

SUMMARY REPORT OF PUEBLO COURT OF INQUIRY

The PUEBLO Court of Inquiry was confronted with many unique and formidable problems, substantially contributed to by the emotional public reaction to the incident under inquiry. Open sessions of the Court which were provided for by the appointing order, and the general policy to keep the public informed, created many additional problems with respect to protecting sensitive information. The designation and warning of the party was generally misinterpreted and it became apparent that further designation of parties would seriously impede the progress and purpose of the Court. It was therefore determined that such designation would be avoided and the use of ancillary proceedings would be appropriate to complete any recommended disciplinary or administrative action pertaining to individuals. Press interest was high and constant throughout the proceedings with many demands being placed upon members of the Court, counsel and others assisting the Court, for detailed information. Press relations are considered, however, to have remained cordial throughout the proceedings. Technical advisors in intelligence, Naval Security Group matters, Medical, and Survival and Resistance were available to and routinely consulted by the Court. The Court members, counsel, and counsel for the party visited the PAIM BEACH (AGER 3) at Little Creek, Virginia on 15 February 1969 for purposes of familiarization with an AGER type ship.

FACTS

PRE-SEIZURE

The AGER program was determined to have been established by CNO in August 1965 for the purpose of collecting signals intelligence (SIGINT) comprised of communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT), in addition to collecting collateral intelligence and hydrographic information. AGERs were tasked for this operation after coordination with the National Security Agency within the Pacific command. The purpose, in addition to collecting the information outlined above, was to determine Soviet reaction to a small unarmed, overt naval surveillance ship deployed in Soviet naval operating areas, and to test the effectiveness of this type ship acting alone.

The USS BANNER (AGER 1) was the first ship in the program and she completed some sixteen successful missions principally near the Soviet and CHICOM coast lines with short and occasional (a total of about 2 days) operations near the North Korean coast line. She experienced several harassing incidents perpetrated by Soviet naval vessels, but none of serious import. The operation originally used the code word CLICKBEETLE, but later Pinkroot was adopted and finally ICHTHYIC for PUEBLO mission. Because of the success of BANNER operations, the program was to be expanded into Phase II using PUEBLO, and there were plans to later extend it by using more AGER type ships.

(U) The missions were planned by COMNAVFORJAPAN based on resources available and intelligence requirements. COMNAVFORJAPAN was the operational commander for each mission from the day the AGER departed on the mission to and including the day of its return. At all other times operational control was within COMSEVENTHFLT. COMSERVPAC was the administrative commander.



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Mission proposals, including an assessment of risk for the missions, were prepared and forwarded by COMNAVFORJAPAN to JCS via CINCPACFIT and CINCPAC. Each command was required to completely evaluate the proposal with respect to all facets including risk assessment, and act upon it. JCS either approved or disapproved the mission based upon combined State Department and Defense Department decision. Risk assessment was the most critical factor examined in this Inquiry and it was determined that each command made an independent assessment for each mission based upon the intelligence information available to it. Such considerations as political climate in the area, possible hostile reaction, value of the mission, support forces available and others were constantly reviewed.

Support forces to protect the AGER operations were basically in two categories, "on call", those which happened

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Direct liaison was authorized between COMNAVFORJAPAN and CG, FIFTH Air Force, subject to final approval by CINCPACAF and CINCPAC. Specific forces were provided for on only two previous CLICKBEETLE missions and even on those occasions the risk was assessed as minimal. There appears to have been a reluctance at many levels to provide for "specific forces" and minimal was the only acceptable risk.

The USS PUEBLO (AGER 2) is a 176' 6" former Army auxiliary light cargo ship which was converted to an AGER at the Puget Sound Naval Ship-yard, BREMERTON, WASHINGTON, and commissioned 13 May 1967. CDR Lloyd Mark BUCHER, 582151/1100 reported on board 30 January 1967 and ultimately assumed command. There were delays and cutbacks in the conversion not unusual to many Navy projects. He did however, effect many improvements in PUEBLO over BANNER's conversion, but his efforts to obtain a sophisticated internal system for the destruction of classified material was unsuccessful because none was available. The Commanding Officer considered himself ready for sea after shakedown at SAN DIEGO from 25 September to 20 October 1967. PUEBLO had a Naval Security Group Detachment embarked with 29 enlisted men and an Officer in Charge. The total allowance of the ship, including SECGRUDET personnel and two civilian oceanographers, was finally 83. The Commanding Officer and the Officer in Charge apparently had a good relationship and although both had the same security clearances there were certain technical areas of sensitive information of which the Officer in Charge was aware which the Commanding Officer did not have a need to know.

(U) PUEBLO departed SAN DIEGO 6 November 1967, proceeded to PEARL HARBOR, arriving 14 November 1967, where the personnel were briefed by CINCPACFLT Staff. CDR BUCHER learned that his first mission would be off North Korea. PUEBLO departed PEARL 18 November 1967 and arrived YOKOSUKA 1 December 1967. Briefings were given by COMNAVFORJAPAN Staff and officers and members of the crew of BANNER, which was in YOKOSUKA at the time. In accordance with a CNO directive two fifty caliber machine gun mounts were installed on PUEBLO to specifications supplied by the Commanding Officer. Policy, made clear at the time, was that these guns were defensive and not to be used in a provocative manner. There were many misgivings expressed with respect to their introduction but PUEBLO's crew was trained in their use and exercised them periodically in the short time they were on board. PUEBLO received some repairs and refitting at YOKOSUKA, particularly to its steering apparatus, which was effectively repaired.

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- PUEBLO mission was off the North Korean coast and consequently it was necessary to provide a North Korean capability to its SECGRUDET. North Korean linguist were provided from NAVSECGRUACT, KAMISEYA, although their capabilities later proved to be minimal. Other specialists were also previded to the SECGRUDET on a TAD basis.
- (U) Orders to PUEBLO specifically forbade her to approach closer than 13 miles to the North Korean coast and, according to testimony, this directive was carefully observed throughout the mission.
- (U) When PUEBLO departed SASEBO the Commanding Officer was satisfied that she was ready for sea in all respects.
- (U) Facts before the Court indicated that COMNAVFORJAPAN, by CINCPACFLT order and his own OPORDER, was tasked to verify the effectiveness of the destruction on PUEBLO, but that such verification was conducted in an informal and cursory manner.
- Risk assessed to the mission was minimal and this assessment was concurred in at all levels of command, consequently only "on call" support forces were available. Considerable attention was directed to a DIRNSA message received by DIRNAVSECGRUPAC at CINCPACFIT Headquarters which correlated much information concerning hostile activities of the North Koreans. All commands considering the mission proposal were aware of this information from other sources, although not aware of its correlation. DIRNAVSECGRUPAC did not pass the message to CINCPACFIT or COMNAVFORJAPAN, who might have re-evaluated the risk but, according to testimony, would not have changed it.
 - (U) PUEBLO left SASEBO 11 January 1968 and proceeded to her operating area off the northern coast of North Korea for several days, where she experienced severe icing conditions. She worked her way South until the 22nd of January when she lay off WONSAN. The mission was considered rather dull and unproductive up until that time, but activity increased on the 22nd of January and later it was considered that the ship had been detected by two fishing trawlers who circled her when she was some 18-20 miles from the nearest land. PUEBLO was ostensibly conducting ocean-ographic activities in the area when detected.
- Commanding Officer with secondary responsibility for collection of SIGINT, as required. The Commanding Officer wrote the fitness report on Officer in Charge, but a concurrent fitness report was submitted by DIRNAVSECGRUPAC, who also was responsible for the readiness and training of the Detachment. For operational control and administrative matters the Officer in Charge reported directly to DIRNAVSECGRUPAC. The SECGRUDET in PUEBLO had its own operating funds in the amount of \$5,000 per quarter.
 - The SECGRUDET was never formally inspected and it appears that its state of readiness was assumed because of the technical qualifications of the personnel who were assigned. The Officer in Charge was however, aware that the linguists were not qualified prior to the date of the seizure of PUEBIO, but he failed to inform the Commanding Officer. This difficiency of the linguists may have contributed materially to the critical situation, in that the Commanding Officer might have had earlier warning of the North Korean intentions had the linguists been capable of obtaining and passing the information to him.

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- (U) About noon the 22nd, the Commanding Officer in accordance with his Operation Order, prepared a situation report. Because of the difficulties in locating compatible frequencies between PUEBLO and the NAVSECGRUACT, KAMISEYA, communications were not established until about 9:30 A.M. the 23rd. From that time, until PUEBLO destroyed her communications equipment upon being boarded, communications were "...like a land-line," and in the opinion of the court, did not play a significant role in the seizure of PUEBLO.
- (U) During the night of the 22nd PUEBLO moved out to sea to avoid drifting into North Korean claimed territorial waters. On the morning of the 23rd she moved at full speed toward WONSAN, arriving at a point slightly to the northwest of the position where she was detected the previous day. It was considered that this position would be the most fruitful for the collection of all types of intelligence on commercial and military operations in the WONSAN area. About 9:30 A.M., CT1 RITTER intercepted two submarine chaser radars and reported them to the bridge, and about the same time the Commanding Officer prepared and released his second situation report describing the events of the night, which included eighteen contacts and the sighting of an orange flare, and indicating his intentions to revert to complete electronic silence, although he never did.
- (U) At 11:45 A.M. QMI LAW relieved CWO3 LACY as the Officer of the Deck, and shortly thereafter, sighted a ship approaching from the south. He reported the sighting to the Commanding Officer, who arrived on the bridge about noon. The approaching ship was identified as a North Korean SO-1 class submarine chaser, hull number 35, (SC-35), at general quarters with guns manned and trained on PUEBLO. PUEBLO was dead in the water with no flags or signal shapes flying, in a calm sea, and with no hydrographic operations in progress.
- (U) SC-35 circled PUEBLO at close range and the Commanding Officer ordered all hands to remain below decks in order not to indicate the size of the crew to SC-35. He also instructed LTJG SCHUMACHER to begin keeping a complete narrative of the incident. The senior oceanographer, Mr. TUCK, went to his winch and commenced a NANSEN cast. SC-35 signalled, "What Nationality," and in answer the Commanding Officer ordered the national ensign and the signal for "Hydrographer" hoisted. He considered this to be normal harassment and directed LTJG SCHUMACHER to prepare an OPREP-3, the report of harassment required by his OPORD. He also ordered the engines lit-off to prepare to maneuver.
- (U) About 12:20 P.M. three motor torpedo boats were sighted approaching PUEBLO, and shortly thereafter, SC-35 signalled, "Heave to or I will open fire on you." The Commanding Officer verified his position, which was 15.8 miles from the nearest land, and ordered the signal, "I am in international waters." He then released his first OPREP-3, and discussed the possibility of scuttling the ship with CWO3 LACY, who had returned to the bridge. CWO LACY replied that scuttling would take considerable time but suggested that watertight integrity (Condition ZEBRA) be set. By 1:00 P.M. the three motor torpedo boats, now identified as North Korean P-4 class boats, took station around PUEBLO at close range. The Commanding Officer ordered the word passed to all hands to prepare for emergency destruction of classified material.

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- (U) By 1:15 P.M., two MIG aircraft had been sighted overhead, SC-35 had signalled "Follow in my wake, I have pilot on board," an armed boarding party had transferred from SC-35 to PT-604 and PT-604 was backing down on PUEBLO's starboard bow with fenders rigged. The Commanding Officer prepared and released his second OPREP-3, reporting these occurrences (the last official message to leave PUEBLO prior to seizure), ordered the signal, "Thank you for your consideration, I am departing the area," and ordered one-third speed and right rudder to depart the area in as dignified a manner as possible. He had considered and rejected the idea of going to general quarters, and decided against manning the fifty caliber guns because he, "...saw no point in senselessly sending people to their death." As PUEBLO settled on course 080 degrees true, the torpedo boats began "...playing porpoise..." across her bow, coming as close as ten yards, and SC-35 signalled again, "Heave to or I will fire." After having way on about five minutes, PUEBLO increased speed to full (about 12.5 knots), and SC-35 closed at high speed, attempting to gain a position on PUEBLO's port quarter. Because of the unfavorable speed differential, PUEBLO was forced to turn more to the south in order to present as small a target-angle as possible to the SC-35.
- (U) At about 1:25 P.M. the operations officer at Headquarters, COMNAVFORJAPAN received PUEBLO's second OPREP-3 and decided PUEBLO was in extremis.
- (U) At 1:26 P.M. CT1 BAILEY, the communications operator in PUEBLO, informed his counterpart at KAMISEYA through informal operator chatter that, "They plan to open fire on us now." This informal chatter continued throughout the remainder of the incident. At about the same time, the torpedo boats opened out from PUEBLO, and at 1:27 P.M. SC-35 fired the first burst of 57MM heavy machine gun fire from a range of between 1500 and 2000 yards. The first shots were intended as warning shots, however, either one of the rounds or shrapnel from an exploding round, hit the radar mast and the Commanding Officer and two men on the bridge were wounded. At this point the Commanding Officer decided that the North Koreans were going to make a "...full-scale incident," and ordered the emergency destruction of classified material.
- (U) The first period of 57MM firing lasted about seven minutes during which time approximately fifteen bursts of from 6 to 14 rounds were fired. Light machine gun fire from the motor torpedo boats commenced at the same time and continued sporadically throughout the incident, with perhaps a total of 2000 rounds being fired.
- During the first firing period the Commanding Officer ordered a "modified general quarters," designed to keep personnel from exposing themselves on the weather decks or from manning the fifty caliber machine guns. It was interpreted by the crew to-prohibit anyone from going topside -- a factor preventing the sound-powered phone on the bridge from being manned and the SECGRUDET personnel from using the ship's incinerator for burning documents or jettisoning weighted bags.
- (U) About 1:34 P.M. the Commanding Officer ordered the ship stopped, at which time the firing stopped. He also ordered the signal, "Protest". About this time he decided that, providing the destruction of classified material was progressing well, and depending on the next moves of the North Koreans, he would surrender the ship. He then left the bridge for about three minutes to check his own cabin for classified material, and noted that emergency destruction was progressing in the ship. When he returned to the bridge SC-35 was again signalling, "Follow me, I have pilot on board,"to which he responded by ordering the ship ahead at one-third

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speed in a wide turn to follow SC-35.

(U) At 1:50 P.M. a cognizant officer at FIFTH Air Force Headquarters in JAPAN became aware of PUEBLO's predicament.

About 2:00 P.M. the Commanding Officer again stopped the ship to inspect the progress of emergency destruction. This action triggered a second period of 57MM fire which resulted in several hits above the main deck, the fatal wounding of FA HODGES, and the serious wounding of others. To stop the firing the Commanding Officer again ordered the ship ahead and conducted an inspection of the SECGRUDET spaces. While there he dictated an informal message to describe the situation and to inform that he did not intend to offer any resistance. He also noted that there was a considerable amount of material remaining to be destroyed, and ordered it done.

- (U) About 2:10 P.M. COMSEVENTHFLT was informed of the PUEBLO situation.
- (U) At about 2:20 P.M., the Commanding Officer granted LT Stephen HARRIS permission to inform KAMISEYA that destruction would not be complete, then in response to orders from the North Koreans, ordered the ship stopped to allow the boarding party to board. The boarding took place at about 2:32 P.M. At no time during the incident, nor during the boarding, were the ship's fifty caliber machine guns manned, her small arms issued, or any resistance offered, except the attempt to maneuver the ship farther to sea.
- (U) CINCPACFLT was first notified at about 2:30 P.M., PUEBLO time.
- (U) A second boarding party which came on board some time later included a North Korean pilot who took the helm. PUEBLO's engine room was manned by her own crew members during the trip into WONSAN. FA HODGES died at about 3:00 P.M.
- (U) About two hours after sunset PUEBLO was moored to a dock about ten miles northwest of WONSAN. Prior to docking there had been little mistreatment of the crew, except for the Commanding Officer.
- (U) FIFTH Air Force and SEVENTHFLT reacted by attempting to come to PUEBLO's assistance, however, none could react in a timely manner to save the ship.
- The destruction of classified material in PUEBLO was ineffective, particularly in the SECGRUDET spaces, largely as a result of poor planning and lack of firm supervision. At the time the ship was boarded, there was no debilitating damage, and only one crew member was fatally wounded.

DETENTION

(U) About 8:30 P.M., 23 January 1969, the ship docked at WONSAN. The crew was removed from the ship, bound and blindfolded, amid a crowd of shouting, spitting, kicking North Koreans, which attempted unsuccessfully to attack them. Prior to boarding the train for PYONGYANG and the first detention site, several of the crew members, especially the Filipinos, were severely beaten in an attempt to have them admit they were North Korean spies.

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- (U) Immediately upon arrival at the first detention site where the crew spent 41 days prior to being relocated at a permanent place of detention, intensive interrogation of the officers commenced. After some 24 hours of concentrated beatings, harassment, torture, threats of death and intimidation, culminating with a threat to shoct the entire crew, commencing with the youngest member, the Commanding Officer signed his first confession admitting intrusions into the claimed territorial waters of NORTH KOREA for espionage purposes. Similar mistreatment was inflicted upon the other officers and some of the crew until all confessed to the intrusions. The number of intrusions increased from one to seventeen by September/October, and the crew was forced to admit the additional ones in subsequent confessions. Some communications technicians were interrogated on several occasions, and some classified information was either disclosed or verified. Again during the last week of detention, referred to as "Hell Week" by the crew, they were required to confess to acts of defiance against their captors and to violations of the "Rules of Life" which they were rigidly required to live by.
- (U) A common method of torture was to force them to kneel on the floor, squatting backwards with a board or stick placed behind the knees, and holding a chair high above the head, with the body straight; being kicked or beaten if they wavered or fell. The more defiant members received the harsher treatment throughout the detention period.
- (U) Food was poor in quality and quantity, lacked vitamin and nutritional content, and would marginally sustain life. Rice, bits of fish, turnip soup, bread and butter comprised approximately a 500 calorie diet. The food was served in unsanitary buckets. Illnesses such as diarrhea, pneumonia, scurvy, hepatitis and other afflictions associated with malnutrition were prevalent among the crew.
- (U) Except for operations performed on FA WOELK and SGT CHICCA, no medical attention was given the crew until the summer months, nor was the ship's corpsman permitted to render treatment. Severe weight loss affected most of the crew, with the Commanding Officer losing 100 pounds.
- (U) Everyone was required to write letters to family, friends, relatives, and most were forced to write to some political figure in the United States. It was imperative that all letters written contain the propaganda efforts composed by the North Koreans. Most everyone, in letters to other than political figures, attempted to secrete messages impeaching the contents of the writings, and were successful in most cases. In the several press conferences, in which the officers and selected members of the crew were required to participate, the same efforts to impeach were attempted.
- (U) In addition to the daily attempts to indoctrinate the crew in communist ideology, in September, when it appeared they were about to be repatriated, "cultural development" trips were conducted in and around PYONGYANG. During all such excursions a concentrated effort was made to shield the crew from the civilian populace.
- (U) On one occasion the crew, except for the officers, was taken to a room in another building, referred to as the "Gypsy Tea Room." for interviews with North Korean officers masquerading as civilians, who sought their ideas of socialism and inquired whether individuals would be willing to receive sympathizers in their homes upon returning to the United States. Some were encouraged to return to NORTH KOREA.

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(U) Following the guidance and lead of the Commanding Officer, the men attempted to deceive and resist their captors' propaganda efforts throughout the detention, by injecting discrediting signs, gestures, and language into confessions, photographs and press conferences, with a degree of success. On 23 December 1968 the crew was transported by bus and train to PANMUNJON, where they were repatriated.

OPINIONS

PRE-SEIZURE

- (U) In the opinion of the Court, certain deficiencies brought out in testimony were not critical to the loss of PUEBLO or the incomplete emergency destruction of classified material. These factors included: The ship's age, stability, watertight integrety and unreliable steering machanism; funding reductions; sound-powered circuit restrictions; weighted bags available for jettisoning; ship to shore communications; icing conditions; and the fact that the national ensign was not being flown at the time of first contact. The last-minute arming of PUEBLO without proper re-indoctrination and re-statement of policies did contribute to Commander BUCHER's lack of appreciation of his responsibilities as a Commanding Officer to defend his ship. Furthermore, the placing of the guns and their ammunition lockers was poorly planned and hastily accomplished.
- (U) Contributing factors to the poor execution of emergency destruction include: The failure of CNO to appreciate the requirement for a rapid destruction system; a lack of forethought, imagination, and mental conditioning in planning and training for emergency destruction, and the failure of COMNAVFORJAPAN to adequately verify the existence of proper destruction plans and facilities.
- (U) The assessment of risk for the mission was incorrect at every level of command. As the operational commander, COMNAVFORJAPAN failed to provide adequate support forces. The FIFTH Air Force was not requested to provide alert support forces.

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The administrative and operational control exercised over the embarked Detachment by DIRNAVSECGRUPAC which deprived the Commanding Officer of these control channels. LT HARRIS, nonetheless, reported his Detachment ready for the mission which contributed to the Commanding Officer's false assumption that his ship was ready.

Intelligence support to the mission was inadequate because of the lack of readiness of the Detachment, and, DIRNAVSECGRUPAC's failure to pass certain pertinent intelligence to responsible commanders, or properly coordinate support requirements with other services and agencies,

(M) Although Commander BUCHER had previous experience in planning for intelligence missions, which should have conditioned him to the risks involved, he was not fully or adequately prepared for the situation he faced.

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(U) It is considered that it is highly improbable that the claimed territorial waters of North Korea were violated by PUEBLO prior to seizure and that there is no doubt that PUEBLO was in international waters when the incident began.



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- (U) Commander BUCHER's compassion for his crew overshadowed his judgement and thereby derogated his actions in defending his ship. He further failed to develop within the crew positive will to resist, and failed to properly organize, station and train his crew.
- (U) Commander BUCHER did surrender his ship while he still had the power to resist, and at the time he made the decision his ship was fully operational and his crew essentially unharmed. Instead of aggressively defending his ship with available weapons and by radical maneuvering, he complied with North Korean orders to follow into WONSAN.
- (U) Due to prevailing circumstances at the time no actions by higher authority could have prevented the capture of PUEBLO. There was, however, excessive delays in message handling resulting in long delays in alerting and informing other commands.
- (U) Performance of the officers and men during the incident was generally unimpressive. A few showed some initiative, but in general there was a lack of teamwork, initiative and imagination, due in some measure to a lack of liaison with, and direction from the Commanding Officer
- (U) Emergency destruction of classified material was in general ineffective. Contributing factors included: lack of initiative and leadership on the part of LT Stephen HARRIS; Commander BUCHER's failure to apprise the crew of his decision to surrender; lack of imagination with respect to mass burning; and Commander BUCHER's decision to modify general quarters.
- (U) Only the 57MM firing was effective against PUEBLO. When the firing commenced it should have indicated to the Commanding Officer that the North Koreans were clearly hostile in accordance with all definitions.

DETENTION

- (U) The capture of the entire crew with their personnel records and a large amount of classified material placed the PUEBLO crew in a unique situation in which it would have been impossible to successfully resist. As a result, the North Koreans did obtain propaganda instruments of value, and some classified material was either disclosed or confirmed by the crew members.
- (U) The North Koreans obtained these propaganda instruments and disclosures through fear, intimidation, and physical mistreatment, although apparently it was not their intention that any member of the crew should ever be killed, or permanently disfigured. No member of the crew ever accepted or displayed a sympathetic attitude toward communist ideology despite repeated attempts at indoctrination.



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- (U) SERE training would have been of considerable value to the crew while in detention.
- (U) Certain modifications should be made to the Code of Conduct to make it applicable to a similar situation. The crew did, by and large, live by the Code with the exception of Article 5. Judgement of their behavior against a strict interpretation of the Code would be a grave injustice. Furthermore, the actions of General WOODWARD in gaining their release, / should be considered in extenuation of their conduct.
- (U) After his initial breakdown, Commander BUCHER contributed to the crew's good morale in detention. Several exhibited similar leadership, while others were undistinguished.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- With regard to the AGER program, the Court recommended: That embarked SECGRUDETS be assigned as Ship's departments; that procedures for risk assessment to reviewed; that AGER operations be premised on assured readiness and ability to defend the ship; that the Fleet Commander have operational controll during the preparation phase; close liaison with U.S. Attroce Commanders; and that adequate emergency destruction and scuttling devices be installed.
- (U) The Court also recommended changes to the Code of Conduct and its application, and more extensive use of SERE training.
- (U) The Court recommended that Commander BUCHER

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
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CT1 Donald R. McCLARREN (Recall)	CR 655-2	VOL II (CLOSED)
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QM1 Charles B. LAW (Recall)	R 815	VOL IV (OPEN)
HM1 Herman P. BALDRIDGE (Recall)	R 839	VOL IV (OPEN)
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QM3 Alvin H. PLUCKER	R 1062	VOL V (OPEN)
EN3 Roy J. MAGGARD	R 1074	VOL V (OPEN)
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SK3 Edward S. RUSSELL	R 1099	VOL V (OPEN)
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CT1 Michael W. ALEXANDER	R 1403	VOL VI (OPEN)
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RM2 Charles H. CRANDELL (Recall) R 1438	VOL VI (OPEN)
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CT2 Rodney H. DUKE	R 1505	VOL VII (OPEN)
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CT2 Anthony A. LAMANTIA	R 1567	VOL VII (OPEN)
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CAPT Albert S. GIORGIS	R 1847	VOL VIII (OPEN)
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EXHIBITS IN ORDER OF RECEIPT AND PAGE RECEIVED

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A	Unclassified	Appointing order, as amended R.	1
1	Unclassified	General Plans of PUEBLO R.	10
2 *	Unclassified	CO, USS PUEBLO (AGER 2) ltr 5041 ser 02 of 10 January 1968: Subj: Pre-deployment Readi- ness Inspection of USS PUEBLO (AGER 2); First and Final Status Report (U)	
	Unclassified	COMSERVGROUP ONE ltr 5041 ser 31-0208 of 3 November 1967: Subj: Pre-deployment Readi- ness Inspection of USS PUEBLO (AGER 2); report of (U)	23
3	Unclassified	Commander Fleet Training Group, SAN DIEGO 1tr 3500/2/AGER-2 ser 0841 of 2 November 1967: Subj: USS PUEBLO (AGER 2); report on completion of shakedown training	. 23
ħ	Unclassified	Design memorandum, Ship Repair Facility, Yokosuka, Japan; Memo number SK-680241, Title: .50 caliber machine gun zone of fire of 26 January 1968.	
	Unclassified	.50 caliber machine gun stands; Arr. and Det	. 40
5	Unclassified	CTF 96 message 050512Z JAN 68 to USS PUEBLO (Subj: SAILORD)	. 50
6	Unclassified	CTF 96 message 110042Z JAN 68 to AIG 6722/ MMSC/USS PUEBLO. (Subj: PUEBLO departure from SASEBO	, 50
7	Unclassified	COMNAVFORJAPAN message 161106Z DEC 67 to CINCPACFLT. (Subj: ICHTHYIC ONE mission proposal)	. 60
8	Unclassified	USS PUEBLO message 220915Z JAN 68 to CTF 96. (Subj: ICHTHYIC ONE SITREP ONE)	. 67
9	Unclassified	USS PUEBLO message 230150Z JAN 68 to CTF 96. (Subj: ICHTHYIC ONE SITREP TWO)	, 67
10	Unclassified	FLEWEAFAC Yokosuka message 300245Z DEC 68 to COMNAVAIRPAC. Memorandum from OinC, Fleet Weather Facility, Yokosuka of 4 February 1968: Subj: Weather SummaryR.	• 77
11	Unclassified	H.O. Chart 3320, as drawn by Commander BUCHER R.	. 91

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18 - 6	Confidential	CINCPACFLTINST 03300.2B ser 32/02327 of 29 November 1965: Subj: Guidance for Protective Measures to be Taken in Applying the Right of Self-preservation in Peacetime CR	• 198 - 3
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			COMNAVSHIPSYSCOM ltr ser PMS83-009853 of 18 July 1967: Subj: Damage Control Facili- ties in USS PUEBLO (AGER 2); comments con- cerning	
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