Naturalism

With the rise of naturalistic philosophy, conceptual analysis has faded into the background, and Ludwig Wittgenstein's account of reddish green and transparent white as grammatically excluded has been written off or ignored.  While his view of such impossible colours is, as he himself saw, open to question, so too is the naturalist's alternative.

There is overwhelming agreement amongst naturalists that a naturalistic ontology should not allow for the possibility of supernatural entities. I argue, against this prevailing consensus, that naturalists have no proper basis to oppose the existence of supernatural entities.

Biosemantics is an inclusive naturalistic philosophical account of the intentional content of both mental and linguistic representations. As it is well known, Millikan explains the normative dimension of intentional content in terms of natural function. However, Millikan’s account (and its reception) suffers from three fundamental problems (1) Usually, her account is not situated in the suitable philosophical tradition, in my view, this tradition is classical pragmatism (Peirce, Mead, Morris) and the pragmatist themes in Sellars’ philosophy, and not classical cognitive science (or Fodorian Psychosemantics). The first chapter of the book is, thus, an exercise in re-contextualization. (2) Biosemantics has neither a philosophically satisfactory notion of naturalism nor a very clear idea of normativity. I claim that biosemantics needs both, a non-reductionist notion of naturalism (I call it “Biological Naturalism”) and a unified account of normativity. Chapters 2 and 3 are dedicated to these tasks. (3) Millikan’s account of perception is underdeveloped. By taking up arguments and distinctions from Thomas Reid, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and J.J. Gibson chapter 5 establishes a theory of the non-conceptual content of (visual) perception in a biosemantic framework.
The manuscript is in need of revision on two different levels: Firstly, the architecture of the book is not clear enough, it contains too much material, and the exposition of Millikan’s point of view could be more straight forward. Secondly, two important arguments do not work in their present shape, namely the argument for self-consciousness in non-human animals (section 4.4) and the argument from animalism against the infamous swampman problem (sections 4.1-4.3). I have received many valuable comments, suggestions, and criticisms.
Obviously, my current SNF-Project at the University of Fribourg “Biosemantics and Normative Pragmatism (Millikan and Brandom)” is a continuation of the Habilitation into the realms of concepts, thought, and self-consciousness."

"One of the central questions in the study of modern Western Esotericism concerns the continued appeal of magic; how did magic survive “the disenchantment of the world”? An appealing explanation has been that the emergence of “occultist magic”, based on the writings of Eliphas Lévi (1810–1875) and the teachings of the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn (est. 1888) in particular, resulted in a “psychologisation” of magic. By interpreting magical practices as psychological techniques, and the trafficking with esoteric entities as manipulation of internal, psychological states rather than externally real spiritual beings it has become possible for well-educated, upper middle class moderners to retain both their belief in magic and their rational integrity.
By presenting a case study of one of the most influential modern occultists, Aleister Crowley (1875– 1947), this article seeks to demonstrate that “the psychologisation thesis” is not entirely tenable. Special notice will be given to Crowley’s magical system, presented as “Scientific Illuminism”, and the role and appeal of science in that system. Contrary to the psychologisation thesis, which it will be argued represents a sort of “psychological escapism”, Crowley did not seek to insulate his magical beliefs from his rational beliefs by withdrawing them to the realm of psychology and internal states; instead, influenced by the ideals of scientific naturalism, he sought to devise a naturalistic method by which magical practice could be rationally criticised, tested and refined. In short, it will be argued that Crowley’s system represent a move towards the naturalisation rather than the psychologisation of magic.
In addition to presenting a close reading of some of Crowley’s ideas on the relation between science and magic, a historical contextualisation will be provided, in which special notice will be given to Crowley’s relation to prominent intellectual currents with interest in this issue, including the Society for Psychical Research, Sir James Frazer, and naturalist philosophers and psychologists, from T. H. Huxley to Henry Maudsley.
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Bovines ou la vraie vie des vaches est un film d’Emmanuel Gras sorti en 2011. Le réalisateur affirme dans un entretien accordé au magazine Télérama que «[Son] film est le premier film animalier au sens strict. Ce n'est ni un documentaire “sur” des animaux, ni juste un film où il y a des animaux, mais un film qui essaye de se rapprocher de ce qu'est “être un animal”.», une réflexion cinématographique qui semble faire écho au ouvrages littéraires et philosophiques de Jean-Christophe Bailly, Le versant animal et Vinciane Despret Etre bête, tous deux parus en 2007.

THE NATURALIST FICTION THAT BEGAN TO APPEAR IN THE UNITED STATES in the s was part of a transnational phenomenon that saw this amalgam of meticulous description, ideas from the emerging social sciences, dystopian plots, and rejection of common literary mores spread from France, where it took shape in the s, to many parts of the world. By the s, varieties of naturalist fiction had appeared in countries across Europe, North and South America, and East Asia. The connections of American literary naturalism to the far-flung phenomenon, and in particular to the French version associated with Émile Zola, once were readily acknowledged by critics and literary historians. For several decades, however, the productive emphasis on the immediate social, economic, and political context in which writers work has drawn attention away from American naturalism's transnational ties. Yet the circulation of naturalist

[EN] This article argues that Rorty's philosophy of mind is possible as a metaphilosophical project. It trespasses the limits of physicalism and yet opposes philosophical scholasticism. Rorty's physicalism is grounded on a metaphilosophical motivation and aims to show that physical descriptions protect against unjustified pretensions to a transcendentally engaged, considered to be objective, universally applicable knowing. while defending Rorty's eliminativism from criticism aimed at his presupposed scientism, the article discusses the possibility of "mind" as an empty concept. the article concludes that, in the context of Rorty's philosophy, the concept of mind should be considered as idealistic and naturalistic, not indicating any concrete content and therefore immune to materialistic criticism. However, despite the physical vocabulary aimed at expanding the problematics of mind, the full self-knowledge at which the scientific knowledge is aimed is unachieved. This leaves space for philosophical, theological and other descriptions of mind.

[LT] Šiame straipsnyje teigiama, kad Rorty sąmonės filosofija įmanoma kaip metafilosofinis projektas, pranoks-tantis fizikalizmo ribas ir oponuojantis filosofinei scholastikai. Įrodinėjama, kad Rorty fizikalizmą grindžia metafilosofinė motyvacija – siekis parodyti, kad fizikinės deskripcijos apsaugo nuo nepamatuotos preten-zijos į transcendentiškai angažuotą, neva objektyvų ir universaliai taikomą žinojimą. svarstoma " sąmonės " , kaip tuščios koncepcijos, galimybė, kartu ginant Rorty eliminatyvizmą nuo kritikos dėl neva esančio pasi-davimo scientizmui. Prieinama išvada, kad Rorty filosofijos kontekste sąmonės koncepcija laikytina idea-listų ir natūralistų konstrukcija, nenurodančia jokio konkretaus turinio, todėl neatlaikančia materialistų kritikos. Vis dėlto net ir pasitelkus fizikinį žodyną sąmonės problematikai išskleisti, ši išsklaida nesuteikia visiško savęs pažinimo, į kurį galėtų pretenduoti mokslinis žinojimas – tam padeda filosofinės, teologinės ir kitokios deskripcijos.

This is my reply to Free Inquiry editor Tom Flynn's insistence that we do away with "spirituality" talk.  In it, I contend that some spirituality talk is perfectly consistent with a rigorous naturalism, and useful to boot.  In fact, "spirit" talk plays a vital (but generally misunderstood) role.  Rather than purge the language of spirit-talk, we should understand it naturalistically.

Phenomenology is often criticized as a philosophy that mistakenly privileges consciousness and subjectivity.  If phenomenology presupposes subjectivity, then it must be either supplemented or supplanted by a more comprehensive ontology.  In this paper, I argue that such a bifurcation of phenomenological and ontological methods is itself ultimately premised on a kind of mind-body dualism, or the idea that consciousness is a world constituting activity.  By drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s 1954-5 lectures on Institution and Passivity, recently translated into English by Leonard Lawlor and Heath Massey, I develop the resources to explain how consciousness is not a meaning-constituting activity but rather an instituting-instituted synthesis, that is, the expressive inheritance and transformation of different developmental institutions of meaning.    The paper proceeds by introducing the phenomenological method, dealing with three antinomies that the idea of constitution cannot resolve (a problem of conscious passivity, the problem of the existence of the pre-conscious past, and the problem of other minds).  I elaborate the concept of institution by drawing on three levels of institution which I present through the examples of organic sensori-motor development, expressive human habituation and learning (particularly writing), and the experience of shared social spaces and gestures.  After exploring these organic, personal, and social institutions, I will briefly develop the implications institution has for, on the one hand, attempts to naturalize phenomenology, and on the other, how we should rethink individual responsibility on the basis of institution.

Talk given at University of Alberta philosophy colloquium series, 27 November 2015.

Darwinizm i koncepcja wieloświata a religijne wyjaśnienie racjonalnego porządku i poznawalności przyrody W artykule wykazuję, że konflikt między nauką (naukami przyrodniczymi) a religią (teizmem chrześcijańskim) obecnie ma miejsce w obszarze do niedawna uznawanym za wykraczający poza kompetencje nauki. Dotyczy on mianowicie kwestii ogólnego uporządkowania, racjonalności, inteligibilności świata przyrody, którą tradycyjnie uznaje się za przedmiot badań filozofii czy teologii a nie nauki. Wykazuję, że teoria Darwina pozwoliła usunąć z nauki argumentację odwołującą się nie tylko do interwencji Boskich, ale i w ogóle do kierowania przez Boga rozwojem życia na Ziemi. W ten sposób sukces darwinizmu wiąże się z ugruntowaniem naturalizmu w nauce. Występujące zaś we współczesnej kosmologii oraz fizyce kwantowej koncepcje wieloświata stanowią naturalistyczny, a przez to akceptowalny w nauce, sposób pozwalający racjonalnie zrezygnować nawet z deistycznego ujęcia roli Boga w stworzeniu uporządkowanego, inteligibilnego wszechświata. Słowa kluczowe: wieloświat, darwinizm, teizm, ateizm, przyroda, naturalizm, teistyczny naturalizm, zasada antropiczna Darwinism and the idea of multiverse versus religious explanation for the rationality.and intelligibility of nature I show that at present times there is a conflict between natural science and religion (Christian theism) in the domain that, until recently, was considered to be beyond scientific interest. What I mean here, is the question of general order, rationality or intelligibility of nature that was supposed to belong to the domain of philosophy or theology, rather than science itself. I show that Darwin's theory of natural selection allowed to remove from science not only explanations referring to God's supernaturaI interventions in nature, but also any reference to God's guidance of development of life on Earth. The success of Darwin's theory contributes to domination of naturalism in science. In turn the concept of multiverse that is found in the contemporary cosmology and quantum physics, is an idea that in naturalistic waywhich makes it acceptable in science-makes it possible to rationally deny even the deistic concept of God's only role in nature as a source of generał order, rationality and intelligibility of the world.

Argument ten stara się uwidocznić konsekwencje, jakie zachodzą przy równoczesnym utrzymywaniu prawdziwości założeń naturalizmu oraz ewolucjonizmu. Plantinga, przypatrując się założeniom obu tych teorii, dochodzi do wniosku, że w ich świetle nie mamy podstaw, aby uważać, że nasze mechanizmy poznawcze generują w większości prawdziwe przekonania.

Moral objectivism based on a metaphysical dualism is no longer tenable. In his "Expanding Circle" Peter Singer argued for a moral objectivism based on "reason', but perfectly rational agents disagree on morality all the time. There are at least 5 reason for a moral subjectivism. Nevertheless we can often discuss moral claims in a quasi-objective fashion, simply because they often refer to mutual or shared interests. Based on a conference paper presented in 1991 in Liblice before the European Sociobiological Society.

Resumen: Este artículo tiene como objetivo mostrar que 1) la teoría de la evolución es ontológicamente neutral en el debate entre naturalismo metafísico y teísmo y 2) que es consistente sostener en conjunto el naturalismo metodológico y el teísmo. Para ello, examinaré en primer lugar el argumento de Plantinga que intenta mostrar que hay consistencia entre teísmo y evolución y que, por el contrario, hay inconsistencia entre la teoría de la evolución y el naturalismo (tanto metodológico como metafísico). Me interesa aceptar la primera parte del argumento de Plantinga, pero rechazar la segunda. Defiendo que el argumento de Plantinga es válido si y sólo si se supone una teoría de la verdad por correspondencia. A continuación, argumento que si se reemplaza dicha noción por la concepción pragmatista de la verdad de James, es posible concluir 1 y 2.

Abstract: This paper aims to show that: 1) theory of evolution is ontologically neutral inside debate about metaphysical naturalism and theism; and 2) that it is consistent to hold simultaneously methodological naturalism and theism. In order to achieve this, I will first examine Plantinga's argument that tries to show that there is consistency between theism and evolution, but, on the contrary, there is inconsistency between theory of evolution and (methodological and metaphysical) naturalism. I accept the first part of this argument, but I reject the second part. I will defend that Plantiga's argument is valid if and only if it is supposed a theory of truth by correspondence. Finally, I will argue that if such notion is replaced by James's pragmatist conception of truth, it is possible conclude 1 and 2.

Cordula Brand, Personale Identität oder menschliche Persistenz? Ein naturalistisches Kriterium, Paderborn: Mentis 2010, 375 S., 978 -3 -89785 -708 -7. Schon häufiger ist der Verdacht geäußert worden, in der von John Locke angestoßenen und bis heute andauernden Debatte um Personen und ihre transtemporale Identität würden verschiedene Themen und Fragestellungen miteinander vermengt, die eigentlich gar nichts oder nur wenig miteinander zu tun hätten. 1 Cordula Brand teilt diesen Eindruck (vgl. z.B. 24 ff. u. 31 ff.) und möchte mit ihrem Buch Personale Identität oder menschliche Persistenz? Ein naturalistisches Kriterium Klarheit in die verworrene Diskussion bringen. Wie der Titel der Tübinger Dissertation bereits verrät, bedeutet dies für sie in erster Linie, zwischen ‚menschlicher Persistenz' und ‚personaler Identität' zu unterscheiden. Brands Entwurf eines ‚naturalistischen Kriteriums' reagiert nicht nur auf die, wie sie meint, aus ‚Expertensicht' unleugbare Extensionsdifferenz der Begriffe ‚Mensch' und ‚Person' (vgl. insbes. 27 f.), sondern stellt überdies den Versuch dar, mit der von ‚Laien' und ‚Experten' 2 gleichermaßen vernachlässigten fundamentalen Differenz zwischen deskriptiven und normativen Fragen ‚unserer' ‚Identität' philosophisch Ernst zu machen (vgl. z.B. 25 f., 245 u. 306). Wenn ‚Person' eigentlich "ein moralisches Konzept" ist (30; vgl. auch 211 u. 306), das bestimmten Wesen "auf der Basis des Vorhandenseins bestimmter Eigenschaften bzw. Fähigkeiten" einen bestimmten "moralische[n] Status" verleiht (353), dann kann eine widerspruchsfreie Rede von ‚personaler Identität' sich nur auf die Identität des mit Personalität verknüpften moralischen Status beziehen (vgl. 320 ff.). Dagegen bleibt es dem naturalistischen Kriterium vorbehalten, die Bedingungen der synchronen wie diachronen Identität desjenigen Wesens zu spezifizieren, dem wir diesen Status im Kontext unserer Lebenswelt zunächst und zumeist zuschreiben: die Individuations-und Persistenzbedingungen des Menschen (vgl. 31 ff. sowie zusammenfassend 304). Allein ein solcher doppelter Problemzugang stellt nach Ansicht der Autorin einen Theorierahmen bereit, innerhalb dessen philosophische ‚Experteneinsichten' zur Lösung konkreter bioethischer Probleme beitragen können (vgl. 41, 324 ff., 355 f. u. den Klappentext). Wer mit der jüngeren Entwicklung der ‚Personal-identity'-Debatte ein wenig vertraut ist, wird sich unweigerlich an den Theorieentwurf von Michael Quante erinnert fühlen: Auch Quante plädiert für eine strikte Trennung normativer und deskriptiver Fragen, 3 woraus vermittelt über die Annahme, der Begriff ‚Person' sei ein nichtkonstitutives Phasensortal (also 1 Vgl. v.a. Quante (2007), zuerst 6 ff., und (2002), 17 ff. 2 Brand übernimmt diese Unterscheidung von Putnam, vgl. 12 ff. 3 Vgl. Quante (2007), 18 ff.

Karl Popper’s conception of methodology and its relationship to epistemology is examined, and found wanting. Popper argues that positivist criteria of demarcation fail because they are attempts to discover a difference in the natures of empirical science and metaphysics. His alternative to naturalism is that a plausible criterion of demarcation is a proposal for an agreement, or convention. But this conventionalism about methodology is misplaced. Methodological rules are conventions, but which methodological rules are followed by scientists it is not itself a matter of convention. This casts doubt upon the status of Popper’s famous criterion of demarcation.

Der Pragmatismus zählt als eines der bedeutsamsten Theorieparadigmen der Philosophie des einundzwanzigsten Jahrhunderts sowie als eine der wirkkräftigsten Perspektiven der gegenwärtigen philosophischen Forschung. Das Proseminar bietet eine Einführung in den Begriff des Pragmatismus an mit besonderer Berücksichtigung seiner Rolle in der Werkentwicklung John Deweys. Das Werk Deweys spannt nicht weniger als sieben Jahrzehnte um und befasst sich mit allen klassischen Teildisziplinen des Philosophierens sowie mit der Pädagogik und der Psychologie; eher als durch eigenständigen Systembau entwickelt es sich durch eine stetige kritische Auseinandersetzung mit vergangenen und zeitgenössischen Denkweisen. Daher darf es auch nicht überraschend sein, dass die Haltung Deweys selbst zum Pragmatismus im stetigen Wandel begriffen war und vielleicht auch unentschieden blieb. Im Seminar wird der Versuch unternommen, die pragmatistische „Mentalität“ (James) als Reaktion auf bestimmte philosophische, wissenschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Probleme zu begreifen.

In Adam Bede, George Eliot explores the way a society divides its members into categories and how these categories contribute to the formation of an individual’s identity. In the mid-nineteenth century authors in the naturalist tradition often discussed this dialogical relationship between individual and society, the specific roles for social gaze, the labeling and degrading. Eliot shows an acute of these labels that no one shapes identity without their influence. According to Nancy Anne Marck, Adam Bede introduces the theme of “emerging social consciousness” where the characters gain broader awareness of human interdependence through an experience of suffering (447). This is particularly evident when examining Eliot’s characters of “lesser fortune.” Once we’ve investigated how Eliot portrays these negative social forces throughout the novel, the labeling and the stigmatization, we will return to how Eliot addresses the larger question permeating her novel of education: how one judg...

A recent exchange of criticisms over a display of Islamic art illustrates the division of Islamic art history into two main schools. The disagreement was occasioned by the 2006 exhibition entitled Cosmophilia: Islamic Art from the David Collection, Copenhagen. The pleasure it gives, and the objects were arranged according to a traditional division of Islamic ornament into four themes. This occasioned a reaction from a prominent representative of the dominant trend in the academic study of Islamic art, who took the organizers of Cosmophilia to task for promoting a view that strips the artworks of their meaning. In this essay, I consider each of these viewpoints critically, point out a premise they share, and propose a fresh perspective under which to study works of Islamic art, one that takes into account the meaning of pleasure as a natural phenomenon.

This article attempts to present the unity as well as the difference between Hegel's and Dewey's social philosophical approaches to struggles for recognition. It argues that interpreting Dewey's Lectures in China as a commentary on Hegel sheds new light on Dewey's social philosophy as a recognition theoretical whole. Furthermore, the resulting "experimentalist" account of recognitive relations, norms and values might turn out to present a fruitful perspective in contemporary discussions on recognition.

Properly executed, metaphysics consists in part of painstaking ontological detail and in part of grand systematic speculation. The distinction between these two aspects is not new: it is inspired by Wolff's distinction between metaphysica generalis sive ontologia and metaphysica specialis, Husserl's distinction between formal and regional ontology, and finally D. C. Williams's distinction between analytic ontology and speculative cosmology. 1 The detail concerns the basic kinds of entity and the ways in which they are discerned, analysed, fitted together and wielded in explanation. In this, analytic philosophy excels, but it cannot take place in a speculative vacuum. The speculation concerns hypotheses for which evidence is partial and inadequate to ground them without demur or risk. The classic metaphysical positions of Platonism, Aristotelianism, Cartesian dualism, Leibnizian monism, and Hegelian idealism all unabashedly adopt such metaphysical speculations. Analytic philosophers have tried generally to steer away from grand speculation because it got a bad name with Hegel and because it tends to undermine their self-sought credentials as "scientific". The upshot has been that their cosmological positions have been largely tacit or shamefaced: commonsense ordinary-language Moorean realism, Carnapian disavowal, Wittgensteinian quietism. But several significant twentieth century philosophers have been unafraid to speculate: Alexander, Whitehead, Quine and Lewis being examples. In my view it is part of a metaphysician's-nay any philosopher's-responsibility, to articulate the speculative hypothetical framework within which his or her detailed work takes its place. 2

Among those who reflect on the nature of neuroscience, there is a view about its scope and limits which we will call, with a certain amount of historical license, the neuron doc-trine.1 Roughly, the neuron doctrine is the view that the framework within which the science of ...

En este ensayo busco señalar algunos puntos que sirven para entender la relación intelectual entre Unamuno y Kierkegaard, especialmente en el contexto de "Niebla", a partir de la idea del amor desarrollada por ambos autores. Lecturas mejor fundamentadas de esas similitudes deben apoyarse en una comprensión de los seudónimos y su importancia en la obra de Kierkegaard, junto a la idea de la “comunicación indirecta”. Propongo tres puntos de análisis para afinar las comparaciones entre Unamuno y Kierkegaard: 1) Un marco teórico que retome el carácter dialógico de la obra de ambos autores; 2) tener en cuenta el contexto intelectual del que surgió "Niebla", incluyendo la oposición de Unamuno al naturalismo realista y 3) una lectura rigurosa de Unamuno y Kierkegaard que respete las características particulares de sus obras. A lo largo del ensayo evidenciaré la importancia de la idea de polifonía en ambos autores, particularmente en el Unamuno de "Niebla". Sostengo que los puntos de contacto entre Kierkegaard y Unamuno, aunque numerosos, en el fondo pueden ocultar ideas del amor diferentes, especialmente si se tiene en cuenta la línea de interpretación de la “comunicación indirecta”.

W literaturze podkreśla się fakt, że Darwin sprzeciwiał się poglądom głoszącym nagłe stworzenie niezmiennych gatunków przez Boga. Wykazuję, że tworząc swoją teorię, odrzucał nie tylko koncepcję bezpośredniej Boskiej ingerencji, ale także wszelkie – oprócz deistycznego – teleologiczne wyjaśnienia procesów ewolucyjnych. Jako powody zmiany przez Darwina stanowiska dotyczącego rozwoju życia na Ziemi wskazuję zarówno przytaczane przez niego argumenty naukowe jak i jego filozoficzno-światopoglądwą ewolucję.

Dzięki sukcesowi teorii Darwina przyjmowany przez niego naturalizm metodologiczny stał się fundamentem współczesnej nauki. Postulat naturalizmu zakazuje wyjaśnień odwołujących się do łamiących porządek przyrodniczy bytów nadprzyrodzonych i do procesów celowościowych. Uwzględnienie czynników naukowych oraz światopoglądowych wpływających na Darwina daje pełniejszy obraz motywów, które przyczyniły się do utrwalenia wizji współczesnej nauki jako bazującej na naturalizmie.

The paper focuses on some naturalistic aspects of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Wittgenstein has often been considered a radical anti-naturalist philosopher, mainly because he does not endorse the thesis of the continuity between philosophy and science. However, it will be argued that Wittgenstein's later philosophy incorporates a kind of naturalism without naturalization, i.e., a liberal naturalism, in virtue of the relation between human nature and language. It will be concluded that Wittgenstein's liberal naturalism provides an example of a naturalistic perspective on language which avoids the limits of an intellectualist approach without leading to scientism: this is meant to express the irreducibility of naturalism to the mere scientific version.

The article surveys Kaplan's ideas about God and salvation in the light of current debates on religious realism and pluralism. Using definitions formulated by John Hick, one of the prominent voices of religious realism and pluralism, the article's central argument is that Kaplan was a religious realist who affirmed the ontological existence of God, even though his epistemology dictated the use of a nonrealistic and functionalistic religious language.

The current situation in philosophy of science generally, and in philosophy of biology in particular, is most unsatisfactory. There are at least three general problems that many philosophers thought themselves near to solving twenty years ago, only to find that the anticipated solutions have come unglued. These are (1) the problem of characterizing and understanding the dynamics of conceptual change in science; (2) he problem of understanding the interrelationships among theories including particularly the reduction of one theory to another); and (3) he problem of scientific realism (i.e., the problem of how seriously to take the claims of theoretical science or, at least, of some theoretical scientists, to be describing the world literally--in terms of such theoretical entities as genes and protons, DNA molecules, and quarks). This general situation has significant effects on the philosophical study of particular sciences. In philosophy of biology, for example, although one finds a large number of elegant studies of particular topics, the sad fact is that there is no generally satisfactory large-scale synthesis n sight. We have no agreed-on foundation, no generally acceptable starting point from which to delimit and resolve the full range of theoretical problems of interest to scientists and philosophers regarding biology.

CONTENTS

October 17th, 2011 [pages 6-15]
I
Persecution and the Art of Writing or Towards a Hermeneutics of Suspicion
from interpretation of the meaning between lines to explanation of the transcendental effect of forms

1. ‘PERSECUTION’: from the threat of philosophical truth to the subversion of the verisimilitude of fiction

2. ‘THE ART OF WRITING’: protection for the author and selective communication with accomplices

i. The protective output: the censor’s impasse and authority outwitted

ii. The communicational output: separation of readerships and selective training in the subversive knowledge

3. The ‘ART OF READING’: from interpretation of the implicit message to explanation of the transcendental revolution in forms

i. The ‘interpretation’ stage: moving from the explicit sense to the implicit intended meaning—criteria for recognizing and reconstructing the concealed message.
  * First stage: criteria for recognizing anomalies that give grounds to suspect second intentions
  * Second stage: reconstruction criteria allowing the implicit meaning to be established

ii. The stage of ‘explanation’: from the sociology of knowledge to transcendental stylistics

October 18th, 2011 [pages 16-31]
II
The Latin Erotic Elegy and the Case of Propertius
from subversion of the Augustan imperial ethos to the metaphysics of dissimulatio

1. Introduction. From the elegiac paradox (irrepressible passion-love in an interruptive texture) to an art of writing between the lines

2. A historico-literary context of substitution: the Roman erotic elegy between poetic dissimulatio and Augustan auctoritas

i. Literary elements that contribute to ‘recognition’ of the elegiac art of writing: from literature as imitatio to irony as dissimulatio

ii. Political elements that contribute to the ‘reconstruction’ of the implied message: elegiac values versus the values of Augustan auctoritas—Propertius’ authorial situation vis-à-vis the vates, Horace and Virgil.

3. Interpretation: an amatory façade for the subversion of imperial values—progressive dissimulatio in Propertius’ writing

i. Propertius’ independence in the Monobiblos: from amatory etiology to the sphragis of political resistance

ii. Propertius’ precautions in Maecenas’ circle, or the art of writing in Books 2 and 3: from the amatory mask to the mask of literary rivalry
  * The love mask: frontal subversion of Augustan moral reforms and marriage laws sheltered in the imperative of ‘irregular elegiac passion’
  * The mask of literary rivalry in the programmatic elegies: from urban recusatio, the refusal to write epic on national themes, to subversion of the Augustan ideals expressed in the official poetry of Horace and Virgil.
  -Subversion of the imperial ideals in Virgil’s poetry: mocking the claims of the Aeneid. Propertius 2.34.
  -Subversion of Horace’s public stances in the Odes. Propertius 3.1-2.
  * The final mask: the use of hyperbole, bad taste and mythological harmonics to subvert the political values and legitimated triumphs of the imperial authority

iii. Propertius under Augustus’ eye: the final dissimulatio in Book 4—subversion by deliberate bad taste and allusion by mythological harmonics.

4. Explanation: from the counterworld of the elegiac fiction to the metaphysics of dissimulatio

i. The sociology of discourse: the counterworld of the elegiac fiction, or the Dionysiac inversion of Apollonian values

ii. Transcendental poetics: the metaphysics of dissimulatio


October 19th, 2011 [pages 32-56]
III
The Love Poetry of the Provençal Troubadours
from the sensualism of the gai saber to the synthesis of sound against the totalitarianism of vision

1. Introduction. A paradoxical contrast – the monotony of the motives of idealized love versus the originality of the couplings of rhyme – as promotion of the queen in a game of warfare

2. A historico-literary context of substitution. Troubadour joi: from the gai saber of Occitan dispersion to the linguistic joculum of the couplings of rhyme

i. The philosophico-discursive side: the naturalistic sensualism of the gai saber vs. Christian orthodox ontotheology

ii. The poetico-literary aspect: the promotion of musical joculum in the couplings of rhyme

3. Interpretation. The naturalistic sensualism of the gai saber: a provocative defense of ‘sensory passion’ in a ‘world governed by chance’

i. The trobar prim (naturau e cortes) of William of Aquitaine (1071-1126): from the paradox of a ‘double-faced poet’ to the game of con in a world of chance
  * The contradictions of a ‘double-faced poet.’ A reading in context
  * The natural register in the companion songs: a pornographic imaginary behind the explicit defense of natural passion.
  * The invention of the ‘courtly love’ register: a confession of unsatisfied desire and submission to the domna as a parody of the new ideals of monastic asceticism.
  * The pseudo-metaphysical register in Farai un vers de dreit nien: an ‘Enigma about Nothingness’ as a parody of the Hyperessence, or immanent naturalism against negative theology.

* Conclusion regarding the interwoven registers at the origin of the trobar: the promotion of passion-love in the immanence of the world behind the defensive façade of courtly love.

ii. Marcabrú’s trobar brau: the paradox of a moralizing but obscene condemnation of love as a parody of preachers that awakens desire.

iii. The courtly trobar or the classic canso in anamorphosis: from confession of a belligerent confrontation over sensory passion to staging of the experience of joi

iv. Arnaut Daniel’s trobar clus: concealment and final communication of the gai saber in the arts of the miglior fabbro del parlar materno
  * The trobar leu and the arrival of the trobar clus: the case of Arnaut Daniel’s trobar ric.
  * The concealment of meanings in the trobar clus.
  * Lexicon and images: the dir strano e bello or the subversion of the metaphorical order
  * Linguistic Marranism and barbarolexia: the Provençal parody of official Latin
  * Impossible images and dream allegories: subversion of the metaphorical order.
  * Verbal music: from the sensory materialization of the joi of the world to the experience of pleasure in the arts of delay
  * Daniel’s characteristic consonance: the song of nature as an invitation to joi
  * The cobla ‘dissoluta’: the arts of amatory delay, intensification of desire by deferred satisfaction, in the sensory field of rhyme. (Sim fos amors de joi donar tan larga).
  * The last stage of the trobar (Lo ferm voler qu’el cor m’intra): linguistic, sexual and metaphysical dissemination in the ‘sestina.’
-The involution of the sestina as the final stage of experimentation in the arts of delay of the trobar (mot refranh, rims estrams, permutations).
-The linguistic dissemination of the words in the poem: from the banal motifs of courtly love to the martial imagery and sensory experience of the pleasures of delay
-The sexual dissemination of images: the pornographic double meaning behind the mask of courtly love
-Metaphysical dissemination in the formal device: the imperative of a ‘game of chance’

4. Explanation. From the foundation of the space of modern lyrical fiction to the synthesis of sound against the totalitarianism of vision

i. Sociology of discourse: the forms of meaning of the trobar as the foundation for the sphere of modern lyrical fiction – from concealment of enjoyment in form to promotion of independent enjoyment of form

ii. Emancipation of the synthesis of hearing versus the totalitarianism of vision and the diurnal image
  * The oral forms of meaning of the Romance tongues versus the written Latinitas
  * From reversal of the hierarchy between material sound and spiritual light to the synthesis of listening vs. the epistemology of vision
  * The significant detail of the ‘alba’: explicit defense of natural passion in the context of a musical and nocturnal perception that turns away from the diurnal vision of the opponents of joi

* Coda. A detective’s art of reading of selective application

The article revisits Habermas’s recasting of moral universalism, so as to avoid the aporias of naturalism
and cultural relativism, according to a pragmatic-formal perspective that does justice to the complex
phenomenon of religion in a postsecular, pluralist world, where believers, atheists, and agnostics can
coexist together and actively participate in the construction of a more tolerant, just society.
Key-words: cultural relativism, moral universalism, naturalism, pluralism, religion, secularization

ÁRBOL (origen etimológico) es una comunicación por la cual Enrique Cabrejas pone en conocimiento que las palabras españolas no son tal y como las conocemos en la actualidad, se refiere a que fueron pensadas de otro y de distinto modo al idioma latín. Ni lo imaginan. Sí, lo que vemos como letras no son únicamente grafemas, unidades mínimas de escritura sino ideas. La ortografía española es una escritura fonética, figurativa y también significada -según Cabrejas-. Nuestros caracteres son ideogramas. ¡Asombroso!

In this dissertation I consider the ideological implications of representations of courtesan culture in Émile Zola’s Nana, and assert the validity and value of this analytic approach to the naturalist text. The date range I have chosen (1860-1885) encompasses the rise of fall of the Second Empire, from its pinnacle at the Exposition Universelle in 1867, to Napoleon III’s surrender to Prussia at the Battle of Sedan in 1870. French terms are referenced throughout this dissertation so I have included a glossary of translations after the concluding chapter. The chapters of my dissertation develop a Zolaesque framework, forming concentric circles that push out from the novel’s central theme: the sexual body. Briefly summarised, Chapter One explores the body observed: the body as myth, the body as spectacle, and the body in (and evading) the narrative field of vision. Chapter Two addresses the ‘crisis of the nude,’ structures of marginality, and the degradation of the social and political body of Second Empire high society. Chapter Three is concerned with the function of environment in the novel, particularly spaces of modernity and how they operate on gender. Nana is, once again, the centre of the hurricane; the focal point of sexual frenzy, the sexual narrative, and of its analysis; a site for the inscription of moral, political and social ideological commentary to which all symbolism returns. Accompanying each chapter is an analysis of Édouard Manet’s realist paintings Nana (1877), Olympia (1863) and Bar at the Folies-Bergére (1882), opening a wider commentary on literature and art as communicating forms of ideological discourse. Contrary to dominant academic criticism—which I will both cite and scrutinise throughout this dissertation—I posit that Zola’s moralising intention is not at odds with his naturalistic literary aim. Rather, the naturalist novel anticipates the immobilisation of its excessive commitment to descriptive realism; it signals the significance of its apparent contradictions as crucial to the topos with which it is engaged; its calls attention to formal and thematic dissonance, and in turn, the historical circumstances it seeks to expose. The irruption of the natural in the naturalist novel observes the ironies of man-made deformations of the natural world, and through ideological commentary on the body and its environment, Zola condemns the conditions of the Second Empire as the fall of man — posing naturalism as its redemption. Both Zola and Manet’s texts develop around a disparate historical, social and political context, and it is in their aberrations that they come the closest to observable truth. 


ABSTRACT: This paper focuses on the presence of French naturalist literature from the second half of the nineteenth century to 1914, highlighting its importance and diversity in the Brazilian literary field and its survival by means of association with other forms of art, such as theatre and cinema. In order to prove this point, data are presented which confirm the circulation of the works of French naturalist writers throughout the period, reaching a varied public, and show their strength and influence outside the literary sphere per se, causing an impact on fashion and customs.

RÉSUMÉ: Cet article se propose de retracer la présence de la littérature naturaliste française au Brésil à partir de la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle jusqu'en 1914, en mettant en relief son importance et sa diversité dans le champ littéraire brésilien ainsi que sa permanence à travers l'association avec d'autres formes d'art, notamment le théâtre et le cinéma. À l'appui, il présente des données qui témoignent de la circulation dans le pays des oeuvres des principaux écrivains naturalistes français le long de cette période et de l'existence d'un public varié de lecteurs. Enfin, il montre comment ces écrivains naturalistes devenus des célébrités ont pu exercer leur emprise au-delà de la sphère littéraire proprement dite, surtout sur la mode et les coutumes.

https://www.ualberta.ca/~aizen/excavatio/journal.html

https://www.ualberta.ca/~aizen/excavatio/articles/v27/PedroPauloGARCIAFERREIRACATHARINA.pdf