Contemporary Terrorism in Peru: Sendero Luminous and the Media

Contemporary Terrorism in Peru: Sendero Luminoso and the Media by Kevin G. Barnhurst An bHkptb anaJysis qf the origins, history, and activities of the guerrilkl group /mown as "the Shining Path" shows that the symbolic acts of violence are embedded in their ｰ｢ｉｯｳｾ＠ of struggle and exist indeptmdenl of media attention. Authorities in the field of terrorism and the media tend to gather in two camps. Those who believe that the media play an essential role posit that news coverage spreads terrorism like a disease. They often call for government regulation of one sort or another. although they warn that media guidelines may push terrorists to greater violence. These escalating demands for attention encourage greater restraint, they argue, in a spiral of media attention, control, and even more terrorism. The opposite camp considers the media to be the victims of terrorists. They concede that free and competitive news organizations may emphasize the violence at first. but they consider the process naturally self-limiting. As terrorism becomes routine. they insist, coverage wanes, so restraint is not only unnecessary but may damage the credibility of the media and of the state. Moreover, controlling the media is ineffective because terrorists can strike other points in the infrastructure. such as transportation. the power grid, or the water supply, with results that communicate directly to the intended audience without media intervention. Much of the literature of terrorism and the media comprises essays written by government authorities and academics, who argue these issues and recommend policy (for a summary of the literature and of studies fOCUSing particularly on the press, see 1). Their evidence is anecdotal, for the mOSt pan_ The few published quantitative studies concentrate on press coverage in major international media such as the New York Times. Although they may examine mainstream coverage of a spedfic terrorist group, their exploration of the origins of the Kevin G. Bamhurst is A",sociate Professor of GraphiC Arts ar the s. L Newhouse School of Public Communiattions, Syracuse University. He "WOuld like to [hank the Peruvian Fulbright Commission and ItS director, Dr, Marcta Koth de Paredes, Vonosupported t1'<1vel and research in Peru; the University of Lima and its faculty in graphiC arts, Professors Ciro Palacios and Elio LetlJria; :and Dian STrutz for ber invaluable researcb assjstance, Earlier "\.-ersiol15 of this article were presenred !O the Center for Latin American and CanbbeanStudies Colloquium, Urbana, Illinois, february 1990, and to the EIghth Annual Intercultural and International COmmunicatiOn Conference.."-iiamL February 1991. Copyright © 1991 Journal 0/ Communication 41(4), Autumn. 0021·9916/91/$0.0+,0'5 75 Journal a/Communication, Autumn 1991 group and its own media activities is usually CUlSory (see, e.g., 24). The central question of whether the media bear some responsibility for encouraging politi· cal violence cannot be answered by relying on anecdotes and content analyses alone. To move beyond polemics requires more thorough case srudies that examine inrlivldual terrorist movements and their media relations. This :micle is an examination of a single guerrilla organization, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), that employs political violence in Peru. Like many violent groups, Sendero Luminoso is hermetic and secretive. By highlighting some incidents in its history that reveal its attitudes tOWllrd the media, this case srudy can better illuminate how relations between terrorist groups and the media develop. Sendero Luminoso, the group responsible for most violent acts in Peru since 1980, is a faction of the Peruvian Communist Party. It adheres to an indigenous version of the Maoist doctrine that revolution arises in rural areas to lay siege to the cities. Most writelS refer to the mystic or millennial narure of Sendero Luminoso, comparing it with the last Inca rebellion by Tupac Amaru (25, p. 124). This mysticism disguises the movement's essential racism, which pits the Quechua·spealting campeSino of farm labor against the Spanish·spealting meso tizo of commerce and government (3, p. 389). The aura of mystery is enhanced by the lack of written Or printed materials available to outsidelS. Possession of primary documents-manifestos and leaf· lets published by Sendero-is illegal in Peru and is used to justify the :mest and killing of ordinary citizens. So the secrecy that frustrates scholars results at least as much from government policy as from Sendero's clandestine narure. The available printed material that does give clues to Sendero's position comes in the form of newspapelS published by sympathizers, speaking through the mask of journalistic objectivity, and in the works of p:misan authors like Fer· ruindez S. (10) and Mercado U. (22), dressed in a cosrume of academiC impar· tiality. These sources probably understate the extreme nature of the Senderista position by presenting it in a familiar guise. Yet enough is kno,,"TI to place the activities of Sendero Luminoso within the context of terrorism. Most definitions of terrorism include three aspects: COm· municative acts involving violence or menace to serve a political purpose (see, e.g., 27, p. 15; cf. 17, p. 270). Sendero Luminoso fits this definition because it advocates and engages in symbolic acts of violence to attain its political ends. But the term is not easy to extricate from its emotional connotations. Although some suggest that "terrorism" is an epithet journalists apply only to foreigners (7, p. 2), Senderista assassinations and bombings are commonly referred to as "terrorism" among the majority media in Peru and elsewhere. Sendero, how. ever, has called the use of the term an "imperialist trick" (6, p. 391) in a leaflet published at the end of 1982. Senderistas may geilUinely object to being identified as terrorists, with ilS implied distance from Peruvian society as a whole. But, more importantly, Sen· dero ultimately rejects all aspects of conventional political discourse. The party seeks not to influence the political system within Peru but to replace it. As a facet of that struggle, Senderistas may communicate by a range of means-from lnfernati(mal Politics and the Press / Contemporary Terron:'im in Peru indoctrination, pamphleteering, and "native" forms, such as Inca·style runners, to violent acts, such as attacking the power grid and water supplies. But by attacking the power grid and water supplies, Sendero Luminoso strikes at all members of society and seems to show little interest in popular support or con· cern for how the party is portrayed. These messages leave no room for feed· back. The roots of this extreme position, and of the complex.Sendedsta attitudes toward the media, can be traced to the movement's beginnings in the early 1960s. The department (similar to a state) of Ayacucho, which gave birth to the movement, straddles the Andes of south central Peru and has been the site of intermittent violence and rebellion since before the Conquest (9, p. 232).' It is among the most impoverished departments in Peru. The illiteracy rate is 685 percent, and per capita food consumption is 420 calories a day, less than half the 8S0·calorie minimum to support life set by the World Health Organization (6, p. 389). Its population has been declining for the last thirty years, and it ranks, with its neighbors Apurimac and Huancavelica, at the bot· tom on measures of Peruvian development and modernization. Data from the Central Reserve Bank of Peru indicate that "among the ten poorest provinces in the country, two are in Ayacucho; CangaUo in second place and Victor Fajardo in seventh, precisely the provinces where Sendero Luminoso initiated armed action in 1980" (9, p. 230). The capital of Ayacucho, called Huamanga in the Quechua language, sits roughly 250 miles by road east and south of Lima, about halfway between the modern capital on the coast and Cusco, the Inca capital in the highlands. It is a conservative town of 70,000 known for its churches and Holy Week celebra· tion. The University of San Cristobal de Huamanga, first established in 1776 under pontifica/license, had been disbanded in 1885 after the War of the Pacific (9, p. 236). When reestablished in 1959 as a public university, it brought , Peru has a long history of political violence, reaching back Into ptet'OIonlal cultures. In the f\\I'entie[h cenemy, Peruvians were the first to use 3irpi:me hijacking during a 1931 mlHrary coup (19, p. lOB). Joumai of Communication, Autumn 1991 together progressive professors, aspiring campesinos, and students from other regions seeking to immerse themselves in their native Peru, Abimael Guzman, who later founded Sendero Luminoso and became its ruler mllximo, joined the faculty as a professor of philosophy in 1962 and took charge of the youth movement for the '1ose Carlos Mariategui" Regional Committee of the Communist pany of Peru (PCP), After the Sino-Soviet split predpitated a division of the PCP into two camps in 1964, the pro-Chinese faCtion took the name of its newspaper, Bandera Roja (Red Flag), and editorials carne under Guzman's direction. This group thought the PCP had not taken "the question of armed struggle seriously" (28, p. 8). They organized a national conference in Noveml:\er 1965 and called themselves the heirs of the original pany founded by MarIategui, the Peruvian socialist phi· losopher. They adopted his characterization of Peruvian society as feudal and colonial (20): They claimed that the road to revolution must necessarily advance from the countryside to the city, as Mao Tse·tung taught. They agreed to pursue a pro· longed popular war, following Chinese strategy and tactics to organize guerrillas and establish liberated zOnes (6, p. 376). According to some sources, early leaders of the Peruvian Maoist movement were trained in China (28, p. 14). By organizing and pub lid zing itself, Bandera Roja gained suppOrt during the early sixties, winning a majority of students and many professors at the university and organizing peasant fedef'dtions in several provinces of the department of Ayacucho. The later hostility of Senderistas toward the media can be traced to the failure of another group of insurgents. In 1965, a radical offshoot of the Aprista pany called the Left Revolutionary Movement (MIR) began a series of guerrilla operations (5). The national government of Fernando Belaunde T, idemified the organizers, killed two principal leaders, and jailed others, ending the insurgency by early 1966. The MIR operation was a training ground for those who became leaders of Sendero Luminoso. In addition to learning how to organize campesinos, they discovered that press conferences served only to identify the leaders and expose them to the reprisals of security forces, The experience of the Bandera ROja pany also provided early training in organizing and building coalitions, After the MIR defeat, the Peruvian government wrned its attention to the l:niversity of Huamanga, considered a breeding ground of subversion, By then, the uni\<ersity had become an imponant focus for the culture and economy of the city and the region, When university fund· ing was cut that year, local businessmen, lawyers, labor leaders, and professors allied with Bandera Roja to organize the Ayacucho People's Defense From and fought successfully to have the funds restOred_ The Bandera Roja leadership of this odd coalition marked the high poim in the pany's infiuence, and its candi· dates placed third in the 1966 municipal eleCtions, behind the mainstream Acci6n Popular and Aprista panies. But Bandera Roja was rom by internal disagreements in the wake of the 1'.11 R defeat (28, p, 9). A mction in favor of greater violence criticized the inaction of 78 inlernaJional Politics and the Pres.;/ Contemporary Terrorism in Peru party leader Saturnino Paredes, a dispute exacerbated by the personalism of Paredes, who published a red book of sayings and was accused of divening funds for his own use (6, p. 377). As a result, the faction splintered from Bandera Roja in 1967 although Guzman remained in the party. Its increasing power in the university brought Bandera Roja into contlict with the rector, who was ousted in 1968. The new executive council, along with the student federation and the faculty union. came under Bandera Roja controL That same year, the Velasco milirary regime took over the national government and cut the teaching budget of the university in 1969. Supporters of the People's Defense Front took to the streets to demonstrate. and the government arrested its leaders. After this defeat, Guzman and his followers split from Bandera Roja in 1970. They took the name PCP-Sendero Luminoso from their con· trol of the Student Revolutionary Front (FER), which used the phrase "por el Sendero Luminoso de Mariiltegui" in its title. The party spent the first two years of the decade in exhaustive examination of Mariategui, issuing one of its few publications, a study plan of his thought (9, p. 243). The Senderista e!Jort to control polities at the university went from study and propaganda to increasing violence. A variety of new leftist groups had organized in Ayacucho and at the university in the wake of agrarian reforms, which generally strengthened the Peruvian Left (28. pp. 2-3). The opposition to Sendero gtew among these groups. During campus elections in 1973, when Senderistas tried to hold the election in a dormitory they con· trOlled, their opponents stormed the building, and more than 60 students were injured in the ensuing campus battle (9, p. 246). By 1974, Sendero Luminoso had lost much of its intluence at the university. A new executive council purged Guzman's supporters from two academic departments and eliminated the Marxist courses that had been approved by the previous council (6, p. 381). Sendero Luminoso then turned to education as a meanS of organizing. At the university, SenderiStas remained in control of the education department and its training school, which offered a secondary education to students drawn from the barrios of Huamanga and had the suppon of their patents. Teachers at the school indoctrinated students, as well as educating them. and recruited them into the FER student group. In an effort to reassett its power in 1975. Sendero Luminoso requested that the training school enrollment and budget be doubled. When the executive council denied the request. student activists took over the building and held it under guard for 18 months, registering students and holding classes with the suppon of local families whose children were being educated there. Police finally dislodged the group in 1976, and several university professors were fired (9, p. 248). Sendero Luminoso thereafter aban· doned public media and institutional action and began to work clandestinely, painting slogans On City "'ails by night and running secret People's Schools to indoctrinate adolescents by day (6,p. 382). Sendero also capitalized on the growing discontent among campesinos. In 1975, the Morales regime instituted deflationary poliCies in the face of eco· 79 Journal 0/ Communication, Autumn 1991 nomic crisis. In a three.year period, real wages fell by 35 percent, prices more than doubled, and the Peruvian sol was devalued almost 500 percent (28, p. 3). The economic crisis, the imposition of cooperatives, and the difficulties of land reform fostered resentment among campesinos. By 1977, Senderista teachers had expanded tbeir proselytizing and indocrrination from Ayacucho 10 the deparunents of Apurimac and Huancavelica, and Guzman had acquired the sobriquet Comrade Gonzalo. His organization issued occasional manifestos opposing peaceful srrikes, calling elections a means of bourgeois domination, and advocating violent capture of Peruvian cities by the peasanrry (6, pp. 383384). During this first phase in the development of Sendero Luminoso, from 1970 to 1977 (28, pp. 9-10), the party recruited and rralned operatives, developed its docrrine of armed conflict as the "shining path of Mar;ategui," and vituperated opposition groups on the Left. The organization also moved (or was driven) outside the legal and institutional system, claiming to have exhausted peaceful solutions (10, p. 23). Sendero did not panicipate in the 1978 elections. Other panies on the Left were well organized, winning 31 percent of the votes for the constituent assembly. The elections were the first step in dismantling the mili· tary government (28, p. 6). The second phase of Sendero development, from 1977 to 1980, established the pattern of tight conrrol over communication. Leaders from the first phase were purged for emphasizing education at the expense of politics and armed struggle, and the pany was reorganized as a military apparatus. Student activists were withdrawn from the unlversities and sent 10 the countrySide, where they set up rralning camps (28. pp. 10-11). Senderista operatives inJiltrated several splinter groups of the PCP and drew olf the best of them into the vertical orga· nlzation based on cells (6, p. 385). Each cell consists of four guerrillas and a leader, who knows the leaders of three or four other cells. These leaders form the local commillee. Leaders of four local commillees form a district commit· tee, whose leader joins others to form a zone committee. Pany cells are gener· aJly isolated from each other, preventing communication. Sendero recruits its members, who must be sponsored by twO insiders. During its organizational period, Sendero Luminoso also developed the prac· tice of assigning propaganda tasks as pan of the rralning and' indoctrination of its urban recruits, who progressed into military action in the same pallern fol· lowed by Guzman and by the pany early In its development. New members spend ｾｴ＠ least a year working with propaganda-painting slogans and pasting posters on 'walls. After this probationary period, during which they are indocrri· nated, they may be allowed to participate in bombings. They are erained in guerrilla warfare and their background is investigated before they are fully accepted into the organization. assigned to a cell, and allowed to participate in action against the police and armed forces (28, pp, 4-15). By the end of the second phase of its development in 1980, Sendero Lumi· noso had organlzed about 200 functioning cells, concentrated in the ceneral Andean region and in Lima. At a party congress that year, the ceneral commillee declared the beginning of the "people's war" (28, p. 13). HO International Politics and tbe Press/ Contemporary Terrorism in Peril FFAA Moral.. coup Velasea coup Martial law APRA MIR AP PC SENDERO LUMINOSO School takaover 1 1>960 11965 1,970 AP Popular Adion APRA American Popular AeYotulionary Alliance SA Bandera Aota (Red Flag) FFAA Armed Forces MIA Lenist Revolutionary Movement First attacks Lagoa funeral 11975 PC CofTTTIJrisl Party 01 Peru PL Pub Lacla PA Patria Aoja (Red Fatherlaro) Drug tlas 11985 Souron: (25.28, APJ VA Revolutionary VM9Jard Peruvian politics and activities ot Sendero Lumlnoso, 1960-1990 Although Sen<lero Luminoso began its armed struggle with propaganda, the organl7ation eschewed contact with the media, preferring to communicate by means of sabotage and violent acts_ SenderistaS disapproved of the "bourgeois methods" employed in 1965, when the MIR Communists acted like "ballerinas," calling press conferences to announce the struggle (6, p. 384). Instead they preferred violent action to attract attention. Ihey began a propaganda phase (stretching the term to Include violence) in 1980, during the general election that returned Belaunde and Accion Popu· lar to power and ended military rule. On May 18, the night before the vote, SenderistaS destroyed ballots in the province of Cangallo, Ayacucho, but "the news was lost in the avalanche of information about the first presidential elec- 81 Journal of Communication, Autumn 1991 tions held in Peru in seventeen years" (9, p. 250). Having failed to disrupt elections, Sendero focused on the next national event, the patriotic celebration of Independence Day. On July 28, police discovered several bombs along tbe parade route in Lima (6, p. 386). In Ayacucbo, Sendero launched hundreds of dynamite attacks on public works and cooperatives and assassinated mayors and other officials (25, p. 110). Sendero Luminoso used interpersonal communication, punctuated by vio· lence, to attract followers. SenderistaS entered communities in the provinces of Ayacucbo by offering education, initially organizing and working In the campesino communities. When they bombed police and military stations in the region, local sentiment supported their resistance to tbe central government, wbich was considered a nuisance. Neither the military, recently retired from power, nor tbe new civilian government was prepared to respond to the insurgency at first (9, p. 250). Instead, the government minimized tbe threat (2;, p. 110). After the police station in the town of Tambo was attacked in October, the government declared a state of emergency in five provinces of Ayacucho, enacting an antiterrorism law by executive decree, opening a prison for terrorists, and sending in antiterrorist police called sinchis, a Quecbua word meaning "those who can do anything" (25, p. 111). During 1981, the sincbis combed Ayacucbo, arresting over 2,000, only a few of whom were Senderisras (28, p. 33). "The well-armed sincbis stole, raped, and killed indiscriminately" (25, p. 111). These tactics increased support for Sendero Luminoso in rural areas, bringing large sections of the Ayacucho countrySide under Sendero influence and leaving the pOlice in control of little more than the central plazas of small towns (25). The most dramatic Sendero "propaganda" event occurred on March 2, 1982. Senderista operatives caused a blackout in Huamanga. In the darkoess, they took over three police installations and freed 304 prisoners, including Edith Lagos, a 19-year-old guerrilla commander of some fame. Thereafter the offen· sive accelerated. Sendero dynamited high-tension towers, destrOyed bridges, and attacked police barracks, banks. and commercial establishments (6, p. 388). The renown of Sendero violence built support in both urhan and rural areas. In the countrySide, they extended their influence by using violence against lawbreakers. According to eyewitnesses, In '82 they appeared more or less in AugtlSt. They came with five ru.<tJers (abi· geos), I think it was five-five rustlers who they said had made the villagers (comuneros) suffer, robbing cattle and the like. So they amved with five rus· tIers, and they whipped four, fifty lashes to the back, and the fifth one they murdered, saying he was a dog that bad no reason to /llle, and hang! (9, p. 253; my translation). SenderistaS imposed a new social order, prohibiting adultery and drunkenness. The campesinos initially supported them, "Oh, because now nobody will rob us ...oh, because if my husband steps out on me, I can tell the comrades" (9, p_ 253) 82 International Politics and tbe PreSS / Contemporary Terron:,'m in Peru Support for Sendero also tended to increase among city dwellers. Most resi· dents of Huamanga had a relative or friend among the guerrillas (6. p. 389). After police detained, tortured, and killed Edith Lagos in the remote town of Andahuaylas in September 1982 (25, p. 111), more than 15,000 joined the funeral cortege at Huamanga, nearly one·li.fth the population of the dty. Her funeral is said to mark the end of the "propaganda" phase of the insurgency: The country had been informed of the beginning of the people's struggle (6, p.393). Sendero Lumlnoso announced a new phase of the intenSifying conflict by publlshlng leaflets that proclahned a peasant war. This war would "strike and suffocate the economic and social system of imperialist exploitation, wrecking microwave and electric towers" to "isolate the reaction and its impe· rialist master in the cities" (6, p. 391). SenderislaS had previously won rural support by attackJng outsiders and law· breakers, but their attempts to control the campeS1nos themselves backiired. When Senderistas tried to impose subsistence farming in the counrryside in order to starVe out the city, they met resistance. Their assassinations of middle· men and small landholders served to rekindle old land disputes (25, p. 113), and government reprisals led communities caught in the cornlict to take sides. The government declared martial law in seven provinces of Ayacucho in December 1982, intervening with armed forces, and Sendero began to with· draw (22, p. 25). Campesinos responded with resentment: Wiry don 'I they take care of us? They gol us into this trouble and they don't take care of us. They should take care of us, they should defend us. How could Ihey say Ihey would lead the fight and we would come behind? W11ere are they? You don ｾ＠ see lhem anywhere around here. They got us into Ibis mess and then they gel out. It can'l be (9, p. 256). As the conflict intensified, the national media, which had been covering the ongoing Story, became the objects of violence. On January 21,1983, the inhabi· tantS of Huaychay, a small impoverished town in the north of Ayacucho, killed seven Senderistas. Police had been in the region, enmuraging campesinos to fight outsiders and guerrillas. Seven journalists from newspapers in Lima, who traveled to the town to cover the story, and another from Ayacucho were killed on January 26. Their deaths and the commission inquiry that eventually blamed Sendero Luminoso were covered heavily in the national press, received international attention, and "discouraged other journalists from venturing out of Aya· cucho" city (25, p. 117). The government tightly restricted press information. The military refused to provide derails from the emergency zone or to cooperate with the press. Freed from journalistic verification, the security forces attributed several of their own massacres to Sendero Luminoso (25, p. 114). Repression by the security forces, which were being advised by several countries, induding the United States and the Argentine military regime, became widespread. Disappearances (desapare· cidos) began to occur daily. By the end of 1983, about 1,500 had disappeared. 83 Journal oj Communication, Autumn 1991 The few who escaped reported having been tortured. A cabinet minister predicted the course of the conflict: For the police force to succeed they would have to hegin killing Senderlstas and non·Senderlstas. ... They kill sixty people and at most there are three Senderlstas among them. . .and for sure the police will say that the sixty were Sen· derlstas (13, p. 50). During this period Sendero Luminoso struggled to retain political control of the armed groups. Caprured documents from the eighth party congress in 1983 provide some evidence of internal conflict. The central committee did adopt a resolution [0 pay particular attention to strengthening their system of communi· carion, combining ancestral methods, such as runners called Chasquis and signals from smoke and light, with the most advanced technology (6, p. 396). But apparently the cult of Comrade Gonzalo, who was reportedly suIfering from leukemia (6, pp. 118-119), 'IIIllS waning. Despite the internal conllict, Sendero announced a national oIfensive in June 1984, and bombings, artacks on police, and assassinations were reported in ten deprutments. Although the military withheld information about the Violent interactions, the press had rerurned to private hands and was not controlled directly. In response to the SenderistaoIfensive, the elected President Belaunde extended a national state of emergency and turned over control of the conflict to the military. In the foothills, the army began to set up strategic villages, like those created in Viemam and Guatemala. Military leaders pressed for the government to silence the opposition press, led by La Republica, but Belaunde refused. Jaime Ayala, a reporter for La Republica, became desaparectdo after visiting the marine headquarters in Huanta. The newspaper demanded an investigation, and 49 bodies were uncovered nearby. One was identified as desaparecido, but Ayala was never found (25, p. 120). Public opinion about Senderista violence and the government response is unclear. Although some observers claim that the populace almost universally rejects Senderista goals and tactics, there is evidence of substantial support (see 28, pp. 23, 28; cf. 3, p. 1l). In Barranco, a lower-middle-class suburb of Lima, 6.5 percent of the voterS claim to be Sendero partisans-a significant minority, given the party's Status as "an execrated, sataniC, proscribed tendency." According to Javier Valle R. of the Peruvian parliament, "This last figure indicates that there is an even greater number of Senderistas" (Valle R. cites data from QueHacer, in 6, p. 162.) In an effort to limit the appeal of Sendero Luminoso, the government of Alan Garcia, which brought the ApriSta parry to power in 1985, reportedly urged the media to limit their coverage of terrorism (14) _The publisher of the largest and most respected daily, EI Comercio, proposed that the media apply voluntary guidelines to play down the news by reducing its visual impact (23). La Repubtica is the only malor newspaper in Peru that refused to honor vol· untary press restrictions, and its critics accuse it of sensationalism. But the newspaper's coverage of the guerrillas and of the excesses of the counterinsurgency has not shielded it from attack. The publisher of La Repllblica says that International PoWles and tbe Press I Contemporary Terrorism in Peru he and his staff continue to be threatened by Sendero (26). When the economy collapsed in 1988, in part due to the continuing violence, Sendero Luminoso was well funded. The guerrillas had been "actively involved" in the cocaine trade at least since 1987, according to Associated Press Writer Monte Hayes:· In return for providing protection from police raids, the Shining Path enjoys the support of tens of thousands ofpeasants who grow coca in the valley, earning 10 times what they could from other crops. The guerrillas collect a 10 to 15 percent "tax"from the growers as well as charging Columbian traffickers 110/.100 to 115, 000 for each small plane that picks up cocaine paste for refining in Colombia, according to the peasants and police (15). By mid-1989, television broadcasts reponed that the estimated damage by the Sendero Luminoso insurgency was greater than the $18 billion foreign debt. "The mining industrY, as well as tourism, has also been disrupted by the increasing threat of terrorism" (4). In the first five months of the year, the gross domestic product fell 22.8 percent. Inllatlon was reponed to be almost 3,000 percent, the countrY was about $5 billion behind on interest payments, and the International Monetary Fund was reponedly discussing steps to expel Peru (4). Doctors, lawyers, miners, school teachers, rransponation workers, and even retirees went On strike over wages and lnllation. The conllict with Sendero Luminoso had taken on an almost routine pattern. In Lima, lengthy blackouts had become a regular occurrence, expected before election days, national holidays, and anniversaries of Senderista events. EleCtrical failures endangered lives in hospitals and left some sections of Uma without water for days at a time. The blackouts also interrupted food production and distribution. Shonages of sugar, rice, oils, and other staples were common. Bread lines formed outside bakeries, and in many urban areas, milk and other fresh goods were not available. The violence also affected political life. More than 130 mayors, local judges, clerks, council members, and municipal candidates were killed by sendero in 1989 alone. As the coumry geared up for national eleCtions that year, city dwellers were subjeCted to roadblocks and searches and were arrested if they failed to carry valid identity papers. In shon, if the goal of Sendero Luminoso is, as one of irs chroniclers has suggested, to "create a climate of collapse" (10, p. 17), then certainly they can be considered successfuL Although suspicion of the media appears to dlstingulsh Sendero Lumi· noso from tnmsoatJonal terrorism, the group's communications goals are remarkably similar to those of other Insurgencies. Sendero Luminoso has generally been characterized as a mysterious native movement, uninterested in media attention. Most observers comment on its secretive narure, its "hermeticism and underutilization of the press and of other mass communica· tion media" (22, p. 13). The Maoist·style organization is practically impenetrable, its members have little knowledge of each other, and its leaders never grant interviews. Senderistas avoid any direct contact with any media. The pau- 85 Journal of Communication, Autumn 1991 city of documenlS, speeches, and tangible propaganda appears to set Sendero Luminoso apart from other insurgent groups. Yet the Senderista approach harks back to the original deJinition of terrorism as "propaganda of the deed" (27, p. 12), which relies on the meaningful narure of the act, with or without media attention... High ·tension lines are saba· taged; the news sweeps the country" (12, p. 298), not by means of the mass media but directly by delivering fear into every darkened home. As Brazilian revolutionary Carlos Marighella characterizes it, insurgency is a war of nerves, "an aggressive technique, based on the direct or indirect use of mass means of communication and news transmitted orally" (21, p. 109, emphasis added). Enrique Maya B., the fanner rector of the University of Huamanga, confirms that the first blackout of Lima in 1984 "had psychological effectS" (6, p. 415). The repeated blackouts of Peruvian cities play on the name "Shlning Path" and spark a terror that "could well outweigh the primary physical damage," to borrow a phrase from a chief scientist v.ith the U.S. Arms Control and Disarma· ment Agency (18, p. 62). Symbolic aclS, such as hanging a dog in a principal avenue of the city of Linta and burning the shape of the hammer and sickle on hillsides by p.ight, are calculated to communicate directly, drawing attention to the party, demonstrating its organizational and military prowess, and building public sympathy for the audacious young rebels (6, p. 385). These actS reach the illiterate and impoverished who cannot read a newspaper or alford a televi· sian set. Despite the regnant characterization, Sendero Luminoso is not entirely hostile to the media. Communications methods used by the Senderista urban sym. pathizers include infonning friendly journalists: "The important weapons of propaganda are the priming press, mimeograph machine, movie house, television, loudspeaker, photograph, wall paintings, rumors, etc.," because these reach "the sectors that suffer" under the government. Civilian supporters have published newspapers, including at least two in Lima. Senderistas include "joumalistic campaigns" among several peaceful acts that, "taken at the right moment, will be more effective than bombs, machlne guns, tanks, and aircraft together" (10, pp. 21-22). Of course, these are the stated goals of cadres not integrated into the military cells of Sendero Luminoso, but they indicate a will· ingness, at least in theory, to use any means, including the media, 10 advance their cause. Nor is suspicion of the media unique to Sendero Luminoso among terrorist groups. Referring to the kidnapping in 1971 of the editor of ACcion in Montevi· deo, a Tupamaro guerrilla said: we wanted to make clear the role played by the media at that ame, namely, the role of being part of lhe repressive forces. . We do ask tbem 7101 to tell too many lies; we understand we cannot ask tbem not 10 lie at all because tbe lie is essential to bourgeoisjouma/ism (29, pp. 146-147). Sendero Luminoso identiJies the press as a weapon of state terrorism in the "filthy war" of the government, listing disinfonnation campaigns as one result of the Counterinsurgency (10, p. 62). By arguip.g that media are a too) of gov· 86 Inlernafional Poli/ics and the Press / Contemporary Terrorism in Peru emment repression, Senderistas justify exploiting them as a weapon against the government. All the major media in Peru are strongly opposed to the insur· gency. Reporters from major newspapers, magazines, and broadcast media have been killed. The lack of information from the emergency zone makes it diffi· cult to determine who is responsible-the guerrllL1s, the security forces, or the peasants armed and encouraged by either side. Restrictions on tr.IVel and the risks to reporters have limited the coverage of the conJiic[. National and ethnic insurgent groups are generally dilferentiated from trans· narional terrorists, whose goal is [Q use media attention to apply international pressure for political aims. Sendero Luminoso would not generally be defined as a transnational terrorist organization; its primary audience is Peruvian. But the movement harbors ambitions for international attention. Although he insists that Sendero says "no (0 the war of communiques and dedarations," one sym· pathetic writer boasts of the guerrilla Edith Lagos, "her name was repeated constantly by the telexes of the international news agencies" (10, pp. 32, 42). Senderistas have also sought international suppOrt and funding, selling post· ers in the United States, for example, to raise money. Rather than being categorically dilferent from imernational terrorist groups, Sendero Luminoso differs in the degree of its attention to national and imernational audiences. Its prag· matic approach would likely target international audiences whenever the tactic appears useful. National insurgencies may seek international media exposure to increase pressure on the governmem. Marighella predlcted of Brazil that government Will wind up in a defensive position by not allowing anything against it to filter OUt: "At this poim it becomes desperate, is involved in greater contradictions and loss of prestige, and loses time and energy in an exhausting effort at con· rrol which is subject to being broken at any moment" (21, p. 109). Sendero Luminoso expects the same in Peru: The government "will be terrified to confrom publicity that casts constant doubt on its stability and therefore its eco· nomic future," and the visits of international groups, such as press freedom committees, "will have repercussions on investment, loans, and foreign mar· kets, as well as good commercial relations" (10, p. 17). The guerrilla, accord· ing to the same source, can withstand this economic crisis indefinitely, but the government cannot, and thus: The government, discredited and mOre desperate by the moment, will resort to the last ､･ｃｦＡｩｾ＠ announcing victories without having achieved them. It will i'lfbrm the outside world that the insurrection "has been totally crushed" and will reach the limit by presenting "proofS" (10, p. 27), This was the pattern in Argentina (8, p. 299), and Peruvian leaders began announcing the end of the insurgency in 1983 (11). The case of Sendero Lwnlnoso suggests that the media are useful to ter· rorists but not lruIllspensab1e. Some analysts insist that terrorism depencls on media coverage and that the news media have become an integral parr of the threat: "terrorists can no more do without media than the media can resist the 87 !1 \ i Joumal oj CommunicatioFl, AulUm" 1991 ' I terror·event" (2, p. 116), Even some experrs of the opposing camp concede that "mass communication, specifically the news media, is an essential ingredient in terrorism" (16, pp. 170-171), A hiStory that examines only the media relations of an insurgent group will tend to overstate the media's role, As this article has shown, other elements that are only'slightly related to the mediaeconomic conditions, breaches in social constraints, and reactionary \iolence and use of force-were crucial to the insurgency in Peru, The Peruvian media appear to be as much the victims of attack as are electrical towers, Sendero Luminoso began violent tactics on a large scale after a restOred democratic government returned media ownership to private hands, As often occurs, the victims of violence ,,,ere asSigned guilt. However, responsibility lies not with the media but with the SenderistaS, who had developed a pattern of violence during the militaty regime in their conllicts with the university, Contemporary Peru presents a microcosm of the debate over terrorism and the media, Sendero Luminoso has by turns vilified, explOited, and attacked the media by bombing and assassination, It considers the media a weapon both of and against the government, Sendero Luminoso seeks to communicate to the , illiterate through ancient and direct means, to the national elite through the Peruvian media, and to the world through international media. If anything, a reputation for secrecy enhances the group's press appeal, The media response has ranged from ignoring the insurgency to sensationalizing it, from refusing to report events to explaining them in detail. The government response has ranged from outright censorship within the emergency zone, to issuing guide, lines, to leaving the press relatively free, Newspapers sympathetic to Sendero Luminoso are a regular target of security forces and are harassed by government legal action, but they continue to be published and sold on the streets of Lima. No terrorist group can be entirely typicaL But if Sendero Luminoso is at all representative, its attirude toward the media exposes and contradicts the implicit assumption of many scholars and policy-makers: that insurgents hold a positive or even an unambiguous view of media attention, Rather than looking for media coverage, groups like Sendero Luminoso may consider violence an end in itself. They then communicate the power of their ideology by exercising that power directly, destroying the pathways, conduits, and networks-political as well as physical-that knit a sodety together, i I I References 1, Bamhu[Sr. Kevin G, "The Liter,!ture of Terrorism: ImplicatiOns for Visual Communications," In A. Ociasuo AJali and Kenoye Kelvin Eke (Eds.), Media Coverage of Terrorism: Methods of Diffusion. Newbury park, CaL: Sage, 1991, pp, 112-137. 2. Bell. J, Bowyer. A Time a/Terror ｾ･ｷ＠ York: Basic Books, 1978. 3. Berg. Ronald R "Explaining Sende(O LumioOSQ." In Proceedings of the Symposium, The legiti· macy of Political Violence, Latio American StudJes Occasional Paper No. 22, Universlry of Mas'!achuserts Internarional Area Studies ProgrJID, Amherst. 1988. 4. Brooke,Jamt"s. "Peru Drained by 1I1f]arion and Violence," Neu' York Times, September 18, 1989. p. 26. 5. CampbelL Lron G, "The Histotlographyofrhe ｐ･ｲｵｾ｡ｮ＠ American Researcb Rct'iew8, Spring 19'13. pp. 45-70. Guerrilla Movement, 1960-1965." Latin International Politics and the Press/ Contemporary TerTorism in Peru 6. Chang· Rodriguez, Eugenio. Opciones Politicas Pemanas (2d ed.). Trujillo, Peru: Editorial Norma::; Legales, 1987. 7. Cooper, Thomas W. "Terrorism and Perspectivist Philosophy: Understanding Adversarial Ne'WS Cov· erage." Monograph, Terrorism and the News Media Research Project, Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communicalion, Columbia, South Carolina, July 1988. 8. Cox, Roben. "The Media as a Weapon." Political Communt'cation and Persuasion 1, 1981, pp. 297-300. 9. Degregoci, Carlos Iv:in. "Sendero Luminoso: Los Hondos y Monaies Desenruentros." In Eduardo Bailon (Ed.), Movi'fJIienJos Soct'ales y Crisis: El Caso Peruano. Lima: DESCO Centro de Esrudios y Promocion del Desarrollo, 1986, pp. 225-263. 10. Fernandez 5., Jose. Terrorismo y GuerTa Suda en el Peru. Pumo Rojo, Peru: n.p., 1986. 11. "Foreign Report." The Economist, November 24,1983, p. 6. 12. Gaucher, Roland. The Terrorists. London: Secker and Warburg, 1968. 13. Gonzalez, Raul. "Ayarucho: la espera del gaucho." Imerview with General Luis Cisneros Vizquerra. QueHacer 20, January 1983, pp. 46-56. 14. Guerrero U., Luis Albeno, publisher of the small pro·government daily Hoy. Personal imerviev.r, San Isidro, Peru. August 16, 1989. 15. Hayes. Monte. "U.S. Gears for War on (:ocaine Dealers in Peruvian Jungle." Associated Press Story. Cbampat'gn·Urbana News·Gazette, September 10, 1989, p. A·9. 16. Jenkins. Brian. "Research in Terrorism: Areas of Consensus, Areas of Ignorance." In Burr Eichel· man, David Soskis, and William Reid (Eds.), Te1'TOrism: Interdisdplinary Perspectives. Washington, D.C,: American Psychiatric Association, 1983, pp. 153-177, 17. Kelly, Micheal). and Thomas H. Mitchell. "Transnational Terrorism and the Western Elite Press." Political Communicaffon and Persuasion 1, 1981, pp, 269-296. 18. Kupperman, Robert H. "Meeting the Terrorist Threat: Challenges to a Free Society," Terrorism: An InternationalJourna/2, 1979. pp. 58-63. 19. Laqueur, Walter. Terrorism. Boston: Linle, Brown, 1977. 20. Mari<ilegui, Jose Carlos. SieJe ensayos de interpretaciOn de fa realidad peruana. Mexico City: Edi· ciones Era, 1979 [1928J. 21. Marighella, Carlos. Teoria y acd6n revoludonarias. Mexico City: Editorial Diogenes, 1971. 22. Mercado U., Rogger. Ef Partido Comunista del Peru: Sendero Luminoso (3d ed.). Lima: Libcerias Srudium y la Universidad, 1986. 23. Miro Quesada G., Alejandro, publisher of EI Comerdo. Personal interview, Lima, August 17, 1989. 24. Paletz, David L., Peter A. Fozzacd, and John Z. Ayanian. "The I.RA., [he Red Brigades, and the FAL.N. in the New York Tt'mes.·' Journal ojCommunication 32(2), Spring 1982, pp. 162-171. 25. Reid, Michael. Peru: Paths to Poverty. London: Latin American Bureau, 1985. 26. Sakuda M., Alejandro, publisher of La Republica. Personal interview, Lima, Augusr 17, 1989. 27. Schmid, Alex P. and Janny de Graaf. Violence as Communication. London: Sage, 1982. 28. Taylor, Lewis. "Maoism in me Andes: Sendero Luminoso and [he Contemporary Gueccilla Move· mem in Peru." University of Liverpool Centre for Latin American Srudies Working Paper 2, Liver· pool, 1983. 29. Wilson, Carlos. 1be Tupamaros. BostOn: Branden Press, 1974. 89