

THE COURT OF APPEAL PRESIDING AT PUTRAJAYA

**CIVIL APPEAL NO: W-02-431-2006**

BETWEEN

(1) SANMARU OVERSEAS MARKETING SDN BHD  
(2) YEOH JIN BENG ... APPELLANTS DEFENDANTS

AND

(1) P.T. INDOFOOD INTERNA CORP.  
(2) P.T. SANMARU FOOD MANUFACTURING CO. LTD  
(3) P.T. INDOFOOD SUKSES MAKMUR TBK ... RESPONDENTS PLAINTIFFS

CORAM:

- (1) Zaleha Zahari , JCA
- (2) Abdul Malik bin Ishak, JCA
- (3) Abu Samah bin Nordin, JCA

**JUDGMENT OF ABDUL MALIK BIN ISHAK, JCA**

**Introduction**

**[1]** Before the High Court, there were three defendants, namely:

- (a) Far East Food Industries Sdn Bhd (dalam likuidasi).
- (b) Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd.
- (c) Yeoh Jin Beng.

**[2]** The first defendant (Far East Food Industries Sdn Bhd (dalam likuidasi)) did not file a defence and judgment was entered against it on

12.5.1994 and it was subsequently ordered to be wound up. Before us only the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd) and the third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng) appealed against the decision of the High Court.

**[3]** The first defendant (Far East Food Industries Sdn Bhd (dalam likuidasi)) took no part in the trial before the High Court and is not a party to this appeal.

**[4]** The second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd) was incorporated under the laws of Malaysia on 21<sup>st</sup> July 1983. The first subscribers to the Memorandum and Articles of Association were Djajadi Djaja, Teoh Sik Hwa @ Chao Sik Hwa and the third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng).

**[5]** The third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng) was, at all material times, a director and general manager of the first defendant (Far East Food Industries Sdn Bhd (dalam likuidasi)).

**[6]** I will now set out the particulars of the plaintiffs. The first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) was incorporated on 20<sup>th</sup> July 1984 under the laws of Indonesia. The first subscribers to the Memorandum and Articles of Association were Djajadi Djaja, Pandi Kusuma, Ulong Sanjaya, Hendy Rusli, Sudwikatmono, Ibrahim Rishad, Anthony Salim and Teddy Djuhar.

[7] The second plaintiff (P.T. Sanmaru Food Manufacturing Co. Ltd) was incorporated on 27<sup>th</sup> April 1970 under the laws of Indonesia. The first subscribers to the Memorandum and Articles of Association were Djajadi Djaja, Harry Gandi, Darmawan Tedja, Tjandra Sudi Rahardja, Lim Weng Ngak, Wirendjaja Ganda, Sudjana and Tedja Sukmana.

[8] The third plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk) was incorporated under the laws of Indonesia known as P.T. Panganjaya Intikusuma on 14<sup>th</sup> August 1990. The first subscribers to the Memorandum and Articles of Association were Pandi Kusuma, Hendy Rusli and Anthony Salim. It became, in 1994, a public company and changed its name to P.T. Indofood Sukses Makmur. Again, on 24<sup>th</sup> June 1997, the Articles of Association of P.T. Indofood Sukses Makmur were amended and its name was changed for the second time to that of the third plaintiff (by the insertion of the last word “**Tbk**”).

[9] For convenience, the parties shall be referred to in the same manner as they were referred to in the High Court. The parties will be described as the plaintiffs and the defendants accordingly.

### **The two groups**

[10] There were two main groups which ventured into instant noodles businesses. They were the Salim group and the Jangkar Jati group.

[11] The Salim group was founded by Liem Sioe Liong, also known as Soedono Salim in the 1940s. In 1992, his son, Anthony Salim took over the management and he held the posts of the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Salim group. The other members of the Salim group included Sudwikatmono, Ibrahim Rishad and Teddy Djuhar. The Salim group's foray into the instant noodles business in Indonesia started with the incorporation of P.T. Sarimi Asli Jaya (better known as "**P.T. Sarimi**") under the laws of Indonesia in 1979 and the launching of the "**Sarimi**" brand of instant noodles. At the time of its launch, there were already in existence two popular brands in the Indonesian market – the "**Supermie**" and the "**Indomie**" brands.

[12] The Jangkar Jati group was founded by Djajadi Djaja and the Indonesian "**Indomie**" trade mark was registered in the name of Djajadi Djaja. Now, the instant noodles operations of the Jangkar Jati group were carried out in Malaysia through the corporate vehicles of the first defendant (Far East Food Industries Sdn Bhd (dalam likuidasi)) and the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd).

[13] Djajadi Djaja had incorporated the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd) in Malaysia on 21<sup>st</sup> July 1983. Djajadi Djaja had coined the "**Indomie**" trade mark and beneficially owned it in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Even before the second defendant

(Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd) applied for registration of the “**Indomie**” trade mark in Malaysia in 1983, Djajadi Djaja had already transferred and assigned all his rights and interests in the Malaysia “**Indomie**” trade mark to the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd).

### **The joint venture between the two groups**

[14] A joint venture and corporate re-structuring exercise involving the Jangkar Jati group and the Salim group was implemented and this resulted in the two groups taking cross – holdings of each other’s instant noodles operations. This was in 1984. The first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) was incorporated by the two groups as the joint venture and management company with 57.5% of its equity held by the Jangkar Jati group with the balance of 42.5% held by the Salim group.

[15] Prior to 1984, the first defendant (Far East Food Industries Sdn Bhd (dalam likuidasi)) and the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd) were the manufacturing and marketing arms of the Jangkar Jati group’s instant noodles operations in Malaysia. This arrangement ceased following the joint venture and corporate re-structuring exercise in 1984 when the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) took over as the joint venture vehicle and management company for the

consolidated instant noodles businesses of the Jangkar Jati group and the Salim group.

[16] Again, prior to 1984, the first defendant (Far East Food Industries Sdn Bhd (dalam likuidasi)) and the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd) were financed entirely by the Jangkar Jati group. But after the joint venture, the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) took over all the financial responsibilities in relation to the affairs of the first defendant (Far East Food Industries Sdn Bhd (dalam likuidasi)) and the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd). Of significance would be this. That the third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng) reported to and took instructions and directions from the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) as well as the Indofood group generally.

[17] It can be surmised that the joint venture between the two groups, in practical terms, increased the scale of integration and close managerial control exercised by the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) over the day to-day Malaysian operations of the first defendant (Far East Food Industries Sdn Bhd (dalam likuidasi)) and the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd).

[18] It was agreed, as part of the joint venture between the two groups, that all snack food and instant noodles brands/trade marks including the “**Indomie**” and other brands/trade marks previously

registered in the names of Djajadi Djaja, the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd) and all other companies in Indonesia and elsewhere, would be owned by the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.). This would foster integration and rationalise the operations of the two groups.

[19] Under the joint venture exercise, the third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng) was to effect the transfer of the brands/trade marks registered in the names of the first defendant (Far East Food Industries Sdn Bhd (dalam likuidasi)) and the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd) including the Malaysia “**Indomie**” trade mark as and when directed by the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) – being the joint venture and management company of the merged snacks and instant noodles businesses of the two investor groups, at nominal consideration. And by a notarial deed dated 15<sup>th</sup> December 1991, the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) acquired all of Djajadi Djaja’s shares, interests and rights in the first defendant (Far East Food Industries Sdn Bhd (dalam likuidasi)). The Salim group propelled ahead and by June 1992 it acquired 100% ownership and control of the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) and the second plaintiff (P.T. Sanmaru Food Manufacturing Co. Ltd) and P.T. Sarimi.

### **The re-structuring in 1994**

**[20]** Now, pursuant to an extraordinary general meeting of the shareholders held on 1<sup>st</sup> March 1994, it was resolved that the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) and the second plaintiff (P.T. Sanmaru Food Manufacturing Co. Ltd) along with sixteen (16) other companies which were part of the Indofood group, would be merged and jointly merged by one holding entity by the name of P.T. Indofood Sukses Makmur and that would be the third plaintiff. It was resolved, inter alia, that:

“All rights and obligations of the COMPANIES (i.e. the companies within the Indofood group which merged) shall become the rights and obligations of ISM (i.e. P.T. Indofood Sukses Makmur) with no exception, as of the date of the joint management, being the first day of January one thousand nine hundred and ninety four (1.1.1994).”

And it was further resolved that:

“All assets and liabilities owned by the COMPANIES (i.e. the companies within the Indofood group which merged) as detailed in the balance sheet dated the thirty first day of December one thousand nine hundred and ninety three (31.12.1993) ... shall become the assets and liabilities of ISM (i.e. P.T. Indofood Sukses Makmur).”

**[21]** By virtue of this resolution, all the rights and obligations, assets and liabilities of the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) and the second plaintiff (P.T. Sanmaru Food Manufacturing Co. Ltd) became the rights and obligations, assets and liabilities of and liabilities of P.T.Indofood Sukses Makmur with effect from 1<sup>st</sup> January 1994 including the rights of



action associated with the Malaysian “**Indomie**” trade mark which is the subject matter of this appeal.

### **Decision of the High Court**

[22] After a full trial, the High Court gave judgment to the plaintiffs and ordered the defendants to take all the necessary steps within 14 days of the order of the High Court to record the transfer of the Indomie trade mark to the plaintiffs in accordance with the terms of the Deed of Assignment dated 26<sup>th</sup> of September 1990, failing which the Senior Assistant Registrar be authorised to execute all the relevant documents to effect the said transfer. The High Court also ordered that the first and the third defendants to transfer all the trademarks presently registered in the first defendant’s name to the first plaintiff within 14 days of the order of the High Court and failing which the Senior Assistant Registrar be authorised to execute all the relevant documents to effect the said transfer. The High Court further ordered that the defendants to forthwith deliver to the plaintiffs, its servants, agents all the products of the plaintiffs in its possession, control including but not limited to the products bearing the trade name Indomie, Top Mie, Pop Mie, Nutrimi – Yin Duo (in Chinese) and Indomie Mi Goreng. The High Court further ordered the defendants to deliver to the plaintiffs, its servants, agents all samples, pamphlets, advertising materials and other materials, documents and papers

whatsoever sent to the defendants by the plaintiffs and relating to the plaintiffs' business which the defendants, their agents may have in their possession or under its control including all the separate books of accounts and records kept or maintained by the defendants. The High Court further ordered that the defendants be restrained from selling or in any way dealing with the products of the plaintiffs but not limited to the products of the plaintiffs bearing trade names of Indomie, Top Mie, Pop Mie, Nutrimi – Yin Duo (in Chinese) and Indomie Mi Goreng. The High Court further ordered that an inquiry as to damages and payment of all sums by the second and the third defendants to the plaintiffs, found due upon taking such an inquiry, together with interest thereon at 8% per annum from 13<sup>th</sup> of October 1993 to the date of realisation. The High Court also ordered the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs the costs of this action for two counsel to be taxed. By consent the High Court ordered that the execution thereof be stayed pending the disposal of a formal application for stay of execution before the High Court.

**[23]** The order of the High Court was accompanied by a penal notice pursuant to Order 45 rule 7 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (“**RHC**”). This penal notice follows the format set out in Form 87 of the RHC and it serves to warn the person served that if he neglects to obey or disobeys the judgment or order, he will be liable to process of execution for the

purpose of compelling him to obey the same. And the failure to insert the penal indorsement in the order has been held to be fatal in the context of an application for committal (**Leow Seng Heat v Low Mui Yein (1996) 5 MLJ 381; General (Rtd) Tan Sri Hashim Mohd Ali & Anor v Francis s/o MG Mirandah (2000) 4 AMR 4699 at 4703; and Gribbles Pathology (M) Sdn Bhd v. Adventist Hospital & Clinic Services (M) Bhd (No 2) (2003) 1 CLJ 317**).

[24] Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, the defendants filed an appeal against the whole decision of the High Court to the Court of Appeal.

[25] The whole case revolved on the sole issue of the consideration for the transfer of the “**Indomie**” trade mark. Yet, the trial proceeded on other issues as well and these issues were mere red herrings. At every turn and corner – indeed at every available opportunity, the defendants sought to raise every possible issue. That prompted the High Court judge to award costs for two lawyers.

### **Merger – locus standi of the plaintiffs**

[26] Liquidation proceedings against the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) and the second plaintiff (P.T. Sanmaru Food Manufacturing Co. Ltd) started on 1<sup>st</sup> March 1994. And they continued to be in liquidation under the laws of Indonesia, each under the management of a liquidator.

Of significance would be this. That they are not dissolved and they continue to exist as legal entities under the laws of Indonesia.

[27] But the defendants submitted that since the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) and the second plaintiff (P.T. Sanmaru Food Manufacturing Co. Ltd) had been dissolved and liquidated, they had no locus standi before the High Court as well as in this court. It was also emphasised that the third plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk) was joined as a party to the proceedings on 20.7.2005 and that would be three months before the commencement of the trial before the High Court. The defendants questioned whether the third plaintiff was properly joined as a party on 20.7.2005. Again, it was emphasised that the third plaintiff was joined as a party only after the first and the second plaintiffs had been dissolved and liquidated according to the laws of Indonesia.

[28] To say as was said that the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) and the second plaintiff (P.T. Sanmaru Food Manufacturing Co. Ltd) were dissolved on 1<sup>st</sup> March 1994 was wholly wrong under the laws of Indonesia. The liquidator of the first plaintiff by the name of Hadi Widjaya affirmed an affidavit on 22<sup>nd</sup> May 2003 as seen in the Appeal Record Jilid IV (“**ARJ IV**”) at pages 1350 to 1351 and there he averred that, “**The process of liquidation has not been entirely completed.**”. A similar statement was also made by the liquidator of the second plaintiff by the

name of Aufrans in his affidavit that was affirmed on 22<sup>nd</sup> May 2003 as seen at pages 1359 to 1360 of “**ARJ IV**”.

[29] Linda Widyati, a legal practitioner in Jakarta, Indonesia affirmed an affidavit on behalf of Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd (the second defendant) and Yeoh Jin Beng (the third defendant) on 4.11.2003 as seen in the Appeal Record Jilid V (“**ARJ V**”) . There she concluded that the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) and the second plaintiff (P.T. Sanmaru Food Manufacturing Co. Ltd) had been dissolved as of 1<sup>st</sup> March 1994 (see paragraph 15 of her affidavit) but her conclusion was inconsistent with the plain words of the “**Minutes of Meeting on Merger and Handover of Assets and Liabilities**” as seen at pages 1198 to 1215 of “**ARJ IV**” which simply stated that it was resolved on 1<sup>st</sup> March 1994 that the first and the second plaintiffs “**has to be liquidated or dissolved**” (see page 1206 of “**ARJ IV**” at the top of the page). Reference should also be made to the Notice in the Gazette No: 28 dated 8<sup>th</sup> April 1994 (see page 1236 of “**ARJ IV**”) and the English language translation can be seen at page 1250 of “**ARJ IV**” which states as follows:

“Notice is hereby given that in relation with a merger between P.T. Indofood Sukses Makmur and ..... P.T. Indofood Interna Corporation ..... the Resolutions for the winding-up of the companies were unanimously approved and the companies be put in liquidation with effect from the 1<sup>st</sup> of March 1994.”

**[30]** I agree with the submissions that just like our Malaysian company law, there is a great deal of difference under the laws of Indonesia between a company that is in liquidation (and managed by a liquidator) and a company that is dissolved (not requiring any management). Here, both the first and the second plaintiffs are merely under liquidation and they are not dissolved and they are certainly entitled to sue.

**[31]** Under cross-examination, PW1 (Cesar M. de la Cruz) testified as follows (see page 380 of the Appeal Record Jilid II (“**ARJ II**”)):

“OBS: I put it to you that the P1 and P2 had been liquidated under Indonesian law and were not able to maintain this action against the D5 as at 1.3.1994. Do you agree or disagree?”

CD: Your Lordship, I disagree. My explanation is that both Ps were still in existence and as of today, continues to be in existence.”

And, under re-examination, PW1 (Cesar M. de la Cruz) confirmed that the liquidator of the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) was Hadi Wijaya. PW1 (Cesar M. de la Cruz) was then asked the following question and he gave the answer accordingly. The notes of evidence at page 387 of “**ARJ II**” carried this exchange:

“TT: He (referring to Hadi Wijaya) is the liquidator of P1 and he states that in paragraph 2 at page 9, paragraph 2 starts from page 8, the process of liquidation has not been entirely completed?”

CD: Your Lordship, the statement says that it was put under liquidation. Yes, the process of liquidation has not been completed.”

[32] All these would categorically show that both the first and the second plaintiffs have not been dissolved and they thus have locus standi to pursue their claims before the High Court and in this court. They have sufficient interests in the matter to compel them to file this civil suit together with the third plaintiff. One cannot analyse the sufficiency of interest from the legal and factual basis of any given case. Lord Diplock in **Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation Of Self-Employed And Small Business Ltd.** [On appeal from *Reg. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex parte National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd.*] (1982) AC 617, at page 644, succinctly said:

“If, on a quick perusal of the material then available, the court thinks that it discloses what might on further consideration turn out to be an arguable case in favour of granting to the applicant the relief claimed, it ought, in the exercise of a judicial discretion, to give him leave to apply for that relief.”

[33] So long as both the first and the second plaintiffs have sufficient interests in the matter that would give them standing to pursue their claims. The cases on standing decided post **Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation Of Self-Employed And Small Business Ltd.** [On appeal from *Reg. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex parte National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd.*] (*supra*) are

more robust and forward looking. They show that the courts are willing to champion substance over procedure. Lord Diplock's judgment in **Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation Of Self-Employed And Small Business Ltd.** [On appeal from **Reg. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex parte National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd.**] (*supra*), at pages 639 to 640, merits reproduction.

There he said:

“The rules as to ‘standing’ for the purpose of applying for prerogative orders, like most of English public law, are not to be found in any statute. They were made by judges, by judges they can be changed; and so they have been over the years to meet the need to preserve the integrity of the rule of law despite changes in the social structure, methods of government and the extent to which the activities of private citizens are controlled by governmental authorities, that have been taking place continuously, sometimes slowly, sometimes swiftly, since the rules were originally propounded.”

[34] Standing would be accorded to a person, at common law, if his or her own legal right is under threat. In relation to a public right, the requirement of standing should be satisfied if that person can show that he has suffered damage peculiar to himself or if he can show that he would imminently be in that position (**Boyce v. Paddington Borough Council (1903) 1 Ch 109**). Both the first and the second plaintiffs would easily qualify as claimants who would suffer damage and accordingly they must be given standing to pursue their claims.



## **Joinder**

[35] In regard to the joinder of the third plaintiff (P.T.Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk), I have this to say. The defendants are precluded from questioning the joinder of the third plaintiff at this point of time. The defendants filed an application seeking an order that the third plaintiff should not be added as a party to this civil suit, whether by way of substitution in place of the original plaintiffs or by way of an additional plaintiff. The defendants pursued that application strenuously before the Registrar, before the High Court and finally before another panel of this court. The defendants even went to the extent of applying for leave to appeal to the Federal Court against the decision of the other panel of this court given on 25<sup>th</sup> October 2005, just one day prior to the commencement of the trial of this suit in the High Court. It was certainly an option for the defendants not to have taken the position of applying in a separate proceeding to strike out the third plaintiff as a party to this suit. The defendants could, if they wanted to, take the objection as a defence at the trial proper. But that did not happen. Now, having pursued the objection vigorously in interlocutory proceedings right up to the Federal Court, the defendants must be precluded by res judicata from raising it again in this court. If the defendants are permitted to pursue the same objection in this appeal, the defendants would be given two bites at the proverbial cherry.

That cannot be right. **Halsbury's Laws of England, fourth edition, at page 434, at paragraph 980** carries the following write-ups:

“Issue estoppel means that a party is precluded from contending the contrary of any precise point which, having once been distinctly put in issue, has been solemnly and with certainty determined against him. Even if the objects of the first and second claims or actions are different, the finding on a matter which came directly in issue in the first claim or action, provided it is embodied in a judicial decision that is final, is conclusive in a second claim or action between the same parties and their privies.”

Continuing at page 436 at paragraph 981, **the learned authors of Halsbury's** had this to say:

“The conditions for the application of issue estoppel require a final decision on the issue by a court of competent jurisdiction and that:

- (1) the issue raised in both proceedings is the same; and
- (2) the parties to the judicial decision or their privies were the same persons as the parties to the proceedings in which estoppel is raised or their privies.”

**[36] Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd (1995) 4 CLJ 283, (1995) 3 MLJ 331, (1995) 3 AMR 2871**, a Federal Court decision, is now the leading case on estoppel and it has been cited in many cases and these cases have been reported in the local law journals: **Hong Leong Leasing Sdn Bhd v Far East Knitting Sdn Bhd (1996) 2 MLJ 251 at 262, (1997) 1 CLJ 123, (1996) 2 AMR 1886; KGN Jaya Sdn Bhd v Pan Reliance Sdn Bhd (1996) 1 MLJ 233, (1996) 1 AMR 839; Chong Yoong Choy v UOL Factoring Sdn Bhd (1996) 1 MLJ 421, (1996) 2 AMR 1394; Teh Poh Wah v Seremban**

**Securities Sdn Bhd (1996) 1 MLJ 701, (1996) 4 CLJ 16, (1996) 1 BLJ 463; Chor Phaik Har v Choong Lye Hock Estates Sdn Bhd (1996) 2 MLJ 206, (1996) 4 CLJ 141, (1996) 2 AMR 2393; UMW Toyota (M) Sdn Bhd v Chow Weng Thiem (1996) 5 MLJ 678, (1997) 1 AMR 728; Lai Yoke Ngan & Anor v Chin Teck Kwee & Anor (1997) 2 MLJ 565, (1997) 3 AMR 2458; Raju Jayaraman Kerpayaya v Chung Khiaw Bank Ltd (1997) 2 MLJ 590, (1997) 3 CLJ 216, (1997) 3 AMR 2420; BSN Commercial Bank (M) Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah, Mersing (1997) 5 MLJ 288; Tan Cheng Yam v. Emperee Sdn. Bhd. & Ors. (1997) 3 CLJ 102, (1997) 4 AMR 3194; and Bukit Melita Sdn Bhd v Lam Geok Hee & 7 Ors (1997) 4 AMR 3160.** Gopal Sri Ram JCA, writing for the Federal Court in **Boustead Trading (supra)** aptly said at page 344 of the MLJ reporting:

“The time has come for the court to recognise that the doctrine of estoppel is a flexible principle by which justice is done according to the circumstances of the case. It is a doctrine of wide utility and has been resorted to in varying fact patterns to achieve justice. Indeed, the circumstances in which the doctrine may operate are endless.”

[37] While the Court of Appeal in **Low v. Bouverie (1891) 3 Ch. 82** establishes the principles that estoppel cannot be used as a cause of action but merely serves as a rule of evidence, the Australian High Court in **Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher and Another (1988) 76 ALR 513** goes to the extent of allowing a plaintiff to utilise estoppel as a

substantive cause of action. The Federal Court in **Boustead** makes no mention of whether estoppel can constitute a substantive cause of action notwithstanding the fact that it cited the **Waltons Stores** case in its judgment. Lord Wright, delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in **Canada and Dominion Sugar Company, Limited v. Canadian National (West Indies) Steamships, Limited (1947) A.C. 46 at page 55**, succinctly said:

“There was, perhaps, a time when estoppels were described as odious and as such were viewed with suspicion and reluctance. But in modern times the law of estoppel has developed and has become recognised as a beneficial branch of law. That great lawyer Sir Frederick Pollock has described the doctrine of estoppel as ‘a simple and wholly untechnical conception, perhaps the most powerful and flexible instrument to be found in any system of court jurisprudence’.”

**[38]** I will now call in aid Order 15 rule 6(1) of the RHC. It reads as follows:

“6(1) No cause or matter shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joinder of any party; and the Court may in any cause or matter determine the issues or questions in dispute so far as they affect the rights and interests of the persons who are parties to the cause or matter.”

This rule is a life saver. It prevents an action from being defeated by the misjoinder or non-joinder of the parties – be it the plaintiffs or the defendants, and subject to certain principles allows for the addition, substitution or striking out of the parties as the plaintiffs or the defendants. It also allows intervention or striking out of persons who are not parties to

the action and for misnomer. It must be borne in mind that the court has a wide discretion to make the necessary order so that all the relevant parties are before the court. In **Chan Kern Miang v Kea Resources Pte Ltd (1999) 1 SLR 145**, the Court of Appeal refused the application of the defendant to add another party as a defendant because that party had been sued separately by the plaintiff previously and a settlement agreement had been reached in that case and the court held that the plaintiff would be barred from claiming any reliefs from him. In **Chan Min Swee v Melawangi Sdn Bhd (2000) 4 AMR 3855**, the court, in actions for breach of contract and misrepresentation where the plaintiff had already assigned his rights under the contract to a bank, ordered a stay of the proceedings to allow the plaintiff to include the assignee bank as a party to the action because both the plaintiff and the bank had rights in the chose in action via the assignment. The court was reluctant to decide the issue in the absence of the bank because any decision on the issue would not bind the bank. The court in **Byrne and Another v. Brown. Diplock, Third Party (1889) Vol XXII QBD 657** allowed the addition of new parties even though such an addition may cause additional expense and necessitate the introduction of new evidence.

[39] Linda Widyati, the legal expert relied upon by the defendants, in her affidavit affirmed on 4<sup>th</sup> of November 2003 categorically stated that the

third plaintiff (P.T.Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk) would have taken over all the assets, rights and obligations, including all legal actions of, inter alia, Indofood and Sanmaru due to the merger exercise that was conducted on the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 1994. In her own words this was what she deposed in her affidavit (see pages 1543 to 1544 of “**ARJ V**”):

“16. Based on the documents mentioned in paragraph 12 above, I state that Sukses would have taken over all the assets, rights and obligations including all legal actions of, inter alia, Indofood and Sanmaru as a result of the merger as of 1<sup>st</sup> January 1994. However, I am not able to comment on the nature of such assets, rights or obligations since a copy of the Financial Statement of 31<sup>st</sup> December 1993 referred to in, inter alia, Deed No: 5 dated 1.3.1994, was not attached to any of the documents mentioned above. The liquidated companies have no right or power to take any legal action or proceeding after the merger as of 1.1.1994. ”

[40] It was quite ironical that despite the averment of Linda Widyati as alluded to above, the defendants have persistently maintained in the High Court that there was no clear evidence what were the alleged rights, obligations, assets and liabilities of the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) and the second plaintiff (P.T. Sanmaru Food Manufacturing Co. Ltd) which were transferred to the third plaintiff (P.T.Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk), and that the plaintiffs did not produce the balance sheet dated 31<sup>st</sup> December 1993 or the Financial Statement dated 31<sup>st</sup> December 1993 referred to in the “**Minutes of Meeting on Merger and Handover of Assets and Liabilities No: 5**” as detailing the assets and liabilities transferred and that no weight should be attached to the plaintiffs’

Indonesian law expert affidavit of Ignatius Andy Andria that was affirmed on 19<sup>th</sup> February 2003 as seen at pages 1342 to 1345 of “**ARJ IV**”. By way of a reply, I have this to say:

**(a)** The bulk of the corporate merger documents relied upon by the plaintiffs including those exhibited in the affidavit of Ignatius Andy Andria have been reviewed by the defendants’ own Indonesian law expert Linda Widyati, whose affidavit affirmed on 4<sup>th</sup> November 2003 as seen at pages 1543 to 1544 of “**ARJ V**” confirmed that the third plaintiff would have taken over all the assets, rights and obligations, including all the legal actions of, inter alia, the first plaintiff and the second plaintiff as a result of the merger.

**(b)** PWI (Cesar M. de la Cruz) was cross-examined on the existence of the Financial Statement, which was enclosed in the trial bundle, by counsel for the defendants and he testified as follows (see page 384 of “**ARJ II**”):

“Your Lordship, if you would allow me, I do not have the financial statement as of the time of merger but my recollection is that it included the usual cash accounts, receivable accounts, tangible fixed assets, liabilities both to the banks and to the third parties and the shareholders equity as of the date of the merger. I also have to state to your Lordship that intangible assets are normally not recorded in accounts of companies in Indonesia.”

**[41]** At this juncture, it is germane to reproduce the contents of the affidavit of Ignatius Andy Andria, the legal expert of the plaintiffs as seen at

pages 1342 to 1345 of “**ARJ IV**”. There, he deposed at paragraphs 3 to 4 of the affidavit to the following salient facts:

“**3.** I make this Affidavit in response to a request by the Plaintiffs and P.T. Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk. to advise on the following issues under Indonesian law:

(a) What are the valid documents under Indonesian law that will be sufficient evidence of the merger of P.T. Indofood Interna Corporation and P.T. Sanmaru Foods Manufacturer Company Limited into P.T. Indofood Sukses Makmur in 1994?

(b) Whether the above documents will provide the evidence to transfer all rights, including all intellectual property rights and accompanying rights of action relating to the same, from P.T. Indofood Interna Corporation and P.T. Sanmaru Foods Manufacturer Company Limited to P.T. Indofood Sukses Makmur?

(c) What are the valid documents under Indonesian law that will be sufficient evidence of the change of name from P.T. Indofood Sukses Makmur to P.T. Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk.?

**4.** With regard to the above issues, I confirm and say as follows:

(a) The valid documents under Indonesian law at the material time in 1994 that will be sufficient evidence of the merger of P.T. Indofood Interna Corporation and P.T. Sanmaru Foods Manufacturer Company Limited into P.T. Indofood Sukses Makmur are the:

(i) Deed of P.T. Indofood Interna Corporation Minutes of Meeting No. 102 dated 12 February 1994;

(ii) Deed of Sanmaru Foods Manufacturer Company Limited Minutes of Meeting No. 107 dated 12 February 1994;

(iii) Deed of P.T. Indofood Sukses Makmur Minutes of Meeting No. 108 dated 12 February 1994;

(iv) Deed of Merger No. 109 dated 12 February 1994;

(v) Public Announcement regarding the merger on *Bisnis Indonesia* daily dated 13 February 1994;

(vi) Announcement in the State Gazette No. 13 dated 15 February 1994 Supplement No. 226;

(vii) Approval From Chairman of the Capital Investment Coordinating Board No. 86/III/PMDN/1994 dated 1 March 1994; and

(viii) Deed of Minutes of Meeting on Merger and Handover of Assets and Liabilities No. 5 dated 1 March 1994.



Now produced and shown to me marked as **Exhibit A-1** are copies of the above documents.

(b) Article 4 of the Deed of Merger No. 109 dated 12 February 1994 states that the parties have also agreed that all rights and obligations of the merged companies including but not limited to fixed assets, movable assets, companies licenses, good will, assets-liabilities etc. as set out in the Financial Report, potential legal claims or the on-going legal claims before the courts or any other institution at any stage will be entirely transferred without limitation and will become the right and/or obligation of P.T. Indofood Sukses Makmur with obligation to accommodate, to bear or to pay all liabilities which previously borne by the merged companies. Therefore, the above documents do provide the evidence to transfer all rights, including all intellectual property rights and accompanying rights of action relating to the same, from P.T. Indofood Interna Corporation and P.T. Sanmaru Foods Manufacturer Company Limited to P.T. Indofood Sukses Makmur.

(c) The abbreviation "Tbk." refers to "Terbuka" which means that the company is a public company. P.T. Indofood Sukses Makmur became a public company in 1994. In compliance with the Company Law of 1995 which came into force in 1996, P.T. Indofood Sukses Makmur, being a public company, was required to insert the word "Tbk." and change its name to P.T. Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk. This was carried out based on the following documents:

- (i) Deed of P.T. Indofood Sukses Makmur Meeting Resolution No. 150 dated 24 June 1997;
- (ii) The Minister of Justice of the Republic of Indonesia's approval No. C2-7092.HT.01.04.TH97 dated 25 July 1997;
- (iii) Announcement in the State Gazette No. 78 Supplement No. 4480 dated 30 September 1997."

**[42]** Clearly, therefore, on the available evidence the third plaintiff (P.T.Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk) was rightly joined as a party to the civil suit.

### **Limitation**

**[43]** In regard to limitation, I have this to say. The wide and broad powers of the court pursuant to Order 20 rule 5 of the RHC read together

with Order 15 rule 6 of the RHC would include the power to give leave to add a party or to amend any pleading even after the expiry of any relevant period of limitation (Order 20 rule 5(2) of the RHC) or to add a new cause of action (Order 20 rule 5(5) of the RHC). And by virtue of the doctrine of relation back, the law treats the “**new**” party (here, it would be the third plaintiff) as being a party who had been a party from the date of the issue of the writ and that would be on 13<sup>th</sup> October 1993 and that would be well within any period of limitation.

[44] The law may be stated as follows. That an amendment will be granted, where the limitation period has expired, notwithstanding that such an amendment will add or substitute a new cause of action provided that the new cause of action has arisen from the same or substantially the same set of facts (**Hock Hua Bank Bhd. v. Leong Yew Chin (1987) 1 MLJ 230, S.C.**). Thus, the court may allow the amendments mentioned in Order 20 rule 5(3), Order 20 rule 5(4) and Order 20 rule 5(5) of the RHC, notwithstanding that the application for an amendment is made after the expiry of any relevant period of limitation current at the date of the issue of the writ. And the best part is this. That the application may be made, even though at the date of the application, the cause of action to which the amendment is related may have become time-barred but would not have been if it had been made at the commencement of the action. And this is

simply because an amendment takes effect not at the date the application for the amendment is made but at the date of the commencement of the action. This is known as the doctrine of relation back and it has been applied in many instances (**Boss s/o Ramasamy v Penang Port Sdn Bhd & Anor (1996) 5 MLJ 511**). The amendments sought must be in relation to correcting the name of the party (Order 20 rule 5(3) of the RHC) or in regard to altering the capacity in which the party sues or is sued (Order 20 rule 5(4) of the RHC) or in regard to adding or substituting a new cause of action (Order 20 rule 5(5) of the RHC).

[45] Still on limitation, reference should be made to section 22 of the Limitation Act 1953. That section enacts as follows (the relevant parts):

**“ 22. Limitation of actions in respect of trust property.**

(1) No period of limitation prescribed by this Act shall apply to an action by a beneficiary under a trust, being an action:

- (a) in respect of any fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was a party or privy; or
- (b) to recover from the trustee trust property or the proceeds thereof in the possession of the trustee, or previously received by the trustee and converted to his use.”

[46] Here, the plaintiffs are claiming to recover trust property from the defendants and by virtue of section 22 (1)(b) of the Limitation Act 1953 there is no limitation period to impede the joinder of the third plaintiff (P.T.Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk) as a party to the proceedings (**Rajoo**

**Selvappan & Ors v. Abdul Bhari Kader Ibrahim & Ors (2005) 7 CLJ 326).**

**Assignment of the “Indomie” trade mark registered in Malaysia from the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd) to the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.)**

[47] I did say in the early part of this judgment that the sole issue for determination in this appeal centred on the quantum of the consideration for the transfer of the “**Indomie**” trade mark. That would be the central question for determination which would adjudicate and end this appeal, one way or the other.

[48] The appropriate question to pose would be as follows: What was the agreed consideration for the assignment of the “**Indomie**” trade mark registration in Malaysia from the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd) to the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.)? Was it **(a)** RM10.00 as contended by the plaintiffs or **(b)** US\$680,000.00 as contended by the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd) and the third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng)?

**Contemporaneous documents**

[49] To answer the central question of the day, an examination of the evidence is called for. The High Court found as a fact that the true consideration was RM10.00 and not US\$680,000.00. The available evidence would show that the High Court was right in arriving at that

conclusion. I will now examine the contemporaneous documents. The **first letter** to consider would be the letter dated 25<sup>th</sup> July 1990 from the first defendant (Far East Food Industries Sdn Bhd (dalam likuidasi)) to the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) and that letter was signed by the third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng). That letter enclosed two deeds of assignment and two Forms of Authorisation of Agent. That letter can be seen at page 794 of the Appeal Record Jilid III (“**ARJ III**”) and it was worded in this way:

“July 25, 1990  
 P.T. Indofood Interna Corpn  
 Central Plaza, 17<sup>th</sup> Floor  
 Jln. Jend. Suriman kav. 47-48  
 Jakarta Selatan 12930  
INDONESIA  
Attn: Mr. Hendy Rusli”

Dear Sir,  
**RE: TRADE MARK – “INDOMIE & DEVICE”**  
 Please find enclosed two Deeds of Assignment for transfer of the above Trade Mark Registration in Class 30 in Malaya, Sabah & Sarawak and in Brunei together with two authorisation forms for your signature.  
 Kindly attach the Common Seal on the Deed of Assignment and return all the documents for our further action.  
 Thank you and regards.

Yours faithfully,  
 FAR EAST FOOD INDUSTRIES SDN BHD  
*Sgd. (Illegible)*  
 YEOH JIN BENG  
 General Manager  
 YJB/kl.”

**[50]** On 26<sup>th</sup> September 1990, the two Deeds of Assignment were executed by both parties with the third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng) signing on behalf of the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn

Bhd). The consideration stated in the two Deeds of Assignment was RM10.00 (see pages 795 to 798 of “**ARJ III**”). One Deed of Assignment was meant for Brunei (see pages 795 to 796 of “**ARJ III**”). The other Deed of Assignment was meant for Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak (see pages 797 to 798 of “**ARJ III**”). In this judgment, I am only concerned with the Deed of Assignment for Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak.

[51] The **second letter** to consider would be the letter from Messrs Shearn Delamore to the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd) dated 23<sup>rd</sup> October 1990 enclosing an invoice for services rendered with regard to the assignment. That letter can be seen at page 803 of “**ARJ III**”.

[52] The **third letter** to refer to would be the letter dated 12<sup>th</sup> November 1990 from the first defendant (Far East Food Industries Sdn Bhd (dalam likuidasi)) to the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) enclosing the invoice from Messrs Shearn Delamore. The first plaintiff subsequently paid for this invoice. That letter can be seen at page 804 of “**ARJ III**”.

[53] The **fourth letter** to scrutinise would be the letter dated 29<sup>th</sup> January 1991 from the Indofood group to the first defendant (Far East Food Industries Sdn Bhd (dalam likuidasi)) to the third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng). That letter enquired about the progress of transferring the trade

mark from the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd) to the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.). That letter can be seen at page 805 of “**ARJ III**” and it was worded in this fashion:

“Re: Trademark Registration

- 1) Please inform us the progress of transferring the trademark(s) registered under Sanmaru Overseas Mkt. to PT Indofood Interna Corp. :
  - Indomie & (Device) / Malaya M/100816.
  - Indomie & (Device) / Sabah S/32614.
  - Indomie & (Device) / Sarawak 27663.
  - Indomie & (Device) / Brunei 13330.
- 2) Whether the process of transferring the trademark(s) also (includes) the process of renewal (of) some of the (expired) trademark registration(s)?
- 3) I don't have in my custody the trademark(s) of :
  - Indomie & (Device) / Malaya M/100816.
  - Indomie & (Device) / Sabah S/32614.
  - Indomie & (Device) / Brunei 13514.

Please send me (the) original copies, if any, or (a) copy (of each of them).”

**[54]** The fifth letter to consider would be the letter dated 19<sup>th</sup> August 1992 from the first defendant (Far East Food Industries Sdn Bhd (dalam likuidasi)) to the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.). That letter was signed by the third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng) and that letter can be seen at pages 806 to 808 of “**ARJ III**”. The letter enclosed the “**Indomie**” trade mark registration certificate meant for the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.).

**[55]** The sixth letter to scrutinise would be the letter dated 26<sup>th</sup> August 1992 from the Indofood group to the first defendant (Far East Food Industries Sdn Bhd (dalam likuidasi)) and to the third defendant (Yeoh Jin

Beng). That letter enquired as to the status of the transfer of the “Indomie” trade mark and that letter can be seen at page 809 of “ARJ III” and it was worded in this way:

***“Indofood***

**THE SYMBOL OF QUALITY FOODS**

26/8/92

To : Mr. Yeoh Jin Beng  
 FAR EAST FOOD INDUSTRIES SDN. BHD.  
 From : Hadi Wijaya

Subject : Indomie Trademark Registration in Malaysia  
 M/100816

Dear Yeoh,

Please advise me (as soon as possible) the status of the “Indomie” Trademark M/100816 under the name of Sanmaru Marketing Overseas which is suppose(d) to be transfer(red) to P.T. INDOFOOD INTERNA CORPORATION.

Up to date we haven’t receive any documents confirming the transfer except for the Invoice of Shearn Delamore dated 23rd October 1990.

Yours truly,  
*Sgd. (Illegible)*  
 Hadi Wijaya

cc: - Her  
 - Edmund C.T.  
 - AL Umali.”

[56] The **seventh letter** to consider would be the letter dated 18<sup>th</sup> September 1992 from the first defendant (Far East Food Industries Sdn Bhd (dalam likuidasi)) to the Indofood group – for the attention of Hendy Rusli. That letter can be seen at page 810 of “ARJ III” and it was worded in this way and it made reference to the **Boustead** injunction:

“September 18, 1992



Indofood International Division  
 Central Plaza, 17th Floor  
 Jln. Jend. Suriman kav. 47-48  
 Jakarta Selatan 12930  
INDONESIA  
Attn: Mr. Hendy Rusli

Dear Sir,

We refer to the trademark of Indomie in Malaysia and wish to inform that Sanmaru Overseas Marketing is still the registered owner of the said trademark for Malaysia and Brunei.

I believe the High Court Injunction taken by Boustead in 1991, in view of the payment dispute which has now been resolved, has prevented any transfer of the trademark.

Thank you.

Yours faithfully,  
 FAR EAST FOOD INDUSTRIES SDN BHD  
*Sgd. (Illegible)*  
 YEOH JIN BENG  
 Regional General Manager – ASEAN  
 YJB/kl.”

[57] The **eighth letter** to scrutinise would be the letter dated 16<sup>th</sup> February 1993 from the Indofood group to Messrs Shearn Delamore enquiring as to the status of the assignment of the “**Indomie**” trade mark. That letter can be seen at page 811 of “**ARJ III**” and it was worded in this fashion:

***“Indofood***  
**THE SYMBOL OF QUALITY FOODS**

Jakarta, 16th February 1993.

To,  
 Messrs Shearn Delamore & Co.  
 P.O. Box 10138, 50704  
 Kuala Lumpur 2  
 Benteng, 50050  
Kuala Lumpur – Malaysia.

Dear Sirs,

RE: INVOICE NO. A 70072

Please advise us accordingly the status of the assignment of "Indomie & Device" trademark from Sanmaru Mkt Sdn Bhd which was supposed to be transferred to P.T. Indofood Interna Corp. as stipulated in your invoice No. A 70072 dated 23th October 1990.

We request your direct explanation to us since we understood that all (the) assignment documentation(s)(have) already been properly executed and submitted to you accordingly.

Your prompt reply will be very much appreciated.

Yours truly,

*Sgd. (Illegible)*

Hadi Wijaya."

**[58]** The ninth letter to consider would be the letter dated 24<sup>th</sup> March 1993 from Messrs Shearn Delamore to the Indofood group. That letter can be seen at page 812 of "ARJ III" and it was worded in this manner:

**"SHEARN DELAMORE & CO**

24 March 1993

Indofood Group

Central Plaza 17th. Floor

Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav 47-48

Jakarta Selatan 12930

Indonesia

Attn: Mr. Hadi Wijaya

FAX NO: 5701431

DEST : INDONESIA

CLIENT:SANMARU OVERSEAS

Dear Sirs,

Re : Assignment Against Trade Mark Nos. M/100816, S/32614 & 27663 TM INDOMIE & DEVICE in Class 7 in Malaya, Sabah & Sarawak

From : Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn. Bhd.

To : P T Indofood Interna Corporation

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I refer to your letter of 16th. February 1993.

Our records show that our instructing clients are Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn. Bhd.

In the light of the solicitor-client relationship we would advise that you communicate with them on this matter. Suffice it for us to say that our records show that the pending recordal of the Assignment has been retracted.

Yours faithfully,  
*Sgd. (Illegible)*  
 (Wong Sai Fong).”

**[59]** In all these letters that were exchanged between the parties and their solicitors from 25<sup>th</sup> July 1990 to 24<sup>th</sup> March 1993, there is no reference to any agreement to show that the consideration for the assignment of the Indomie trade mark was US\$680,000.00 as claimed by the defendants. On the contrary, the Deed of Assignment expressly states that the consideration is a paltry RM10.00. Thus far, the defendants cannot point to a single contemporaneous document to support their claim that the agreed consideration was US\$680,000.00.

**[60]** The first ever reference to the sum of US\$680,000.00 was made by the third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng) in his affidavit affirmed on 26<sup>th</sup> October 1993 which can be seen at pages 1516 to 1534 of the Appeal Record Jilid V (“**ARJ V**”). At paragraphs 26 and 27 of his affidavit, the third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng) deposed as follows (see pages 1526 to 1527 of “**ARJ V**”):

“26. With regard to paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of Hendy’s Affidavit, it is true that the 2nd Defendant has agreed to sell the trade mark “Indomie” to the 1st Plaintiff but the Plaintiffs have failed to inform this Honourable Court the true position and the reason why the transfer was withdrawn. It was the 1st Plaintiff (who) was in breach of

contract in failing to pay the 2nd Defendant a sum of US\$680,000.00 as the agreed consideration for the transfer of the trade mark "Indomie". The document now produced and shown to me and marked as "YJB-6" is a true copy of a letter dated 25.7.1990 from the 2nd Defendant to the 1st Plaintiff.

27. I state that the 1st Plaintiff has failed to pay the said sum of US\$680,000.00 to the 2nd Defendant despite the assurance of the 1st Plaintiff that it would be paid as agreed. I have personally reminded Hendy Rusli for the said payment and he assured me that it would be paid before the assignment of the trade mark was finalised. The reason why the 2nd Defendant did not insist on payment of the said sum of US\$680,000.00 before the assignment was signed by the 2nd Defendant was due to the fact that the parties were then in cordial and harmonious relationship and all dealings and transactions were conducted between the parties on a mutual trust basis. The Defendants therefore take objection that the Plaintiffs have not disclosed this important and material fact in their Affidavit filed in support of the Ex parte Summons-In-Chambers dated 13.10.1993."

[61] This affidavit that was affirmed by the third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng) on 26<sup>th</sup> October 1993 was used in the interlocutory injunction proceedings after the writ in this civil suit was issued on 13<sup>th</sup> October 1993. In that affidavit, the third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng) exhibited a letter bearing the date 25<sup>th</sup> July 1990 which he claimed that he had sent it to Hendy Rusli. The letter dated 25<sup>th</sup> July 1990 formed the plank of the defendants case and it will now be referred to affectionately as the "**side letter**". The side letter alluded to the alleged agreement between the third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng) and Hendy Rusli wherein the latter had purportedly proposed "**to buy over the Indomie trade mark and device for a total consideration of US\$680,000.00**". It would be ideal to

reproduce that side letter which can be found at page 813 of “ARJ III” and it was worded in this way:

“SANMARU OVERSEAS MARKETING SDN. BHD.

25 th July, 1990

Mr. Hendy Rusli  
P.T. Indofood Interna Corpn.  
Jakarta Indonesia

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Sir

Re: Assignment of Trade Marks

I refer to my letter and enclosures to you in respect of the Assignment of Indomie trade mark and device of today and also to our discussion in Jakarta of June 11.

I have discussed and persuaded the shareholders of (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing) to agree to your proposal to buy over the Indomie trade mark and device for a total consideration of US\$680,000.00 (United States Dollars Six Hundred and Eighty Thousand Only).

The shareholders of (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing) agreed on the basis of our continuing good relationship to promote the brand jointly.

Please arrange to let me have the Bank Draft of US\$680,000.00 (United States Dollars Six Hundred and Eighty Thousand Only) in favour of Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn. Bhd. in settlement of the abovementioned together with the signed Assignment documents.

As soon as I received same, I shall arrange for our Solicitors to file accordingly.

Regards,

Yours faithfully  
*Sgd. (Illegible)*  
YEOH JIN BENG

c.c. Izzap. Ltd  
c/o Singapore.”

[62] The side letter which was dated 25<sup>th</sup> July 1990 was kept out of sight by the third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng) and it only surfaced as an exhibit on 26<sup>th</sup> October 1993 when the third defendant affirmed an affidavit that was used in the interlocutory injunction proceedings. Calculation wise the side letter surfaced some 3 years 3 months 1 day later (26.10.1993 minus 25.7.1990).

[63] Hendy Rusli quickly responded by affirming an affidavit in reply on 9<sup>th</sup> November 1993 which was used in the interlocutory injunction proceedings. In his affidavit, Hendy Rusli categorically and expressly denied receiving the side letter and, by implication, he too denied such an agreement to buy over Indomie trade mark for US\$680,000.00. Hendy Rusli's affidavit in reply can be seen at pages 814 to 820 of "**ARJ III**" and at page 817 thereof he deposed to the following salient facts:

"(a) If the trade mark "Indomie" was not assigned as part of the agreement reached in Indonesia, between the Jangkar Jati Group and the Salim Group, why was the Deeds of Assignment executed and the monetary consideration was stated to be \$10.00 ringgit instead of US\$680,000.00 as alleged. The exhibit YJB 6 is a document which I never received, and I assume to be a document created as an afterthought. I deny receiving such a letter for the simple reason no such letter was sent to me. Even if the same was alleged to have been sent to me it could not have reached me as there was no proper address in the said letter.

(b) If the non-payment of the alleged US\$680,000.00 was the real reason for the non-transfer of the trade mark "Indomie", then why did the deponent state in the exhibit marked HR-7 attached to Annexure D of my earlier affidavit that it was the Boustead injunction which was the cause for

the delay in the transfer. If the non-payment of the alleged sum is true, (then) the non-transfer would have been communicated earlier to the 1st Plaintiff. Despite written queries about the transfer at the material time, no such absurd reason was communicated to the 1st Plaintiff. I am advised and verily believe that the exhibit YJB-6 is a concocted document. In any event its cogency is suspect.

(c) It is clearly stated that Messrs Shearn Delamore was appointed as the trade mark agents of the 1st Plaintiff. See exhibit HR-2(e) attached to Annexure B of my earlier affidavit.”

**What was the position of the third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng) in the Indofood group in the early 1990's?**

[64] At the outset, it is necessary to consider the position of the third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng) in the Indofood group in the early 1990's when determining the credibility of his claim that he had reached an oral agreement during that period of time with Hendy Rusli – one of his superior officers in the Indofood group in regard to the payment of US\$680,000.00. PWI (Cesar M. de la Cruz) in his witness statement at paragraph 53 of pages 1552 to 1584 of “**ARJ V**” made reference to the degree and scale of integration and close managerial control exercised by Jakarta over the day to day operations of its Malaysian subsidiaries, namely, the first defendant (Far East Food Industries Sdn Bhd (dalam likuidasi)) and the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd). Such control reflects the commercial reality of the day and it is often the way in which multinational companies with headquarters outside Malaysia direct and manage the operations of their Malaysian subsidiaries. Approximately

thirty (30) documents were referred to in PWI's witness statement at paragraph 53 and these documents can be seen at pages 680 to 767 of "**ARJ II**". The degree of control by Jakarta over the three defendants (Far East Food Industries Sdn Bhd (dalam likuidasi), Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd and Yeoh Jin Beng) are reflected in these thirty (30) documents. Suffice for this exercise that I refer to only three pertinent documents. The **first document** would be an internal memorandum at page 693 of "**ARJ II**" and it was worded in this way:

**"INTERNAL MEMORANDUM**

To : Mr Yeoh Jin Beng                      Date : August 10,1990  
 From : A.L. Umali                              Ref. : FS-02/90-210  
 Subject: CAR REPLACEMENT

I am pleased to inform you that our Managing Director has agreed to your proposal to replace your existing company car with a VOLVO 740.

Thank you for your attention.

Signed (*Illegible*)  
 A.L. Umali."

**[65]** The **second document** was a document from the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd) addressed to the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) dated 24.6.1991 and that can be seen at page 741 of "**ARJ II**". That document was worded in this way:

"SANMARU OVERSEAS MARKETING SDN. BHD.

Our Ref : GM/255/91

June 24, 1991



P.T. Indofood Interna Corpn  
 Central Plaza, 17th Floor  
 Jln. Jend. Sudirman kav. 47-48  
 Jakarta Selatan 12930  
 INDONESIA

Attn : Mr. Hendy Rusli

Dear Sir,

RE: REQUEST FOR CHANGE OF DIRECTOR

As you know that Far East Food will be manufacturing noodles in Sibu and will be selling the product to Sanmaru Overseas Marketing for further distribution in East Malaysia.

However, due to sales tax purposes, it will not be proper for my name to appear in both Far East Food and Sanmaru Overseas Marketing. As such, I am writing to you to seek your approval to appoint another name to replace me in Sanmaru.

I am proposing to use the name of Liew Yoke Fatt.  
 Kindly revert and advise.

Regards,  
 Yours faithfully,  
 SANMARU OVERSEAS MARKETING SDN BHD  
*Sgd. (Illegible)*  
 YEOH JIN BENG  
 General Manager

YJB/kl.”

**[66]** The **third document** would be a letter addressed to the third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng) from Indofood group and it was worded in this fashion (see page 743 of “**ARJ II**”):

***“Indofood***  
**THE SYMBOL OF QUALITY FOODS**

Jakarta, June 1992

CONFIDENTIAL

To : Mr. Yeoh Jin Beng

Dear Mr. Yeoh Jin Beng,

We are pleased to inform you that effective 1st April 1992 your Monthly Basic Salary will be M\$9,830.

On behalf of the company we also would like to express our appreciation for the effort you have extended this past year, and hope next year will be even better for you.

Yours Sincerely,  
*Sgd. (Illegible)*  
Herman S. Endro  
Personnel Director

*Sgd. (Illegible)*  
Edmun C. Tate  
IOD Director.”

[67] At the material time when the third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng) claims that he had reached an oral agreement with Hendy Rusli, the third defendant’s freedom to manage matters in Malaysia was so limited and constrained to such an extent that he had to seek Jakarta’s permission even for such mundane and routine matters like purchasing a company car and having his salary fixed by Jakarta. In short, the third defendant’s powers were shackled and circumscribed. In these circumstances, it defies belief that the third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng) can seriously contend that he was negotiating at arms length and had reached an agreement with a superior officer in the corporate hierarchy by the name of Hendy Rusli, which agreement required the Indofood group to pay US\$680,000.00 to the third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng) – a mere middle-ranking employee in the group to purchase Indofood’s own trade mark.

## **Testimony of witnesses**

[68] The next step to take would be to test the testimony of the witnesses with the contemporaneous documents. The relevant testimony pertaining to the agreed consideration for the assignment of the “**Indomie**” trade mark registration in Malaysia from the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd) to the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) were given by PWI (Cesar M. de la Cruz) – on behalf of the plaintiffs, and DWI (Yeoh Jin Beng) – on behalf of the defendants. It is appropriate to reproduce their relevant evidence.

[69] Under cross-examination, the evidence of PWI (Cesar M. de la Cruz) went like this (see page 385 of “**ARJ II**” ):

“OBS: Do you agree with me that this letter carries the date 25.7.1990?”

CD: Your Lordship, that is what it appears too but I have to state that in my capacity at that time, we never saw this letter.”

[70] Continuing at the same page and spilling over to page 386 of “**ARJ II**”, PWI (Cesar M. de la Cruz) testified under cross-examination:

“OBS: I put it to you, Mr CD that the letter referred to at paragraph 1 of page 389 of Bundle C is the letter at page 370 of Bundle C.

CD: Your Lordship, again at face value, this is what letter 389 is purporting to say. However, I want to emphasise that at the time the letter was supposed to have sent, we have never received this letter because even the address in the letter does not fully state the address of PT Indofood Interna and only refers to Jakarta, Indonesia.

OBS: I put it to you Mr CD that the letter at page 389 of Bundle C was sent together with the letter at page 370 of Bundle C.

CD: Your Lordship, having not seen the letter at that time, I would disagree.”

**[71]** Under re-examination, PWI (Cesar M. de la Cruz) testified in the following manner (see page 388 of “**ARJ II**” ):

“TT: This letter, C389, makes reference to payment of US\$680,000. My question for you is, did Mr HR bring this subject up to the management committee?

CD: Your Lordship, I do not recall having heard this subject from Mr HR at that time.

TT: Or from any other person in the management committee.

CD: Yes.

TT: Did any other person in the management committee bring up this subject of payment of US\$680,000?

CD: Your Lordship, no.”

**[72]** Still under cross-examination, PWI (Cesar M. de la Cruz) had this to say (see page 417 of “**ARJ II**” ):

“MS: My Lord, still on paragraph 81. I put it to you that you cannot say for certain that HR and the D3 did not reach an agreement on the payment of US\$680,000 referred to in the letter dated 25.7.1990?

J: And where is that document?

MS: It is referred to ..... I (am), sorry my Lord ..... it’s 379. I apologise my Lord. It is C389.

CD: Your Lordship, first of all, it is the Ps’ position that that particular letter has never been received by any of the Ps. Secondly my Lord, HR, in his capacity as Managing Director did not have the authority to agree to such amount and would have presented that to the shareholders of Indofood

Interna through the MC of which I was a member at that time.

J: Did not have the capacity to agree to that amount and would have?

C: Submitted a proposal to the P1 through the management committee of which I was a member at that time and I do not recollect any discussion with Mr Rusli to this effect at the time the letter was purportedly sent or even when the letter was presented at the time the claim was filed. I believe in 1993.”

**[73]** I will now allude to the evidence of DWI (Yeoh Jin Beng). He had this to say under cross-examination at pages 428 to 429 of “**ARJ II**”:

“TT: Could you please explain to his Lordship why the figure US\$680,000 was not set out in the DOA at page C1? So you have to go back to C1. At the bottom of C1, I will read it ... sum of \$10 only, \$ one assumes to be Ringgit Malaysia. Can you tell his Lordship why it does not state US\$680,000.00?

D3: The DOA is a formality and we just put a nominal sum which is I must say quite a common practice and if you refer to some of the documents that the P1 produced, their assignment was also of a nominal sum, something like 10,000 rupiah. It is always in the commercial sense the actual amount is actually mentioned in separate letters or separate meetings.

TT: So Mr. Yeoh you are saying that page 1 does not state the truth?

D3: Yes. It does not state the specific amount that was agreed upon, my Lord.

TT: Therefore it tells a lie. So it is a false statement? You accept that. It is a false statement.

D3: It did not specify the right amount of agreed sum.

TT: In paragraph 20 of your WS you explained that by saying the amount was not stated and is for tax reasons. Could you explain to his Lordship what is your understanding of the 2 words “tax reasons”?

D3: For tax reasons, I was given to understand that you know, if you make earn some .... some sales, then you'll have to pay taxes on it like stamp duties and income tax or property gain tax, things like that.

TT: Let us take your answer one by one. Stamp duty. I am told that a DOA of this nature does not attract stamp duty of value. It is a nominal stamp duty. And therefore it is not to save stamp duty that the figure of US\$680,000 was not put in.

D3: It is. At that point of time, we were advised that besides stamp duty, there are also other relevant taxes which I, being not an accountant I would not understand what these taxes are for so we take it that in order to avoid other taxes and complications, let's put it aside in a separate letter.

TT: Who advised you on the stamp duty point?

D3: Our tax people, our tax ... what you call, advisors.

TT: Who were they?

D3: I have no recollection now who exactly they were but it was a kind of err advice given to me, my Lord.

TT: Messrs Shearn Delamore ("**SD**") prepared this DOA and helped in the entire transfer of assignment issue. Is that not correct?

D3: Yes my Lord.

TT: Would you confirm that this document, C1 & 2, was prepared by SD?

D3: Yes.

TT: Now we come to tax. When you talk about income tax, are you looking at it from your personal standpoint or are you looking at it from the perspective of D1 or D2? Is it D1, D2 or D3's tax that we should be concerned about? And before you answer the question, the US\$680,000 if what you say is correct, is going to be paid by the Indofood Group to the vendor, comes from Indonesia. Is it the income tax repercussion for D1, D2 or D3? Tax reasons for whom?

D3: D2.

TT: So, are you telling his Lordship that the page 1 did not state the true figure US\$680,000 so that the D2 does not have to disclose this receipt to the authorities?

D3: Yes, my Lord.

TT: Mr. Yeoh, do you know that that is a serious statement and there are serious implications and consequences?

D3: I believe so, my Lord.”

**[74]** Continuing at pages 432 to 434 of “**ARJ II**”, DWI (Yeoh Jin Beng) testified as follows:

“TT: Mr. Yeoh, can you tell his Lordship why, although the Ds, D1 and D2, wrote many letters to the Ps in the 2 and a half years since July 1990, when the so-called agreement of C389 took place. My question is why in the 21/2 years when there were so many letters written by the Ds to the Ps, there was not a single reference by the Ds to the agreement of US\$680,000?

D3: Although there were no other letters written because this is a private & confidential arrangement, communications were established, my Lord. Err.. communications were established. We talked about it. Because this is a private and confidential matter. If you look at it. It is a P&C matter so we did communicate quite often. We met in Singapore or in Jakarta or when HR was err... came down to Malaysia. There were a number of times when we met, the matter was raised.

TT: When you use the terms “private and confidential”, what do they mean? Private and confidential between who and whom?

D3: Between myself, the D3, for the shareholders of the D2, and with Mr HR for the Plaintiff Group, my Lord.

TT: But you’ve already told his Lordship that the US\$680,000 was not to be paid by HR personally from his own money but from monies coming from the Indofood Group. That was what you said about ½ hour ago.

D3: Yes. Because Mr HR I understand represents the Plaintiff Group. I represent the D2. So we have got a lot of talks going on.

TT: So if you accept that Mr Rusli was acting on behalf of the Indofood Group and you accept that Indofood Group money was going to be used, what was the difficulty in stating it in a letter like C386? Please go back to C386. This is the Boustead injunction. What was the difficulty?

You have accepted that HR acted on behalf of Indofood Group and Indofood money was going to be used to fund the payment of the US\$680,000... what was wrong in saying “by the way where is my US\$680,000?”.

D3: Because both parties, Mr HR and myself representing our respective shareholders, want this matter to be private and confidential. That is the reason why there were no further letters written. We want it to be a private and confidential matter for reasons better known... in Sanmaru’s case I have mentioned... for reasons better known to them.

TT: You are aware that when HR affirmed that affidavit, he denied this agreement. Shall I show that to you?

D3: Yes.

TT: I will show that to you... [inaudible] ... 390. It starts at 390 and the relevant paragraph is at C393. For the record this affidavit was affirmed on 9.11.1993... and it is paragraph 6A C393, if I can read it “The exhibit YB-6 is a document which I have never received... I deny receiving such a letter...”. Could you explain to his Lordship when HR has an opportunity of seeing this letter, his response is to say I have never received this letter, C389 and there is no such agreement. What is your response to that?

D3: I believe he is lying.”

**[75]** Further down at page 434 of “**ARJ II**”, DWI (Yeoh Jin Beng)

had this to say:

“TT: Well, Mr Yeoh, I put it to you that there was no such agreement between you and Mr Rusli for the Indofood Group to pay US\$680,000 as consideration for the execution of the DOA. I put that to you.

D3: I don’t agree, my Lord.”

**[76]** The second witness called by the plaintiffs was Pandi Kusuma (PW2). He was a founding member of the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) and the third plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk). He is also the brother-in-law of Djajadi Djaja, the founder of the Jangkar



Jati group and the inventor of the “**Indomie**” trade mark. Pandi Kusuma (PW2) represented the Jangkar Jati group in the joint venture. In his witness statement at pages 1585 to 1588 of “**ARJ V**”, particularly at paragraphs 7(1) to 7(9), Pandi Kusuma (PW2) gave detailed outline of the evidence pertaining to the circumstances of the joint venture from the Jangkar Jati perspective. Essentially, this was what he testified:

- (a) that the joint venture between the Jangkar Jati group and the Salim group took place in 1984;
- (b) that as part of the joint venture exercise, all trade marks including Indomie previously registered in favour of Djajadi Djaja, the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd) and all the other companies in the Jangkar Jati group and the Salim group, whether in Indonesia or elsewhere, were transferred to the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.); and
- (c) that pursuant to the joint venture agreement between 1986 and 1991, various trade marks registered in the name of Djajadi Djaja, P.T. Sarimi, and other members of the Jangkar Jati group including the most important trade mark in Indonesia, that is, the Indomie trade mark, were transferred in favour of the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) for a nominal consideration.

**[77]** In short, everything was transferred to the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) for a nominal consideration.

**[78]** It must be borne in mind that Pandi Kusuma (PW2) was hardly tested in cross-examination on his entire witness statement. The defendants too did not call any evidence to rebut Pandi Kusuma's testimony nor did they adduce any evidence of their own to contradict him. Pandi Kusuma's testimony was certainly crucial. It demonstrated that the Indomie trade mark registered in Malaysia from the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd) to the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) cannot be seen as an isolated agreement or transaction. In fact, it formed part of a complex joint venture agreement between two of Indonesia's largest corporate groups. Just as the consideration for the Indonesian assignment was nominal – a mere 10,000 rupiah, so too was the consideration for the Malaysian assignment. In such circumstances, logic and commercial sense dictate that the consideration would be nominal.

**[79]** Evidence must certainly be scrutinised against the background of the other facts or circumstances in the case in order to determine its reliability. Challenging each other's evidence is the best method to determine reliability so that weaknesses of the opponent's case may be exposed. Cross-examination is the best method to expose the

examination-in-chief of a witness, be it by way of an oral examination in court or by way of an affidavit or by way of a contemporaneous document. To discover the truth is to embark on cross-examination. Here, as I said, Pandi Kusuma (PW2) was hardly cross-examined on his entire witness statement.

**The alleged agreement to acquire the Indomie trade mark for US\$680,000.00**

[80] Out of deference to the learned counsel for the defendants, I must consider this issue. The defendants advanced the following reasons to support their contentions that the side letter dated 25<sup>th</sup> July 1990 as seen at page 813 of “**ARJ III**” was delivered with the covering letter dated 25<sup>th</sup> July 1990 as seen at page 794 of “**ARJ III**” and that the side letter reflected the second defendant’s (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd’s) acceptance of the proposal from the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) to acquire the “**Indomie**” trade mark for a consideration of US\$680,000.00. In listing down the reasons, I will also allude to the arguments advanced by both the parties.

[81] The **first reason** concerned the argument by the defendants that the authenticity of the side letter was not challenged by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs argued that they have always challenged the authenticity of the side letter from the time of its appearance as an exhibit in the

defendants' affidavit that was affirmed on 26<sup>th</sup> October 1993 and filed to oppose the plaintiffs' application for an injunctive relief. The plaintiffs contended that the side letter did not exist at the material time and was concocted by the defendants for purposes of the proceedings. The plaintiffs elaborated further by referring to the evidence of PWI (Cesar M. de la Cruz) to the following effect:

**(a)** PWI (Cesar M. de la Cruz) testified that in his capacity as a member of the management committee in the Salim group overseeing its investment in the food division, he never saw the side letter at that time (see pages 378 and 417 of the notes of evidence at **"ARJ II"**).

**(b)** PWI (Cesar M. de la Cruz) then referred to the sworn affidavit of Hendy Rusli where at paragraphs 6(a) and 6(b) of page 817 of **"ARJ III"** Hendy Rusli categorically stated that **"exhibit YJB-6 (the side letter) is a document which I never received, and I assume to be a document created as an afterthought. .... I am advised and verily believe that the exhibit YJB-6 (the side letter) is a concocted document."**

**[82]** The **second reason** centred on the argument by the defendants that Hendy Rusli's denial was inadmissible on the ground of hearsay. By way of a rebuttal, the plaintiffs argued that the authenticity of

Hendy Rusli's affidavit in reply affirmed on 9<sup>th</sup> of November 1993 as seen at pages 814 to 819 of "**ARJ III**" was not challenged by the defendants at the trial and the affidavit in question was admitted as part and parcel of the body of evidence during the trial proper. To resolve this impasse, reference should be made to the case of **Jaafar bin Shaari & Anor (suing as administrators of the estate of Shofiah bte Ahmad, deceased) v Tan Lip Eng & Anor (1997) 3 MLJ 693**, a decision of the then Supreme Court. There, the late Peh Swee Chin FCJ laid down the following salient principles (see pages 706 to 707 of the report):

*"In the absence of any express conditions regarding the inclusion of any of the documents in the agreed bundle of documents, speaking for myself, I have always taken the agreed bundle in a civil case to mean as follows without meeting any contradiction or any serious contradiction from any member of the Bar or any appellate court in my decades at the Bar or on the Bench.*

First and foremost, the agreed bundle of documents means that the documents therein are authentic and they do exist, therefore they require no proof of their authenticity by calling, eg their makers.

Secondly, the truth of contents of any of the documents in the agreed bundle of documents is always not admitted unless the contrary is indicated directly or indirectly and such truth of such contents is liable to be challenged in court at the instance of either of the parties.

Thirdly, such documents therein do not form automatically a part of the evidence of the case in question ipso facto, but any of such documents does become part of such evidence if it is read or referred to by either of the parties, wholly or partly, at length or in a briefest of mention, either in examination of any witness, in submission at any stage or even on any unilateral drawing of court's attention to it by either of the parties at any time before the conclusion of the case.

Fourthly, at the end of the whole case, the truth of the contents of any of the document is up to the court to

determine, regard being had, inter alia, to any absence of challenge by either of the parties on any part of the document and similarly, the question of weight, eg either great or no weight to be given to any part of any document is also a matter for the trial court, which considers the documents including any ‘written hearsay’ contained therein. The court may refuse to give any weight at all to any document, but then it is accountable like in other matters, to the parties and to the appellate court for reasons for such refusal.

I find support for my views or some of my views in a learned article under the title of ‘The Bundle of Discord’ written by Mr Lim Kean Chye a very senior member of the Malaysian Bar, published in ‘Insaf’, its September issue 1988; also Mahadev Shankar J’s (now JCA) judgment in *Chong Khee Sang v Pang Ah Chee* [1984] MLJ 337; both Federal Court cases of *Henry Trading v Harun* [1962] 2 MLJ 281 and *Borneo Co v Penang Port Commission* [1975] 2 MLJ 204; Practice Note 1/48; Practice Note No 2/77 and s 58 of the Evidence Act 1950.”

**[83]** Hendy Rusli’s affidavit in reply at pages 814 to 819 of “**ARJ III**” was referred to by the plaintiffs during the cross-examination of DWI (Yeoh Jin Beng). Applying the speech of Peh Swee Chin FCJ in **Jaafar bin Shaari**, Hendy Rusli’s affidavit in reply was already part of the admitted body of evidence and, consequently, the argument that the statements of Hendy Rusli as contained in his affidavit in reply was inadmissible on the ground of hearsay was certainly misconceived.

**[84]** The **third reason** advanced by the defendants was the failure on the part of the plaintiffs for not calling Hendy Rusli as a witness and the adverse inference to be drawn from it. It must be recalled that PWI (Cesar M. de la Cruz) explained as to why Hendy Rusli was not called as a witness at the trial. According to PWI (Cesar M. de la Cruz), Hendy Rusli had left

the employment of the plaintiffs in 1995 and resided in Jakarta. PWI (Cesar M. de la Cruz) testified that sometime in May 2005, Anthony Salim requested Hendy Rusli to attend the trial but Hendy Rusli responded that he was not able to be present in Malaysia (see the notes of evidence at pages 376 to 377 of “**ARJ III**”). This explanation was not challenged by the defendants and it must, accordingly, be accepted as a good reason for not raising the adverse inference under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950. Chang Min Tat F.J. adopted the same approach in **Murugan v. Lew Chu Cheong (1980) 2 MLJ 139, 140** and there his Lordship aptly said:

“Lastly, I was asked to draw an adverse inference under section 114(g) Evidence Act, 1950 against the motorist from the failure to call his travel companion as his witness. His explanation was that he did not know her address. This explanation was unchallenged and must therefore be accepted as sufficient to prevent the raising of the inference.”

[85] The plaintiffs did not withhold or suppress evidence and there was no evidence to that effect either. The scope of section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 has been explained by Mohamed Azmi SCJ in **Munusamy v. Public Prosecutor (1987) 1 MLJ 492** and this was what his Lordship said at page 494 of the report:

“It is essential to appreciate the scope of section 114(g) lest it be carried too far outside its limit. Adverse inference under that illustration can only be drawn if there is withholding or suppression of evidence and not merely on account of failure to obtain evidence. It may be drawn from withholding not just any document, but material document by a party in his

possession, or for non-production of not just any witness but an important and material witness to the case.”

**[86]** And since the sworn statements of Hendy Rusli have been admitted as evidence before the court, it cannot be presumed that Hendy Rusli, if called, would give unfavourable evidence to the plaintiffs. In regard to presumptions of fact and law, Ong J. had this to say in **Mohamed Ali v. Public Prosecutor (1962) 28 MLJ 230, 231 to 232:**

“In drawing presumptions under section 114 of the Evidence Ordinance, 1950, it is to be observed that what the section says is that the existence of certain facts may be presumed which the court ‘thinks likely to have happened’ in the circumstances of the particular case. Presumptions of fact must not be drawn automatically, or, as it were, by rule of thumb, without first considering whether in the circumstances of each particular case there were adequate grounds to justify any presumption being raised. Even, with regard to presumptions of law, Devlin L.J. said recently in *Berry v. British Transport Commission* [1961] 3 W.L.R. 450, 463:

‘... Presumptions of law ought to be used only where their use is strictly necessary for the ends of justice. They are inherently undesirable – in the sense that ‘estoppels are odious’, and the ‘doctrine should never be applied without a necessity for it’ ; per Bramwell L.J. *Baxendale v. Bennett* [1878] 3 Q.B.D. 525, 529, C.A. – because they prevent the court from ascertaining the truth, which should be the prime object of a judicial investigation, and because if they are allowed to multiply to excess, the law will become divorced from reality and will live among fantasies of its own’.”

**[87]** It must be borne in mind that PWI’s (Cesar M. de la Cruz’s) testimony in regard to the non-receipt of the side letter and the alleged consideration of US\$680,000.00 were not based solely on the statements made by Hendy Rusli. PWI (Cesar M. de la Cruz) himself has testified as



to his own capacity to testify on matters pertaining to the assignment of the “**Indomie**” trade mark in Malaysia without making any reference to the alleged side letter as well as to the alleged consideration of US\$680,000.00.

**[88]** Be that as it may, the High Court judge had considered the issue of whether an adverse inference should be drawn and he held that the findings of the court in relation to the existence or non-existence of the side letter were not based upon the affidavit of Hendy Rusli (see the grounds of judgment at pages 1631 to 1632 of “**ARJ VI**”). The High Court judge did not err in concluding that the defendants had failed to prove the existence of the alleged side letter in order to establish its defence.

**[89]** Illustration (g) of section 114 of the Evidence Act 1950 is quite wide in its scope. It applies to civil as well as to criminal cases. This illustration has been held to operate when a witness is not called (**Chua Kim Suan v Ang Mek Chong (1988) 3 MLJ 231 ; Eastern & Oriental Hotel (1951) Sdn Bhd v Ellarious George Fernandez & Anor (1989) 1 MLJ 35; Guthrie Sdn Bhd v Trans-Malaysian Leasing Corp Bhd (1991) 1 MLJ 33; Abdullah Zawawi v. Public Prosecutor (1985) 2 MLJ 16; Public Prosecutor v Chew Yoo Choi (1990) 2 MLJ 444; and Jazuli bin Mohsin v Public Prosecutor (1990) 2 MLJ 190**). The illustration may also apply when a document or other material evidence has not been produced

(**Public Prosecutor v Abdul Razak bin Johari (1991) 1 MLJ 105**). Again, the illustration may apply in a situation when a person is proved to have destroyed evidence (see page 2701 of **Woodroffe and Amir Ali Law of Evidence, 14<sup>th</sup> edition**).

[90] Of significance is this. That the presumption can only be activated under illustration (g) if the evidence could have been produced. Thus, it is not appropriate to draw the inference if the absence of the witness can be explained to the court's satisfaction as when, for instance, he cannot be found (see **Murugan v Lew Chu Cheong (supra)** where the party's explanation that he did not know the address of the witness was accepted; and see also **Munusamy v Public Prosecutor (supra)**) or is **out of jurisdiction just like our case at hand**.

[91] The **fourth reason** was the argument by the defendants that the sum of US\$680,000.00 was "**private and confidential**" in order to avoid tax. The plaintiffs argued in rebuttal by stating that it was improbable that the plaintiffs would diligently and conscientiously enquire over two and a half years about the status of the recordal of the Deed of Assignment and make no reference to the side letter even if the matter was "**private and confidential**" and to confound the matter further the plaintiffs were not even aware of the non-payment of US\$680,000.00.

[92] To defraud the revenue would amount and is a clear infringement of public policy. The Court of Appeal in **Lim Yoke Kian & Anor v Castle Development Sdn Bhd (2000) 4 MLJ 443** considered the Supreme Court's case of **Lim Kar Bee v Duofortis Properties (M) Sdn Bhd (1992) 2 MLJ 281** which concerned a scheme devised by a tax consultant to avoid payment of estate duty and Abdul Malek Ahmad FCJ (as he then was and later the President of the Court of Appeal) made the following observations after alluding to the decision of the Supreme Court (see page 447 of the report):

“It was held by the Supreme Court that when the contract is not ex facie illegal, the court can still take judicial notice of illegality and refuse to enforce the contract even though illegality has not been pleaded but only in the situation when facts which have not been pleaded emerge in evidence in the course of the trial showing clearly the illegality. They also held that the real test to be applied in any given transaction seems to be whether the primary purpose of the transaction is to avoid tax; if it is, it is an illegal purpose, that is, of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the tax law in question, coming under s 24(b) of the Contracts Act 1950. Since, from the facts, the primary purpose of the scheme in that case was to avoid paying estate duty, especially bearing in mind that the said land would practically remain with members of the immediate family of the appellant/landowner in the sense that the children and the wife of the appellant/landowner would control exclusively the holding company without their having paid one cent towards the purchase price of the said land, the Supreme Court was of the view that the scheme was therefore illegal and the agreement of sales and purchase of the said land and the subsequent trust deed were therefore unenforceable.”

[93] In **Lim Yoke Kian & Anor v Castle Development Sdn Bhd (supra)**, the court was asked by the respondent to make a finding in its

favour which would condone an illegality. Factually speaking, in that case the petitioners sought a court order to wind up the first respondent which the first respondent resisted on the advice of their tax consultant in order to minimise the payment of income tax. This was what the Court of Appeal said through Abdul Malek Ahmad FCJ (as he then was and later the President of the Court of Appeal) at page 448 of the report:

“It cannot be disputed that it was the intention of the shareholders to defer the winding up to minimise the payment of income tax, and this clearly is an illegality, not realising that as the tax would be determined at the date of disposal, it really would not have made any difference as to when the winding up takes place.

Having considered the arguments and the authorities, we were of the unanimous view that the learned trial judge was in error when he refused to order the winding up. Accordingly, we allowed the appeal with costs here and below, refunded the deposit to the appellant and granted the order in terms of the winding up petition.”

**[94]** Here, it was the third defendant's (Yeoh Jin Beng's) unequivocal admission that the alleged oral agreement between himself and Hendy Rusli was intended to conceal the consideration of US\$680,000.00 (which was denied by the plaintiffs) in order for the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd) to avoid disclosing receipt of these monies to the authorities. Simply put, it was to defraud the revenue. In the face of such an admission by the third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng), this court cannot uphold such a defence as it would be

countenancing the illegal act of the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd).

[95] The **fifth reason** as advanced by the defendants was that the payments were consistent with the other “**confidential payments**” that were remitted. But the payments that were relied upon by the defendants as seen at pages 1473 to 1495 of “**ARJ V**” and at pages 1497 to 1502 of “**ARJ V**” were not in relation to any alleged “**confidential payments**” at all. The plaintiffs have explained in paragraph 10 of the affidavit in reply of Hendy Rusli that was affirmed on 9<sup>th</sup> November 1993 that the second plaintiff (P.T. Sanmaru Food Manufacturing Co Ltd) had remitted those monies to the first defendant (Far East Food Industries Sdn Bhd (dalam likuidasi)) as advertising and promotional expenses and operating expenses and that the first defendant (Far East Food Industries Sdn Bhd (dalam likuidasi)) had also remitted monies into an authorised account at Citibank in Singapore as repayment of shareholder loans. The averments by Hendy Rusli in his affidavit in reply at paragraph 10 thereof must be reproduced to counter the defendants’ argument that the remittances were consistent with the other “**confidential payments**” (see pages 818 to 819 of “**ARJ III**”):

“10. Para (34) to (47)

(a) I am advised and verily believe that the remaining paragraphs of the deponent’s affidavit is

misconceived in law. I crave leave to refer to Tan Kong King's affidavit filed on the 26th October 1993. The facts contained therein speak for itself, and needs no further elaboration. The deponent has acted irresponsibly and to the detriment of the 1st Defendant company and Tan Kong King as our representative has every right to protect the company's interest.

- (b) With regard to the account in Singapore, Angel Umali and myself are the authorised account holders and have the full authority to operate the said account. It is none of the deponent's business as to the reason why the account is operated in the name of Angel Umali and myself so long as the company authorises the same. I annexed herewith the relevant documents in support of our authority to operate the said account in Singapore and marked as exhibit HR-E. I confirmed that (the) 2nd Plaintiff did remit money to the 1st Defendant not as reimbursement as alleged by (the) deponent but rather (as) advertising and promotional expenses, which at that material time the 1st Defendant did not have funds to finance the same. The 2nd Plaintiff in 1989 in fact remitted a sum of US\$440,000,- and in 1990 remitted another sum of US\$500,000,-. The deponent in his affidavit has expressly admitted that part of this sum was used to finance the advertising and promotional expenses for which he states that the sum of RM1,310,450,- was so incurred. The balance of remittance was used by the 1st Defendant for other operating expenses of the 1st Defendant.
- (c) The remittance to the Singapore account referred to in para 46 of the deponent's affidavit has nothing to do with the advances made to the 1st Defendant for the aforesaid advertising and promotional expenses. The said remittance to the Singapore account was in fact repayment of shareholders' loan which was remitted to the 1st Defendant in the early years of the operation of the 1st Defendant.
- (d) The deponent, Yeoh Jin Beng has failed in his affidavit to condescend to the various particulars marked as exhibits HR-12 and HR-13 attached to my earlier affidavit. The said exhibits show clearly the extent of financial assistance rendered to the 1st and 2nd Defendants as companies of the Indofood Group.

(e) If the deponent, Yeoh Jin Beng is the beneficial owner of 20% equity of the 1st Defendant company as alleged, he has yet to explain how as employee of the 1st Plaintiff, he had the financial means to acquire the said equity and from whom. He has failed to disclose from whom he had acquired the said equity. In every such transaction, there has to be a transferor and (a) transferee.”

**[96]** The **sixth reason** concerned the argument by the defendants that it was a common practice to merely state a nominal consideration and not the sum of US\$680,000.00. But, sad to say, the defendants have failed to adduce any evidence of the alleged common practice. An analysis of the evidence would show that, in reality, the agreed consideration for the assignment of the “**Indomie**” trade mark registration was RM10.00 and not US\$680,000.00. It was not a question of common practice but rather it was an agreed consideration borne out by the evidence.

**[97]** Yeoh Jin Beng’s version that an oral agreement was reached between himself and Hendy Rusli at an unknown date in circumstances where according to Yeoh Jin Beng’s own admission Hendy Rusli was representing the Indofood group and was going to use monies belonging to the Indofood group (as opposed to Hendy Rusli’s own monies) to pay for the US\$680,000.00, did not represent the truth and it was neither credible nor believable, having regard to the following salient facts:

- (a)** the Indomie trade mark in Indonesia, and in all countries where registration had taken place, belonged to the joint venture entity of the Salim and Jangkar Jati groups ;
- (b)** Yeoh Jin Beng was merely reporting to the Indofood group and had to seek the group's permission and/or instruction on various management matters;
- (c)** in such circumstances, the commercial reality would have been that the Indofood group would have instructed Yeoh Jin Beng to effect the transfer for a nominal consideration – consistent with their merger agreement in Jakarta;
- (d)** Yeoh Jin Beng acted pursuant to such instructions when he executed the Deed of Assignment on behalf of the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd) and signed the covering letter dated 25<sup>th</sup> July 1990 and submitted the executed Deed of Assignment to Messrs Shearn Delamore for their further action;
- (e)** in at least nine contemporaneous documents as alluded to somewhere in this judgment and exchanged between Yeoh Jin Beng, the plaintiffs and Messrs Shearn Delamore from 1990 to 1993, those documents did not make any reference to the sum of US\$680,000.00;



(f) of critical importance would be the averment in the Deed of Assignment which states that the consideration was for a mere RM10.00;

(g) the excuse given by Yeoh Jin Beng in September 1992 that the trade mark was not transferred because of the alleged **Boustead** injunction, which even if true, could only have been a fetter for a short period of time;

(h) Yeoh Jin Beng produced the side letter which made reference, for the very first time, in regard to the sum of US\$680,000.00 in his affidavit affirmed on 26<sup>th</sup> October 1993 and the delay was for 3 years 3 months 1 day – a most convenient afterthought;

(i) Hendy Rusli categorically denied receiving the side letter; and

(j) PWI (Cesar M. de la Cruz) testified that Yeoh Jin Beng's alleged side letter was never brought up for discussion at management meetings of the Indofood group during the early 1990's when both Hendy Rusli and Cesar M. de la Cruz were members of the management committee.

[98] It was hardly surprising that based on the totality of the evidence, the High Court found as a fact that the consideration for the transfer was RM10.00. If Yeoh Jin Beng's version had been believed by the High Court it would mean that any finding of fact that the true

consideration was US\$680,000.00 would result in the High Court determining that the Deed of Assignment contained a false statement on a very material fact, namely, the consideration bearing in mind that Yeoh Jin Beng had admitted to conceal the consideration of US\$680,000.00 for the purpose of defrauding the revenue.

### **Constructive trust**

[99] As I said earlier that the Deed of Assignment for Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak in “**ARJ III**” at pages 797 to 798 was executed by both parties on 26<sup>th</sup> September 1990. The Deed of Assignment expressly states the consideration of RM10.00 was “**paid by the Assignees (referring to the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.)) to the Assignors (referring to the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd)), the receipt whereof the Assignors hereby acknowledge**”. That being the case, the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd) must be estopped from denying that the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) had paid to it the declared consideration of RM10.00. In such a situation and pending the registration of the assignment of the trade mark, the position in equity may be described in the same way in which Jessel M.R. described the contract in **Lysaght v. Edwards (1876) 2 Ch D 499, 506:**

“It appears to me that the effect of a contract for sale has been settled for more than two centuries; certainly it was completely settled before the time of Lord Hardwicke, who speaks of the settled doctrine of the Court as to it. What is that doctrine? It is that the moment you have a valid contract for sale the vendor becomes in equity a trustee for the purchaser of the estate sold, and the beneficial ownership passes to the purchaser, the vendor having a right to the purchase-money, a charge or lien on the estate for the security of that purchase-money, and a right to retain possession of the estate until the purchase-money is paid, in the absence of express contract as to the time of delivering possession.”

Continuing at page 510 of the report, Jessel M.R. had this to say:

“It must, therefore, be considered to be established that the vendor is a constructive trustee for the purchaser of the estate from the moment the contract is entered into.”

[100] The Federal Court in **Temenggong Securities Ltd. & Anor. v. Registrar Of Titles, Johore & Ors. (1974) 2 MLJ 45** accepted the equitable principle propounded by Jessel M.R. in **Lysaght v. Edwards (supra)** and said through Ong Hock Sim F.J. at page 47 of the report that:

“The law is clear that the vendors, after receipt of the full purchase price and surrender of possession of the lands to the appellants are bare trustees for the appellants of the said land and it must consequently follow, as night must day, that the vendors have no *interests* in the lands which can be the subject matter of a caveat.”

[101] The Privy Council affirmed the decision of the Federal Court vide **Registrar Of Titles, Johore v. Temenggong Securities Ltd. (1976) 2 MLJ 44.**

[102] It must be emphasised that although **Lysaght v. Edwards** and **Temenggong Securities** were cases involving the sale of immovable

properties and the filing of a **Registrar's** caveat respectively, the courts there were merely recognising the general principles of equity which would apply to all kinds of transfers and dealings of all types of property. These equitable principles are also applicable to an assignment of a trade mark like the present case at hand.

[103] The law is quite settled. It is this. That a person who holds property on a constructive trust is a constructive trustee in respect of that property (**Soar v. Ashwell (1893) 2 QB 390 at 393**). And the person in question cannot claim for himself any increase in value of the property or any profits earned from that property. And if the person becomes a bankrupt, the property is not available for that person's general creditors but rather it is for the benefit of the beneficiaries in whose favour the constructive trust was held.

[104] Hashim Yeop A. Sani J. (as he then was) in **Yong Nyee Fan & Sons Sdn. Bhd. v. Kim Guan & Co. Sdn. Bhd. (1979) 1 MLJ 182** makes a valiant attempt at defining the word "**trust**". This was what his Lordship said (see page 188 of the report):

"It has been found difficult to give a satisfactory definition of a trust but it has been accepted that the most satisfactory definition is by Professor Keeton which definition is that a trust is the relationship which arises wherever a person called the trustee is compelled in Equity to hold property, real or personal, and whether by legal or equitable title, for the benefit of some persons (of whom he may be one) or for some object permitted by law, in such a way that the real

benefit of the property accrues, not to the trustee, but to the beneficiaries or other objects of the trust.”

[105] And **“trusts”** which arise by operation of law are generally referred to as constructive trust. A constructive trust is imposed by equity in order to satisfy the needs of justice and good conscience. Lord Denning developed what he called as **“a constructive trust of a new model”** (**Eves v Eves (1975) 3 ALL ER 768 at 771**) by imposing a constructive trust **“whenever justice and good conscience required it”** ( **Hussey v Palmer (1972) 3 ALL ER 744 at page 747, C.A.** ). In **Gissing v Gissing (1971) AC 886 at 906, (1970) 2 ALL ER 780 at 790, H.L.**, Lord Diplock aptly said of resulting or implied trust in these sage words :

“..... the relevant intention of each party is the intention which was reasonably understood by the other party to be manifested by that party’s words or conduct notwithstanding that he did not consciously formulate that intention in his own mind or even acted with some different intention which he did not communicate to the other party. On the other hand, he is not bound by any inference which the other party draws as to his intention unless that inference is one which can reasonably be drawn from his words or conduct.”

[106] In sharp contrast, no formalities are needed to create a constructive trust. The concept of constructive trust is tied up with the principles of fairness and good conscience. Usually a constructive trust is imposed over the disputed property and constructive trusteeship is placed on the person who is responsible for that disputed property. The

characteristics of a constructive trust may be listed as follows, and they are by no means exhaustive:

- (a) a constructive trust arises by operation of law;
- (b) it certainly does not depend on the express intention of the settlor like the case of a private trust;
- (c) it is also not dependent on the presumed intention of the settlor like the case of an implied trust as well as the resulting trust; and
- (d) it depends on the conduct of the parties (**Khor Kuek Jin v. Haji Yasin & Ors. (1976) 2 MLJ 70**).

[107] The Americans have their own view. It is this. That a constructive trust is to be imposed so as to prevent an unjust enrichment.

[108] Authorities have shown that constructive trusts will be imposed in the following situations:

- (a) on a trustee as a result of the breach of a fiduciary duty (**George Bray v John Rawlinson Ford (1896) AC 44 at 51; Allcard v. Skinner 57 The Law Times Vol. LVII, N.S. 61; M.P.M. Murugappa Chetti & Anor. v. The Official Assignee of Madras(1938) 1 MLJ 25 PC; Barclays Bank Ltd. v Quistclose Investments Ltd. (1970) AC 567; Carreras Rothmans Ltd v Freeman Mathews Treasure Ltd (in liq) and another (1985) 1 ALL ER 155; Toovey v. Milne (1819) 2 B. & ALD 682 ; Edwards and other v Glyn and others**

**(1859) 2 EL & EL 29; In Re Rogers, Ex Parte Holland & Hannen (1891) 8 Morr 243; Holder v. Holder and others (1968) 1 Ch 353; and Lee Hiok Woon & Ors v Lee Hiok Ping & Ors (1993) 2 SCR 304);**

**(b)** on a stranger who has received the property as a result of the breach of a fiduciary duty (**In re Barney. Barney v. Barney (1892) 2 Ch 265; and Mara v. Browne (1896) 1 Ch 199);**

**(c)** on a trustee as a result of fraudulent or inequitable conduct (**Ng Tien & Anor v Chow Nim Yan (1990) 3 MLJ 373; English v Dedham Vale Properties Ltd (1978) 1 ALL ER 382; Wan Naimah v. Wan Mohamad Nawawai (1974) 1 MLJ 41; Rochefoucauld v. Boustead (1897) 1 Ch 196; and Othman & Anor. v. Mek (1972) 2 MLJ 158);**

**(d)** on a vendor as a constructive trustee;

**(e)** on either party to a mutual will in the context of mutual wills (**J.T. Smith and The Barrow Hematite Steel Company, Limited v. Henry Cooke, Rachel Swinnerton and Others (1891) AC 297 at 299);** and

**(f)** on married partners and co-habitees (**Binions and Another v. Evans (1972) 1 Ch 359; and Lyus and Another v Prowsa Developments Ltd & Others (1982) 1 WLR 1044).**

[109] Reverting back to the appeal at hand, it must be stated categorically that from 26<sup>th</sup> September 1990, the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd) and the third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng) were holding the Indomie trade mark in Malaysia as constructive trustees for the benefit of the first plaintiff. At this juncture, the germane observations of Millett L.J. in the case of **Paragon Finance plc v D B Thakerar & Co (a firm), Paragon Finance plc and another v Thimbleby & Co (a firm) (1999) 1 ALL ER 400, 409, C.A.** should be referred to. There his Lordship Millett L.J. had this to say:

“A constructive trust arises by operation of law whenever the circumstances are such that it would be unconscionable for the owner of property (usually but not necessarily the legal estate) to assert his own beneficial interest in the property and deny the beneficial interest of another.”

[110] For all these reasons, I would hold that the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd) and the third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng) were, since 26<sup>th</sup> September 1990, the constructive trustees of the Indomie trade mark in Malaysia for the benefit of the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.). This was also the finding of the High Court judge.

### **Delay and laches**

[111] Two issues surfaced under this category. The first would be the question of whether the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd) and the third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng) have been



prejudiced by the inordinate and inexcusable delay in prosecuting this action? The second would be the crucial question of whether the plaintiffs are disentitled to the reliefs claimed by reason of the delay and laches?

**[112]** Both these two issues should be considered together. I have to ask this nagging question. Are the defendants precluded by the doctrine of issue estoppel in claiming that they suffered prejudice by an alleged delay on the part of the plaintiffs in prosecuting this action bearing in mind that they (the defendants) had made a specific application to have this suit struck out for want of prosecution? It must be recalled that the High Court and the Court of Appeal had ruled against the defendants in that application. And that leave to appeal to the Federal Court is still pending.

**[113]** The defendants were themselves responsible for filing numerous procedural applications of dubious merit. It does not lie in the mouth of the defendants to contend that the plaintiffs were guilty of inordinate delay in setting this suit for trial before the High Court. On the contrary, it was the defendants who were determined to prevent the commencement of the trial including unsuccessfully advancing the stay applications.

**[114]** It is the judgment of this court that the plaintiffs are not guilty of any conduct that would disentitle them to the reliefs sought by them notwithstanding that there was delay and laches. While the delay was

prolonged, it is in all the circumstances, not inordinate or inexcusable and the plaintiffs are not entirely to blame. In this context, two authorities must be put to the forefront. The first would be the case of **Du Sautoy v. Symes And Others. (1967) 1 ALL ER 25**, a decision of Cross J. There, his Lordship had this to say at pages 37 to 38 of the report which would surely put the issue of delay in its correct perspective:

“In this case the writ was issued promptly, and I do not think that the fact that the plaintiff was making alternative claims under both branches of cl. 14, one of which he has subsequently abandoned, can affect the right to specific performance, though it may have some bearing on the question of costs. It is said, however, that there was great delay in bringing the action to trial. I have not been taken through the correspondence in detail, but what I gather is alleged by the first defendant is that, though there was some negotiation in the early stages, from about October, 1964, the delay in bringing the action to trial was the fault of the plaintiff. Assuming that to be so, however, I do not think that it is sufficient to justify me in refusing to grant him specific performance and instead to grant damages under Lord Cairns’ Act (the Chancery Amendment Act, 1858). I can conceive of a case where, though an action is started promptly, nevertheless, by his conduct the plaintiff has lulled the defendant into a belief that he is going to ask for damages only and not specific performance; but it would need a clear case to make that out, and no such case has been made out here. Therefore, I make the order for specific performance.”

[115] Secondly, it would be the case of **Eagleview Limited v Worthgate Limited and another**, decided on 14.7.1998, unreported at the Chancery Division (see Lexis Nexis). There Park J., made the following germane observations:

“I can now state my own view on the delay arguments. I entirely accept that there was long delay by Eagleview; that the delay was seriously unsatisfactory; and that no sufficient excuse or explanation for it has been given. I disapprove of the way that Eagleview let its action go to sleep, but if I refuse the remedy of specific performance I thereby effectively destroy the legal rights which in my judgment Eagleview has under its contract. Because Worthgate is in liquidation, damages are likely to be a worthless alternative remedy. I do not believe that I should do that simply because of my disapproval of Eagleview’s inaction. I need to think about it more deeply than just to say: ‘I will not give you specific performance because you did nothing for four years and it serves you right.’ As Cross J said, it needs a clear case to justify the refusal of specific performance. The situation which he visualised was where the plaintiff has lulled the defendant into a sense of false security that he was going to ask for damages only, not specific performance. Eagleview never lulled Worthgate (or Capital Prime either, if it is relevant) into thinking that, because Eagleview was delaying over prosecuting its action, it was only going to seek damages.

In common with most of the Australian judges I think that it is relevant to ask three questions about a plaintiff’s delay (here Eagleview’s delay):

(1) Did Eagleview’s delay indicate that it had abandoned its contract to purchase the property?

The answer is: certainly not. It maintained its caution in force. At one stage the Land Registry wrote and asked whether it still objected to cancellation of the caution. Eagleview’s solicitors replied that it did. The Land Registry sent a copy of the letter to Capital Prime.

(2) Did Eagleview’s delay cause any prejudice to the vendor (Worthgate)?

It seems to me that it did not. The prejudice to a vendor which the majority of the High Court of Australia identified in *Lamshed* was being left for a protracted period, not knowing whether he had sold the property or not and not being able to deal with it. There was nothing like that in this case. Worthgate resold the property to Capital Prime on the very day on which it purported to rescind its contract with Eagleview. Worthgate clearly wanted to see the back of Eagleview, probably because Mr Cooper believed that Mr Yeganeh Junior (who ran Eagleview) was playing a devious game and had planted the squatters in the property. Whatever the reason, the correspondence and other

contemporary documents show that Worthgate was falling over itself to rescind its contract with Eagleview as soon as it could, and to re-sell the property to Capital Prime pursuant to negotiations with Capital Prime which it had conducted without Eagleview knowing about them. It did both of those things long before any delay by Eagleview began, and Eagleview's delay did not restrict Worthgate's dealing with the properties in any way at all.

(3) Did Eagleview's delay prejudice any third parties?

Again, it seems to me that it did not. The only relevant third party is Capital Prime. Capital Prime may be in an awkward situation now, but that is not the result of Eagleview's delay. It is primarily the result of Capital Prime having chanced its arm in 1993. It knew all about Worthgate's contract to sell to Eagleview, but it decided to go ahead with its purchase anyway. Capital Prime's solicitors warned it about Eagleview's caution, but Capital Prime decided to take the risk. Further, after the failure of Eagleview's Order 86 application, Eagleview's solicitors wrote to Johnson Fry, Capital Prime's sponsoring organisation, stating:

'We give you notice that any works or expenses incurred by yourself will be regarded by us as entirely at your company's own risk and is (sic) clearly not a bar to specific performance being granted to our clients.'

Capital Prime went ahead nevertheless, and spent substantial sums on renovating the property and converting it into flats. This was Capital Prime's own decision, and Eagleview's delay had nothing to do with it. At that time, Eagleview's period of delay had not even started.

It is true that a long period of delay by Eagleview followed, but Capital Prime was just as responsible for the delay as was Eagleview. Capital Prime had put provisions into its contract with Worthgate, designed to get the situation about Eagleview's caution sorted out. Capital Prime sat back and allowed Worthgate to ignore them. It seems to me quite likely that, if Capital Prime thought about the matter at all, it took the view that if it kept its head down and did nothing to stir Worthgate or Eagleview into action, Eagleview would in practice go away and forget about its contract.

For the foregoing reasons, while Eagleview's delay in pursuing its actions is to be deplored, I do not think that it has been the cause of any prejudice to Worthgate or Capital Prime, and I do not consider that it is a sufficient reason for me to refuse to grant to Eagleview an order for specific performance."

**[116]** On the totality of the evidence presented during the trial before the High Court, we have come to the following conclusions:

- (a)** that the contemporaneous documents all point in one direction and that would be that the agreed consideration for the transfer of the registered trade mark “**Indomie**” by the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd) to the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.) was RM10.00 ;
- (b)** even though PW1 (Cesar M. de la Cruz) was extensively cross-examined, his testimony stood firm and was not shaken ;
- (c)** that the plaintiffs’ second witness – PW2 (Pandi Kusuma) was hardly tested in cross-examination;
- (d)** that the third defendant (Yeoh Jin Beng) who testified as DWI was not a credible witness because he shifted his stand on numerous occasions;
- (e)** that all the parties were part and parcel of the Indofood group at all material times;
- (f)** that the second defendant (Sanmaru Overseas Marketing Sdn Bhd) was holding the Indomie trade mark in Malaysia as a constructive trustee for the benefit of the first plaintiff (P.T. Indofood Interna Corp.); and

(g) that having regard to the manner in which numerous interlocutory applications in the High Court and appeals to the Court of Appeal were filed on behalf of all parties in this suit, the details of which are summarised in the Amended Reply filed on behalf of the plaintiffs on 11<sup>th</sup> November 2005 (see the particulars in paragraph 7 at pages 92 to 95 of (“**ARJ I**”)), the plaintiffs cannot be accused of undue delay. At any rate, since the trial in the High Court has concluded, there is no evidence of any prejudice suffered by the defendants in the conduct of the trial.

### **Conclusion**

[117] The High Court judge was justified in giving judgment in favour of the plaintiffs after a long drawn trial. There was ample documentary evidence to entitle the High Court judge to reach the conclusions which he did. There was no error of law on his part. Neither did he misappreciate the available evidence. On the contrary, the assessment of the available evidence was correctly and judiciously done and it was done in an admirable way. The defendants have failed to demonstrate to this court that the High Court judge was “**plainly wrong**” in arriving at his decision. There is no reason to disturb the decision of the High Court judge.

**[118]** This is a unanimous decision of this court. The appeal is dismissed with costs here and below. Deposit to the plaintiffs to account of taxed costs. All the orders of the High Court judge are hereby affirmed. An oral application for a stay was refused. The defendants were advised to file a formal application.

**[119]** My learned brother Abu Samah bin Nordin, JCA has seen this judgment in draft and has kindly expressed his agreement with it.

29.2.2008

ABDUL MALIK BIN ISHAK  
JUDGE COURT OF APPEAL  
PUTRAJAYA

Counsel

- |     |                    |   |                                                                      |
|-----|--------------------|---|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| (1) | For the Plaintiffs | : | Mr. Tommy Thomas,<br>Miss Chew Kherk Ying and<br>Miss Elaine Yap     |
|     | Solicitor          | : | Messrs Wong & Partners<br>Advocates & Solicitors<br>Kuala Lumpur     |
| (2) | For the Defendants | : | Mr. Porres P. Royan,<br>Mr. Michael C.M. Soo and<br>Mr. Ong Boo Seng |
|     | Solicitor          | : | Messrs Shook Lin & Bok<br>Advocates & Solicitors<br>Kuala Lumpur     |