



rVMI

A New Paradigm for Full System Analysis

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Overview

1. About us
2. Motivation
3. Architecture
4. Implementation
5. Demo
6. Summary



1. About us

1. About us



Dr. Jonas Pfoh

- Engineers at FireEye
- Work on malware detection
- Research Interests
 - Virtualization and Virtual Machine Introspection
 - Malware and exploitation techniques



Dr. Sebastian Vogl



2. Motivation

2. Motivation: What we did

rVMI: “Debugger on Steroids”

- Runs completely isolated from the target through **Virtualization**
- Full control over the target with **VMI**
- Leverages **memory forensics** to make the full state of the guest available to the analyst
- **Interactive** and **scriptable**

2. Motivation: Why we did it

Manual dynamic analysis

- Analyzing malware and exploits
- Gain a full understanding of a sample
- Tools
 1. Debuggers
 2. Sandboxes

2. Motivation: Why we did it

Debuggers

- Provide visibility and flexibility
- **BUT: NEVER DESIGNED FOR MALICIOUS SOFTWARE**
- Inherent attack vectors
 1. No isolation
 2. Rely on the OS to function and to obtain data
 3. Designed to trace a single process (or the kernel)

2. Motivation: Why we did it

Sandboxes

- Provide isolation and evasion resistance
- **BUT: NEVER DESIGNED FOR INTERACTIVE ANALYSIS**
- Manual analysis is difficult
 1. Limited Visibility
 2. Limited Control
 3. Limited Interface

2. Motivation: Why we did it

The current state of interactive dynamic analysis

- Neither debuggers nor sandboxes were designed for this
- We face a tradeoff between visibility/flexibility and isolation/evasion resistance
- We are not aware of any tool that combines these properties

➔ We need a new tool that was designed for the job.




3. Architecture

3. Architecture: Goals

1. Resistant to evasion
2. Full system analysis
3. Interactive and scriptable


3. Architecture: Resistant to evasion



Building Block 1 **Virtualization**

- Isolate the target system from the analysis environment
- Increase evasion-resistance

3. Architecture: Full system analysis



Building Block II VMI

- Provides full control of target system
- Allows access to entire state of the VM
- Exports this functionality through an API

3. Architecture: The semantic gap

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
3. Architecture: The semantic gap



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...EX_PUSH_LOCK Proc
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...LARGE_INTEGER Exi
...EX_RUNDOWN_REF R
...WORD64 UniquePr
...CT_ENTRY Ac


3. Architecture: Full system analysis



Building Block III Semantic Layer

- Reconstruct the semantic knowledge of the guest OS
- Export this knowledge through an API

3. Architecture: Interactive and scriptable



Building Block IV Interactive Interface

- Environment for the actual analysis
- Provides access to the VMI layer and the semantic layer
- Support for scripting



4. Implementation

4. Implementation: Virtualization

1

Guest Operating System

Virtual Hardware


KVM

QEMU

Building Block I Virtualization

- Chose KVM/QEMU as a basis as it is the natural choice for a debugger
- System does not depend on the hypervisor


4. Implementation: VMI



Building Block II VMI

- Extended KVM/QEMU with a VMI interface
- Interface exposes the hardware features
- Exported this interface via QMP


4. Implementation: Semantic Layer



Building Block III Semantic Layer

- Used Rekall as a basis
- Supports multiple OSs
- Can access OS structures in python
- Added a QMP address space to access the VM through VMI

4. Implementation: Interface



Building Block IV Interactive Interface

- Used the iPython shell of Rekall as basis for the debugger interface
- Added Rekall plugins for VMI commands
- Added rVMI events and exported an interface to these events



5. Demonstration

5. Demonstration

DEMO



6. Summary

Summary



- Interactive dynamic malware analysis is an important technique
- Currently no tools for the job
- We presented **rVMI**: Debugger on steroids
 - Isolation
 - Full control and full access
 - Interactive and scriptable

<https://github.com/fireeye/rVMI>

We are open to feedback and feature requests and hope for contributions.