Subjective Mind & Nature

University of Amsterdam Subjective Mind & Nature Course: Subjective Spirit Supervised by: P. G. Cobben Student: Nienke Ernstsen (11781300) Word count: 7264  Table of Contents 1. Introduction 3 2. Analysis 5 2.1 On Anthropology 5 2.1.1 Physical Soul 6 2.1.2 Feeling Soul 7 2.1.3 Actual soul 8 2.2 On the Phenomenology of Mind 9 2.2.1 Consciousness 10 2.2.2 Self-Consciousness 11 2.2.3 Reason 12 2.3 On Psychology 13 3. Conclusion 14 4. Bibliography 16  1. Introduction A long history can be traced back on a philosophy that has tried to explain the meaning and nature of our mental activity. George Friedrich Hegel provides a perspective on this philosophy of mind that does not necessarily confine itself to the mental realm. Specifically, it is not confined to the mental realm because Hegel naturalises the world of philosophy of mind. As an idealist, he locates the understanding of things in the Absolute (a transcendental, teleological structure). Hegel prioritises the teleological in order to break with an analysis that favours causal order. A more adequate analysis, according to Hegel, should be integrative. The notion of Geist, translated as Mind or Spirit, is central to this philosophy. Hegel differentiates this conception with that of Kant’s thought mainly through the continuous dialectics expressed in his formulation of Geist. Moreover, Geist is the final formulation, the point of union, and the transcendental goal of the world. George Friedrich Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind: Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press), xi. Taking this form only in the third stage of his dialectics, Geist becomes the infinite form of the finite capacities of the mental realm. It should come to see itself as the end of everything, because, according to Hegel, Geist is the end of everything. Hegel developed a system within the covered topics in his philosophy reaching from logic to aesthetics. His Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences addresses these systematics in three parts: logic, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of spirit. In this paper, I will focus on the last part of his Encyclopaedia, which structurally explains the concepts of Subjective Spirit, Objective Spirit, and the Absolute Mind. Specifically, the analysis will solely focus on the part of Subjective Spirit. Hegel dialectically subdivides the structure of Subjective Spirit under three big headings: Anthropology (the soul), the phenomenology of Spirit (consciousness), and psychology (Spirit). These three subdivisions concern how our mind as finite and as infinite are in opposition with each other and dialectically submerse into the Absolute. In Subjective Spirit, Hegel shows that humans – being bodily and mental creatures – are embedded in the materiality and organic parts of Nature, being interrelated with the subjectivity of the social world, leading to a unity articulated later in self-consciousness. Overall, Hegel addresses the problem of Cartesian dualism of how Spirit can be in relation to Nature. This substance dualism is characterised by distinguishing – in Descartes’ terms – the res extensa and res cogitans. Tackling this substance dualism is the groundwork for the conception of Spirit and constitutes the basis of the developments for the systematics of Subjective Spirit. Throughout the ‘narrative’ of Subjective Spirit, Hegel posits philosophical elaborations that act as criticism and development on Descartes’ project. Cartesian dualism is used to portray the processes and changes that work against – or more precisely, that work as counterforces to – such a substance dualism. In order to further understand how Hegel develops his analysis, I will provide a reading of Hegel’s Subjective Spirit to see how Hegel solves for this dualism. Thus, the research question that will guide this paper is: how does Subjective Spirit allow for Nature to coexist with Spirit? This paper is not directed towards seeking how Nature is subjected to Spirit, but rather how the two are reconciliated in Hegel’s system. As such, the interrelatedness and embeddedness of Spirit in Nature can be outlined by addressing the distinct parts of Subjective Spirit that Hegel portrays in his system throughout the Philosophy of Mind. In this analysis, I will describe the structure of Subjective Spirit in order to gain insight in the dialectical system of immersion and opposition that is considered as essential to understanding Hegel’s point of departure to understand the realm of Geist. Throughout this paper, the concepts of body and soul – and corporeity and Spirit for that matter – are conceptualised as two concepts for the sake of language differentiation. This does not imply however that they exclude each other per definition, as they imply one another in Hegel’s systematics. This position is a result of the development of the immediate relation and unity between Spirit and Nature. It is imperative to keep this in mind, as it constitutes the core to Hegel’s project in the Encyclopaedia, and in the section of Philosophy of Mind. The position Hegel develops is that the immediate unity of Spirit and Nature is made explicit, in order to reach a position wherein they are implicitly united. Specifically, this essay will be subdivided in the three dialectical parts that Hegel poses in his Philosophy of Mind to do justice to each section, and in order to see how each stage may allow for Nature to subdue in Spirit. It will provide an in-depth closed-reading of Anthropology and Phenomenology of Mind, and a short insight on Psychology. This is because the former two present a more accurate foundation on the relationship and contradictions present in Hegel’s system with regards to how Nature is involved in the realm of Mind. The latter is a dialectical union of the former two, and will thus be analysed more holistically. Finally, in the conclusion the main points will be gathered in order to portray the embeddedness of natural conditions in Hegel’s formulation of Subjective Spirit.  2. Analysis In the introduction to the Philosophy of Mind (1830), Hegel poses the statement that knowing oneself is knowing another and the universal. George Friedrich Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, §377. In other words, self-knowledge is embedded in another and in the universal, and is therefore not conceptualised as a distinct concept from knowledge of another and the whole. This is the most developed form achieved by Idea. Thus, Mind recognises itself when it recognises itself in everything other than itself. As a ‘restless activity’, Hegel approaches the analysis of Mind through a ‘speculative examination’ Ibid., §379. in order to comprehend it as a development of the eternal Idea. Hence, Geist is conceived as cognitive Ibid., §387., which is reconstructed through the sections of Anthropology, Phenomenology, and Psychology in the part of Subjective Spirit in the Philosophy of Mind. With this narrative being executed against ontological dualism, Hegel places Spirit as having nature as its presupposition. Ibid., §381. Specifically, to conceive of them as independent of each other is considered to bring up a contradiction. Ibid., §403. Both the soul and the body refer to the individual. In the individual, the soul-body moment is present, and is not separated between distinct moments. On the level of the soul, Geist is connected to a body, but considering from the soul it is not explicit yet. In this formulation, the soul is not immaterial, but is explained as the universal immateriality of nature: it is the simple ideal life. Ibid., §389. Specifically, what Hegel refers to is an assumption that the individual is constituted by a unity in body and soul, it is implicit to the individual. Soul becomes, and is, the substance of the body. Ibid. Hegel takes a naturalistic approach in the sense that the soul is understood as a type of entity other – yet not implying it to be separate of – than the living natural individual. It corresponds to the different levels of nature as formulated in the section of Anthropology. As seen, Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind is quite broad. Spirit includes the soul, even though soul is not yet fully Spirit. Soul is the natural-sentient-feeling activity which is not intrinsically intentional. On the other hand, consciousness and self-consciousness are in the intentional mind of the individual. As such, Hegel proceeds with his system in order to show the interrelation and embeddedness of these oppositions in order to counter the ontological dualism posited by previous materialist and empiricist philosophers such as Descartes. Through the subdivisions of Anthropology, Phenomenology, and Psychology Hegel further develops this thought. He poses the subjective mind to be immediate in his outline of Anthropology, as mediate in Phenomenology, and as an independent subject in Psychology. Ibid., §387. This will be outlined in the following sections with Mind taking form as first the soul being abstract universality, then consciousness as particularisation, and lastly as Mind being as the result of the development of the Notion. 2.1 On Anthropology Hegel commences his analysis of Subjective Spirit by addressing the soul and body relation, commencing from a point in which this immediate relation is not an external nor explicit relation. The soul as soul cannot be separated from the body. The soul is the form of immediateness and “is still in the grip of Nature and connected with its corporeity”. Ibid., Zusatz §387. This shows that the section on Anthropology considers Spirit in its natural life as immersed in Nature. In actuality, it finds itself in conflict with and in relation to corporeality. Ibid. The outcome of this opposition and relation is the soul triumphing over corporeity, reducing it to the representation of the soul which will further be outlined in the section on Phenomenology. In Anthropology, Mind is no longer universality as it is self-externalised in the corporeality of Mind. Ibid., §388. Mind as ideality only is as natural Spirit in a natural form: the externalisation is always happening and cannot be conceived as a sudden and singular moment of mind. Therefore, Mind is no longer Mind, but it is Soul. This soul should not be considered as a thing, nor as a material entity, it should be considered as the universal immaterial substance of Mind. Ibid., §389. Hegel continues this section by differentiating between three modes of soul: the natural mode, the soul which feels, and the corporeity as actual soul. Ibid., §390. I will continue the analysis of Anthropology through these differentiations of soul. 2.1.1 Physical Soul The first form of soul is the immediate natural mode, it is the physical soul. This is still a universal and immediate substance of mind. There is yet no difference to be found yet between universality and individuality. Embedded in the natural soul are the physical and mental differences of humanity. Hegel poses the example of racial differences and of national mentality to exemplify the form of soul here. Ibid., Zusatz §390. It is specifically the physical qualities which are part of the soul. These physical qualities are not possessed, as the development of Spirit is directed towards having explicit natural qualities of the soul. We can characterise the soul with these physical qualities from the outside, but from within the soul cannot yet make these qualities something that it owns nor possesses. In this moment, it constitutes a form to the interaction the soul has with the world, but it does not imply that the soul can characterise itself as such. Thence, Mind partakes in the natural world as a physical soul. Because Mind is immersed by Nature at this stage, Hegel delineates it to be the soul’s task to rise above this natural state to attain freedom, as freedom can only be achieved with universality. On the other hand, this means that Nature is also necessary for Spirit to be realised. The next step for soul becomes de-universalised when individualised into the subject in which it differentiates its natural modes. Ibid., §395. The general differences of the universalised Spirit become particularised when subjected to individuals. This particularisation is explicated by national differences, and the accepting of a national culture. Ibid., Zusatz §395. In some sense, this is a form of an historical cultural expression that is then particularised into the individual. Specifically, Hegel delineates natural disposition, temperament and character as spheres of mental activity into which this expression is then characterised. They mark the natural foundation of Spirit in this stage. When taking the soul now as an individual, the diversities are also found depending on the age of this individual. This is further explained in the stages of Childhood, Youth, Manhood, and Old Age. Ibid., §396. They are delineated as phases which pass on into each other that further particularise the immediate universal differences of the natural mode of Spirit. This is a reflection of how a time scope influences the extent to which Nature, in the form of corporeity of an individual body, is necessitated to mature the individualised and subjected Spirit. Hegel claims that the antithesis to the individual arise with the sexual relation taking a function in the family. This is because the sexual relation posits an individual itself in another individual. Hegel posits a complex structure, referring to the family on the level of objective Geist in an ethical relation. The relation between men and women have to be thought of as an ethical relationship in the sexual relation. This sexual relation is not a relation to another, but it is a self-relation. It pushes the universal principles of morality and love to be carried out on an individual basis. At this point, Hegel posits the differentiation between the sleeping and waking state as one of the first oppositions that the soul encounters with itself. The former is the natural quality of the self-absorbed natural life and the latter is the immediate judgment of the individual soul. Ibid., §398. A distinct self is realised through the self-conscious and rational activity, which for Hegel is still a natural fact in order to distinguish ourselves from others. The waking state can be regarded as an emancipation of the determinateness of Nature, but it is still the nature of Nature rather than a development or a projection of Nature. Grosso modo it is not the reproduction and satisfaction of desires. With the sleeping and waking state being considered as alternating conditions Ibid., §399., and their striving towards an unattainable unity portrays that they are still contained in simplicity, and what Hegel calls sensibility. Ibid., Zusatz §399. There is an immediate form of a relationship with self, where Spirit flows in its unconscious individuality. Sensation is something that is not in the objective world but is within the immediateness of the relationship with oneself. Hegel enhances that everything emerges and has a source in sensation, and that there is no content without feeling. Ibid., §400. A contradiction emerges between one’s mental content and one’s sensation. Whereas both are still something in oneself, sensation is still on the grounds of a more immediate and natural subjectivity which denies the freedom to be enjoyed of universal subjectivity. Ibid., Zusatz §400. The content of this sensation can partake in the mind or in the body, as such it can belong to the outer world or to the interior world of the mind. Ibid., §401. Here comes the transition of the physical soul to the feeling soul. Whilst sensations are still immediate, they can be transient to the interior psychic activity of the soul. Therefore, the immediacy and still natural mode of feeling reflects the bounded natural state of the soul in this phase. This leads to an opposition whilst attaining consciousness of the soul’s totality, and is in conflict with its freedom and unfreedom. Whilst conditioned by its naturalness, it is at the same time trying to raise above this naturalness into a free consciousness. These conditions open up a door to dialectical intertwinings of the soul that demarcate the attempt to rise above its own nature. As such, the transition starts to take place, and Hegel opens up a new section in Anthropology named as the feeling soul. 2.1.2 Feeling Soul In this phase of soul, there is a transformation from a universal natural soul to individual souls. This is where the process of ‘owning’ natural and physical characteristics starts, but it is still on a very implicit level. Hegel starts the analysis about self on a very elementary level. The universal qualities are separated amongst individual souls and come into unity in the individual soul. It enters in opposition with its natural qualities. Ibi., Zusatz §390. Thus, the feeling soul is the one leaving the natural state. The latter has subjectivity, but the inner form of this subjectivity is not yet developed. The unity of feeling is made explicit in the soul, hence feeling is the simple ideality of sensation. Moreover, Hegel describes that the form of sensations is the content of consciousness. Ibid., §403. The existence of the natural soul mutually with a rational consciousness that is now present shows the gateway of Nature in the realm of consciousness. Soul in this perspective should be regarded as an ‘activity’ of the body rather than a thing of the body. All spiritual activities (from consciousness to self-consciousness) presuppose the corporeal constitution of certain abilities. These activities must become embodied to be exercised. The harmony of immediateness is however broken. The sensation and feeling part of soul still enables to understanding of phenomena on these scales. However, understanding has broadened its scale to rational explication. Hegel explains it as follows: “When I have raised myself to rational thinking I am not only for myself, objective to myself, and therefore a subjective identity of the subjective and objective, but I have also separated this identity from myself, set it over against me as an actually objective identity” Ibid., Zusatz §408.. Here, he posits the claim that a separation between the objective and subjective has taken place but is a contradiction before it is a real separation. This separation, he continues, is demarcated by the feeling soul overcoming its immediacy, naturalness, and corporeity in order to achieve an ideal moment. This is one of the first signs in which we find that the relation and contradiction with nature is necessary to overcome it in order to achieve a state of ideality. Hegel continues on this idea by stating “the individual soul is in itself already physically exclusive; as alive, I have an organic body and this is not something extraneous to me; on the contrary, it belongs to my Idea, is the immediate, outer existence of my Notion, constitutes my individual natural life”. Ibid., Zusatz §410. In the process of disengagement from corporeality to reach the stance of ideality, the natural being appears as exterior to Spirit. The point here is not that Spirit has to be expressed in corporeity, but that the soul has to express itself through Spirit. With soul being the substance of its corporeity, corporeity on itself cannot be substantive, because the body is enveloped in the abstract universality of the soul. One must assume the natural immediacy and exercise non-reflexively (as habit) Ibid., §410., as habit is natural mode of existence. Ibid., §409. The goal in this stage is for the mind to acquire a high degree of adequacy in order to transform the body into its property by increasing the capacity to express itself in it. Hegel calls this a magical relation, with this being the “immediate operation of mind on body”. Ibid., §410. Hence, corporeity is ‘at service’ of the mind for it to express itself through it, as an act of appropriation of the natural immediateness of the soul. 2.1.3 Actual soul The last stage of Anthropology is marked by the actual soul: a soul that has made corporeity its own, and expresses itself through it. Through habit, the soul gains control over its corporeality, which is now pervaded by the soul and subjected to its ideality. The body, here, becomes a sign and expression of the soul being “an externality of a higher nature”. Ibid., §411. From being a mere immediate soul, it passed onto being-for-self into which it separated itself from its immediateness in the feeling soul, the soul has now developed itself to being in a mediated unity with its natural being. Ibid., Zusatz §411. Corporeity should not be considered from an organic point of view anymore. It should be regarded in light of it being an externality transformed into an ideality, where the soul is no longer restricted to inner sensations. There is a mental embodiment in corporeity, enabling freedom of the soul. It is the spirit or mind aspect that persists in the body that distinguishes man from animal. From this point onwards, when soul rises to be consciousness, Hegel starts preparing for the transition to the Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel explains, that before the soul rose to be consciousness, soul was in its universality and expressed in the bodily. By now, it has awakened to be an I, enabling itself to have a self-relationship. The natural soul is consumed in the actual soul, in the sense that the natural soul’s possibility of being-for-self and becomes an actuality in the actual soul. Thence, the essence of the soul is for the soul. Ibid., Zusatz §412. Having the self setting itself now as an abstract universality over its particularities, the soul now posits itself “in opposition to its being to its (conscious) self, absorbing it, and making it its own, has lost the meaning of mere soul, or the ‘immediacy’ of mind”. Ibid., §412. This means that it has sublated itself, where the abstract universality is the I. This paves the way for the section on Phenomenology of Spirit, where the ‘I’ has emerged. 2.2 On the Phenomenology of Mind The Phenomenology in the Encyclopaedia is dedicated to examine the different forms of consciousness. It is a development that adequately expresses Idea. As outlined in the previous section, the soul becomes consciousness through negating its corporeity and freed itself from naturalness. Ibid., Zusatz §387. This I, as a thinking subject, is purely abstract and empty, and finds itself as being-for-itself as it finds itself in relation to Other which is given. Ibid., Zusatz §387. Mind is no longer immersed in Nature but is reflected into itself and in relation to Nature. The last phases in Anthropology outlined the process of the emerging I. Having freed the soul from particularities and sensation, these activities of the soul are now reduced to occasions for consciousness. Thence, the I as a subject of consciousness awakens, where all the mental activities that were described in Anthropology become subject to higher-order organisations of the soul. In Hegel’s view, this distinguishes man from animal, as mankind can oversee and control via this higher-order of organisation in the mental realm. As such, Spirit as consciousness appears between Anthropology and Psychology. Spirit becomes the truth of nature, and is declared higher than nature, but spirit is still immersed in nature. Nature has not been left behind, as it is sunken into it. Nature is the form of spirit’s natural life and immediate existence. Soul is necessarily embodied because Soul cannot be other than be embodied because Spirit is the truth of nature. Anthropology marks conflict between corporeality and Spirit. This conflict is solved once the immediate unity of self and nature on the level of Nature is broken. The ratio of self as tabula rasa that is in proportion with the exterior world is the point from which we should depart. Specifically, this is because the immediate identity of the soul has moved to being the pure ideal identity. At this point, soul is a subjective reflection in itself, and its substantiality is negative. Consciousness, in this aspect, is a contradiction between the two sides of soul. Ibid., §414. This shows us how consciousness is about being in proportion with something other. The development of consciousness appears to itself not as the changing self-proportion, but as an object. Self-consciousness will characterise itself as for self. Hegel presents us with a critique on Kant who distinguishes between the nominal and phenomenal world. Spirit returns to itself, for which the exterior world for Hegel cannot be determined outside of Spirit. This shows us how, even in consciousness, Hegel recognises the natural world to be part of Spirit, and thus does not conceptualise it as something independent of the realm of Spirit. We can distinguish between subjectivity and objectivity, yet it is about an internal unity between subject and object. Nature and Geist are made explicit, but on the level of consciousness through implicit unity. According to Hegel we can distinguish between objectivity and subjectivity, but it is important that we acknowledge the unity between them. In this structure of thought, the I is active still in relation to itself whilst at the same time with the exterior world. We come across what is a self-constituting system of pure thoughts, where the I is active within this system. The elevation of consciousness in this system is to be considered as three judgments, namely that of consciousness in general, self-consciousness, and the unity of consciousness and self-consciousness. Ibid., §417. 2.2.1 Consciousness In consciousness, Hegel presents us with three stages which reveal the logical process of thought. These stages are sensuous consciousness, sense-perception and intellect. Sensuous consciousness is the immediate consciousness, where the object of it changes from a single thing to something of manifold characteristics and becomes more concretised. The immediate object has no truth in its immediacy for which it must rise to the essential being of the object. Ibid., Zusatz §418. Thus, the content of sensuous consciousness is dialectical, and shoes that the individual here is dependent on another. The immediateness of this stage is found in the relation to another. Ibid., Zusatz §419. This is defined by it simply being, as well as being an independent Other posited against oneself. Its content belongs to sensation, and is hence not representative for the absolute universal content. This consciousness only allows for the determination of something that exists outside of the mind and possesses certain properties. Consciousness, however, wants to take an object in its truth as a universal. Ibid., §420. Here, consciousness enters the phase that Hegel calls sense-perception. Individual things are only referred to as universal, as the unity of the individual with the universal is not yet achieved. This unity can only stem from a contradiction which happens in a later stage of consciousness. In this stage, a relationship is drawn between the sensuous materials and a universal that is not immediately observable. At the beginning of Phenomenology we have a free consciousness which relates itself to the world. In the development of Phenomenology, the free consciousness realises itself, meaning that consciousness realises its freedom immediately in the exterior world. The thinking through of empirical relations should be viewed from the inside as a relation of consciousness with the world. This means that consciousness determines the objective relation, needing subjective insight to understand this objective reality. The objective and subjective are inseparable in this subject matter. One experiences x event, and can only be experienced with one’s subjective insight. In other words, experiencing in this sense in nothing other than being oneself. The object will undergo a change. As such, Hegel tries to bring together empiricism and rationalism. The latter has to behold the relationship with the former and vice versa. Specifically, he wants to avoid the view that nature is only a subjectively protected thing from the subject within. For Hegel, reality is a realisation of the Notion. As human beings, we cannot bring about nature because we are not omnipotent. The realm of mind has to be understood as a mind of a self-consciousness which has loosened itself, which can transcend its natural relation, but is not completely letting go of the natural relation. For this reason, nature is still an expression of the Notion. The structure of self-consciousness is the structure of the play of forces of nature. The highest stage of consciousness is that of intellect. Here, the “object is reduced or raised to the appearance of a self-existent inner being” which is the living being. Ibid., Zusatz §418. There is a turn from the object to something subjective, where consciousness finds itself to be the essential being of the object and reflects itself into it. It is in the non-sensuous non-exterior being that intellect sees itself as having the truth. Ibid., Zusatz §422. There exists a unity of laws and relations to self, whether in nature or in the ethical world, determining an inseparable unity. Intellect is about the comprehension of the inwardness of the object determining it as similar to the I, which then becomes intellectual consciousness. Ibid. Intellectual consciousness finds in the laws of nature the laws to its own nature, and thus becomes objective. Consciousness finds itself in something other, and develops itself into self-consciousness. Ibid., Zusatz §423. The dialectical process and differentiation within itself where there is truth of natural existence. 2.2.2 Self-Consciousness In this section of Phenomenology, Hegel portrays the necessity of seeing consciousness by acknowledging the immediate negation of it, and it being dependent on that which it has been negated from. It shows that consciousness is bound to an exterior object. It is about interdependence and recognition between the I and the world. Ibid., §424. Self-consciousness is the negation of consciousness. In order to dialectically dissolve in it, self-consciousness has three stages it develops through, which Hegel denominates appetitive self-consciousness, recognitive self-consciousness, and universal self-consciousness. The first form of self-consciousness – as appetitive – is immediate, contradictorily, and related to an external object. Ibid., §425. It is a self-consciousness led by impulse, directed towards the satisfaction in an external object. Ibid., Zusatz §426. The satisfaction of appetite makes explicit the identity of subject and object. As Hegel puts it, “self-consciousness is the manifested Notion of the object itself”. Ibid., Zusatz §427. This means that the individuality of self-consciousness does not correspond to universality of its Notion. In this phase, subjectivity becomes objective to itself. Nevertheless, as negation of immediacy and the character of this identity of self-consciousness a character of universality develops. The appetitive phase of self-consciousness ceases to be in the confrontation of the I with itself. As a result, self-consciousness rises above this state and becomes self-less and free in the recognitive state of self-consciousness. Ibid., §429. The recognitive self-consciousness is the realisation of the union of individuality and universality. Ibid., §425. On the one hand, this stage of self-consciousness finds itself in the immediacy of the previous stage, as well as being universal. This posed contradiction gives the impulse to show itself as free and existing for the other. Ibid., §430. This is what Hegel calls the process of recognition. As such, one gives existence to one’s freedom. At this point, one is immediate in one’s existence as natural and corporeal, as well as a free subject. The recognition of these existences, and of others’ existence as such consists in regarding these beings as natural and as free. “I am only truly free when the other is also free and is recognized by me as free” Ibid., Zusatz §431. Hegel says, meaning that this recognition unites men, and can only happen when in negation with one’s immediacy. It is in relation with another, that as a rational self-consciousness the I is entitled to freedom. Ibid., Zusatz §433. However, it is only the beginning of freedom, as it is only the manifestation of individuality in freedom and not the universal. Lastly comes the universal self-consciousness where otherness is overcome dialectically. Ibid., §425. Whereas the last stage was a negation state, this phase of self-consciousness “is the affirmative awareness of self in an other self: each self as a free individuality has his own ‘absolute’ independence, yet in virtue of the negation of its immediacy (…) without distinguishing itself from that other”. Ibid., §436. The struggle for recognition in its negation brings about Spirit as universal self-consciousness. In being reflected into oneself one is immediately reflected in other, and as such one is immediately self-related. Ibid., Zusatz §436. This consists of the unity between the objective and the subjective and constitutes itself as universal. Hegel expresses it correctly by saying that “it is in the identity of subjectivity and objectivity that constitutes the universality now attained by self-consciousness” Ibid., Zusatz §437.. Thus, the activity of the I here consists in building objectivity into itself and making subjectivity objective. This means that self-consciousness breaks away from its subjectivity and particularity and attains universality as such. 2.2.3 Reason The last phase of Phenomenology is constituted by Reason. Specifically It is the yielding of particularity of the universal self-consciousness. The universality of reason signifies the object. Truth adheres to an immanent form in Reason, specifically of a pure notion. Here, truth is Spirit. Humans as complex organisms that exhibit self-reflexivity and are embodied in otherness participate in the complexity of the system by determining through Reason as a means to obtain truth. Consciousness appears to be a specific mode of human existence in its natural, political and social realm. As an opposition of particularity and universality, and of internalising and externalising, a totality is abstracted which is Absolute. Reason is the absolute substance and “the truth that knows it” Ibid., §439. Hegel posits. It is when true content becomes object to one’s intelligence that one acquires Reason. “This universal self-consciousness is, in itself or for us, Reason. (…) Reason forms the substantial nature of mind; it is only another expression for Truth or the Idea which constitutes the essence of mind” Ibid., Zusatz §387. Hegel states. We see here the necessary expression of the Idea through Reason in Phenomenology. 2.3 On Psychology In Psychology, Hegel posits the claim that it is on this level where the spirit becomes the unity of soul and consciousness. This section is about self-relation of the concrete subjective spirit with other given through the theoretical mind, the practical mind, and the free mind. Because this section is in essence a dialectical development of Anthropology and Phenomenology, I will address it in a wholistic manner rather than pin pointing at the details of this section of Subjective Spirit. In Psychology, Hegel carries out the principle of Spirit’s relation to itself. Hegel’s answer to ‘what is Spirit?’ goes back to the transition from nature to freedom. The essence of Spirit is freedom, but freedom is a concept that has to come to existence. As seen in the previous sections, the soul’s immanence in corporeality is the departure point for freedom’s realisation. In Phenomenology, we saw that by overcoming its other and making it a moment within itself, Spirit ceases to be conditioned by the external world. Spirit, as a self-revelation, nature is no longer opposed to it. By now, we have reached a stage of a free mind in which Reason is a pure infinite form and is identical with the object of Knowing. Ibid., Zusatz §440. The Free Spirit shows itself to be the unity of the soul as simple immediate substance, and of consciousness. From the former it obtains the subjective element, and from the latter the objective element, and as such becomes a totality of both. The finitude of mind lies in it not attaining the full reality of its reason, and as such adhering to the immediate natural soul, or objective consciousness. Reason is only infinite as absolute freedom, in-itself and for-itself. Immediate feeling thus has to be purified with that which is present in the formal and abstract, and in conformity with Mind. In theoretical mind, Mind receives that which is exterior as inward and universal to relate to objects subjectively instead of solely immediately. In practical mind, Mind focuses on itself and proceeds to make them objective. As such it reacts against the one-sided subjectivity of theoretical mind. They integrate themselves reciprocally, and they can be seen as an interplay between the subjective and objective. Both can be seen as forms of Reason as they constitute reason. Ibid., Zusatz §443. Spirit thus sets itself in relation to the world by filling it with subjectivity and objectivity as determining factors for its content. Man is thence realising himself through this activity of mind concretising both soul and spirit. The free Spirit of man wills its Spirit as Reason, and wills itself. It is a progress in the consciousness of freedom. The tripart division Hegel presents us with sets forth an individual which can now stand in the threshold of the social public sphere and can participate both as object and subject. Whereas before, the activity of the mind was seen to focus on the satisfaction of needs, intelligence in this stage of mind produces a whole other dynamic development of will, specifically free will. With it standing in conflicting directions being immediate yet still being complex, Hegel conjoins them by showing that from these positions we derive notions such as ethics or religion. Hegel concludes this section with a self that is realised as pure activity. Our thinking self goes by a system of dialectics that result in concrete universal concepts that can be self-realised and are part of us. Hegel offers a complex system of cognitive as well as emotive functions that show the relationship between our natural and conscious state as human beings. He concludes the part on Subjective Spirit with Psychology stating that this form of mind is “intended to develop into an objective phase” Ibid., §482. exemplifying conditions of morality and legal statuses.  3. Conclusion To conclude, we will return to the research question – how does Subjective Spirit allow for Nature to coexist with Spirit? – in order to address the main points of the analysis that give insight on the natural aspect of Spirit in Hegel’s writings. In order to process these points, I will return to the project of the Encyclopaedia as a whole to highlight the project Hegel carried out. As outlined in previous sections, Kant and Descartes are the cornerstones from which Hegel’s systematics depart. Whereas for the former two there is a clear distinction between a world of cogito and a natural world, for Hegel these are combined into one. This sets the base for starting the Encyclopaedia and comes back in its three parts of Logic, Philosophy of Nature, and Philosophy of Mind. The first part of the Encyclopaedia, named Logic, provides the explanation that reality is tied to a logical structure. Developing upon this, his next section of Natural Philosophy outlines how reality is constituted of internal concepts that appear through a natural reality. If these do not appear as such they cannot express reality. The natural reality loses its unity in reality if internal concepts are not present in it. In continuation with the Natural Philosophy, we have to look at the natural reality as having an internal unity with the Idea. In the different appearances from the natural reality, Nature comes to itself. This unity manifests itself in nature, and comes out of nature itself. Hegel wants to show that the ideas of the explicit Nature develop from the externalisation of nature that comes to itself. By this point in the Encyclopedia, Hegel explicated how the realm of the Spirit and the natural realm are inseparable. This is Hegel’s main statement and his philosophical position: it is pointless to refer to the realm of Spirit and the natural realm as two distinct concepts. This dualism that he addresses is his starting point from which he develops a uniting system of philosophy. In order to further develop the concept of Spirit, Hegel formulates the concept of ideality. Nature is internal, and is brought to a unity in this ideality. The question then appears of how Spirit is formed, and what it is. Spirit that is expressed in the multiplicity of Nature is not expressed adequately as Spirit. Spirit, according to Hegel, has to be expressed in the appearances of reality in such a way that Spirit is righteous to itself. It is in itself universal, and its appearance has to follow through with this as such. Spirit, in its most initial stages should already be embedded in universality. It has something natural of its immediateness in itself, and is at the same time related to universality. Therefore, universality is embedded in the immediateness of Spirit. From soul to consciousness, the relation with Nature does not disappear, it just becomes more adequately expressed. Internal universality becomes explicit with the distinction of objective nature. In contrast to the project of Descartes, who expresses his doubts on all but cogito, Hegel recognises the importance of cogito that Decartes highlights, yet emphasises that it is not a separate entity from objective reality. Cogito is developed by seeing it in relation to what cogito is not. By doubting wat Nature is, one is already making an assumption on what Nature is. The natural reality has a significant role in self-consciousness. With Kant, cogito is formulated as a transcendental subject that makes reality a unity through intuition. The a priori structure of Kant and the conditions of such structure determine reality. Hegel, ‘conversing’ with Descartes and Kant, sees the necessary mental structures that they thematise. The big difference is that Hegel sees that the knowledge object is separate from the thing-in-itself; it is in our subjective categories that determine reality. Therefore, Hegel develops a position after Kant in which the thing-in-itself is overcome. Hegel’s principle of universality is a system of logical structure that has to be bound to both cogito and Nature, with this being the key to overcome Descartes’ and Kant’s dualism. Hegel wants to find the internal unity of empiricism and rationalism in his philosophy and the system he develops accordingly. The ground of this system is structure of Spirit. The unity of the three dialectical moments that Hegel posits come together in this structure. The internal unity of nature and Spirit are made possible as such. Having thematised the basics of the Encyclopedia, we have seen how Hegel’s main statement is directed towards the inseparability of Nature and Spirit. Now, returning to the Subjective Spirit in the Philosophy of Mind, I will more precisely address the relation of Spirit to Nature. In Anthropology we have seen that in the soul’s relation to corporeality, spirit is not yet Spirit, and not in relation to itself, and thus not free. Corporeality is that which immediately constitutes Spirit as subjective, and thus as a finite Spirit. Corporeality is therefore Spirit’s initial truth. Consciousness is the result of the development of embodied Spirit where it will bring about Spirit to its body. Spirit is in the middle here, between the world of conflict with body and Spirit’s relation to itself. As such, Hegel sees a balance between man’s self-made condition and what Nature makes of man due to the immediate universal relation between them. Thus, Spirit has to start form its natural unfree condition to grow to human self-determination. For Hegel, the Soul is the inner purpose of the organic body. To show that Spirit can know itself and can act freely in the body, Soul is real in relation to the body. As such, Soul is Spirit’s immediate and natural relation to corporeality, as to be Spirit is to be Soul in corporeity. The relationship between them is essential. Soul is the universal immateriality of nature. As such, Spirit is fundamentally connected to Nature and body. By overcoming its ‘other’, and specifically making its other a moment within itself, Spirit ceases to be conditioned by anything external. Since Spirit is precisely its self-revelation, Nature – as one form of this revelation of Spirit – is no longer absolutely opposed to Spirit. Nonetheless, Nature is not the complete or perfect revelation of Spirit, and insofar as Spirit’s essential nature is this self-revelation, Nature is not yet Spirit. In the immediacy of the soul, universality is embedded. Hegel, in ‘fighting’ the thing-in-itself constitutes a position where reality made of logical structure just as cogito is. In other words, the subjective and objective are one and the same universality. This is an implicit relation in the structure of Spirit. Later in Phenomenology, Hegel talks about contradiction with corporeity, and the dialectics between the subjective and objective. In Psychology, he addresses the merging of both conditions to attain freedom. We see that cogito only is in relation to universality of Nature, both implying one another. Therefore, not only in Subjective Spirit, but also in the whole of the project of the Encyclopaedia, Hegel has addressed the necessary unity in the structure of Spirit, and its internal relation with Nature. Throughout the development of Spirit in Anthropology, Phenomenology, and Psychology, Spirit evolved from Soul to self-consciousness. There is a transition from the immediate to the universal relation of Spirit to Nature throughout the tripartite division in Subjective Spirit. It is a mutual internal relation that becomes universal. Hegel, concerned with expressing this adequately without falling into the category of having developed another dualist philosophy, uses his dialectics to show the necessary opposition and unity between Spirit and Nature and their relation. Having seen the change from a naturalistic Spirit to a rational Spirit, the relation to Nature for and with Spirit is made more explicit. The rational scrutiny developed across Psychology enables the relation with Nature to be universal and necessary. Hegel’s dialectical program in the Encyclopaedia offers us insight in how Hegel tackled the dualistic approaches of Descartes and Kant, and thus shows us how Subjective Spirit does not ‘allow’ Nature to coexist with Spirit, but rather shows us that Spirit necessarily is in unity with Nature. 4. Bibliography George Friedrich Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind: Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 2