Pakistan's Military Elite

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Abstract: Pakistan's Army is a very politically important organization. Yet its opacity has hindered academic research. We use open sources to construct unique new data on the backgrounds, careers, and post-retirement activities of post-1971 Corps Commanders and Directors-General of Inter-Services Intelligence. We provide evidence of bureaucratic predictability and professionalism while officers are in service. After retirement, we show little involvement in electoral politics but extensive involvement in military-linked corporations, state employment, and other positions of influence. This combination provides Pakistan's military with an unusual blend of professional discipline internally and political power externally - even when not directly holding power.

This paper examines the inner workings of Pakistan's army, an organization central to questions of local, regional, and global stability. We investigate the organizational politics of the Pakistan Army using unique individual-level data on the corps commanders of the Army and Directors-General of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) since 1971. The corps commanders are of enormous importance, working with the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) to launch coups, withdraw from power, forge external and internal security policies, and shape the politics of Pakistan.[1] We gathered data from open sources on the personal and career backgrounds of the corps commanders and ISI directors-general, their trajectories within the military, and what they did in retirement, both immediately after leaving service and later in retirement. These data provides systematic, detailed information on the military's elite personnel and, crucially, how it has managed to keep them largely on board with a complex, politically demanding project. These data have numerous and important limitations – but they are also, to the best of our knowledge, unique in the Pakistani case, and among a small number of similar studies world-wide.[3]

We first show strong evidence of high levels of bureaucratic institutionalization and professionalism within the Pakistan Army. Despite its recurrent praetorianism and ongoing political influence, the rules within the organization seem to be generally followed, with limited factionalism and consistent promotion pathways. This shows the stark contrast between this rational-bureaucratic organization and other political militaries racked by internal fratricide, plagued by factional rivalries, or vulnerable to divide-and-rule strategies by ruling elites.

We then provide unique data on the retirement of the corps commanders. We show a clearly institutionalized transmission belt that shifts retired elites into military-owned charitable

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[1] This includes the nine standard corps, plus Army Air Defence and Army Strategic Forces Command. This comes to 183 officers over 45 years. There have been 18 DG's ISI, of whom a number were also corps commanders.
[3] For other similar studies, see Lee and Laksmana 2017, Nakanishi 2013, Poczter and Pepinsky 2016, and Kammen and Chandra 2010. The paper from this paper will be available upon publication.

foundations and affiliated corporations, specific posts in the civilian government, and other positions of real and/or symbolic authority. These positions of influence, in addition to generous pensions and other benefits provided to retired generals, provide powerful incentives to toe the organizational line while serving, and to avoid directly participating in politics after retirement. Importantly, these "off-ramps" are centrally controlled by the high command.

Few retired corps commanders go into electoral politics, and most only join the private sector late in retirement (often working for multinationals). Of the data we have, over 60 percent of corps commanders' first post-retirement positions are in the service of the state. As they move deeper into retirement, more tentative data suggests greater involvement in the private sector and civil society, but still little direct embrace of electoral politics.

As a result, we suggest a different way of looking at the military's political influence as a unitary actor in Pakistan. Internal bureaucratic discipline fused with the continued cooperation of elites *even after they retire* are crucial to the military's professional cohesion and its high levels of power within Pakistani society. This distinctive combination has allowed the Pakistan Army remarkable influence over key areas of national policy - even when it does not directly rule the country. Common arguments about military professionalism and praetorianism may miss the coexistence of internal professionalism and external politicization.[4] Our evidence on deep continuities over time also shows that distinguishing between military and civilian rule can be very difficult: the end of formal military rule may not usher in civilian control of key areas of national policy.[5]

New Evidence on Pakistan's Army

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[4] Cf. Huntington 1967. Finer 1962, Barany 2012 make similar arguments.
[5] Major efforts to distinguish democracy and dictatorship, as well as variants of authoritarianism, include Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014, Svolik 2012, and Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2013.

Our approach differs from the existing literature on the Pakistani security state in two ways. First, extant work is dominated by macro-historical narratives.[6] These are excellent and important. But without further access to the military's archives, there are serious limitations to conducting further research of this kind. Adjudicating among existing narrative accounts is difficult without further access to primary evidence. Some scholars are able to conduct interviews with current and former military officers, but access is uneven and restricted, the results are often contradictory, and the data are only helpful for certain research questions. Reliance on the military's publications has many of the same limitations.

Second, Pakistan is almost always compared to India. India is the praetorian road not taken, the historically-similar matched pair that followed a more appropriately "objective control" model of the military and politics. This is a helpful comparison for the first decade of South Asia's post-colonial history. But after the 1958 coup, or even as early as the entry of General Ayub Khan into the civilian cabinet in 1954, the comparison loses value. To understand the origins of Pakistan's military politics, comparative analysis with India is essential; beyond that, it devolves into an apples and oranges comparison. Instead, we look within the military's organization to generate new insights into its functioning.

Micro-Data on Pakistan's Military Elite

We used open sources to gather data on soldiers who became corps commander from 1971 onward. We also gathered the same data for the DGs of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), some of whom never became a corps commander, providing a small complementary dataset. This is, to the best of our knowledge, unique public data.[8] The top position in the Army, Chief of

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[6] Cohen 1998, Fair 2014a, Shah 2014, Wilkinson 2015, Siddiqa 2007, Cloughley 2008, Nawaz 2008, Rizvi 2000.
[8] For an important exception, see Fair and Nawaz 2011 on district-level recruitment patterns and Fair 2014b, who combines these data with household surveys.

Army Staff (COAS), presides over a tight pyramid of control. Technically, the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) is a higher position with jurisdiction over all three

services, but in reality CJCSC is fairly powerless, and mainly a way for worthy senior officers to

achieve a fourth star before retirement.[9] Below the COAS are General Headquarters (GHQ) staff

positions, combat commands at the corps and division level, positions heading military

academies, and a variety of other postings, from running ordnance factories to staffing UN

peacekeeping missions. The corps commanders are the crucial collective elite who work with the

COAS to manage this sprawling military establishment.

   We used internet resources, journalistic coverage, government documents, and published

secondary sources to gather data on the corps commanders through February 2017. This ranged

from newspaper articles to Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) press releases to annual

reports of military-affiliated corporations to Wikipedia (with cross-checking). We created

individual documents for each officer, which vary in quality and extent because of variation in

the amount of data available, with coding and sources to provide maximum transparency. In

addition to the dataset, these materials will be made publicly available, which will help improve

their quality over time. We focused on the post-1971 period because data was more readily

available and this time frame allowed us to examine three periods of civilian rule (1972-77,

1988-1999, 2008-present) and two periods of military rule (Zia, 1977-1988 and Musharraf,

1999-2008).

   The unit of analysis is the individual officer who became a corps commander or DG ISI

in or after 1971. The definition of corps commander we adopt is broader than just the nine

"standard" combat corps: we include Army Air Defence Command and Army Strategic Forces

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[9] Occasionally, if rarely, air marshals or admirals are appointed CJCJC.

Command. We assigned each CC and DG ISI a unique ID, since some individuals had multiple commands of a corps and/or the ISI, which would lead to replication of the same individual data if the command was the unit of analysis. To assess overall military careers, we coded the officer's first corps/ISI command, a later corps/ISI command if relevant, the year that the first corps/ISI command began and ended, and the year that the officer's overall military service began and ended. We ended up with a Corps Commander dataset of 183 officers and an ISI dataset of 18 officers. Eighteen of these officers were still serving as of February 2017, but the vast majority are retired. Two former corps commanders died while serving, both as COAS: Asif Nawaz in 1993 and Zia ul Haq in 1988. Two former DGs ISI died while in service, Akhtar Abdur Rahman – in the same plane crash as Zia while CJCSC – and Major General Riaz Hussain.

Becoming a Corps Commander: Bureaucratic Predictability

In this section, we discuss pre-corps command characteristics of the corps commanders in our sample. We separate DG ISI analysis for a distinct section later in the paper. Our main conclusion is that the Pakistan Army, consistent with extant accounts, is a highly professionalized and bureaucratized organization, showing substantial continuities along a range of outcomes. There are some exceptions, mainly surrounding the top commanders in periods of military rule or extreme political instability, but there is little evidence of the pervasive factionalism that has plagued many other political militaries. By reducing grievances and disagreements, such a meritocratic system also enables the military to polish its image of unity and cohesiveness in the public eye, an important consideration for an organization obsessed with its public image and legitimacy. While there is a baseline level of friction within the organization on particular decisions, especially concerning the wide latitude army chiefs have to choose corps

commanders, by and large, the Pakistan army does not see splits either among top commanders or between commanders and the ranks.

*Demographic and Education Characteristics*

Where are the eventual corps commanders from? These were the most difficult variables, by far, for us to gather and thus any findings are highly tentative. 87 of 183 observations are missing, but of the sample , 55 percent were born in Punjab and 21 percent in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). Only 3 percent of our sample were born in Sindh, 3 percent in Azad Kashmir, and 2 percent in Balochistan. KPK is thus moderately over-represented while Sindh is very heavily under-represented, affecting both Muhajirs (Urdu-speaking migrants from India at Partition) and Sindhis. Earlier generations of officers have substantial numbers born in present-day northwestern or central India, but this cohort has obviously diminished dramatically. While missing data is a massive problem, this basic finding aligns entirely with all other accounts of the demographics of the Army. Given that we expect better data on more prominent officers, this further suggests that these provinces contribute the bulk of the military elite.

This also provide insight into ethnicity, a variable we also struggled to code. Though not everyone born in Punjab is Punjabi or in KPK is Pashtun, it is highly suggestive. We also explore how these dynamics have shifted as India-born, Urdu-speaking officers move from the scene. Of officers whose first corps command came after 2004, 61 percent are from Punjab, 18 percent from KPK, and 7 percent from Sindh. This suggests a tilt toward Punjab and continued Sindhi under-representation at the highest levels of the military, which aligns with the findings of Fair and Nawaz (2011) that showed Sindhi under-representation and over-representation from KPK in recruitment. They identify something of an increase over time from Sindh, however, which

may eventually translate into representation in the military elite. Similarly, the military has made recent efforts to increase recruitment from Balochistan; they will reach senior ranks in a decade.

What is the distribution of taking the first corps command over time? Figure 1 shows the incidence of first commands by year. There are some obvious periods of instability that lead to reshuffling – 2001-2 as Musharraf tried to bring the Army under tighter control in the face of American pressure, the late Zia years, and the last years of Musharraf's rule (2005-2007). All army chiefs are extended some latitude to form their own "management team" upon ascending to the position, though from a pool of two- and three-star generals that is relatively fixed. In addition, the elevation to army chief of a general who has officers senior to him will lead to their premature retirement, thus opening three star positions. The one spike fitting none of these categories – around 2010 – is an idiosyncratic result driven by General Kayani being granted an extension, which forced multiple retirements and a reshuffling among the corps commanders.

**Figure 1. Distribution of first corps commands by year**

Fair and Nawaz (2011) identify an expansion of Pakistan Military Academy-Kakul (PMA) intakes in the 1980s, resulting in a general increase in the size of the candidate pool, thereby necessitating more and quicker reshuffles. Quicker reshuffles can also be a symptom of greater politicization and favoritism at the very top of the pyramid. As we discuss in the second half of the paper, experience as a corps commander – as a position of recognized leadership – can serve as a boon to future career options, within and outside the military. An army chief may thus seek to reward loyalists with this status, however briefly. Consistent with this view of such positions as a leadership credential, we find that the on average, the length of time spent in command of a corps has reduced significantly over the last few decades. The typical officer beginning command of a corps in the 2010s spends barely half of the time (18 vs 33 months) in such a position relative to their predecessors in the 1980s. Tellingly, of the nine officers who spent less than a year commanding a corps, eight assumed command after 2001.

Figure 2. Time Commanding Corps over Time

Time (in yrs) commanding corps by decade of service

We have plausible evidence of the beginning of military service for 133 of 183 corps commanders. Figure 2 shows when future corps commanders begin their service. Because of missing data, this may not be representative, particularly of those ascended before 1998. If reflecting an underlying reality, the spike in the sample around 1971 is striking. Two explanations are possible for why these PMA classes did so well. First, 1971 would have produced the lieutenants who entered the military at its nadir after the loss of East Pakistan, perhaps uniquely positioned to advance as a regenerative force. Second, they entered corps command eligibility in the Musharraf years, when the COAS needed political support. His ISI chief and future two-term COAS, Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, graduated from the PMA in 1971. Handing out promotions to this cohort may have been a way of maintaining internal political support, especially in the tumultuous 2005-7 period of growing insurgency and faltering military rule. We return to this question of elite management below. This is the only period of entrants in which peer-favoritism was plausible, however.

Figure 3. Year of entry into military service

How long does it take to become a corps commander? We use the year of service beginning outlined above and the year of the first command to estimate the amount of time in the military before commanders reach a corps command. Of the 133 officers with data on this variable in the sample, they average 33 years in service prior to first corps command, meaning they take this command around 53-55 years old. There is a fairly clear clustering we see in Figure 3: notwithstanding outliers in each direction, most corps commanders take command around the same time in their lives and careers. The time to first command in the sample is 31.3 years for corps commanders who left service before 2000 and 33.7 for those who have retired since. If this is right, it may mean that the growing number of officers over time competing for slots, as shown in Fair and Nawaz (2011), is delaying promotion, pushing careers backward compared to the 1980s and 1990s.

With the average lieutenant-general retiring at 57-58, it is little surprise that this is the last posting for the plurality of corps commanders. This is also why a difference of means of a couple of years in time to first corps command is potentially very meaningful: taking command at 56 means an officer is at retirement age upon its completion, while taking command at 54 opens the possibility for one or more postings before retirement.

The general clustering of the retirement age, regardless of this subtler variation, suggests a highly bureaucratized, institutionalized organization. In personalized or factionalized militaries, we would expect a much higher variance, with favored officers – the son-in-law of the dictator, members of the dominant faction – being promoted early and often. The average time to first corps command of those officers who became Army Chief was 31.5 years, with 28 being the fastest (the ill-fated Khwaja Ziauddin) and 35 the oldest (the current COAS, Qamar Javed Bajwa). The relative youth of even the highest commanders at retirement also means they can

expect years of working life ahead, putting a premium on what to do these elites after they formally leave military service.

Figure 4. Time to first corps command

Military Pathways to Initial Corps Command

This section considers the military characteristics of the corps commanders. As noted already, our lack of a comparison pool of officers who were not selected for corps command limits inferences we can draw, but the strict pyramidal structure of the military, particularly the fact that key staff positions are fixed and can only be filled by one person at a time, does at least somewhat mitigate these concerns. Though similarly qualified with respect to skillset and talent, there are likely to be very few individuals who are identically-positioned with respect to experience and specific postings at any given point in time.

The Pakistan Army is dominated by the infantry. We have substantial data on the sub-branch affiliation of the corps commanders, with 151 out of 183. Of those on which we have

data, 66 percent are from the infantry, 15 percent from armor, 14 percent from artillery, and less than 5 percent from engineering or from air defense. This blend has not dramatically changed over time. Table 2 shows the sub-branch composition, estimating the proportion of officers departing service in four time periods by sub-branch. There is not much of a trend, beyond an apparent decline in artillery representation at the highest levels, and some variation in armor. Engineering and air defence are, unsurprisingly, marginal among the elite. This is an infantry army, and eight of ten army chiefs came up through the infantry according to our data. Future research will examine whether the patterns we do see may have any systematic cause. For instance, did the rise of COIN operations in the 2000s limit armor representation among the corps commanders who retired from 2008-2017?

Table 2. Sub-Branch Percentages of Corps Commanders (Periodized by Service End)

Period	Infantry	Artillery	Armour	Engineering	AAD
1974-1988 (N=20)	55	25	15	5	0
1989-1999 (N=29)	76	3	14	7	0
2000-2007 (N=33)	61	12	21	0	0
2008-2017 (N=52)	69	15	8	4	4
Currently serving (N=17)	65	6	24	0	6

Our data on education suffer from severe limitations. With this serious caveat, we find that 74 out of the 183 corps commanders received some sort of foreign training, meaning that at least 40 percent of the command elite have been exposed to international military experiences. Notably, not all foreign military experience is considered equally prestigious: competition for courses in the U.S., U.K., and Germany is especially pressing, while experience in Turkey and Bangladesh, say, is not viewed with the same regard. 105 have at least a Bachelor's degree, and

at least 96 have a Master's degree; chances are that the real proportion is higher. This is

consistent with a professional military that educates its elite, especially in the last two decades, a

period which has seen a greater emphasis on senior officers attaining post-graduate degrees.

We next examine the types of jobs held by officers just prior to their first corps

command. Here we present the general categories, and then examine more specific positions. We

have data for 150 out of 183 officers. Table 3 presents the overall distribution of posts held prior

to the first command.

Table 3. Pre-First Corps Command Posts

Pre-First Corps Command	Frequency	Proportion
GHQ Position	65	43.33
GOC, Combat Unit	29	19.33
Head of Army School	23	15.33
ISI Position	10	6.67
IG, Frontier Corps	7	4.67
DG, Rangers	5	3.33
Head of Govt. Agency	4	2.67
Commander, UN Mission	3	2.00
Martial Law Administrator	2	1.33
Defense Attache	1	0.67
Head of Army Organization	1	0.67
Total	150	100

The primary category of posting prior to the corps command is a staff position at General

Headquarters (GHQ). The second most common is being a General Officer Commanding (GOC)

of a combat unit – usually a division such as those at Bahawalpur, Murree, Multan, Sialkot,

Okara, or Kharian – but also units like the commando Special Service Group (SSG), or Force

Command Northern Areas (FCNA). Following these two core pathways, we see leading a

military school (the PMA, Command Staff College Quetta, National Defence University), having

a position in Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and serving with the Frontier Corps or Rangers, the

main paramilitary forces. Corps commanders are coming up through the pathways we would expect from a professional military organization, after serving for a long period of time.

Specific jobs prior to a command are numerous, and widely spread across responsibilities. Within the GHQ staff positions, the most common jumping-off points to a command are Adjutant General (N=10), military secretary (N=7), Vice Chief of General Staff (VCGS; N=7), and Chief of General Staff (N=6). Interestingly, leading PMA (N=7), NDU (N=6), and Command and Staff College (N=7) are also common steps to becoming a corps commander: though none of these are important operational/political positions, this suggests the importance of education within the army. Other positions have become more important over time; DG Rangers and IG Frontier Corps were once considered bureaucratic backwaters and represented the end of one's career, but today are considered important assignments after counter-insurgency operations gained prominence in the 2000s. As deeply politically involved as the Pakistan Army is, its internal structures appear highly institutionalized and professional: the military elite have held the kinds of demanding positions, in combat formations, staff positions, and military education, that should prepare the elite for increasingly onerous responsibilities. Indeed, it is rare, especially recently, to rise to Lt. General rank without having rotated through command, staff, and instructional appointments.

There does appear, tentatively, to be some shift in the composition of these pathways, with a greater reliance over time on staff and educational assignments directly prior to corps command. As Table 4 shows, of the 54 officers who left service in or prior to 2000 about whom we have prior command data, 35 percent held a GHQ staff position, 33 percent held a combat formation command, and 15 percent commanded an army school. By contrast, of the 96 retirees after 2000, GHQ positions accounted for 48 percent of pre-corps positions, heads of army

schools for 16 percent, and a combat formation command for only 11 percent. The importance of attaining a GHQ position seems to have shifted over time fairly dramatically since the mid-1980s. Of the 24 individuals who attained a non-ISI command post prior to 1984 for whom we have data, only two had previously held a GHQ position; by contrast, of the 130 individuals for whom we have data who became a corps commander after 1984, 60 (46 percent) held a GHQ posting. Only one-third as many officers were jumping directly from a combat unit into a corps command after 2000. While missing data remains a major concern, we know everyone who has commanded PMA, CSC Quetta, and NDU, which means we are at least not missing military education commandants in the earlier period. Of the current command elite, there is a mixed picture in between these extremes.

Table 4. Patterns in Pre-Corps Command Roles over Time (percentages)

Period	GHQ	GOC	Army School	ISI	Rangers	FC
Left service before 2001 (N=54)	35	33	15	2	2	6
Left service 2001-2017 (N=96)	48	11	16	9	4	4
Presently in service (N=17)	41	23.5	23.5	6	0	6

If there is in fact a trend, this suggests a more layered, bureaucratized promotion pathway over time, with greater emphasis on staff and educational leadership experience. A growing, increasingly complex military may require more of the skills that such positions demand, rather than just battlefield experience. Many major-generals have experience in command; their ability to handle other types of tasks may further differentiate them. Or this may also be a way to manage a growing set of potential elites, due to an increase in officer intake in the 1980s (Fair

and Nawaz 2011), as the number of senior corps commands remains fairly static. As noted above, there is tentative evidence that officers have to wait longer to get a corps command than previously, and cycling through staff and academy slots may be one way they spend this time. This may have been a particular issue in the late Musharraf years, when 1971 graduates received a striking number of commands at a time of political tumult and escalating domestic insurgency. Time at headquarters or at the academies also separates field commanders from trusted subordinate officers, which is useful for internal coup-proofing.

Overall, our evidence suggests that, in general, the Pakistan Army is a highly bureaucratic organization with quite routinized, institutionalized, and professionally-relevant pathways to the top. There does not appear to be the wild factionalism, personalization, or weak institutionalization of some other highly political militaries (such as Thailand). Though the very top of the ladder, selection to corps commander, sees room for personal preferences with the army chief enjoying considerable latitude, most rungs below the highest echelons follow a systematic and predictable path. Employing a more-or-less meritocratic system has the benefit of minimizing internal disagreements and grievances, an important consideration for an organization intensely conscious of its public image as unified and cohesive. The only evidence of the academy year-based preference we can find involves the 1971 graduates, but even this has multiple possible interpretations. These data do not radically change the conventional understanding of the Pakistan Army, but they do provide substantially greater detail, as well as much clearer insights about trends or their absence over time. We can now move into the more interesting world of what happens to these people once they have made it into the elite ranks.

After the First Corps Command

For most of the Pakistani military elite, their first corps command is their last major command (see Figure 5 below). Of the 140 corps commanders for whom we have reliable end-of-service dates, we find that 43 percent leave service the year that their first command ends, 11 percent the year after it ends, and 16 percent two years after the end of their first corps command. The average is 1.67 years from the end of the first corps command to the end of service. Only 15 percent make it to three years, and then only a few beyond that. The three key outliers are Zia ul Haq (twelve years, then death in plane crash), Pervez Musharraf (nine years, "retired" by being pushed out of power), and Ashfaq Pervez Kayani (nine years, retired). The first two were military dictators; the third was DG ISI from 2004-2007 under Musharraf, then COAS during the violent, politically volatile years of 2007-2013. That these are the outliers is good news for data quality – we are not getting random people being coded as surviving for a decade longer than average for unclear reasons.

We also have estimated ages at retirement. In the cases where we lack a confirmed end of service date, we assume that on average corps commanders retire two years after the end of their first command and compare that to the date of service entry for the cases in which we have that data. The mean of the 120 cases we can make this calculation for is 57.8 years. Depending on the specifics of the rank and the assignment, retirement age for corps commanders ranges from 57 to 60 years, not including individual extensions granted by the government. Figure 4 provides the distribution of end of service ages. Two of these are deaths in service – army chief Asif Nawaz (57) and President/COAS Zia ul Haq (64) – the rest are actual retirements. The list of oldest leavers of service is topped by Zia, Musharraf, and Kayani, who we will see again

below as having the longest gaps between end of first corps command and end of service.[16]

Leaving aside these cases, however, the basic pattern reaffirms the analysis throughout, with

relatively high levels of predictability and institutionalization in promotion pathways.

Figure 5. Estimated end-of-service ages of corps commanders

There is a minor difference in time from end of first corps to command to end of service

between those who ended service in or before 2000 (1.9 years) and those who left service after

2000 (1.52 years). This is barely suggestive, but, along with the evidence of a somewhat longer

time to first corps command, it could indicate the greater crowding at the top is pushing people

out a little bit more quickly as the pool has grown but the number of slots to go around has

remained constant. The basic picture is that the Pakistan Army looks like a bureaucratic

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[16] If our age estimates are basically right, it is noticeable that of the ten other elites who retired after 60 years of age, six took on their first command between 2004 and 2011, during the chaos of the post-9/11 wars and political transitions.

organization in which retirement rules usually bind. Moreover, the exceptions are easily explicable.

Figure 6. Time from end of first corps to end of service

Last Military Post before Retirement

Beyond dates and ages, we tentatively coded the last command held by a corps commander, or in the case of serving (as of February 2017) officers, the one currently held. To be clear: we lack systematic data on full career trajectories, so officers may very well have had a position in between their first command and their final command that we do not identify. Of those who are not in service and for whom we have data, Figure 6 summarizes their post at end of service (N=155).

Figure 7. Roles at End of Service

Where do commanders go who do not retire at the same time as their first corps command ends?[17] Sixteen corps commanders moved to another corps command, including one who is currently serving, with Strategic Forces Command being the primary location (N=4); no other corps for which we have data gets more than two repeat commanders. Of these, eight retired as a corps commander and one is still serving as commander of Army Strategic Forces, four moved to a GHQ position, two to the Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), and one as head of the NDU.

That leaves 167 individuals who held a single corps command. Data on final commands are missing for 11 officers, while 15 single-corps commanders are currently serving. Of the one-

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[17] We can only measure these transitions at the level of the year, so some may do something for a few months after leaving their corps.

time corps commanders who have left service and about whom we have final command data (N=141), ten became Chief of Army Staff (COAS), three retired as DG ISI, seven ended service as CJCSC, 38 ended up in a GHQ staff position, eight took over an Army school, four became the head of a government agency, three became a martial law administrator, two headed an Army organization, and three held international roles (one ambassador, two at the UN). Because we also gathered ISI data, we know that two COASs and one CJCSC were DG ISI after their first corps command.

A near-majority (N=63) of one-time commanders, consistent with our data on time to end of service, left service after their first corps command. Of the 38 who took a GHQ position, there is a cluster of 11 top staff slots for post-corps command elites: adjutant general (N=5), Chief of General Staff (N=4), Chief of Logistics Staff (N=5), DG Joint Staff (N=6), the now-defunct Deputy COAS (N=2) and Vice COAS (N=2), Inspector-General (IG) Arms (N=3), IG Training and Evaluation (N=4), Military Secretary (N=2), and Quartermaster General (N=3). Of the 17 current and former corps commanders still serving, one is on his second corps, one is DG ISI, ten are currently serving in their first corps command still, one is COAS, one is CJCSC, and three are in GHQ staff slots (IG Training & Evaluation, Military Secretary, DG Joint Staff) as of February 2017.

There are some noteworthy, if tentative, patterns in who makes it up the command chain. First, Punjabi and Pashtun dominance continues. Only one of the ten Chiefs of Army Staff is not coded as one of these ethnic groups (he is a Muhajir, Musharraf). Of the ten CJCSC who came from the Army, we believe that one was a Muhajir (Shamim Alam Khan), two were Kashmiris, and the rest likely either Punjabi or Pashtun. Second, the infantry continues to lead the way: nine out of ten of Army CJCSCs and eight out of ten COASs come from the infantry. However, the

other ranks at retirement are roughly proportional to the overall balance of sub-branches within the army: infantry is only dramatically over-represented at the very highest posts. Third, there may be overrepresentation of these top ranks by people who were in GHQ positions prior to their first corps command. Of the 20 top ranks, 11 had a GHQ slot, three were in charge of an Army educational institution, and only two had a GOC position as their jumping-off point into command. They almost all held a combat command earlier in their career, but moved into corps command from a staff position.

This pattern of early staff positions is more pronounced than for the 45 officers who moved from a corps command to a GHQ slot but did not advance further: 11 were a GOC, 13 had a GHQ staff position, with a smattering of other commands. Yet the same pattern that holds for the very top commands also holds for the commanders whose career ended after a single corps command: 27 had a GHQ slot, nine a command position, and the rest a variety of other roles prior to their command, missing data excepted. We end up with, if the data are basically right, a curious mix of staff-heavy elites at the top and bottom of the distribution, with the in-between layer more broadly blending command and staff jumping-off points into corps command.

Broadly speaking, this analysis suggests several things about the nature of the Pakistan Army. First, the plurality of corps commanders end their careers after their first command. The age profile of those who take on high commands and leave service is remarkably consistent. Second, there is a clear set of high-prestige staff positions into which elites move after a corps command. These data provide a way of identifying the core power nodes of the military based on where the upwardly mobile cluster after entering the elite. Third, the Army seems quite

professionalized – the pyramid narrows, and most fall by the wayside. Those who do not retire move into an identifiable set of professionally demanding slots.

Managing the Elite after Retirement

Data on the Military Elite after Service

Identifying the post-retirement fates of the military elite has been the most interesting empirical challenge and represents the most novel contribution of this paper. We coded the first post-retirement position (both specific posts and broad categories), which is both the easiest and also the most relevant for the question of how the military tries to manage elites beyond its direct control. We also tried to measure post-retirement roles following the first one, though the number of observations drops and patterns become difficult to identify.

As noted earlier, it is hard to find evidence of absence; there are a few cases in which sources explicitly say officers retired entirely from activities, but in most cases of missing data we are uncertain about what happened. We nevertheless have surprisingly substantial data. English as Pakistan's elite language and the military elites' political importance have made these officers more visible than would likely be the case in many other contexts. 17 officers were still serving when data collection was completed and we know that at least two died in office. This leaves 164 possible retirement trajectories to measure. 25 cases are missing, and we have some kind of data on 141 corps commanders, or 85 percent of those retired from service. Table 5 lists the professional categories into which the non-currently-serving corps commanders for whom we have data.

Table 5. Overall Distribution of Post-Service Outcomes

First Post- Military Occupation	Frequency	Percent
Fauji Company	33	23.4
Ambassador	13	9
Governor of a Province	10	7
Head of Sports Organization	10	7
Academic/Think Tank Work	9	6
Federal Govt. Minister	9	6
Defense Secretary	8	6
Head of Federal Govt. Agency	7	5
Head of School	6	4
Head of NGO	5	4
Head of Provincial Govt. Agency	5	4
Founder, School/NGO	4	3
Defense Analyst	3	2
Author/Artist/Farmer/Preacher	2	1.4
Died in service	2	1.4
Head of Private Company	2	1.4
Military Detention	2	1.4
NGO Member	2	1.4
Politics	2	1.4
Company Work	1	0.7
Founder, Company	1	0.7
International Political/Military Advisor	1	0.7
National Security Advisor	1	0.7
Provincial Govt. Minister	1	0.7
Total	**141**	

As we can see, the dominant post-retirement slot is into a blend of foundations and associated corporations we group together as "Fauji Companies." These are almost entirely senior leadership positions, like board chairman and managing director. Much has been made of the military's involvement in Pakistan's private sector economy, particularly following the publication of Ayesha Siddiqa's (2007) excellent monograph. However, we make three important qualifiers regarding Siddiqa's work. First, for all its prominence, the military's footprint in the Pakistani economy is relatively modest, particularly in comparison to comparable cases such as Egypt and Myanmar. The assets of the four military foundations – the Fauji

Foundation, the Army Welfare Trust, The Bahria Foundation and the Shaheen Foundation – that together form the core of mil-bus are valued at an estimated $1.2 billion in 2007, which represents 1.7 percent of total market capitalization in Pakistan.

Second, while many of the companies affiliated with these foundations are quite profitable, this is largely because they are located in rent-rich sectors like banking, insurance, energy, fertilizer and cement production. Preliminary analysis has shown no substantive difference in success between military-affiliated and civilian companies within these sectors. Third, the purpose of these foundations is to generate resources to fund a large network of hospitals, clinics, schools and colleges throughout Pakistan, principally but not only for ex-servicemen; the Bahria and Foundation Universities are popular centers of higher education. In this way, these foundations are a principal means of maintaining legitimacy within and around the military but also projecting a sense of welfare focus to the rest of society.

Preliminary analysis suggests that at any given time, around seven former corps commanders serve as either the managing directors of the Fauji Foundation or the Army Welfare Trust – who also serve as chairmen of the board of affiliated companies – or as managing directors of key enterprises, such as Mari Gas, Fauji Fertilizer, Fauji Cement, Askari Cement and Askari Bank. Personnel in these positions seem to change every three years, providing opportunities for the newly retired. And while serving as an executive director is a prototypically well-compensated position, it is both term-limited and dependent on competence in providing value for shareholders and stakeholders; it is not a path to independent oligarchic wealth. These foundations and related companies are also fairly professional: while many director and managerial positions are filled by retired officers from major generals to captains, there are also many civilians in leadership roles.

To be clear, there are also other aspects of the Pakistani economy in which the military is involved, notably the acquisition of land for the purposes of real estate, both to provide retiring officers with residential property and to participate in the lucrative property market in Pakistan. Retired officers often have more than one property, and selling or renting housing to civilians is a common practice, thus military officers and civilians commingle in most of the ostensibly military housing companies, which have become some of the most elite locations in urban Pakistan. While some of the colonial-era military cantonments like Lahore and Clifton in Karachi have long since passed from the military's control as effectively civilian municipalities, newer neighborhoods in Defence Housing Authorities have emerged in and around the most sought-after urban locations in the country. The pyramidal structure of the Army is operative when it comes to land perks: after 15 years of service, officers are entitled to one residential plot, after 25 a second, after 28 a third, and after 32 a fourth. Alongside DHAs, there is the grey zone of Bahria Towns in the major cities, run by the real estate tycoon Malik Riaz, a private citizen who has extensive experience in acquiring land from the army as well as in hiring senior officers after retirement. The participation of senior military leadership in the political economy of real estate is an important area of further research.

Aside from economic and commercial positions, diplomatic appointments are also valued. A common practice in times of military rule, retired military personnel are often appointed to ambassadorships even under civilian governments. It is likely, however, that ambassadorships have lost their previous appeal since Pakistan's economy has liberalized, with civilian and military elites gaining access to consumer goods and opportunities abroad that had previously required official sanction through overseas postings. Moreover, key embassies and high commissions have a parallel structure for the representation of the military's interests

abroad, through the office of the military attache, which decreases the need for the ambassador to be from a military background for the military's interests in foreign capitals to be maintained.

Overall, the bulk of elites continue to be employed by the state or extensions of military-affiliated civil society (87/141; 62 percent) even after leaving formal military service. The foundations, ambassadorships, the post of defence secretary (nominally the highest civilian bureaucrat in defence affairs), provincial and federal agencies, provincial governorships, and even federal cabinet appointments before 2008 are all ways retired elites have continued to be involved in governance. Regardless of the precise destination, the military aims to provide its senior officers comfort and influence even in retirement. Interference in decision-making of current senior officers by retirees is looked upon extremely unfavorably; former Army chief Raheel Sharif, considered quite popular during his tenure, was even told to cease his organizing of social activities with serving generals after retirement. A comfortable retirement makes it easier to sustain a system in which retirees stay away from the locus of power and decision-making in the military.

Strikingly, almost no one goes directly into politics after retirement. This is a sharp contrast to contemporary India, where retired generals are now entering politics, much less Indonesia, with its plethora of retired-military politicians. Yet in Pakistan, there are an array of ways to stay relevant, if one desires. This set of opportunities limits the ability of retired elites to reach back into the military later on, if they do get more involved in electoral politics. There is, furthermore, a long-cultivated cultural distaste for politicians among the military fraternity, and the geographic concentration of the military and military officers in garrisons and cantonments, with regular circulation, provides little opportunity to cultivate a geographic constituency

required for electoral mobilization. For such a politically-involved military, its command elite have little directly to do with electoral politics even after they retire.

The private sector is, at least initially, also not a popular destination. Though this becomes a more common pastime after the first retirement position, the initial post-military phase is dominated by state employment of some variety. Other pursuits include running schools and NGOs, doing defense analysis, writing, farming, and advising foreign governments and multilateral organizations. Strikingly, none of the COAS or CJCSC have joined a fauji company and only one entered the private sector, suggesting these are mere fallback or "safety" options for the highest echelon. In other preliminary analysis we have examined post-retirement trajectories by last military command; tentatively, we do not see enormous differences across final posts, though there does seem to be some preference for GHQ retirees to attain a post at a fauji company.

Trends by regime

We wanted to see how this varies by the period in which officers left service. We roughly group service end periods into four, as above: the Zia era (1978-88), the "democratic decade" under Bhutto and Sharif (1989-1999), the Musharraf era (1999-2007), and the contemporary democratic period (2008-2017). There is some messiness around the end of the Zia and Musharraf eras, but almost all of these officers retired cleanly under one of the regimes.

Table 6. First Retirement Roles by Period/Regime (percentages in parentheses)

Position	1978-88	1989-1998	1999-2007	2008-2017
Fauji Company	1 (5)	9 (24)	9 (23)	14 (33)
Province Governor	5 (26)	2 (5)	3 (7.5)	0
Federal Govt. Minister	3 (16)	3 (8)	2 (5)	1 (2)
Ambassador	4 (21)	0	4 (10)	4 (9.5)
Head of Sports Organization	0	3 (8)	4 (10)	3 (7)

Head/Founder/Member of School or NGO	1 (5)	5 (13)	8 (20)	5 (12)
Electoral Politics	0	0	2 (5)	0
Academic/Think tank	0	6 (16)	1 (2.5)	2 (5)
Defence Secretary	0	1 (3)	1 (2.5)	5 (12)
Head of Fed. Govt. Agency	0	3 (8)	3 (7.5)	1 (2)
Private Company	1 (5)	1 (3)	1 (2.5)	0
Head of Provincial Govt. Agency	1 (5)	0	1 (2.5)	3 (7)
Other	3 (15)	6 (13)	1 (2.5)	4 (9.5)[26]
Total	19	38	40	42

This is striking data: it is difficult to differentiate the Musharraf era of military rule from the two democratic decades around it. The military continues to put the same kinds of people in the same kinds of positions both when in formal power and out of it. If anything, there is evidence of new forms of military influence even after the withdrawal from power in 2007-8: there has been an increase in the number of retired corps commanders who have become Secretaries of Defence since 2008. Why does this matter? The Defence Secretary is supposed to be the top civilian bureaucrat in Pakistan's Ministry of Defence. Yet since 2008, only one actual civilian, Nargis Sethi, has actually held this post, for about 7 months in 2012.

The importance of this position lies not in its policy implications, as foreign and defense polic is *de facto* planned and executed at GHQ, not in the civilian bureaucracy. Rather, the position matters because any removal or appointment of the army chief has to be approved by the Defence Secretary, thus providing the military with some checks on the civilian government's power over appointments of army chief. Even when not ruling, the military is able to put its just-

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[26] These four are interesting: 1 became National Security Advisor, 2 became Defence Analysts, and 1 became something he refers to as an International Political-Military Advisor (i.e. advising the UN).

retired personnel into positions of high civilian influence in defence, but we do not see the same former military involvement in other sections of the federal bureaucracy.

There is a stark difference between the Zia era and the post-Zia era. Under Zia, it appears that the military was used more directly to govern: federal ministers and provincial governors formed a substantially higher percentage of the first retirement slots than after 1988. This suggests that we cannot make general assumptions about how military regimes relate to civilian governance: Zia offered a more overtly "khaki" government than Musharraf, with the latter appointing only a few veterans in the federal government. The economic network surrounding the foundations really comes into its own following 1988; the percentage of retired elites going into Fauji companies shoots up and stays high across the three ensuing periods.

This analysis suggests that we should be careful making assumptions about obvious differences between civilian and military rule, which would predict much clearer differences between the Musharraf era and the democratic periods. Instead, while obviously much was different in macro-politics, the management of elite personnel looks almost identical across the post-1988 era. For those who do not go into government or a military corporation, being a retired senior officer opens up opportunities in the world of thinktanks, overseas fellowships, or the higher echelons of Pakistani civil society. One two-time corps commander and CJCSC founded the polo club at the Lahore garrison; another later reinvigorated and expanded it. The military elite's post-service life chances are largely unaffected by whether the military is directly ruling.

Deeper into Retirement

We also have data (N=89) on the most recent activity we can find retired elites doing *after* their first post-retirement post: this requires an individual moving into a new category, or moving between specific posts within a category. We go from 141 observations of post-retirement to 89,

reflecting elites not finding a second job, dying, or the data being unavailable. This is therefore a hazy, but still illuminating, representation of retired senior officers several years out of service. We see a substantially larger move into the private sector – this suggests, in alignment with qualitative evidence, that there is a period in which elites find other respectable things to do before making money. The particular activities in the private sector also worth noting. For those 13 corps commanders that have 'head of a private company' as a final occupation post-retirement, six were previous Fauji company executives, suggesting that these foundations are a gateway to broader opportunities in the private sector. The types of business they run are particular, however: largely either in similarly rent-rich public sector-adjacent activities, such as the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation, Coastal Refinery or Alphagas, with foreign multinationals such as Philip Morris or Nissan, or in managing military-associated service businesses such as in private security. None of these are allied with any of the powerful domestic corporate groups in Pakistan and thus maintain a level of insulation, even as they engage with the national economy.

There is a substantially smaller share of elites who still hold government posts in their later retirement: 87 out of 141 (62 percent) work for the state in their first post-retirement position, while only 30 out of 88 (34 percent) do so later in the retirement. No one in our sample serves as secretary of defence in a later retirement position, making apparent how tight and immediate the pipeline is from military into the larger security bureaucracy. The recently retired are a power resource for the military that likely decreases in effectiveness over time, as elites age, start to lose their connections to those serving, or get interested in new activities. Despite their connections to the state diminishing, they continue to be part of a broader elite social milieu, living in housing developments specifically intended for retired defense personnel, and

frequenting elite clubs and golf courses. The private sector and NGO world became far more prominent in the later stages of retirement, while electoral politics rises a little but still remains remarkably small.

Table 7. First vs. Most Recent Post-Retirement Rolee, percentages in parentheses

	First Post- Military	**Last Post-Military**
Fauji Company	33 (23.4)	8 (9)
Ambassador	13 (9)	6 (7)
Governor of a Province	10 (7)	4 (5)
Head of Sports Organization	10 (7)	2 (2)
Academic/Think Tank Work	9 (6)	2 (2)
Federal Govt. Minister	9 (6)	3 (3.4)
Defense Secretary	8 (6)	0
Head of Federal Govt. Agency	7 (5)	2 (2)
Head of School	6 (4)	6 (7)
Head of NGO	5 (4)	13 (15)
Head of Provincial Govt. Agency	5 (4)	5 (6)
Founder, School/NGO	4 (3)	
Defense Analyst	3 (2)	9 (10)
Author/Artist/Farmer/Preacher	2 (1.4)	3 (3.4)
Died in service	2 (1.4)	
Head of Private Company	2 (1.4)	13 (15)
Military Detention	2 (1.4)	
NGO Member	2 (1.4)	3 (3.4)
Politics	2 (1.4)	5 (6)
Company Work	1 (0.7)	
Founder, Company	1 (0.7)	1 (1)
International Political/Military Advisor	1 (0.7)	
National Security Advisor	1 (0.7)	
Provincial Govt. Minister	1 (0.7)	
Total	**141**	**88**

A "State within a State"? Inter-Services Intelligence

Since 1971, there have been 18 Directors-General (DGs) of ISI, the infamous intelligence organization.[29] Though there have been a small number of accounts dedicated to the ISI (Kiessling 2016), systematic evidence on the organization is quite scarce. Our data can only offer a limited perspective on this secretive organization, but does provide some interesting insights. The ISI is often described in near-mystical terms as a "state within a state," possibly operating even outside the control of the Army. This is why we specifically gathered data on the Directors-General of the ISI since 1971, including those who never held a corps command (according to our data, 8 of the 18 DGs ISI).

The number of cases is small, and we proceed with caution. It is also crucial to note that selection as DG ISI is the prerogative of the Prime Minister in periods of civilian rule. Thus, under civilian rule this is not a purely military selection process, in sharp contrast to most of the other positions discussed above. The termination of a DG's position can also be highly political as premiers come and go, or as coups reshuffle the deck. We have some qualitative data on how premiers and army chiefs have selected DGs ISI in a number of cases, which will allow richer future analysis than is possible for most of the corps commanders, as military promotion processes are opaque.

What can we say about the ISI command elite? Like the broader set of military elites, this is primarily a Pashtun-Punjabi operation: ten were born in Punjab, two in KPK, two in Kashmir and one contemporary India (we lack data on three). We know that 9 of the 18 received foreign training. They are spread out more broadly across the sub-branches than the corps commanders:

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[29] Kiessling 2016 identifies 17, and then Naveed Mukhtar took over as the 18th in late 2016.

41 percent from the infantry, 23 percent from artillery, 18 percent from armour, and 18 percent from engineering and/or signals.

11 of the 18 DGs ISI held the ISI slot before a corps command, eight of whom never advanced to a corps command. Five of the 11 retired as DG ISI, two retired as corps commanders, one as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, and three in GHQ positions (MG Ordnance, Adjutant General, IG Training and Evaluation). Of the seven DGs ISI who took the position after a corps command – particularly prevalent since the Musharraf years – three retired as DG ISI, one as CJCS, and one is still serving. Two retired as COAS. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani is the only DG ISI to have become COAS under normal circumstances; Khwaja Ziauddin was extremely briefly tapped to be COAS by Nawaz Sharif in his effort to get rid of Pervez Musharraf, but he was put under military detention once Musharraf seized power in the 1999 coup. This is an important position, but one in which a plurality of DGs ISI retire from the position, just like first corps commands.

Though obviously ultimately determined by a political decision, the basic professional qualifications of DGs ISI appear very similar to elevation to the other elite ranks of the military, particularly in the more recent past. Of ten DGs ISI since 1995, all but three either were appointed after corps command or left ISI for a corps command. Of these exceptions, the first went from a divisional command to ordnance chief at GHQ via ISI and became defence secretary upon retirement, the second served as DG Military Operations before ISI, and the third, the currently serving DG ISI, previously served as the DG Sindh Rangers, thus responsible for the paramilitary response to escalating urban insurgency in Karachi.

What does this mean? The ISI seems to be deeply integrated into the Army, a standard command for a variety of types of officers despite its political importance, though there is a clear

bias toward those with previous intelligence experience, with eight serving as the Director-General of Military Intelligence before appointment. The non-intelligence specialists had similar professional background as corps commanders, ranging from commanding a division to managing logistics to directing paramilitaries. While the ISI was the final post for just under half of those we have data on – similar to the percentage of those retired after their first corps command – the rest moved into other senior posts in the military once they finished their ISI posting, including corps commands, key positions at GHQ, and CJCSC.

We see this relative normalcy in the data on retirement as well: the ISI does not seem to generate a particularly distinctive set of post-retirement trajectories. One died in office and we lack data on four others, so our N is only 13. Of these, two became Defence Secretary, one became an ambassador, one is the current President of the NDU, one became head of a military company, one became a federal minister and another head of a federal agency, and the rest were an assorted mix of authors, sexecutives, think-tankers, and the president of the Pakistan Golf Federation.

To the extent that we can draw conclusions from this limited data, it seriously complicates claims of ISI exceptionalism or "rogueness." The ISI leadership is part of a highly cohesive military organization, staffed at the top by the same kind of senior officers who command the rest of the Army. It is neither a clear stepping stone to the top, nor an irrelevant dead-end. While it is biased toward intelligence specialists, it is not restricted to them. The ISI is an understandable target for the United States and India and a useful scapegoat for military elites blaming it for rogue elements, but at least at its top the ISI can only be considered an integrated part of the Pakistan Army and highly aligned with the rest of the military elite. Even with prime ministerial discretion over selecting and managing its DG, the ISI remains the Army.

Conclusion

This paper provides insights into how the Pakistani army maintains cohesion and influence amidst deep political involvement. Using unique data, we show that the Pakistan Army has managed to maintain professional internal processes while using retired personnel to help carve out dramatic political influence in the political system. This suggests a new way of looking at civil-military relations and politically active militaries that focuses less on the strategic interactions between civilian and military elites and more on the ways that militaries can combine internal organization with external political power.

Future research can build on these insights. First, more complete and extensive data will provide valuable detail on the military elites' backgrounds and career trajectories. This includes forward-looking data on the current command elite. We plan to pursue these tasks in future work. Second, the puzzle emerges of why Pakistan's Army has been able to build a "military enclave"[33] while many other political militaries have fractured internally or been sidelined from politics. Cross-national comparisons with politically-involved militaries – such as Thailand, Indonesia, Egypt, Turkey, Myanmar, and Chile - will be essential for answering this question. Third, we may need to re-think standard distinctions between military and civilian rule so common in studies of regimes. Pakistan's military has not given up control of key policy areas even when withdrawing from power, and this influence is sometimes accomplished through informal practices rather than formal pacts. Finally, more research on "Military Inc."[34] can provide new information about the networks of economic influence that the military has constructed, and how they relate to its political project.

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[33] Cook 2007.
[34] Siddiqa 2007.

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