

of his back to the direction in which his engine is running, must militate against the maintenance of a good look-out.

The horse-box train was booked to arrive at Virginia Water at 8.45 a.m. and to depart at 8.50 a.m., and it is not clear why this booked stoppage has been allowed to fall into disuse, apparently without authority.

The Company will, doubtless, recognize the danger of permitting an empty train to occupy a running line for so long a period as 35 minutes, and consider whether further facilities, in the shape of siding accommodation, are required at Virginia Water. The present intricate and cumbersome method of crossing trains, etc., which involves running on the wrong line between two signal boxes, also appears to deserve consideration.

The Assistant Secretary,  
Railway Department, Board of Trade.

I have, &c.,  
J. W. PRINGLE,  
Major, R.E.

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#### APPENDIX.

##### *Damage to Rolling Stock.*

Engine of horse-box train.—Three buffers and back of coal bunker broken; vacuum pipe, large whistle and tool boxes broken.

Engine of passenger train.—One buffer broken.

Brake-van, No. 134.—Completely destroyed.

Bogie Third Class, No. 49.—Will require to be rebuilt.

Bogie Composite, No. 344.—Drawbar pin, coupling, side chain and head-stock broken.

Bogie Third Class, No. 1160.—Two head-stocks and one buffer casting broken.

##### *Damage to Permanent Way.*

Eleven 40-lb. chairs, four fish-plates and one sleeper broken.

Fifty feet of platform coping displaced.

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Printed copies of the above Report were sent to the Company on the 4th January, 1901.

## LONDON AND SOUTH-WESTERN RAILWAY.

Board of Trade (Railway Department),  
8, Richmond Terrace, Whitehall, London, S.W.,  
November 8th, 1900.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to report for the information of the Board of Trade, in compliance with the Order of the 11th October, the result of my enquiry into the collision that occurred on the 7th idem at Twickenham Station on the London and South-Western Railway.

In this case, as four special coaches were being transferred from the rear of the 7.45 p.m. up train from Reading to the front of the 8.30 down train to Kingston by the engine of the latter, they came into sharp collision with 8.54 up train from Gunnersbury which was due at Twickenham at 9.12 p.m.

The driver of the Gunnersbury train was badly hurt and the fireman cut about the head. The driver of the Kingston train was shaken, and 49 passengers complained of injury, one of whom is reported to have received a nasty shock.


Both engines were considerably damaged. Three of the vehicles that were being shunted and two of those belonging to the Gunnersbury train were more or less broken, the van next the engine of the latter having its end compartment completely smashed in. Details of the damage to the rolling stock and permanent way will be found in the Appendix.

##### *Description.*

This collision occurred about 160 yards west of Twickenham Station on the up Windsor line. There are three lines passing through the station, viz., the up loop, the up Windsor, and the down Windsor, their direction being approximately east and west. Twickenham is the junction between the Windsor lines and the Kingston lines; the down

Kingston line diverges from the down Windsor at a point about 210 yards from the west end of the place, while the up Kingston line crosses the Windsor lines by an over-bridge 400 yards west of the station, and joins the up loop line at the back of the up platform. At the west end of the station there is a cross-over road between the up and down lines with trailing points on each line, which are worked by No. 22 lever in the signal-box, and about 175 yards further west there is another cross-over road worked by No. 32 lever. Between these two cross-over roads there is a facing connection worked by No. 28 lever on the up Windsor line leading into the up loop line.

The west signal-box, from which these points and the signals relating to them are worked, is 66 yards west of the up platform on the north side of the Windsor lines, and between it and the loop line. The up signals both for the Windsor and loop lines are carried on a bracketed post which is 225 yards from the signal-box, and 185 yards from the site of the collision. I annex a small diagram (not to scale) which renders the arrangement of the place easier to understand. The points and signals are properly interlocked.



Block working is in force through the station, and the signalmen in the east and west boxes are prohibited by the rules from allowing trains to approach Twickenham from Whitton Junction (the next block box towards the west) while a train or engine is being shunted back through the station on the up line or is crossing from the up to the down line; and conversely after a train has been accepted from Whitton, no train or engine should be allowed to move back along the up line. It would however be legitimate for the man in the west box, after pulling over the points (No. 28) leading into the up loop, to allow a train to approach from Whitton while another train was standing in the station on the up Windsor line.

### *Evidence.*

*William Pittman*, station-master, states: I have been stationmaster at Twickenham 12 years. On Saturday afternoon, 6th October, I received notice that a theatrical party would arrive by the 7.45 up Reading train on Sunday evening, to be attached to the 8.30 down Kingston train, and I had, during Sunday morning, instructed inspector Andrews that the engine of the 8.30 down was to be detached and utilised to fetch the vehicles from the up Reading line to attach to the front of the down Kingston train. I was present on Sunday night to see the operation carried out, and before the up Reading train arrived I went to signalman Dunkley at the west box, and enquired whether inspector Andrews had explained to him how the operation was to be carried out. Finding that Dunkley had received instructions I returned to the platform. At 9.17 p.m. the up Reading train arrived. The down Kingston train arrived at 9.10. The engine of the down Kingston train had been detached and sent forward over No. 32 points, ready to set back on to the up Reading train. After the arrival of the up Reading train No. 32 points were pulled over, and the engine of the down Kingston crossed over and backed on to the four coaches at the rear of the up Reading train. While this operation was in progress the Reading train proceeded on its journey. After porter Wall had uncoupled the coaches from the

Reading train, I noticed that the vacuum pipe of the detached vehicles had not been replaced on the dummy. I instructed Wall to do so, to enable the engine driver to create vacuum. I then asked shunter Diamond if he was accompanying the vehicles across the road, and he replied that he was, and he at once jumped on the footboard of one of the coaches. A portion of the theatrical train was fouling No. 22 cross-over road, and it was my intention for the engine and coaches to return to the down line through No. 32, the same way as they had come, this being quicker than to have backed them clear of No. 22, and send them across through No. 22 cross-over road. I had not given instructions as to which route was to be followed in returning from the up to the down line. I did not see who gave the engine driver a signal to start, nor did I notice whether any signal was given from the West signal-box. I was not aware that an up train from Gunnersbury was approaching at the time. Shortly after the vehicles had moved away from the platform, I heard someone shouting, and then saw the headlights of the Gunnersbury train approaching. The collision occurred immediately afterwards. When I saw signalman Dunkley, I did not go into the detail working of the shunting operation, feeling sure that inspector Andrews had already done so.

*G. Andrews*, inspector, states: I have been in the Company's service 28 years, and I have been inspector since February 1st, 1900. I have been stationed at Twickenham since February 1st, 1900. I had been advised on the morning of Sunday, October 7th, by Mr. Pittman, of the vehicles to be detached from the 7.45 p.m. up Reading train, and was instructed by him that the engine of the 8.30 p.m. down Kingston train was to be utilised to fetch these vehicles from the up line, and attach them to the front of the down train. Sometime during the afternoon I advised signalman Dunkley of this by telephone. The down Kingston train arrived first and the engine was detached and sent forward to a point about opposite the West signal-box. I then went to the signal-box and had a conversation with Mr. Pittman and signalman Dunkley, and we came to the conclusion that the rear part of the up train would be standing foul of the cross-over road No. 22 at the end of the platform; we therefore decided to send the engine of the down train forward to cross over by way of No. 32 points, and I instructed shunter Diamond to take charge of this operation. I then left the box and proceeded to the up platform to signal the engine back on to the detached vehicles. I said nothing to signalman Dunkley or anyone else as to the route the engine was to follow on returning with the coaches from the up to the down line. After the engine was attached to the vehicles and apparently ready to start I looked back and saw two carriage doors open at the rear, with some of the passengers still on the platform; I hastened back and induced these to take their seats, and before I could close both doors the vehicles were in motion, but I did not see anyone give the driver a signal to start, and cannot say who did so. I gave no signal, neither did I see any signal exhibited from the signal-box. I remained on the up platform preparing to signal the vehicles back on to the down Kingston train, and on hearing someone shouting, looked round, and noticed that the Gunnersbury train was approaching. I immediately exhibited a red light, but it was too late to avoid the collision, which occurred almost immediately.

*Arthur Wall*, porter, states: I have been in the Company's service three years, four months. I have been all the time at Twickenham. On Sunday, 7th October, I came on duty at 9 a.m. to work till 12 midnight. Every other Sunday I am off duty. I was on the platform when the up Reading train arrived at 9.17 p.m. I detached the four Great Western vehicles from the rear of the up Reading train, and after receiving from inspector Andrews the tail lamps I placed them on the rear van of the Reading train ready to proceed to London. I was about to release the vacuum brake by pulling the strings under the Great Western coaches when I was told by Mr. Pittman to replace the vacuum pipe on the dummy, which I did, and shortly afterwards I found the vehicles moving away. I remained on the permanent way between the up and down Windsor lines preparing to couple the vehicles on to the down Kingston train, and while waiting I looked round and was surprised to see the head-lights of the Gunnersbury train. The collision occurred immediately afterwards.

*James Alfred Diamond*, shunter, states: I have been in the Company's service 16 years. I have been a shunter between four and five years, and 10 months at Twickenham. On Sunday, October 7th, I came on duty at 8.30 a.m. to work until 12 midnight—two hours off for dinner, and

an hour off for tea. This is my regular turn of duty every second Sunday. Intermediate Sundays I am off duty. I was waiting in the station for the arrival of the down Kingston train, which arrived about 9.10 p.m. I had been instructed to take charge of the shunting of the vehicles from the 7.45 up Reading to the 8.30 p.m. down Kingston train. I uncoupled the engine from the down Kingston train and took it forward to a point about opposite the West signal-box. While there I was instructed to take it further forward clear of No. 32 cross-over road points. After the arrival of the Reading train the engine was crossed through No. 32 to the up line. I accompanied the engine and attached it to the four vehicles detached from the up Reading train. I was walking back towards the rear to see everything was right when I was asked by Mr. Pittman who was going across the road with the vehicles? to which I replied that I was, and finding the vehicles then in motion I jumped on the footboard of the third vehicle and signalled to the driver to go forward. I did not signal the driver to start, neither did I hear or see anyone do so, and I did not see any light exhibited from the West signal-box. I thought we were going back the same way as we came, viz., through No. 32 crossover. I did not hear anyone shout from the signal-box but when close to that box I saw the head-lights of the Gunnersbury train, and thought it was standing at the home signal, but on looking more closely I found it was approaching us. I therefore jumped off on to the permanent way. I cannot say whether the driver applied the brake but noticed that the vehicles had almost come to a standstill when the collision occurred. I know there is no fixed signal for shunting vehicles from the up to the down line through No. 32 points, and it did not occur to me to look for a signal from the signal-box. As the driver had started I concluded he had received a signal from someone to do so, and that is why, after jumping on to the coach, I continued to show him an all-right signal.

*William Dunkley*, signalman, states: I have been in the Company's service 24 years, and I have been signalman 22½ years. I have been stationed at Twickenham West signal-box 17 years, having been for one year in Twickenham East. On the 7th October I came on duty at 2 p.m. to work eight hours. I was alone in the box. I was advised by inspector Andrews during Sunday afternoon of four vehicles for Kingston having to be detached from the 7.45 p.m. up Reading train, and that it was the intention to detach the engine of the 8.30 p.m. down Kingston train to fetch and attach them to the front of that train. Shortly after the 8.30 p.m. down train arrived, and before the up Reading train had been signalled as leaving Whitton Junction both Mr. Pittman and inspector Andrews visited my box almost simultaneously. Mr. Pittman enquired whether inspector Andrews had advised me how the shunting was to be carried out and I said "Yes." As I felt sure that the up Reading train would stand foul of No. 22 crossing I suggested to Mr. Pittman and inspector Andrews the engine of the 8.30 down being sent ahead to cross over by way of No. 32 crossing, and this was done. As soon as the engine had crossed over on to the up line I closed the points of No. 32 crossing as the 8.53 p.m. train from Gunnersbury, due to arrive at Twickenham at 9.12, was then waiting at Whitton Junction, and being anxious to let that train run and so avoid delay to the 8.45 p.m. train from Windsor, I cleared the line to Whitton Junction. I accepted the Gunnersbury train at

9.13 p.m., set the junction points No. 28, and lowered my outdoor home signal for it to run to the up Kingston line platform, it being my intention that the engine with the vehicles detached from the up Reading should be pushed back clear of No. 22 crossing to cross over on to the down line. I did not tell inspector Andrews or Mr. Pittman that I wanted this done, and that I could not have them back by way of No. 32 crossing, neither did I show a danger signal to the platform when I set the road and lowered the signal for the Gunnersbury train. After accepting the Gunnersbury train I saw a steady green light shown to the driver of the down Kingston train and concluded it was for him to set back clear of No. 22 crossing. I then turned round to make an entry of the Gunnersbury train in my train signal book, and after I had done this I looked out and to my surprise found the engine coming up on the up line and approaching my box. I immediately picked up my hand lamp and exhibited a red light, and then replaced my up home signal to danger, but it was too late to prevent the collision. I think it was about 30 to 40 yards from my box to the engine when it was attached to the four vehicles on the up train. I did not see the engine start. No. 22 crossing is the one generally used, if possible. I think it would have been a quicker operation to have set the engine and coaches back so as to clear No. 22 points in order to enable them to have crossed by the east (No. 22) crossing instead of using the middle (No. 32) crossing. If I had put the coaches through No. 32 crossing I should have caused delay to the Gunnersbury train.

*Frederick Roberts*, driver, states: I have been 17 years in the Company's service. I have been driver between three and four years. On Sunday 7th October I came on duty at 3.0 a.m., having gone off duty about 2.0 p.m. the previous day. I should have finished work about 11.30 p.m. I was working the 8.30 p.m. down train from Waterloo to Kingston. My engine was No. 104 ten-wheeled bogie tank, leading bogie, four-wheels-coupled, radial wheel under coal bunker, passenger engine. I was running chimney first. My train consisted of 14 vehicles. The engine was fitted with steam brake and the train with vacuum-brake, both brakes working together and applied by one handle. We left Waterloo right time, and arrived at Twickenham at 9.10. On arrival at Twickenham the shunter told me we had to pick up some coaches from the up Reading. The shunter took us forward over the first pair of points. After stopping there the shunter told me that we had to go on the next pair of points. No sooner had we passed the points than we got a signal from the shunter to set back on the up line. On reaching the rear of the Reading train, shunter Diamond coupled the engine on to the coaches. After Diamond coupled on to the loose coaches he gave me a light to pull up, which I took to mean that we were to go back to the down line the same way as we had come. Before I could move the coaches I had to blow the brakes off. As soon as I had blown off the brakes, the shunter gave me a signal. He was on the footboard. Inspector Andrews was present, and called my engine back on to the coaches. The inspector took the tail lamps off the coaches and attached them to the rear portion of the Reading train. As soon as the shunter had completed coupling he gave me the signal to start, and then got on to the footboard of one of the coaches. I received no signal from inspector Andrews, or from Mr. Pittman, nor from the signalman. The only signal I received

was from the shunter. I received this signal before my engine was in motion. As soon as I got the signal from the shunter I started to return to the down road. I did not see the Gunnersbury train at all. I felt my engine go through No. 28 points and thought that something was wrong, and I at once applied the brake. I was still looking back for the signal from the shunter when the Gunnersbury train ran into mine. My engine was barely moving at the time of the collision. My engine was badly damaged. I was badly shaken. My fireman jumped off just before the collision occurred. The shunter jumped off before the collision. After the collision shunter Diamond came to me and asked me if I was hurt. I told him I was shaken. He then said it was his fault. I remained with my engine.

Shunter *Diamond* being recalled adhered to his statement that he did not give a signal to the driver to start, and that the only light he exhibited to the Driver was after the vehicles were in motion.

*William Joseph Brown*, fireman, states: I have been with the Company about eight years. I have been fireman three years in December. My hours of duty on the 6th and 7th October were the same as my driver's. On arrival at Twickenham we were sent forward over the points of the middle crossing road, and after the Reading train had arrived we crossed over and backed on to the coaches at the rear of the up Reading train. The shunter accompanied us. I think the shunter got down and coupled us on. Someone called out twice to pull up before the brakes were off. The shouting seemed to be on the platform side. As soon as the driver released the brake he started ahead. A green light was shown from the platform side before we started and afterwards. I have no idea who exhibited the light. While we were moving forward I was on the driver's side watching the shunter's green light. My driver said something about the points being wrong. He did not apply the brake at that time. I then crossed over to my side of the engine and saw the Gunnersbury train approaching. I shouted out to my driver "Whoa! he's into us." Until that moment I had no idea the Gunnersbury train was approaching. I jumped off on to the ballast, the six-foot side. After the collision I jumped up on the engine and asked my driver if he was hurt, and also asked where the shunter was. He replied that he was shaken, and that the shunter had just been to the engine and asked him if he was hurt. The driver told me the shunter said "They can't blame you for it." When we left the up platform we thought we were going back to the down road the way we had come.

*Thomas Simmonds*, engine-driver, states: I have been in the Company's service since 1877, and have been driver for about 13 years. On the 7th October I came on duty at 3.5 p.m. to work until 12.30 a.m. I was working the 8.53 p.m. train Gunnersbury to Twickenham, eight-wheeled tank engine No. 31, four-wheels-coupled, trailing bogie. There were four coaches on the train. Engine and train were fitted throughout with the automatic vacuum brake. The brake was in proper working order. We were stopped at Whitton Junction 7 minutes, waiting for the up Reading train to pass. On approaching Twickenham the distant signal was at danger and we slackened. When I first sighted the home signal it was at danger and it was lowered when I was about

30 yards from it. After having travelled past the home signal about 100 yards I saw an engine approaching me, but before I had time to reduce the speed of the train I had struck the engine with great force. I was unable to see the engine before, owing to carriages in the siding taking the view off. My engine was badly damaged and I was badly hurt myself; teeth knocked out, nose injured, and back and shoulders bruised. I have been off duty ever since. My fireman was also hurt.

*Frederick Tunley*, fireman, states: I have been in the Company's service nine years, about four and a half as fireman. On 7th October my times and of duty were the same as driver Simmonds. I was working the 8.53 p.m. train Gunnersbury to Twickenham. We stopped at Whitton Junction about 7 minutes. On approaching Twickenham the distant signals were against us. The home signals were also at danger until we were 40 or 50 yards from them, when they were lowered. We were preparing to stop at the home signal

when it dropped. When we were some distance past the home signal we saw the other engine approaching us. Steam was not on at the time and the driver at once applied the brake, but the brake had hardly time to take effect before the collision occurred. We were going about 8 or 9 miles an hour. The shock was severe. I got a bad blow on the head and was knocked senseless for a short time. I have been off duty ever since. The Kingston engine had one red light showing.

*W. Dunkley*, signalman, recalled, stated: I did not lower the home signal for the Gunnersbury train immediately after accepting the train from Whitton Junction, the reason being that I had some doubt in my mind as to which way the engine and coaches would return. I expected to get some information from Mr. Pittman or the inspector which way the coaches were to go. I think it is probable that the Gunnersbury train was in sight on my home signal at the time I lowered that signal.

### Conclusion.

The circumstances under which this collision occurred are as follows. Four coaches containing a theatrical party had to be transferred from the 7.45 p.m. up train from Reading to the 8.30 p.m. down Kingston train. The Kingston train consisting of a bogie tank engine and fourteen vehicles, arrived at Twickenham at 9.10 p.m., and the engine after being detached was sent forward past No. 32 points, ready to be backed through the cross-over road on to the Reading train as soon as it came in. The Reading train arrived at 9.17, and the engine of the Kingston train was brought back and attached to the four special coaches which had been detached from the rear of the Reading train immediately on its arrival. The Reading train proceeded on its journey at 9.20 p.m.

So far all went well, the course of action having been previously arranged between the stationmaster, the signalman, and the traffic inspector. But no definite understanding seems to have been arrived at as to the route by which the coaches were to be taken from the up to the down line in order to be attached to the Kingston train, and in this way the blunder arose which resulted in the collision.

The stationmaster and the shunter assumed that the engine and coaches would return to the down line through No. 32 cross-over road, by the same route in fact as that by which the engine had previously crossed. The signalman however says that he expected the engine would in the first place push the coaches back clear of No. 22 points, and would then cross to the down line by that road. He therefore accepted at 9.18 the 8.54 train ex Gunnersbury which was then waiting at Whitton Junction, pulled over No. 28 points and lowered the signal for the up loop line.

Meanwhile as soon as the engine was attached to the four coaches off the Reading train, and the brakes blown off, someone gave the signal to the driver to start on his return to the down line. The evidence as to who first gave this signal is contradictory, but the driver's statement, which so far as I could judge, was truthfully given, shows that there was no doubt in his mind at the time that shunter Diamond gave him the signal to proceed. Shunter Diamond strongly denies this, and declares that he did not show a green light to the driver until the latter had got his engine into motion. Diamond further states that after he had coupled the engine to the coaches the stationmaster put the question to him "Who is going across the road with the vehicles?" to which he (Diamond) replied that he would do so, and perceiving that the coaches were then in motion he jumped on to the footboard of the third vehicle and showed a green light to the driver. Stationmaster Pittman and traffic inspector G. Andrews were both present on the platform close to the coaches from the time of their arrival, but neither of them can throw any light on this matter, although they both deny having given any signal whatever to the driver. I have little doubt that the driver did receive a signal from someone, and I think it is probable that the man who gave it was shunter Diamond. The driver having received the signal started, being under the impression that he was to return to the down line via No. 32 cross-over road. When he reached No. 28 points, which as already explained had been set by the signalman for the Gunnersbury train to run into the loop, the engine burst them open, and driver Roberts feeling that something was wrong applied his brake, and

had nearly brought his engine to a stand, when it met the engine of the Gunnersbury train, which as already stated had been allowed by the signalman to come forward from Whitton Junction.

Driver Simmonds of the Gunnersbury train did not notice the engine approaching him until he was close to it. Fortunately his train was not moving fast as it had been checked by signals, but he was unable to do much to further reduce the speed before his engine struck the other with considerable violence. Simmonds was badly hurt, having his teeth knocked out, his nose injured, and his back bruised. No blame seems to be due to this man.

The collision was primarily due to the absence of any clear understanding between the stationmaster, the inspector, and the signalman as to the route by which the four coaches and engine were to return from the up to the down line, and also to the fact that no one in authority took charge of the shunting operation. The stationmaster assumed that the inspector had arranged the details; the latter left it to the former to do so; while signalman Dunkley says that he expected to get some information from one or the other of them which way the coaches were to go. If this was in Dunkley's mind, he was wrong in accepting the Gunnersbury train, until he had satisfied himself that all concerned knew what he was about to do, and that there was no risk of the Kingston engine being set in motion, until the Gunnersbury train had arrived. This man was doubtless actuated by a desire not to cause delay to the traffic, and particularly to the Gunnersbury train, but he allowed his zeal to outrun his discretion, and he must bear the larger share of the blame for this serious collision. At the same time stationmaster Pittman cannot evade his responsibility for he was the senior official present, and it was his duty, according to rule, "to give personal attention to the shunting of trains" at the station in his charge.

I have already expressed my belief that shunter Diamoud acting on a hasty assumption that the engine was to cross to the down line via No. 32 cross-over road gave driver Roberts a hand signal to proceed, in doing which he undoubtedly committed an error of judgment. But seeing that his superior officers were present, and gave him no instructions or guidance whatever, he can hardly be held responsible for what happened.

The operation which had to be performed was a very simple one, and ought to have been carried out without any risk whatever.

The signalling at Twickenham Station appears to be out of date. The up home signals are 360 yards from the station and about 230 yards from No. 28 facing points, which distances are far greater than is desirable. And there are no disc signals for controlling the shunting of trains through cross-over road No. 32. I believe it is contemplated by the Company to carry out a rearrangement of the whole place, and it is to be hoped that this work will be put in hand with as little delay as possible.

The Assistant Secretary,  
Railway Department, Board of Trade.

I have, &c.,  
H. A. YORKE,  
*Lieut.-Col., R.E.*

#### APPENDIX.

##### DAMAGE TO ENGINES.

No. 31 engine.—Both buffer plates bent; vacuum pipe broken; four buffers broken; back of bunker broken; sand pipe broken; draw bar broken.

No. 104 engine.—Leading buffer plate broken; two buffers, vacuum pipe and draw bar broken; main frame, left side broken and right side bent; back window frames broken; and footplating bent.

##### DETAILS OF STOCK DAMAGED.

###### 8.53 p.m. train from Gunnersbury.

No. 4 passenger guard's van.—Two sole bars broken; one headstock broken; two diagonals broken; two longitudinals broken; two sole plates broken; stepiron bent; axle bent; four axle boxes broken; four stepboards broken; four buffer rods broken; four buffer pads broken;

stepiron broken; vacuum brake pipe broken; brake work broken and bent; end of van completely smashed in.

No. 353 bogie composite.—Bogie pivot pin bent; two buffer rods bent; two buffer castings broken; two quarter lights broken; one end panel broken; one bolster canted; one end rail broken; two end steps bent; one lamp iron bent; one bogie frame shifted; one draw bar washer broken.

###### *Vehicles to be shunted from the Reading to the Kingston Line.*

No. 2,193 Great Western Railway bogie third.—Two buffer rods broken; one buffer casting broken; one bogie pivot broken; one bogie pivot pin broken; two stepboards broken; eight side spring castings broken; three suspending irons

bent; one suspending iron broken; nine supply irons bent; one bogie frame twisted.

No. 200 Great Western Railway carriage truck.—Four buffer rods bent; two buffer castings broken; two headstocks broken; four buffer pads broken; one vacuum brake pipe broken; two axle boxes broken; two buffer rods bent; one diagonal damaged; two sole bars damaged; truck broken across centre.

No. 255 Great Western Railway carriage truck.—

Two sole bars broken; two side rails broken; two cross bearers broken; one headstock broken; vacuum brake pipe broken; two end rails broken; two C springs broken; two buffer rods broken; two axle boxes broken; truck broken across centre.

*Damage to the Permanent Way.*

One pair of switches badly bent, and had to be renewed; several rods bent.

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Printed copies of the above Report were sent to the Company on the 14th December.

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## LONDON AND SOUTH-WESTERN RAILWAY.

Railway Department, Board of Trade,  
8, Richmond Terrace, Whitehall, London, S.W.,  
22nd February, 1901.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to report for the information of the Board of Trade, in accordance with the Order of the 29th December, the result of my enquiry into the circumstances under which a collision occurred, about 5.2 p.m. on the 22nd December, close to Bournemouth Central Station, on the London and South-Western Railway.

In this case, after the 2.15 p.m. down express passenger train from Waterloo had been brought to a stand at the Bournemouth Goods Yard home signal, the 3.50 p.m. goods train from Hamworthy Junction, started from a goods line, under proper signals, by a through road over the down main line, in the up direction. The passenger train also commenced to move, and the two engines met on the crossing, chimney to chimney.

Fortunately neither of the trains had attained any considerable speed, and the collision was but slight. No one on either of the trains appears to have been injured. One of the buffer castings of the goods engine was broken, and the tender of the passenger engine was derailed and one of the buffers bent.

The points in the permanent way were also damaged.

### *Description.*

The up and down main lines, at the scene of this accident, run in a north-east and south-west direction. South of the running lines there are seven goods lines or sidings. The junction of these goods lines with the running lines is controlled by the Goods Junction signal box, which is situated on the north of the up main line. The gradient on the main line is 1 in 320, falling in the up direction. The junction down stop signal is on the north side of the up main line, and was thus on the right side of the driver of the passenger train. The up advance signal is also on the north side of the up line, and some little distance behind that driver's position as he stood at the down stop signal.

The two trains before they commenced to move were facing each other, on parallel and adjoining roads, and about 180 yards apart.

### *Evidence.*

*Edward Sydney*, driver, states: I have been in the Company's service about 27 years, 12½ years of which I have been driver. I came on duty on the 22nd December at 2.15 p.m., and was due off at 12.15 a.m. I was driving the 3.50 p.m. goods train from Hamworthy Junction to Ringwood, via Bournemouth Central, on the day in question. We had to put into the Bournemouth Central goods yard to put off and take on waggons. We were due to leave Bournemouth Central at 4.38 p.m. We arrived at the goods yard, however, at 4.40 p.m. About 5 o'clock we pulled out on to No. 1 road, as far as the goods yard exit signal. We stood there for three or four minutes. I saw

a passenger train standing on the down line at the down home signal, there was also a light engine standing at the end of No. 1 goods line in the dead end. We got our advance and starting signals off, and I gave the engine steam. As we were taking the first cross-over from the goods line to the down line I heard shouting, and thinking that something was wrong, I stopped the engine and applied the brakes. At this moment we were travelling between eight and 10 miles an hour. The collision took place between the two pairs of points on the down road. We had almost come to a stand, and the collision was but a slight one. Neither myself nor my fireman was thrown