

Future work: Linking the backend and frontend

- Authentication of users
- Election formats


Frontend

Plan

- ❖ Tequila authentication
- ❖ Dela node request signatures
- ❖ Administration panel

How it was at the beginning


- One React process
- Anyone can login (and have a random ID) and create/manage elections and vote



Starting architecture


Tequila authentication

- Need to add a new trusted backend (as React is only for frontend)
- Modification on the webpages
 - Show the user's name on each page
 - Actually "log in" the users on React and Express processes



New ExpressJS backend

Authentication process



DELA message signature : reason


- Until now, everybody could send actions to the blockchain
- With Tequila implemented, actions must be now trusted / signed

→ Let all the traffic that goes to the DELA nodes pass through the Express


→ The Express adds current user data and signs the data

DELA message signature : architecture change

- The ExpressJS receives all requests that needs to go to the DELA nodes



DELA message signature : signing process




Administration Panel

- Since users are authenticated, we can set roles to users to allow / disallow certain actions:
 - Voter: can vote
 - Operator: can create / manage / close elections and can do the same as a voter
 - Admin: can add operators / admins and do the same as an operator

Administration Panel : User Interface

- Added a new view that allow admins to add a role to a user
- Changes the navigation bar to only display the correct tabs



ADD A USER

sciper	role	Action
231123	operator	DELETE
111112	operator	DELETE
123567	admin	DELETE
295747	admin	DELETE


Rows per page: 100 ▾ 1-4 of 4 < >

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View as an admin user


Administration Panel: Database

- Added a database with only one table to store roles




```
1 • SELECT * FROM dedis.user_rights;
```

	id	sciper	role
▶	3	231123	operator
	6	111112	operator
	7	123567	admin
	12	295747	admin
*	NULL	NULL	NULL



Administration Panel : Backend access

- Middleware on the Express server that allow / reject a request depending on:
 - The user's role
 - The current URL to access



Production-ready configuration

- Set up of a server with the following configurations
 - NGINX as a reverse proxy that holds the SSL certificate
 - Custom services files to run the different processes
 - crond configuration to restart the apps often

Demo

Conclusion

- Focused on **security**, made advances in **usability**
- Addressed many issues... and found new ones
- **The project should be usable** during the next semester!

The project's journey

