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One Nation's Electoral Support: Where Does It Come From, What Makes It Different and How Does It Fit?

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This paper does three things. First, it offers a critique of the academic literature on the One Nation vote, focusing on the limitations of the work of political geographers and the methodological shortcomings of survey researchers. Second, it re-examines data from the 1998 Australian Election Study in order to explore the demographic and attitudinal forces that both drove the One Nation vote and distinguished it from the votes secured by the Labor Party, the Liberal and National parties and the Australian Democrats; this highlights the importance of gender, geography and class, of political alienation and of attitudes to Aborigines and immigration. Third, it suggests that the basis of One Nation's mobilisation did not lie in concerns about economic insecurity so much as in opposition to 'new class' values, particularly around race. In doing so, it challenges common understandings of the Party's constituency and of its distinctiveness.

Since 1998, social scientists struggling to come to grips with the electoral politics of Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party have focused on three broad questions: What sorts of people have voted for One Nation and why? What distinguishes these voters from those who have voted for other parties? And what does the nature of One Nation's electoral support say about One Nation as a "party of protest", its chances of survival and its place in the Australian party system?

In the wake of the Queensland and federal elections of 1998, over a dozen journal articles, book chapters and conference papers have attempted to tackle one or more of these questions in a systematic way. They have done so by using a variety of data and a range of analytical techniques — from the quite simple, to the highly sophisticated. They have ranged widely in quality. And they have reached various conclusions: some, quite clear-cut and consensual; others, contested or contestable. This paper tries to pull these disparate analyses together, to critique both their methods and their interpretations, and to offer a new analysis based largely around the 1998 Australian Election Study — a data source inadequately used in the analyses we review.

Accounting for One Nation's Electoral Support

One way of getting a sense of who votes for a party is to compare the characteristics of the areas in which the party has done well with those in which it has performed poorly. Another is to examine the data thrown up by sample surveys, whether in the form of

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public opinion polls or academic surveys, so as to see the social, economic or demographic characteristics most likely and least likely to be associated with voting that way. In the case of One Nation, both approaches have been used.

Aggregate Data

One of the most striking things about the One Nation Party has been the regional nature of its appeal. From the very first poll, hard on the heels of the Party's launch, it was clear that its appeal was much stronger in Queensland than it was in other States.[1] And the first of the ecological or aggregate analyses focused on state differences. Census data from 1996 showed that federal electorates in Queensland differed from those in most other states, particularly Victoria, on several seemingly important variables: age left school, occupation, ethnicity and country of birth. Queensland electorates were much more likely to contain voters who had left school aged fifteen or less and who were working as trades persons or labourers. These electorates also included relatively large proportions of Aborigines and relatively low proportions of people from non-English speaking backgrounds.[2]

Wider-ranging, more fine-grained research, conducted in the wake of the Queensland election of June 1998, confirmed some of these relationships and pointed to several others. Matching Census data for 20 variables from 6,448 collectors districts to the election results recorded in 1,647 polling booths, Davis and Stimson were able to show, via a step-wise multiple regression model, that the geography of the One Nation vote was positively related (net of other factors) to the presence of unskilled workers and workers in either blue-collar or agricultural industry; and negatively related, not only to the proportion of people from Asian (or, more strongly, the proportion of overseas born), but also (if only marginally) to the proportion of Aborigines or people of Torres Strait Islander descent. One Nation's electoral support also appeared to be inversely related to high incomes and single-parent families (possibly a gender effect, they thought); and directly related to a number of other variables — home-ownership, mobility (the proportions changing address), "gun-belts" and areas of Christian fundamentalism.[3]

The most powerful message was that the propensity to vote One Nation was a function of urban geography, of where — especially in relation to urban centres — voters lived. Public opinion polls had long since made it clear that support for One Nation was higher outside metropolitan areas than within them.[4] And the Queensland election had demonstrated that it was the National Party vote, rather than the Liberal or Labor vote, that One Nation put most at risk.[5] What Davis and Stimson's model

[1] In Morgan Poll No. 1422, April 16-17 and April 22-23 1997, Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party was the first choice of 20 per cent of respondents from Queensland and just 4 per cent of respondents from Victoria.

[2] Murray Goot, "Hanson's Heartland: Who's for One Nation and Why", in Nadine Davidoff ed., *Two Nations: The Causes and Effects of the Rise of the One Nation Party in Australia* (Melbourne: Bookman, 1988), pp. 62-8.

[3] Rex Davis and Robert Stimson, "Disillusionment and Disenchantment at the Fringe: Explaining the Geography of the One Nation Party Vote at the Queensland Elections", *People and Place*, 6, 3 (1998), pp. 79-80.

[4] Goot, "Hanson's Heartland", p. 63.

[5] Paul L. Reynolds, "One Nation's Electoral Support in Queensland: The 1998 State and Federal Elections Compared", in Michael Leach, Geoffrey Stokes and Ian Ward eds, *The Rise and Fall of One Nation* (St

offered was a more complete account of this phenomenon. One Nation's "base vote" was "higher the smaller the town or city". More importantly, there was an "urban fringe" effect with One Nation's vote rising "dramatically to a peak" on "the outskirts" of a city; a dummy variable for "distance from a major centre" (set at ten kilometres) accounted for much more of the variance in One Nation's vote than any other factor. "Where these areas contain unskilled workers in blue collar industries, few indigenous Australians or people born overseas" and a high number of homeowners or people aspiring to own a home, One Nation was "likely to do well"; faced with inner city "multicultural" populations, with "higher incomes", the Party was likely to fare poorly.[6]

Further attempts to match Census data to voting patterns in Queensland (and New South Wales) were made after the federal election; in those studies that went beyond single electorates, the units of analysis were not polling booths but federal electorates. Grant Bligh and Tony Sorensen selected 49 "indicator variables", mapped them against the One Nation and two-party preferred vote in the 76 federal divisions that cover Queensland and New South Wales, grouped them into seven clusters, and argued that while support for One Nation was lowest in "inner city and silvertail locations", mid-range support came "surprisingly" from "middle distance industrial suburbs", with the highest support coming not from the "urban fringes" but from seats which were "deeply rural". The main correlates of One Nation's support, they concluded, were "disadvantage and rural poverty" and the related factor of "geographical location at the urban fringe or in rural areas", with One Nation's "heartland" stretching "from southern Queensland into New South Wales".[7] Paul Reynolds, looking just at Queensland, reported findings "broadly similar" to those produced by Davis and Stimson: where levels of household income, tertiary education, or the proportion of overseas born dipped below the median, the level of One Nation support rose above it; higher than average levels of unemployment were also correlated with One Nation's vote. But the patterns were less similar than Reynolds allows; Davis and Stimson reported an inverse relationship between the vote and high income households, but no relationship with low income households; and they did not test for a tertiary education effect.[8]

Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2000), pp. 155-6.

[6] Davis and Stimson, "Disillusionment and Disenchantment", pp. 74 and 81. For technical critiques, see Bligh Grant and Tony Sorensen, "Marginality, Regionalism and the One Nation Vote: Exploring Socio-Economic Correlations", in Marian Simms and John Warhurst eds, *Howard's Agenda: The 1998 Australian Election* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2000), pp. 197-98, and J. Forrest, M. Alston, C. Medlin and S. Amri, "Voter Behaviour in Rural Areas: A Study of the Farrer Electoral Division in Southern New South Wales at the 1998 Federal Election", *Australian Geographical Studies* (forthcoming).

[7] Grant and Sorensen, "Marginality", pp. 193, 202-7; see also, for New South Wales, Elaine Thompson, "New South Wales", in Simms and Warhurt, *Howard's Agenda*, pp. 99-102 and the brief analysis in Forrest et. al., "Voter Behaviour in Rural Areas". Another study, based on ecological correlations in a single electorate (Farrer, in Sydney) but focused on the relationship between ethnicity and support for One Nation and Unity, a party established to oppose One Nation, is reported in Ernest Healy, "The Unity Party and the Attempt to Mobilise Australian Electoral Support for Multiculturalism", *People and Place*, 7, 3 (1999), pp. 51-62.

[8] Reynolds, "One Nation's Electoral Support", p. 162; Davis and Stimson, "Disillusionment and Disenchantment", pp. 80-81.

In a larger, more ambitious study, covering all but one of the federal electorates, Jeanette Money argued that almost all the variance (82 per cent) in One Nation's vote could be explained by a Hanson factor (her presence on the ballot in Ipswich), the nature of the electoral contest (whether there was a One Nation candidate; and, less obviously, whether there was an ALP incumbent), state effects (residing in Tasmania made one distinctly less likely to vote for the Party; living in Queensland made one rather more likely), ethnicity (a migrant presence in marginal seats lowered the One Nation vote; an Aboriginal presence marginally increased it), high unemployment and low education (both of which lifted the One Nation vote).[9] Though unacknowledged, much of this gels with earlier work, at least on the demographic side.

Some of it, however, is more problematic. The Hanson factor, easily the most powerful of the variables she uncovers, relates only to Hanson's seat; it cannot tell us anything about the other 139 electorates contested by the Party. Allowing for the absence of One Nation candidates in nine seats,[10] by including them as a variable rather than dropping them, boosts the variance explained by this model but makes its explanatory value more difficult to compare with that of others.[11] And the decision to create a variable called "anti-Aboriginal sentiment" (only partly do with Aborigines and nothing to do with sentiment), by combining a measure of unemployment with a measure of Aboriginal numbers, is even more difficult to justify.

Aggregate studies, in any event, are just that: studies of aggregates. They are not studies of individuals. To slide from one to the other, as if they were simply separate measures of the same thing, is to commit an ecological fallacy. When Davis and Stimson, for example, announce that they are "modelling the characteristics of ONP voters" and "providing a highly accurate description" of them,[12] they are not necessarily doing any such thing. Far from ecological and individual relationships always being the same, a pattern that holds at one level may disappear, or appear in reverse, at the other.

Individual Level Data

The only way of finding out about individuals is to look at individual data. The early (and later) Morgan polls not only indicated that One Nation voters were likely to come

[9] Jeannette Money, "Xenophobia and Xenophilia: Pauline Hanson and the Counterbalancing of Electoral Incentives in Australia", *People and Place* 7 (3) 1999, pp. 7-19. A negative relationship between the number of recently arrived migrants in an electoral division and the size of the One Nation vote is also reported in Rachel Gibson, Ian McAllister and Tami Swenson, "The Politics of Race and Immigration in Australia: One Nation Voting in the 1998 Election" (Washington DC: Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 2000), Table 1. Another study fails to find a statistically significant relationship between the proportion of Asian-born and the ONP vote, though it does confirm the relationship between levels of unemployment and the One Nation vote; David Charnock "Voting at the 1998 Australian Federal Election: Studying Major and Minor Parties Simultaneously", in J. Brookfield comp., *Proceedings of the 1999 Conference of the Australasian Political Studies Association* (Sydney: Department of Government, University of Sydney/APSA, 1999), volume 1, p. 97.

[10] Seven in Victoria (Batman, Calwell, Holt, Maribyrnong, Melbourne, Scullin, Wills) and two in Tasmania (Denison, Franklin) — all Labor seats; Electoral Pocket Book (Australian Electoral Commission, Canberra, 1999), pp. 91-3.

[11] Compare Money's, "Xenophobia and Xenophilia", p. 19 note 39, decision to drop one seat from the analysis "because a swing could not be determined".

[12] Davis and Stimson, "Disillusionment and Disenchantment", pp. 69 and 79; also Grant and Sorensen, "Marginality", p. 198.

from outside the metropolitan areas, they also suggested that One Nation voters were likely to be: men not women; over fifty years of age rather than under fifty (regardless of gender); from "blue-collar" rather than "white-collar" households (at least where the main income earner was in full-time work); and educated to around Intermediate (School Certificate) level rather than beyond.[13]

Much of this, but not all, is confirmed by data from the 1998 Australian Election Study (AES) reviewed by Clive Bean. Like the polls, the AES suggests that the One Nation vote was higher among men than among women, among blue collar rather than white collar workers and, for the most part, among those residing outside the metropolitan areas rather than those within the metropolises. But it also suggests that the vote was at its highest among the "middle-aged" (those aged forty-five to sixty-four) rather than those aged sixty-five or older; that its blue collar support was bolstered by "associate professionals" — equivalent, one imagines, to the "semi-professionals" ranked least likely to vote for One Nation by the Morgan poll; that it gravitated towards the "middle" of the educational range, drawing most heavily from those with a trade or non-trade qualification; and that it was highest in rural Australia, lowest in the inner metropolitan areas, with provincial and outer metropolitan areas (the "urban fringe") falling somewhere in between.[14]

But Bean also says that ONP's electoral support may be "best defined in terms of those groups that are least likely to give their support to the party": those with a university education, who work in managerial and professional occupations, high income earners and immigrants from non-English speaking countries.[15] Gone from this list are: males, the blue collar/white collar divide, the regional dimension, the age factor, "associate professionals", and those in the "middle" of the education range; in short, every noteworthy aspect of One Nation's electoral support singled out just a few pages earlier.

In presenting these findings, Bean implies that the AES data are superior to those generated by the polls. But there are grounds for doubt. First, repetitive opinion polling, because it allows the data to be aggregated and averaged, has a built-in reliability check; the AES does not. Second, while all the polls undersampled the One Nation vote, so did the AES — and by at least the same margin.[16] Third, because of the methods used by the AES, One Nation voters who failed to respond may well have been different from those who did respond; in particular, those who failed to return their questionnaire may have been more poorly educated (and more alienated).

As well as including the same variables, more or less, as those discussed in relation to the polls,[17] the AES incorporated half-a-dozen others. Similar proportions of respondents in public, private, and self-employment voted for One Nation; Hanson's

[13] Goot, "Hanson's Heartland", pp. 57-63. Forrest et al., who note a similar set of marginal frequencies from the polls: ask, "Is there a geography of this support base?"; examine the fifty federal electoral divisions in New South Wales; and answer, that "there is". See, "Voting Behaviour in Rural Areas", Table III.

[14] C. Bean, "Nationwide Electoral Support for One Nation in the 1998 Federal Election", in Leach et al., *The Rise and Fall*, pp. 138-42.

[15] Bean, "Nationwide Electoral Support", p. 150; see also Gibson et al., "The Politics of Race", p. 7.

[16] On the eve of the 1998 election, none of the final national polls put One Nation above 7 per cent ; Morgan Poll No. 3134, 5 October 1998.

[17] Bean's claim that the polls don't report more variables than reported in Goot, "Hanson's Heartland", is mistaken; Bean, "Nationwide Electoral Support", p. 137.

own background notwithstanding, respondents employed in their own businesses were no more likely than the average respondent to have voted One Nation. Those who had voted for the Party were twice as likely to identify as "working class" rather than as "middle class" and slightly more likely to be union members than not. In terms of reported annual income, they were more "middle" ($20,000-$40,000) than high or low. In terms of religion they were under-represented within Catholic ranks and over-represented among those who never attended church. And, in terms of birthplace, the Party drew most heavily on those born in Australia or Northern Europe, including Britain; it drew not at all on those born in Asia.[18]

Searching for a sentence that might serve to summarise such findings, identify the party's "core" constituency, or provide an "indepth" profile of the "typical" or "archetypal" One Nation voter, Bean and McAllister suggest "manual workers, trade union members, those who describe themselves as working class, the less well educated, men and people who have never attended church".[19] Gibson, McAllister and Swenson settle for "male, blue collar and working class, between the ages of forty-five and sixty-five and living in rural and regional Australia".[20] Reynolds, keen to add the insights afforded by aggregate statistics to those proffered by the polls, goes one better: "Sociological data", he writes, "points to a lower income, lower educated, blue collar, semi- to unskilled male vote, characterised by a modest financial stake in the society (home ownership) and a dash of religious fundamentalism, all of which is concentrated in regional electorates marked by monoculturalism".[21] This, along with the word-pictures painted by Bean and McAllister and by Gibson, et al., is nonsense. To search for the "typical" One Nation voter by stringing together a selection from the almost endless number of features which might characterise One Nation voters as a whole is not only a mistake in logic; it is ultimately futile: the more numerous or seemingly inclusive the descriptors, the smaller the number of voters (as we shall show below) caught in the net.

A more sensible way of simplifying the data is to identify those relationships which matter. This means doing to the data on individuals what Davis and Stimson did to the data on aggregates: running a regression analysis to see what difference, if any, any of these factors makes. Since they are not available at the individual record level, poll data do not lend themselves to this approach; AES data, however, do. According to Bean, only six of the twelve AES variables show a statistically significant relationship with the One Nation vote: being male, aged forty-five to fifty-four (or, to "a lesser extent", fifty-five to sixty-four), having a trade qualification ("weakly"), or living in a state other than Victoria made respondents more likely to vote ONP; earning more than $60,000 per year, or attending church "with greater frequency", meant respondents were less likely to vote for One Nation.[22]

[18] See also Clive Bean and Ian McAllister, "Voting Behaviour", in Simms and Warhurst, *Howard's Agenda*, pp. 177-9.

[19] Bean and McAllister, "Voting Behaviour", p. 181.

[20] Gibson et al., "The Politics of Race", p. 7. One of the sources for this portrait explicitly warns that summary attempts of this kind involve problems of logic and plausibility, Goot, "Hanson's Heartland", p. 72, especially note 4. For the warning noticed, heeded, but not understood, see Grant and Sorensen, "Marginality", p. 197.

[21] Reynolds, "One Nation's Electoral Support", p. 165.

[22] Bean, "Nationwide Electoral Support", p. 143. Bean actually says that "church attendance leads to higher levels of ONP support"; but from the bivariate data he clearly means to say that it leads to lower

What, then, of the reasons respondents might have had for supporting One Nation? In a Morgan poll, conducted shortly after Hanson's maiden speech, in which respondents were asked if they might vote for her movement in the Senate, two-thirds of those who said they would do so offered quite vague reasons for their support: they liked her policies or ideas. What policies or ideas? One-in-four respondents, either initially or when pushed (what other reason? anything else?) mentioned Hanson's views on immigration; one-in-eight referred to her views on Aborigines; and one-in-ten expressed their admiration for Hanson herself.[23] Two years later, before the Queensland election, Morgan asked a similar question of those intending to vote One Nation in the State poll. Again, about half of those interviewed spoke in vague terms about liking her policies or ideas (25 per cent), about Hanson's saying "what most people really think" (14 per cent) and about her having the courage to say things that others would not (10 per cent). Much of this, presumably, was code: respondents praising her for saying things that they themselves weren't prepared to say — at least, not to interviewers. Almost as many (43 per cent) spoke of being dissatisfied with the alternatives — a line of reasoning hardly evident in the earlier poll. Among the specific issues, immigration (11 per cent) and Aborigines — spending (nine per cent), "equal rights" or "same treatment" (seven per cent) — again stood out. Guns (five per cent) and unemployment (four per cent) were raised as issues as well.[24]

In the AES, where respondents were confronted by forced choice items rather than questions that were open-ended, nearly all of those who had voted for One Nation agreed that "the number of migrants allowed into Australia at the present time" had gone "too far" (90 per cent) and "should be reduced" (85 per cent); that "Aboriginal land rights had gone too far" (92 per cent), as had "government help for Aborigines" (93 per cent); and that "when it comes to the availability of good jobs for Australian workers ... the best years are behind us" rather than "yet to come".[25]

Moving from a univariate to a multivariate analysis of the AES data, Gibson, McAllister and Swenson argue that the attitudes most strongly associated with One Nation's vote had to do with opposition to immigration and dissatisfaction with democracy, not with being unemployed or concerned about jobs. Opposition to immigration, they argue, is "interest-based" rather than "identity-based"; that is, organised around fears that immigrants "increase the crime rate", are "generally [not] good for Australia's economy" and "take jobs away from people born in Australia",

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levels of ONP support.

[23] Morgan Poll No. 1391, 23-24 October 1996.

[24] Morgan Poll Finding No. 3098, 10-11 June 1998. Reynolds argues that anti-immigrant and anti-indigenous sentiment accounted for "only" one-in-four ONP supporters. In the circumstances — an open-ended question with only a minority of respondents prepared to spell out their reasons — we think one-in-four a high proportion not a low one. Reynolds relies on an account of the poll from Davis and Stimson, "Disillusionment and Disenchantment", p. 72. They, in turn, derive their account from a misleading summary in *The Bulletin* 16 June 1998, p. 17. According to this version, 46 per cent of the sample volunteered the view that "[Hanson's] better than other politicians and knows what ordinary Aussies want". This is not so. Even if it were so, it does not follow that respondents were endorsing Hanson's views, as Reynolds puts it, "on all specific issues"; if it did, it would cast doubt on Reynold's own remark that "only" one-in-four raised issues with "racial overtones". See, Reynolds, "One Nation's Electoral Support", p. 164.

[25] Bean, "Nationwide Electoral Support", p. 149; Clive Bean, David Gow and Ian McAllister "Australian Election Study, 1998: User's Guide for the Machine-Readable Data File", SSDA Study No. 1001 (Social Science Data Archives, Australian National University, 1999), pp. 64, 73-4 and 95.

not organised around feelings that "while it is good to celebrate one's heritage it is more important for new migrants to learn what it is to be an Australian than to cling to their old ways", that "most people in Australia would mind ... if a suitably qualified person of Asian background were appointed as their boss", or that "most people in Australia would mind ... if one of their close relatives were to marry a person of Asian background". Feelings about the political system (being "not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in Australia") were equally important. But a sense of economic insecurity (a variable constructed from three items about jobs) made no difference, at least not on its own; it helped mobilise support for One Nation "only when that insecurity was associated with immigrants".[26]

In the one attempt, using the AES data, to assert the importance of job insecurity to the One Nation vote, Anthony Mughan argues that although performance measures on the national economy "play no role in explaining why voters opted for One Nation" and personal job insecurity does not do the trick, a sense that "the best years are behind us" for "good jobs" and the failure in government of both the Coalition and Labor to deal effectively with unemployment led "voters to abandon both parties". It is difficult to accept, however, that a sense of nostalgia about good jobs should be taken as a surrogate for a sense that jobs are insecure, especially when the most direct measure of this — an interactive variable designed to capture concerns about unemployment in the next twelve months and the chances of finding good jobs at good wages now — shows virtually no relationship with a One Nation vote.[27] Nostalgia about "good jobs", along with criticisms of the major parties' efforts on unemployment, are likely to be part of a broader dissatisfaction. The biggest shortcoming with Mughan's model is its failure to factor in other possible explanatory variables — most conspicuously, immigration, Aborigines and political discontent.

The Distinctiveness of the One Nation Vote

In what ways did One Nation voters differ from those who voted for the Liberal or National Party, Labor or the Australian Democrats? Data from the Morgan Poll, conducted between April 1997, when One Nation was launched, and June 1998, around the time of the Queensland election, suggest that several of the demographic correlates that characterised the One Nation vote also distinguished it from the Coalition parties and from Labor. On this evidence the party seemed peculiarly dependent on voters who had no tertiary education; who, at every age level, were men; and who had blue collar jobs. Its age profile, however, appeared not to be distinctive.[28] Newspoll data, gathered in the run-up to the Queensland election, suggested that in terms of its regional make-up, gender and occupational balance, One Nation's vote differed from that of the Democrats and the Greens as well. Its age profile also differed from that of these other minor parties.[29]

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[26] Gibson et al, "The Politics of Race", pp. 12, 15 and 18; Bean et al., "Australian Election Study, 1998", pp. 22, 96, 102 and 104.

[27] Anthony Mughan, "The Economy and the One Nation Party in the 1998 Federal Election", Annual Meeting of the Australasian Political Studies Association, Sydney, 1999, especially Table 3. The discussion of Table 2 (pp. 10-12), which makes much out of differences which are tiny, is even less convincing.

[28] Goot, "Hanson's Heartland", p. 57.

[29] Reynolds, "One Nation's Electoral Support", p. 160.

What of the AES survey? In a confusing account, Bean first argues that, as is "characteristic of minor parties", One Nation's socio-demographic support was "constrained within a fairly narrow range". This might have been taken to mean that, in relation to the major parties at least, ONP's social base was distinctive. Instead, Bean takes it to indicate "the lack of a strongly distinctive social base". (What he is actually reporting is the unsurprising fact that parties that secure only a small proportion of the vote don't draw large numbers from any demographic group). Then, the lack of a "distinctive social base" notwithstanding, Bean reports "signs in the data of a clearer and more consistent pattern of differences ... than tends to be found for most minor parties". In support of this contention, he presents the scores for One Nation respondents on a list of variables (see above). But nowhere does he compare the profile of One Nation's voters on these variables with the profile of any other voters.[30]

In terms of issues, two things seemed fairly distinctive about One Nation voters, from the start: their views on immigration and their views on Aborigines. Polling in Queensland by AC Nielsen, at the time of the Queensland election, suggested that One Nation respondents were more inclined than those who supported Liberal, National or Labor to agree strongly that "racial problems" were "getting worse" and less inclined to feel that Australia should make sure it "keeps its Aboriginal heritage".[31] Immigration and Aboriginal issues also stood out in the AES data. Bean reports that on items to do with equal opportunities for migrants, migrant numbers, links with Asia, government assistance to Aborigines and Aboriginal land rights, the gap (34 to 50 percentage points) between One Nation respondents and other respondents (undifferentiated by party) was vast; One Nation had "tapped into a well of resentment over racial and ethnic issues harboured deeply by a small minority of Australians".[32]

Concerns about crime are also evident in these surveys. In the AC Nielsen poll, One Nation voters gave a distinctly higher priority to "law and order" than did respondents who intended to vote for any of the other parties. And in the AES survey, substantially more One Nation than other respondents thought crime had increased since the last election. "Law and order" may be short-hand, among other things, for "getting tough with Aboriginal trouble-makers" — or, less provocatively, "applying the same the rules to Aborigines as to whites".

In addition to its appeal on issues of this sort, indeed often related to it, One Nation has been characterised as having a particular appeal to those "left behind" by economic and social change of the 1980s and 1990s and thrown off balance by the penetration of a market calculus into all manner of human relationships. And some evidence for this can be gleaned from the polls. In the AC Nielsen poll, a substantially greater proportion of One Nation respondents agreed that "everything" was "changing too fast", and that "you don't know who to trust these days". However, on two related issues, One Nation respondents did not stand out: finding it "hard to make ends meet" and feeling that life had handed them a "raw deal".[33] In the AES, by contrast, substantially more One Nation respondents than others felt that taxes had increased and standards of living (including their own) had fallen since the last election. This, said

[30] Bean, "Nationwide Electoral Support", pp. 139 and 150; emphasis supplied.
[31] Goot, "Hanson's Heartland", pp. 69-70.
[32] Bean, "Nationwide Electoral Support", pp. 148-9.
[33] Goot, "Hanson's Heartland", pp. 69-70.

Bean, "pointed to a constituency more economically vulnerable than the majority of the Australian electorate".[34]

The AES Revisited

A more persuasive case awaits a more systematic analysis. Our analysis is based on the AES, a survey that includes a wide range of relevant variables and the only readily accesssible survey that can be used for unit level re-analysis. Although we have reservations about this data set (spelt out below), the AES allows us to compare the structure of One Nation's electoral support with the structure of support for the Liberal and National parties (jointly), the Labor Party and the Democrats. It enables us to compare the ideological appeal of the various parties. And it enables us to do so in the context of both the House of Representatives election and the election for the Senate.

In coming to grips with these data, we use a multinomial logit model, an extension of the binomial logit model commonly used for modelling categorical data. The distinctive profile of each party's constituency, in relation to both the House of Representatives and the Senate, is evident from Tables 1A and 1B. These show the mean values for each of a series of independent variables for each of the parties. The demographic variables included (age, blue collar occupation, and gun ownership) are those which proved statistically significant,[35] plus two other variables (gender and rural location) that seemed to be substantively important in distinguishing the One Nation vote, even though they failed the statistical test of significance.

In terms of demography, what distinguishes respondents who voted One Nation, is their propensity to be male, to come from rural electorates (including villages, small country towns, and large country towns), to be engaged in blue collar occupations and to own firearms. Of the variables that seemed to distinguish One Nation respondents from both Labor and Coalition respondents in the Morgan poll, tertiary education turns out not to do so in this analysis; gender appears to do so, but not in a way that satisfies tests of statistical significance; while age, which seemed not to do so, does. Of the variables that seemed to matter in the Newspoll, gender fails the test of statistical significance; but occupation and age both pass. None of the polls asked about firearms. No doubt, we would have been looking at a more extensive list of both hits and misses had someone done for the AES what others did for Morgan and Newspoll — tried to build a profile of each party's support from a series of marginal frequencies.

The other variables in Tables 1A and 1B go to questions of identity (working class self-placement, union membership) and to social, economic or political attitudes (an anti-immigration scale, an anti-Aboriginal scale, an economic insecurity scale, and a measure of dissatisfaction with Australian democracy).[36] All were statistically significant. Neither class self-placement nor union membership, however, distinguish One Nation from Labor respondents. Where One Nation respondents are strikingly

[34] Bean, "Nationwide Electoral Support", pp. 148-9.

[35] All non-derived variables which were considered substantively important or which had been used in other studies were treated as candidates for inclusion. Each of these variables was assessed on the strength of its bivariate association with the dependent variable and then entered into the multinomial logit model in order of importance. Variables were left in the model if they were statistically significant at the 0.05 level on both Wald tests and likelihood ratios tests. Bayseian Information Criterion (BIC) tests were also employed.

[36] For the items used in each of the scales see Appendix.

distinct, and not just in comparison with Labor voters, is in their attitudes: anti-immigrant, anti-Aboriginal and alienated from Australian democracy. They were not distinct, however, in their level of concern about economic insecurity.

Table 1A: Mean values for independent variables, House of Representatives, AES 1998

	Min	Max	LNP	ALP	ONP	AD
Age	18	86	48.02	43.90	48.14	43.71
Male	0	1	0.53	0.55	0.68	0.46
Union member	0	1	0.17	0.37	0.35	0.29
Rural location	0	1	0.30	0.29	0.49	0.17
Blue collar occupation	0	1	0.21	0.33	0.53	0.26
Working class self-identification	0	1	0.33	0.57	0.63	0.33
Gun owner	0	1	0.15	0.08	0.28	0.10
Anti-immigration scale	-2.20	2.41	-0.06	-0.10	0.87	-0.33
Anti-Aboriginal scale	-2.38	1.82	0.17	-0.25	0.81	-0.35
Economic insecurity scale	-2.37	2.06	-0.46	0.33	0.39	0.04
Political dissatisfaction scale	-2.07	2.61	-0.26	0.02	0.79	0.30
n			**510**	**407**	**80**	**69**

Table 1B: Mean values for independent variables, Senate, AES 1998

	Min	Max	LNP	ALP	ONP	AD
Age	19	83	47.39	43.30	52.04	46.54
Male	0	1	0.54	0.54	0.65	0.51
Union member	0	1	0.18	0.37	0.25	0.26
Rural location	0	1	0.29	0.29	0.45	0.23
Blue collar occupation	0	1	0.22	0.34	0.52	0.19
Working class self-identification	0	1	0.34	0.59	0.56	0.31
Gun owner	0	1	0.15	0.08	0.27	0.13
Anti-immigration scale	-2.20	2.41	-0.06	-0.11	0.75	-0.31
Anti-Aboriginal scale	-2.38	1.82	0.19	-0.20	0.73	-0.38
Economic insecurity scale	-1.92	2.06	-0.53	0.32	0.33	0.05
Political dissatisfaction scale	-1.43	2.45	-0.32	0.00	0.77	0.11
n			**450**	**392**	**93**	**186**

The central significance of attitudes to immigration, Aboriginal issues, and the workings of Australian democracy, to One Nation voters was already suggested by the simplest of bi-variate analyses and confirmed by a series of calculations, carried out by David Charnock, that showed One Nation respondents, on the AES data: with a score of 0.29 on a (0-1) pro-immigration scale (scores for supporters of the other parties ranged from 0.45 for the Nationals to 0.56 for the Democrats; with a score of 0.26 on a pro-Aboriginal scale (National Party respondents, on 0.35, coming closest); and with a score of 0.24 on a scale measuring satisfaction with democracy, (although Democrat respondents, with 0.36, were not much different).[36] It is curious that in Bean's analysis, and in Anthony Mughan's, the importance of dissatisfaction with democracy is

[36] Charnock, "Voting at the 1998 Australian Federal Election", p. 92.

overlooked completely.[38]

Are these patterns sustained within a multivariate analysis? Our multinomial model, based on these variables, allows us to answer this question. To increase the chances that our explanatory variables are genuinely independent, we have excluded those variables which are substantially (though not exclusively) shaped by the very thing they are intended to explain. Thus, party identification and items that attempt to measure attitudes to the party leaders have been culled; to leave them in would be to swamp almost everything else.[39] Since the standard approach to modelling of this kind places the principle of parsimony foremost, and since the addition of variables from the AES increases the number of missing observations (respondents who did not answer particular questions), we have only included those variables known to be substantively important or that show up as statistically significant; even so, this reduces the number of cases by 892 respondents, from 1897 to 1066 for the House and 1121 for the Senate.[40]

In discussing our results, we use three methods of presentation, applying each to votes cast for the House of Representatives and for the Senate. Firstly, we present the findings of our multinomial logit model as a set of odds ratios (also known as relative risk ratios or conditional odds ratios). These express the change in the odds of voting for one party rather than another (say, One Nation over Labor), as each of the independent variables is changed, with all the other variables held constant (the usual *ceteris paribus* assumption found in linear regression). In terms of dummy variables, this means a change from one category to another (such as male to female); in terms of the continuous variables, the change is a unit increase along a continuum. Compared to a binomial logit model where there are only two outcomes, and hence one set of odds, with a multinomial logit there can be several sets of odds (for each combination of political parties). While this adds some complexity to the discussion, the use of odds ratios rather than coefficients is still a more straightforward method of presentation, and one which is particularly well suited for drawing out the distinctiveness of the One Nation vote. Since the modelling presupposes that each of the parties was a possible choice for each of the respondents, the Liberal and National respondents have been combined[41] and respondents living in the nine electorates in which One Nation did not

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[38] Mughan, "The Economy".

[39] David Denemark and Shaun Bowler, "Minor Parties and Protest Votes in Australia and New Zealand: Locating Populist Politics", in J. Brookfield, *Proceedings*, p. 188, include party leaders; Mughan, "The Economy", Table 2 and Table 3, includes party identification as well as feelings about the leaders. For Australian evidence that partisanship is "the predominant direct influence on the evaluation of a leader", see Brian Graetz and Ian McAllister, "Popular Evaluations of Party Leaders in the Anglo-American Democracies", in H.D. Clarke and M.M. Czudnowski eds, *Political Elites in Anglo-American Democracies: Changes in Stable Regimes* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1987), p. 51. On the possibility that party choice determines party identification, rather than the reverse, see Murray Goot, "Party Identification and Party Stability", *British Journal of Political Science*, 2, 1 (1972), pp. 121-25 and, more generally, "Introduction: Party Identification and Beyond", in Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe and Dennis Fairlie eds, *Party Identification and Beyond: Representations of Voting and Party Competition* (London: John Wiley & Sons, 1976).

[40] Charnock's use of twenty-three variables represents an implicit rejection of parsimony. What this means for the number of cases is not clear; the paper is presented as if n = 1897, the original number of cases. See, "Voting at the 1998 Federal Election", pp. 91 and 95. Even in Bean's analysis, the number of cases shrinks to 1145; personal communication.

[41] Although the National and Liberal parties ran separate teams for the Senate in Queensland, South

stand candidates have been excluded. Secondly, we present the predicted probabilities of voting for each party as each independent dichotomous variable (age, gender, and so on) changes from one category to the other; for example, from male to female. Thirdly, we present the predicted probabilities for voting for each of the parties at particular levels on each of the continuous variables (the anti-immigration, anti-Aboriginal, economic insecurity and political dissatisfaction variables); for ease of comprehension, these have been graphed. In calculating predicted probabilities we have set all the independent variables (that is, variables other than the parties' share of the vote) not under immediate scrutiny at their mean values.

Other explorers have been here before us; indeed, one claims that his application of multinomial logistic regression to the 1998 AES data set to "examine attitudinal and social influences" on Australian voting behaviour represents an Australian first[42] — an extraordinary comment on Australian political science. Be this as it may, the paths of those who have preceded us differ from ours in at least three ways. First, while Denemark and Bowler present their findings using predicted probabilities,[43] as we do, they include parties that failed to field candidates in all seats; not just One Nation in nine seats (which we've allowed for, in the standard way, by omitting respondents from those seats), but also the Greens which failed to run candidates in twenty-five of the 148 seats. This violates one of the model's fundamental assumptions. Second, Denemark and Bowler (and for all we know, Charnock as well) include missing observations. They assume, for example, that where respondents fail to indicate whether or not they are union members, it is safe to assume they are not; or, that where respondents don't indicate their gender it is reasonable to assume they are male![44] Third, neither Charnock, nor Denemark and Bowler, uses odds ratios. In a multinomial model it is particularly difficult to comprehend the coefficients since they express the logs of the odds and multiple contrasts are involved. For these reasons, the tendency these days is to present the reader with odds ratios and predicted probabilities.[45] We also note that both Charnock and Denemark and Bowler restrict themselves to comparisons between the Coalition (as reference group) on the one side and each of the other parties, in turn, on the other. Not only is this unnecessary; it fails to realise the technique's full potential.[46]

Australia and Western Australia we have treated a Senate vote for either the Nationals or the Liberals as a vote for the Liberals and Nationals combined; since about 95 per cent of the electorate votes the party ticket in the Senate and since the two parties exchange preferences, the decision to combine the votes introduces only a minor inaccuracy while enabling us to boost an otherwise small sample, Australia-wide.

[42] Charnock, "Voting at the 1998 Australian Federal Election", p.91.

[43] Our problems with their model include the fact that its baseline is not the predicted party shares generated by the model and the fact that its figures — most notably for Labor, which show a probability of .39 against almost every variable! — are wrong, Denemark and Bowler, "Minor Parties and Protest Votes", p. 189.

[44] Because their model includes so many variables (18), had they excluded both the Greens and the missing observations their data set would have shrunk to 836; including the Greens but excluding missing observations would have left them with 904 cases. Against an original data set of 1897, these numbers are alarmingly low.

[45] J. Scott Long, *Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables* (Thousand Oakes: Sage, 1997), p. 164; Tim Futing Liao, *Interpreting Probability Models, Logit, Probit, and Other Generalizeed Linear Models* (Thousand Oakes: Sage, 1994), p. 7.

[46] Mughan's analysis is also restricted to one reference group, One Nation; "The Economy", Table 13.

Table 2A: Odds Ratios, House of Representatives, AES 1998

	ONP/LNP	ONP/ALP	ONP/AD	ALP/LNP	AD/LNP	AD/ALP
Age	1.00	1.03 **	1.02	0.97 **	0.98 *	1.01
Male	1.38	1.34	1.81	1.03	0.76	0.74
Union	2.31 **	0.96	1.29	2.41 **	1.79	0.74
Rural	1.60	1.42	2.72 *	1.13	0.59	0.52
Blue collar	2.66 **	1.74	1.55	1.53 *	1.72	1.13
Working class	1.50	0.76	1.77	1.99 **	0.85	0.43 **
Gun owner	0.88	2.28 *	1.40	0.39 **	0.63	1.62
Anti-immigration	2.23 **	2.19 **	3.05 **	1.02	0.73	0.72
Anti-Aboriginal	1.40	2.87 **	2.81 **	0.49 **	0.50 **	1.02
Economic insecurity	1.86 **	0.44 **	0.87	4.19 **	2.14 **	0.51 **
Political dissatisfaction	2.78 **	2.51 **	1.06	1.11	2.62 **	2.36 **

n=1066 Pseudo R^2 = .26 * significant at .05 ** significant at .01

For the House of Representatives, Table 2A highlights the key demographic variables on which One Nation respondents stood out. This table shows the odds of voting for one party against each of the others, as these key demographic variables changed (from male to female, from union member to non-union member, blue collar job to non-blue collar job). For example, being a man rather than a woman, increased the odds of respondents voting One Nation, compared to Labor, by about 1.3 times. With the Coalition as the reference group, the odds for males compared with females were 1.4 times greater, and with the Democrats for reference, the odds for males were 1.8 times greater than for females (though none of these results was statistically significant). Being a member of a union, compared with not being in a union: increased the odds of respondents voting One Nation, compared to the Democrats, by about 1.3 times; increased the odds of voting One Nation, compared to the Coalition, 2.3 times; and made no difference to the odds of voting One Nation, compared to the Labor Party (only the Coalition comparison was statistically significant). And having a blue collar job, rather than a non- blue collar job: increased the odds of respondents voting One Nation, compared to the Democrats, by about one and a half; and increased the odds of voting One Nation, compared with Labor, by about 1.7 times. With the Coalition as the reference, the odds of blue collar respondents voting One Nation were nearly 2.7 times greater than those of the non-blue collar respondents (a result that was statistically significant).

When it came to class identity, One Nation respondents were not very distinctive, but the ALP contrast with the other parties was much more pronounced. The odds of voting Labor over the Coalition were twice as great for those respondents who viewed themselves as working class compared to those who didn't. The odds of voting Democrat, compared to Labor, were significantly reduced (by about 0.4) amongst respondents who saw themselves as working class rather than non-working class. Turning to the issue of gun ownership, we find that the odds of voting One Nation over Labor were twice as great for gun owners compared with those who didn't own guns. The odds of voting One Nation compared to the Coalition did not differ much for gun owners compared to non-gun owners (and this difference was not statistically significant).

Table 2B: Odds Ratios, Senate, AES 1998

	ONP/LNP	ONP/ALP	ONP/AD	ALP/LNP	AD/LNP	AD/ALP
Age	1.03 **	1.06 **	1.03 **	0.97 **	0.99	1.02 **
Male	1.14	1.23	1.22	0.93	0.93	1.00
Union	1.23	0.58	0.83	2.12 **	1.49	0.70
Rural	1.21	1.22	1.62	0.99	0.75	0.75
Blue collar	2.85 **	1.81 *	2.87 **	1.57 *	0.99	0.63
Working class	1.08	0.56 *	1.46	1.92 **	0.74	0.38 **
Gun owner	1.17	2.82 **	1.17	0.41 **	0.99	2.40 **
Anti-immigration	2.02 **	2.19 **	2.46 **	0.92	0.82	0.89
Anti-Aboriginal	1.22	2.42 **	2.94 **	0.50 **	0.41 **	0.82
Economic insecurity	1.83 **	0.41 **	0.70	4.45 **	2.64 **	0.59 **
Political dissatisfaction	3.96 **	3.08 **	1.74 **	1.28	2.27 **	1.77 **

n=1121 Pseudo R^2 = .24 * significant at .05 ** significant at .01

Of the attitudinal variables, three again stand out: opposition to immigration, opposition to Aborigines and political alienation (Table 2A). But the way to read the figures for these variables is slightly different. With a scaled variable, like anti-immigration, an odds ratio of 3.00 means that for each unit in the scale the odds of voting for Party X over Party Y increase three-fold with all other variables held constant. In this sense, scaled variables are similar to continuous variables, like age, where an odds ratio of 1.03 means that for each extra unit (here, years of age), the odds of voting for Party X over Party Y increase by 3 per cent.

For each unit in the anti-immigration scale, the odds of voting One Nation versus Labor, and One Nation versus the Coalition, increased two-fold, whilst the odds of voting One Nation versus the Democrats increased three-fold. For each unit increase on the anti-Aboriginal scale, the odds of voting One Nation over Labor, or One Nation over the Democrats, both increased three-fold. With the Coalition as the reference group, the odds of voting One Nation only increased 1.5 times with each unit increase in the scale (and this result was not statistically significant). In this respect, anti-Aboriginal sentiment does not distinguish One Nation voters from Coalition voters, whereas it clearly differentiates them from Labor and the Democrats. Finally, turning to the political alienation scale, a unit increase here saw the odds of voting One Nation over the Coalition increase two-fold; the odds of voting One Nation over Labor increase two and a half times; and the odds of voting One Nation over the Democrats remained the same. In other words, respondents who felt dissatisfied with the functioning of the political system were inclined to turn away from both Labor and the Coalition, and to cast their votes for One Nation or the Democrats.

Among the economically insecure, often seen as the group for which One Nation might have most appeal, each unit increase on the scale doubled the odds of voting for One Nation compared to voting for the Coalition. More importantly, however, each unit increase almost halved the odds of voting for One Nation over Labor. (Such an increase somewhat lessened the odds of voting One Nation over the Democrats, though this was not statistically significant). Economic insecurity favoured Labor against the Coalition much more than it favoured One Nation or the Democrats against the Coalition; for each unit increase on the scale, the odds of voting for the Opposition

rather than for the Government more than quadrupled. No other variable had odds ratios of this magnitude.

What differences emerge if we compare the odds ratios for votes cast in the House of Representatives with those cast in the Senate? On most of the variables, the Senate results were much the same as those in the House, but on a couple of the variables the One Nation results were more distinctive. Take political alienation, for example. The odds of voting for One Nation over the Coalition, and of voting for One Nation over Labor, both increased more strongly in the Senate than they did in the House, as movement along the political dissatisfaction scale grew; the odds of voting One Nation rather than for the Democrats also increased with each unit increase on the political dissatisfaction scale. On gun ownership, the Senate results for One Nation were also sharper than in the House. The odds of voting One Nation over Labor, for example, increased nearly three-fold when gun owners were compared with non-gun owners; the equivalent odds ratio in the House was just above two.

There are two shortcomings with odds ratios. First, they do not indicate the overall probability of a particular outcome. A high odds ratio may not mean much if the actual probability of that outcome is itself quite small.[47] Second, it becomes tedious to qualify every odds ratio by having to note which of the other outcomes is serving as the reference category in each of the odds under discussion (first comparing One Nation with the Coalition, then with the ALP, and so on).

It is much more straightforward to express the results of multinomial logit models in terms of predicted probabilities. However, because probability variables are not linear, interpreting the results requires a different approach. One of the best methods is to fix these variables at their mean values, and to change each dichotomous variable separately from one of its categories to the other. The results of our modelling, for the House and the Senate, are shown in Table 3A and Table 3B.[48]

Of the dichotomised variables in the model, the one that has the biggest impact on One Nation's support in the House (Table 3A) is blue collar employment; the switch from white collar to blue collar doubles One Nation's predicted vote, from 2.7 per cent to 5.5 per cent. A similar if less marked effect is evident for the Democrats with their vote increasing by a third (from 5.8 per cent to 7.8 per cent), their image as something of a middle class party notwithstanding.[49] The contrast with the ALP is worth noting. Being a blue collar worker only increases the predicted ALP vote by 7.1 percentage points (from 37.4 per cent to 44.5 per cent), a small gain in proportional terms.

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[47] Bean et al., "Australian Election Study, 1998", pp. 116 and 122. The same problem arises with the finding that those who scored highest on interest-based opposition, or democratic dissatisfaction, lifted their chances of voting for One Nation from 0.03 to 0.11 or 0.12 respectively — a four-fold increase. The authors don't say to how many respondents this applied; Gibson et al, "The Politics of Race", p. 18.

[48] If the base probability for One Nation appears low (3.9 per cent) it is because One Nation voters generally do not fit the means very well; for example, 67 per cent of those who voted One Nation were male compared with the sample mean of 49 per cent; see Table 1.

[49] See, for example, the frequencies reported from a 1979 study and the 1996 AES, in Clive Bean, "The Australian Democrats After Twenty Years: Electoral Performance and Voting Support", in John Warhurst ed., *Keeping The Bastards Honest: The Australian Democrats' First Twenty Years* (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1997), p. 78.

Table 3A Predicted Probabilities, House of Representatives, AES 1998

	ALP	ONP	AD	LNP
Male	40.0	3.8	5.6	50.6
Female	39.0	2.8	7.4	50.8
Change	**-1.0**	**-1.0**	**1.8**	**0.2**
Rural location	41.8	4.5	4.3	49.4
Non-rural location	38.5	2.9	7.5	51.1
Change	**-3.4**	**-1.6**	**3.2**	**1.7**
Union member	53.1	4.3	6.9	35.8
Not a union member	34.7	2.9	6.0	56.4
Change	**-18.4**	**-1.4**	**-0.8**	**20.6**
Blue-collar occupation	44.5	5.5	7.8	42.1
Non-blue-collar occupation	37.4	2.7	5.8	54.1
Change	**-7.1**	**-2.9**	**-2.0**	**12.0**
Working class identification	48.8	3.5	4.9	42.8
Not working class identification	32.6	3.1	7.6	56.7
Change	**-16.3**	**-0.4**	**2.7**	**13.9**
Gun owner	23.0	3.9	5.6	67.4
Not gun owner	42.4	3.2	6.4	48.0
Change	**19.4**	**-0.7**	**0.8**	**-19.4**

n=1066

None of the other variables identified in Table 3A has nearly so great an impact on One Nation's vote — though some have a considerably greater impact on the probability of voting for one of the major parties. Trade union membership lifts the probability of voting One Nation by about a half (from 2.9 per cent to 4.3 per cent) and it lifts the probability of voting Labor by about a half (from 34.7 per cent to 53.1 per cent) as well; but it reduces the Coalition's support by more than a third (from 56.4 per cent to 35.8 per cent). However, while class consciousness adds little to One Nation's support, it adds quite a lot to support for the major parties. A sense of being working class rather than non-working class make no difference to the chances that respondents will have voted One Nation; but it increases the chance they will have voted Labor by half (32.6 per cent to 48.8 per cent), decreases the chance they will have voted for the Coalition by a quarter (56.7 per cent to 42.8 per cent) and decreases the chance they will have voted for the Democrats by about a third (7.6 per cent to 4.9 per cent).

Living outside a major city or large town increases the probability of a respondent voting One Nation by more than half, from 2.9 per cent to 4.5 per cent. The impact on Labor support is similar in direction, which may surprise, but proportionately much smaller. For Democrats, the effect is exactly the opposite to the effect on One Nation respondents and not quite as large: support declines by nearly half. For the Coalition, support also declines (Liberals counting more than Nationals) though the effect is very small. Not owning a firearm decreased the chances that respondents voted for One Nation and increased the chance that they voted for the Democrats, in almost equal measure; but the measure was hardly great. The impact on the fortunes of the major parties of respondents not owning a gun was considerably greater — almost doubling the probability that they had voted Labor (from 23.0 per cent to 42.4 per cent) and reducing by nearly a third (from 67.4 per cent to 48.0 per cent) the chances that they voted for the Coalition. Being a woman reduced the probability that a respondent would vote One Nation by about a quarter (3.8 per cent to 2.8 per cent) and increased

the probability of voting for the Democrats by about a third. The impact on Labor support is similar in direction to the impact on One Nation support, which will surprise no one, but much smaller. For the Coalition, perhaps surprisingly, there was no difference.

Table 3B Predicted Probabilities, Senate, AES 1998

	ALP	ONP	AD	LNP
Male	36.6	3.9	18.2	41.3
Female	38.0	3.3	18.9	39.8
Change	**1.4**	**-0.6**	**0.6**	**-1.5**
Rural location	38.2	4.3	15.6	42.0
Non-rural location	36.8	3.4	19.9	40.0
Change	**-1.4**	**-0.9**	**4.3**	**-2.0**
Union member	48.1	3.2	18.5	30.2
Not a union member	33.4	3.8	18.3	44.5
Change	**-14.7**	**0.6**	**-0.2**	**14.3**
Blue-collar occupation	43.6	6.5	15.6	34.3
Non-blue-collar occupation	34.6	2.9	19.6	42.9
Change	**-9.0**	**-3.7**	**4.1**	**8.6**
Working class identification	47.2	3.3	13.7	35.7
Not working class identification	30.0	3.8	22.7	43.5
Change	**-17.3**	**0.4**	**9.0**	**7.8**
Gun owner	21.4	5.2	22.9	50.5
Not gun owner	40.0	3.4	17.8	38.9
Change	**18.5**	**-1.8**	**-5.1**	**-11.6**

n = 1121

The story in the Senate, overall (Table 3B), is similar; but there are some differences. Whereas having a blue collar job, or not owning a gun, made a vote for the Democrats more likely in the House, in the Senate the reverse was true. While union membership made it more likely respondents would vote for One Nation in the House, the reverse was true in the Senate. And while respondents from rural areas were less likely than urban voters to vote for the Coalition in the House, they were more likely to do so in the Senate.

Table 4A: Predicted Probabilities, 'archetypes', House of Representatives, AES 1998

	ALP		ONP		AD		LNP	
	P (%)	n	P (%)	n	P (%)	n	P (%)	n
Base probability (mean values on all variables)	39.7	407	3.3	80	6.3	69	50.7	510
Female, non-rural, not blue-collar, not working class, aged 30 or under	43.2	11	1.5	0	12.4	5	42.9	51
Male, rural, blue-collar, working class, aged 45-65	49.5	11	9.8	5	3.1	1	37.6	8
Difference from mean	9.8		6.5		-3.2		-13.1	
Difference from opposite	6.3		8.3		-9.3		-5.3	

n=1066

As well as examining changes in single variables, one by one, it is possible to change several variables simultaneously. This way we can produce both a set of figures to match the caricatures or "identikit" profiles of the One Nation vote, noted earlier,

and a count to show how many — or rather how few — respondents there were who actually measured up. Take, for example, the summary sketch offered by Gibson, McAllister and Swenson. Their vision of the "typical" One Nation voter was a picture of someone who was "male, blue collar and working class [self identified], between the ages of 45 and 65 and Australia".[50]

Table 4A shows that for such respondents, the predicted probability of voting One Nation in the House of Representatives was 9.8 per cent, about half as great again as the mean value for all respondents and a six-fold increase over someone with the opposite characteristics; in the Senate the corresponding figure was 10.4 per cent, nearly three times as great as the average respondent and about a ten-fold increase over someone with the opposite characteristics. The Table shows that on these characteristics there is some overlap between One Nation's support base and Labor's (an echo of Bean's observation about how like Labor voters One Nation voters seemed) with the chances of voting Labor rising by a quarter in both the House and the Senate. But it also shows that the proportion of One Nation respondents who matched the profile was about 6 per cent — much lower than the figure a summary statistic of this kind might lead one to imagine; the corresponding figure for Labor was no more than 3 per cent.[51]

Table 4B: Predicted Probabilities, 'archetypes', Senate, AES 1998

	ALP		ONP		AD		LNP	
	P (%)	n	P (%)	n	P (%)	n	P (%)	n
Base probability (mean values on all variables)	37.3	392	3.8	93	18.5	186	40.4	450
Female, non-rural, not blue-collar, not working class, aged 30 or under	42.0	10	1.2	0	23.8	8	33.1	19
Male, rural, blue-collar, working class, aged 45-65	46.4	10	10.4	5	9.5	1	33.7	7
Difference from mean	9.1		6.6		-9.0		-6.7	
Difference from opposite	4.4		9.2		-14.3		0.6	

n=1121

[50] Gibson et al, "The Politics of Race", p. 7.

[51] The only other attempt to calculate a figure like this, that comes to mind, is Don Aitkin's. He used data from two surveys to estimate the proportion of "archetypal" manual voter in the electorate. "In 1979 the proportion of the sample who had manual jobs, lived in rented accommodation, had not completed high school, belonged to trade unions, and thought of themselves as working class was just 1 per cent; in 1967 it had been 2 per cent"; D. Aitkin, *Stability and Change in Australian Politics* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1982), second edition, p. 316. For another attempt to model extreme differences in party choice, this time around three values (attitudes to unions, economic organisation and the monarchy), but again with hardly any respondents having the requisite set of beliefs, see Jonathan Kelley, "Political Ideology in Australia", in J. Kelley and C. Bean eds, *Australian Attitudes: Social and Political Analyses from the National Social Science Survey* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1998), pp. 73-4. And for a third example, this time without any attempt to calculate the proportion of voters who might have met the requirements, see F.L. Jones and Ian McAllister, "The Changing Structural Base of Australian Politics since 1946", *Politics*, 24, 1 (1989), p. 10, where "an unskilled Catholic man under thirty-five years of age, who lived in a capital city and had neither a phone nor a car" is contrasted with "an older non-conformist woman, living in the country, married to the local doctor or bank manager". Rodney Smith drew our attention to this delightful example of the genre.

Attitudes

Several of the key variables were no t dichotomised but measured on a continuous scale. To interpret predicted probabilities for these a different method is required. While predicted probabilities are still calculated with all the other variables set to their mean values, the way changes in these variables are measured has to change as well. As Table 5A shows, the predicted probabilities can be calculated for the minimum and maximum values of the independent variables. But this is a fairly extreme measure of change; for example, as one moves from the minimum value on the anti-immigration scale to the maximum value the predicted probability of voting for One Nation changes by 20 percentage points. Another approach is to present figures for the marginal effect, also known as partial change.

Table 5A:

Changes in Predicted Probabilities, Scaled Variables, House of Representatives, AES 1998

	ALP	ONP	AD	LNP
Anti-immigration scale				
From minimum to maximum	-0.02	0.20	-0.10	-0.07
Marginal effect	0.00	0.03	-0.02	-0.01
Anti-Aboriginal scale				
From minimum to maximum	-0.56	0.09	-0.08	0.56
Marginal effect	-0.16	0.02	-0.02	0.16
Economic insecurity scale				
From minimum to maximum	0.87	0.00	0.01	-0.88
Marginal effect	0.32	0.00	0.01	-0.32
Political dissatisfaction scale				
From minimum to maximum	-0.17	0.21	0.34	-0.38
Marginal effect	-0.02	0.03	0.05	-0.07

n=1066

Table 5B: Changes in Predicted Probabilities, Scaled Variables, Senate, AES 1998

	ALP	ONP	AD	LNP
Anti-immigration scale				
From minimum to maximum	-0.09	0.19	-0.14	0.04
Marginal effect	-0.01	0.03	-0.03	0.02
Anti-Aboriginal scale				
From minimum to maximum	-0.32	0.08	-0.33	0.57
Marginal effect	-0.10	0.02	-0.09	0.17
Economic insecurity scale				
From minimum to maximum	0.79	-0.01	0.09	-0.87
Marginal effect	0.27	-0.01	0.04	-0.31
Political dissatisfaction scale				
From minimum to maximum	-0.16	0.33	0.34	-0.51
Marginal effect	-0.02	0.04	0.10	-0.12

n = 1121

However, the figures for marginal effects may be quite misleading. Because the variables in a probability model are not linear, the marginal effect of a continuous variable may only be accurate for part of the range of that variable. Typically, this occurs towards the middle of the range. When continuous variables are graphed against the predicted probabilities they typically show curvature of the tails and a straight line

in the middle. For this reason it is useful to supplement Tables 5A and 5B with a graphical presentation (Figure 1A, for the House; Figure 1B, for the Senate).

Figure 1A:
Changes in Predicted Probabilities, Scaled Variables, House of Representatives, AES 1998



Figure 1B:
Changes in Predicted Probabilities, Scaled Variables, Senate, AES 1998



The uniformity of political opinion around immigration, in votes cast for the House, is evident in Figure 1A. As one moves towards stronger anti-immigration sentiment, the predicted probabilities of voting for all the parties — bar One Nation — decline steadily. For One Nation the reverse applies, and the increased propensity to vote for the Party climbs very steeply as respondents hold more extreme views on immigration. Anti-Aboriginal sentiment is different. Here the patterns for Labor and Coalition

respondents were diametrically opposed, with support for Labor declining sharply as anti-Aboriginal sentiment increased and support for the Coalition increasing sharply. One Nation respondents emerge as watered-down versions of Coalition respondents; as one moves to the anti-Aboriginal end of the scale One Nation increases its vote, though not as much as it does at the extreme end of the anti-immigration scale. Economic insecurity, by contrast, had very little impact on the vote for either One Nation or the Democrats; the big changes are in the Labor and Coalition votes which moved, again, in opposite directions: as one moves towards greater economic insecurity, the Labor vote rises and the Coalition's vote drops — just as quickly. As one would expect, with increased political dissatisfaction support for the Coalition declined; at the higher levels, support for Labor declined too. By contrast, support for One Nation rose; but it rose more steeply for the Democrats.

For the Senate, the patterns are not quite the same; but the differences generally exaggerate differences evident in the House (Figure 1B). Thus, as one moves towards stronger anti-immigration sentiment, the predicted probability of voting for the Coalition rises slightly while for One Nation it rises markedly; by contrast, the probabilities of voting for Labor, and especially of voting for the Democrats, fall away. Anti-Aboriginal sentiment follows trajectories similar to those for the House, save that the Democrats gain more pro-Aboriginal voters; as a result, their vote falls away more sharply at the higher end of the scale. For One Nation, economic insecurity continues not to register; but insecurity does provide some fuel for the Democrats as well as providing considerable support for Labor, largely at the Coalition's expense. The minor parties continue to benefit from political discontent, One Nation less so than the Democrats.

One Nation and the Australian Party System

Over the last two decades the major parties have embraced new positions on a number of important social and economic issues. Many of these positions they have shared, if not in detail then at least in their general direction. Whether the parties have actually drawn closer, or were just as close before and have simply shifted the terrain of their shared policy positions, is a moot point — and one which need not detain us here.[52] What is relevant is that in the minds of many respondents, Labor and the Coalition still remain opposite choices. This applies to both "old" class politics and new "social movement" politics. In the case of the former, we find that on measures of class consciousness (working class self-identification), class location (perceived, if not actual, economic insecurity) and class mobilisation (trade union membership), Labor respondents and Coalition respondents line up in diametrically opposed positions. Turning to new "social movements", Labor was also the party favoured by pro-Aboriginal forces and by younger voters; by contrast, the Coalition was inclined to attract those with anti-Aboriginal sentiments and who were older. That respondents saw the major parties as distinct in these ways fits in well with what a series of surveys has shown: that respondents are no less inclined than they were twenty-five or thirty years ago to see a good deal of difference between the major parties and to believe that

[52] For data which suggest that in some respects the "convergence thesis" is mistaken, see Ian McAllister and Rhonda Moore, *Party Strategy and Change: Australian Electoral Speeches Since 1946* (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1991), p. 14 and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Richard I. Hofferbert and Ian Budge, *Parties, Policies and Democracy* (Boulder: Westview, 1994), p. 85.

it matters which party wins.[53]

Where does One Nation fit into this story? On the more subjective aspect of class, working class self-identification, One Nation respondents were indifferent; on the more objective dimension, they had a stronger presence. While not responding to economic insecurity in the same way that Labor respondents did, those who had voted One Nation nevertheless were solidly within "old class" constituencies — more likely to be in blue-collar jobs or to belong to trade unions. In other words, One Nation had a beach-head within the traditional working class, but those foot soldiers didn't think of themselves in class terms. Their subjective orientation, saturated with political alienation, was more towards racism — classic ingredients of right-wing populism. In their racism, particularly against Aborigines, One Nation respondents were not that far from their cousins in the Coalition's ranks; in particular, as Denemark and Bowler's analysis suggests, from their country cousins in the National Party. Indeed, on a left-right scale, One Nation respondents located themselves at about the same point as the Liberal and the National Party — well to the right of Labor, the Democrats and the Greens.[54]

Rather than focus on the politics of class, many of those who have attempted to analyse the One Nation vote have focused on the politics of protest, on the ability of the Party to grow and on its chances of establishing itself as a continuing element of the Australian party system. In all these accounts the concept of protest is under-theorised. In one sense, any new party may be seen as a party of protest since by definition its presence indicates dissatisfaction with the existing range of choice. And the label can stick; to this day the Liberal Party is sometimes described as an "anti-Labor" party, as was each of its predecessors.[55] In another sense, a vote registered by any party, major or minor, might be a protest vote; as Helena Catt reminds us, and as pre-election polls attest, it is misleading to assume that voters necessarily cast their votes for a party; in many cases they might better be described as casting their vote against one or more of the other parties.[56] Some votes of this kind are cast in the hope

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[53] See Murray Goot, "Disengaged, Distrustful and Disenchanted? Polled Opinion on Politics, Politicians and Parties: A Historical Perspective", Papers on Parliament, 37 (Canberra: Department of the Senate, Parliament House, 2001), in press.

[54] Bean, "Nationwide Electoral Support", p. 145. Unlike Bean (p. 146), we see no "paradox" in the fact that similar scores "suggest scope both for ONP to win over further National Party voters and for the National Party to win back ONP voters"; on the contrary, this is precisely what ideological proximity means. For an interpretation of the Queensland election which argues that, in the eyes of the electorate, the party closest to One Nation was Labor (with the Liberals furthest away), see Geoffrey Brennan and Nicole Mitchell, "The Logic of Spatial Politics: The 1998 Queensland Election", *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 34, 3 (1999), pp. 379-90. However, this analysis runs foul of the ecological fallacy; it is based on seats gained and lost, not votes, much less (as the authors readily concede) on any knowledge about the voters themselves. On the problem of using seats to interpret election results, see Murray Goot, "Rewriting Electoral History: The Myth of McKell", in Michael Easson ed., *McKell* (North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988). For evidence that "electorates with higher ALP two-party referred[sic] votes" in Queensland and New South Wales at the federal election were "associated with lower levels of One Nation primary support", see Grant and Sorensen, "Marginality", p. 207.

[55] In an obvious sense this is true; but since Labor is not described as an anti-Liberal party, it is also telling; see Henry Mayer, "Some Conceptions of the Australian Party System 1910-1950", *Historical Studies, Australia and New Zealand*, 27 (1956); reprinted in Margot Beever and F.B. Smith eds, *Historical Studies: Selected Articles* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1967), second series.

[56] H. Catt, *Voting Behaviour: A Radical Critique* (London: Leicester University Press, 1996), chapter 2. After the 1993 federal election — and Paul Keating's claim that the Opposition had not lost the election,

that the party they are cast against will win, but with a smaller majority than it might otherwise have enjoyed; others are cast in the hope that the party they are cast against will lose.

A different view, championed by Charnock, is that the protest vote, "though somewhat stronger among minor party voters", drives the vote of any "non-governing" party.[57] There is some truth in Charnock's account. But it misses three things: the difference between the size of the protest vote that goes to the alternative party of government (the ALP) rather than to the parties that are not alternative parties of government (One Nation and the Democrats); the difference between the minor parties themselves; and the difference between votes cast for the House and votes cast for the Senate. Labor did benefit from a protest vote (measured here by the reported voting behaviour of those who were politically dissatisfied); in both the House and the Senate the odds of voting Labor rather than for the Coalition were greater among the politically dissatisfied (though not at the level of statistical significance). However, the chances of voting One Nation or Democrat were affected much more markedly; here the odds ratios jumped by between two and three. Clearly, political dissatisfaction is measuring something more than a response to the Government. There were differences between One Nation and the Democrats, too. One Nation's advantage over both the Coalition and Labor was more marked in the Senate than in the House; by contrast, the Democrats' advantage was less marked in the Senate than in the House. The Senate election saw respondents who were dissatisfied with the political system shift their votes towards One Nation and away from the Democrats. Perhaps the politically alienated saw the Democrats, holding the balance of power in the Senate for much of the previous twenty years, as too "mainstream" to really "keep the bastards honest".

Reynolds insists that what "animates" the majority of One Nation voters is not particular policies but "a diffuse and generalised dissatisfaction with the political process" and "resentful feelings" directed at the major parties "of being overlooked and ignored".[58] But the problem with thinking about One Nation in these terms is that it begs a key question: what is it that draws voters to One Nation rather than to some other "party of protest" like the Democrats? As we have seen, some of the demographic differences between One Nation and Democrat respondents were rather like those between One Nation and the Coalition or One Nation and Labor: One Nation's voters are older (statistically significant in the Senate), are more likely to be men, are more likely to come from rural Australia (statistically significant in the House), and are more likely to be in blue collar jobs (statistically significant in the Senate). In terms of attitudes to immigration and Aborigines, the differences between One Nation and Democrat respondents were also rather like those between One Nation and the Coalition or One Nation and Labor; but, importantly, they were generally closer to the differences between One Nation and the Coalition than One Nation and Labor: One Nation respondents were much more likely than the Democrats to be anti-immigration and to be anti-Aboriginal (in each case, the differences are statistically

Labor had won it - Newspoll asked "Which one of the following was a stronger influence on the way you voted: your liking of the party you voted for; your disliking of the other parties". In the seven surveys conducted since then, between 42 per cent and 52 per cent of respondents have chosen the second option; personal communication, Sol Lebovic, Newspoll.

[57] Charnock, "Voting at the 1998 Federal Election", p. 98.

[58] Reynolds, "One Nation's Electoral Support", p. 165.

significant for both the House and the Senate). It is these attitudes, rather than those that have to do with economic insecurity (where the odds favour the Democrats over One Nation) or even with political dissatisfaction (where the odds in the House are roughly the same) that distinguish One Nation's "protest" from that of the Democrats.

The ideological proximity of One Nation voters to the Coalition on issues of immigration and Aboriginal affairs helps us answer two other questions begged by pigeon-holing One Nation as a party of protest: from which parties do One Nation voters come and where do their preferences go? The answer to both questions is the same: on the whole, the Liberal and National parties. That One Nation voters were drawn generally from the ranks of the Liberal and National party voters is evident from the polls, from the AES and from election returns. Not drawn exclusively, of course; but to paraphrase Davis and Stimson, ex-Labor voters were the "icing" on a conservative "cake".[59] An examination of One Nation preferences tells a similar story. In the Queensland election, across the 43 seats in which they were distributed, One Nation's preferences went to the Liberal (57.2 per cent) or National Party (20.2 per cent) overwhelmingly; and in the federal election, One Nation's preferences also favoured the Coalition though not perhaps as markedly.[60]

Not that this is something that everyone would have predicted. Hanson, after all, had made her mark by winning a Labor seat; pollster Gary Morgan, on the back of a poll taken after her maiden speech and before One Nation existed, had declared that "Pauline is doing to the Labor party what the DLP did to Labor in the 1950s";[61] and even as the first opinion polls on One Nation itself were providing a more informed basis on which to assess the Party's electoral support, political scientist Simon Jackman was warning (on the basis of the 1996 AES) that race might be emerging as "a realigning dimension of Australian politics", a development that would put Labor rather than the Coalition at risk. A "reasonably large proportion of ALP identifiers", he reported, were "exhibiting conservative attitudes on race" (attitudes to immigration and Asia, not just Aborigines); these voters were ideologically closer to the Coalition candidates than to Labor's; so "coalition leaders could well be tempted to 'play the race card'". Although it was not clear that this would be a "winning strategy", the "political implications", he advised, "should not be underestimated".[62]

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[59] See Goot, "Hanson's Heartland", pp. 55-7; Bean, "Nationwide Electoral Support", p. 144; Davis and Stimson, "Disillusionment and Disenchantment", pp. 78-9.

[60] Bean, "Nationwide Electoral Support", pp. 156-7 (Queensland), p. 144 (federal election); Grant and Sorensen, "Marginality", p. 207.

[61] When the Morgan poll asked respondents how they would vote in a Senate election, it included "the Pauline Hanson Movement" as one of the options respondents could choose. The poll, which reported that 18 per cent of respondents favoured the PHM, suggested that support was even higher in New South Wales than in Queensland and that a swing to the PHM would do more damage to Labor than to the Coalition; Morgan Poll No. 1391, 23-24 October 1996, Finding No. 2941. Morgan is quoted in Kerry-Anne Walsh, "The Power of One", *The Bulletin* 5 November 1996, p. 23. Graham Richardson reports that, initially, many Liberals shared this view; "Clouds Gather in the Sunshine State", *The Bulletin* 16 June 1998, p. 40.

[62] S. Jackman, "Pauline Hanson, the Mainstream, and Political Elites: The Place of Race in Australian Political Ideology", *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 33, 2 (1998), pp. 171, 180-1 and 183-4. Similar elite/mass patterns, in the 1990 AES, are reported in Ian McAllister, "Immigration, Bipartisanship and Public Opinion", in James Jupp and Marie Kabala eds, *The Politics of Australian Immigration* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1993), pp. 165-7. For a reading of Jackman's findings, which inverts them, see Frank Jones, "The Sources and Limits of Popular Support for a

Arguably, the Coalition had played "the race card" already. "For All Of Us", the slogan it chose for its 1996 election campaign, "suggested both that the Coalition would govern for all and that Labor cared only for special interest groups";[63] the "special interests" included Aborigines (land rights) and migrants (multiculturalism). As Judith Brett observed, what John Howard did "was to sharpen up long-standing patterns of grievance". In doing so, he "opened up the space in which Pauline Hanson felt emboldened to speak".[64]

If some commentators failed to anticipate One Nation's single most important political source, others still find the conservative origins of its electoral base hard to credit. Bean sees a "tension" between the "social and political hues" of One Nation's electoral support — between "a social profile which in some respects approximates that of a Labor voter" and the fact that most One Nation voters supported the Coalition in 1996 and still preferred the Coalition to Labor in 1998. What the "tension" is, however, or who actually feels it, is not clear. If there is a "tension" in what ways does it differ from the "tension" suggested by other combinations of "social and political hues" — working class conservatives, the middle class left, or the more general phenomenon constituted by the decline of "class voting"? The last is something which Bean does not appear to see in terms of tensions at all.[65] The "tension" with One Nation is "resolved", he thinks, by the observation that nearly half of One Nation's voters live in rural electorates and are "counterbalanced" by the majority of Labor voters who live in metropolitan electorates. But if there is a tension, neither the observations themselves nor the curious attempt to connect them go anyway to resolving it.

Of course, one cannot assume that One Nation voters will not shift their support to one of the major parties: that such a shift would necessarily involve a move back to their party of origin; or that those who continue to vote for One Nation will give the majority of their preferences to the Coalition, though that may hinge on which way One Nation itself jumps. None of this, however, has anything to do with the sort of "tensions" that concern Bean; the only tensions it has to do with are the real tensions, and worse, that have plagued One Nation itself.

What then of its future? "Political issues", Bean argues, "especially those to do with race and immigration but also, if to a lesser extent, issues related to the economy", might work to the Party's advantage "if the party can continue to mine the widespread disenchantment with the way the mainstream parties have handled some of these questions".[66] But, except for the Aboriginal question, the issues on which One Nation

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Multicultural Australia", in Ghassan Hage and Rowanne Couch eds, *The Future of Australian Multiculturalism* (Research Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Sydney, 1999), p. 28.

[63] Pamela Williams, *The Victory* (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1997), p. 156.

[64] Judith Brett, "John Howard, Pauline Hanson and the Politics of Grievance", in G. Gray and C. Winter, eds, *The Resurgence of Racism: Howard, Hanson and the Race Debate, Monash Publications in History*, 24 (Clayton, Vic: Department of History, Monash University, 1997), p. 9. For the argument that "the shift to the right of the conservative parties did not inhibit the emergence of more extreme parties" but "paved the way" for them, applied more generally, see Piero Ignazi, "The Silent Counter-Revolution: Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Europe", *European Journal of Political Research*, 22 (1992), pp. 20, 25.

[65] Compare Bean and McAllister, "Voting Behaviour", p. 180.

[66] Bean, "Nationwide Electoral Support", p. 150.

stands out most strongly against the "mainstream parties" — dissatisfaction with the workings of Australian democracy and anti-immigration — are not issues on which there is "widespread disenchantment" (if we take this to mean issues on which at least half the AES sample expressed some level of support for change); and those other issues on which there is "widespread disenchantment" — especially on issues related to the economy — are not issues on which One Nation respondents stand out from any party other than the Coalition.

Even with "race and immigration", Bean cautions that "the very size of the gap" between One Nation and other respondents might indicate "a degree of policy isolation" which would make it not only more difficult for the Party to attract more voters but to retain those who voted for One Nation in 1998. Why being on the side of the majority, regardless of the margin, should constitute "policy isolation" is difficult to fathom. Nor is it clear why something evident in 1998, when One Nation rallied voters to its cause, should make it more difficult to retain these voters next time around. What might make it more difficult to attract new support or retain the support previously won is not "policy isolation" in Bean's sense; it is not even Charnock's point that because of Australia's changing composition anti-immigration positions are hardly a "growth stock" (an argument which would make it hard to explain One Nation's success in the first place);[67] rather, it is the position the mainstream parties adopt. And on both land rights and government help for Aborigines — the "race" items on which One Nation, in 1998, might be said to have occupied the position of the median voter — the Coalition, in particular, has certainly tried (in the language of the AES) not to go "too far".[68]

Not that the data suggest that a government bent on winning back One Nation's constituency would restrict itself to issues of this kind. On immigration, it might restrict family reunions, de-emphasise multiculturalism, and make sure that refugees were not seen to be enjoying "privileges"; each of these it has done. On rural issues, were the government to follow Davis and Stimson's advice, it would decentralise services, though not to all regional and rural areas (since most pastoral and mixed-farming areas, for example, are not a problem) and not to any regional urban centres, lest it exacerbate the problem. And since union membership raises the odds of voting for One Nation (and for Labor) compared with voting for the Coalition, policies designed to lower union densities may serve not only to damage Labor, but to undercut One Nation; indeed, because union membership is much more clearly an independent variable in relation to One Nation then to Labor,[69] the precipitous drop in union membership may have disproportionately damaged the former rather than the latter.

In saying that the Coalition has gone some way to accommodate the race and immigration concerns of One Nation voters we differ, clearly, from those who argue that this is something that, for various reasons, parties bent on winning office cannot do. Denemark and Bowler, for example, insist that "by championing unorthodox issues

[67] Charnock, "Voting at the 1998 Australian Federal Election", p. 93.

[68] Money's argument, about the Coalition's attempt to undermine One Nation by switching the debate from issues of race to issues of the economy, underestimates both the Coalition's need to fight on two grounds at once and its ability to do so, Money, "Xenophobia and Xenophilia", p. 14.

[69] On the question of whether union membership encourages a Labor vote, or Labor voting encourages union membership, see Aitkin, *Stability and Change*, pp. 140-42, and D.W. Rawson, *Unions and Unionists in Australia* (Sydney; Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), pp. 88-91.

which catch-all parties could not electorally afford to embrace", One Nation "attracted votes for which effectively they had no partisan competition".[70] But on what John Hirst has called "hard multiculturalism"[71] and on what a much wider range of people call Aboriginal "privilege", a catch-all party might well have championed a paler version of the sorts of policies that Hanson herself embraced; in 1996, this was precisely what the Liberals did.[72] Money thinks that on immigration, the Coalition is boxed-in not because immigration is popular but because migrants vote. On her analysis, the Coalition's only room for manoeuvre is to switch the ground on which the contest for votes is conducted from issues of immigration to issues of economics; she thinks that, in 1998, this is what it did; and that in so doing it "virtually shut out" One Nation from the federal parliament. But her analysis assumes that there are more migrant votes to be lost on immigration than non-migrant votes to be won. Even if she is right, the risk of losing migrant votes is an unlikely principal cause of the Liberals' change of strategy; the massive loss of votes in Queensland through its preferencing strategy is likely to have concentrated Liberal minds much more sharply.[73] And while the Coalition avoided making the same mistake twice about its own preferences, it still needed to heed One Nation voters in order to secure their preferences.

Conclusion

There are three general lessons about the analysis of voting behaviour that our study underlines. First, relationships between patterns of voting and patterns of demography that hold true for aggregates do not necessarily hold true for individuals; even where they do, aggregate variables are necessarily more limited in range than individual level variables. Second, variables that function to identify difference are not necessarily useful as tools of analysis; to discover, for example, that the number of single-parent families or level of geographical mobility is correlated with voting for One Nation is not necessarily to discover anything worth knowing. And third, variables which show up strongly in a bivariate analysis may be washed away in analyses which are multivariate; this held true for country of birth, age, education and income, among others.

Our analysis largely depends on the quality of the AES data. The fact that One Nation voters were under-sampled and that this is something that no amount of weighting can make up for, is something we have to live with.[74] The manner in which

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[70] Denemark and Bowler, "Minor Parties and Protest Votes", p. 193. The concept of a "catch-all" party, under which party behaviour is governed by the pursuit of votes, is developed in Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party System", in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner eds, *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1966). The limits of this view in relation to the Liberal Party are argued in Murray Goot, "Public Opinion, Privatisation and the Electoral Politics of Telstra", *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 45, 2 (1999), pp. 214-38 and "The Prime Minister and the Polls", *The Bulletin* 14 March 2000, pp. 32-33.

[71] J. Hirst, "National Pride and Multiculturalism", *People and Place*, 2, 3 (1994), p. 22.

[72] See also Jackman, "Pauline Hanson", p. 183, who argues, on the basis of the 1996 AES, that "the probability of coalition[sic] electoral victory is positively correlated with the salience of race, ceteris paribus".

[73] See Reynolds, "One Nation's Electoral Support", p. 156.

[74] Bean, "Nationwide Electoral Support", pp. 137-38, refers, in quite abstract terms, to the data being "weighted" so that it "reaffirms" [sic] the proportion of the vote won by One Nation at the election. But apart from writing as if surveys validate elections rather than the other way around, he fails to note the extent to which the proportion of One Nation respondents was under sampled or to discuss the extent to

the data were collected (mail out, mail back self-completion questionnaires) suggests that those who failed to reply may have been disproportionately working class and of limited literacy; certainly the sample has a large skew towards those with university degrees and diplomas.[75] Under these conditions the strength of many of our key variables — blue collar, working class self-placement, union membership, and so on — will, if anything, have been underestimated; the importance to the One Nation vote of respondents who left school early may have been underestimated as well. Another concern about the quality of the data relates to the number of missing observations; this concern has already been flagged. Non-response (blanks) on every question effectively cuts the data set from 1897 (the number of questionnaires returned) to as few as 1066 for our analysis of voting for the House of Representatives or 1121 for the Senate. It is possible that reductions of this size have introduced a further bias.

If our analysis is right, however, certain class-related interpretations of One Nation's success have to be abandoned. There is little evidence for the view that One Nation support is quintessentionally petite bourgeois;[76] Pauline Hanson ran her own business before she entered Parliament — as a director of One Nation Ltd, she still does — but those who voted One Nation were less likely than those who voted for the Coalition, and only slightly more likely than those who voted for Labor or the Democrats, to come from small business backgrounds.[77] Nor does One Nation represent a working class revolt against governments that have stripped away industry protection; One Nation respondents may have been somewhat more likely than others to think that "Australia should continue to use tariffs to protect its industry", but this issue did not win the Party votes.[78] We cannot even say that One Nation is a magnet for the unemployed or the economically insecure. As in Western Europe, where high rates of unemployment create a political environment conducive to parties of the extreme right, the unemployed themselves were not especially likely to support the One Nation Party.[79]

But at a time when class itself has become increasingly marginalised as an explanatory schema within the literature on Australian political science, it is instructive to see how well it stands out in at least three other respects: blue collar employment, working class self-placement and union membership. Not only are they relevant to an

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which weighting the data might not address the consequences of this under-sampling.

[75] See Murray Goot, "More "Relaxed and Comfortable": Public Opinion on Immigration Under Howard", *People and Place*, 8, 3 (2000), Table 2, for a comparison between the AES and the Census.

[76] The most eloquent exposition of this view , is in Brett, "John Howard", p. 9ff. For evidence that "the vast majority" of One Nation candidates in the 1998 Queensland election were "middle-class, professional or business-related", see Tracey Arklay and John Wanna, "Dissidents in Paradise: A Profile of One Nation, its Candidates, Voting Support and Policy Impacts", Paper given to the Policy Network Conference, Adelaide, February 1999, p. 6; but compare J. Brett, "Representing the Unrepresented: One Nation and the Formation of the Labor Party", in Davidoff ed., *Two Nations*, p. 30.

[77] The proportion of the Coalition's vote that derived from the self-employed was 30 per cent, for Labor it was 16 per cent, for One Nation 21 per cent and for the Australian Democrats 15 per cent.

[78] On a scale of 1 to 5 (where 1 represents "strongly agree", 3 "neither agree nor disagree", and 5 "strongly disagree"), the overall mean was 2.40 and the mean for Democrat respondents was 2.47, for LNP respondents 2.42, Labor 2.42 and One Nation 2.15; Bean et al., "Australian Election Study 1998", p. 93.

[79] Robert W. Jackman and Karin Volpert, "Conditions Favouring Parties of the Extreme Right in Europe", *British Journal of Political Science*, 26 (1996), pp. 505 and 508. There are other similarities, but also differences, between their findings and ours.

explanation of the One Nation vote; they are of continuing importance to understanding votes for the Coalition and Labor parties as well.[80]

For one political scientist, Judith Brett, the rise of One Nation was "rightly seen" as the result of the "established political parties" not giving "the people what they want". The "hysterical denunciations and crude name-calling" of Pauline Hanson and One Nation reminded her of the way in which conservative politicians had "responded to the emergence of successful Labor candidates in the 1890s and 1900s". The challenge for Labor now was "to rediscover its tradition of representing the unrepresented" — the "poorly educated, Anglo-Australians, outside the southeastern corner" — and to "rebuild its credibility as a vehicle for popular democratic aspirations". Race, she conceded, may have been "a major idiom" of these popular aspirations; but what One Nation fundamentally expressed was "a new social cleavage", generated by "globalisation" in which class differences were amplified by regional differences. On this view, Labor could move to accommodate One Nation voters while maintaining, even redoubling, its efforts on behalf of women, ethnic Australians and Aborigines.[81] The historian, Ross Fitzgerald also denies that race has much to do with it; indeed, he has doubts about the term itself. "Despite the media hoopla about 'racism'", he writes, the "underlying causes" of One Nation's support were "primarily economic"; they derived from "a doctrinaire adherence, by all the major political parties, to the supposed clear benefits for Australia and Australians of 'free trade', deregulation, and so-called 'economic rationalism'".[82] The geographers Davis and Stimson not only doubt that attitudes to race have much to do with One Nation voters; they doubt that such attitudes has much to do with the One Nation Party. The "anger and disillusionment" expressed by One Nation at the ballot box, they insist, have little to do with "the racist connotations which are sometimes perceived to be behind ONP's strong stand against immigration, foreign investment and the Aboriginal programs of governments". Instead, the anger has to do with "globalisation". This has produced a "disillusionment, despair and alienation" which is both "widespread throughout Australian society" and "locationally specific".[83]

Nowhere in all this is there an acknowledgement that the electorate is not, for the most part, disenchanted, disillusioned or in despair; that globalisation has constituted a threat to workers in the cities — in manufacturing — and in the "rust belt" states of Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania not only to workers in the "gun belts" of

[80] So entrenched is the notion that "class is dead", that Charnock, "Voting at the 1998 Australia Federal Election", p. 96 takes his own findings — which show that being a manager or administrator significantly decreases the Labor and One Nation vote, while being a labourer significantly increase it — as evidence "that occupational class is not of major importance in influencing voting behaviour". For a wider discussion, see Murray Goot, "Class Voting, Issue Voting and Electoral Volatility", in J. Brett, J. Gillespie and M. Goot eds, *Developments in Australian Politics* (South Melbourne: Macmillan, 1994).

[81] J. Brett, "Representing the Unrepresented", pp. 26, 31 and 33.

[82] R. Fitzgerald, "A Shooting Star", *Australian Book Review*, 224 (September 2000), p. 16.

[83] Davis and Stimson, "Disillusionment and Disenchantment", pp. 69, 72. There is much in these denials which is redolent of a particular set of views about the politics of race, class formation, and the birth of the Labor Party in the late nineteenth century; see the discussion in Humphrey McQueen, *A New Britannia: An Argument Concerning the Social Origins of Australian Radicalism and Nationalism* (Ringwood, Vic: Penguin, 1970), chapter 2 and Verity Burgmann, "Capital and Labour", *Labour History*, 35 (1978), also published as Ann Curthoys and Andrew Markus eds, *Who Are Our Enemies: Racism and the Working Class in Australia* (Neutral Bay, NSW: Hale & Iremonger, 1978), p. 21 note 4.

Queensland, regional Australia or the bush, many of whose industries have long had a global focus; or, above all, that what is at stake maybe not so much a conflict over economic welfare as a clash over social and political values — values that relate not only to the treatment of Aborigines, attitudes to immigration, and relations with Asia but to other touchstones of social conservatism including opposition to homosexuality, support for capital punishment, and retention of the monarchy.[84] Even when the theory of "status-frustration" is invoked to explain One Nation's support, the vaguely defined "status" turns out be one threatened by economic change rather than a change in the dominant political values.[85]

Dissatisfaction with democracy, characteristic of One Nation supporters, may well be fuelled by a sense that "new class elites" stand for values that they themselves, and the majority of Australians, would never approve; hence the push for Citizens Initiated Referenda and the rise, in at least some of the areas where One Nation was strong, of Citizens Electoral Councils — dedicated not only to particular procedural norms but to certain substantive outcomes.[86] Those commentators who have seen in One Nation an embryonic grassroots socialism — the voice of the battlers against the elites, in favour of protectionism against global capitalism — have: fallen victim to their own prejudices about globalisation, deregulation, economic rationalism, and the rest; been misled by the outward and visible signs of One Nation's support; and been seduced by elements of the Party's own policy statements. They have failed to examine closely One Nation's core constituency. Their accounts, framed in a populist rhetoric of their own, have failed to come to terms with the parties from which the majority of One Nation voters have come, the policies which have mattered most in the shaping of their vote, and the parties with whose ideologies they feel most closely aligned.

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[84] In her maiden speech, Hanson refrained from attacking homosexuals despite being strongly encouraged to do so by her speech writer; John Pasquarelli, *The Pauline Hanson Story ... by the Man Who Knows* (Frenchs Forrest, NSW: New Holland, 1998), p. 118. On this issue, her speech writer certainly had a good sense of her constituency: two-thirds (64 per cent) of One Nation respondents in the AES disapproved of "allowing homosexuals to teach in schools" (in the sample as a whole, this view was shared by just 44 per cent) and twice as many (56 per cent) as in the sample as a whole disapproved "of homosexuals holding positions in public life". In the same survey, 87 per cent of One Nation respondents (compared with 65 per cent of the sample as a whole) favoured the reintroduction of the death penalty for murder; and while well over half (59 per cent) of One Nation respondents favoured retaining the Queen as head of state, only a third (34 per cent) of the overall sample did. See, Bean et al., "Australian Election Study, 1998", pp. 76, 97 and 106 for the survey items.

[85] See Iva Ellen Deutchman, "Pauline Hanson and the Rise of the Radical Right", *Patterns of Prejudice*, 34, 1 (2000), pp. 52-53. Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, *The Politics of Unreason* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1973), pp. 306-9, whom Deutchman cite as arguing for the status frustration thesis, do acknowledge the thesis as a possible line of explanation; but, they concede, the evidence for it is "slight". A more promising work in this vein is Joseph R. Gusfield, *Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966).

[86] We lack a good political geography of the CECs; but see Rae Wear, "One Nation and the Queensland Right", in Leach et al. eds, *The Rise and Fall of One Nation*, pp. 65-68.

APPENDIX

Independent variable	Questionnaire item	Coding
Male	I.1. What is your sex?	Dummy: Male (1) Female (0).
Age	I.2. When were you born?	Continuous: 1998 minus year of birth.
Gun ownership	I.11. Do you, or anyone in your household, own a firearm?	Dummy: Yes (1) No (0).
Union member	H.6. Do you belong to a trade union?	Dummy: Yes (1) No (0).
Blue-collar occupation	H.5. What kind of work do you do? (Coded to ASCO 2nd Edition).	Dummy: Blue collar (1) {trades, intermediate production workers and labourers}. Other occupations (0).
Working class self-identification	I.12. Which social class would you say you belong to? Upper class / Middle class / Working class /None.	Dummy: Working class (1), remainder (0)
Rural location	I.13. Would you say you now live in: rural area or village / small country town / larger country town / large town / major city.	Dummy: Rural (1) {rural area or village; small country town; larger country town}. Others (0).
Anti-immigration scale	F.6. Do you think the number of immigrants allowed into Australia should be reduced or increased? (Answer from: Increased a lot through to reduced a lot).	Factor analysis score.
	F.7. There are different opinions about the effects that immigrants have on Australia. How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? i. Immigrants increase the crime rate. ii. Immigrants are generally good for Australia's economy. iii. Immigrants take jobs away from people who are born in Australia. iv. Immigrants make Australia more open to new ideas and cultures.	
Anti-Aboriginal scale	E.2. For the following statements, say whether you think the change has gone too far, no gone far enough, or is it about right? i. Aboriginal land rights. ii. Government help for Aborigines.	Factor analysis score.
	G.14. How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? i. As the first Australians, Aborigines should have special cultural protection that other groups don't have. ii. It is important for the well-being of Australian society that the aspirations of Aborigines be recognised. iii. The constitution should specifically recognise the right of Aborigines to self-government.	
Economic insecurity scale	D.4. How does the financial situation of your household now compare with what it was 12 months ago? And how do you think the general	Factor analysis score.

Independent variable	Questionnaire item	Coding
	economic situation in Australia now compares with what it was 12 months ago? (Answer: A lot better through to a lot worse).	
	D.6. Compared to now, what do you think the financial situation of your household will be in 12 months time? And what do you think the general economic situation in Australia as a whole will be in 12 months time? (Answer: A lot better through to a lot worse)	
	D.8. How worried are you that in the next 12 months you or someone else in your household might be out of work and looking for a job for any reason – very worried, somewhat worried, or not worried at all?	
Political dissatisfaction scale	B.7. Considering everything the Labor Party and the Liberal Party stand for, would you say there is ... A good deal of difference between the parties. Some difference between the parties. Not much difference between the parties. No difference between the parties.	Factor analysis score.
	B.8. In general, do you think political parties are doing a very good job, a good job, neither a good nor bad job, a bad job or a very bad job for the people of Australia?	
	B.9. On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in Australia?	
	B.19. Some people say that political parties in Australia care what ordinary people think. Others say that political parties in Australia don't care what ordinary people think. Where would you place your view on this scale from 1 to 5?	
	B.19. Where would you place your view on this scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means that political parties are necessary to make our political system work, and 5 means that political parties are not needed in Australia.	