Nagarjuna

My aim in this book is to analyse India’s contribution to the study of reason. I seek to discover the active rational principles driving Indian theory, and to use this as a vehicle for disclosing a fabric of conceptual relations in their thinking about language, mind, and the normative. The book is based on courses I have taught and has been used successfully as a textbook for modules on Indian Philosophy within Philosophy curricula in the US and Britain. Unlike other books, I focus on the arguments rather than on merely surveying doctrine.

CAPITULO UNO: Examen de las Condiciones. Pág. 4 CAPITULO DOS: Examen del Movimiento. Pág. 6 CAPÍTULO TRES: Examen de los Sentidos. Pág. 10 CAPÍTULO CUATRO: Examen de los Agregados. Pág. 11 CAPÍTULO CINCO: Examen de los Elementos. Pág. 12 CAPÍTULO SEIS: Examen del Deseo y de Quien Desea. Pág. 13 CAPÍTULO SIETE: Examen de lo Condicionado. Pág. 14. CAPÍTULO OCHO: Examen del Agente y de la Acción. Pág. 18. CAPÍTULO NUEVE: Examen de la Entidad Anterior. Pág. 21. CAPÍTULO DIEZ: Examen del Fuego y el Combustible. Pág. 23. CAPÍTULO ONCE: Examen del Comienzo y Fin. Pág. 25. CAPÍTULO DOCE: Examen del Sufrimiento. Pág. 26. CAPÍTULO TRECE: Examen de los Fenómenos Compuestos. Pág. 27. CAPÍTULO CATORCE: Examen del Contacto. Pág. 29. CAPÍTULO QUINCE: Examen de la Esencia. Pág. 30. 3 CAPÍTULO DIECISEIS: Examen de la Esclavitud. Pág. 31. CAPÍTULO DIECISIETE: Examen de las Acciones y sus Frutos. Pág. 33. CAPÍTULO DIECIOCHO: Examen del "Yo" y los Fenómenos. Pág. 37. CAPÍTULO DICINUEVE: Examen del Tiempo. Pág. 39. CAPÍTULO VEINTE: Examen de la Concurrencia. Pág. 40. CAPÍTULO VIENTIUNO: Examen de la Transformación y de la Destrucción. Pág. 43. CAPÍTULO VEINTIDOS: Examen del Tathagata. Pág. 45. CAPÍTULO VEINTITRES: Examen de los Errores. Pág. 47. CAPÍTULO VIENTICUATRO: Examen de las Cuatro Nobles Verdades. Pág. 51. CAPÍTULO VEINTICINCO: Examen del Nirvana. Pág.56. CAPITULO VEINTISEIS: Examen de los Doce Vínculos de la Originación Dependiente. Pág.59. CAPÍTULO VEINTISIETE: Examen de las Visiones. Pág. 60. Nagarjuna: Versos Fundamento del Camino del Medio. Mulamadhyamaka-karikas. Me postro ante el Buda Perfecto, El Mejor de los Maestros, quien enseñó Que todo lo que se origina dependientemente Es sin cese, sin surgimiento, Sin aniquilación, sin permanencia, Sin venir de ningún sitio, sin ir a ningún sitio, Sin distinción, sin identidad, 4 Lleno de paz-libre de toda elaboración conceptual. CAPÍTULO UNO: Examen de las Condiciones. 1. Ni a partir de sí mismo ni de otro, Ni de ambos, Ni sin causa alguna, Nada surge jamás en ninguna parte. 2. Hay cuatro condiciones: hay una condición eficiente, Y similarmente, existe la condición objetiva, La condición inmediata, y la condición dominante. No hay una quinta condición. 3. La esencia de las entidades No existe en cosas tales como las condiciones. Si la entidad que es "yo" no existe, La entidad que es "otro" no existe. 4. La acción no tiene condiciones. No hay acción sin condiciones. No hay condiciones sin acción. Ni ninguna condición tiene acción. 5. Puesto que en dependencia es estas se da el surgir, Estas son llamadas condiciones. Mientras que aquellas no surgen, ¿Por qué no son llamadas "no condiciones"? 6. Ni para una cosa existente, ni para una inexistente Es posible una condición; Si una cosa es no existente, ¿De qué sería condición su condición? Si una cosa ya es existente, ¿Qué haría una condición? 7. Cuando los fenómenos son establecidos Ni como existentes, ni como no existentes, ni como ambos, ¿Cómo podría uno proponer una causa para la existencia de una cosa? En este caso, no tendría sentido. 5 8. Vosotros habéis afirmado enfáticamente que no se da el caso De que un fenómeno existente tenga algún objeto. Por tanto, puesto que los fenómenos 1 no tienen objetos, ¿Cómo podría haber una condición objetiva? 9. Puesto que los fenómenos son no surgidos, El cese no es sostenible. Por tanto, una condición inmediata no tiene sentido. Si algo ha cesado, ¿Cómo podría ser una condición? 10. Puesto que no hay existencia De cosas sin esencia, La afirmación: "Cuando esto existe, esto surgirá" No es sostenible. 11. El efecto no está ni en las diversas condiciones 2 , Ni en las condiciones unidas. ¿Cómo podría algo que no está en las condiciones Surgir a partir de las condiciones? 12. No obstante, sí sin eso, Surge a partir de estas condiciones, ¿Por qué no surge a partir de eso Que no es una condición? 13. Si el efecto tuvo la naturaleza de las condiciones, Las condiciones no tendrían su propia naturaleza. ¿Cómo podría un efecto de algo que no tiene naturaleza propia Tener la naturaleza de condiciones? 14. Por lo tanto, los efectos no tienen la naturaleza de condiciones, Ni la naturaleza de "no condiciones". Si no hay tales efectos, ¿Cómo podría haber condiciones, o "no condiciones"? 1 Aquí la palabra "fenómenos" denota todos los estados de consciencia. 2 Por separado. 6 CAPÍTULO DOS: Examen del Movimiento. 1. Ahora, donde uno ha ido, uno no va 3 ; Donde uno aún no ha ido, uno no va 4 . Aparte de donde uno ha ido, y de donde uno no ha ido, Eso sobre lo que uno va 5 , no puede ser concebido 6 . 2. Donde hay movimiento 7 , hay un estar yendo. Puesto que hay movimiento en eso que está siendo transitado; Pero no donde uno ha ido, ni donde uno no ha ido; De ello se sigue que el estar yendo, está en eso que está siendo transitado. 3. ¿Cómo podría ser defendible Para el estar yendo, el estar en eso que está siendo transitado? Cuando no acontece el estar yendo, no es sostenible El decir que hay un estar yendo allí. 4. Para cualquiera existe el ir por donde uno va, La consecuencia absurda que se seguiría sería Que habría un sendero sobre el cual uno está yendo, sin ir; Pero siempre que uno va, está yendo 8 . 5. Si el estar yendo fuera "el lugar donde uno va", Habría un ir que sería doble: Uno para él, quien va allí; Y uno en la acción de ir que está allí. CAPÍTULO TRES: Examen de los Sentidos. 1. La vista, oído, olfato, Gusto, tacto, y mente Son las seis facultades. Sus esferas son los objetos visibles, etc. 2. Esa propia vista no Se ve a sí misma. ¿Cómo algo que no se ve a sí mismo Puede ver a otro? 3. El ejemplo del fuego No puede elucidar la visión. Eso, junto con la visión ha sido tratado A través del análisis de lo ido, lo no ido, y el estar yendo. 4. Cuando no hay la menor visión, No hay un sujeto que vea. ¿Cómo podría tener sentido decir que, En virtud de la visión, esta ve? 5. La visión no ve, La falta de visión, no ve. A través de la propia visión, El análisis del sujeto que ve es comprendido. 6. Sin desapego de la visión, no hay un sujeto que vea; Ni hay un sujeto que ve desapegado de ella. Sin un sujeto que vea, ¿Cómo puede haber visión, o lo visto? 7. De la no existencia de la visión y de lo visto, se sigue Que los cuatro-la consciencia, etc.-no existen. Puesto que este es el caso, ¿Cómo podrían existir Cosas tales como el que se apropia? 8. A través de la explicación de la visión,

Revised publication of Ph.D. dissertation providing a text-critical study and translation of the Karmaphalaparīkṣā chapter of Candrakīrti's Prasannapada with a study of early Buddhist theories of karman, relying on Sanskrit, Pali, Chinese, and Tibetan sources.

This seminar examines the history of Buddhist Thought in India. Buddhists like to place emphasis not on belief as such but on practicing, following a path, and knowing, directly seeing. This direct ‘seeing things the way they really are’ is held to free a person from the depths of suffering through cognitive transformation. By ‘Buddhist thought’ we
mean, in this general context, the discussions, speculations, and arguments concerning ‘how things really are.’ In this seminar we will try to understand this issue through the works of various Buddhist philosophers beginning with Śākyamuni Buddha (480-400 BCE) through to Candrakīrti (ca. 570-650 CE).

I examine the consistency between contemporary environmentalist ideals and Buddhist philosophy, focusing, first, on the problem of value in nature. I argue that the teachings found
in the Pāli canon cannot easily be reconciled with a belief in the intrinsic value of life, whether human or otherwise. This is because all existence is regarded as inherently unsatisfactory, and all beings are seen as impermanent and insubstantial, while the ultimate spiritual goal is often viewed, in early Buddhism, as involving a deep renunciation of the world.

Therefore, the discussion focuses mostly on the Mahāyāna vehicle, which, I suggest has better resources for environmentalism because enlightenment and the ordinary world are not conceived as antithetical. Still, many contemporary green ideas do not sit well with classical Mahāyāna doctrines. Mahāyāna philosophers coincide in equating ultimate reality with 'emptiness,‘ and propose knowledge of this reality as a final soteriological purpose.

Emptiness is generally said to be ineffable, and to involve the negation of all views. An important question is how to reconcile environmentalism with the relinquishing of views. I consider several prevalent themes in environmentalism, including the philosophy of
'Oneness,‘ and other systems that are often compared with Buddhism, like process thought. Many of these turn out to have more in common with an extreme view that Buddhism seeks
to avoid, namely, eternalism.

I attempt to outline an environmental position that, like the doctrine of emptiness, traverses a Middle Path between eternalism and nihilism. I conclude by proposing that emptiness could be regarded as the source of value in nature, if it is seen in its more positive aspect, as 'pliancy.‘ This would imply that what
Buddhist environmentalists should seek to protect is not any being in its current form, nor any static natural system, but the possibility of adaptation and further evolution.

PhD dissertation on the 17th chapter of Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika with Candrakirti's Prasannapada commentary, providing an analysis of early Buddhist karma theories of little known Abhidharma schools. The majority of the dissertation is now obsolete, since a revised version has been published in the 2006 book "Early Buddhist Theories of Action and Result". However, the dissertation contains some parts that were not included in the 2006 book and that remain unpublished. These include the critical Sanskrit and Tibetan editions of the last third of the 17th chapter of the text as well as the appendix providing an English translation of that part of the text.

This paper offers a parallel analysis of the concept of śūnyatā in Nāgārjuna’s philosophy and the concept of zero in mathematics. A historical survey of the development of zero in its Indian origin and an appraisal of its role in contemporary mathematics is undertaken in the first part, while an analysis of Nāgārjuna’s śūnyatā is provided in the second. The third and concluding part considers a possible, speculative parallel configuration of concepts, approached through a philosophical framework inspired by the philosophy of Jacques Derrida and Alain Badiou.

The charge of nihilism in relation to emptiness is a charge that is all too familiar to the Mādhyamika.  This paper attempts to explain and extrapolate Burton’s nihilist objection to Madhyamaka Buddhist thought and dispel it with primary recourse to original writings by Nāgārjuna and subsequent commentators such as Candrakīrti.  I examine how the Mādhyamika can avoid the trappings of nihilism whilst simultaneously arguing that conventional phenomena (persons and entities) are empty of intrinsic existence or essence, thus illustrating how Madhyamaka philosophy works as a cogent Middle Way between nihilism and eternalism.

To this end, I have split the paper into four distinct but interrelated sections, with each one laying the groundwork for the next and building upon the last.  The four topic areas subsumed under our main endeavour to refute Burton’s claim of nihilism are; I: Emptiness and its Foundations, II: Emptiness and Nihilism, III: The Mādhyamika Method and IV: Emptiness, the Noble Truths and the Two-Truth Position.  Each section attempts to deal with the subtleties of both Madhyamaka thought and Burton’s criticisms with the eventual goal being vindication of Nāgārjuna’s school of Buddhism in virtue of the no-view goal that characterises enlightenment: the Mādhyamika aims to relinquish all views, not engage in metaphysical jostling to score points.  I conclude by arguing that Burton’s criticisms are incorrect because he has misunderstood or misconstrued the conventional Mādhyamika position by attacking a metaphysic that is of no great importance to the wider Madhyamaka project and by misunderstanding precisely what emptiness is by reifying it as some sort of obscure substratum.

This course focuses on the philosophy of Nāgārjuna, a crucially important (or unimportant?) Buddhist philosopher from the first or second century (CE) in South Asia. Nāgārjuna’s thought revolves
around a critique of “essence” (svabhāva), and his critique results in the claim that all entities are “empty” (śūnya), in that they lack any such essence. For Nāgārjuna, this lack of essence, which he calls “emptiness” (śūnyatā), plays a central role in Buddhist soteriology, for it cures the “grasping at essences” (ātmagrāha) or essentialism that lies at the root of all suffering. The course centers on Nāgārjuna’s most famous (or infamous) work, Wisdom (prajñā) or the Root Verses on the Middle Way (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā).

Theist religions argue for the pre-existence of self/Atman/ruh based on mentalistic idealism and/or interactive substance dualism frameworks; whereas Buddhism denies this; instead, this atheist religion (i) proposes Karmic theory (impression of karmas/

En su totalidad, o separadamente-Todas las cosas son vacías. 4. Lo existente no surge, puesto que ya existe. Lo no existente no surge, puesto que no existe. Lo existente y lo no existente juntos no surgen, debido a su disparidad. Consecuentemente no perduran o desaparecen. 5. Eso que ha estado naciendo, no puede nacer; Ni eso que es no nacido puede nacer. Lo que está naciendo ahora, siendo nacido y no nacido en parte, Tampoco puede nacer. 6. Una causa tiene efecto cuando hay un efecto, Pero cuando no lo hay, se suma a las no causas. Es inconsistente que este 1 ni exista, ni no exista. Es ilógico que esta 2 funcione en los tres tiempos 3 . 7. Sin el uno, los muchos no existen. Sin los muchos, el uno no es posible. Todo lo que surge dependientemente No es determinable. 8. Los doce vínculos de la originación dependiente, Los cuales resultan en sufrimiento, son no nacidos. No son posibles ni en una mente 4 , Ni tampoco en muchas 5 . 9. Lo permanente no existe 6 , no impermanente no existe; Una no entidad no existe, una entidad 7 no existe; Lo impuro y lo puro no existen; el placer y el sufrimiento no existen 8 . Por lo tanto, las visiones pervertidas no existen. 10. Sin estas, la ignorancia basada en Las cuatro visiones distorsionadas, no es posible. 1 El efecto. 2 La causa. 3 En el presente, en el pasado, y en el futuro. 4 En un momento de la mente. 5 En una sucesión de momentos. 6 Inherentemente. 7 Inherentemente existente. 8 Inherentemente, pues son dependientes. 17. ¿Cómo puede lo no existente tener naturaleza propia, La naturaleza de otro, o no naturaleza? Consecuentemente, la naturaleza propia, la naturaleza de otro, 9 Sin la ignorancia. 10 Los diez vínculos restantes de la originación dependiente, que surgen dependiendo cada uno de ellos del vínculo anterior. 11 Vaibhashika. 12 Los seis reinos de la existencia.

In recent years, French classicist Pierre Hadot has argued that modes of thought and theory in Greco-Roman antiquity and early Christianity are not represented by what modern or post-modern scholars understand as philosophy, but rather as philosophia, a way of life or art of living. Philosophy as a way of life centers around spiritual exercises that are designed to transform one's whole being. Hadot himself has mentioned, but not examined, the many troubling analogies that may exist between the spiritual exercises of ancient Greco-Roman philosophia and so-called "Oriental religious thought." This paper applies Pierre Hadot's methodology to several select examples of Buddhist thought exploring the utility this technique of interpretation may have for cross-cultural understanding.

The teachings of Madhyamaka (" middle way philosophy ") have been the basis of Tibetan Buddhist thought and practice since the eighth century. After the twelfth century, Tibetan scholars distinguished two branches of Madhyamaka: Autonomist (rang rgyud pa) and Consequentialist (thal 'gyur ba, *prāsaṅgika). What distinctions in Madhyamaka thought and practice did twelfth century Tibetan scholars make to differentiate these two branches? This article focuses upon a newly identified twelfth century Tibetan manuscript on Madhyamaka from the Collected Works of the Kadampas: Khu lo tsā ba's Treatise. Khu lo tsā ba, also known as Khu ston Mdo sde 'bar, was a contemporary of Jayānanda and Pa tshab Lo tsā ba Nyi ma grags and instrumental for the revitalized reception of Madhyamaka in twelfth century Tibet. Khu lo tsā ba's Treatise outlines a multifaceted understanding of Madhyamaka (" middle way philosophy ") as the work solely focuses upon the distinctions between Autonomist and Consequentialist Mādhyamikas. The paper outlines the structure and content of the Treatise and identifies six topics that the author emphasizes to distinguish Autonomist and Consequentialist branches of Madhyamaka. Based on an overview of these topics, the paper concludes that the Autonomist/Consequentialist distinction of Madhyamaka was already well developed in twelfth century Tibet and involved a differential of systems that encompassed much more than distinct styles of logical proof.

Buddhists like to place emphasis not on belief as such but on practicing, following a path, and knowing, directly seeing. This direct ‘seeing things the way they really are’ is held to free the person from the depths of suffering through cognitive transformation. By ‘Buddhist philosophy’ we mean, in this general context, the discussions, speculations, and arguments concerning ‘how things really are.’ In this course we will try to understand this issue through the works of various Buddhist philosophers. In examining the primary sources (via translations), we will question the notion of “schools” of Buddhism as historical realities while accepting the importance of “schools” for subsequent traditions. The goal is to perceive continuities between the works of philosophers while recognizing their unique attempts to solve some persistent philosophical problems. Our hope is to integrate our study of Buddhist philosophy and our encounter with Buddhist meditation.

"Religion 43 (2013), no. 4, pp. 487-498 (+ addendum).

""This article supplements Jens Schlieter’s discussion of the cognitive metaphor of a karmic bank-account,

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0048721X.2013.765630#.Ugy7t5I3Bic

adding selected points on karma monetary/fiscal metaphors as preserved chiefly in Pāli and Sanskrit sources. It explores various strands of the history of South Asian religions where distinct economic metaphors for karma come closer to the late ‘bank-account of karma’: i.e., the Vedic ‘three debts’, a Hindu concept of God as accountant, the varieties of weighing the (mis)deeds, the Buddhist monastic status of debt and fiscal transactions, the equivalence of karma and debt as discussed by Madhyamaka thinkers, and others. While endorsing Schlieter’s point, it also takes into account such modern Western sources as early theosophical discourse and ‘Protestant Buddhism’."""

Article analyzing the exegetical parallels found between the Sanskrit commentaries on Nagarjuna's Mūlamadhyamakārikā. The paper also provides an extensive methodological discussion of how to study classical Indian exegetical traditions on the basis of textual borrowings and parallels.

While the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Upadeśa (大智度論 Dàzhìdù Lùn  ), the extensive commentary of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Sūtra and traditionally attributed to Nāgārjuna, is encyclopedic in its scope, it is perhaps the teachings on emptiness (śūnyatā) that have been most commonly seen as its philosophical focal point. The accurate presentation of this core doctrine is fraught with the perils of the audience falling to the two extremes of eternalism and annihilism, as has been the case since the formation of the Buddha’s own teachings on not self (anātman).
The author of the Upadeśa, following the Sūtra itself, thus chooses the rhetorical strategy of exegesis through metaphor, arguing that: “Although all dharmas are empty, there are distinctions between emptiness which is difficult to comprehend and emptiness which is easy to comprehend. We now use easily comprehended emptiness metaphors [to comprehend] difficultly comprehended emptiness”. The Sūtra and Upadeśa give ten metaphors for emptiness: illusion, mirage, moon [reflected] in the water, empty space, echo, city of the gandharvas, dream, shadow, image in a mirror, and magical creation. In the Upadeśa, each metaphor is explicated and tailored into its general interpretative strategy of applying Madhyamaka dialectic to interpret and defend the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra against all manner of Ābhidharmika (generic “Hīnayāna”) and non-Buddhist views of realism and nihilism.
A deeper examination of not only the metaphors so employed, but also how metaphors function in general, reveals that the matter is perhaps not quite so “easily” resolved. I will draw upon theories of “cognitive metaphor” from modern philosophy of language, in particular from Kittay’s acclaimed Cognitive Metaphor, Its Cognitive Force and Linguistic Structure, Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By, Ricœur’s classic The Rule of Metaphor (La Métaphore Vive), and other writings. Kittay’s “perspectival” approach utilizes analysis of both the semantic fields and syntagmatic structures of the two sides of metaphor, i.e. the topic (or tenor) and vehicle, to reveal that “the critical feature of metaphor can be seen as a process in which the structure of one semantic field induces a structure on another content domain.” With respect to syntagmatic analysis, due attention will be given to the fact that our present text of the Upadeśa is a Chinese translation of an original Sanskrit, both languages having radically different grammatical syntax.
The “cognitive” or “conceptual” approach is the most appropriate theory of metaphor for our study here, because this is exactly what the author of the Upadeśa claims when explaining the use of easy vehicle metaphors to “comprehend” the difficult topic content of emptiness. A syntagmatic analysis of the Upadeśa’s metaphors enables us to group the text’s ten metaphors in several ways, as it appears that several of the metaphors are possibly merely sub-categories of another metaphor, thus providing little new conceptual comprehension of the topic of emptiness. Furthermore, more thorough analysis reveals that all ten can be divided into quite distinctive categories, distinctions which may have serious implications for the Upadeśa’s interpretation of emptiness of which the author themselves  himself was perhaps unaware. One distinction concerns the issue of external agency, as some metaphors have structures involving active intentional agency, whereas others lack this. A second distinction relates to the presence or absence of an underlying ultimate real beyond the empty in the metaphor in question. Both agency and real ultimates are key issues for the Upadeśa’s Madhyamaka methodology and interpretative standpoint.
While such critical distinctions may possibly be discovered through a very thorough reading of the Upadeśa itself, Kittay and others’ analytic and synthetic methods for the understanding of cognitive metaphors allows us to very quickly and clearly make such issues both apparent and accessible for critical interpretation. Final reflections will be made on the matter of applying kataphatic metaphor vehicles for apophatic empty topics, i.e. how to make nothing out of something.
Keywords:
Prajñāpāramitā, Mahāprajñāpāramitā Upadeśa, emptiness, cognitive metaphor, metaphor

Que está adornado con todas las buenas cualidades, El único amigo de todos los seres. 2. ¡Oh, Rey! Yo explicaré las prácticas virtuosas Para generar en ti la Doctrina 2 , Porque las prácticas serán establecidas En el vaso de la excelente Doctrina. 3. En alguien que practica primero hacia el nivel más elevado Posteriormente surge el bien definitivo, Porque tras haber logrado el nivel más elevado Uno llega gradualmente al bien definitivo. 4. El nivel más elevado es considerado felicidad, El bien definitivo es la liberación. La quintaesencia de los medios para alcanzarlo Es, en resumen, la fe y la sabiduría. 5. Debido a que uno tiene fe, confía en las prácticas; Debido a tener sabiduría, uno conoce verdaderamente. De estas dos, la sabiduría es la principal, y la fe es el requisito previo. 2 Dharma. 4 6. Alguien que no rechaza las prácticas Debido al deseo, odio, miedo, o ignorancia, Es conocido como alguien que tiene fe, Y es un vaso adecuado para el bien definitivo. 7. Habiendo analizado correctamente Todas las acciones de cuerpo, habla y mente, Aquellos que realizan qué es lo que verdaderamente les beneficia a ellos y a los demás, Y siempre lo ejecutan, son considerados sabios. 8. No matando, no robando, Abandonando el perseguir a los conyugues de otros, Desechando completamente la falsedad, El hablar para dividir, el utilizar palabras duras, y el decir cosas sin sentido. 9. Abandonando completamente la envidia, el deseo de que se sufra daño, Y las visiones extremistas (existencia y no existencia); Esto es el Sendero de las Diez Acciones Virtuosas, Su opuesto es la oscuridad. 10. No consumir intoxicantes, tener un medio de vida correcto, 5 No causar daño, practicar la generosidad adecuadamente, Honrar al digno de ello, y un amor desinteresado; Eso es, en resumen, la práctica. 11. La práctica no se hace Mortificando al cuerpo, Porque uno no ha abandonado el injuriar a los demás, Y tampoco ello supone una ayuda para los otros. 12. Aquellos que no estiman el gran sendero de la excelente Doctrina Brillan con la generosidad, la ética, y la paciencia, Afligiendo sus cuerpos, tomando Un camino aberrante semejante al sendero de una vaca 3 . 13. Con sus cuerpos abrazados por las viciosas serpientes De las emociones aflictivas 4 , entran durante mucho tiempo En la terrible jungla de la existencia cíclica, Entre los árboles del ilimitado número de seres. 14. Una vida corta proviene del matar; El mucho sufrimiento viene del dañar; El tener pocos recursos proviene del robar; 3 Viéndose decepcionados ellos y sus seguidores. 4 Kleshas. 6 Y el tener muchos enemigos viene del adulterio. 15. Del mentir surge el ser calumniado; Del hablar causando división, se origina el perder a los amigos; Del hablar con palabras duras, surge el que escuchemos lo que no nos gusta oír; Del hablar cosas sin sentido, viene el que nadie respete lo que decimos. 16. La codicia destruye nuestras aspiraciones; Del intento de herir se cosecha el terror; Los puntos de vista incorrectos llevan a visiones malas; Y del beber se obtiene la confusión de la mente. 17. Del no dar viene la pobreza; De los medios de vida incorrectos, la decepción; De la arrogancia, un mal linaje; De los celos, la poca belleza. 18. Un mal color viene del enfado; La estupidez, de no preguntar al sabio. Estos son efectos del karma en los que nacen como seres humanos, 7 Pero antes de que ocurra todo esto hay una mala transmigración 5 . 19. Lo opuesto al bien conocido Efecto de estas "no virtudes", Es el surgir de los efectos Causados por todas las virtudes. 20. El deseo, el odio, la ignorancia, y Las acciones que ello genera son las "no virtudes". La ausencia de deseo, odio, e ignorancia, Y las acciones que esto genera, son las virtudes. 21. De las "no virtudes" vienen todos los sufrimientos, E igualmente, todas las malas transmigraciones. De las virtudes vienen todas las buenas transmigraciones, Y las cosas placenteras de todas las vidas. 22. Abandonar todas las "no virtudes" Y practicar en todo momento las virtudes, Con el cuerpo, habla y mente, Es llamado las Tres Maneras de Practicar. 5 Antes de que sucedan estos efectos en una vida humana propiciados por las malas acciones, se ha de experimentar primero un renacimiento desafortunado como animal, fantasma hambriento, o ser infernal. 8 23. A través de estas prácticas uno se ve libre del poder renacer Como un ser infernal, un fantasma hambriento (preta), o un animal. Renaciendo como un ser humano, o como un dios, uno obtiene Una gran felicidad, oportunidad y dominio. 24. A través de la concentración 6 , de los inmensurables 7 , y de las carencias de forma 8 , Uno experimenta el gozo de Brahma y demás. Estas son, en resumen, las prácticas Para lograr un estatus elevado y sus frutos. 25. De las enseñanzas para lograr el bien definitivo 9 Han dicho los Conquistadores 10 Que son profundas, sutiles y aterradoras Para quienes son como niños, los cuales carecen de conocimiento. 26. "Yo no soy, Yo no seré"; "Yo no tengo, yo no tendré". Esto aterroriza a los que son como niños, Y elimina el miedo en el sabio. 6 Realizando los Cuatro Dhyanas (primero, segundo, tercero, y cuarto). 7 Amor, compasión, alegría, y ecuanimidad. 8 Las Cuatro absorciones sin forma (espacio infinito, consciencia infinita, nada, y el pico de la existencia cíclica) 9 La Budeidad. 10 Jinas. 9

In this paper, Nāgārjuna’s philosophical interpretation of the terms kāraṇa and kārya is analysed after having methodologically confined the specific field of interest to the MMK. From the study of all the occurrences of kāraṇa and kārya in the MMK (listed in paragraph 2), it emerges that Nāgārjuna makes use of these two terms to refer to skandhas as causes (kāraṇa) of further skandhas as effects (kārya), hence conveying with this words the idea of, so to speak, subjectivity and (re)birth. From the principal commentaries on the MMK (particularly Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti), we know also that, even when the reference of kāraṇa and kārya to skandhas is not explicitly pointed out by Nāgārjuna, it nonetheless can be inferred from the peculiar context in which these terms are employed.
This conclusion seems to be confirmed also by the crosscheck analysis of the philosophical usage of the parallel terms hetu and phala, which refer either to, so to speak, objective (i.e., concerning general bhāvas) causes and effects, or – in the case of phala as consequence of karman/kriyā – to moral results (these two meanings are confirmed also by some passages from the Vigrahavyāvartanī), but in no cases Nāgārjuna makes recurse to hetu and phala to refer to what could be called a subjective (i.e., concerning skandhas) level of causality.
To the paper an addendum is added, in which the commentaries on MMK 8.4 are taken into consideration. From this excursus it appears that at least Buddhapālita, Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti, by ‘overinterpreting’ the meaning of hetu in the kārika, are consequently forced to readapt the philosophical significance of kāraṇa and kārya in a way that does not fit so much with Nāgārjuna’s original message.

1 Lalitavistara 25.4cd. 2 I am not implying that the MĮlamadhyamakakÄrikÄ may be related only to the NidÄnasamyukta as a non-MahÄyÄna source. Compare for example MĮlamadhyamakakÄrikÄ 24.8 with a passage from the EkottarÄgama: dve satye samupÂĜritya buddhÂnÂӅ dharmadeĜan | lokasaӅvӟtisatyaӅ ca satyaӅ ca paramÂrthataҩ || 24.8 ||; dve satye Ĝaikӧasya bahukare bhavataҩ | saӅvӟtisatyaӅ paramÂrthasatyaӅ ca || EkottarÄgama, page 201 in TripÄӷhî's edition. Thai International Journal of Buddhist Studies II (2011): 57-95.

This work will argue that Mahāyāna philosophy need not result in endorsement of some cosmic Absolute in the vein of the Advaitin ātman-Brahman.  Scholars such as Bhattacharya, Albahari and Murti argue that the Buddha at no point denied the existence of a cosmic ātman, and instead only denied a localised, individual ātman (what amounts to a jīva).  The idea behind this, then, is that the Buddha was in effect an Advaitin, analysing experience and advocating liberation in an Advaitin sense: through a rejection of the individual ātman and knowledge (jñāna) of and immersion into the universal ātman-Brahman. 

I will explore how different religious traditions define and shape the Absolute according to their own religious convictions, illustrating a divergence in conception from the very start, before exploring key differences between the Advaitin conception of the Absolute as put forth by Śaṅkara and as defended by Bhattacharya in The Ātman-Brahman in Ancient Buddhism.  I then challenge Bhattacharya’s claims that prajñāpāramitā literature necessarily endorses the ātman-Brahman and that Mahāyāna philosophies reorientate Buddhists towards the truth of the ātman-Brahman.

I do this by arguing that there are viable interpretations of Vasubandhu’s Yogācāra and Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka that do not advocate such a belief, that prajñāpāramitā literature can be viewed as a project in episteme rather than ontology, and that we need not find a ground of the same sort as the ātman-Brahman in the Buddhist flux of experience.  I conclude by showing that whilst Absolutism is a theme in some schools of Buddhism, it need not be – contra Bhattacharya – the conclusion of two major Mahāyāna philosophies.

Qu'est-ce que la méditation ? C'est suspendre son adhésion au monde (épochè), ramener l'attention au corps, observer ce qui se produit à chaque instant. Comme en physique quantique, il s'agit d'une observation paradoxale, sans coupure entre l'observé et l'observeur, ce qui ouvre à une forme de connaissance non duelle et non conceptuelle. La résorption de la conscience dans cet état de présence apaisée et non duelle renvoie à un retour à l'état fondamental en physique quantique. Cet état s'obtient par un phénomène d'intrication entre corps et esprit, grâce au lien entre concentration et observation. A l'inverse, les sauts que la conscience du méditant peut parfois connaître, en re-basculant dans des états agités, ou en accédant à des états de conscience modifiés, peuvent se comprendre comme un phénomène de décohérence. La discussion de ce nouveau modèle d'intrication montre les apports de trois disciplines pour l'expliquer : les neurosciences mettent en évidence les zones cérébrales concernées par la méditation. La phénoménologie énactive permet d'intégrer le vécu du méditant et des états de conscience. La physique quantique apporte un troisième éclairage complémentaire et nouveau pour comprendre le type de mécanisme et de processus qui intervient dans les modifications de la conscience pendant la méditation. L'apport de cette physique quantique ouvre toutefois de nombreuses questions à résoudre dans le futur, sous la forme de trois pistes de recherche : on peut penser que la méditation représente ainsi une voie d'accès privilégiée vers la dimension quantique sous-jacente du monde et de la conscience ; ou que cette dimension quantique représente un éclairage opérationnel et non confessionnel utile au méditant, qui invite finalement à revenir au seul monde de l'apparaitre ; ou enfin qu'elle indique de manière fractaquantique l'existence d'un même type de mesure à de multiples échelles de l'univers.

For this article, the author attempts to describe the metaphysics of nothingness from three sources; Martin Heidegger, Ibn 'Arabi and Nagarjuna. Each of the philosophers engages the intimation of 'the nothing' to fathom the existential question of being, reality and logic. The idea for the article was influenced by Heidegger's seminal text "What is Metaphysic?" (1929/1998). Heidegger writes how human "a being held out into the nothing." Why and how is human holding out into the nothingness? What are the boundaries that form this nothingness? Rather than risk into pessimistic existentialism, the author pursues the question of nihilism in the nothingness with the kind of joy, as Heidegger would say it: "Secret alliance with the cheerfulness and gentleness of creative longing." With three different thinkers from different eras-Heidegger was a German philosopher but brought up with Christian teachings, Ibn 'Arabi was an Andalusian Islamic Sufi whereas Nagarjuna was an Indian-Buddhist teacher-it is hoped that the idea about nothingness can be grappled and if not, be meditated upon.

Some time ago I advanced on the pages of this journal a critique of the interpretation given by Jay L. Garfield and Mark Siderits (hereafter GS) of Nāgārjuna's doctrine of the two truths (Ferraro, J Indian Philos 41(2):195-219, 2013.1); to my article the two authors responded with a 'defense of the semantic interpretation' of the Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness (GS, J Indian Philos 41(6):655-664, 2013). Their reply, however, could not consider my personal understanding of Nāgārjuna's notions of śūnyatā and dve satye. My interpretation of these notions was in fact absent in the paper GS responded, and was only related in a second paper of mine (Ferraro, J Indian Philos 41(5):563-590, 2013.2), still unpublished at the time of GS's drafting of their 'defense'. Therefore, in the present rejoinder, I found it appropriate, rather than responding point by point to the passages of GS's reply, to advance a comparison between the semantic interpretation and my 'realist antimetaphysical' understanding of Nāgārjuna's thought.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

In this paper, I refute Giuseppe Ferraro’s attack against the Semantic Interpretation of emptiness not by considering each of his (numerous!) objections in turn, but instead by arguing against what I consider to be elementary misunderstandings of both Madhyamaka philosophy and methodology that consistently underpin all of his objections. 

First, I argue that Ferraro has misapplied the Semantic Interpretation to the two-truths rather than to its intended target, emptiness.  From here, I proceed to illustrate that Nāgārjuna is not concerned with questioning the existence of objects per se, but in questioning how we perceive these objects to exist when we uncritically engage with and erroneously assign essential intrinsic existence to them. 

I then attempt to explain how the Mādhyamika can account for the existence of empirical objects Conventionally without referring to any Ultimate grounding and without clinging to any metaphysical views: emptiness and its relation to the Ultimate Truth is thus discussed as a principle to be of use to the unenlightened mind, but abandoned by the awakened. 

I conclude that the Semantic Interpretation subsequently has emptiness as a means to calm mental propensities to attachment rather than a metaphysical doctrine concerned with ontological possibilities, and that as a consequence, any idea of Ultimate Truths are to be jettisoned as views that propagate attachment.

Anditya Soares de Moura Costa Matos (org.). Filosofias Gregas e Orientais: A radicalidade das origens e o desafio do diálogo atual. Belo Horizonte: Initia Via. 2013. Cap. 6. Pp. 111-125 GIUSEPPE FERRARO "NEM SER, NEM NÃO SER": SUGESTÕES PARA UM POSSÍVEL DIÁLOGO ENTRE PARMÊNIDES E NĀGĀRJUNA. "NEITHER TO BE NOR NOT TO BE": SUGGESTIONS FOR A POSSIBLE DIALOGUE BETWEEN PARMÊNIDES AND NĀGĀRJUNA.

Nāgārjuna’s (c. 150-250) Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way (Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā), contains copious, clear, and comprehensive calls for the ‘abandonment of all views’ (sarvadṛṣṭiprahāṇāya). Despite this, contemporary scholars typically interpret such statements as referring only to false views (however these may be understood). In this paper, I argue instead that Nāgārjuna’s insistence on the abandonment of all views – including ultimately his own – constitutes his distinctive means to the metaphysical exhaustion characteristic of nirvāṇa, wherein all views, propositions, theses (dṛṣṭi, pakṣa, pratijñā) – all beliefs – are abandoned as so many subtle affirmations of an only ever empty self.