Naval and Maritime Activities of Alexander the Great in South Mesopotamia and the Gulf

ANDREAS P. PARPAS T H E H E L L E N I S T IC GU L F Greek Naval Presence in South Mesopotamia and the Gulf (324-64 B.C.) Front cover Detail from an early 17th century map of the Near East, South Mesopotamia and the Gulf. (Private collection of the author) Back cover An imitation “Arabian Alexander” silver tetradrachm struck at Gerrha, with the head of Herakles on the obverse and the sun god Shams on the reverse. ANDREAS P. PARPAS T H E H E L L E N I S T IC GU L F Greek Naval Presence in South Mesopotamia and the Gulf (324-64 B.C.) To my family Poem Philhellene by Constantine P. Cavafy C.P. Cavafy – he Collected Poems: A new translation by Evangelos Sachperoglou with parallel Greek text, Oxford World Classics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008 See to it the engraving be skilfully done. he expression serious and digniied. he diadem preferably rather narrow; those broad Parthian ones are not to my liking. he inscription, as usual in Greek; nothing excessive, nothing pompous lest the proconsul, who always pokes around and reports to Rome, take it the wrong way– but nonetheless, of course, honoriic. Something very special on the other side; some handsome youth, a discus-thrower. Above all, I bid you pay attention (Sithaspes, in god’s name, don’t let this be forgotten) that after the words ‘King’ and ‘Saviour’ be engraved in elegant lettering: ‘Philhellene.’ And now don’t start your witticisms on me, like: ‘where are the Greeks’ and ‘where is Greek used around here, this side of Zagros, way beyond Fraata.’ Since so many others, more barbarous than we, write it, we will write it too. And inally, do not forget that on occasion there come to us sophists from Syria, and poetasters and other pretentious pedants: hus, we are not lacking in Greek culture, I do believe. Constantine P. Cavafy Philhellene CONTENTS P R E F A C E – 17 I N T R O D U C T I O N – 19 CHAPTER I HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND – 23 (1.1) he Seleukid Empire – 25 (1.2) Makedonian imperial policies and governance in South Mesopotamia and the Gulf – 43 (1.3) he Parthian Empire – 48 (1.4) he kingdom of Mesene (Μεσήνη) or Charakene (Χαρακηνή) – 50 CHAPTER II NAVAL AND MARITIME ACTIVITIES OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT IN SOUTH MESOPOTAMIA AND THE GULF – 55 (2.1) he global and regional naval strategy of Alexander the Great – 56 (2.2) Regional geographical reconstruction – 61 (2.3) he rivers Euphrates and Tigris – 61 (2.4) he Chaldean Lakes – 63 (2.5) Mesopotamian delta and lakes. he Karkheh, Dez and Karun/Pasitigris rivers – 66 (2.6) Exploration of the Persian side of the Gulf by Nearchos – 69 (2.7) he voyage to the entrance of the Gulf in the Strait of Hormuz along the Karmania coastline – 72 (2.8) he voyage from Karmania along the Persis coastline – 75 (2.9) he voyage from Persis along the Susiana coastline and Southern Mesopotamia – 76 (2.10) Nearchos’ return trip from the mouth of the Euphrates to meet Alexander – 78 (2.11) Alexander’s trip from Susa to Opis – Identiication of the site of Alexandria on the Tigris – 80 (2.12) Construction and transport of warships from Phoenicia to Babylon – 86 (2.13) Construction of harbour at Babylon – 94 (2.14) Alexander’s irst Babylonian War Fleet – 95 (2.15) Construction of river leet of small punts Inspection of waterways and canals – 99 (2.16) Alexandria on the Tigris – 104 (2.17) Alexandria on the Euphrates or in Babylonia – 105 (2.18) Alexander’s plans to conquer Arabia – 108 (2.19) he strength of the expeditionary force against Arabia – 116 (2.20) Food and water needs for the army and navy, logistics and communication lines – 117 CHAPTER III HELLENISTIC NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE GULF – 123 (3.1) Seafaring in the Gulf – 125 (3.2) Alexander’s and the Seleukids’ Kingdom of Asia and the Gulf – 127 (3.3) he Seleukids’ naval policies – 127 (3.4) he maritime district “Tylos and the Islands” – 135 (3.5) Makedonian network of naval and military settlements and colonization in the Gulf – 137 (3.6) Trading routes – 141 CHAPTER IV ALEXANDRIA ON THE TIGRIS–ANTIOCHIA–CHARAX SPASINOU – 145 (4.1) Foundation of Alexandria on the Tigris – 145 (4.2) he restoration of Alexandria – 150 (4.3) Rivalry with Ptolemaic Egypt – 151 (4.4) Molon’s revolt – 154 (4.5) he Seleukid Eparchy of the Erythrean Sea – 155 (4.6) Antiochos III’s trip in the Gulf during his anabasis – 158 (4.7) Antiochos IV’s campaign in the Gulf and Numenios' victory in the Strait of Hormuz – 165 (4.8) Charax Spasinou – 168 (4.9) he kingdom of Mesene (Μεσήνη) or Charakene (Χαρακηνή) – 170 (4.10) Location of Alexandria–Antiochia–Charax Spasinou – 180 (4.11) Forat and Apologos – 185 CHAPTER V TyLOS (BAHRAIN) – 189 (5.1) Qal’at al-Bahrain and its Hellenistic past – 191 (5.2) Tylos and the Phoenicians – 202 (5.3) he domination of Tylos before the Hellenistic period – 203 (5.4) Asklepios at Tylos – 208 (5.5) he Seleukid maritime district “Tylos and the Islands” he Kephisodoros inscription – 224 (5.6) Greek inluence – 231 (5.7) Numismatic evidence – 235 (5.8) Tylos: the administrative centre of the Seleukids in the Gulf – 237 CHAPTER VI IKAROS (FAILAKA)– 239 (6.1) Dilmun and the pre-Hellenistic past of Ikaros – 239 (6.2) he Makedonians at Ikaros – 243 (6.3) he Hellenistic fortiied enclosure F5 – 248 (6.4) Hellenistic sanctuaries – 251 (6.5) he “From Ikaros” (ΟΙ ΕΞ ΙΚΑΡΟΥ) inscription – 257 (6.6) he “Soteles” (ΣΩΤΕΛΗΣ) inscriptions – 259 (6.7) Numismatic evidence – 260 (6.8) he Ikadion-Anaxarchos inscription – 262 CHAPTER VII SOUTH-WESTERN IRAN, ANTIOCHIA IN PERSIS–SELEUKEIA ON THE HEDyPHON AND SELEUKEIA ON THE ERyTHREAN SEA – 273 (7.1) Antiochia in Persis – 274 (7.2) Seleukeia on the Hedyphon or on the Erythrean Sea – 281 (7.3) Aracha, possibly Kharg island – 286 CHAPTER VIII THE NORTHERN-EASTERN ARABIAN COAST – 287 (8.1) Gerrha – 287 (8.2) Larissa, Chalkis, Arethusa – 294 CHAPTER IX THE SOUTHEASTERN ARABIAN COAST, OMAN AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES – 297 (9.1) Magan – 297 (9.2) Mleiha – 300 (9.3) Al-Dur – 303 E P I L O G U E – 307 N O T E S – 313 A B B R E V I AT I O N S O F A N C I E N T S O U R C E S – 343 A N C I E N T S O U R C E S – 345 B I B L I O G R A P H Y – 349 I N D E X O F N A M E S A N D P L A C E S – 369 CHAPTER II NAVAL AND MARITIME ACTIVITIES OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT IN SOUTH MESOPOTAMIA AND THE GULF Although the Hellenistic period starts after Alexander’s death, it is necessary, for the purpose of this book, to examine his naval plans and maritime activities, which had taken place a couple of years before his death. he primary reason is to show that all that happened in the Gulf in the next three hundred years was a continuation of his strategic plans and ingenious thinking. Alexander wanted to use Babylonia and South Mesopotamia as the hub and main base of operations for his intended conquest of Arabia and to satisfy his imperial ambitions in the East. But above all, he was interested in the conquest of oikoumene – the entire inhabited world. His intentions were to keep the long-existing administrative, as well as commercial and social local structures intact. In order to develop further the ongoing trade between the Orient and the West, he was well aware of the fact that he had to maintain and expand safe trading routes and a functioning regional economy. He realized right from the start that the two most important pillars of the Southern Mesopotamian economy were trade and irrigated agriculture. Free and safe navigation in the Gulf and the rivers and waterways of South Mesopotamia, as well as maintenance and improvement of irrigation canals, became his top priorities. herefore, in order to sustain a satisfactory economic growth in Mesopotamia and by extension to achieve his military and global imperial ambitions with immediate target to conquer Arabia, he realized that he needed to create an operational standing leet in Babylon and the Gulf for military and commercial purposes. In order to do that, it was necessary to build new cities and foundations around Babylon and the Gulf and create a naval and maritime infrastructure like the one that existed for centuries in Southeastern Mediterranean. 55 THE HELLENISTIC GULF his is not the irst time that the world domination in antiquity extended from the Mediterranean to the Gulf. he stele of Sargon II at Kition in Cyprus refers to the Assyrian “rule over the people between the Upper Sea and the Lower Sea” (that is between the Mediterranean and the Gulf ).(1) In fact, on Sargon’s stele we ind for the irst time that islands –Cyprus and Tylos (Bahrain)– are used to mark the extent of the Assyrian domination.(2) his is exactly what Alexander had in mind. Since Cyprus was already under his control, he also intended to dominate not only the lands around the Gulf but also its islands. (2.1) he global and regional naval strategy of Alexander the Great Alexander’s plan was to transform his established naval supremacy in the Mediterranean with his intended domination of the Gulf into one integrated naval and maritime empire. He intended to sail from the Gulf around India to the east and around Libya (Africa) to the west. He also gave more emphasis to his naval expansion in the Gulf because of the tremendous prospects to expand trade and communications with India and Arabia. When Alexander started his campaign to conquer the Persian Empire in 334 B.C., he had under his command a small Makedonian naval force of 22 warships and 38 auxiliary small boats.(3) With his unprecedented victories on land and efective blockade of the Persian navy, he ended up controlling the entire Mediterranean Sea. When the Cypriot and Phoenician ships deserted the Persian leet in the Mediterranean and joined Alexander’s navy during the siege of Tyros, the Makedonian naval force increased to 224 warships. his newly acquired naval power was instrumental to the successful elimination of the Persian threat at the rear of his advancing army(4) and the defeat of Agis III by Antipatros. he Persian efort to open a second front at the rear of Alexander’s army was “drowned” once and for all in the Aegean and along the shores of Asia Minor and Phoenicia. 56 Fig. 3 Alexander’s plans to link his naval supremacy in the Mediterranean (Upper Sea) with the Gulf (Lower Sea) THE HELLENISTIC GULF Later on, during his campaign to India, at the river Indus, he put together a naval force of some 800 ships, which included warships and other support vessels.(5) here is no doubt whatsoever that Alexander realized irst hand, for the second time, both the importance and the beneits of having a navy and of being in control of the rivers and the sea with its coastline and safe anchorages. Consequently, in order to achieve his goal to conquer Arabia and control and develop further the long established trading routes, as well as trade from India through the Gulf and Babylon to reach Phoenicia and the Mediterranean, he started the implementation of the plan to build a strong and efective navy, as well as a network of naval bases and safe anchorages in strategic locations in Southern Mesopotamia and the Gulf. his is illustrated very clearly in the following passage by Strabo: “For of course Alexander, he says, intended to acquire possession of that country [Arabia], and had already prepared leets and bases of operations […].”(6) Even before he reached Babylonia and Susiana in 324 B.C., he had big plans for a naval expansion programme, which would permit him to make the region of the Gulf a prosperous trading country similar to the Phoenician coastline. His intentions are clearly stated in the following passage by Arrian: “[…] For Alexander was planning to colonize the coast along the Persian Gulf and the islands there, as he thought that it would become just as prosperous a country as Phoenicia […].”(7) his expanion in the Gulf was part of his grand scheme to conquer the then known world and to establish his universal kingdom becoming the rightful “King of Asia”. According to the perception of ancient Greeks, the world was surrounded by the outer ocean. Alexander assumed that after sailing through the “Erythrean/Persian Sea” he could sail round the ocean south of the Arabian Peninsula, Ethiopia and Libya and enter the Mediterranean through the Pillars of Herakles at Gibraltar. His plans were clearly expressed when he 58 CHAPTER II reached Pasargadae and Persepolis after the campaign in India. Details are given in the following passage by Arrian: “[…] Some have also recorded that Alexander was planning to sail round most of Arabia, Ethiopia, Libya and the Nomads beyond Mount Atlas, Gadeira [Gadiz] and into our sea and, after subduing Libya and Carthage, inally to earn the title of king of all Asia; as for the Persian and Median kings, in his view they had not ruled even a fraction of Asia, and so had no right to call themselves Great Kings. hereafter, in some accounts, he planned to sail into the Euxine Sea to Scythia and Lake Maeotis, in others to make for Sicily and the Iapygian promontory, as he was already rather disturbed that Rome’s fame was advancing to a great height.”(8) In his speech, earlier on, to the regimental commanders of his victorious army at the Hyphasis river, he made it clear that his intention was to sail round the outer sea in both directions, east and west, and become master of the world: “I observe that you Macedonians and allies are not following me into dangers any longer with your old spirit. I have summoned you together, either to persuade you to go forward, or to be persuaded by you to turn back. […] For my part, I set no limit to exertions for a man of noble spirit, save that the exertions themselves should lead to deeds of prowess. Yet if any one longs to hear what will be the limit of the actual ighting, he should understand that there remains no great stretch of land before us up to the river Ganges and the eastern sea. his sea, I assure you, will prove to be joined to the Hyrcanian Sea; for the great sea encircles all the land. And it will be for me to show Macedonians and allies alike that the Indian Gulf forms but one stretch of water with the Persian Gulf, and the Hyrcanian Sea with the Indian Gulf. From the Persian Gulf our leet shall sail round to Libya, as far as the Pillars of Heracles; from the pillars all the interior of Libya then becomes ours, just as Asia is in fact becoming ours in its entirety, and the boundaries of our Empire here are becoming those which God set for the whole continent.”(9) 59 Fig. 4 Alexander’s world and sea domination plans of naval supremacy of the “oikoumene” CHAPTER II (2.2) Regional geographical reconstruction Before we attempt to draw a sketch of the speciic actions Alexander took in order to achieve his goals in Southern Mesopotamia and the Gulf, it will be useful to try to reconstruct the geography, especially the river routes of Southern Mesopotamia and the surrounding regions, during the end of the fourth/early third century B.C. his is not an easy task since the rivers of the region of Lower Khuzestan and of the Mesopotamian delta have been subjected to continuous lux and alteration. here is at present an ongoing efort to deine the Mesopotamian geography of that period, which is far from over. Nevertheless, we must try to make some sense of the available research and historical geography. Our work becomes even more diicult because historical sources are sometimes contradictory or inaccurate and at times even confusing. To add to our diiculty, today’s Mesopotamian and Lower Khuzestan plain is full of disused water streams and channels that are only adding to the confusion. here are many credible studies and reports on the subject but for the purpose of this book we will base our narrative on the indings and proposals of an excellent work of the joint Belgo-Iranian project “he Persian Gulf shorelines and the Karkheh, Karun and Jarrahi rivers: A geo-archaeological approach – First progress report – part 3”, published in 2007,(10) as well as John Hansman’s seminal work (1967).(11) (2.3) he rivers Euphrates and Tigris In the fourth century B.C., the southern lower part of the Euphrates was discharging into the Gulf by its own separate mouth.(12) According to Strabo: “[…] but that the Euphrates, again issuing from the lake, joins with the sea by its own separate mouth.” (13) his is also shown schematically in the so-called “Babylonian Map of the World” dated in the eighth century B.C., but it is also conirmed by Pliny in the following passage: 61 THE HELLENISTIC GULF “We will now describe the coast from Charax onwards, which was irst explored for King Epiphanes. here is the place where the mouth of the Euphrates formerly was, a salt water stream;”(14) Further conirmation is also found in Arrian: “[Alexander] was also informed of two islands in the sea near the mouth of the Euphrates. he irst was not far from its outlet […]. his island, according to Aristobulus, Alexander commanded to be called Icarus […].”(15) According to the Belgo-Iranian study,(16) the Euphrates must have followed the Khor Zubair at a distance of about 20 km from the sea(17) and joined the sea via Khor Sabiya, which is at the moment about 15 km northwest of the northern tip of Failaka (Ikaros) island and about 60km west of the mouth of modern Shatt al Arab (see Fig. 6). According to Aristoboulos, Ikaros island was about 120 stades (22.2 km) from the shore.(18) he diference from today’s distance of 12 km must be due to the fact that the Euphrates continued to build up towards the sea until its waters were gradually either directed to the Tigris to form the Shatt al Arab or used for irrigation or both.(19) According to Arrian, because of the heavy usage of the Euphrates by the inhabitants of the Lower Mesopotamian region the river was “coming to an end in little water, and that swampy, ceases to low.”(20) Most probably by the irst century B.C. the Khor Zubair-Sabiya channel had dried out completely. his is also conirmed by Pliny,(21) who states that although the Euphrates at the time of Alexander was navigable from the Gulf to Babylon by the time of Juba(22) the same river was navigable only from Charax Spasinou to Babylon. he Tigris was swift and its water level was lower than the ground level. his way none of its waters were used extensively on the land. Instead, the Euphrates was more “lazy” with its waters at the same level as the ground thus giving the inhabitants the opportunity to use the river for irrigation. Most probably, sometime after the time of Alexander, between the third and irst century B.C., the Euphrates began to low all its waters into the Tigris, although there is evidence of a small stream already lowing to the Tigris earlier. 62 CHAPTER II he fact that the Euphrates eventually discharged into the sea by joining the Tigris is conirmed by Pliny in the following passage: “[…] but a long time ago the Euphrates was dammed by the Orcheni [people of Uruk] and other neighbouring tribes in order to irrigate their lands, and its water is only discharged into the sea by way of the Tigris.”(23) he diferent nature of the two rivers can be found in the following passage by Arrian: “[…] the Tigris, which runs through much lower ground, receives many canals from the Euphrates, and takes in many tributaries, thus increasing its volume, runs into the Persian ocean and is large and can not be crossed at any point down to its mouth, since none of the water is used up on the land. For the land is here higher than the river, and the Tigris does not empty its waters into canals or into any other river, but instead receives theirs; hence it does not provide irrigation for the land. he bed in which the Euphrates lows is however, higher; its banks are level with the land at all points, and many canals have been cut from it, some of which are always running and supply water to the inhabitants on either bank, while others are constructed as occasion requires, whenever they are short of water to irrigate the land.”(24) he above description is also relected in the local names of the two rivers. he Sumerian name of the Tigris is “Idigina” which means “swift river”. Instead the Semitic name of the primary stream of the Euphrates is “Puratu” meaning “the fruitful one.”(25) (2.4) he Chaldean Lakes According to Sumerian literature, in the time of Shulgi (2033-1988 B.C.), the seashore of the Gulf might have reached up to Eridu. his is attested by the following cuneiform chronicle “Shulgi the son of Ur-Nammu cared greatly 63 THE HELLENISTIC GULF for the city of Eridu, which was on the shore of the sea.”(26) Most probably, this must refer to the shore of the intervening lakes with the sea of the Gulf. Geologists believe that in those days the sea level was two-three metres higher than it is today. In the days of Alexander the Great, the Gulf Sea was further north than the modern coastline. As we know from Nearchos, Pliny, Strabo and other ancient writers, the mainland was separated from the sea by the so-called Chaldean Lakes, called by the Greeks λιμήν and by Roman historians Chaldaeus lacus. hese intervening lakes were separated from the Gulf by an extensive area of marshes made of swamps and tidal mud lats, which bordered directly to the Gulf. From literal evidence, part of the Chaldean Lake shoreline, at the time of Alexander, was about 22 km south of modern Qurna. It was extending on a kind of straight line from modern Ahwaz to the conluence of the river Tigris and then turning southwards it run parallel to the low of the Euphrates along the Khor Zubair/Khor Sabiya line (see Fig. 6).(27) he Euphrates, as well as the Tigris and the combined Fig. 5 he Babylonian Map of the World 64 CHAPTER II streams of Karun, Kharkeh (Eulaios and Choaspes) and Dez, which we will name Eulaios/Pasitigris, all run into the lakes through their distinct diferent mouths. his is clearly illustrated in Figures 6 and 7. At the time of Alexander, the Euphrates was lowing out of the lakes through its own mouth into the Gulf along the Khor-Sabiya channel. Instead, the Tigris and the Eulaios/Pasitigris after emptying into the lakes their combined waters were discharging into the sea at a big estuary. he mouth of this estuary, as given by Pliny, was approximately 14.8 kilometres.(28) he estimated width of the lakes and of the estuary at the mouth of the rivers as given in Pliny’s following passage was approximately 100 km: “he Tigris […] is joined by the Kerkhah (Eulaios/Pasitigris) from Media, and, […] empties itself into the Chaldean Lakes, and broadens them out to a width of 62 miles. hen […] it discharges into the Persian Sea, the mouth of the river being 10 miles wide. he mouths of the two rivers used to be 25 miles apart, or as others record 7 miles, and both were navigable.”(29) Although there may not have been a distinguishable shoreline due to the marshy and swampy nature of the waters, this is the best possible proposal bearing in mind the historical geography of the Gulf and Southern Mesopotamia and taking into consideration the available geographical and literal, sometimes conlicting evidence found in the ancient sources. Later, during the irst century B.C., the Euphrates joined the Tigris. he combined stream of the Tigris and Euphrates, called Shatt al-Arab, entered the lakes and together with the Eulaios/Pasitigris stream discharged into the sea in one large estuary through the swamps and tidal shoals. In the meantime, the entire shoreline extended further to the south due to heavy silting and mud deposits as a result of which the lakes throughout the centuries dried out. Literary evidence of the fact that all rivers in the region emptied into the lake and from there ran into the sea, is found in Pliny and Strabo (the relevant passages are quoted in the notes).(30) 65 THE HELLENISTIC GULF he lake’s boundaries are almost impossible to be deined. hey are therefore shown in Figures 6 and 7 on a tentative basis. Although this is still a tentative picture, it might be the best we can come up with taking into consideration the available evidence and narratives of ancient sources and the proposals of recent studies. In fact, it might lead to more questions than answers and further evidence might change it. Hopefully, further geological studies will eventually give such evidence that will enable scholars and researchers to reconstruct a more deinite picture. (2.5) Mesopotamian delta and lakes. he Karkheh, Dez and Karun/ Pasitigris rivers he river Karkheh, which passed from Susa, split into two branches. he Belgo-Iranian report suggests that during the fourth century B.C. the southern branch of the river Karkheh was called Choaspes and its northern branch Eulaios. he latter, which joined the Dez, was called by the ancient Greeks Coprates. All these river streams joined the river Karun near modern Ahwaz. he Karun, as well as the resulting waterway canal, were called Pasitigris.(31) It was also called Eulaios presumably because the Eulaios branch contributed to this canal. he Pasitigris/Eulaios at the proposed point on Fig. 7 entered the lake and from there discharged into the sea together with the Tigris.(32) Another channel of the Pasitigris/Eulaios(33) joined the Tigris in a westerly direction and both discharged into the sea. he identiication of Pasitigris with ancient Karun is also derived from Diodoros who informs us that the width of the Pasitigris “[…]in many cases is three stades, and in some places even four.”(34) Only Karun could have the reported width of 555 m to 740 m By the irst century A.D., the river stream that entered the Gulf near Forat, south of Alexandria on the Tigris, was also called Pasitigris.(35) he area was part of the region known to the ancient Mesopotamians as “Sealand”. Within this region and near the junction where the Pasitigris/Eulaios canal entered the Tigris, Alexander built a city called Alexandria on the Tigris. 66 Fig. 6 South Mesopotamia and top north part of the Gulf in the fourth century B.C. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Ancient Alexandria-Antiochia-Charax Spasinou Modern Naisan – Al-Khayaber Forat Qurna Basra Khorramshahr Abadan Ikaros Proposed ancient rivers Kuwait city and water channels 4th century B.C. Bubiyan island Proposed Chaldean Lakes Ahwaz Proposed Gulf shoreline 4th century B.C. Susa (Seleukeia on the Eulaios) Modern rivers and water channels Seleukeia on the Hedyphon* Proposed marshes Seleukeia on the Erythrean Sea* * Tentative Fig. 7 Proposed major ancient river routes and channels CHAPTER II he city-port of Alexandria was built some 20 km south from the point where modern Euphrates joins the river Tigris and forms the Shatt al Arab. It is situated today about 5 km east of the Shatt al Arab at the site of Al-Khayaber known traditionally to the locals as Naisan. According to Pliny, it was situated in the innermost recess of the Gulf at a distance of 10 stades (1.85 km) from the coast (the lakes shoreline).(36) his conirms that the Gulf (lake shoreline) in the fourh century B.C. was north of today’s coast at about 22 km south from the modern starting point of the Shatt al Arab.(37) As we have seen earlier, because the lower Mesopotamian delta is virtually lat, it is most probable that during the fourth century B.C. there may not have even been a distinguishable shoreline. his shoreline was gradually extended to today’s boundaries after being in constant lux from tidal efects and overlowing of rivers that carried masses of sediment that afected location of ports and anchorages. Such state of afairs is also reported in cases of ports in the Mediterranean, certainly at a much smaller scale than South Mesopotamia. Having given the summary of regional geography of the region, we can now look at Alexander’s speciic actions to establish his maritime empire in South Mesopotamia and the Gulf. (2.6) Exploration of the Persian side of the Gulf by Nearchos Nearchos sailed from India to Babylon on 20 September 325 B.C., when Kephisodoros was Archon in Athens. As we will see in Chapter V, some 200 years later, an Athenian strategos by the name Kephisodoros was in charge of the Seleukid maritime district “Tylos and rhe islands”. Most probably they were both from the same prominent Athenian family. Alexander gave speciic instructions to Nearchos,(38) his appointed commander in chief of the navy,(39) when he sailed from the mouth of the Indus river to reach Babylonia(40) to reconnoitre and explore the coast all along the trip. He selected the strongest and most seaworthy ships from the leet at the Indus river.(41) he number of ships are not disclosed in the ancient sources but are believed to have 69 THE HELLENISTIC GULF been about 150 ships.(42) We will presume these ships included the necessary support, cargo and food carrying and other light vessels. In order to reconstruct the composition of Nearchos’ leet we use Arrian as our source. According to the historian, the leet at the Indus river consisted mainly of 800 ships, which included ships of war, 80 triakontoroi, and the rest were hemoliai, round vessels, merchant ships, kerkouroi and horse transports.(43) At some stage additional triakontoroi were built, presumably to strengthen the leet and replace those damaged during the trip.(44) Nearchos was supplied with the best available ships and equipment in order to make sure that risks were reduced to the minimum.(45) We will therefore assume that he took with him the 80 triakontoroi that were newly rebuilt or refurbished and some triereis. We have no information whether triereis were among the ships at the Indus river apart from the fact that thirty three prominent oicers from Alexander’s staf were assigned the duty of trierarchs, which was an Athenian honorary title to the sponsor and responsible person of a trieres, although he might not have had any operational duty.(46) his fact, together with the explicit mention that there were warships among the leet’s ships, points out to the strong probability that the leet included a number of triereis as well. Robin Lane Fox is also of the opinion that Nearchos took with him triereis, which he repaired before the trip.(47) We will tentatively assign twenty of them to Nearchos’ leet. he rest of the ships were support vessels for transport of food supplies, equipment and personnel like hemioliai, merchantmen and round vessels. he leet was manned with a marine force which was necessary only for the leet’s protection, in this case about one thousand marines.(48) He took with him food supplies for ten days(49) and water for ive days, which might have been the maximum they could carry.(50) Nearchos’ task was not to carry by sea any large part of Alexander’s army neither to supply the army with grain and water since Alexander already brought grain supply for the army for four months and built a ship station at the mouth of the Indus river presumably for storing and resupply purposes.(51) Moreover, he dug wells to supply water for “the forces sailing along the coast.”(52) Instead, 70 CHAPTER II Nearchos had a fact-inding mission in his hands with a speciic task to identify possible safe anchorages, ports, water supplies and gather information about the people living along the coast. He was expected to map the coastlines, ind out about established trading hubs and routes, and identify which lands were fertile and which ones were desert. his assignment, which is clearly stated in the following passage, put an emphasis on the identiication of rivers and their discharge into the sea since they were sources of fresh water and outlets to the sea, where cities were built or new foundations could be built. “[…] Nearchus says that […] he had to report to Alexander on the commission for which he had been despatched, that in fact he had not been sent to navigate the ocean, but to reconnoitre the coast lying on the ocean, the inhabitants of the coast, its anchorages, water supplies and the manners and customs of the people.”(53) “[…] Alexander’s purpose in despatching the expedition […]: he desired to reconnoitre the coasts that lay on the line of the voyage and the roadsteads and islets, to explore thoroughly every bay which they found, to learn about all the cities on the sea-coast, and to discover which land was fruitful and which desert.”(54) So, when Nearchos reached the Strait of Hormuz, he did not follow Onesikritos’ wish to venture into the sea but took the way into the Gulf: “Setting out from there, they voyaged 800 stades and moored of a desert shore, where they sighted a long cape jutting out far into the ocean; it seemed as if the headland was a day’s sail away. hose who had knowledge of the district said that this jutting promontory belonged to Arabia, and was called Maceta [Ras Musandam]. [...] From this beach, of which the leet anchored in the open roadstead, and from the promontory which they sighted opposite them jutting out into the sea, the bay [in my opinion, and that of Nearchus] runs back into the interior, and would seem to be the Red (Erythrean) Sea.”(55) 71 THE HELLENISTIC GULF According to Arrian’s calculations, Nearchos’ eventual voyage along the entire coast of Karmania, Persis and Susiana to South Mesopotamia was about 10,100 stades (about 1850 km). It is described in some detail in Arrian’s Indica and can be divided into three parts: along the Karmania, the Persis and the Susiana coast. (2.7) he voyage to the entrance of the Gulf in the Strait of Hormuz along the Karmania coastline(56) As we have seen earlier, when Nearchos reached the Strait of Hormuz(57) instead of venturing into the ocean, he turned inwards into the Gulf.(58) He passed from “[…]the river Anamis at a place called Harmozia. Here there was an abundance of products of all kinds […].”(59) he river Anamis is most probably modern Minab, while Harmozia must have been the area around the mouth of the river.(60) he leet moored here and after a ive-day inland march, Nearchos met with Alexander and the main body of the army, which was returning back to Susa. It was about December 325 B.C. Before sending Nearchos back to continue his trip to the Gulf, Alexander “[…] engaged in sacriicing thank-oferings for the safety of the expedition, to Zeus the Saviour, Heracles, Apollo the Averter of Evil, Poseidon and all the gods of the sea;”(61) Nearchos resumed his trip along the coastline of Karmania and reached a desert island “called Organa, and, that where they moored Oaracta.”(62) Organa is the modern island of Hormuz while Oaracta is the modern island of Qishm.(63) According to Arrian, the length of Oaracta, which produced corn, vines and date palms, was 800 stades (148 km). his must be an error since it does not agree with today’s actual length of Qishm, which is about 100 km. Arrian claims that on the island of Oaracta there was the tomb of the irst ruler of the territory, who was King Erethres, and hence came the name of the sea.(64) his contradicts Strabo, who writes that “[...]both Nearchus and Orthagoras state that the island Ogyris lies in the high sea at a distance of two thousand stadia from Carmania and that on it is to be seen the grave of 72 CHAPTER II Erythras, a large mound planted with wild palm trees; and that Erythras reigned as king over that region and left the sea named after himself.”(65) Ogyris is most probably modern Masira island. Masira is the Sarapis island mentioned in he Periplous of the Erythrean Sea.(66) In front of Oaracta at a distance of forty stades they anchored at another island, which was sacred to god Poseidon, considered to be modern Hejam. North of Hejam is modern Larak island, some forty miles north of cape Musandam. his is possibly the Semiramis mountain referred to in the Periplous.(67) According to Arrian, “he hyparch of the island [Oaracta], Mazenes, sailed with them as far as Susa as a volunteer pilot.”(68) Drawing on Nearchos, Strabo conirms that Mazenes was the ruler of Oaracta and was accompanied by Mithropastes, who had taken refuge at Oaracta (Qishm) after he had to depart from Ogyris (Masira).(69) From Strabo’s narrative, Mazenes took the assignment of guiding the Makedonians at the recommendation of Mithropastes. Mazenes and Mithropastes are Persian names, which attest to the fact that the Persians controlled the Strait of Hormuz and Oman at the time. here is no doubt that as hyparch, Mazenes had Persian troops with him at Oaracta for that purpose. It is reasonable to assume that Nearchos left a Makedonian commander with a small garrison on the island in the place of Mazenes. If he had not left one at that time, a garrison must have been dispatched later by Alexander, possibly with Hieron, although our sources are silent on the matter. With Mazenes’ guidance, they continued their voyage in the Gulf until they inally reached the border of Karmania and Persis at “[…] Cape Tarsias,which runs out into the sea, after a voyage of three hundred stades, and next came to Cataea, a desert, low-lying island, said to be sacred to Hermes and Aphrodite; the voyage was of three hundred stades.”(70) hese gods could possibly have been the Persian gods Anahita and Mithras. Anahita was associated with Venus and was the goddess protector of rivers and waters and was identiied by Greeks with Aphrodite and Artemis. For this part of Nearchos’ trip, see Fig. 8. 73 Fig. 8 Nearchos’ voyage from Karmania to Susiana CHAPTER II (2.8) he voyage from Karmania along the Persis coastline (71)(72) According to Arrian’s narrative, starting from the sacred island, they sailed along the Persis coastline and after passing a desert island called Caicandrus “[…] they anchored of a high mountain called Ochus […].”(73) After sailing 450 stades, they reached a place by the name of Apostana (modern cape Bostaneh to the west of Qishm), which was a busy trading anchorage with inland traders and merchants. After travelling for another 1,000 stades, they reached the mouth of the Arion river and following a further voyage of 800 stades, they reached the mouth of river Sitacus.(74) here, they repaired their damaged ships and got resupplied for the remainder of the trip. he fact that they stayed there for twenty-one days is an indication that the place was an emporion equipped perhaps with ship repairing facilities. After the well-deserved rest, they sailed some 750 stades to a city called Hieratis at a sea called Heratemis. hey anchored at a channel connecting the river with the sea. From there, they reached a peninsula where “there were many gardens, and all sorts of fruit trees were growing there; the name of the place was Mesambria.”(75) From Mesambria, they set out and after a voyage of about 200 stades anchored at Taoce on the river Granis.(76) Mesambria is most probably modern Bushehr(77) while Taoce is identiied with Tawwaj.(78) Inland from Taoce at a distance of about 200 stades from the mouth of the river, there was a Persian royal residence. his is most probably the palace of Cyrus the Great excavated by Dr. A. Sarfaraz (see Chapter VII, note 13). Hieratis was presumably the port of this Achaemenid residence.(79) Somewhere around these places, as we will see later on, Seleukos I and Antiochos I founded Antiochia in Persis. From there, they passed various river outlets like the river Granis, Rogonis and Brizana until they reached the borders of Persis and Susiana at the mouth of river Oroatis, the modern Zohreh.he fact that river Oroatis was considered as the boundary between Sousiana and Persis, is also conirmed by Strabo who states that the Persian seaboard is “[…] burning hot, sandy, and stinted of fruits except dates” and that “it terminates at the largest of the rivers in that part of the world, the Oroatis, as it is called.”(80) 75 THE HELLENISTIC GULF (2.9) he voyage from Persis along the Susiana coastline and Southern Mesopotamia(81)(82) he mouth of river Oroatis (modern Zohreh), southwest of modern Hendijan was the irst visiting point of the Susiana district (Fig 9, point a). Ancient authors considered the coast that spanned from Oroatis to the old mouth of the Euphrates, opposite the island Ikaros, as being part of Susiana.(83) he voyage along the Susiana coast is described in Arrian’s Indica: “From here (Oroatis river) the leet passed along the Susian land. Nearchus says that he cannot describe this part of the voyage in accurate detail, except for the roadsteads and the length of the voyage. his is because the country is mostly marshy and runs out well into the sea, with breakers, and is very hard to get safe anchorage in. So their voyage was mostly in the open sea. hey sailed out from the outlets of the river [Oroatis], where they had encamped on the Persian border, and took on board water for ive days, as the pilots said that water was lacking. After traversing 500 stades, they anchored at the mouth of a lake, full of ish, called Cataderbis, of which lay a small island called Margastana.”(84) herefore, when Nearchos and his leet sailed from Oroatis, they must have passed irst from modern Bandar Imam Khomeini and reached the Cataderbis lake, which might be the modern Shahdegan marshes (Fig. 9, point b). Most likely, and as suggested by the Belgo-Iranian study, the Hedyphon river (modern Jarrah or Jarrahi) was emptying its waters into the Cataderbis lake at a distance of about 500 stades from the start of their voyage in Susian territory, which, as we have seen, was the mouth of the Oroatis river (Fig. 9, point a). he coastline and the shores were not well deined and were very shallow and muddy, as a result of which sailing was problematic and had to be done mostly at the open sea. Most probably later on, Seleukeia on the Hedyphon was founded north of the mouth of the Hedyphon river, while Seleukeia on the Erythrean Sea was most probably founded somewhere between the Hedyphon and Oroatis. Arrian continues his description of the trip as follows: 76 CHAPTER II “From there, they sailed about daybreak and in a single line ahead passed the shallows, which were marked on either side by poles driven in, just as in the strait between the island of Leucas and Acarnania […] but here there is mud on both sides of the channel, both deep and viscous; and no device could save them once aground there, as the punt-poles sank into the mud and gave them no help, and it became impossible for the men to disembark and push the ships of into the sailable water, for they sank up to their breasts in the ooze. So they sailed out with diiculty, traversed 600 stades, and after anchoring attended to supper on board, each in their own ships.”(85) In order to make sailing safe, they navigated all their 150 ships in a single line in a sea route marked on either side by poles to ensure that the ships did not run in the shallows. After the Cataderbis lake and the mouth of the Hedyphon, they sailed about 600 stades (Fig. 9, point c). hey have thus reached the mouth of Eulaios/Pasitigris that was emptying into the Chaldean Lakes. From there, they sailed southwards a distance of 900 stades and reached the mouth of the Euphrates at Khor Sabiya, opposite Ikaros island (Fig. 9, point d). hey anchored “in the mouth of the Euphrates near a village of Babylonia, called Diridotis [...].”(86) his is the village of Teredon located also by Strabo at the mouth of the Euphrates.(87) In a recent study, J.F. Salles puts forward an alternative location for Teredon more to the north, close to Khor Zubair and south of Zubair.(88) According to Arrian: “[...] here the merchants gather together frankincense from the land of Gerrha and all the other sweet-smelling spices Arabia produces.”(89) Evidently, the region’s importance as a trading hub had been well known to the Makedonians since the late fourth century B.C. According to Arrian: “he length of the coastal voyage along Susian territory to the mouth of the Pasitigris is 2,000 stades.”(90) he 2,000 stades are the 500 stades from river Oroatis (Zohreh) to lake Cataderbis (near the ancient mouth of river Hedyphon) plus the 600 stades 77 THE HELLENISTIC GULF from there to the proposed mouth of the river Eulaios/Pasitigris into the Chaldean Lakes and, inally, the 900 stades from there to the mouth of the Euphrates opposite Ikaros island.(91) (2.10) Nearchos’ return trip from the mouth of the Euphrates to meet Alexander he outlet of the Euphrates as given by Arrian was about 3,300 stades to Babylon,(92) which agrees with today’s corresponding distance of the two points. When Nearchos heard that Alexander was on his way from India with his army heading for Susa, he sailed back through the Chaldean Lakes to the outlet of the Pasitigris/Eulaios (Fig. 9, point c). From there, he continued his voyage up the Eulaios/Pasitigris to meet with Alexander. “here (in the mouth of the Euphrates near a village of Babylon called Diridotis) they heard that Alexander was on his way to Susa. hey therefore sailed back themselves in order to sail up the Pasitigris and meet him. hey sailed back with the land of Susia on their left and went along the lake where the Tigris runs.”(93) “he voyage is 600 stades from the lake up to the river itself at a point where a village of Susia lies, called Aginis, 500 stades from Susa. […] From there they sailed up the Pasitigris through inhabited and prosperous country. When they had sailed up about a hundred and ifty stades, they moored there, waiting for the scouts whom Nearchus had sent to see where the King might be. He himself sacriiced to the Saviour gods and held games, and the whole naval force made merry. And when news was brought that Alexander was actually approaching, they sailed up the river, and moored near the pontoon bridge on which Alexander intended to take his army over to Susa.”(94) 78 Fig. 9 Nearchos’ coastal trip at the top of the Gulf 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Ancient Alexandria-Antiochia-Charax Spasinou Modern Naisan – Al-Khayaber Forat Proposed ancient rivers Qurna and water channels 4th century B.C. Basra Proposed Chaldean Lakes Khorramshahr Proposed Gulf shoreline 4th century B.C. Abadan Modern rivers and water channels Ikaros Proposed marshes Kuwait city * Tentative Bubiyan island Total Nearchos voyage on the Susian coastline Ahwaz 2000 stadia [Arr. Ind. 42.4] Susa (Seleukeia on the Eulaios) (a) to (b)= 500 stades Seleukeia on the Hedyphon* (b) to (c)= 600 stades Seleukeia on the Erythrean Sea* (c) to (d)= 900 stades THE HELLENISTIC GULF According to Arrian, the distance of the outlet of the Eulaios/Pasitigris into the lakes (Fig. 9, point c) and Susa was 1,100 stades, which agrees with today’s corresponding distance of these two points. he two forces were reunited near the boat bridge, which was located near modern Ahwaz(95) in or about March 324 B.C. here, Nearchos received a golden crown for the unique achievement of bringing to safety the leet from Pattala to Babylonia and Susiana. Most probably it is around this time, or even a bit earlier, that Alexander gave orders to the kingdoms of Phoenicia and Cyprus to build triereis and other ships of war and to transport them to hapsakos and from there to Babylon, where he found them when he reached Babylon later in that year. (2.11) Alexander’s trip from Susa to Opis – Identiication of the site of Alexandria on the Tigris After staying for a while at Susa and during the summer of 324 B.C., Alexander decided to meet with the main body of his army at Opis, the future location of Seleukeia on the Tigris. He ordered Hephaestion to march with his army down to the “Persian Sea” while he sailed with the leet down the Eulaios/ Pasitigris having Opis as his inal destination:“Alexander ordered Hephaestion to take most of the infantry force to the Persian Sea and, now that his leet had put in to Susian land, embarked himself with the hypaspists, the agema and a few of the Companion cavalry, and sailed down the river Eulaeus to the sea. Once he was near the estuary, he left most of his ships there including those which had been damaged, and with the faster sailers coasted himself by sea from the river Eulaeus to the mouths of the Tigris, while the rest of his lotilla were brought back by the Eulaeus as far as the canal cut between the Tigris and Eulaeus, by which they entered the Tigris.”(96) “After sailing by sea along the whole length of the coast of the Persian gulf between the Eulaeus and the Tigris, Alexander sailed up the Tigris to the camp where Hephaestion had encamped with all his force. From there he sailed on to Opis, a city situated on the Tigris. In the voyage upstream 80 CHAPTER II he removed the weirs in the river and made the stream level throughout; these weirs had been made by the Persians to prevent anyone sailing up to their country from the sea and mastering it with a naval force. he Persians had constructed them because they had no naval power […] Alexander […] therefore regarded this precaution as of no advantage to himself, and showed by his action in destroying with ease works on which the Persians had spent their energy that it was of no value.”(97) Since we do not have any evidence of Alexander having sailed earlier down the Eulaios/Pasitigris around the area where he instructed Alexandria to be founded, we are to assume that it was during this irst trip that he identiied a suitable place for a city-port to be built close to the Tigris on the channel connecting the Eulaios/Pasitigris with a channel of the Tigris. His intentions in clearing the river of any obstacles, as we will see later on, were very clear. He wanted to make the river as navigable as possible in order to facilitate the movement of people and goods from Alexandria to the north and vice versa. It is quite interesting to look into the composition of the troops he took on board with him during the trip. He had with him the hypaspists and the agema. his means 3,000 soldiers. He also took with him a few of the companion cavalry. his means he had with him at least the Royal Companions, about 200 cavalry. In order to transport 3,200 soldiers and 200 horses, at least 32 triereis were needed or the equivalent in triakontoroi and hemoliai plus horse carriers. herefore, for this purpose he utilized a good part of Nearchos’ leet that had come back from India. Alexander had taken the “fastest sailers”, we must assume triereis, and from the mouth of the Eulaios/Pasitigris he entered the lakes (Fig. 9, point c) and sailed by the sea westwards along the coast and then upwards from the outlet of the Tigris. (Hephaestion’s and Alexander’s routes are shown in Figures 11 and 12) Among other things, his intention was to locate suitable estuaries and a safe place where he would construct a port, which he could use to control and regulate the sea trade and other maritime and naval activities. Having identiied the place on the channel connecting the Tigris with the Eulaios/Pasitigris, 81 Fig. 10 Nearchos’ return trip from the mouth of the Euphrates to meet Alexander 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Ancient Alexandria-Antiochia-Charax Spasinou Modern Naisan – Al-Khayaber Forat Qurna Basra Khorramshahr Proposed ancient rivers Abadan and water channels 4th century B.C. Ikaros Proposed Chaldean Lakes Kuwait city Proposed Gulf shoreline 4th century B.C. Bubiyan island Modern rivers and water channels Ahwaz Proposed marshes Susa (Seleukeia on the Eulaios) Seleukeia on the Hedyphon* * Tentative Nearchos' return trip to meet Alexander Seleukeia on the Erythrean Sea* CHAPTER II where he intended to have Alexandria built, he probably gave instructions for the construction of the city-port, and thereafter sailed all the way up the Tigris to the point where Hephaestion was already waiting for him. It is most likely that Alexander was accompanied by Nearchos and Onesicritos, both of whom had navigated most of that trip before and had a good knowledge of the sea and the rivers in the region. For sure he must have had Seleukos with him as well since he was the commander of the hypaspists. herefore, Seleukos must have been with Alexander when the location of Alexandria was chosen and most probably listened to the king’s plans. When Seleukos became king in Babylonia later on, he already knew how important and useful Alexandria could prove to his plans to control the navigation in the Gulf and surely he acted accordingly. Alexandria on the Tigris built by Alexander served as the port of entry from the Gulf to his new capital Seleukeia on the Tigris with its big harbour and access to the Euphrates through the Royal Canal. In order to reach the point where he was to meet Alexander, Hephaestion embarked with part of his army on the rest of the leet and sailed with a westerly direction through the channel of Eulaios/Pasitigris, which passed from the place Alexander ordered Alexandria to be constructed and entered the Tigris, sailing up the river and reaching the point where he waited for Alexander’s arrival. From there, they both sailed up the river to Opis. According to Arrian and Strabo, on his voyage upstream, Alexander removed the weirs and structures erected by the Persians at frequent intervals in the river. According to our ancient sources, these structures were constructed by the Persians for defense purposes in order to obstruct anyone attempting to sail up the river. he narrative of our sources leads us to believe that although the Achaemenids were most certainly in control of navigation in the Gulf(98) they were afraid of local pirates and other sea-bound enemies. here is a debate among contemporary scholars as to whether Alexander’s actions had purely commercial motives to improve irrigation or were for military reasons. P. Briant argues that the structures the Persians erected were not any permanent installations but seasonal piles made of tree trunks and wooden structures for the regulation 83 Fig. 11 Artist impression of isometric reconstructed view of the location of Alexandria on the Tigris and the surrounding rivers Fig. 12 he trip of Alexander and Hephaestion from Susa to Opis THE HELLENISTIC GULF of irrigation. In our opinion, irrespective of the nature of these structures, Alexander’s actions were motivated by his desire to try to improve irrigation, but mainly to improve navigation in order to facilitate uninterrupted trade from the top of the Gulf and the newly constructed port of Alexandria on the Tigris with Opis, which was the terminus of the important Khorasan route. Of course, military reasons motivated his action as well. (2.12) Construction and transport of warships from Phoenicia to Babylon Alexander ordered in Phoenicia and Cyprus the construction of warships that could be disassembled and transported to hapsakos, the crossing port on the Euphrates.(99) According to Curtius, he gave instructions to build there keels for up to 700 ships. “Accordingly, Alexander instructed his governors in Mesopotamia to cut timber on Mt. Libanus, transport it down to the Syrian city hapsacus and there lay down keels for 700 ships. hese were to be all septemremes, which were to be transported to Babylon. he kings of Cyprus were instructed to furnish bronze, hemp and sails.”(100) Strabo informs us that the trip of the boats from the Phoenician coastline took seven days. “Alexander[…] having built some of his boats in Phoenicia and Cyprus, boats that were constructed with bolts and could be taken to pieces, which were conveyed by a seven days’ journey to hapsacus and then down the river to Babylon, and having built others in Babylonia […].”(101) hus, the ships were re-assembled in hapsakos and sailed down the Euphrates to Babylon. he irst such ships that arrived in Babylon this way were about ifty Phoenican warships:(102) 86 CHAPTER II • • • • two quinqueremes (penteres: ive rows per side)(103) three quadriremes (tetreres: four rows per side twelve triremes (trieres: three rows per side) some thirty triakontoroi(104) hese are the ships, together with Nearchos’ Indian leet, that Alexander found when he came to Babylon for the second time. It might be useful to analyse the composition of these warships so we can have a better understanding of Alexander’s intentions. Triakontoroi and pentekontoroi he triakontoros was the old type of Greek warship propelled by rowers. As its name suggests, it was a 30-oared ship, with ifteen oarsmen on each side, and was about 23 m in length.(105) In the naval warfare in the Mediterranean, in the late fourth century B.C., it was not the preferred irst line ship of war. Although in earlier times it was used for irst line naval combat, in the late fourth century it was mostly used for support duties mainly for the transport of troops and goods. It was the medium size of the old series of ships, the smallest of which was the eikosoros (20-oared) and the largest the pentekontoros (50-oared). In spite of this, we see that Alexander and his admirals showed preference for the triakontoros type since their leet in India included about 80 such ships and they ordered another thirty. he most probable reason for this was its simpler construction and easier maintenance and repair. he pentekontoros was the preferred ship for transportation and naval purposes. Initially, it had two rows of 25 rowers on each side that made the ship too long at 39 m. So an improved version was constructed with two series of rows on each side superimposed on top of each other, which resulted in a shorter vessel of 21 m., evidently much more compact sturdier and more seaworthy. Although the initial deliveries of warships at hapsakos did not include any pentekontoroi, there is no doubt they must have been included in later deliveries. We know for sure that the Makedonians knew about this type of 87 THE HELLENISTIC GULF ship because a pentekontoros probably built at Amphipolis, commanded by Proteas, joined Alexander’s leet for the siege of Tyros. hese types of twobanked ships were not new to the Mesopotamians either since similar ships are depicted on Sennacherib’s palace walls. hese are most probably similar to the ships which, as we will see later on, the Syrian shipwrights (possibly Phoenician) constructed for the Assyrian king in Nineveh and transported by land and river to ight against the Chaldeans in Elam in 694 B.C. Trieres he trieres, which was primarily the new preferred ship of war, was the natural ofspring of the pentekontoros. It was about 35 m. in length and 4.8 m. in breadth.(106) It had three superimposed banks of oarsmen on each side. It was much faster than both the triakontoros and pentekontoros. Its advantage was its power and adaptability, as well as mobility and manoeuvrability. It had a displacement of about 60-70 tons and was operated by 170 oarsmen (eretai) plus 30 support personnel and oicers. hese included the commander of the ship or helsman (kybernetes), the time-beater or rowing master (keleustes), the bow oicer (proreus), a shipwright (naupegos) and a time keeper (auletes). he all-important administrative duties of paymaster, purchasing and recruiting were entrusted to the pentekontarchos (captain of ifty). he trieres could be equipped with a deck which was built over the top row of the oarsmen to carry warriors. hey were equipped with a ram at the front for assault against enemy ships. Trieres carried normally 14 marines (epibatai) but was reported on occasions to have carried up to a maximum 100 warriors making the total man load up to 300 men. his had reduced the ships mobility but made it suitable for amphibious operations and naval battles. Usually each warship was assigned a trierarchos, who was the oicial captain of the ship and the one responsible to inance its operation for a certain period of time. 88 CHAPTER II Olympias is a reconstructed ancient Athenian trieres commissioned by the Hellenic navy in 1987. It is presently serving as an exhibit in dry dock at Palaio Phaliro in Athens, Greece. Its general characteristics are the same as the triereis in antiquity. With a crew of 170 oarsmen it reached a maximum speed of 9 knots or 17 km.p.h and could do 180 degrees turns within a minute, in arc not more than 2.5 ship length. his is a conirmation of its manoeuvrability reported by the ancient writers.(107) Tetreres and penteres he tetreres (quadriremes: four rows) and penteres (quinqueremes: ive rows) were among the latest Phoenician and Cypriot designed and constructed warships.(108) (According to William Murray, drawing on Aristotle and Pliny, the irst to invent the penteres was Dionysios I of Syracuse whilst the Carthagenians the irst to invent the tetreres. However, Mnesigiton ascribes the penteres to Salamis in Cyprus). hese ships had gradually been included in the Greek navies since the fourth century B.C. hey were an average of about 40 metres long and much bulkier and multipurpose than the trieres.(109) he penteres could carry 300 oarsmen, 120 marines or archers and spear throwers together with 50 oicers and other support personnel.(110) hey were stronger and more robust than the trieres but less mobile. hey had an increased ramming 89 THE HELLENISTIC GULF power. Usually, they were also used as command ships, where the admiral of the leet took his position. his was the case of the kings of Cyprus at the siege of Tyros. According to Curtius, at Tyros Alexander chose a Cypriot royal penteres for his lagship.(111) No doubt he did the same in Babylon. he tetreres and penteres and even larger ships were widely used during the naval warfare in the Mediterranean between the Alexander’s Successors at the end of the fourth and the beginning of the third century B.C. hey were useful in harbour attacks(112) and could carry siege equipment to besiege coastal cities. According to William Murray: “Since groups of warships relied upon one another for protection ‘threes’ (triereis) worked well in fast moving squadrons of 10 to 30 ships.”(113) We can assume the same applies for the triakontoroi. Merchant ships Without a doubt, Alexander must have ordered cargo and merchant ships, which were perhaps delivered at a later date, or he had them built in Babylon. hese were, most probably, similar to the fourth century B.C. merchant shipwreck found of the coast of Cyprus, a mile from the harbour of Kyrenia in 1967. A replica, built with the same technique of the original fourth century ship, called Kyrenia II, is shown below. he ship was sunk in around 300 B.C. either due to bad weather or because it was attacked by pirates. Its length was 14m and its beam 4.2 m. It had a single square sail and could achieve a speed of 4-5 knots (7.4-9.3 m.p.h). It was capable of long trips and was intended for long service. Its cargo was made of more than 400 wine amphorae, 9,000 almonds in jars and 29 mill stones, laden over the keel in three rows, used at the same time as ballast. he ship was capable of a total of 25 tonnage of cargo. It was operated by a crew of four seamen although it could accommodate more crew. In the case of merchant ships in Alexander’s and Seleukid navies used for military purposes, we will assume a crew average of 20-25 seamen since their duties were more multipurpose than those of a solitary private cargo ship. 90 CHAPTER II here is no doubt Alexander went for a versatile multipurpose navy. He wanted to have strength with a solid support base. he largest ships could easily be used as “stratiotides” or “hoplitagogoi”, which were ships converted temporarily to carry troops. He also intended to mount siege machinery on their deck in his plans to put all coastal ports and cities along both sides of the Gulf under his control. herefore, with this irst delivery Alexander could easily transport a landing force of about 2,500-3,000 troops plus horses for the cavalry. In other words, he could easily have carried out a medium size amphibious expedition. his capacity was very useful in his plans to colonize the Gulf. he reduced number of triereis, in the initial deliveries of warships, was an indication that he did not expect large naval battles, where mobility was of utmost importance. He also opted for more triakontoroi because they were easier to maintain and service than the triereis. More ships were under construction and on their way to enable him to achieve his goals. As we have seen earlier in this chapter, the kingdoms of Cyprus supplied ships together with bronze, hemp and sails.(114) It is evident that a continuous stream of naval supplies and expertise was channelled from the entire Southeastern Kyrenia II, a full-size replica of a fourth century B.C. merchant ship, which sank of the north coast of Cyprus 91 HELLENISTIC GULF Mediterranean to South Mesopotamia and the Gulf. his was not the irst time that ships had been transported overland and then re-assembled to sail down the rivers of Mesopotamia. As mentioned earlier, Sennacherib, in his campaign against the Chaldeans in Elam in 694 B.C., used a naval force made of ships constructed in Nineveh by captive Syrian boat-wrights. he ships sailed down the Tigris to Opis by Tyrian, Sidonian, and Cypriot sailors,(115) whose kingdoms were in the Assyrian Empire as client states charged with the responsibility to provide naval and maritime facilities and services to the Assyrians. hese ships were most probably similar to the dieres (bireme) depicted on a relief from the Palace of Sennacherib (about 700 B.C.).(116) he dieres (bireme), which was similar to the pentekontoros, was the predecessor of the trieres and was constructed both in Greece and Phoenicia. It consisted of two superimposed banks of rowers on each side. he dieres depicted on the relief from the palace of the Sennacherib carried two superimposed banks of rowers per side, each side had 8-10 rowers. Its crew was between 32 to 40 rowers. Its length was just under 20 m. he Greek dieres was longer and could carry 40 rowers per side.(117) Instead of sailing down the Tigris and across the lake to Nagitu, at the southern outlet of the Euphrates, Sennacherib ordered that the ships be transported overland and then sailed down the Euphrates by way of the river Arahtu passing from Babylon. He reached the southern tip of Babylonia by following the waterway, which was the old channel of the Euphrates along the Khawr Zubair and Khawr Sabiya and was at a distance of “two double hours from the shore.” In other words, starting from Nineveh, he reached the village of Nagitu at the southern course of the Euphrates by land and river transport.(118) 92 Transport shipbuilding material Sennacherib’s navy river route Overland transport Port and shipbuilding facilities Fig. 12a Sennacherib’s Mesopotamian naval campaign in 694 B.C. THE HELLENISTIC GULF (2.13) Construction of harbour at Babylon According to Arrian: “[…] Alexander had excavated a harbour at Babylon, large enough to be an anchorage for a thousand ships of war, with dockyards in the harbour.”(119) his must have been an enormous project requiring substantial capital expenditure from imperial funds taken from the Persian treasury. For comparison purposes, it should be noted that the cost of construction of the Zea ship-sheds in Athens was reported to have reached 1,000 talents.(120) he Babylon dockyards with a capacity of 1,000 ships were two and a half times as big.(121) Consequently, its cost must have been in excess of 2,500 talents, taking into account the higher wages Alexander had to pay. he dockyards mentioned in Arrian could possibly have included suitable ship-sheds where ships could be drawn out of the water to be serviced and dried out.(122) he implementation of such a project would have beneited the city’s economy by providing opportunities for construction and employment although a good part of the Makedonian army might have also been used in the construction. Although the intention of the port was to be an anchorage for warships, surely it could have been used by cargo and merchant ships. he Babylonian business community must have been quite pleased with Alexander’s plans since the additional trading that would have resulted from the construction of such a port could very well boost local inances and improve the strength of local institutions. he natural access to the Gulf for the harbour and its leet at Babylon was the Euphrates and its outlet at Diridotis opposite the island of Ikaros. his must have increased the strategic importance of Ikaros and leads us to believe that the initial settlement of the island may have started with Alexander as an extension of the harbour project at Babylon. he project was either half completed or it was well under way during the time of his death. However, it must have been shelved by his generals after his death and we do not have any evidence that Seleukos I or his son Antiochos I continued its construction. We do not even have as yet any archaeological or other evidence for the existence of such a port in Babylon. 94 CHAPTER II Two-decked bireme warship depicted on Sennacherib’s palace relief, currently on display at the British Museum in London. Similar warships were used by Sennacherib in his naval campaign in 694 B.C. (2.14) Alexander’s irst Babylonian War Fleet According to Aristoboulos, Alexander built on top of the ships delivered to him from Phoenicia and Southeastern Mediterranean an additional lotilla from locally cut cypress wood. “Aristobulus says that yet another lotilla was being built for him, by cutting down the cypresses in Babylonia, as this is the only tree which grows freely in the Assyrian country, a land bare of everything else necessary for shipbuilding, that as crews for the ships and for the other naval services a mass of purple-shell divers and other sea-faring men reached him from Phoenicia and the rest of the coast [...].”(123) hese ships, most probably cargo and support vessels, together with sailors and seamen brought from Phoenicia and the coast of Southeastern Mediterranean, were added to Nearchos’ navy of about 150 ships that sailed from Patalla to Babylon. 95 THE HELLENISTIC GULF “Aristobulus says that Alexander also found the leet at Babylon; the part which was with Nearchus had sailed up the Euphrates from the Persian Sea.”(124) Nearchos’ navy must have included the eighty triakontoroi, which accompanied his leet from India,(125) as well as the twenty triereis sponsored and inanced by their trierarchs. he remaining ifty were support vessels used mainly for the transport of goods, equipment, marines and support personnel. he additional lotilla Alexander built in Babylon for his war leet, which we estimate that it could have reached 50 ships initially, must have consisted mainly of cargo and merchant ships and small support vessels possibly of the hemoliai type.(126) he hemoliai (one and a half ) was a popular ship with Greek navies of the fourth century B.C. because of its versatility and manoeuvrability. It could be sailed and rowed at the same time. It was presumably rowed with one and a half ile of oars per side all at the same level. his meant the boat had additional space to carry goods and personnel. Its construction was simpler than the triereis and as such it could easily be constructed in Babylon by locals under Greek, Cypriot and Phoenician supervision. With this action, Alexander showed his intention not to rely solely on the Phoenicians, the Cypriots and other Southeastern Mediterranean but to build up local expertise and capacity. He knew, of course, that the best seafaring skills were more easily available in Phoenicia and Southeastern Mediterranean (Egypt, Cyprus and Kilikia); therefore he did not hesitate to go ahead and hire, recruit or purchase from there seamen and other personnel skilled in shipbuilding and seafaring, whom he most probably settled at Babylon and Alexandria on the Tigris as well as Ikaros and Alexandria on the Euphrates. his task was entrusted to Miccalos of Clazomenae, who was given 500 talents for this purpose. It is worth noting that among the crews, most probably oarsmen, he also used slaves. “Further, Miccalus of Clazomenae was despatched to Phoenicia and Syria with ive hundred talents to hire recruits or purchase men accustomed to seafaring.”(127) 96 CHAPTER II We can call Alexander’s war navy at that time (late 324 B.C.) “Alexander’s irst Babylonian War Fleet”, which comprised about 250 ships. Most probably he used the same command structure he had for the leet at the river Indus: • Commander-in-chief of the navy: Nearchos • Hellsman of Alexander’s ship and naval commander: Onesikretos • Secretary of the leet: Evagoras from Corinth Alexander also sent Herakleides to the Caspian Sea to build ships since he had a plan to explore the Caspian Sea and ind out if it was possible to make a round trip of the world through there. “After this Alexander sent Heraclides son of Argaeus to Hyrcania with shipwrights, with orders to cut wood from the Hyrcanian mountains and built warships, both decked and open, in the Greek style. For he was seized with a longing to discover what other sea is joined by this sea, called both Caspian and Hyrcanian, whether it joins the Euxine, or whether on the east side towards India the great sea circling round pours into a gulf, the Hyrcanian, just as he had discovered the Persian Sea [Gulf] or, to use its actual name, the Red [Erythrean] Sea, to be only a gulf of the ocean.”(128) Greek geographers, following Patroklos’ periplous of the Caspian Sea, erroneously believed that it was a gulf leading to the northern outer ocean making it possible to reach India from there. hese perceptions were echoed in Alexander’s speech on the Hyphasis: “[…] his sea [eastern sea], I assure you, will prove to be joined to the Hyrcanian Sea; for the great sea encircles all the land. And it will be for me to show Macedonians and allies alike that the Indian gulf forms but one stretch of water with the Persian gulf, and the Hyrcanian Sea with the Indian gulf.”(129) All these are relected in the orders Alexander gave to Herakleides. Evidently, he had already put in motion his plans to build his ecumenical Kingdom of Asia by land and by sea. 97 1 2 3 4 Triakontoroi Triereis (3) Tetrereis (4) Pentereis (5) L (m) Seamen 36 23 200 35 320 40 350 45 Total = 250 ships Seamen = 13,360 Fig. 13 Alexander’s irst Babylonian War Fleet (324 B.C.) CHAPTER II (2.15) Construction of river leet of small punts – Inspection of waterways and canals he Euphrates in lower Mesopotamia transported its water and sediment load via a large number of multiple streams and channels. During the NeoBabylonian period and the fourth century B.C., it split north of Babylon into two major branches. he eastern branch passing through Babylon, called Arahtu, and the western branch, called Purattu. (his identiication throughout the history of Mesopotamia might appear to have changed at times but in general these are the names by which the principal branches of Euphrates were known). he river had a tendency that started much earlier to follow more a westerly direction and pour more water through the Purattu principal branch. his fact, together with poor irrigation canal network planning and maintenance, caused over-proportional water to low through the Purattu. his caused excessive looding in the western region, while the irrigation of the Babylonian ields associated with the Arahtu, during certain periods, collapsed causing numerous problems to the Babylonian administration. In order to improve the situation, elaborate irrigation schemes and networks were undertaken to redirect the low of the river so as to irrigate the entire Babylonian plain. Poor maintenance of these canals and frequent overlowing of the river, as well as rise of the sea water level caused a great expansion of the marshes and swamps in this region. It was a paramount duty of the kings and rulers of Babylonia to be diligent and attend to these problems. According to the old Babylonian Epic of Atrahasis, the wise man who built the ark during the Flood and saved mankind from destruction, the text of which was inscribed on clay tablets dated around 1700 B.C., discovered in the palace library of King Assurbanipal, before gods made mankind to take over from them the hard task of labour and hard work on earth, it was the gods’ responsibility to take care of the canals and rivers. hey even assigned a “canal-controller” god named Ennugi: 99 THE HELLENISTIC GULF “[…] he gods had to dig out canals, Had to clear channels, the lifelines of the land. he gods dug out the Tigris river [bed] And then dug out the Euphrates.”(130) his fact did not escape Alexander’s attention, who was quite sensitive on religious beliefs as well as traditions and superstitions. Since he was convinced of his divine origins and wanted to be worshipped as god by all his subjects, he considered it his duty to ill in the divine role of the one who controlled and maintained the canals “the lifeline of the land”. In addition to the navy he built strictly for military purposes, Alexander constructed a leet of small boats, mainly punts, for river patrol as well as for transport and crossing. he small punts made of lat base were ideal for shallow waters and river duty. hey had a multipurpose duty to serve the civilian population for its irrigation and transport needs, as well as for the maintenance of the elaborate canal system. He must have built at least 300-500 punts since we know that in 316 B.C., when Eumenes and his army invaded Babylonia, Seleukos and Pithon sailed down the Tigris with two triereis and a number of punts and tried to persuade the Makedonians, who accompanied Eumenes, to abandon him. We know that “these craft still survived from those that had been built by Alexander near Babylon.”(131) Finally, Eumenes managed to keep his army with him and crossed over by using about three hundred of those punts.(132) hese punts were evidently the ones Alexander built for river patrol and transport. In the past, the various canals that were constructed had a dual purpose. hey were used for irrigation and river transport but were also used for defence and military purposes. Nebuchadnezzar caused excessive looding of the surrounding areas of Babylon in order to defend the city from his enemies by building his own elaborate canal system. He claimed that this way he strengthened the defences of Esangil and Babylon. He described the marshes that surrounded the city walls as “a mighty lood of deep water which was like the expanse of the sea.”(133) 100 CHAPTER II In contrast, in 689 B.C., Sennacherib sacked and destroyed Babylon after a siege of ifteen months by running water through the canals into the city causing excessive looding and destruction. On the clifs of the Bavian Gorge, Sennacherib carved an inscription in which he bluntly boasted the following: “[…] I destroyed the city (Babylon) and its houses, from foundation to parapet, I devastated and burned them. I tore out the bricks of the inner and outer walls (of the city), of the temples, and of the ziggurat as much as there was and I dumped these into the Arahtu canal. I dug canals through the midst of the city, I looded it with water. I made its very foundations disappear, and I destroyed it more completely than a devastating lood. So that in future days the site of that city and (its) temples would not be recognized, I totally dissolved it with water and made it like inundated land.” “After I had destroyed Babylon, had smashed its gods, and had annihilated its people, so that the location of that city would not be recognizable, I removed its earth and had it carried by the Euphrates river to the sea. he earth reached Dilmun, and when the Dilmunites saw it, the fear of Assur fell upon them and they brought their treasures to me.”(134) Sennacherib not only torn down the city but he turned it into a wasteland by “dissolving” it with water. He built canals not for the good of the city but to enable him to remove its earth and lush it down the river through the Arahtu canal, the branch of the Euphrates that runs through Babylon. “He [Marduk] made evil plans to overthrow the land and to overthrow its people. he Arahtu canal, the river of abundance, a mighty river, a raging torrent, whose high water is like a lood rose up. It poured the water into the city of his abode and made it like a ruin heap.”(135) Sennacherib boasted that the water was lushed all the way to the Gulf and even up to the Dilmun island (Tylos-Bahrain). he gods of Babylon and especially its principal god Marduk were angry with Sennacherib’s actions 101 THE HELLENISTIC GULF and took revenge in 681 B.C., when the Assyrian king was assassinated by his own son. he cycle of revenge stopped when Sennacherib’s son, Esarhaddon, rebuilt Babylon and reversed the destruction caused by the looding of the city. In his Babylonian inscription, he claims to have done so by restoring the Arahtu canal lowing through Babylon. he combined efect of constant river shifting, as well as the use of the canals for defensive and military purposes and looding and poor maintenance caused the area west and southwest of Babylon near Borsippa to become a morass and a swampy lake, which even the people called the “sea”.(136) he major contributor feeding this swampy sea was the Pallukkatu channel, a man-made channel, which functioned as an escape system when the river was looding. Pallukkatu had been attested since the reign of Neriglissar.(137) It is mentioned in numerous other cuneiform sources, as well as in Arrian and Strabo, who refer to Pallukkatu by the name Pollakopas.(138) It was situated across the west of Purattu/Arahtu(139) and departed from the village of Pallukkatu.(140) he modern course of the Euphrates eventually followed the old Pollakopas path, which, according to Arrian, was lowing west of Babylon by the time of Alexander.(141) his is the main canal Nebuchadnezzar used to lood the area around Babylon and turned into a marsh to defend it from its enemies. According to Herodotos, by diverting massive lows of Arahtu into the lakes, presumably by utilizing Pollakopas, Cyrus the Great caused the level of the river through the city to reach a man’s thigh thus permitting his soldiers to enter the city by the river bed. he morass and swamps that prevented Alexander from entering Babylon from the direction pointed out to him by the Chaldean priests in 324 B.C. were a result of Pollakopas looding the area. he rulers of Babylonia had to assign sometimes more than ten thousand people for over two months at a time to divert and regulate the low of Pollakopas.(142) Captain Chesney wrote in 1883 about Pollakopas and the land it irrigated: “By means of this great channel, and the numerous cuts from the Euphrates, the country between Hit and Basrah must once have been the most productive spot in the world; and nothing now is wanted but a 102 CHAPTER II settled government and a better population, to ill the arid plains of Chaldaea with fertility and happiness. But the present government of this wretched country can efect nothing; the impulse of civilization must come from a foreign force, as civilization has always come.”(143) Well, our dear Captain Chesney got right the irst part about the most productive spot of the world but I am afraid he is terribly wrong about the importation in Mesopotamia of civilization from such places where there is so much deiciency of civilization compared to the civilization of Mesopotamia. It is due to such miserable misconceptions that our region (the Middle East) is sufering today. Consequently, Alexander had no choice but to inspect the canals and aqueducts, especially Pollakopas, clear them from debris and obstacles and redirect them when and where needed. his was done not only for military purposes but also in order to serve better the irrigation needs of the cities and inhabitants of the area. He paid special attention to Pollakopas, where, according to Strabo and Arrian, he opened a new discharge mouth in order to be able to better regulate the channel’s outlow rates: “Aristobulus says that Alexander himself, when he was sailing up the river and piloting the boat, inspected canals and with his multitude of followers cleared them; and that he likewise stopped up some of the mouths and opened others; and when he noticed that one canal, the one which stretched most directly towards the marshes and lakes that lay in front of Arabia, had a mouth most diicult to deal with and could not easily be stopped because of the yielding and soft nature of the soil, he opened up another mouth, a new one, […] having selected a place with a rocky bottom, and that he diverted the stream to that place; […] Accordingly, he adds, Alexander busied himself thus with the canals, and also inspected thoroughly the tombs of the kings and potentates, most of which are situated among the lakes.”(144) “While his triremes were being built, and the harbour at Babylon dug out, Alexander sailed from Babylon down the Euphrates to the so-called river 103 THE HELLENISTIC GULF Pollakopas. his is eight hundred stades away from Babylon, and it is a canal from the Euphrates, not a river that rises from its own springs. […] Since the bed of the stream is lifted high up, it would overlow into the surrounding country unless it were given an outlet along the Pollacopas and so turned into the marshes and the lakes, which […] runs mostly into lagoons and thereafter into the sea by many unnoticed mouths. […] At the point where the stream of Euphrates was turned into the Pollakopas, he determined to close the outlet securely […].”(145) hese activities had a signiicant purpose for political, as well as military and ideological reasons. he Mesopotamians were expecting their kings and rulers not only to protect them and respect their religious rights but also to maintain the city walls, their buildings and temple institutions. hey were also expecting particular care to be given to the preservation of the aqueducts and irrigation networks in the city and countryside since irrigated agriculture was among the most important economic sectors of the region. his is exactly what Alexander did since he wanted to be considered by the Babylonians a good ruler. No doubt Alexander was told of Sennacherib’s terrible acts and punishment and he made sure with his actions the Babylonians were reassured of his good intentions. (2.16) Alexandria on the Tigris As we have seen, the Gulf shoreline was in those days further north than the modern coastline. It was most probably some 22 km south of modern Qurna, the crossing point of Euphrates and Tigris today. he resulting waterway channel of the rivers Karkheh, Dez and Karun, which was called Eulaios/ Pasitigris, entered the Tigris via a channel very close to the shoreline and both discharged into the sea. As we have already demonstrated, Alexander identiied this location during his trip from Susa to Opis. On an elevated mound, near this junction, he built a city-port called Alexandria on the Tigris. 104 CHAPTER II “he original town [Alexandria] was founded by Alexander the Great with settlers brought from the royal city of Durine […] and with the invalided soldiers from his army who were left there.”(146) he city-port of Alexandria was built some 20 km south of Qurna from the point where modern Euphrates joins the Tigris and both form the Shatt al Arab. It is situated today about ive km east of the Shatt al Arab at the site of Al-Khayaber known traditionally as Naisan. According to Pliny, it was situated in the innermost recess of the Gulf at a distance of ten stades (1.85 km).(147) his is a conirmation of our proposal earlier that the Gulf in the fourth century B.C. was about 22 km from the modern starting point of the Shatt al Arab.(148) Because the lower Mesopotamian delta is virtually lat, it is most probable that during the fourth century B.C. there may not have been a distinguishable shoreline. he purpose of the city-port at that position was intended to supersede Teredon, built by Nebuchadnezzar, and become an urban centre for the development of the region capable of guarding the low of maritime trade to Babylonia. At the same time to serve as an advanced naval post to facilitate forthcoming military campaigns and the resulting trade after the Gulf would become a Makedonian lake much like the Eastern Mediterranean. Alexander’s foundation on the Tigris served as the nucleus for the formation of the Seleukid Eparchy of the Erythrean Sea. For the next three and a half centuries after its original foundation, despite extensive looding, damage and periods of inaction, it survived and developed into a major centre of commerce between the Orient and the West. As we will see in the following chapter, what made this possible was a combination of geographical, political, economic and commercial reasons and circumstances. (2.17) Alexandria on the Euphrates or in Babylonia While Alexander was improving the irrigation and water distribution of Babylonia, he identiied and built another fortiied city down the marshes towards Arabia, where he settled Greek mercenaries, as well as old and wounded 105 THE HELLENISTIC GULF soldiers and other volunteers to serve as an advanced outpost towards the southwest. he foundation of this new city is mentioned by Arrian: “[…] For these reasons he sailed to the Pollacopas and down it to the lakes in the direction of Arabia. here, having seen a good site, he built and fortiied a city and settled in it some of the Greek mercenaries, volunteers and men unit for service through age or wounds.”(149) According to Arrian’s description, the location of the city could be southwest of Babylon towards Borsippa in the direction of Arabia. Georges Le Rider identiied the site somewhere in the vicinity of Kufa.(150) Arrian’s narrative clearly states that Alexander found the suitable site for his new foundation when he sailed down the Pollakopas and after he entered into the lakes. We know that during that time the area around Borsippa was a swamp of lakes. he city’s gate facing these lakes was renamed the “Sea Gate”.(151) We also know that the principal watercourse that contributed to this morass, which its people called “the sea”, was the Pollakopas.(152) herefore, identifying the probable location of the city around the Borsippa area south of Kufa can be in line with Arrian’s description, provided the lakes south of Pollakopas were navigable. In the absence of any archaeological evidence, this can only be an educated guess. It is possible that this city is the same one referred to in Alexander’s Romance as Alexandria near Babylon, “Ἀλεξάνδρεια τήν ἐπὶ Βαβυλῶνος”.(153) Since the city was most probably in Babylonia on or near the Euphrates, we can call it “Alexandria on the Euphrates” or “Alexandria in Babylonia”. Uruk was a thriving emporion (trading centre) during the Seleukid period. Most probably, Alexandria on the Euphrates could have joined the iscal district of Uruk that regulated the commercial river traic along the Euphrates moving up along the river from the Gulf. As we have seen in the previous chapter, there could have been a Greek colony at Uruk. A cuneiform text from Uruk dated in 270 B.C. records a contract executed at “Antiochia on the Ishtar canal”. Since the Ishtar canal during the Seleukid period was the main water way to Uruk, it is possible that Greeks mentioned 106 CHAPTER II in the cuneiform texts of Uruk were connected to Antiochia on the Ishtar canal,(154) which could have an association with the Greeks of Alexandria on the Euphrates or in Babylonia.(155) Salles suggests an alternative location of this unnamed city to be in the region between Nasiryah and Basra.(156) He goes a step further to suggest, in spite of the absence of any evidence, that the city might be Arethusa, a Greek city mentioned by Pliny.(157) In a recent study, an alternative location was proposed northwest of Babylon on the Pollakopas.(158) In fact, some 40 km north of Babylon towards Baghdad there is a modern city called Iskandariyah (Alexandria). he identiication of this place with the site described by Arrian does not run contrary to the description in Arrian’s narrative and can therefore be considered a credible alternative choice. In fact, a number of contemporary historians gave the city the name “Alexandria on the Pollakopas”. here are other proposals which lack literal or archaeological support.(159) In the absence of any archaeological evidence, all these proposals can only be tentative for the time being. It is interesting to look into the synthesis of the population of this new foundation. It consisted of Greek mercenaries and of men unit for service due to age or injuries (apomachoi). Most probably, these were Makedonians. In such a case, they must have been from Philip’s, Alexander’s father, old soldiers, who were iercely loyal to the Makedonian monarchs. He also settled volunteers from the neighbouring regions (perioikoi), who could add value to the new foundation’s usefulness by their knowledge of the area. He did the same with Alexandria in Egypt. We can only speculate that the Makedonian and Greek constituency were presiding over the local volunteer population. It is worth noting the striking similarities between this city and Alexandria on the Tigris. hey were both fortiied settlements founded on or close to the two Mesopotamian rivers. hey were both settled by Greek and Makedonian wounded and ageing but trusted and loyal soldiers from Alexander’s victorious army. his was a typical foundation/settlement practice, where military settlers (katoikoi) built a military foundation (katoikia) surrounded and supported 107 THE HELLENISTIC GULF by an indigenous volunteer or resettled population. his was the irst step before such community could become a polis. Alexander followed the same practice in other cases in Eastern Iran and Central Asia like, for example, in Alexandria Eschate. (2.18) Alexander’s plans to conquer Arabia Alexander knew very well of the richness of Arabia as well as the instrumental role trading centres, like Gerrha and Tylos, played in the trade between the Orient and the West. he trading routes and caravan trails across Arabia carrying uniquely rich merchandise from yemen to the north were among his targets. An example of the aluence of the Arab trading communities, as we know from Herodotos, is that the Arabian cities sent 1,000 talents of incense to the Persian king every year. Possibly, Alexander had a irsthand experience of Arabia’s richness from his brief raid in northwestern Arabia, during the siege of Tyros, as it was reported by Curtius.(160) It is very likely that it was after this raid into northwestern Arabia that Alexander sent his teacher Leonidas “ive hundred talents of frankincense and a hundred of myrrh”(161) with instructions that he could make oferings freely to the gods.(162) his is in response to earlier advice of his teacher that lavish sacriices to the gods with incense can only be made when Alexander subdues Arabia, the land in which frankincense and myrrh were produced in such abundant quantities. It was, therefore, his declared intention to bring Arabia under his control. his is conirmed in a number of ancient sources and by most of Alexander’s historians: According to Strabo: “For of course Alexander, he says, intended to acquire possession of that country, and had already prepared leets and bases of operations […].”(163) Arrian’s statements are basically along the same lines. 108 CHAPTER II “[…] he prosperity of the country (Arabia) was also an incitement, since he heard that cassia grew in their marshes, that the trees produced myrrh and frankincense, that cinnamon was cut from the bushes, and that the spikenard grew self-sown on the meadows. hen there was also the size of their territory, since he was informed that the sea-coast of Arabia was nearly as long as that of India, and that there were many islands of-shore and harbours everywhere in the country, enough to give anchorage for his leet, and to permit cities to be build on them, which were likely to prosper.”(164) “At this time Alexander was testing out his leet constantly, and there were many competitions between the triremes and such quadriremes as were on the river, and contests between oarsmen and helmsmen and crowns for the victors.”(165) “His naval preparations were directed at the greater number of the Arabs, on the pretext that they alone of the barbarians in these parts had sent no envoys to him. he truth in my own belief is that Alexander was always insatiate in winning possessions.”(166) According to Arrian, he also wanted the Arabs to worship him as a god, in the same way they worshipped their two and only gods; the sky/heavens, Uranos (Οὐρανός), who is visible to all people with the stars, the moon and the sun, and god Dionysos. hese references to Alexander wanting to be worshipped as a god by the Arabs might also come from the development of Alexander’s legend after his death by contemporary and other historians, like Cleitarchos, for example. In this game between legend and reality, Alexander was portrayed as if he believed he had achieved in his life as great things as the two gods worshipped by the Arabs, and therefore, considered himself equal to Arab gods, thereby deserving the same worship. 109 THE HELLENISTIC GULF “A story is prevalent that he heard that the Arabs honoured only two gods, Uranus [Οὐρανός] and Dionysus. Uranus because he is visible and contains within himself the stars and especially the sun, from which the greatest and most obvious beneit comes to all human afairs […] and that Alexander therefore thought himself worthy to be regarded as a third god by the Arabs, since his achievements were as magniicent as those of Dionysus.”(167) On the reverse of Alexander’s tetradrachm imitations like the ones found at Qal’at al-Bahrain and elsewhere in Arabia, there is a seated beardless male deity wearing a ribbon representing the Semitic solar deity Shams.(168) Such examples of worship of the solar deity Shams are also found in other parts along the coast of the Arabian Peninsula in Gerrha and Mleiha. It is plausible that this solar deity worshipped in Arabia was related to god Uranos (Οὐρανός), to which Arrian refers in the passage quoted above. In the ancient world, people had two ways of travel in order to communicate, trade and earn their living – either by sea or by land. he Arabs in order to travel on land had to go through the desert. he desert is as dangerous and diicult to travel and chart as is the sea. Consequently, for both means of transport they had to rely on and study the sky and its stars, the moon and the sun. No doubt they relied on Babylonian astronomical science for their travel. It is, therefore, not surprising that their gods were closely related to the Babylonian ones and it is equally not surprising that they became worshippers of Uranos (Οὐρανός) and all its elements: the stars, the moon and the sun, so explicitly stated in the above passage by Arrian. he Arab worship of Uranos might even go back to the Sumerian theology. he Sumerians believed in seven supreme gods, among whom the heaven-god An and the air-god Enlil, the moon-god Nanna or Sin and the sun-god Utu. Most probably, Arrian’s mention of “Uranus” (sky and heavens), which contained the sun and the stars, was referring to the syncretisation and fusion of all these solar deities. he Seleukid usage, at a later stage, of solar images and star symbols and the depiction of Apollo with a star above his head signifying his fusion with Helios was targeting the eastern non-Greek community of their empire, 110 CHAPTER II who worshipped and believed in solar gods and divinities.(169) We must also consider the possibility that Arrian might be referring to a similar divinity like the western Semitic god “Master of Heavens” Ba’al Samin.(170) Zeus Ouranios is the Hellenized version of cults and deities similar to Ba’al Samin. his is demonstrated on a coin of Antiochos VIII Grypos minted in Damaskos in 117/6 B.C. On the reverse, Zeus Ouranios is holding a six-pointed star and is crowned by a horizontal crescent. he astrological attributes with oriental symbols and emblems of Zeus is an attempt to align western and oriental cults and deities of similar attributes and address the indigenous population with Orientalized gestures. An imitation “Arabian Alexander” silver tetradrachm struck at Gerrha. On the obverse, the head of Herakles wearing a lion skin. On the reverse, the sun god Shams wearing a tainia and chlamys, seated on a throne holding an eagle in his extended right hand, leaning with his left hand on a long staf. he name Shams in South Arabia language appears on the left ield. Imitation of an Alexander tetradrachm found in Mleiha in Sharjah, U.A.E., depicting the head of Herakles on the obverse and the Semitic solar deity Shams on the reverse 111 THE HELLENISTIC GULF In order to fully understand all of Alexander’s reasons to conquer Arabia, we must also take into consideration the fact that Cyrus the Great declared that the Arab kings “who dwell in tents” became his vassals.(171) Surely, Alexander would in no way want to achieve less than Cyrus. In the last days of his life, he completed the preparations for his naval and land campaign to conquer Arabia and the Gulf. His plan was to send the army and cavalry to march inland while he intended to follow personally with the leet.(172) According to the King’s Journals or Diaries (Ephimerides),(173) a few days before his death he summoned several times Nearchos, his trusted admiral, and other important oicers for consultations and to give them instructions for the land and naval campaign. His navy, which we might call “Alexander’s Arabian Expedition Fleet”, must have grown from “Alexander’s irst Babylonian War Fleet” of 250 ships to a formidable navy of twice as many, probably 500 ships.(174) his navy, which could have been used to transport troops, constituted a major instrument of power. Alexander had used ships to transport troops before, such as from Sidon to Tyros and at the Hindus river. In these cases, a deck was provided about 70 cm wide ixed above the rowers, which covered the whole length from bow to stern but not all the width. At the same time, with the same navy he was able to resupply his army, the main body of which was planned to march inland, with food, water and other supplies. We have no information whatsoever if the people of the Gulf had large warships or navies capable of challenging Alexander’s navy. he only evidence we have is of small local ishing boats and trading dhows, as well as rafts and reed bundled merchant ships. In order to put together all necessary naval and navigational intelligence for the campaign, he relied on the information Nearchos gathered during his voyage along the Persian side of the Gulf from the Strait of Hormuz to the Susiana coastline up to the mouth of the Euphrates, opposite the island of Ikaros. In addition, Alexander organized at least three further missions at the Arab side of the Gulf this time.(175) His orders to the naval commanders, who were assigned this task, were similar to the ones given to Nearchos. Among 112 CHAPTER II Coin of Antiochos VIII Grypos minted in Damaskos in 117/6 B.C. Obverse: Head of diademed Antiochos Reverse: ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΑΝΤΙΟΧΟΥ ΕΠΙΦΑΝΟΥΣ, Zeus Ouranios other information, they were ordered to gather data on geographical, tribal, ethnographical and botanical matters, which were very useful to Alexander and his successors, as well as to later historians like Eratoshenes, heophrastos, Pliny, Strabo and Arrian. he irst mission was assigned to Archias, a prominent and trusted Makedonian from Pella, who was the son of Anaxidoros. He was an experienced naval commander and participated in the voyage from the river Indus to the Gulf. He accompanied Nearchos in the inland march to meet with Alexander’s army in Karmania. In his exploratory assignment down the Gulf, he sailed with a triakontoros up to Tylos and back. Most probably, this was the irst direct meaningful encounter between Alexander’s forces and Tylos. Archias must have no doubt reported back how useful Tylos was for the control of the navigation in the Gulf. It was strategically positioned half way close to the Arab coast and to important trading routes. We will demonstrate later on how Tylos played an important role in the Seleukid and Charakenean domination of the Erythrean Sea by becoming the centre of the maritime district “Tylos and the Islands”. here is no doubt that during his trip he passed from the island of Ikaros (modern Failaka), which later on became a Hellenistic fortiied settlement and most probably was part of the district “Tylos and the Islands”. he second commander was Androsthenes, 113 THE HELLENISTIC GULF the son of Kallistratos from hasos. He, like Archias, is named as one of Alexander’s trierarchs on the Hydaspes leet in 326 B.C. He was with Nearchos on the voyage from India and in his trip down the Gulf he most probably sailed further than Archias. We know from Strabo that Androsthenes “sailed down the Gulf with a leet.” herefore, his trip must have been an extensive one, which took him up to the Strait of Hormuz(176) with speciic tasks and instructions for a more detailed survey and reporting. In addition, he was probably ordered to install the irst advance garrisons, perhaps in strategic places like Ikaros, otherwise why did he sail with a leet and not a single boat like Archias? Androsthenes wrote a detailed account of his travels in the Gulf under the name Voyage Along the Indian Coast (Περίπλους τῆς Ἰνδικής). His work on plant life, botanical plants, river lines and pearl ishing in the area survived through later georgraphers like Eratosthenes, heophrastos and Strabo. No doubt his original work, which was available to Alexander and his war planners, was an indispensable tool in the planning and logistical arrangements of the Arabian expedition. Hieron from Soloi in Cyprus was the third naval oicer who also sailed up to the Strait of Hormuz and back. Hieron, who sailed in the summer of 323 B.C., had to return because it was impossible for him to circumnavigate Arabia because of the monsoons. No doubt there were other naval missions in the Gulf that were not reported by the ancient historians. he indings of all these missions were very useful not only to Alexander’s plans to conquer Arabia but were necessary for the future navigation of the Makedonian and Seleukid leets and their naval domination of the Gulf and the establishment of their maritime empire. By putting together all of Alexander’s naval actions, it is evident that his strategy was to control the seas in order to safeguard and develop his eastern empire.(177) herefore, at the same time he dispatched Archias, Androsthenes and Hieron to sail to the Arabian Peninsula along the Persian Erythrean Sea, he ordered Anaxicrates to do the same in the opposite direction and circumnavigate the Arabian Peninsula starting from Hieropolis in Egypt.(174) 114 CHAPTER II After Alexander’s death his successors spent most of their time ighting each other in an efort to split the empire among them. Inevitably, Alexander’s naval plans in the East were either cancelled or put aside. One thing we know for sure is that the Arabian expedition was cancelled and nothing is known of the Arabian Expedition Fleet he built up for it. Most certainly, the shipping programme at Babylon and hapsakos was stopped. His admiral Nearchos seemed to have been entirely put aside by other more strong contenders like Perdikkas, Ptolemaios, Antigonos Monophthalmos (the One-eyed), Antipatros, Seleukos, Lysimachos and others, who fought iercely against each other to split the empire. As we have seen, the Wars of the Diadochoi (Successors) went on for almost thirty years. During the naval battles of the Diadochoi in the Mediterranean, mainly between Ptolemaios and Antigonos and his son Demetrios, we have no evidence that the Babylonian Fleet had any active part. We can only assume that it was kept battle-worthy and perhaps used for servicing and maintaining the canals and irrigation schemes, as well as for transportation purposes mainly of troops and supplies from Babylon to hapsakos and from there overland to the Phoenician coast. We only have a single literal reference of Seleukos using two triereis when Eumenes invaded Babylonia. Only after Seleukos established himself as king in Southern Mesopotamia, following his decisive victory over Antigonos, can we assume that whatever was left of the existing Arabian Expedition Fleet and was not destroyed in the battles that took place in the meantime, was put in good use again to establish the Seleukid maritime domination of the Erythrean/Persian Sea and the Gulf coastline. he lifetime of warships, in ancient times, of the types Alexander had built was between twenty and thirty years.(179) Depending on good maintenance, this lifetime could be extended. If we assume that the ships when not in use at sea were kept at dry boathouses, like the ones the Athenians had at Zea, then, when Seleukos started his empire in 311 B.C., big part of the leet he inherited was most probably still of seaworthy condition. 115 THE HELLENISTIC GULF (2.19) he strength of the expeditionary force against Arabia We do not have any information on the size of the army that Alexander was planning to take with him in his intended conquest of Arabia. We can only make tentative deductions by looking at the strength of his army on previous occasions. When he crossed the Hellespont into Asia Minor in 334 B.C., he had with him 32,000 infantry and 5,100 cavalry.(180) At Gaugamela, the most decisive battle of the campaign, he ielded his largest army against the Persians of 40,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry.(181) For the expedition against Arabia we can assume that he opted for a rather smaller army on account of the diicult environmental conditions and the fact that he did not consider that he would encounter a ferocious resistance by any large army. We will thus propose that he took with him 25,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry supported by a leet of 500 ships. He intended to lead in person the naval forces. his is a preference he had shown since the campaign on the Indus river on a number of occasions. Taking into consideration that in a number of cases in the past he took with him on board the ships the hypaspists and Royal Companion squadrons and archers, we will assume he intended to do the same in his campaign in Arabia. Based on these assumptions, we can, therefore, propose the following tentative split between land and naval forces. Land Forces Foot-soldiers Cavalry Total 116 Naval Forces 18,000 4,400 22,400 Hypaspists Royal Companions (3 squadrons) 3,000 600 Infantry phalanx (2 taxeis) 3,000 Archers, javelin throwers and others 1,000 Total 7,600 CHAPTER II For the navy of 500 ships he employed twice as many sailors as he used for his irst Babylon leet in 324 B.C., which is a maximum of 26,720 men. his navy must have been divided into irst line warship squadrons and support vessels like merchant ships and hemioliai to carry food supplies and equipment, and horse carriers. his latter part of the navy was to be strategically stationed at preselected locations with ship stations and storage depots. hese locations were mostly the islands like Tylos and Ikaros as well as Alexandria on the Tigris, which was intended to play the role of the main resupply station. he latter two places played an important role in Alexander’s planning since they were respectively at the mouths of Tigris and Euphrates at the Gulf. For sure, Alexandria’s construction and fortiication was well advanced and at Ikaros Alexander should have stationed support military units, perhaps of a temporary nature, for the purpose of the expedition. (2.20) Food and water needs for the army and navy, logistics and communication lines In his book Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army, D.W. Engels states the following: “It has long been recognized that supply was indeed the basis of Alexander’s strategy; and when the climate, human and physical geography, available methods of transport and the agricultural calendar of a given region are known, one can often determine what Alexander’s next move will be.”(182) his is indeed the case in his intended campaign in Arabia and how the role of his navy was determined. he campaign was well planned from all aspects and preparations were well completed ahead of its start in mid-June. his period was just after the crops in the rich Mesopotamian plain were collected and stored ready to be transported. Alexander’s planners knew from the intelligence reports of Archias, Androsthenes and Hieron that Arabia was sparsely populated without big urban cities. he population was mostly 117 THE HELLENISTIC GULF nomadic tribes living mainly at oases and near wells, as well as at certain places by the sea where vegetation existed and food could be found. Settled life was around the big oases like Qatif, Hasa and haj. here is evidence that during the Hellenistic period there was a riverine system of aquifers that were exploited by digging wells and constructing irrigation schemes. In spite of this, the extreme aridity of the northern Arabia region did not allow agriculture on a grand scale like in Mesopotamia. he food of the inhabitants consisted of ish, dates, wheat and barley, and sheep and wild goats. he climatic conditions of Arabia in antiquity was not much diferent from today’s climate. Under these circumstances, Alexander could not depend on feeding his army or navy solely with food and supplies he could obtain along the journey. Although the Arabian coast of the Gulf had the fresh water sources we have mentioned and deep water anchorage, due to the hostility of the environment, Alexander was more likely to use the islands like Ikaros, Tarut and Tylos than the mainland for his food chain logistics. he climatic conditions and especially the heat during the prolonged summer season were a bitter reminder of what his army went through on their return from India through the Gedrosian desert. hat was a mistake he could not aford to repeat. herefore, the role his navy could play by sailing along the coast of Eastern Arabia was very important. It had the double task of a military operation –carrying marines for amphibious landings and safeguarding the sea lanes– and at the same time resupply itself and the army on the land. As no major naval battles envisaged, speed and manoeuvrability were not the navy’s primary concern. his determined the nature and type of ships the leet consisted of and the sailing tactics. Since in the previous chapter we determined the number of troops Alexander intended to use on land and at sea, we will now look at the daily food and water needs of both army and navy. According to Engels, the minimum grain and water requirements for military personnel, cavalry horses and baggage animals were:(183) 118 CHAPTER II Personnel: 3 lbs/day of grain and 1/2 a gallon or 5lbs of water = 8 lbs daily ration of food and water. Cavalry horses: 20 lbs of grain and forage and 80 lbs of water = 100 lbs of daily ration of food and water. Baggage animals: 20 lbs of grain and forage and 80 lbs of water = 100 lbs of daily ration of food and water. herefore, for every thousand sailors or soldiers at sea he needed a daily ration of food and water of about 3.6 tons (1 ton = 2,204 lbs). Similarly, he needed 3.6 tons of daily ration of food and water for every thousand foot soldiers and cavalry men on land. For every thousand animals on land, he needed about 45 tons of food and water per day. Alexander’s navy, as we have already mentioned, consisted of a maximum of 26,720 sailors and 7,000 soldiers and 600 cavalry and horses. his means their daily need for ration of food and water for the sailors and marines was about 120 tons per day and, for the 600 horses, an additional 27 tons per day. Consequently, the total daily need of food and water for the navy and marines and cavalry with their horses was 147 tons. His foot soldiers and cavalry on land, as we have seen above, consisted of 22,400 men. heir daily ration requirement was 80 tons. he 4,400 horses needed 198 tons. herefore, the total daily need of food and water for his infantry and cavalry and their horses on land was 278 tons. he total daily food and water needs for the navy and the army was 425 tons [147 tons (navy) + 278 tons (army)]. here were two options for resupplying the army and navy: by sea or by land: Option A: Sea transport We know that in antiquity merchant ships had diferent cargo capacity. A medium to small merchant ship would carry up to 70 tons while a large one could transport up to a maximum of 400 tons of cargo in food and equipment.(184) 119 THE HELLENISTIC GULF We can thus assume that for a daily supply of 278 tons of food and water for the army, Alexander needed a medium to large merchant ship and for the 147 tons needed for the navy a medium size merchant ship. he distance from Alexandria to Tylos was about 630 km. herefore, for a trip down the Gulf to reach Tylos from Alexandria with his navy and by land with his army, he needed at least ten days for the navy and twice as many for the army on land (we assume a cruising speed of about 65 km per day for the navy(185) and a marching speed of just over 30 km/day for the army.(186) Based on the above information, we can conclude that he needed about twenty medium to large size merchant ships for his army and ten medium size merchant ships for his navy that is a total of thirty merchant ships or the equivalent number of various other cargo carrying capacity ships. Option B: Land transport A baggage or food carrying animal could carry 250 lbs on average,(187) but consume 20 lbs of food and 8 gallons or 80 lbs of water.(188) herefore, the net deliverable per animal per day was 150 lbs. his means he needed approximately 7 animals per day to deliver one ton of food and water. herefore, in order to transport by land with baggage animals a day’s rations in food and water for his army and navy, he needed a maximum of 278x7 = 1946 baggage or food carrying animals for the army and 147x7 = 1029, making a maximum grand total of 2,975 baggage or food carrying animals for both army and navy. his was too big a number of animals to handle. Even if the number could have been reduced by supply in stages or by using more camels than mules and donkeys, it was still a large number. In other words, it was the navy that was given the task of resupplying the army. he baggage animals that were used on land were only to carry an amount of emergency food supplies plus all non comestible supplies and equipment like medical supplies, siege and other machinery, construction equipment, tents, furniture and other miscellaneous stuf. 120 CHAPTER II For a similar trip to reach from Alexandria all the way to Ras Musandam in the Strait of Hormuz, which was about 1,500 km, he needed about ifty days for his army and about twenty-ive days for the navy. herefore, in order to cover the complete Arab side of the Gulf, Alexander needed about ifty medium to large merchant ships to carry food and water supplies for the army and twenty ive medium merchant ships to carry the corresponding needed supplies for the navy. Since having such a large leet of merchant ships would have been too cumbersome and impracticable, most probably Alexander opted for the solution of establishing storing and resupply stations on the islands like Ikaros and Tylos. herefore, his leet may have enumerated about twenty medium to large size and ten medium merchant ships or equivalent smaller ones or a combination of the two. Most probably, most of these ships were constructed at the Babylon shipyards to match the actual expedition needs. herefore, our tentative assumption that the leet for the Arabian expedition in the summer of 323 B.C. was double the size and capacity of the irst Babylonian War Fleet assembled in 324 B.C. would it comfortably Alexander’s military and logistics needs. As we have already pointed out the campaign was planned to start in mid-June, meaning that most of the crops in the rich Mesopotamian plain had already been collected and stored ready to be transported. Calculations of food consumption for the army and navy • Consumption of tons of food per 1,000 men/day = (1,000 x 8)/2,204 = 3,629 tons/day: about 3.6 tons/day. • Consumption of tons of food per 1,000 horses/day = (1,000 x 100)/2,204 = 45,372 tons/day: about 45 tons/day. • Total navy consumption per day for 26,720 sailors and 7,000 marines and 600 horses = (26.72 x 3.6) + (7 x 3.6) + (0.6 x 45) = 147 tons/day. • Total army consumption per day for 22,400 soldiers and cavalry plus 4,400 horses = (22.4 x 3.6) + (4.4 x 45) = 278 tons/day. 121 • Total army and navy consumption from Alexandria to Tylos: ‡ Navy 10 days x 147 tons per day = 1,470 tons (10 medium size merchant ships). ‡ Army 20 days x 278 tons per day = 5,560 tons. (20 medium to large merchant ships). • Total army and navy consumption from Alexandria to Ras Musandam: ‡ Navy 25 days x 147 tons per day = 3,675 tons. (25 medium size merchant ships). ‡ Army 50 days x 278 tons per day = 13,900 tons. hey need about 50 medium to large merchant ships. 122 NOTES CHAPTER II NAVAL AND MARITIME ACTIVITIES OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT IN SOUTH MESOPOTAMIA AND THE GULF 1) 2) 3) 4) Radner (2010), p. 441 Radner (2010), p. 440 Parpas (2013), p. 65, Fig. 3 and p. 213, note 5. From the Makedonian navy, thirty-eight of those warships were small triakontoroi or pentekontoroi. here was a clear preference for these ships on the part of the Makedonians since later on they used 80 triakontoroi on the river Indus, which formed the backbone of the navy of Nearchos that sailed through the Gulf. he outcome of the naval confrontation between the Persians and Alexander in the Aegean and Southeastern Mediterranean between 334-331 B.C. was extremely important for the campaign of the Makedonian king. he Makedonian leet (he leet of the Hellenic League in 334 B.C.) was a poor match against the mighty Persian leet of 400 warships plus support vessels. he major participants in the Persian leet were the Phoenicians with 200 ships followed by the Cypriots with 150 ships and 50 ships from other cities on the coast of Asia Minor. Alexander took one of the most controversial decisions of his career, namely to give freedom of movement to the Persians and to blockade them from the land by depriving them access to their major ports of resupply. his stratagem did not work fully to his favour since the Persians with the support of the Spartan King Agis III became a real threat at the rear of the advancing Makedonian army. hey successfully disrupted his supply lines but most importantly the supply lines to Greece. It is not an exaggeration to say that the victories of Alexander on land were countered with the naval activities and victories of the Persians in the Aegean. What tipped the scale in favour of Alexander was his second decisive victory against Dareios at Issos. he defeat of the Persians at Issos sent shock waves across the Aegean. he Cypriot and most of the Phoenician navies abandoned the Persian navy and joined forces with Alexander for the siege of Tyros. At Tyros, Alexander succeeded in assembling a formidable navy of 224 warships. he Cypriot and Phoenician squadrons, numbering 80 and 120 warships respectively, formed the backbone of Alexander’s unexpected naval power. In an eight-month epic siege, he managed to conquer Tyros. With this important Persian naval base under his control, he proceeded 315 THE HELLENISTIC GULF 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10) 11) 12) 13) 316 to take Gaza. With the entire Phoenician and Palestinian coast under his power, he was free to march against Egypt, which soon became part of his empire. After he put the entire Eastern Mediterranean under his control, Alexander did not disband his leet but rather depended on his newly acquired tool of power to consolidate his position. He sent ships and army from his new navy back to the Aegean to clear it of any remnants of the Persian leet. From then onwards, the Aegean and the Southeastern Mediterranean became a Makedonian mare nostrum. he Persian naval supremacy in the Mediterranean was dissolved and the Persians with their allies, mainly the Spartans, were convincingly defeated. Antipater, his regent and military commander back in Greece, defeated the Spartan King Agis III at Megalopolis in 331/330 B.C. and eliminated any resistance to the Makedonians back home. When Dareios realized the diicult situation he got himself into, he tried to reach a negotiated peace agreement, which Alexander turned down. Facing no danger at the rear of his army, he went ahead with his advancement and at Gaugamela about 80 km northwest of Arbela in Assyria, he defeated the Persians in a last and decisive battle and was proclaimed king of Asia. For more details and additional information, see Parpas (2013) and Parpas (2014). he river leet in India (326-325 B.C.) was partly newly built and partly provided by locals. here is a disagreement on the number of ships reported in the ancient sources. Ptolemy in Arrian gives 2,000 (Arr. 6.2.4), Nearchos gives only 800, which includes ships of war, merchantmen and horse transports (Arr. Indica 19.7). Diodoros (Diod. 17.95.5) and Curtius (Curt. 9.3.22) both give 1,000 ships. he discrepancies are probably due to the smaller ships that were not always included in the total igure. It is worth noting that nothing is heard of the river leet in India later on. Str. 16.1.11 Arr. 7.19.5-6 Arr. 7.1.2-3 Arr. 5.25.3; 5.26.1-2 Cole and Gasche (2007) Hansen (1967) Cole and Gasche (2007), p. 19: “he Euphrates entered directly into the Gulf until after the time of Alexander, when it began to low into the Tigris.” For more details see Cole and Gasche (2007), p. 19, note 107. NOTES 14) 15) 16) 17) 18) 19) 20) 21) 22) 23) 24) 25) 26) 27) 28) 29) 30) Plin. 6.32.147 Arr. 7.20.3 Cole and Gasche (2007), p. 21, Fig. 69 Cole and Gasche (2007), p. 47 Arr. 7.20.3 Cole and Gasche (2007), pp. 19-21 Arr. 7.7.5 Plin. 6.30.124 Juba was the king of Mauritania (48 B.C.-23 A.D.). Plin. 6.31.130 Arr. 7.7.3-5 Gill (2011), p. 12. Safar, Mustafa, Lloyd (1981), p. 33. Hansman (1967), p. 35, Fig. 2; Cole and Gasche (2007), p. 38 Plin. 6.31.129-130 Plin. 6.31.128-131 Evidence in ancient sources that all rivers emptied into the lake and from there into the sea: • he Tigris empties into the Chaldean Lakes and from there discharges into the sea: “he Tigris […] splits into two channels […] when the two streams, have reunited the river is called Pasitigris. Afterwards it is joined by the Kerkhah from Media, and, as we have said, […] empties itself into the Chaldaean Lakes, and broadens them out to a width of 62 miles. hen it lows out of the Lakes in a vast channel and passing on the right-hand side of the town of Charax discharges into the Persian Sea, the mouth of the river being 10 miles wide. he mouths of the two rivers used to be 25 miles apart, or as others record 7 miles, and both were navigable; but a long time ago the Euphrates was dammed by the Orcheni and other neighbouring tribes in order to irrigate their lands, and its water is only discharged into the sea by way of the Tigris.” (Plin. 6.31.129-131) • he Tigris and the joint Choaspes-Eulaios streams meet in a lake and then empty to the sea: “Polycleitus says that the Choaspes, the Eulaeus, and also the Tigris meet in a kind of a lake, and then empty from that lake into the sea. […] Others, however, say that the rivers which low through Susis meet in one stream, that of the Tigris, opposite 317 THE HELLENISTIC GULF • • 31) 32) 33) 34) 35) 36) 37) 38) 318 the intermediate canals of the Euphrates; and that on this account the Tigris, at its outlets, has the name Pasitigris.” (Str. 15.3.4) Between the Euphrates and the Pasitigris is the lake: “[…] for the seaboard of the Arabians borders next on the mouth of the Euphrates and the Pasitigris, the whole of the intervening space being occupied by a lake, that is, the lake that receives the Tigris.” (Str. 15.3.5) All the rivers, including the Tigris and the Euphrates, empty into the lake and then join the sea: “[…] Onesicritus says that all the rivers empty into the lake, both the Euphrates and the Tigris; but that the Euphrates, again issuing from the lake, joins with the sea by its own separate mouth.” (Str. 15.3.5) Cole and Gasche (2007), p. 26, note 135 According to Cole and Gasche [(2007), p. 30], it is located about 30 km northeast of Al-Khayaber. Hansman (1967), Fig. 2 refers to two canals. he second man-made canal was constructed at a later date. Diod. 19.18-19. For detailed discussion, refer to Cole and Gasche (2007), p. 27. Cole and Gasche (2007), p. 28, note 147. According to Pliny and Strabo, by the irst century A.D., the name Pasitigris was also used to designate the stream that inally entered the Gulf near Forat, the combination of Tigris, Euphrates (Shatt al-Arab) and Eulaios/Pasitigris. Plin. 6.31.139 Cole and Gasche (2007), p. 15; Arr. 7.7.1-2 Nearchos, son of Androtimos, was a Cretan and a trusted friend of Alexander from his early age. His family lived in Amphipolis, where he most probably acquired his shipping and sailing skills. In 334/333 B.C., Alexander appointed him satrap of Lykia and Pamphylia. He joined Alexander in Baktria in the spring of 328 B.C. In Autumn 326 B.C., he was appointed admiral of the Indus leet that Alexander had assembled at the Hydaspes. From there, it took him ten months to sail down to Patala. From the Indus river, he sailed with a leet of about 150 ships all the way along the coast to the mouth of the Gulf, where he met Alexander, and from there to Susa and Babylon. he expedition is described in detail in his book, which is lost, but fortunately it formed the basis of Arrian’s Indica. We know that Nearchos was in Babylon when Alexander died because it was after a banquet Alexander gave in his honour that Alexander NOTES 39) 40) 41) 42) 43) 44) 45) 46) 47) 48) 49) 50) 51) 52) 53) 54) 55) 56) 57) 58) 59) 60) 61) 62) went to Medios’ drinking party that led to his death. he last we hear of him is in 313/312 B.C. with Demetrios Poliorketes. Most probably, afterwards he retired to write his memoirs. For further details and information on Nearchos, the reader is referred to Heckel (1992), pp. 228-233. he naval commander of the navy was Onesikritos [Heckel (1992), p. 230]. According to Ernst Badian: “Nearchus was in overall command. Onesicritus was in charge of navigation; i.e. it would be Nearchus’ job to decide where the expedition was going and Onesicritus’ to see that it got there.” [Potts (1990 Vol. II), p. 3, note 9] Arr. Indica 21.1 Curt. 9.10.3; Diod. 17.104.3 Hauben (1976), p. 92: “he number of vessels that took part in the expedition is unknown but may, as Tarn believes (n. 99), have been in the vicinity of 100 to 150 (n. 100).” Arr. Indica 19.7; Arr. 6.18.3 Arr. 6.15.1 Arr. Indica 20.9 Arr. Indica 18.1-10 Lane Fox (1986), p. 386 Hammond (1980), p. 238: Hammond believes that “the marines hardly exceeded a thousand”. Arr. Indica 23.7 Arr. Indica 40.11; Hammond (1980), p. 239 Arr. 6.20.5 Arr. 6.21.3 Arr. 7.20.9-10 Arr. Indica 32.10-12 Arr. Indica 32.6-9 Arr. Indica 36-37.10. According to Arrian (Indica 38.1), the length of the voyage along the Karmanian coast was 3,700 stades. Arr. Indica 32.7 Arr. Indica 32.9 Arr. Indica 33.2-3 Brunt (1983), p. 403 Arr. Indica 36.3 Arr. Indica 37.2; Str. 16.3 319 THE HELLENISTIC GULF 63) 64) 65) 66) 67) 68) 69) 70) 71) 72) 73) 74) 75) 76) 77) 78) 79) 80) 81) 82) 83) 84) 85) 86) 87) 88) 89) 90) 91) 320 Dr. Fahed Al-Wohaibi; Potts (2009), p. 38 Arr. Indica 37.3 Str. 16.3.5 Huntingford (1976), p. 104 Huntingford (1976), p. 105. Semiramis might be Larak island some 40 km north of Cape Musandam at the entrance of the Gulf. Arr. Indica 37.2-4 Str. 16.3.7 Arr. Indica 37.9-10 Arr. Indica 38-39.9 he length of the voyage was 4,400 stades (Arr. Indica 40.2). Arr. Indica 38.4 Arr. Indica 38.8 For more details on the trip, see Potts (2014), pp. 135-145. Arr. Indica 39.3 Brunt (1983), p. 420, note 1 Potts (2009), p. 38, note 133 Whitehouse (1996), p. 342 Str. 7.15.3 Arr. Indica 40-42.10 he length of the voyage was 2,000 stades (Arr. Indica 42.4-5). Cole and Gasche (2007), p. 41, note 213 Arr. Indica 40.8-41.1 Arr. Indica 41.2-5 Arr. Indica 41.7 Cole and Gasche (2007), p. 41, note 211. Pliny moves Teredon more to the north, when Euphrates was emptying into the Tigris (Plin. 6.32.145); Potts (1990 Vol. II), p. 7, note 25 and p. 8, note 30. Although trade through Teredon was greatly reduced due to Alexander’s and Seleukid foundations. According to Juba, Teredon was still visited by Parthian merchants around his time (Plin. 7.145). Salles (2012), p. 299 Arr. Indica 41.7-8 Arr. Indica 42.4 Cole and Gasche (2007), p. 42, Fig. 73 NOTES 92) Arr. Indica 41.8. he distance of 3,300 stades agrees with today’s actual distance of about 600 km from Babylon to the southern tip of Khawar Sabiya. 93) Arr. Indica 42.1-2 94) Arr. Indica 42.4-8 95) Cole and Gasche (2007), p. 45, note 216 96) Arr. 7.7.1-2 97) Arr. 7.7.6-7. his is also attested in Strabo: “[…] on account of the cataracts, purposely constructed, the rivers cannot receive the merchandise that comes in from the sea nor bring down any either, and that all traic is carried on by land.” 98) Potts (1990 Vol. II), p. 2 99) Parpas (2014), p. 191, note 6 and p. 193, note 20 100) Curt. 10.1.19. he septemremes were introduced for sea warfare by the Phoenicians at a later date. hey were used extensively in the Roman wars. It is highly unlikely that Alexander had taken delivery of such warships at that time. 101) Str. 16.1.11 102) “Aristobulus says that Alexander also found the leet at Babylon; the part which was with Nearchus had sailed up the Euphrates from the Persian Sea, but the rest had been brought up from Phoenicia, two Phoenician quinqueremes, three quadriremes, twelve triremes and some thirty triacontoroi, which had been broken up and carried across from Phoenicia to the Euphrates, to the city of hapsacus, put together again there, and sailed down to Babylon.” (Arr. 7.19.3-6) 103) (penteres = singular, pentereis = plural, same for dieres, trieres and tetreres) 104) (triakontoros = singular, triakontoroi= plural, same for pentekontoros) 105) Meijer (1986), p. 14 106) Parpas (2013), pp. 194-199 107) https://www.hellenicnavy.gr/el/istoria/ploia-mouseiaka-ekthemata/triirisolympias. [Accessed 15 May 2016] 108) Murray (2012), p. 24 109) Parpas (2013), pp. 199-201 110) Meijer (1986), p. 119 111) Curt. 4.3.11 112) Murray (2012), p. 30 113) Murray (2012), p. 15 114) Curt. 10.1.19 115) Cole and Gasher (2007), p. 47 321 THE HELLENISTIC GULF 116) Meijer, p. 21, Fig. 3.3 117) Meijer, p. 21, Fig. 3.2 118) Cole and Gasher (2007), p. 47, notes 219, 220 he following passage gives a detailed account of Sennacherib’s movements in the Mesopotamian delta. he Gulf region more than three and a half centuries before the Makedonians were sailing through its rivers and shorelines was not much diferent from what Nearchos and Arrian described. “My warriors went down the Euphrates on the ships while I myself kept to the dry land at their side. I had (them) proceed to Bab-Salimeti […] from the bank of the Euphrates, to the shore of the sea, a distance of two double hours […] and the waves of the sea […] In that place I pitched my camp. Massive waves of the sea came up and entered my tent, completely surrounding me while in my camp. All my people were forced to huddle for ive days and nights in the strong(est) ships. My warriors’ ships reached the shallows at the river’s mouth, where the Euphrates discharges its waters in a straight line into the turbulent sea. I myself stood opposite them along the shore of the Salt-Sea (ID Mar-ra-ti). To Ea, king of the deep, I made pure oferings, and with a ship made of gold I cast into the sea a ish and crab, both made of gold as well. I had my ships make a speedy crossing over to Nagitu. At the shore of the fearful sea, which was unit for riding and walking, exceedingly diicult ground, the people of Chaldea who lived at Nagitu, and Nagitu-di’ bina, the people of Hilmu, Pillatu, and Hupapanu, saw my warriors’ ships and gathered together archers, wagons, horses, mules, a countless host, to oppose them. At the Ulaya, a river whose banks were good, the battle line was drawn up. Holding the elevated ground from my warriors they ofered battle. My warriors reached the embankments (and) mooring places. From the boats to the riverbanks they swarmed towards them like locusts and defeated them.” Another inscription identiied Bab-Salimeti as the southernmost point of Babylonia. here is still no credible explanation why Sennacherib did not sail straight down the Tigris but instead he transported his ships overland to the Euphrates and from there sailed down the Gulf to Nagitu, which was located on an island in the sea. Most probably, the marshes near Qurna with the wetlands and islets, which the author visited with his friend Abu Riadh, do not difer that much from the marshes around Nagitu, where Sennacherib defeated the Chaldeans. 119) Arr. 7.19.4 322 NOTES 120) Meijer (1986), p. 115 121) Parpas (2013), p. 122: he Athenian leet in 323/322 comprised about 392 ships. Of these 332 were triereis and 60 tetrereis. 122) Grainger (2011), p. 12. In the Athenian ship-sheds there was a famous hanginggear store designed by Philo. his meant the Athenian ships were kept on dry land, but were available to be launched and commissioned at short notice. herefore, the life of the ships was prolonged while the leet kept its readiness. 123) Arr. 7.19.4 124) Arr. 7.19.3 125) Arr. 6.2.4 126) Arr. 6.20.4 127) Arr. 7.19.5 128) Arr. 7.16.1-3 129) Arr. 7.26.1-2 130) Dalley (1989), p. 9 131) Diod. 19.12.5 132) Diod. 19.13.3 133) Cole (1994), p. 95 134) Marc Van De Mieroop (2003), pp. 3-4. Sennacherib’s description of the destruction of Babylon, which stands out for its detail, is carved on the clifs of the Bavian gorge at the mouth of an irrigation canal, which he constructed in the mountains to the north of Nineveh. Royal inscriptions of this type are a main source of reconstruction of the history of Mesopotamia. Sennacherib’s inscription is very important since it describes an act that set in motion a series of events for the next 150 years. 135) Van De Mieroop (2003), p. 18, note 37 136) Cole (1994), p. 95, note 76 137) Cole (1999), p. 105: “Finally, a watercourse called the Pallukkatu is attested from the reign of Neriglissar on. From the perspective of Sippar, the Pallukkatu was situated across the Purattu, that is, to the west of it. his is proven by the mention of the village Al(u-sa)-Samas sa neberti Puratti in BM 63900, which can be identiied with […] etc. Because of topographical constraints, the channel must have departed from the Purattu somewhere west of Sippar, but certainly not at Falluga as has been commonly suggested. herefore it could have only followed the modern course of the Euphrates, which currently passes between Iskandariyah 323 THE HELLENISTIC GULF 138) 139) 140) 141) 142) 143) 144) 145) 146) 147) 148) 149) 150) 151) 152) 153) 154) 155) 156) 157) 158) 159) 160) 161) 162) 163) 324 Terrace and the western desert. We cannot yet determine precisely when the bed of the Pallukkatu was replaced by the bed of Euphrates, but it is quite clear that it followed the path followed by the former.” Potts (1990 Vol. II), p. 7, note 24 Cole (1999), p. 105, note 52 Cole (1999), p. 105, note 53 Cole (1999), p. 105, note 53; Arr. 7. 21.1-4 Arr. 7.21.5 Potts (1990 Vol. II), p. 7, note 24 Str. 16.1.11 Arr. 7.21.1-6 Plin. 6.31.138 Plin. 6.31.139 Cole and Gasche (2007), p. 15. We estimate the distance between Qurna and Al-Khayaber to be about 20 km. By adding 1.85 km from Al-Khayaber to the coast, as suggested by Pliny, we arrive at approximately 22 km. Arr. 7.21.7 Potts (1990 Vol. II), p. 7, note 26 Cole (1994), pp. 81-103 Cole (1994), p. 95 For further discussion, see Cohen (2013), pp. 117-121. Cohen (2013), pp. 125 and 174-176 Iossif and Lorber, p. 27, note 44. It has been argued that on account of many identical seal impressions found at Seleukeia on the Tigris and Uruk (Orchoi), Uruk was under the administration of the eastern Seleukid capital. Salles (1987), p. 100 Plin. 6.32.159 Martinez-Seve (2014), p. 372 Potts (1990 Vol. II), pp. 7-8. Ritter proposes a location near modern Kufa, while Tscherikower suggested that the Parthian city Vologesia might be located on the same site. Curt. 4.3.1-2 and 4.3.7 Plut. Alex. 25.4 Plin. 12.32.62 Str. 16.1.11 NOTES 164) 165) 166) 167) 168) 169) 170) 171) 172) Arr. 7.20.2 Arr. 7.23.5 Arr. 7.19.5-6 Arr. 7.20.1 Potts (1990 Vol. II), p. 122 Iossif and Lorber (2009), p. 23 Wright (2011), p. 152 Potts (1990 Vol. I), p. 350 Arr. 7.25.2-5: “he royal journals have this account […] At this time he gave the oicers instructions for the march and the voyage; the foot were to prepare for departure after three days and those who were to sail with him after four. […] Next day he bathed and after bathing sacriiced and explained to Nearchus and the other oicers all about the voyage. […] summoned the most important oicers and gave them instructions for the voyage.” 173) he Ephimerides (King’s Journals or Diaries) are mentioned in Arr. 7.25-26 and Plut. Alex. 76. Up until recently, they were regarded as an authentic view that is now challenged and even rejected by a number of contemporary historians. L. Pearson calls them “a faked or ictitious diary”. He casts doubt on the historical value on a big part of the content of these diaries. It is probable that the journals reported the numerous meetings and active discussions between the king and Nearchos with respect to the campaign in Arabia in order to undermine the spreading of rumours that the king was killed by his own generals. On the other hand, A.E. Samuel (1965), while admitting that certain lucid details in the Ephimerides could be doubtful, accepts the view that they are based on authentic Babylonian documents. For more detailed discussion on the subject, see Pearson (1960) and Hauben (1976), pp. 94-95. 174) With this formidable navy built up, the focal point of naval activity shifted from eastern Mediterranean to Babylon and the Gulf. In spite of this, Alexander intended to launch a large scale naval build-up in southeastern Mediterranean since he was planning to put the entire Mediterranean under his control in order to extend his empire to the west. hese plans were revealed by Perdikkas to the army in Babylon after Alexander’s death. According to Diod. 18.4, these plans appeared in the hypomnemata. here has been a heated debate among contemporary scholars on the authenticity of these documents. It has been argued that the contents of these hypomnemata have been touched up and 325 THE HELLENISTIC GULF 175) 176) 177) 178) 179) 180) 181) 182) 183) 184) 326 inlated in order to get the army to reject them. For detailed discussion, see Hauben (1976), pp. 97-98, note 119. Arr. 7.20.7-10: “his was told to Alexander, partly by Archias who had been sent with a triacontor to reconnoitre the coastal voyage towards Arabia, and reached the island Tylus, though he did not venture further. Androsthenes was despatched with another triacontor, and sailed round part of the Arabian peninsula: but of all those sent of, Hieron of Soli the steersman, who also received a triacontor from Alexander, went furthest, yet, though his sailing orders were to coast round the whole Arabian peninsula till he reached the Arabian Gulf [Red Sea] on the Egyptian side of Heroonpolis, he did not dare to go further, though he had sailed the greater part of Arabia, but turned about and reported to Alexander that the peninsula was vast in size and nearly as large as India and that a promontory ran far into the great sea. Nearchus’ crews, when sailing from India before they altered course for the Persian Gulf, had seen it stretching not far away, and they were on the point of putting in there, as advised by Onesicritus the helmsman. But Nearchus says he himself forbade this; having completed his voyage round the Persian Gulf, he had to report to Alexander on the commission for which he had been despatched, that in fact he had not been sent to navigate the Ocean, but to reconnoitre the coast lying on the Ocean, the inhabitants of the coast, its anchorages, water supplies and the manners and customs of the people, and to discover if any part of the coast was fertile or not; and that this was the reason that Alexander’s force came through safely, for they would have been lost if they had sailed passed the desert parts of Arabia. On this ground Hieron too is said to have turned about.” Str. 16.3.2 Potts (1990 Vol. II), p. 5, note 15 Potts (1990 Vol. II), p. 6 Grainger 2011, p. 12 Parpas (2014), p. 75 Parpas (2014), p. 119 For detailed discussion, see Engels (1978), pp. 1-10. Engels (1978), Appendix 5, Tables 1, 2 and 3, pp. 144-145 In her article “Phoenician Shipwrecks of the 8th to the 6th century B.C. – Overview and Interim Conclusions”, p. 2, Selma Abdelhamid writes: “A text found in Ugarit could indeed indicate that Canaanean ships around 1200 B.C. carried up to 450 tons; for the irst millennium B.C. maximal cargoes are thought to NOTES 185) 186) 187) 188) have taken 100 to 500 tons.” [Available at: https://www.academia.edu/21391893/ Phoenician_Shipwrecks_of_the_8_th_to_the_6_th_century_B.C._Overview_ and_Interim_Conclusions (Accessed 10 May 2016)] Meijer (1986), pp. 227-228 Engels (1978), Appendix 5, Table 7, p. 153 Engels (1978), p. 15 Engels (1978), p. 145 CHAPTER III HELLENISTIC NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE GULF 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10) 11) 12) 13) 14) 15) 16) 17) 18) 19) 20) 21) 22) 23) Possehl (1996), p. 133 Potts (2009), p. 32 Potts (1996), p. 282 Str. 16.3.2 Hdt. 4.44 Plut. Alex. 34.1; Parpas (2014), pp. 141-155 Parpas (2014), p. 165, notes 10a, 10b Strootman (2015a), p. 6 Strootman (2015a), p. 11 Shipley (2000), p. 294 Arr. 7.19.5 Potts (1990 Vol. II), p. 10 Str. 16.1.11 Bosworth (2002), p. 215 Newell 1978, Plate XXI Newell 1978, Plate XXXV Newell 1978, Plate XXXVIII Newell 1978, Plate XXXI honemann (2015), p. 21, Fig. 1.24 honemann (2015), p. 146, Fig. 8.1 honemann (2015), p. 54, Fig. 3.13 honemann (2015), p. 27, Fig. 2.2 honemann (2015), p. 156, Fig. 8.19 327 BIBLIOGRAPHY Agius (2005) Agius, D.A., Seafaring in the Arabian Gulf and Oman. he People of the Dow, New york: Routledge 2005. Al-Nashef (1986) Al-Nashef, K., “he Deities of Dilmun”, in H.A. Al Khalifa and M. Rice (eds.), Bahrain hrough the Ages: he Archaeology, London: KPI, 1986. Al-Wohaibi (1980) Al-Wohaibi, F., Studio Storico-Archaeologico della Costa Occidentale del Golfo Arabico in Età Ellenistica, Rome: L’Erma di Bretschneider, 1980. 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