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WiFi-Based IMSI Catcher

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5G Ensure

Overview

- What is an IMSI?
- Conventional IMSI Catchers
- WiFi-based IMSI Catcher
  - WiFi Network Authentication 💣
  - WiFi Calling Authentication 💣
- Operator/Vendor/OS Mitigations
- User Mitigations
- Demo

What is an IMSI?

- **I**nternational **M**obile **S**ubscriber **I**dentity
  - 15 digit number e.g. 234123456789012
  - Allows for mutual authentication of a device to the network
    - Using SIM's secret authentication Key (K_i) and for 3/4G the **Se**q**u**ence **N**umber (SQN)
- Stored in two places:
  - In the 'SIM Card' (USIM/UICC)
    - IMSI is accessible in read only section of SIM
    - Secret key (K_i) and SQN are not directly readable
  - At the Operator
    - IMSI indexes K_i and SQN from HSS/AuC Database
- An identifier that can be used for tracking
  - One of a few like WiFi/Bluetooth/NFC Hardware address (e.g. MAC), IMEI, MSISDN (Phone number), etc.

Conventional IMSI Catchers

- Typical features
  - Tracking: IMSI/IMEI, Location
  - Interception: Call/SMS/Data
- Operates on licensed Mobile Bands: GSM/3G/4G
- Acts as a fake base station to lure nearby mobile devices
- Operates in two modes
  - 'Passive' - mainly for tracking (interception when no/weak ciphering)
  - Active – interception and tracking
- Cost
  - Commercial solutions expensive - but now possible with Laptop+SDR board
- Been around since the early 1990s
  - Patented in Europe in 1993

Techniques in Conventional IMSI Catchers

2G

- Exploits protocol flaws (no mutual authentication..)
- Tracking & Interception
- Easily available to buy online
- Use of fake base station

http://www.epicos.com/EPCompanyProfileWeb/Content/Ability/EM_GSM.JPG

3G/4G

- Exploits architecture issues (Base station > UE..)
- Tracking & difficult to intercept traffic w.r.t 2G
- Commercial products usually downgrades
- Use of legitimate base station also possible

http://edge.alluremedia.com.au/m/g/2016/05/nokia_ultra_compact_network.jpg

Protection against IMSI Catchers

- No protection for commercial non-rooted mobile devices
- Special phones (expensive though) and apps for rooted phones
- Turn off cellular connection or use WiFi platform for secure calls/data??

WiFi-Based IMSI Catcher

- Features
  - Tracking: IMSI, Location
  - No interception (yet)
- Operates in unlicensed ISM Bands: WiFi
  - Range - few hundred meters – can be extended…
  - Fake Access Points
  - Redirect/Spoofs mobile packet data gateway
  - Exploits protocol & configuration weaknesses
- Based on two separate techniques [3GPP TS33.234]
  - **WiFi Network Authentication (‘WLAN direct IP access’)**
  - **WiFi-Calling Authentication (‘WLAN 3GPP IP access’)**
- Cost
  - Low: Virtually any WiFi capable computer

WiFi Network attachment

- Unencrypted WiFi access points
  - Captive Portal approaches
    - Wireless Internet Service Provider roaming(WiSPr) etc
- Normal Encrypted WiFi access points
  - Pre-shared password/credentials
- ‘Auto Connect’ Encrypted WiFi access points
  - WiFi key is negotiated without user intervention
  - Based on credentials in the USIM/UICC (‘SIM Card’)
  - Controlled by operator provided configuration
    - Manual
    - Automatic/pre-installed

Automatic configuration

- Some Android and Windows phones automatically connect based on SIM
- iOS configures phone based on inserted SIM
  - Activates an operator specific .mobileconfig file
  - Configures a range of operator specific options
    - Including a list of Auto/EAP supported WiFi SSIDs
- Our analysis of iOS9 profiles showed
  - More than 50 profiles for Auto/EAP WiFi
  - Also other config info

‘Manual’ Configuration

- Some Android devices require initial manual config
  - After which it automatically connects
- Instructions on operator websites
  - Follow simple steps to set up
- Android provides various Carrier controlled mechanisms
  - Lollipop (v5.1 MR1): UICC Carrier Privileges
  - Marshmallow (v6.0): Carrier Configuration
    - “Privileged applications to provide carrier-specific configuration to the platform”

Automatic WiFi Authentication

- Port Based Network Access Control [IEEE 802.1X]
  - Uses **E**xtensible **A**uthentication **P**rotocol (EAP) [RFC3748] **o**ver **L**AN (EAPOL) over WiFi
- Based upon two EAP Methods
  - EAP-SIM [RFC 4186]
    - GSM based security - Currently most widely used
  - EAP-AKA [RFC 4187]
    - 3G based security - Being deployed
- Support in Android, iOS, Windows Mobile, and Blackberry devices
  - We've reported the issue to them all and to operators & GSMA
    - No privacy bounties 😕
  - Apple included 'conservative peer' support due to our work
- Deployed in many countries – adoption growing

EAP-SIM/AKA Identities

- Three basic identity types for authentication
  - Permanent-identity (IMSI)
    - Typically used initially after which temporary ids are used
  - Pseudonym identity
    - A pseudonym for the IMSI has limited lifetime
  - Fast reauthentication-identity
    - Lower overhead re-attachment after initial exchange
- Behaviour affected by peer policy
  - “Liberal” peer - Current default
    - Responds to any requests for permanent identity
  - “Conservative” peer – Future deployment option
    - Only respond to requests for permanent identity when no Pseudonym identity available

EAP-SIM/AKA transport

- Basic EAP protocol is not encrypted
- Currently EAP-SIM/AKA in EAPOL is unencrypted
  - Thus IMSI is visible (to a passive attacker) when permanent identity used for full authentication 😱
  - Also open to active attacks by requesting full auth 😱
- WiFi Access keys not compromised
  - All content still protected
- There are encrypted tunnel EAP methods
  - EAP-TTLSv0, EAP-TLS…
  - But support required in both mobile OS and operator

WiFi-Calling Connection

- Phone connects to Edge Packet Data Gateway (EPDG) over WiFi
  - Voice calls over WiFi
  - Phone connects on low/no signal
    - Also connects in Airplane mode + WiFi …
- Connection to EPDG uses IPsec
  - Authenticates using Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKEv2)
- Supported on iOS, Android, and Windows devices
  - WiFi-Calling available in a number of countries
  - The issue also been reported to OS makers and Operators

IPsec brief overview

- **I**nternet **P**rotocol **Sec**urity
  - Confidentiality, data integrity, access control, and data source authentication
  - Recovery from transmission errors: packet loss, packet replay, and packet forgery
- Authentication
  - Authentication Header (AH) - RFC 4302
- Confidentiality
  - Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) - RFC 4303
- **Key management**
  - Internet Key Exchange v2 (IKEv2) - RFC7296
- Two modes
  - Tunnel - used for connection to Gateway (EPDG)
  - Transport

Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2)

- Initiates connection in two phases
  - IKE_SA_INIT
    - Negotiate cryptographic algorithms, exchange nonces, and do a Diffie-Hellman exchange
  - IKE_AUTH
    - Authenticate the previous messages, **exchange identities (e.g. IMSI),** and certificates, and establish the child Security Association(s) (SA)
- IKE_AUTH uses EAP-AKA
  - IMSI exchange not protected by a certificate
  - Open to MitM attacks on identity (IMSI) 😱
- IPsec ESP keys are not compromised
  - Call content still safe

Operator/Vendor Mitigations

- Deprecate EAP-SIM in favour of EAP-AKA
  - EAP-SIM is weaker as it only uses GSM triplets
- Deploy EAP-AKA/SIM with conservative peer pseudonym
- Deploy Certificate based approach
  - Deploy certificates on suitable AAA infrastructure
  - Deploy certificate protected tunnelled EAP-AKA for WLAN access
    - E.g. EAP-TTLS+EAP-AKA on 802.1X
  - Deploy certificate protected IPsec/IKEv2 to EPDG
    - E.g. EAP-TTLS+EAP-AKA for IKE_AUTH, or multiple IKEv2 auth exchange
- (Re)investigate other potential solutions
  - IMSI encryption – 5G-ENSURE project has proposed an 'enabler'
  - E.g. 3GPPP TD S3-030081 – 'Certificate-Based Protection of IMSI for EAP-SIM/AKA'
- Standards bodies should re-evaluate approaches

Mobile OS Mitigations

- Support conservative peer for EAP-AKA/SIM with pseudonym support
  - Emerging in some Oses (e.g. iOS10)
- Certificate based approach
  - Support for EAP-TTLv0 + EAP-AKA in IKEv2 & EAPOL
  - Other approaches?
- Allow for more user choice with automatic WiFi network access
  - Preferably allow for editing of all stored associations

User Mitigation

- WiFi Network Access Control
  - iOS
    - Turn off ‘Auto-Join’ toggle for Auto-WiFi networks
      - Only possible when network in range
    - iOS10 may provide better protection (once operators deploy support)
      - It has conservative peer pseudonym support – due to us 😉
  - Android
    - ‘Forget’ Auto-WiFi profiles
      - Depending on version only possible when network in range
- WiFi-Calling
  - Android/iOS: Selectively disable WiFi-Calling
- Switch off WiFi in untrusted environments

Summary

- Exposed two IMSI catching new techniques
  - WiFi Network authentication protocols
  - WiFi-Calling authentication protocols
- Most of the world's smartphones implement these protocols
  - Both techniques rely upon installed operator automatic configuration for these popular services
- We've been working with Operators/Vendors/ OS companies to fix the issue
  - But it's a complex issue

Conclusions & Future Work

- Investigating other uses of EAP-SIM/AKA
- Exploring use of USIM credentials in other WiFi based protocols
- Continuing work in 5GENSURE.EU Project
  - Security Architecture and enablers

Demo and Questions…