

Appendices

Appendix 1

Interviews

[Unless otherwise stated, all interviews on or about Saudi Arabia were held in Riyadh; names are listed alphabetically; 14 additional interviews with Saudi officials were held on condition of nonattribution].

Al Saud Ruling Family

HRH Fahad bin Abdullah bin Mohammad Al Saud, Assistant to the Minister of Defense and Aviation, Chairman of the Economic Offset Committee, Ministry of Defense and Aviation (in Jeddah)

June 12, 1996

HRH Dr. Faysal bin Salman bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, Assistant Professor, King Saudi University (in London)

February 4 and November 4, 1995; January 23, and March 2, 1997

HRH Naef bin Ahmed bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, doctoral candidate, Cambridge University, United Kingdom

January 21, 1997

HRH Salman bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, Governor of Riyadh

January 17, 1996

HRH Sultan bin Salman bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, Royal Saudi Air Force (Ret.), former astronaut, head of several charitable organizations

January 18 and 21, 1997

HRH Turki bin Faysal bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, Director, Directorate General of Intelligence

January 20, 1997

Other Saudi Officials

Dr. Abdulrahman Y. Al-Aali, Associate Professor, Department of Business Administration, King Saud University

January 16, 1997

Abdul Muhsin Al-Akkas, Member of the Board and Assistant to the Chairman, Saudi Research and Marketing Group

January 14, 1997

Dr. Ghazi A. Algosaiibi, Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United Kingdom (in London)

January 23, 1997

Hussein M. Al-Askary, General Secretary, Islamic States Broadcasting Organization (ISBO-OIC) (in Jeddah)

November 15, 1994

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Awaji, Former Deputy Minister of the Interior

June 1, 1996; January 18, 1997

Dr. Saeed M. Badeeb, Directorate General of Intelligence

June 4, 1996; January 15, 1997

Dr. Omar S. Bagour, Assistant Professor, Department of Business Administration, King Abdul Aziz University (in Jeddah)

November 15, 1994; May 27, 28 and June 11, 13, 1996

Dr. Hassan A. Bahafzalah, Deputy General Secretary of Commission, Commission on Scientific Signs of Qur'an & Sunnah (in Jeddah)

June 12, 1996

Mohammed bin Ibrahim Basrawy, Director, Islamic Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

November 13, 1994

Ahmed Behery, General, Royal Saudi Air Force (Ret.)

June 1, 1996

Zein Al-Abedin Dabbagh, Director, Legal & Conferences Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

November 13, 1994

Dr. Fouad Al-Farsy, Minister of Information

January 17 and May 26 (in Jeddah) 1996

Dr. Abdul Aziz Al-Fayez, Member, Majlis al-Shura

January 17, 1997

Hassan Abdul-Hay Gazzaz, Founder and Former Chief Editor, *Arafat* and *Al-Bilad*; Author (in Jeddah)

May 28, 1996

Faheem Al-Hamid, Managing Editor-Foreign Affairs, *Ukaz* (Jeddah)

November 15, 1994; June 12, 1996

Dr. Turki Al-Hamad, Chairman of the Political Science Department, College of Administrative Sciences, King Saud University

November 13, 1994; June 10, 1996; January 17, 1997

Dr. Waheed Hamzah Hashem, Associate Professor and Assistant Dean for Graduate Studies and Scientific Research, King Abdul Aziz University (in Jeddah)

June 11, 1996

Hashem Abdo Hashem, Member, Majlis al-Shura; Editor; *Ukaz* (in Jeddah)

May 28, 1996

Shaykh Saleh Al-Lihaydan, President, Higher Justice Council

January 12, 1997

Jamil Ibrahim Al-Hujeilan, Secretary-General, Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (Gulf Cooperation Council)

January 13, 1997

Dr. Khaled Ibrahim Jindan, Ambassador and Director, Western Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

November 13, 1994; January 13, 1997

Shaykh Muhammad bin Jubeir, President, Majlis al-Shura

June 11, 1996

Sherif Kandil, Managing Editor, *Al-Muslimoon* (in Jeddah)

June 11, 1996

Abdulwahab Kashef, Director, International Islamic News Agency (in Jeddah)

November 16, 1994

Dr. Rayed Krimly, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, King Saud University

November 13, 1994; January 16, 1997

Ridah M. Larry, Editor, *Saudi Gazette* (in Jeddah)

May 27, 1996

Dr. Mohammed Omar M. Al-Madani, Ambassador and Director-General, The Institute of Diplomatic Studies, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

November 13, 1994

Dr. Nizar Madani, Member, Majlis al-Shura

January 16, 1997

Khalid Maeena, Columnist, *Arab News*, and Executive Director, Saudi Public Relations Company (in Jeddah)

May 28, 1996

Dr. Abdullah Siraj Mansi, History Department, King Abdul Aziz University (in Jeddah)

June 11, 1996

Abdul Rahman Mansouri, Assistant Foreign Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in Jeddah)

June 12, 1996

Dr. Jamil M. Merdad, The Institute of Diplomatic Studies, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

November 13, 1994

General Saleh Al-Mohaya, Chief-of-Staff, Ministry of Defense

January 15, 1997

Dr. Majid A. Al-Moneef, Associate Professor, Department of Economics, King Saud University

January 16, 1997

Dr. Mazin Salah Motabagani, Assistant Professor, Department of Orientalism, Faculty of Da'wa, Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University, Madinah (in Jeddah)

November 16, 1994

Dr. Saleh M. Al-Namlah, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, King Saud University

November 13, 1994; January 15, 1996

Dr. Abdul Aziz M. Al-Rabghi, Vice Dean, King Abdul Aziz University (in Jeddah)

November 13, 1994

Abdallah Al-Rashid, Economic Adviser to Brigadier General Ali Muhammad Khalifa, Prince Sultan's Office, Ministry of Defense (in Jeddah)

June 12, 1996

Dr. Othman Y. Al-Rawaf, Professor, Department of Political Science, King Saud University

November 13, 1994; January 16, 1996; January 13, 1997

Dr. Abdulrahman bin Muhammad Al-Sadhan, Assistant Secretary-General, Council of Ministers (in Jeddah)

May 29, 1996

Mohammed Ibrahim A. Sattar, Editor in Chief, *Muslim World* (in Jeddah)

November 14, 1994

Dr. Fahd Al-Semmari, Deputy Director, Ministry of Higher Education; Director, King Abdul Aziz Research Center

January 14, 1997

Mansour M. bin Shalhoub, Political Analysis Department, Office of HRH Minister of Foreign Affairs

November 13, 1994

Abdallah Al Shaykh, Manager, Business Development, Hughes Aircraft (Saudi Arabia)

January 13, 1997

Dr. Abdul Aziz A. Turkistani, Abdul Latif Jameel Company, Limited

November 16, 1994

Shaykh Abdul Aziz Al-Tuwayjiri, Deputy Assistant Commander, National Guard

January 12, 1997

Non-Saudi Officials

Dr. Abdulhamid Abdulghani, Director of the International Organization Department, later Director, Department of Information, Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf

November 13, 1994; June 3, 1996; January 13, 1997

Dr. Jasim Muhammad Abdulghani, Office of the Secretary-General, Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf

November 13, 1994; June 3, 1996

James E. Akins, United States Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (1972–1974) (in Washington, D.C.)

November 19, 1999

Willis Brown, President, Hughes Aircraft (Saudi Arabia)

January 19, 1997

Charles L. Daris, Consul General, Embassy of the United States of America (in Jeddah)

November 15, 1994

Chas. W. Freeman, Jr., United States Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (1989–1992) (in Washington, D.C.)

November 19, 1999

Fred M. Hofstetter, Hughes Aircraft (Saudi Arabia)

January 19, 1997

Michel Jobert, Former Foreign Minister of France (in Paris)

February 1, 1993; March 21, 1994; March 17, 1995

Jessica E. Lapenn, Second Secretary, Political-Military Affairs, Embassy of the United States of America

January 19, 1997

Saif bin Hashil Al-Maskari, Undersecretary for Tourism, Ministry of Commerce and Industry (former Assistant Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, 1981–1992)

September 25, 27, and 29, 1993; March 22 and 25, 1995

David McClain, Second Secretary-Economic Affairs, Embassy of the United States of America

January 19, 1997

Kenneth McKune, Political Counselor, Embassy of the United States of America

November 13, 1994

Colonel Gary Nelson, Defense Attaché, Embassy of the United States of America

November 13, 1994

Guy Ruediger, First Secretary, Embassy of Australia

January 19, 1997

David C. Welch, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of the United States of America

November 14, 1994

Appendix 2

Chronology

- 1720 Saud bin Muhammad reigns as a local shaykh (ruler) around Dir'iyah in central Arabia.
- 1745 Muhammad bin Saud campaigns for religious piety and order with Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab. "First" Saudi state initiated.
- 1800 Al Saud forces capture Buraimi and begin series of incursions into Oman lasting until 1860s.
- 1818 First Saudi state ends after most of Arabia falls to the Ottoman Empire. Great-grandson of Muhammad bin Saud, Abdallah bin Saud bin Abdulaziz bin Muhammad bin Saud, is executed by Ottoman conquerors.
- 1824 Turki bin Abdallah bin Muhammad bin Saud, a grandson of Muhammad bin Saud, seizes Riyadh from Egyptian forces, marking the beginning of the "second" Saudi state. The seventh Saudi ruler, and probably the most powerful in the nineteenth century, Turki rules until 1834. He is succeeded by his son Faysal, who is exiled to Cairo in 1837.
- 1843 Faysal bin Turki bin Abdallah escapes from his Cairo prison and returns to power to usher in a period of prosperity and stability. He unifies Riyadh and rules until 1865.
- 1865 Start of two-decade-long Al Saud family feud over succession matters; increasingly the Al Rashid dominate Riyadh and its surroundings.
- 1891 "Second" Saudi state ends when Abdul Rahman bin Faysal bin Turki flees to Kuwait. His eleven-year-old son, Abdul Aziz, escapes with him.
- 1902 Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman leads a small group of men in attack on Riyadh and seizes control.
- 1912 The Ikhwan, a religious brotherhood of tribesmen, are established to provide Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman with shock troops.
- 1913 Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman gains control of Gulf coast.
- 1920s Widespread rivalry and takeovers on the Arabian Peninsula.

- 1926 Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman gains control of Makkah and Madinah as well as all of the Hijaz (western region of the Kingdom). He declares himself King of the Hijaz.
Establishment of a General Education Department. Primary and secondary education starts.
- 1927 Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman declares himself King of the Hijaz and Najd.
- 1929 Rebellious Ikhwan forces are defeated.
- 1930 Establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jeddah. Prince Faysal bin Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman is appointed minister.
- 1932 Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman establishes the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Establishment of the Ministry of Finance.
- 1933 Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman appoints eldest son, Saud, Heir Apparent and declares that the next eldest, Faysal, will be Heir Apparent when Saud is King.
- 1937 Oil is discovered in Saudi Arabia.
- 1944 Establishment of the Ministry of Defense.
- 1945 Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman meets U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt on the *USS Quincy* in the Red Sea.
Saudi Arabia is founding member of the League of Arab States.
- 1951 Establishment of the Ministry of the Interior.
- 1952 Saudi Arabia occupies the Buraimi oasis at the Oman-Abu Dhabi border.
Establishment of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) and introduction of paper currency in the Kingdom.
- 1953 Establishment of the Council of Ministers. Heir Apparent Saud bin Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman heads the cabinet.
Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman dies. Crown Prince Saud bin Abdul Aziz succeeds him and Faysal bin Abdul Aziz is declared Heir Apparent.
Aramco workers go on strike in October.
The General Education Department is transformed into a Ministry of Education.
- 1956 Aramco workers strike. King Saud issues a royal decree banning strikes.
- 1957 Establishment of the University of Riyadh (later King Saud University).
- 1958 Heir Apparent Faysal bin Abdul Aziz takes over executive powers after King Saud surrenders his authority under pressure from the ruling family. Serious internal disagreements on governance surface.
- 1960 Prince Faysal bin Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman resigns. King Saud bin Abdul Aziz regains full executive powers. Prince Talal bin Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman is appointed minister of finance and Shaykh Abdallah Tariqi is appointed minister of petroleum. Prince Talal bin Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman proposes constitutional reforms for the Kingdom.
Establishment of seven primary schools, and three teacher training facilities, for female students.

- 1961 Government shuffle in September. Prince Talal bin Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman leaves the cabinet. Prince Faysal bin Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman is appointed vice president of the Council of Ministers.
- 1962 Ruling family split leads to the rise of the so-called liberal princes. Princes Talal, Badr, and Fawwaz present themselves as liberal backers of King Saud against the so-called conservatism of Heir Apparent Faysal. Their “cause” is supported by President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. Heir Apparent Faysal promises to establish a Majlis al-Shura and abolish slavery in the Kingdom following family contest. Shaykh Ahmad Zaki Yamani replaces Shaykh Abdallah Tariqi as minister of petroleum and mineral resources.
Monarchy overthrown in Yemen (September). Egypt and USSR support revolutionary government.
Heir Apparent Faysal is named head of the Council of Ministers in October and announces a ten-point reform plan including the abolition of slavery.
Saudi Arabia is founding member of the Muslim World League in Makkah.
- 1963 The Egyptian Air Force, supporting Yemeni revolutionaries, initiates bombing raids on Saudi Arabia. Attempt by King Saud to retake power against sustained family opposition.
- 1964 Members of the ruling family gain the support of senior ulama (religious leaders) to force a change of power. Saud is deposed after he is declared “unfit to rule,” and Faysal is proclaimed King.
- 1965 Khalid bin Abdul Aziz is named Heir Apparent.
- 1966 Establishment of the University of Petroleum and Minerals in Dhahran (later King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals).
- 1967 Six-day Arab-Israeli war.
Egypt withdraws troops from Yemen at start of civil war.
- 1968 Britain announces that treaties with nine Arab emirates would be terminated by the end of 1971 when it plans a “withdrawal” from east of Suez.
- 1969 Deposed King Saud bin Abdul Aziz dies in exile in Greece.
Coup attempt within Royal Saudi Air Force. Purges follow.
- 1971 Iran occupies Abu Musa and Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb islands, a day before six emirates (Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Sharjah, Umm al-Qaiwain) issue a proclamation (December 2) announcing the establishment of the state of the United Arab Emirates. Saudi Arabia does not extend recognition.
First five-year economic plan is introduced.
- 1972 Riyadh purchases 25 percent of Aramco.
- 1973 October Arab-Israeli war. King Faysal bin Abdul Aziz proposes an Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) oil embargo (which Iraq refuses to honor) against the United States and the Netherlands after an arms resupply air bridge is opened between the United States and Israel (via the Netherlands).

- 1974 Riyadh purchases 60 percent of Aramco.
- 1975 King Faysal bin Abdul Aziz is assassinated by his American-educated nephew. Heir Apparent Khalid bin Abdul Aziz is proclaimed monarch after his older brother, Muhammad, renounces his place in line of succession. Fahd bin Abdul Aziz is Heir Apparent (the latter decision skips over Princes Nasir and Saad, who step aside as well). Prince Fahd assumes additional responsibilities to manage the government.
Iran-Iraq Shatt al-Arab border agreement signed in Algiers.
- 1976 Second five-year economic plan is adopted.
- 1977 King Khalid bin Abdul Aziz is unwell. Defense Minister Sultan bin Abdul Aziz attempts to prevent Prince Abdallah bin Abdul Aziz from becoming Heir Apparent when the monarch dies.
- 1979 Shah of Iran overthrown by Ayatollah Khomeini (February 11).
Egypt and Israel sign Camp David Accords (March). Baghdad Summit expels Cairo from League of Arab States.
Seizure of the Makkah Grand Mosque. Uprising by several hundred followers of Sunni extremists Juhayman Al Utaybi and Muhammad Al Qahtani. Rebels surrender after a two-week siege. Shia Muslims riot in Eastern Province.
USSR invades and occupies Afghanistan (December 25).
- 1980 A nine-member Constitutional Commission is established to draft a definitive text for the Kingdom.
Riyadh purchases 40 percent of remaining Aramco holdings. The company is renamed Saudi Aramco.
Iran-Iraq war starts (September 20).
- 1981 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) established in Abu Dhabi (May 25–26). Saudi Arabia is founding member (along with Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates) of the Riyadh-based regional organization.
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Ethiopia, and Libya establish tripartite treaty organization. Observers label it the "anti-GCC body."
Bahrain coup plot uncovered. Riyadh deploys military assets to the island state and signs a bilateral security agreement.
- 1982 Saudi Arabia signs bilateral security agreements with the UAE, Qatar, and Oman.
King Khalid bin Abdul Aziz dies. Heir Apparent Fahd bin Abdul Aziz is proclaimed monarch. Next oldest son of Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman, Prince Abdallah bin Abdul Aziz, is chosen Heir Apparent.
Israel invades Lebanon. Saudi Arabia convenes a GCC emergency meeting to discuss Sabra and Shatilla Palestinian camp massacres.
- 1983 Saudi military units participate in the first GCC *Dara al-Jazirah* (Peninsula Shield) maneuvers, held near Abu Dhabi, UAE.
- 1984 Saudi military units participate in the second GCC *Dara al-Jazirah* maneuvers, held near Hafr al-Batin, Saudi Arabia.

- 1985 Two explosions, for which Islamic Jihad claims responsibility, take place in Riyadh, coinciding with a visit to Iran by Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud bin Faysal. The visit is the first by a high-ranking Saudi official to Teheran since the 1979 revolution.
- 1986 King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz changes his title from “Majesty” to “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.”
- 1987 More than 400 Muslims, mostly Shia pilgrims from Iran, die in riots—allegedly instigated by Iranian pilgrims—in Makkah after National Guard units open fire on demonstrators.
- 1988 U.S. intelligence discovers that Saudi Arabia has purchased medium-range missiles from China, with the capability to reach Israel and Iran. U.S. Ambassador Hume Horan delivers a formal protest, after which King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz demands his replacement, and Washington obliges.
Iran-Iraq war cease-fire (Baghdad on the 17th and Teheran on the 18th of August—in effect on the 20th).
- 1989 Riyadh does not react to the establishment of the Arab Cooperation Council on February 16, when Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and the Republic of Yemen join in the ACC.
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini dies (June 3).
- 1990 At the ACC Amman Summit, Saddam Hussein warns that Israel might embark on “new stupidities” in the wake of the recent U.S. supremacy in international affairs.
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (August 1). Western forces deploy to Kingdom and other Gulf Cooperation Council states.
A “secular” petition, calling for political reforms in the Kingdom, is signed by 43 prominent Saudi public figures and delivered to King Fahd.
- 1991 Kuwait liberated by UN-backed international coalition forces operating, for the most part, from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
A “religious” petition, calling for political reforms in the Kingdom, is signed by prominent Saudi religious figures, several judges, preachers, and university professors. It too is delivered to King Fahd.
King Fahd announces that the old system of ministerial appointments for life would be changed to an appointment period of four years.
Demonstrations occur in Burayda against the ban preventing two prominent religious preachers from delivering sermons that, in the past, were critical of the autocratic ways of the Saudi ruling family and the presence of U.S. troops in the Kingdom.
- 1992 King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz issues edicts defining principles of succession and a basic law of government, and establishes a new Consultative Council.
In a joint interview with the Kuwaiti *Al-Siyasa* and Emirati *Al-Ittihad* dailies, King Fahd declares that Riyadh would not hold “free elections” and that Islam would continue to provide the social and political laws for the Kingdom. The King posits that “the nature of [the Saudi] people is different,” which consequently requires values different from those espoused in the West.

The Washington Post reports (September 28) that in July 1992, 107 religious scholars had submitted a 45-page memorandum to King Fahd criticizing Saudi foreign policy as well as its human rights record and its failure to follow Shariah law.

King Fahd dismisses seven members of the Supreme Authority of Senior Scholars, the country's highest-level religious body, after they refuse to denounce religious figures who earlier criticized the government. They are replaced by ten younger, more "progressive" scholars.

King Fahd demands that Saudi Islamists cease the distribution of antigovernment materials and the use of mosques in spreading antigovernment sentiment. He accuses foreign influences of backing an alleged antigovernment campaign.

USSR abolished (December 25).

1993 Six Saudis headed by Shaykh Abdallah Al Masaari announce the creation of the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR), whose goal is to "alleviate injustice and defend the right secured by Islamic Law." The CDLR claims to be the first Saudi human rights organization, as some of its founders are vocal advocates of a strictly Islamic political structure.

Riyadh dismisses Abdallah bin Abdul Rahman Jibrin, Abdallah bin Humud Tuwayjiri, Abdallah Hamid, Hamad Sulayqih, as well as Sulayman bin Abdallah Rushudi, from their university positions and closes the offices of two Islamist lawyers, ostensibly because all were founders of the CDLR. The government-appointed Senior Muslim Scholars Authority condemns the group as "superfluous" and "illegitimate."

King Fahd decrees the formation of a Ministry of Islamic Affairs, headed by Shaykh Abdallah bin Abd al-Muhsin al-Turki, and a Ministry of the Hajj, headed by Mahmud bin Muhammad al-Safar.

Prince Saad bin Abdul Aziz dies in July, making King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz the oldest surviving son of Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman.

King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz appoints 60 male citizens not belonging to the ruling family to four-year terms on the Majlis al-Shura (August).

A gunman drives into the grounds of King Fahd's al-Salam Palace in Jeddah and opens fire. A security guard is injured but the gunman is killed.

Riyadh and the Shia Reform Movement announce an agreement whereby the group will suspend publication of its monthly newsletter, *Al-Jazirah Al-Arabiyyah*, and cease its various attacks on government policies. In return, the interior ministry agrees to allow the safe return of dissidents, the release of an undetermined number of imprisoned group members, and the issue of passports to members who wish to travel.

Members of first Majlis al-Shura are sworn in (December 29).

1994 Muhammad Al Masaari, the spokesman for the banned Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights, disappears while on a business trip to al-Qasim. He was detained by Riyadh for six months in 1993.

Widespread demonstrations occur after the arrest of Shaykh Salman Al-Awda, a religious figure in Burayda, for "antigovernment activities."

Approximately 270 Muslim worshippers are killed when crowds surge toward the Mina cavern near Makkah during the annual pilgrimage.

Saudi diplomat Muhammad al-Khilewi seeks asylum in the United States (June 13) and accuses Riyadh of financial improprieties, human rights violations, and funneling money through Jordan to the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). He is granted asylum in August.

King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz appoints a Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs led by Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, the defense minister, to “widen the government’s authority over religious interpretation.”

The British home office rejects Muhammad Al Masaari’s bid for asylum (November 28).

Riyadh dismisses Shaykh Ibrahim Al-Akhdar as imam of the Madinah Mosque, reportedly because he criticizes government policies.

1995 Riyadh arrests Shaykh Hammud bin Abdallah al-Shaabi, a leading cleric, reportedly for criticizing alleged government human rights abuses.

King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz acknowledges new ruler of Qatar after the latter overthrows his father (June 28).

King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz shuffles the cabinet, replacing 16 ministers, including those of finance, oil, and information (August 2).

A car bomb in Riyadh on November 13 kills seven, including five U.S. military advisers assigned to National Guard training duties, and wounds more than 60. The Tigers of the Gulf, Islamic Movement for Change, and Ansar Allah [Partisans of God] all claim responsibility.

King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz suffers a minor stroke; court sources report a “temporary health emergency.”

1996 King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz, citing a temporary need to rest due to work overload, voluntarily turns control of the government over to Heir Apparent Prince Abdallah bin Abdul Aziz.

After two months of rulership by Heir Apparent Abdallah bin Abdul Aziz, King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz announces that he is resuming full control of the government, on February 21.

Muhammad Al Masaari is granted a four-year “permit” to remain in Britain (April) after his safety could not be guaranteed on Dominica.

Four Saudis are executed after being sentenced to death for the November 1995 Riyadh bombing, although U.S. officials are refused permission to interview them before the public executions.

A powerful bomb explodes at the Khobar Towers barracks near Dhahran (June 25). Nineteen U.S. servicemen are killed and 400 individuals of various nationalities are wounded. Two previously unknown groups, the Legion of the Martyr Abd al-Huzayfi and Hizballah-Gulf, according to the London *Times*, claim responsibility a few days later. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) acknowledges “difficulties in conducting its investigation because Saudi officials refuse to cooperate with the U.S. agency.”

The “Grouping of Clergymen of Hijaz” reports that security forces have arrested a Shia cleric, Shaykh Hashim Muhammad Shakshi, in Hasa.


King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz is ill. Heir Apparent Abdallah temporarily assumes authority.

- 1997 American and Canadian counterterrorism officials link the Khobar bombing to Hani Abd al-Rahim Al-Sayegh, who confesses that Ahmad Ibrahim Mughassil, another Saudi citizen, is the mastermind and head of Hizballah-Gulf. Al-Sayegh further links an Iranian officer, Brigadier Ahmad Sharifi, to terrorist plots against U.S. targets in the Gulf.
An estimated 217 die and 1,290 others are wounded outside Makkah when a fire breaks out in a pilgrimage tent.
King Fahd approves the establishment of an Internet system.
- 1998 The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) announces that it plans to deport Hani al-Sayegh, a suspect in the bombing of the Khobar Towers in 1996, to Saudi Arabia. INS officials claim that al-Sayegh backed out of an arrangement to help instigate the bombing.
In an interview with the Kuwaiti daily *Al-Ray al-'Am*, Interior Minister Prince Nayif bin Abdul Aziz recognizes that the Khobar Towers bombing was "carried out by Saudi hands."
An estimated 750,000 expatriate workers are expelled for violating residency regulations.
The London *Financial Times* reports that the Kingdom received a \$5 billion loan from the United Arab Emirates.
- 1999 Iranian President Mohamed Khatami visits Saudi Arabia in May. King Fahd and senior Saudi officials extend a red-carpet welcome.
King Fahd spends several months in Marbella, Spain.
The London-based publication *Al Hayat* reports that women attended a session of the Consultative Council (October 4) for the first time. The 20 women in attendance sat in the balcony.
- 2000 King Fahd established the Supreme Council for Petroleum and Mineral Affairs (January 4) to devise strategic oil policies.
The Saudi Press Agency reports (April 23) that in Najran Province, after the closing of an Ismaili mosque and the arrest of an alleged sorcerer, demonstrators had opened fire on security forces in front of the residence of Governor Prince Mish'al bin Saud, killing one policeman and injuring three others.
Saudi Arabia and Yemen sign a historic border agreement (June 12), although a full demarcation is not announced.

Sources: *FBIS-Middle East and Africa, 1977-1987*; *FBIS-Near East and South Asia, 1987-1996*, Anders Jerichow, *The Saudi File: People, Power, Politics*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998, pp. 330-331; Simon Henderson, *After King Fahd: Succession in Saudi Arabia*, Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1994, pp. 61-64; *The Middle East Journal*, chronology sections, 1985-2000.

Appendix 3

Mainline of Succession and Cadet Branches



Sources: Simon Henderson, *After King Fahd: Succession in Saudi Arabia*, Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1994, p. 57; and Alexander Bligh, *From Prince to King: Royal Succession in the House of Saud in the Twentieth Century*, New York and London: New York University Press, p. 105.

Appendix 4

Twentieth-Century Al Saud Leaders

<i>Generation</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Life Span</i>	<i>Rule Period</i>
Sixth	Abdul Rahman	1850–1928	1875–1876
			1889–1891
Seventh	Abdul Aziz	1880–1953	1902–1953
			1953–1964
Eighth	Saud	1902–1969	1953–1964
	Faysal	1906–1975	1964–1975
	Khalid	1912–1982	1975–1982
	Fahd	1921–	1982–
	Abdallah	1923–	
	Sultan	1924–	

Source: Alexander Bligh, *From Prince to King: Royal Succession in the House of Saud in the Twentieth Century*, New York and London: New York University Press, p. 108.

Appendix 5 Maternal Linkages Among Sons of King Abdul Aziz

DOB	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
1900	<i>Turki</i>																
1902	<i>Saud</i>																
1904		<i>Fayyad</i>															
1910			<i>Muhammad Khalid</i>														
1912				<i>Nasir</i>													
1920					<i>Saud</i>												
1922						Fahd											
1923							Mansur										
1924					Musaid			Abdallah									
1925						Sultan			Bandar								
1925					A. Mohsin												
1926							Mish'al Mitr'ab										
1928																	
1931						A. Rahman				Talal							
1932											Mishari						
1933						Nayif Turki				Nawwaf		Badr					
1934									Fawwaz								
1935																	
1936						Salman											
1937																	
1940						Ahmad											
1941														Majid	<i>Thamir</i>		
1942															Mi'aduh		
1943															Mashhur		
1947																Satam	Miqrin
																	Hamud

Source: Simon Henderson, *After King Fahd: Succession in Saudi Arabia*, Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1994, p. 58. This chart lists the sons of King Abdul Aziz and indicates their fraternal relationship with one another. Each number along the horizontal axis represents a different mother; names in the same column are thus full blood brothers. Sons in the same row were born in the same year. Names in italics are deceased. In several cases, dates and relationships are in dispute.

Appendix 6

The Sons of Abdul Aziz

King Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman bin Faysal Al Saud (1880–1953) fathered 36 sons and 21 daughters. Only the male offspring are listed here.

<i>Number/Name</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Maternal Origin</i>	<i>Full Brothers</i>	<i>Political Career</i>
1. Turki	1900–1919	Wahba of the Bani Khalid tribe	Saud	Court education. Eldest son. Commanded Saudi forces against Rashids (1918). Died in 1919 Spanish Flu epidemic.
2. Saud	1902–1969	Wadhba of the Bani Khalid tribe	Turki	Court education. Fought in several Najdi battles, including defeat of Rashids (1921) and Ikhwan rebellion (1929). Viceroy of Najd (1932–53), Heir Apparent (1932–53), regent (1950–53), King (1953–64), prime minister (1953–54, 1960–62), foreign minister (1960–62). Deposed in 1964 and died in exile in 1969.
3. Faysal	1906–1975	Tarfah bint Abdallah Al Shaykh	None	Court education. Fought conquest of Asir (1920) and Hijaz (1924–26). Viceroy of Hijaz (1926–53). Foreign minister 1930–60, 1962–75), prime minister (1954–60, 1962–75), Interior (1959–60), Defense (1959–60), Finance (1958–60), Commerce (1958–60), Heir Apparent (1953–64), regent (1953–64), King (1964–75). Assassinated by nephew in 1975.
4. Muhammad	1910–1988	Jauhara bint Musaid bin Jiluwi	Khalid	Court education. Fought in conquest of Hijaz and defeat of Ikhwan rebellion. Honorary governor of Madinah (1926–54) after he liberated it in 1925. Played key role in Saud-Faysal struggle. Voluntarily renounced succession in favor of younger full brother Khalid, but influential family elder and adviser to Faysal and Khalid.
5. Khalid	1912–1982	Jauhara bint Musaid bin Jiluwi	Muhammad	Court education. Fought in Ikhwan rebellion and Yemen war (1934). Early career as deputy to

(continued)

<i>Number/Name</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Maternal Origin</i>	<i>Full Brothers</i>	<i>Political Career</i>
6. Nasir	1920–1984	Bazza (Moroccan concubine)	None	Faysal, including acting viceroy of Hijaz (1932). Played key role in Saud-Faysal struggle. Deputy prime minister (1962–75), Heir Apparent (1965–75), prime minister and King (1975–82). Died of natural causes in 1982. Court education. Early career as deputy to Saud including acting deputy of Najd (1944). First governor of Riyadh (1944–47), but forced to resign in scandal. Held no further office. Supported Saud and refused to sign 1964 decision against him. Bypassed for succession in favor of Fahd.
7. Saad	1920–1993	Jauhara bint Said Al Sudayri	Musaid Abdulmuhsin	Court education. Son of Jauhara bint Saad Al Sudayri, widow of Abdul Aziz's brother Saad. Has never held office. Bypassed in succession in favor of Fahd.
8. Fahd	1921–	Hassa bint Ahmad Al Sudayri	Sultan Abdulrahman Nayif Turki Salman Ahmad	Court education. Eldest son of Hassa bint Ahmad Al Sudayri after her remarriage to Abdul Aziz. Early career as assistant to Faysal. Key supporter during Saud-Faysal struggle. Governor of Jawf (1949–53), minister of education (1953–60), minister of the interior (1962–75), second deputy prime minister (1967–75), Heir Apparent and first deputy prime minister (1975–82), appointed regent during King Khalid's illnesses. Prime minister and King since 1982.
9. Mansur	1921–1951	Shahida (Armenian wife)	Mish'al Mit'ab	Court education. First Saudi minister of defense (1940). Considered rising prince until death due to kidney illness in 1951. Succeeded as minister of defense by younger full brother Mish'al.
10. Abdallah	1923–	Fahda bint Asi Al Shammar	None	Court education. Obscure early career, but emerged a key supporter of Faysal in last years of Saud-Faysal struggle. Commander of National Guard since 1963. Second deputy prime minister (1975–82), first deputy prime minister and Heir Apparent since 1982.
11. Bandar	1923–	Bazza (unknown origins. Moroccan concubine?)	Fawwaz	Court education. Noted for strict religious observance. Never held office. Recluse.

(continued)

<i>Number/Name</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Maternal Origin</i>	<i>Full Brothers</i>	<i>Political Career</i>
12. Musaid	1923–	Jauhara bint Said Al Sudayri	Saad Abdulmuhsin	Court education. Never held office; supported Saud and refused to sign 1964 decision deposing the latter. Considered an eccentric. His son assassinated King Faysal.
13. Sultan	1924–	Hassa bint Ahmad Al Sudayri	Fahd Abdulrahman Nayif Turki Salman Ahmad	Court education. Early career as commander of Royal Guard (?–1947) and governor of Riyadh (1947–53). Key supporter of Faysal and later one of his chief lieutenants. Minister of agriculture (1953–55), minister of communications (1955–60), minister of defense since 1962. Second deputy prime minister since 1982. Considered next in line for throne after Heir Apparent Abdallah.
14. Abdulmuhsin	1925–1985	Jauhara bint Saad Al Sudayri	Saad Musaid	Court education. Early career as court figure under his father. Supported Faysal in 1958 crisis, but switched to Saud and appointed minister of the interior (1960–61) in Saud-Talal coalition. After Saud-Faysal reconciliation, joined Talal in exile as free prince (1962–64). Rehabilitated by Faysal to governor of Madinah (1965–85). Said to have challenged Sultan's claim to seniority.
15. Mish'al	1926–	Shahida (Armenian wife)	Mansur Mit'ab	Court education. Succeeded full brother Mansur as defense minister (1951–56). Made royal adviser (1957–60) by King Saud. Appointed governor of Makkah in 1963, but removed by King Faysal in 1971. Extensive business interests.
16. Mit'ab	1928–	Shahida (Armenian wife)	Mansur Mish'al	Court education. Deputy minister of defense (1951–56). Governor of Makkah (1959–60), deputy governor of Makkah (1963–69) when removed by Faysal. Returned to office as minister of housing and public works since 1975.
17. Abdul Rahman	1931–	Hassa bint Ahmad Al Sudayri	Fahd Sultan Nayif Turki Salman Ahmad	First son to study abroad, B.A. (USA). Major businessman for years; appointed deputy minister of defense (1983-), under his full brother Sultan.
18. Talal	1931–	Munaysir (Armenian wife)	Nawwaf	Court education. Commander of Royal Guard (1950–52), minister of communications (1953–55), until removed by King Saud.

(continued)

<i>Number/Name</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Maternal Origin</i>	<i>Full Brothers</i>	<i>Political Career</i>
19. Mishari	1932–	Bahra(unknown origins)	None	Supported Faysal in 1958 crisis, but later led “liberal princes” in alliance with Saud and appointed minister of finance (1962–64). Business interests. Special envoy to UNESCO since 1979. Court education. Never held office. Business interests. Shot dead British consul in Jeddah (1951).
20. Badr	1933–	Haiya bint Saad Al Sudayri	Abdul Illah Abdul Majid	Court education. Joined Saud-Talal coalition as minister of communications (1960–61) and later joined Talal in exile as Free Prince (1962–64). Rehabilitated by Faysal to deputy commander of National Guard (1968–).
21. Nayif	1933–	Hassa bint Ahmad Al Sudayri	Fahd Sultan Abdulrahman Turki Salman Ahmad	Court education. Career pattern has followed close association with older full brothers, Fahd and Sultan. Deputy governor of Riyadh (1951–53), governor of Riyadh (1953–54), governor of Madinah (1954–60), remained in business until deputy minister of the interior (1970–75). Minister of interior since 1975.
22. Nawwaf	1933–	Munaysir (Armenian wife)	Talal	Court education. Commander of Royal Guard (1952–56) when removed by Saud, later supported Saud as chief of Royal Diwan (1961) and minister of finance (1961–62), served as adviser on Gulf affairs to Faysal (1968–75) and retired to business in 1975.
23. Turki	1934–	Hassa bint Ahmad Al Sudayri	Fahd Sultan Abdulrahman Nayif Salman Ahmad	Court education. Deputy minister of defense (1969–78) when forced to resign in marital scandal. Later in business.
24. Fawwaz	1934–	Bazza (unknown origins. Moroccan concubine?)	Bandar	Court education. Joined in Saud-Talal coalition as governor of Riyadh (1960–61) and later joined Talal in exile as Free Prince (1962–64). Rehabilitated by Faysal as governor of Makkah (1971–79) but forced to resign following Makkah Mosque takeover. Now in business.
25. Abdul Illah	1935–	Haiya bint Saad Al Sudayri	Badr Abdul Majid	Court education. Appointed governor of Qasim (1980–92) after Makkah Mosque takeover.
26. Salman	1936–	Hassa bint Ahmad Al Sudayri	Fahd Sultan	Court education. Governor of Riyadh (1954–60, 1962-). Said to

(continued)

<i>Number/Name</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Maternal Origin</i>	<i>Full Brothers</i>	<i>Political Career</i>
			Abdulrahman Nayif Turki Ahmad Sattam	be possible future candidate for succession.
27. Majid	1937–	Mudhi (Armenian concubine)		Court education. Considered one of the young “liberal princes,” but broke with Talal in 1960 and entered business. First appointed to office as minister of municipal and rural affairs (1975–80) and transferred to governor of Makkah in 1980 after the Makkah Mosque takeover. His deputy, Saud bin Abdul Muhsin, has been acting governor since 1992. Retired in 1999.
28. Thamir	1937–1958	Nouf bint Al Ruwalah	Mamduh Mashhur	Committed suicide in 1958.
29. Ahmad	1940–	Hassa bint Ahmad Al Suda y ri	Fahd Sultan Abdulrahman Nayif Turki Salman	B.A. (USA). Entered business with older brother Abdulrahman until Abdulrahman appointed deputy governor of Makkah (1971–75) and transferred to deputy minister of the interior (1975–).
30. Mamduh	1940–	Nouf bint Al-Ruwalah	Thamir Mashhur	Never held public office, but extensive business interests. Chairman of Strategic Studies Bureau.
31. Abdul Majid	1940–	Haiya bint Saad Al Suda y ri	Badr Abdul Illah	Court education. Appointed governor of Tabuk (1980–1985) after Makkah Mosque takeover, then governor of Madinah.
32. Hadhlul	1941–	Baraka (Yemeni concubine)	Miqrin	Never held public office, but extensive business interests.
33. Mashhur	1942–	Nouf bint Al-Ruwalah	Thamir Mamduh	Never held public office, but extensive business interests.
34. Sattam	1943–	Mudhi (Armenian concubine)	Majid	B.A. (USA). Deputy governor of Riyadh since 1968.
35. Miqrin	1943–	Baraka (Yemeni concubine)	Hadhlul	Military training in USA and UK. Air force major, retired to become governor of Hail (1980–99) after Makkah Mosque takeover. Governor of Madinah (1999–). Married to a member of the Al Rashid tribe.
36. Hammud	1947–	Futayma (Yemeni concubine)	None	Never held public office, but extensive business interests providing transport for military programs. Lives in Paris, France.

Sources: Alexander Bligh, *From Prince to King: Royal Succession in the House of Saud in The Twentieth Century*, New York and London: New York University Press, 1984, p. 109; Gary Samuel Samore, *Royal Family Politics in Saudi Arabia (1953–1982)*, doctoral dissertation, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, 1984, pp. 528–532; and Simon Henderson, *After King Fahd: Succession in Saudi Arabia*, Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1994, pp. 65–71.

Appendix 7

Leading Grandsons of Abdul Aziz

Father/Son (Years)

Political Career

1. Turki (1900–1919)	
1. Faysal (1920–)	Supporter of King Saud during the Saud-Faysal struggle, minister of labor and social affairs (1961–62), and minister of the interior (1962). Adviser to the minister of petroleum and mineral resources. His eldest son, Abdallah (b. 1946), is director of the Yanbu and Jubayl Industrial Project.
2. Fahd (xxxx–)	Major in army special forces.
3. Khalid (xxxx–)	Businessman.
4. Sultan (xxxx–)	N/A
2. Saud (1902–1969)	
1. Fahd (1923–)	King Saud's eldest son. Chief of the Diwan (1953–56) and minister of defense (1956–60). Later in business.
2. Musaid (xxxx–)	Commander of the Royal Guard (1956–58).
3. Muhammad (1934–)	Early favorite to succeed Saud, married to King Faysal's daughter. Chamberlain (1953–59), chief of the Diwan (1959–60), and minister of defense (1960–62). Later in business along with sons Faysal and Mish'al (1951-). Now governor of Baha Province.
4. Abdallah (xxxx–)	Chief of Royal Gardens and Farms (1953–?), and governor of Makkah (1960–62).
5. Faysal (1945–)	B.A., M.B.A. (USA), director of overseas education, director-general of education, and assistant deputy minister of education.
6. Khalid (xxxx–)	Commander of National Guard (1957–61) and chief of the Diwan (1962–63). Joined his father in exile.
7. Mansur (1946–)	Commander of Royal Guard (1961–63) and chief of the Diwan (1963–64). Joined his father in exile.
8. Saad (1948–1968)	Commander of personal bodyguard (1958–61) and commander of National Guard (1961–63). Joined his father in exile.
9. Badr (xxxx–)	Commander of Royal Guard (1958–61) and governor of Riyadh (1962–63). Joined his father in exile. Later in business.
10. Sultan (xxxx–)	Commander of Royal Guard (1963–64). Joined his father in exile.
11. Abdulrahman (xxxx–)	B.A. (USA). One of the first of Saud's sons to declare loyalty to King Faysal. Director-general at Ministry of Finance.
12. Salman (xxxx–)	B.A. (USA). President of Saudi Direction Company for Trading and Construction.
13. Moataz (xxxx–)	Captain in the National Guard, now assigned to the Saudi National Guard office in Washington, D.C., while studying at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies.
3. Faysal (1906–1975)	
1. Abdallah (1921–)	Son of Sultana bint Ahmad Al Sudayri. Eldest son who was deputy to his father—as viceroy of Hijaz—minister of health (1951–54) and minister of the interior (1951–59). Supported his father during

(continued)

*Father/Son (Years)**Political Career*

	Saud-Faysal struggle. Retired to extensive business interests. Poet. His own sons include Khalid (B.S., business interests), Muhammad (B.A., assistant deputy minister of education), and Saud (army officer).
2. Muhammad (1937–)	Son of Iffat Al Thunayan. B.A. (USA), deputy in SAMA (1963–65), director-general (1965–71) and deputy minister of agriculture (1971–75), director of saline water conversion company (1975–77). Now in business. Heads the Faysal Islamic Bank Group, headquartered in Switzerland.
3. Khalid (1941–)	Son of Haya bint Turki bin Abdallah Al Jiluwi. B.A. (UK). Director-general of youth welfare (1969–71) and governor of Asir (1971–).
4. Saud (1941–)	Son of Iffat. B.A. (Princeton, USA). Deputy at Petromin (1965–70), deputy governor at Petromin (1970–71), and deputy minister of Petroleum (1971–75). Minister of state for foreign affairs (1975) and minister of foreign affairs since 1975.
5. Abdulrahman (1942–)	Son of Iffat. Sandhurst Academy (UK). Army Lt. colonel, commander of an armored brigade.
6. Saad (1942–)	Son of Haya. B.A. (UK). Deputy governor at Petromin (1971–74). Later in business. Head of the Faysal Foundation.
7. Bandar (1943–)	Son of Iffat. Cranwell RAF Academy (UK) and RAF Staff College (UK). Lt. colonel in charge of air force intelligence.
8. Turki (1945–)	Son of Iffat. B.A. (USA), Ph.D (UK). Deputy director (1973–78) and director—since 1978—of the Directorate General of Royal Intelligence. Commander of Saudi forces at 1979 Makkah Mosque takeover.
4. Muhammad (1910–1988)	No sons known to hold office, but several in business (Bandar, Saud).
5. Khalid (1912–1982)	No sons known to hold office, but several in business (Bandar [1935–], Faysal).
6. Nasir (1920–1984)	
1. Muhammad (xxxx–)	Son of Mudhi bint Ahmad Al Sudayri. Army officer.
2. Turki (xxxx–)	Son of Mudhi bint Ahmad Al Sudayri. Air force Lt. colonel. Commands Dhahran air wing.
7. Saad (1920–1993)	No sons known to hold public office. Muhammad in business.
8. Fahd (1921–)	
1. Faysal (1945–1999)	Son of Anud bint Abdul Aziz bin Musaid Al Jiluwi. B.A. (USA). Director-general of youth welfare (1971–99), director-general at the Ministry of Planning, and minister of state (1977–99). Sometime emissary for King Fahd to Iraq. Married to Munirah bin Sultan bin Abdul Aziz.
2. Khalid (1947–)	Runs Al-Bilad Company. Deputy head of youth welfare and head after his older brother passed away in 1999.
3. Muhammad (1950–)	B.A. (USA). Major businessman. Married to Nura bint Nayif bin Abdul Aziz. Governor of the Eastern Province since 1985.
4. Saud (1950–)	B.S. (USA). Major businessman, copublisher of <i>Who's Who in Saudi Arabia</i> . Married to daughter of Turki bin Abdul Aziz. Deputy head of External Intelligence since 1985. Elevated to minister rank in September 1997.
5. Sultan (1951–)	Sandhurst Academy (UK). Army officer. Elevated to minister rank in November 1997.
6. Abdulaziz (1973–)	King Fahd's youngest—and allegedly favorite—son. Involved in business ventures with the Al-Ibrahim brothers, whose sister is King Fahd's wife.

(continued)

Father/Son (Years)

Political Career

9. Mansur (1921–1951) 1. Talal (xxxx–)	B.A. (USA). Businessman.
10. Abdallah (1923–) 1. Khalid (xxxx–) 2. Mir'ab (1943–) 3. Abdulaziz (1964–) 4. Faysal (xxxx–) 5. Mish'al (xxxx–) 6. Turki (xxxx–)	B.A. (UK). Eldest son. Director of planning and administration in National Guard, appointed deputy head of National Guard for the Western Province after 1979 Makkah Mosque takeover. Deputy governor of the Western region until 1992. Sandhurst Academy (UK). National Guard officer. Deputy head of the National Guard since 1984. Local representative for the Ford Motor Corporation. Adviser to his father's court. Dropped out of Sandhurst Military Academy. Later in business. N/A Sandhurst Academy (UK). National Guard officer.
11. Bandar (1923–) 1. Faysal (1943–) 2. Mansur (xxxx–)	Eldest son. Appointed governor of Asir after 1979 Makkah Mosque takeover. Now governor of Qasim Province. Air force Lt. colonel. Commands Jeddah Air Base squadron.
12. Musaid (1923–) 1. Khalid (xxxx–65) 2. Faysal (1944–75)	Shot in 1965 protest against Riyadh's first television transmitter. B.A. (USA). Assassinated King Faysal. Tried and executed.
13. Sultan (1924–) 1. Khaled (1949–) 2. Fahd (1950–) 3. Faysal (1950–) 4. Bandar (1950–) 5. Nayef (xxxx–) 6. Muhammad (xxxx–) 7. Turki (xxxx–)	Eldest son. Sandhurst Academy (UK), U.S. Army Command General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas), Air War College (Maxwell AFB, Alabama), M.A. (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California). Commander, Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces (1986–90), commander of the Joint Forces after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990–91). Resigns commission at forty-two. Author of <i>Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander</i> (1995). Owner and publisher of London-based <i>Al-Hayat</i> (daily) and <i>Al-Wasat</i> (weekly). Extensive business interests. B.A. (USA). Director of research (1969–70) and director-general of social welfare (1970–) at the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. Governor of Tabuk since 1988. Ministry of Planning official. Cranwell RAF College (UK). Air Force major. Director of Asad Military City at Al-Kharj (1978–83). Ambassador to Washington since 1983. Married to Haifa bint Faysal bin Abdul Aziz. N/A N/A Director of the press department at the Ministry of Information.
14. Abdul Muhsin (1925–) 1. Saud (1947–) 2. Badr (xxxx–)	Sandhurst Academy (UK), B.A. (USA). Director of health and housing in Central Planning Organization (1970–73), director-general of planning at the Ministry of Health (1973–76), and deputy governor of Makkah (1976–92). Acting governor of Makkah since 1992. Governor of Hail since 1999. Married to Lu'lua bint Faysal bin Abdul Aziz. B.A. (USA). President of the Saudi Arts Association.
15. Mish'al (1926–) 1. Mansur (1951–)	B.A. (USA). President of the Saudi-American Modern Agriculture Company.
16. Mit'ab (1928–)	No sons known to hold public office.

(continued)

<i>Father/Son (Years)</i>	<i>Political Career</i>
17. Abdul Rahman (1931–)	No sons known to hold public office, but Turki in business.
18. Talal (1931–)	
1. Walid (1955–)	Major investor. Starting in 1991, when he invested \$590 million in Citicorp—making him the bank's largest individual shareholder—he accumulated an estimated \$15 billion, which by 1999 ranked him as <i>Forbes</i> magazine's eighth richest person in the world. His Lebanese mother is former president Riad Solh's daughter.
19. Mishari (1932–)	No sons known to hold public office.
20. Badr (1933–)	
1. Khalid (xxxx–)	Lt. colonel in army.
2. Faysal (xxxx–)	Son of Haya bint Saad Al Sudayri. B.A. (USA). Director-general of training, Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telecommunications.
21. Nayif (1933–)	
1. Saud (xxxx–)	Eldest son. B.A. (USA). Major businessman, including president of Saudi-French road construction company. Deputy governor of the Eastern Province since 1993.
2. Muhammad (xxxx–)	Extensive business holdings.
22. Nawwaf (1933–)	No sons known to hold public office.
23. Turki (1934–)	
1. Faysal (xxxx–)	Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources official.
2. Fahd (xxxx–)	N/A
3. Khalid (xxxx–)	B.A. (USA). Businessman, cofounder of Arab National Bank.
4. Sultan (xxxx–)	N/A
24. Fawwaz (1934–)	Has no sons.
25. Abdul Illah (1935–)	No sons known to hold public office.
26. Salman (1936–)	
1. Ahmad (xxxx–)	Army officer. Director of firm that owns <i>Al-Sharq Al-Awsat</i> daily.
2. Fahd (xxxx–)	B.A. (USA). Deputy governor of the Eastern Province until February 1993. Businessman. Keen on racing horses.
3. Abdulaziz (xxxx–)	B.A. (USA). Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources official. Businessman.
4. Sultan (xxxx–)	Lt. colonel in Royal Saudi Air Force. Former astronaut on a <i>Discovery</i> mission.
5. Faysal (xxxx–)	Ph.D (Oxford, UK). Assistant professor, King Saud University.
27. Majid (1937–)	
1. Mish'al (xxxx–)	B.A. (UK). Businessman, partner in Saudi-Danish dairy company.
28. Thamiir (1937–1958)	No sons known to hold public office.
29. Ahmad (1940–)	
1. Nayef (xxxx–)	Army special forces; promoted to ministry of defense post in 1999.
2. Abdulaziz (xxxx–)	Partially blind. Active in the Saudi Blind Society.
30. Mamduh (1941–)	No sons known to hold public office.
31. Abdulmajid (1940–)	No sons known to hold public office.
32. Hadhlul (1941–)	No sons known to hold public office.
33. Mashur (1942–)	No sons known to hold public office.
34. Sattam (1943–)	No sons known to hold public office.
35. Miqrin (1943–)	No sons known to hold public office.
36. Hammud (1947–)	No sons known to hold public office.

Sources: Alexander Bligh, *From Prince to King: Royal Succession in the House of Saud in the Twentieth Century*, New York and London: New York University Press, 1984; and Gary Samuel Samore, *Royal Family Politics in Saudi Arabia (1953–1982)*, doctoral dissertation, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, 1984, pp. 528–532.

Appendix 8

Provincial Governors

Except for the Jizan post, which is held by a cadet family branch member, all governors are members of the Al Saud ruling family (November 1999).

<i>Governor</i>	<i>Province</i>
Salman Bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud	Riyadh
Khalid Bin Faysal Bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud	Asir
Abdul Majid Bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud	Makkah
Muhammad Bin Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud	Eastern Province
Abdallah Bin Abdul Aziz Bin Musaid Bin Jiluwi Al Saud	Northern Territories
Faysal Bin Bandar Bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud	Qasim
Miqrin Bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud	Madinah
Mish'al Bin Saud Bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud	Najran
Muhammad Bin Saud Bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud	Baha
Muhammad Bin Turki Al Sudayri	Jizan
Fahd Bin Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud	Tabuk
Abdul Ilah Bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud	Jawf
Saud Bin Abdul Muhsin bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud	Hail

Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Information. Updated by *Reuters* on November 25, 1999.

Appendix 9

The Cabinet (June 1999)

Royal Decree
2/3/1420H/16 June 1999

(Protocol List)

The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, Head of State, Prime Minister
HRH Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud

First Deputy Prime Minister and Commander of the National Guard
HRH Heir Apparent Abdallah bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud

Second Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Aviation, and Inspector General
HRH Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud

Minister of Public Works and Housing
HRH Prince Mit'ab bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud

Minister of the Interior
HRH Prince Nayif bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud

Minister of Foreign Affairs
HRH Prince Saud bin Faysal bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud

Minister of State (no portfolio)
HRH Prince Abdul Aziz bin Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud

Minister of Justice
Dr. Abdallah bin Muhammad bin Ibrahim Al Shaykh

Minister of State (no portfolio)
Dr. Abdul Aziz bin Abdallah al-Khuweiter

Minister of Higher Education
Dr. Khalid bin Muhammad al-Angari

Minister of State (no portfolio)
Dr. Muhammad bin Abdul Aziz Al Shaykh

Minister of Islamic Affairs, Endowments and Guidance
Shaykh Saleh bin Abdul Aziz bin Ibrahim Al Shaykh

Minister of Civil Service
Muhammad bin Ali al-Fayez

Minister of Commerce
Osama bin Jaafar bin Ibrahim al-Faqih

Minister of Health
Dr. Osama bin Abdul Majeed al-Shobokshi

Minister of Agriculture and Water
Dr. Abdallah bin Abdul Aziz bin Muammar

Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources
Ali bin Ibrahim al-Naimi

Minister of Post, Telegraph and Telecommunications
Dr. Ali bin Talal al-Juhani

Minister of Information
Dr. Fouad bin Abdul Salaam bin Muhammad al-Farsy

Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs
Dr. Muhammad bin Ibrahim al-Jarallah

Minister of Education
Dr. Muhammad bin Ahmad al-Rashid

Minister of Communications
Dr. Nasir bin Muhammad al-Salloum

Minister of Industry and Electricity
Dr. Hashim bin Abdallah bin Hashim al-Yamani

Minister of Finance and National Economy
Dr. Ibrahim bin Abdul Aziz al-Assaf

Minister of Pilgrimage
Dr. Iyad Amin Madani

Minister of Planning
Dr. Khalid bin Muhammad al-Ghosaibi

Minister of Labor and Social Affairs
Dr. Ali bin Ibrahim al-Namlah

Minister of State (no portfolio)
Dr. Mutlib bin Abdallah al-Nafissa

Minister of State (no portfolio)
Dr. Abdul Aziz bin Ibrahim al-Manie

Minister of State (no portfolio)
Dr. Musaid bin Muhammad al-Ayban

Minister of State (no portfolio)

Dr. Madani bin Abdul Qadir Alaqi

Secretary-General of the Cabinet

Abdul Aziz bin Abdallah al-Salem

Assistant Secretary General of the Cabinet

Abdul Rahman bin Muhammad al-Sadhan

Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Information.

Appendix 10

Leading Religious Figures in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Shaykh Abdallah bin Humaid
Shaykh Abdul Aziz bin Abdallah (Chief Theologian)
Shaykh Abdul Aziz bin Nasir bin Rashid
Shaykh Abdallah bin Abdallah bin Aqil
Shaykh Rashid bin Salih bin Khinnin
Shaykh Umar bin Abdul Aziz bin Mutriq
Shaykh Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman al-Rabi'a
Shaykh Abdul Rahman Al-Rabi'a
Shaykh Abdul Rahman bin Muhammad bin Faris
Shaykh Nasir bin Hamad al-Rashid
Shaykh Ali bin Sulayman al-Rumi
Shaykh Sulayman bin Abdul Aziz bin Sulayman
Shaykh Muhammad bin Abdallah al-Amir
Shaykh Abdallah bin Abdul Aziz bin Rashid
Shaykh Muhammad bin Sulayman al-Badr
Shaykh Muhammad bin Ibrahim bin al-Jubair
Shaykh Salih bin Ali bin Ghassan
Shaykh Ghunaym bin Mubarak al-Ghunaym
Shaykh Nasir bin Abdul Aziz al-Shatari
Shaykh Abdallah bin Sulayman bin Mani'
Shaykh Abdul Aziz al-'Isha al-Shaykh
Shaykh Muhammad 'Alawi Maliki
Shaykh Salih bin Muhammad bin Lahidan
Shaykh Muhammad bin Sabil
Shaykh Sulayman bin Ubaid
Shaykh Abdul Rahman Hamza al-Marzuqi
Shaykh Muhammad bin Ibrahim al-Bashar
Shaykh Muhammad Ibrahim al-'Isha



There are many younger religious figures throughout the Kingdom who articulate points of view that are sometimes diametrically opposed to the establishment perspective. Among these are:

Shaykh Hamud Al-Uqla
Shaykh Safar al-Hawali
Shaykh Nasir al-Umar
Shaykh Ali bin Said Al-Ghamidi
Shaykh Salman Al-Awda



Many respected religious authorities have been arrested and/or received “visits” from interior ministry officials. Most have strong followings throughout the Kingdom.

Appendix 11 ~

“Secular” Petition to King Fahd (December 1990)

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.
The Guardian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz, may God support him.

Preamble

One of the favors bestowed by God upon you is that you held, during the past forty years, the most momentous and delicate responsibilities. That provided you an unadulterated acquaintance with the workings of the State as well as a fine knowledge of the various exigencies of state reforms. Your open-doors policy and your open-heartedness with regard to all peoples' appeals, your care and concern for the requests submitted to you, created truthfulness and encouraged your subjects to speak freely.

A number of your loyal subjects have prepared the enclosed memorandum about the ways of affecting certain reforms as they see them. They are concerned with the safety of the entity we are proud of. They address you out of their desire to enhance its safety and stability, progress and prosperity, out of their obligation to their rulers, and out of their obedience to God with regard to the religious duty of offering advice to God, His Messenger, the leaders of the community as well as all Muslims.

They put this memorandum before you, the Guardian of the Two Holy Mosques, in expression of their deep conviction that you are best qualified to turn their hopes [into] reality and sanction their loyalty.

May God preserve and support you in your search for the right path.

Proposed Landmarks of the Way of Reforms and Development

The critical conditions and painful events unfolding in this region for the Muslim Nation—with our country in the foreground—that emerged in the wake of the invasion of Kuwait and the scattering of its people, are in fact ominous forerunners which make the citizens duty-bound to give their advice to rulers. Citizens are obliged to share with their rulers, in words and deeds, what they deem to be advantageous to the country that belongs to all of them. All are responsible to build it and share in its benefits as well as losses.

The Holy Quran stresses this great religious duty in the following words: “And from amongst you there should be a party who invite to good and enjoin what is right and forbid the wrong, and these it is that shall be successful. And be not like those who became divided and disagreed after clear arguments had come to them, and these it is that shall have a grievous chastisement.” This passage makes it quite clear that refraining from calling to good and keeping away from enjoining good and forbidding evil inevitably leads to the emergence of rifts between people and spreads confusion in their affairs, as well as scatters them in opposing fronts.

The Prophetic Holy Sunnah had explained the grades of this duty and identified the parties to whom Muslims should offer advice. The Messenger of God (peace and the blessings of God be upon him) is reported to have said: “Faith is advice.” Muslims who were present asked him: “To whom should we offer our advice.” “To God (that means to be obedient to Him), to His Messenger, and to the leaders of the Community and to all Muslims,” he replied.

Advice is then the soul of faith. It is obligatory on the Muslim to give his advice first to God and His Messenger, expressed in obeying them and abiding by their orders. Secondly, to the leaders of the Community, to emphasize his loyalty out of his duty to help them and bless their efforts. Thirdly, to the faithful out of his concern for their interests, care for their affairs and truthful desire in exhausting all means of serving them.

Thus, according to the holy traditions, there are three pillars on which the Muslim Nation is built:

1. The Shariah that governs people, regulates society’s movement and is, in itself, the decisive word that settles all affairs.
2. The rulers who shoulder the responsibility of implementing the Shariah, do their utmost to secure the interests of the people, and serve the Ummah.
3. The believers who represent the whole Muslim Nation, the faithful party who are addressed by divine words.

Throughout Islamic history, Muslim communities progressed as long as these three pillars were in harmony. The power of the Shariah was extended and implemented as rulers did their duties and complied with God’s orders. The whole Ummah were completely aware of their responsibilities and were forthcoming. But when these three pillars were shaken, the lives of all Muslims were thrown into chaos.

If the Holy Shariah had made it compulsory on rulers to advise their people, it had made it similarly obligatory on wise and fair-minded believers to advise their leaders as well. We are from this section of the faithful. If offering advice is an ordained duty observed at any time, it becomes more necessary during critical times of hardships and desperation, like those we are going through today. The momentous and horrid events we are witnessing, that make us stop at crossroads, are banging the doors of the region and the world violently and relentlessly. Out of our obedience by the Shariah, our love for the rulers and fidelity to this country and its citizens, we felt it was our duty to put before you this concise summary of opinions, views and frameworks, with the aim of solidifying the bases of this country, which lead it towards further achievements and keep it abreast of events. We have two prime goals in mind:

1. A full implementation of the blessed Shariah, as it has been the Kingdom’s policy right down from its formation, for the purpose of fulfilling the sublime ob-

jectives of the Shariah, including establishing justice, achieving equality, carrying out reforms and restoring peoples’ rights. That would make our society a noble image of the modern Islamic state and an example followed by others in implementing Islam.

2. Retaining the present rule and keeping the noble Royal family, the symbol of loyalty, the axis of unity and the just rule that serves the country and Ummah. It is the rule that keeps the interests of the country and Ummah above differences as well as criticisms, and prevents them from being a means of abandoning laws or ignoring them.

Accordingly, we propose the following:

First: Setting up an organized framework for the religious fatwa [decree], taking into consideration the Holy Shariah—that is never erroneous or immune from being changed—expressed in the texts from the Book as well as the Sunnah. Apart from these texts, we believe that all the fiqh [jurisprudence] presented by the Fuqaha [Islamic legal scholars], the religious schools of thought, the commentaries of Quranic exegetes and the fatwas of the jurisprudent, are only human attempts at grasping the full meaning of the religious texts, likely to be affected by the grade of human power of understanding and the concerned people’s knowledge. Usul al-Fiqh is also influenced by the times and surroundings. In other words, such interpretations are likely to be either flawless, or erroneous, and subject to lengthy discussions. That is why scholars unanimously agree that no one, no matter how high his status is, can monopolize the explanation of the true meaning of the words of God and His Messenger, nor can he impose his religious views as binding on the whole Ummah.

In our life, it is decisively necessary to draw a distinction between Divine Law, that is infallible and binding, and the views put forth by the ulama that must be seriously examined beforehand. They are subject to boundless discussions. We must adopt the opinions of the ulama and that of the prominent religious men, be they in the past or present, that may make our country the true image of the modern Islamic state and a good example adopted by other Muslims.

Second: Viewing the conditions of the main system of rule, and in light of the statements and addresses given by officials on various occasions, we call for:

Third: The immediate setting up of a consultative assembly comprising a group of competent, learned and fair-minded people, known to be honest and impartial, well-bred and hardworking, who perform in the interests of the country, and hail from different parts of the Kingdom. One of the assembly’s duties is to study, develop and approve the laws and regulations related to all economic, political, educational and other matters, as well as keep watch on the workings and duties of the executive.

Fourth: Reviving the municipal councils, implementing the system of provinces and opening trade chambers in the provinces.

Fifth: Examining the judiciary at all levels and powers, to modernize its working methods, re-examining the system of forming judges and their assistants, and taking all measures to secure their independence. These are necessary so that justice may be served in an effective way, and the judiciary power be solidified. Judicial institutions should open their doors to all citizens, without bias toward a certain section of the population, on the basis of granting equal chances to all. That is what the Shariah calls for.

Sixth: Establishing total equality between all citizens, in all domains, without discrimination against any group due to race, lineage, sect or social status, and implementing the principle of noninterference in any citizen’s affairs without lawful and religious justification.

Seventh: Re-examining the media on the basis of a comprehensive and precise criterion that reflects the most modern technology and planning available in the world. The Saudi media is free to exercise its freedom in enjoining good and forbidding evil and enriching free discussions in an open society.

Eighth: Affecting a comprehensive reform of the *Bodies of Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil* and laying down an exact system for their assignments, a religious framework for their duties, and stern standard with respect to the process of choosing their members and directors in a way that stresses the method of calling to Islam with wisdom and goodly exhortation, as well as achieving the outlined goals set for this important and sensitive apparatus.

Ninth: Notwithstanding our belief that caring for the new generations is the most sacred duty of the Muslim woman, we believe that there are various scopes for her participation in social activities. These spheres can be opened to the noble women within the limits of the Shariah, as a token acknowledging their role in building society and as a way of honoring them.

Tenth: All divine books and God's messengers had come to teach and nurture human beings. This fact emphasizes the great importance of teaching as an indispensable ground for the revival of the people and the progress of nations. We hold the opinion that teaching in our country is in need of deep and all-out reforms to prepare faithful, committed generations that can positively and effectively take part in building the present and future of the country, face contemporary challenges, and foster the Ummah to catch up with other nations that are quite ahead of us in every sphere.

These are broad lines that need detailed examination. You undoubtedly look at these demands as being pressing, exactly as we do, and take them into consideration, as we do. We made a covenant with God that we only tell you the truth and open our hearts to you as God had ordered us, and as a sign of our love and loyalty to you. We believe that the Arab and Islamic World and the whole World are entering a new era in which much of the old concepts have given way to new ones, where conditions changed and the equations of forces altered. This fact makes it necessary for us to review some of our affairs without bias, re-study the whole of our conditions actively and honestly, so that we are able to weather what events the future will bring and what troubles it may cause us.

It is worth mentioning that the signatories are the elite of your subjects, your brothers, and sons. You know very well that they are neither ill-meaning or spiteful, nor are they in pursuit of private interests or whims. Their sole motivation is, InshAllah, to seek the good and right, and their goal is to secure the highest interests of the country. Their first and foremost objective is the preservation of this great entity, the continuation of its stability, security and safety.

Certainly God alone can grant us success.

Signatories:

1. Ahmad Salah Jamjoon
2. Muhammad Abduh Yamani
3. Abdul Maqsud Khujah
4. Muhammad Salahuddin
5. Dr. Rashid al-Mubarak
6. Ahmad Muhammad Jamal
7. Salih Muhammad Jamal

8. Abdallah al-Dabbagh
9. Muhammad Hassan Faqi
10. Dr. Abdallah Manna‘
11. Muhammad Said Tayyib
12. Muhammad Ali Said al-‘Audi
13. Abdallah bin Abdul Rahman Al-Ibrahim
14. Dr. Abdul Rahman al-Mari‘i
15. Yusuf Muhammad al-Mubarak
16. Dr. Marzuq bin Manitan
17. Dr. Ibrahim bin Abdul Rahman al-Mudaybigh
18. Adil Jamal
19. Fahd Ali al-Urayfi
20. Salih Abdul Rahman al-Ali
21. Abdallah Hamad al-Sabkhan
22. Salih Abdallah al-Ashqar
23. Aql Rajih al-Bahili
24. Dr. Ahmad Mahdi al-Shuwaykhat
25. Ali Jawad al-Khurs
26. Isa Fahd
27. Dr. Saad al-Abdallah al-Soyan
28. Dr. Abdul Khaliq Abdallah Aal Abdul-Hay
29. Abdul Karim Hamad al-Odah
30. Abdallah Yusuf al-Kuwaylit
31. Hamad Ibrahim al-Bahili
32. Abdul Jabbar Abdul Karim al-Yahyah
33. Ibrahim al-Hamdan
34. Ishaq al-Shaykh Ya‘qub
35. Muhammad Obaid al-Harbi
36. Shakir Abdallah al-Shaykh
37. Abdul Ra‘uf al-Ghazal
38. Ali al-Dumayni
39. Muhammad al-Ali
40. Abdul Rahman Abdul Aziz al-Husayn
41. Ibrahim Fahid al-Aql
42. Jam‘an Abdallah al-Waqidi
43. Abdallah Bukhayt al-Abdul Aziz

Source: “A Memorandum to the King,” translated from the original Arabic, in author’s hands. According to *Middle East Watch*, this so-called secular petition, believed to have been first written in October 1990 and presented to the monarch in December of that same year, was written by Dr. Abdallah Manna‘, a physician and writer known for voicing critical views of the government.

Appendix 12 ~

“Religious” Petition to King Fahd (February 1991)

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

To the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques: May God help you. May the peace and blessings of God be upon you.

This state has distinguished itself by announcing its adherence to Islamic Shariah, and the ulama and those capable of offering guidance have always fulfilled their divine obligation in offering sound advice to those in power. We therefore find that the most pressing task, at this critical juncture and at a time when all have realized the necessity of change, is to direct our energies to reforming the situation which put us in our present predicament. For this reason, we request the ruler to look into the matters which need to be addressed by reform in the following areas:

1. The establishment of a consultative council to decide on internal and external affairs. The members of this body should be selected so as to include individuals of diverse specialization, and who must be known for their sincerity and upright conduct. The council must be fully independent and free from any pressures that could affect the discharging of its full responsibilities.
2. Examining all political, economic and administrative laws and regulations to ascertain their conformity to Shariah. This task should be conducted by fully mandated, competent and trustworthy Shariah committees. All laws not conforming to the Shariah should then be abrogated.
3. Ensuring that all state officials and their representatives internally and abroad must be competent and suitably specialized. They must also be dedicated, upright and honest. Failure to fulfill any of these requirements must be deemed as betrayal of trust and a major threat to the country's interest and its reputation.
4. Granting justice and equality for all members of society to safeguard full rights and exacting duties without any favoritism to the privileged or condescension towards the disadvantaged. It should also be realized that taking advantage of one's influence to shirk one's duties or usurp the rights of others could cause the disintegration of society and lead to the dire fate against which the Prophet (peace be upon him) had warned.
5. Establishing justice in distributing the public wealth among all classes and factions of society. Taxes must be abolished and government fees must be decreased

as they have overburdened people. The financial assets of the state must be safeguarded against waste and exploitation, and priority must be given to the dire needs of the country. All forms of monopoly and illegitimate types of ownership must be removed. The ban on Islamic banks must be lifted, and all public and private financial institutions must be cleaned of usury (interest), which is an assault against God and His Messenger and a reason for the vanishing of God's bounties and blessings.

6. Building strong and integrated armed forces fully equipped from diverse sources. Special attention should be paid to the development of military industries. The aim of the army should be to protect the country and its sacred values.
7. Reconstructing the media to bring them in line with the Kingdom's policy of serving Islam. The media should reflect the values of society and enhance and advance its culture, and they must be purified from all that contradicts the above goals. Freedom of the media to educate and inform, through the propagation of true stories and constructive criticism, must be safeguarded in accordance with legitimate safeguards.
8. Directing foreign policy to safeguard the interests of the nation, away from illegitimate alliances. The state must champion Muslim causes, while the status of our embassies abroad must be rectified to reflect the Islamic character of this country.
9. The development of religious and missionary institutions in this country, and providing them with all the necessary human and material resources. All obstacles preventing them from fulfilling their tasks properly must be removed.
10. Unifying judicial organs, according them full and real independence, and ensuring that the authority of the judiciary extends to all. An independent body must be set up to follow the implementation of all judicial decisions.
11. Safeguarding the individual and collective rights, and lifting all traces of pressures against the will and rights of people in a way that preserves human dignity and that accords with the acceptable legal rules and regulations.

Signatories [partial list]

1. Shaykh Abdul Aziz bin Baz
2. Shaykh Muhammad bin Salih al-Uthaymin
3. Shaykh Hamudah bin Abdallah al-Tuwayjiri
4. Shaykh Abdallah bin Jibrin
5. Shaykh Abdul Muhsin al-Ubaykan
6. Shaykh Safar al-Hawali
7. Shaykh Said al-Qahtani
8. Shaykh Salman al-Audah
9. Shaykh Abdallah al-Jalali
10. Shaykh Muhammad al-Shihah
11. Dr. Ahmad al-Tuwayjiri
12. Dr. Tawfiq al-Qaseer
13. Shaykh Said bin Zuayr

Note and Sources: Known as the Shawwal Document, or more commonly, the Letter of Demands (sometimes also referred to as the Letter of the Ulama), this petition was probably written in February 1991, although various sources give an April 1991 date as well. This so-called religious petition may well have been a response to the December 1990 "secular" petition or, as claimed by opposition groups, was in the making long before the latter surfaced. See Saad al-Faqih, *The Rise and Evolution of the Modern Islamic Reform Movement in Saudi Arabia*, London: The Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA), 1996? (on-line at <http://www.miraserve.com/HistoryOfDissent.htm>). MIRA maintains that an estimated 400 individuals signed this petition, although it does not reproduce any names. The facsimile copy in my hands reproduces 52 signatures, although most are illegible (the 13 signatures above are the names that are relatively legible). Shaykh Abdul Aziz bin Baz added this phrase: "On the basis of Islamic Law," before giving his support to the demands. Shaykh Muhammad bin Salih al-Uthaymin also gave his support to this memorandum. Together, the support of these two senior religious scholars must have caught King Fahd and other Al Saud officials by surprise. Signatories included religious scholars, judges, university professors, and members of the intelligentsia. Translated from the original Arabic, in author's hands, and adapted to the MIRA text (reproduced as an appendix on the home page edition).

Appendix 13 ~

King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Address to the Nation on the New Laws March 1, 1992

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. Thanks be to God, the lord of all universe, and prayers and peace be upon the most noble of prophets, our Lord Muhammad, and upon all his family and companions.

Fellow citizens:

If God intended good to come to a people He will guide them to what is most appropriate. God bestowed on us countless bounties, and the greatest favor of all is Islam. If we fully adhere to this religion, we shall never go astray. Rather, we shall be guided and be pleased by it because Almighty God has told us this, as has His Messenger (peace be upon him). The facts of history and reality are the best witness to this.

Muslims have been happy with the Islamic Shariah ever since it came to rule their affairs and daily lives. In modern history, the first Saudi state was established, based on Islam, more than two and a half centuries ago when two pious reformers—Imam Muhammad bin Saud and Shaykh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab (may God have mercy on their souls)—committed themselves to it. This state was established on a clear course of politics and government. It was committed to propagating Islam and to fostering a sense of community. This is the course of Islam—the Creed and the Shariah. Ever since the establishment of this righteous State, Saudis have enjoyed happiness, security and unity of opinion. They have been living in harmony and fraternal cooperation, after a prolonged period of fear and division.

The Creed and the Shariah being the basic principles on which this State has risen, the application of these principles has manifested itself in full adherence to the correct Islamic course in the Creed, its doctrine, in the Propagation of Islam (Da'wa), in the enjoining of good and the forbidding of evil, in its judicature and in the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. As such, the Saudi State has become a distinguished model of politics and government in modern political history. The adoption of this course has continued in all subsequent stages as successive rulers have continued to adhere to the Islamic Shariah. And it is that bounty of God that He grants to whom He wishes.

This continuous upholding of the course of Islam is based on three facts:

1. The fact that the basis of the course of Islam is fixed and is not subject to change or alteration. God Almighty said: “Lo! We, even We, reveal the Reminder [Message], and lo! We verily are its Guardian [from corruption]” [XV:9].
2. The fact that upholding the course of Islam should be continuous. God Almighty said: “Warn them (O Muhammad) of the Day of the approaching (doom), when the hearts will be choking the throats, (when) there will be no friend for the wrong-doers, nor any intercessor who will be heard” [XL:18].
3. The fact that the rulers of this State remain loyal to Islam under all circumstances and conditions. Loyalty to Islam, the Creed and the Shariah, continued during the era of King Abdul Aziz (may God have mercy on him). He founded the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and unified it on the same course, despite difficult historical circumstances and the problems he faced during the process of unifying the country.

In accordance with this course, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was founded on the following grounds:

1. The unity of faith that encourages believers to worship God alone, with no partners, and live in dignity and honor.
2. Islamic Shariah that protects life, preserves rights, and regulates the relationship between ruler and ruled, regularizes dealings among members of the community, and safeguards public security.
3. Undertaking the propagation of the faith (Da’wa) because spreading the Islamic call for God is among the most important responsibilities of an Islamic state.
4. The founding of an environment free of evil deeds and deviations that helps believers to act honestly and righteously. This task is achieved by encouraging good and discouraging evil.
5. Achieving the “unity” of faith that is the basis of political, social, and geographic unity.
6. Adopting the means of progress and achieving an “overall awakening” that directs peoples’ lives and their livelihood, and looks after their interests in light of Islam’s guidance and standards.
7. Achieving “Shura” just as Islam has commanded, and praised whoever undertakes it, since Islam has ranked practicing consultation among the qualities of believers.
8. The two holy mosques shall remain inviolate for visitors and worshippers—as they were intended by God—far away from all that which hinders the performance of the minor and major pilgrimage and worship in the best way. The Kingdom shall carry out this duty in fulfillment of God’s right and to serve the Islamic community.
9. To defend the faith and the holy shrines, the homeland, the people, and the State.

These are the grand bases on which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been established.



During the reign of King Abdul Aziz, political systems based on this course emerged, due to the development of modern life. In the year 1373H, in view of the evolution of the State and the expansion of its responsibilities, King Abdul Aziz—may God have mercy

on him—issued a decree for the formation of a Council of Ministers. This Council is in operation in accordance with the law issued then and the amendments that followed. This course is still followed to this day, with the grace and guidance of God. Therefore, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has never known the so-called “constitutional vacuum.” The literal meaning of “constitutional vacuum” is that the State has no guiding principles, or binding frames of reference, in the sphere of legislation and regulations. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has never witnessed such a phenomenon in its entire history because it has been ruled according to the guiding principles, the binding rules, and the clear fundamentals to which judges, ulama, and all those employed by the State refer.

All the organs of the State currently function according to laws that stem from Islamic Shariah and are regulated by it. Thus, it is not from a vacuum that we are today enacting the following laws in new forms: the Basic Law of Government, the Law of the Majlis al-Shura, and the Law of the Provinces. These three laws codify existing practices and embody what is already in operation. These statutes are subject to reconsideration and amendments in accordance with what the Kingdom’s circumstances and interests require. The three laws were formed on the basis of the Islamic Shariah, reflecting our genuine traditions, righteous values and cherished customs.



Compatriots:

The source of the Basic Law of Government as well as its foundation is the Islamic Shariah. This law has been guided by the Islamic Shariah in defining the nature, objectives, and responsibilities of the State, as it has been in defining the relationship between ruler and ruled on the basis of brotherhood, consultation, friendship and cooperation.

The relationship between citizens and state officials is founded on solid and deep-rooted traditions, compassion, mutual respect and loyalty stemming from the sincere and firm convictions in the hearts of this country’s people, generation after generation. There is no difference between the ruler and the ruled. They are equal before God, and they are all equal in their love of this homeland and in their eagerness to preserve its safety, unity, pride and progress. Whoever is in charge has obligations as well as rights. The relationship between the ruler and the ruled is first and foremost governed by the Shariah of God as it has come to us in His Holy Book and in the traditions of His Messenger (peace be upon Him). The Basic Law of Government has been inspired by these sources. It has sought to apply them fully in the relationship between the ruler and the ruled, in compliance with all that has been revealed through our true religion in this respect.

As for the Majlis al-Shura Law, it is based on Islam both in name and content, in response to God’s words, “Those who respond to their Lord, and establish regular prayer, who (conduct) their affairs by mutual consultation; who spend out of what we bestow on them for sustenance” [XL:38]. “It is part of the mercy of God that thou dost deal gently with them. Wert thou severe or harsh-hearted, they would have broken away from about thee: so pass over (their faults) and ask for (God’s) forgiveness for them; and consult them in affairs (of moment). Then, when thou hast taken a decision, put thy trust in God. For God loves those who put their trust (in Him)” [III:159].



We have already mentioned on several occasions that the country witnessed the establishment of Majlis al-Shura long ago. Throughout this period, Shura (consultation) ac-

tivities continued in many and various ways. The rulers of the Kingdom maintained consultations in times of need with ulama and advisers.

The new Law of the Majlis al-Shura provides for the modernization and development of an existing system through the consolidation of the Majlis' framework. It also provides vehicles for more efficiency, better organization and vitality in order to achieve the desired objectives. The capable members of this Majlis will be carefully chosen so as to contribute to the development of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its progress, taking into consideration the public interest of the Homeland and its citizens. While the Majlis al-Shura undertakes, God willing, general consultation at the level of the State, we ought not to ignore the consultations currently practiced within the State's organs through specialized councils and committees. These structures ought to remain active so that their work will complement that of the Majlis al-Shura.

The country has recently witnessed tremendous developments in various fields. These developments have called for a renewal of the general administrative system in the country. To meet this need and interest, the Law of the Provinces has come to allow for more organized action through appropriate administrative measures, and to upgrade the level of administration in the provinces of the Kingdom.



O Compatriots:

These laws have been drawn up after a meticulous and patient study carried out by a select group of learned men of sound knowledge and experience. Full consideration was given to the Kingdom's distinguished position in the Islamic world, and to its traditions and customs, as well as its social and cultural conditions. Therefore, these laws have sprung from our realities, taking into account our traditions and customs, while adhering to our true religion. We are confident that these laws will, with the help of God, assist the State in realizing every Saudi citizen's hopes for the welfare and progress of his homeland and his Arab and Islamic nation. The Saudi citizen is the base for the advancement and development of this homeland, and we shall not spare any effort to ensure his happiness and well-being.

The world, that is following the development and progress of this country, greatly admires its domestic policy, which safeguards the citizen's security and well-being. It also admires this country's foreign policy, that seeks to establish relations with other countries, and contribute to world peace.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the sanctuary of the Muslim Shrines and a site for the Hajj, the Umrah and the visit to the Prophet's Mosque. It has a special place in the hearts of all Muslims. God has honored this State with the custody of the Two Holy Mosques, to facilitate the performance of the pilgrimages and the visit to the Mosque of the Prophet (peace be upon Him). We have done our utmost to expand the Two Holy Mosques and develop the other holy sites. The State offers full assistance to all guests bound for the Holy Places. We thank God and ask Him to continue granting us more grace to go on serving these places and all Muslims wherever they may be.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has adhered constantly to the Islamic course in government, in judicature, in the Propagation of Islam (Da'wa), in education, in enjoining good and forbidding evil, as well as in the performance of God's rites. The rulers and state officials have adhered to that course. The people, too, have adhered to it in their daily lives.



Islam is a way of life. There can be no neglecting what has been included in God's Book (The Holy Quran), what has been authenticated of the Prophet's traditions, or what Muslims have unanimously agreed on. Our constitution in the Kingdom is the Book of God, that is infallible, and the Traditions (Sunnah) of His Messenger, who does not speak irresponsibly. Whatever we disagree on we refer back to them. They both are arbiters on all laws issued by the State.

Rulers and ulama in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have cooperated, and are still cooperating and helping each other. Similarly, the people have been, and still are, supportive of, cooperative with, and obedient to their leadership according to the legal pledge of allegiance (*bay'ah*) rendered by the ruled to the rulers.

The ruler fulfills his obligations with regard to the implementation of the Shariah, the establishment of justice among the people and the defense of legitimate individual rights. The society, therefore, enjoys security, stability and prosperity.

In the past and present, the Kingdom has been and is committed to the Shariah and to implementing it vigorously and firmly in all its domestic and foreign affairs. With the help of God, it will remain keenly committed to the Shariah.

With the help of Almighty God, we hold firm to Islam and advise each other, generation after generation, ruler after ruler. As promised by God, there can be no harm done to us by those who oppose us. We do not close the door on any aspect of modernization, so long as it does not conflict with our Islamic heritage and identity.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an Arab, Islamic, State. All matters that concern Arabs and Muslims will be its concerns. The State promotes their solidarity and their unity of opinion and contributes, with all its capabilities, to their welfare. Past events and circumstances have indeed witnessed the truth of its stances and the fulfillment of its commitments towards the Arab nation and the Islamic nation as well as towards other international obligations.



Compatriots:

With the help of God, we will continue upon our Islamic course, cooperating with those who want good for Islam and Muslims, and is determined to consolidate and disseminate the religion of God and to ensure progress for this country and happiness for its people. We ask Almighty God to bestow on our people and on the Arab nation and the Islamic nation goodness, righteousness, progress, prosperity and welfare. Praise be to God, by whose grace all righteous deeds are done.

Fahd bin Abdul Aziz
Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques

Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Majlis al-Shura, *The Basic Law of Government*, Riyadh: n.d. (translated and adapted from the Arabic), pp. 6–14.

Appendix 14

The Basic Law of Government

Royal Decree Number A/90
Dated 27 Shaaban 1412H/1 March 1992

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate.

With the help of God, we, Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, Monarch of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, having taken into consideration the public interest, and in view of the progress of the State in various fields and out of the desire to achieve the objectives we are pursuing, have decreed the following:

1. The promulgation of the Basic Law of Government as the attached text;
2. That all regulations, orders and decrees in force shall remain valid when this Basic Law comes into force, until they are amended to conform with it;
3. That this decree shall be published in the Official Gazette, and shall come into force on the date of its publication.

Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud
Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques

The Basic Law of Government

Chapter One: General Principles

Article 1

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Muslim State. Its religion is Islam. Its constitution is Almighty God's Book, the Holy Quran and the Sunnah (Tradition) of the Prophet (Peace be upon Him). Arabic is the language of the Kingdom. The city of Riyadh is the capital.

Article 2

The State's public holidays are 'Id al-Fitr [the Feast of Ramadan] and 'Id al-Adha [The Feast of the Sacrifice]. Its calendar follows the Hijri [lunar] year.

Article 3

The flag of the State is as follows:

- a. Its color is green.
- b. Its width equals two thirds of its length.
- c. The words “There is no God but God and Muhammad is His Messenger” are inscribed in the center with a drawn sword underneath. The flag should never be inverted.

The Law will specify the rules pertaining to the flag.

Article 4

The State’s emblem represents two crossed swords with a palm tree in the middle of the upper space between them. The Law will define the State’s anthem and its medals.

Chapter Two: The Law of Government

Article 5

- a. Monarchy is the system of rule in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
- b. Rulers of the country shall be from amongst the sons of the founder, King Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman al-Faysal Al Saud, and their descendants. The most upright among them shall receive allegiance according to the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet (Peace be upon Him).
- c. The King shall choose the Heir Apparent and relieve him by a Royal Decree.
- d. The Heir Apparent shall devote himself exclusively to his duties as Heir Apparent and shall perform any other duties delegated to him by the King.
- e. Upon the death of the King, the Heir Apparent shall assume all Royal powers until a pledge of allegiance [bay’ah] is given.

Article 6

In support of the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of His Messenger (Peace be upon Him), citizens shall give the pledge of allegiance [bay’ah] to the King, professing loyalty in times of hardship as well as ease.

Article 7

The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its authority from the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet (Peace be upon Him), which are the ultimate sources of reference for this Law and the other laws of the State.

Article 8

The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is based on justice, Shura [consultation], and equality according to Islamic Shariah.

Chapter Three: The Values of Saudi Society

Article 9

The family is the nucleus of Saudi society. Members of the family shall be raised in the Islamic Creed, that demands allegiance and obedience to God, to His Prophet (Peace be

upon Him), and to the rulers; respect for and obedience to the laws; and love for, as well as pride in, the Homeland and its glorious history.

Article 10

The State shall aspire to promote family bonds and Arab/Islamic values. It shall take care of all individuals and provide the right conditions for the growth of their talents and skills.

Article 11

Saudi society is based on full adherence to divine guidance. Members of this society shall cooperate amongst themselves in charity, piety, and cohesion.

Article 12

The consolidation of national unity is a duty. The State shall forbid all activities that may lead to disunity, sedition, and partition.

Article 13

The aim of education is to instill the Islamic Creed in the hearts of the young generation, to help them acquire knowledge and skills, to prepare them to become useful members in their society, to love their homeland and take pride of its history.

Chapter Four: Economic Principles

Article 14

All natural resources that God has deposited underground, on the surface, or in national territorial waters, or within the land and maritime domains under the authority of the State, together with revenues of these resources, shall be the property of the State, as provided by the Law. The law shall specify means for the exploitation, protection and development of these resources in the best interests of the State, its security and economy.

Article 15

No concessions or licenses to exploit any public resources of the country shall be granted unless authorized by provisions of the Law.

Article 16

Public funds are sacrosanct. They shall be protected by the State and safeguarded by all citizens and residents.

Article 17

Ownership, capital and labor are basic components of the economic and social entities of the Kingdom. They are personal rights which perform a social function in accordance with Islamic Shariah.

Article 18

The State shall guarantee private ownership and its sanctity. No one shall be deprived of his private property, except when this serves the public interest, in which case a fair compensation is due.

Article 19

General confiscation of assets is prohibited. No confiscation of an individual's assets shall be enforced without a judicial ruling.

Article 20

No taxes or fees shall be imposed, except in need, and on a just basis. Imposition, amendment, cancellation or exemption shall take place according to the provisions of the Law.

Article 21

Tithes [*Zakat*] shall be collected and dispersed for legitimate expenses.

Article 22

Economic and social developments shall be carried out according to a just and scientific plan.

Chapter Five: Rights and Duties

Article 23

The State shall protect the Islamic Creed, apply the Shariah, encourage good and discourage evil, and undertake its duty regarding the Propagation of Islam (Da'wa).

Article 24

The State shall develop and maintain the Two Holy Mosques. It shall provide care and security to pilgrims to help them perform their Hajj and Umrah [pilgrimage] and visit the Prophet's Mosque in ease and comfort.

Article 25

The State shall nourish the aspirations of the Arab and Muslim nations, in solidarity and harmony, and strengthen relations with friendly states.

Article 26

The State shall protect human rights in accordance with the Shariah.

Article 27

The State shall guarantee the rights of citizens and their families in cases of emergency, illness, disability, and old age. The State shall support the Social Insurance Law and encourage organizations and individuals to participate in philanthropic activities.

Article 28

The State shall facilitate job opportunities for every able person, and enact laws to protect both employees and employers.

Article 29

The State shall patronize the sciences, letters and the arts. It shall encourage scientific research, protect the Islamic and Arab heritage, and contribute towards Arab, Islamic and human civilization.

Article 30

The State shall provide public education and commit itself to the eradication of illiteracy.

Article 31

The State shall promote public health and provide medical care to all citizens.

Article 32

The State shall work towards the preservation, protection and improvement of the environment, as well as prevent pollution.

Article 33

The State shall form the armed forces and equip them to defend the Islamic Creed, the Two Holy Mosques, society and the homeland.

Article 34

It shall be the duty of every citizen to defend the Islamic Creed, society and the homeland. The Law shall specify rules for military service.

Article 35

The Law shall specify rules pertaining to the Saudi nationality.

Article 36

The State shall provide security for all citizens and residents alike. No one may be confined, arrested or imprisoned without reference to the Law.

Article 37

Dwellings are inviolable. Access is prohibited without their owners' permission. No search may be carried out except in cases specified by the Law.

Article 38

No one shall be punished for another's crimes. No conviction or penalty shall be inflicted without reference to the Shariah or the provisions of the Law. Punishment shall not be imposed ex post facto.

Article 39

Mass media and all other vehicles of expression shall employ civil and polite language, contribute towards the education of the nation and strengthen unity. It is prohibited to commit acts leading to disorder and division, affecting the security of the State and its public relations, or undermining human dignity and rights. Details shall be specified in the Law.

Article 40

The privacy of telegraphic, postal, telephone and other means of communication shall be inviolable. There shall be no confiscation, delay, surveillance or eavesdropping, except in cases provided for by the Law.

Article 41

Foreign residents in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall abide by its laws, observe the values of the Saudi community, and respect Saudi traditions, values and feelings.

Article 42

The State shall grant the right of political asylum provided it is in the public interest. International agreements and laws shall define the rules and procedures for the extradition of common criminals.

Article 43

Councils held by the King and the Heir Apparent shall be open to all citizens and to anyone else who may have a complaint or a grievance. A citizen shall be entitled to address public authorities and discuss matters of concern to him.

Chapter Six: The Authority of the State

Article 44

The authority of the State shall consist of:

- a. Judicial Authority;
- b. Executive Authority; and
- c. Organizational Authority.

Officials shall cooperate in performing their duties according to this Law and other regulations. The King is the ultimate arbiter of these authorities.

Article 45

The Holy Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet (Peace be upon Him) shall be the sources for fatwas [religious advisory rulings] in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The law shall specify hierarchical organizations for the composition of the Council of Senior Ulama, the Research Administration of Religious Affairs, and the Office of the Mufti, together with their jurisdictions.

Article 46

The judiciary is an independent authority. In discharging their duties, judges bow to no authority, other than that of Islamic Shariah.

Article 47

Both citizens and foreign residents have an equal right to litigation. The necessary procedures are set forth by the Law.

Article 48

Courts shall apply the provisions of Islamic Shariah to cases brought before them, according to the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet (Peace be upon Him), as well as other regulations issued by the Head of State in strict conformity with the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet (Peace be upon Him).

Article 49

Subject to the provisions of Article 53 of this law, the courts shall have jurisdiction to deal with all disputes and crimes.

Article 50

The King, or whosoever he may deputize, shall be concerned with the implementation of judicial rulings.

Article 51

The law shall specify the composition of the Supreme Judiciary Council and its functions, as well as the organization and jurisdiction of all courts.

Article 52

Judges shall be appointed and relieved by Royal Decree, based on a proposal by the Supreme Judiciary Council, in accordance with provisions of the Law.

Article 53

The Law shall specify the hierarchy of the Board of Grievances and its functions.

Article 54

The law shall specify the relation between the Commission of Inquiry and the General Prosecutor, and their organizations and prerogatives.

Article 55

The King shall rule the nation according to the Shariah. He shall also supervise the implementation of the Shariah, the State's general policy, as well as the protection and defense of the country.

Article 56

The King shall be the Prime Minister and shall be assisted in the performance of his duties by members of the Council of Ministers according to the rulings of this Law and other laws. The Council of Ministers Law shall specify the powers of the Council with regard to internal and external affairs, organizing government bodies and coordinating their activities. Likewise the Law shall specify the conditions that the Ministers must satisfy, their eligibility, the method of their accountability along with all other matters related to them. The Law of the Council of Ministers may be amended according to this Law.

Article 57

- a. The King shall appoint the Deputy Prime Minister and Cabinet Ministers and may relieve them of their duties by a Royal Decree.
- b. The Deputy Prime Minister and Cabinet Ministers shall be jointly responsible before the King for the implementation of Islamic Shariah, the laws and the State's general policy.
- c. The King shall have the right to dissolve and reconstitute the Council of Ministers.

Article 58

The King shall appoint ministers, deputy ministers and other senior officials, and may dismiss them by a Royal Decree in accordance with the rules of the Law. Ministers and heads of independent authorities shall be responsible before the Prime Minister for their ministries and authorities.

Article 59

The law shall prescribe the provisions pertaining to civil service, including salaries, bonuses, compensation, privileges and retirement pensions.

Article 60

The King shall be the Supreme Commander of the armed forces, and shall appoint military officers, as well as terminate their services in accordance with the Law.

Article 61

The King shall have the right to declare a state of emergency, a general mobilization, and war. The Law shall specify rules for this purpose.

Article 62

If danger threatens the safety of the Kingdom, the integrity of its territory, the security of its people and their interests, or impedes the performance of State institutions, the King shall take all necessary and speedy steps to confront such a danger. If the King concludes that these measures may better be permanent, he then shall take whatever legal actions he deems necessary in this regard in accordance with the Law.

Article 63

The King shall receive Kings and Heads of States, appoint his representatives to other countries, and accept accreditation of the representatives of other countries to the Kingdom.

Article 64

The King shall award medals according to provisions of the Law.

Article 65

The King may delegate parts of his authority to the Heir Apparent by a Royal Decree.

Article 66

In the event of his traveling abroad, the King shall issue a Royal Decree deputizing the Heir Apparent to run the affairs of the State, and protect the interests of the people as stated in the Royal Decree.

Article 67

Acting within its terms of reference, the "Regulatory Authority" shall draw up regulations and bylaws to safeguard the public interest, and eliminate corruption in the affairs of the State, in accordance with the rulings of Islamic Shariah. It shall exercise its authority in compliance with this Law and the two other laws of the Council of Ministers and the Majlis al-Shura [Consultative Council].

Article 68

The Majlis al-Shura shall be established. Its law shall determine the structure of its formation, the method by which it exercises its special powers, and the selection of its members. The King shall have the right to dissolve and reconstitute the Majlis al-Shura.

Article 69

The King may summon the Council of Ministers and Majlis al-Shura to hold a joint session to which he may invite whomsoever he wishes for a discussion of whatsoever issues he may wish to raise.

Article 70

Laws, treaties, international agreements and concessions shall be approved and amended by Royal Decrees.

Article 71

Laws shall be published in the Official Gazette and they shall take effect as from the date of their publication unless another date is stipulated.

Chapter Seven: Financial Affairs

Article 72

- a. The Law shall determine the management of State revenues, and the procedures of their delivery to the State Treasury.
- b. Revenues shall be accounted for and expended in accordance with the procedures stated in the Law.

Article 73

No commitments for funds from the State Treasury shall be made except in accordance with the provisions of the budget. Should the provisions of the budget not suffice to meet said obligations, a Royal Decree shall be issued for their settlement.

Article 74

State property may not be sold, leased or otherwise disposed of, except in accordance with the Law.

Article 75

The regulations shall define the provisions governing legal tender and banks, as well as standards, measures and weights.

Article 76

The Law shall determine the State's fiscal year. The budget shall be issued by a Royal Decree which shall spell out revenue and expenditure estimates for the year. The budget shall be issued at least one month before the beginning of the fiscal year. If, owing to overpowering reasons, the budget is not issued on time and the new fiscal year has not yet started, the validity of the old budget shall be extended until a new budget has been issued.

Article 77

The competent authority shall prepare the State's final accounts for the expired fiscal year and submit it to the Prime Minister.

Article 78

The budgets and final accounts of corporate authorities shall be subject to the same provisions applied to the State budget and its final accounts.

Chapter Eight: Auditing Authorities

Article 79

All State revenues and expenditures shall be audited to ascertain that they are properly managed. An annual report thereon shall be submitted to the Prime Minister. The Law shall define its terms of reference and accountability.

Article 80

Government institutions shall be audited to ensure proper administrative performance and implementation of laws. Financial and administrative violations shall be investigated and an annual report thereon shall be submitted to the Prime Minister. The Law shall specify the authority to be charged with this task and shall define its accountability and terms of reference.

Chapter Nine: General Provisions

Article 81

The implementation of this Law shall not violate the treaties and agreements the Kingdom has signed with other countries or with international organizations and institutions.

Article 82

Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 7 of this Law, none of the provisions of this Law shall, in any way, be obstructed unless it is a temporary measure taken during the time of war or in a state of emergency as specified by the Law.

Article 83

No amendments to this law shall be made except in the same manner in which it has been promulgated.

Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Majlis al-Shura, *The Basic Law of Government*, Riyadh: n.d. (translated and adapted from the Arabic), pp. 15–34.

Appendix 15 ~

The Majlis al-Shura Law

Royal Decree Number A/91
Dated 27 Shaaban 1412H/1 March 1992

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate.

With the help of God, we, Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, Monarch of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in compliance with the words of God, “Consult them on the matter,” and His other words, “Their affairs are carried out in consultation among themselves,” and following the Sunnah of His Messenger (peace be upon him) who consulted his companions, and after taking cognizance of the previous Shura [Consultative] Council of 1347H, decree the following:

1. The promulgation of the Majlis al-Shura Law in the attached text;
2. That this Law shall replace the Majlis al-Shura Law issued in 1347H and that the affairs of the Council shall be arranged according to Royal Decree;
3. That all laws, orders and resolutions in force at the time of promulgation shall remain valid until they are amended to comply with this Law;
4. That this Law shall come into force within a period not exceeding six months effective from the date of its publication;
5. That this Law shall be published in the Official Gazette.

Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud
Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques

The Majlis al-Shura Law

Article 1

In compliance with the words of Almighty God:

It was by the mercy of God that thou wast lenient with them (O Muhammad), for if thou hadst been stern and fierce of heart they would have dispersed from round about thee. So pardon them and ask forgiveness for them and consult with them upon the conduct of affairs. And when thou art resolved, then put thy trust in God. Lo! God loveth those who put their trust (in Him) [III: 159];

and in compliance with the words of Almighty God:

And those who answer the call of their Lord and establish worship, and whose affairs are a matter of counsel, and who spend of what We have bestowed upon them [XLII: 38]

and following the Sunnah of His Messenger (peace be upon him) who consulted his Companions and urged the Nation [*Ummah*] to engage in consultations, the Majlis al-Shura shall be established to exercise all tasks entrusted to it according to this Law, and the Basic Law of Government, while adhering to the Book of God and the Sunnah of His Messenger (peace be upon him), maintaining brotherly ties and cooperating in righteousness and piety.

Article 2

The Majlis al-Shura shall be established in adherence to God's bonds and commitment to the sources of Islamic jurisprudence. All Members of the Majlis shall serve the public interest, preserve the unity of the jamaa [community], the entity of the State, and the interests of the Ummah.

Article 3

The Majlis al-Shura shall consist of a Chairman and sixty members chosen by the King from amongst scholars and men of knowledge and expertise. Their rights, duties and all other affairs shall be defined by Royal Decree.

Article 4

It is stipulated that every member of the Majlis al-Shura shall be:

- a. A Saudi national by birth and descent;
- b. A competent individual of proven integrity;
- c. Not younger than 30 years old.

Article 5

A member of the Majlis al-Shura may submit a request to resign his membership to the Chairman of the Majlis, who in turn shall refer the matter to the King.

Article 6

If a member of the Majlis al-Shura has neglected his duties, an investigation shall be conducted, and, if warranted, he shall be tried according to rules and procedures issued by Royal Decree.

Article 7

If, for any reason, the seat of a Majlis al-Shura member becomes vacant, the King shall name a substitute by Royal Decree.

Article 8

A member of the Majlis al-Shura may not use his membership to serve his own interests.

Article 9

A membership in the Majlis al-Shura may not be combined with any other government post, or with the management of any company, unless the need for such an exception arises and the King deems it necessary.

Article 10

The Chairman of the Majlis al-Shura, his Deputy and a Secretary-General shall be appointed and relieved by Royal Decrees. Their grades, rights and duties, as well as other affairs, shall be defined by Royal Decrees.

Article 11

Prior to the assumption of their duties, the Chairman, members, and the Secretary-General of the Majlis al-Shura shall take the following oath before the King:

I swear by God Almighty to be loyal to my religion, then to my King and my country; I swear not to divulge any State secrets; to protect its interests and laws; and to perform my duties with sincerity, integrity, loyalty and fairness.

Article 12

The city of Riyadh shall be the headquarters of the Majlis al-Shura. The Majlis may meet in another place inside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia if the King deems this necessary.

Article 13

A Majlis al-Shura term shall be four Hijira calendar years beginning from the date specified in the Royal Decree establishing it. A new Majlis shall be constituted at least two months before the previous body's term expires. If a term expires before a new Majlis is constituted, the outgoing Majlis shall continue to function until the successor institution is formed. When a new Majlis is established, new members shall account, at least, for one half of the total.

Article 14

The King, or his deputy, shall deliver an annual royal address before the Majlis al-Shura on the State's domestic and foreign policies.

Article 15

The Majlis al-Shura shall express its opinions on the general policies of the State referred to it by the Prime Minister. In particular, it shall have the right to:

- a. Discuss and express its opinion of the general economic and social development plan;
- b. Study laws, regulations, treaties, international agreements and concessions, and make whatever suggestions it deems appropriate;
- c. Interpret laws;
- d. Discuss annual reports submitted by various ministries and other government bodies and offer whatever suggestions it deems appropriate.

Article 16

Majlis al-Shura meetings shall not be valid if a quorum of at least two thirds of its members, including the Chairman or he his deputy, are not present. Resolutions shall not be valid unless approved by a majority of Majlis members.

Article 17

Majlis al-Shura resolutions shall be forwarded to the Prime Minister for consideration by the Council of Ministers. If the views of both councils are concordant, the resolutions shall come into force following the King's approval. If the views differ, the King may decide what he deems appropriate.

Article 18

Laws, international treaties, agreements and concessions shall be issued and amended by Royal Decrees, after being reviewed by the Majlis al-Shura.

Article 19

The Majlis al-Shura shall form specialized committees from amongst its members to exercise its various functions. It shall also have the right to form temporary committees to discuss any item on its agenda.

Article 20

Majlis al-Shura committees may, with the Chairman's consent, enlist the assistance of anyone from among nonmembers.

Article 21

The Majlis al-Shura shall have a General Commission composed of the Chairman, his two deputies, and the heads of specialized committees.

Article 22

The Chairman of the Majlis al-Shura shall submit to the Prime Minister a request to summon any government official to attend Majlis meetings, when matters within the

area of his jurisdiction are discussed. The official shall have the right to debate but not the right to vote.

Article 23

Any group of ten Majlis al-Shura members may make a motion for the enactment of a new regulation, or the amendment of one already in effect, and present it to the Chairman, who shall forward it to the King.

Article 24

The Chairman of the Majlis al-Shura shall submit a request to the Prime Minister for access to governmental documents and statements deemed necessary by the Majlis to facilitate its tasks.

Article 25

The Chairman of the Majlis al-Shura shall submit an annual report to the King detailing the activities carried out by the Majlis in accordance with its bylaws.

Article 26

Civil service regulations shall apply to the personnel of the Majlis al-Shura, unless its bylaws stipulate otherwise.

Article 27

The Majlis al-Shura shall have a special budget approved by the King, and dispensed in accordance with rules issued by Royal Decree.

Article 28

Majlis al-Shura financial matters, auditing and closing accounts shall be organized in accordance with special rules issued by Royal Decree.

Article 29

Majlis al-Shura bylaws shall define the prerogatives of the Chairman, his deputy, the Secretary-General, and defines the Majlis Secretariat, the methods of holding its sessions, the management of its activities, the work of its committees and its voting methods. Likewise it organizes the rules of debate, rejoinder and other matters that could enhance order and discipline, and enable it to perform its duties in a manner that is beneficial to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the probity of its people. The bylaws shall be issued by Royal Decree.

Article 30

This law shall be amended in the same manner in which it was promulgated.

The Rights and Duties of Majlis al-Shura Members

Article 1

Membership in the Majlis al-Shura shall take effect from the beginning of a term, specified in the order for its formation, according to Article 13 of the Law of the Majlis. A substitute member's term shall commence from the date specified in the Royal Decree nominating him and shall expire at the end of the Council's term. If the Council term ends prior to the formation of the new Majlis, the membership shall continue until the creation of a new Council, except if specifically terminated.

Article 2

A Majlis al-Shura shall receive a monthly remuneration of SR 20,000 (twenty thousand Saudi Riyals) while in office. The member shall be treated in accordance with the rules governing government officials of Grade 15 for his compensations, benefits and other privileges, all of which shall not affect any pensions to which the member may be entitled.

Article 3

A full-time member shall retain the position and grade he held before joining the Majlis al-Shura. His term of office in the Majlis shall be taken into consideration with respect to merit increases, promotions and retirement benefits, to which he is entitled. A member shall pay, during his membership term, his pension premiums imposed on the salary of his original employment.

A member shall not receive both the allowance and benefits assigned to members of the Majlis al-Shura and the salary and benefits from his original post simultaneously.

A member shall not receive both the Majlis al-Shura remuneration and the salary from his original post simultaneously.

In case a member's salary from his original post exceeds his remuneration in the Majlis al-Shura, the Council shall pay the member the difference. If the post he was holding entitled him to greater benefits than the benefits assigned to the membership, he shall continue to receive the former.

Article 4

As an exception to Article 2 hereof, the member of the Majlis al-Shura shall be entitled to a 45-day annual leave. The Chairman of the Majlis al-Shura shall determine its timing to ensure that leaves do not affect the quorum needed for Majlis meetings.

Article 5

A Majlis al-Shura member shall be completely impartial and objective in all his functions at the Majlis. He shall not raise any matter before the Majlis that may serve a private interest or that may conflict with the public's interest.

Article 6

A Majlis al-Shura member shall regularly attend the meetings of the Majlis and its committees. He shall notify the Chairmen of both the Majlis and the committee, in writing,

of any forced absences. Members shall not leave Majlis al-Shura or committee meetings prior to their adjournment, except with the consent of the Chairmen.

**Terms of Reference for the Chairman,
Vice Chairman and Secretary-General**

Article 1

The Chairman shall supervise the entire activities of the Majlis, represent it in its relations with other authorities and act as its spokesman.

Article 2

The Chairman shall chair the Majlis sessions and the meetings of its General Assembly as well as the committee meetings he attends.

Article 3

The Chairman shall declare the sessions open and closed. He shall manage and participate in debates, give permission to speak, determine the topic of the discussion, draw the speaker's attention to the need to bind himself to the subject and time limits, terminate the discussion and put the subjects to the vote. He shall take whatever action he deems appropriate to keep order during sessions.

Article 4

The Chairman shall call the Majlis al-Shura, or the General Assembly, or any other committee to hold an emergency session to discuss any given matter.

Article 5

The Vice Chairman shall give assistance to the Chairman when he is available, and shall deputize for him in his absence.

Article 6

The Vice Chairman shall chair the Majlis sessions and the meetings of the General Assembly in the absence of the Chairman. If both are absent, the chairmanship shall be taken up by whomever the King may choose. The one thus designated shall enjoy, in respect to sessions management, the same powers vested in the Chairman.

Article 7

The Secretary-General, or whoever may deputize for him, shall attend the sessions of the Majlis and meetings of the General Assembly, supervise the details of the minutes of meetings, notify members of the timetable of sessions and agendas, in addition to any other duties assigned to him by the Majlis, the General Assembly or the Chairman.

He shall answer to the Chairman for the financial and administrative affairs of the Majlis.

Article 8

The General Assembly of the Majlis shall consist of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman and the heads of specialized committees of the Majlis.

Article 9

The meetings of the General Assembly shall not be considered valid unless attended by at least two thirds of its members. Resolutions shall be passed by approval of the majority present, and in case of a tie vote, the Chairman of the meeting shall have the casting vote.

Article 10

For each meeting of the General Assembly, minutes shall be drawn up listing the date and place of the meeting, names of present and absent members, a summary of debates and the texts of recommendations. The minutes shall be signed by the Chairman and the participating members.

Article 11

The General Assembly shall have the following functions:

- a. To draw up a general plan for the Majlis and its committees in order to help it discharge its duties and realize its objectives;
- b. To prepare agendas for Majlis meetings;
- c. To decide on objections to the contents of minutes of the meeting, or balloting results, or separation of votes, or any other objections which may be raised during the meetings. Its decision in this regard shall be final;
- d. To issue the necessary rules needed to organize the activities of the Majlis and its committees in a manner that shall not conflict with the Majlis Law and its by-laws.

Article 12

The Majlis shall hold at least one ordinary session every two weeks. The date and time of the session shall be decided by the Chairman, who shall have the right to advance or set back the time of the session if necessary.

Article 13

The agenda shall be distributed to the members prior to the sessions. Reports and other documents, deemed by the General Assembly to be related to the subjects on the agenda, shall be attached thereto.

Article 14

A member of the Majlis shall study the agenda at the Majlis headquarters. Under no circumstance shall he take away with him outside the Majlis building any papers, laws or documents relating to his work.

Article 15

A member who may wish to speak during the sessions shall put his request in writing. Requests to speak shall be listed in order of submission.

Article 16

The Chairman shall give permission to speak to those who have requested to do so, taking into account the sequence of their requests and their relevance to a fruitful debate.

Article 17

A member may not speak for more than ten minutes on any one subject, except upon permission from the Chairman. A speaker may address himself to no one other than the Chairman. Only the Chairman may interrupt the speaker.

Article 18

The Majlis may decide to postpone the debate or reconsider a subject. The Chairman may suspend the session for a period not exceeding one hour.

Article 19

Each session shall have its own minutes, which make a note of the venue and date of the session, opening and closing times, name of Chairman, number of present and absent members, and the cause of absence, if any. They shall also include a summary of debates, the number of affirmative and negative votes, voting results, text of resolutions, session's adjournment or suspension and any other matters which the Chairman may decide to put on record.

Article 20

The Chairman and the Secretary-General, or whoever may deputize for them, shall sign the minutes after reading them out to the Majlis. All members shall have access to the minutes.

Article 21

The Majlis shall appoint, from among its members, at the start of its term, the specialized committees required for the implementation of its functions.

Article 22

Each specialized committee shall consist of a number of members as specified by the Majlis, provided that such number may not be less than five. The Majlis shall choose these members and nominate the head of the committee and his deputy with due regard to the member's line of specialization and the requirements of the committees. It may set up ad hoc committees from among its members. In turn each committee may set up one ad hoc subcommittee or more from among its members.

Article 23

The Majlis shall have the right to re-form its specialized committees or form new ones.

Article 24

A committee head runs the activity of his own committee and represents it at the Majlis. His deputy takes over in his absence. If both the committee head and his deputy are absent, the eldest member of the committee takes charge.

Article 25

The committee shall meet at the invitation of its head, the Majlis, or the Chairman of the Majlis.

Article 26

Committee meetings shall not be held in public and shall not be considered valid except when a minimum of two thirds of the members are present.

Article 27

Committees shall consider matters referred to them by the Majlis or the Majlis Chairman. If a matter is of concern to more than one committee, the Chairman of the Majlis shall decide which of them is more entitled to deal with the said matter, or shall refer it to a committee consisting of members from among all committees concerned. The said committee shall hold meetings under the chairmanship of the Chairman of the Majlis or the Vice Chairman.

Article 28

Each member of the Majlis may proffer his opinion on any subject referred to any committee, even if he is not a member thereof, provided that the said opinion is submitted in writing to the Chairman of the Majlis.

Article 29

Minutes shall be drawn up for each committee meeting, and shall indicate the date and venue of the meeting, the names of those members present and absent, a summary of

debates and the text of recommendations. The minutes shall be signed by the chairman of the meeting and members present.

Article 30

Upon consideration of a given matter by the committee, a report shall be filed detailing the essentials of the referred subject, the committee's point of view and its recommendations relative to it, the fundamentals on which such recommendations are based and the opinion of the minority, if any.

Article 31

The Resolutions of the Majlis shall be passed by the majority stipulated in Article 16 of the Law of the Majlis al-Shura. If such a majority is not realized, the subject shall be rescheduled for voting at the next meeting.

If the majority is not obtained at this second meeting, the subject shall be brought before the King along with the study that has already been made thereon and the voting results at the two meetings.

Article 32

No debates or new points of view shall be accepted during voting. In all cases the Chairman of the Majlis shall vote after the completion of voting by members.

Article 33

The Chairman of the Majlis shall present the annual report, provided for in Article 5 of the Law of the Majlis al-Shura, within three months, after the end of the year.

Article 34

Financial and functional affairs of the Majlis shall be determined in accordance with the financial and functional bylaws.

The Chairman of the Majlis shall issue rules required to organize financial and administrative affairs of the Majlis, including the organizational structure and duties of the various departments of the Majlis, in a manner consistent with the Law of the Majlis and its bylaws.

Financial and Staffing Affairs of the Majlis al-Shura

Article 1

The fiscal year of the Majlis shall be the same fiscal year of the State.

Article 2

The Chairman of the Majlis shall prepare the draft of the annual budget of the Majlis and shall present it to the King for approval.

Article 3

Following approval, the budget shall be deposited with the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA). Expenditure of funds shall require the signature of the Chairman of the Majlis or the Vice Chairman.

Article 4

If the amounts allocated in the budget are outstripped by the expenditures of the Majlis, or if an emergency outlay arises which could not have been foreseen while the budget was being prepared, the Chairman shall submit a statement of the needed amounts to the King for possible endorsement.

Article 5

Titles and grades of the Majlis posts shall be included in its budget. Titles of posts may be amended and their grades scaled down during the fiscal year at the discretion of the Chairman.

Article 6

The posts of Grades 14 and 15 shall be filled with the approval of the King. Other posts of the Majlis shall be filled in accordance with the Civil Service Law and bylaws and shall be exempted from the provisions of the competitive examination.

Article 7

The General Assembly of the Majlis shall establish rules governing allowances of government officials and other individuals, other than the Majlis members, whose work with the Majlis may be needed.

Article 8

The Majlis shall not be subject to control by any other authority. The Majlis administration shall include a department for pre-disbursement financial control. The General Assembly of the Majlis shall undertake post-disbursement control. The Majlis Chairman shall have the right to request a financial or administrative expert to prepare a report on any financial or administrative matter related to the Majlis.

Article 9

At the end of the fiscal year, the general secretariat of the Majlis shall prepare the final accounts, which the Majlis Chairman shall forward to the King for possible approval.

Article 10

Without prejudice to the provisions of this bylaw, the Majlis financial affairs and accounts shall be organized in accordance with the same rules observed in organizing the accounts of ministries and government services.

Rules Governing the Investigation and Trial of the Majlis Member

Article 1

If a member of the Majlis betrays any of his duties, he shall be subject to one of the following penalties:

- a. A censure in writing;
- b. The deduction of one month's salary;
- c. The forfeiture of membership.

Article 2

Investigation of a member of the Majlis shall be conducted by a committee consisting of three members of the Majlis nominated by the Chairman.

Article 3

The committee shall inform the member of the violation ascribed to him. It shall hear his testimony and record his justification (defense) in the investigation minutes. The committee shall submit a report on the outcome of the investigation to the General Assembly.

Article 4

The General Assembly of the Majlis shall form a committee consisting of its members, provided that none of them shall be the Chairman or the Vice Chairman of the Majlis, to prosecute the member to whom the violation is ascribed. The committee shall have the right to impose the penalty of censure or salary deduction.

If the committee decides to strip him of membership, the matter shall be submitted to the Chairman to forward to the King.

Article 5

Imposition of any of the foregoing penalties shall not impede the filing of a public or private suit against the member.

Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Majlis al-Shura, *The Basic Law of Government*, Riyadh: n.d. (translated and adapted from the Arabic), pp. 61–86.

Appendix 16

The Law of the Provinces

Royal Decree Number A/92
Dated 27 Shaaban 1412H/1 March 1992

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate.
With the help of God, we, Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, Monarch of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, having taken into consideration the public interest, and wishing to modernize and improve the performance of government institutions in various provinces, have decreed the following:

1. The promulgation of the Law of the Provinces in the attached text;
2. That this Law shall come into force within a period not exceeding one year effective from the date of its publication;
3. That this Law shall be published in the Official Gazette.

Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud
Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques

The Law of the Provinces

Article 1

The aim of this statute is to improve administrative operations in the provinces of the Kingdom and ensure their overall development. It further aims at maintaining law and order, guaranteeing the rights and liberties of citizens, all within the framework of Islamic Shariah.

Article 2

The provinces of the Kingdom and the headquarters of the governorates shall be organized by Royal Decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior.

Article 3

Administratively, each province shall consist of a number of governorates, districts and localities, created after taking into account demographic, geographic, and environmental

conditions, as well as security needs and available communications facilities. The governorate is organized by Royal Decree on the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior. The districts and centers are created and linked by a decision of the Minister of the Interior upon the recommendation of the Provincial Governor.

Article 4

Each province shall have a Governor with the rank of Minister, and a Vice-Governor at a distinguished grade to assist him in discharging his duties, as well as to substitute for the Governor during the latter's absences. Provincial governors and vice-governors are appointed and relieved by Royal Decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior.

Article 5

The Governor of a province is accountable to the Minister of the Interior.

Article 6

Provincial governors and vice-governors shall take the following oath before the King prior to the assumption of their duties: I swear by Almighty God to be loyal to my religion, to my King and my Country, not to disclose any State secrets, to protect its interests and respect its laws, and to discharge my duties with honesty, trust, loyalty and justice.

Article 7

Each provincial governor shall administer his province according to the general policy of the State, in compliance with the provisions of this Law, as well as other laws and regulations. He must in particular:

- a. Maintain security, order and stability, and take necessary measures in accordance with this Law and other regulations;
- b. Implement judicial rulings;
3. Protect the rights and liberties of individuals, and refrain from any actions that may compromise these rights and freedoms, except within the limits prescribed by the Shariah and this Law;
4. Endeavor for the social, economic and urban development of the province;
5. Attempt to develop and promote public services in the province;
6. Administer governorates, districts and localities; supervise the work of administrators, district directors, and heads of localities; to ascertain their capabilities to perform assigned duties;
7. Protect State assets and property and prevent any transgressions against them;
8. Supervise governmental institutions and their personnel in the province to ascertain proper performance of their duties with honesty and loyalty, taking into account the ties of employees within ministries and within various services in the province with competent authorities;

9. Have direct contact with ministers and heads of departments to discuss the affairs of the province with them in order to improve the performance of organs under his authority; and inform the Minister of the Interior accordingly;
10. Submit annual reports to the Minister of the Interior on the efficiency of public services in the province according to the executive provisions of this Law.

Article 8

An annual meeting of provincial governors shall be held under the chairmanship of the Minister of the Interior to discuss issues related to the provinces. The Minister of the Interior shall submit a report hereon to the Prime Minister.

Article 9

At least two meetings shall be held every year for administrators and district directors to discuss matters of interest to the province. The Governor shall submit a report thereon to the Minister of the Interior.

Article 10

- a. At least one undersecretary with a rank of not less than 14 is to be appointed to each province, in accordance with a decision by the Council of Ministers, based upon a recommendation from the Minister of the Interior.
- b. Upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior, a governor shall be appointed by the Prime Minister, and shall have a grade not less than 14. Each province shall have a vice-governor at a grade not less than 12 who shall be appointed by the Minister of the Interior upon the recommendation of the provincial governor.
- c. Each governorate shall have an administrator with a rank not less than 12 who shall be appointed by the Minister of the Interior upon the recommendation of the provincial governor.
- d. Each district shall have a director, whose rank is not less than 8, who shall be appointed by the Minister of the Interior upon the recommendation of the provincial governor.
- e. Each locality shall have a head, whose rank is not less than 5, who shall be appointed by the provincial governor upon the recommendation of the district director.

Article 11

Provincial governors, vice-governors, administrators, district directors and heads of localities shall reside within the province, and shall not leave it without authorization from immediate superiors.

Article 12

Administrators, district directors, and heads of localities shall assume their responsibilities within their jurisdictions, and within the limits of the powers vested in them.

Article 13

Administrators shall administer their provinces within the limits of the authorities stipulated in Article 7, with the exception of provisions (f), (i), and (j). They shall supervise the performance of district directors and heads of localities, to ascertain their ability to perform duties efficiently, and submit periodic reports to the provincial governor on the performance of public services and other matters with which the governorate is concerned, in accordance with the stipulations under the executive regulations of this Law.

Article 14

Every ministry or government agency providing services to the province shall appoint an official at the head of its bodies in the province with a rank not less than 12. He shall report directly to the parent ministry or agency and shall operate in close coordination with the governor of the province.

Article 15

Each province shall have a Provincial Council with offices at the headquarters of the governorate.

Article 16

The provincial council shall consist of:

- a. The provincial governor as Chairman;
- b. The vice governor as Vice Chairman;
- c. The Commissioner (Wakil) of the Province;
- d. The Heads of governmental institutions in the province as specified by an order issued by the Prime Minister upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior.
- e. Not less than ten men from the local community who are eligible in terms of their knowledge, expertise and specialization. They are appointed by order of the Prime Minister, upon the provincial governor's recommendation, and with the approval of the Minister of the Interior. Their renewable term of office shall be four years.

Article 17

A member of a provincial council shall satisfy the following requirements:

- a. Be of Saudi nationality both by birth and upbringing;
- b. Be of recognized integrity and capability;
- c. Be no younger than 30 years of age;
- d. Be a resident of the province.

Article 18

A member shall be entitled to submit written proposals to the Chairman of the provincial council on matters pertaining to the council's jurisdiction. The Chairman shall place each proposal on the council's agenda for consideration.

Article 19

A member of a provincial council shall not attend deliberations, or the deliberations of any of its committees, if the subject under discussion shall involve personal gains, or benefit individuals for whom his testimony would be unacceptable, or individuals who have appointed him a guardian, proxy or a representative.

Article 20

If a council member wishes to resign, he shall submit his resignation to the Minister of the Interior, through the provincial governor. The resignation shall not be considered valid until approved by the Prime Minister upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior.

Article 21

In all cases other than those specified in this Law, an appointed member may not be dismissed during his term, except by order of the Prime Minister, acting on a recommendation from the Minister of the Interior.

Article 22

Should a vacancy arise for any specific reason, a successor shall be appointed within three months, effective from the vacancy date. The term of the new member shall be equal to the remaining period of his predecessor's term, in accordance with Article 16 (e) of this Law.

Article 23

The provincial council shall discuss any issue that may improve the standard of services in the province. Its prerogatives shall be as follows:

- a. Determine the needs of the province and propose their inclusion into the State's development plans;
- b. Determine useful projects according to a scale of priorities, and propose their endorsements in the State's budget;
- c. Analyze the province's urban and rural organizational layouts, and implement changes once adopted;
- d. Follow up and coordinate the implementation of allocations from the development plan as well as the budget.

Article 24

The provincial council shall propose and submit to the Minister of the Interior any move calculated to serve the general good of the province's population and shall encourage citizens' contribution thereto.

Article 25

The provincial council shall limit its deliberative scope to subjects that fall within its prerogatives as stipulated in this Law. Its decisions shall be considered null and void if its powers are misused. A resolution to this end shall be issued by the Minister of the Interior.

Article 26

Provincial councils shall hold ordinary sessions every three months at the invitation of their Chairmen. Under his discretion, a Chairman shall also convene extraordinary sessions. Ordinary sessions shall include one or more meetings that are held upon a single summons. The sessions may not be adjourned until all issues on the agenda have been examined and discussed.

Article 27

Attendance at the meetings of provincial councils shall be considered a function-related duty for members identified in Article 16, clauses (c) and (d) of this Law. Members must attend meetings in person or appoint substitutes when they cannot. For members identified in clause (e) of said Article, unexcused nonattendance at two successive sessions shall be considered grounds for dismissal from a council. In this case, the dismissed member shall not be eligible for reappointment, except after the lapse of two years from the date of dismissal.

Article 28

Provincial council meetings shall be considered in order only if attended by at least two thirds of council members. Council resolutions shall be issued by absolute majority of cast votes. Deadlocked votes shall be settled by the Chairman's ballot.

Article 29

Provincial councils shall form special committees, as needed, to examine any decrees falling within their jurisdictions. They may seek the assistance of specialists and invite whoever they wish to attend their meetings and participate in deliberations without having the right to vote.

Article 30

The Minister of the Interior shall have the right to summon a council to meet under his chairmanship at any venue he chooses. Likewise he shall have the right to preside at any meeting he attends.

Article 31

A provincial council may convene only at the request of its Chairman or his deputy or by order of the Minister of the Interior.

Article 32

The Chairman of a provincial council shall submit a copy of its resolutions to the Minister of the Interior.

Article 33

The Chairman of a provincial Council shall inform ministries and governmental agencies of any resolutions concerning them that are voted upon in the affirmative.

Article 34

Ministries and government agencies shall take into consideration resolutions voted by provincial councils in accordance with provisions of Article 23, clauses (a) and (b) of this Law. If a ministry or governmental institution rejects any such resolutions, it shall explain the reasons to the said provincial council. In case of disagreement, said provincial council shall refer the matter to the Minister of the Interior for reconsideration by the Prime Minister.

Article 35

Each ministry or governmental agency that maintains services of its own in the province shall inform the provincial council of projects allocated to it in the State budget. It will also notify the council about development plan allocations for the province.

Article 36

Every minister and head of service may seek the views of a provincial council about any subject pertaining to its jurisdiction. Said provincial council shall give its opinion as requested.

Article 37

The Prime Minister, acting upon a proposal from the Ministry of the Interior, shall set the remuneration of the Chairmen and members of provincial councils, taking into account transportation and residence costs.

Article 38

A provincial council shall only be dissolved by order of the Prime Minister based on a proposal from the Minister of the Interior. New members shall be appointed within three months from the date of dissolution. In the interim, members specified in Article 16, clauses (c) and (d) of this Law, shall perform the duties of the dissolved council under the chairmanship of the provincial governor.

Article 39

Provincial councils shall have a secretariat at their respective governorates, entrusted with the preparation of agendas, extending timely invitations, keeping records of all deliberations and meetings, counting ballots, preparing the minutes of meetings, drafting resolutions, maintaining order at council meetings, and registering council decisions.

Article 40

The Minister of the Interior shall issue the necessary regulations for the implementation of this Law.

Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Majlis al-Shura, *The Basic Law of Government*, Riyadh: n.d. (translated and adapted from the Arabic), pp. 48–60.

Appendix 17 ~

Heir Apparent Abdallah Address to Majlis al-Shura January 13, 1996

Brothers:

May the peace, mercy and blessings of God be upon you.

It gives me great pleasure to convey to you on this auspicious occasion the greetings of my brother the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and his best wishes for your council. I also bring you the good news that his health is constantly improving, thanks be to God.



Brothers:

Prior to my coming here, I recalled past speeches delivered by my brother the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques to this revered council, realizing that they gave detailed accounts of our internal and external policies—Arab, Islamic and international relations—and of the benefits of consultation [Shura] in Islam, in addition to brief histories of this modern state of ours and its founder King Abdul Aziz. Let us remember these speeches and follow their advice, as I draw this address from their spirit and from the objectives and legitimacy of this revered council, whose activities are seen to reflect the dire need for its sincere opinions. I hope that you will continue to voice them, because this is your trust and responsibility, bearing in mind that sincere opinions like these have achieved social justice among various peoples in many an era of Islamic history. Thanks to God, we are governed by a gracious Islamic creed that has honored man with a just law capable of solving mankind's problems until the day of judgment when the Almighty inherits the earth and all that is on it.



Brothers:

If we look today to have others see us through this humane concept of the message of Islam, we have to protect this great message from flaws and concepts which do not measure up to its wisdom and justice, for it is indeed a lofty message and a just and divine law.



Brothers:

On this occasion I say to you, that many questions have been raised with the establishment of this council and many things have been said; but our reply to all inquirers who seek the truth is that Shura in Islam can only be granted to those who have honesty in words, actions, and opinions, and in the proclaimed vision of what is true. This is what we understand and want to protect, to safeguard from faults and errors in an era of change, political and economic, in security and in information. We also say to you, brothers and citizens, that there is no room for hesitation in advice and consultation. We speak out, and remain committed, within the service of God, His religion, our homeland and its citizens, and we will, God willing, be sincere in performing this service.

As my brother the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques has said, the doors are open, and the hearts and minds are vigilant, God willing, for all citizens and those in need.

May the peace, mercy and blessings of Allah be upon you.

Source: Press release, Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington, D.C., January 15, 1996.

Notes

Introduction

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2. Prince Abdallah's remarks were first published on August 18, 1962, in *al-Safa* and *al-Hayat*, two leading Beirut dailies. See Gerald De Gaury, *Faisal: King of Saudi Arabia*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966, pp. 107–108.
3. Stanley Reed, "A Princely Power Struggle Could Shake the House of Saud," *Business Week*, December 25, 1995, p. 56; see also Kathy Evans, "Saudi Arabia: Shifting Sands at the House of Saud," *The Middle East Magazine*, number 253, February 1996, pp. 6–9.
4. An altered version of this introduction was first published in Joseph A. Kechichian, "Saudi Arabia's Will to Power," *Middle East Policy* 7:2, February 2000, pp. 47–60.
5. The body of water that separates the Arabian Peninsula and Iran is known as the Persian Gulf in Western sources and Arabian Gulf in Arab references.
6. Among the more useful introductory volumes on Saudi Arabia, see Hassan Abdul-Hay Gazzaz, *Al-Amn Allazi Na'ishuha* [The Security We Enjoy], 2 volumes, 3rd edition, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Dar Al-'Ilm Printing and Publishing Co., 1993 (a one-volume summary was published in English under the same title in 1992). See also H. St. John Philby, *Sa'udi Arabia*, London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1955; John S. Habib, *Bin Sa'ud's Warriors of Islam: The Ikhwan of Najd and Their Role in the Creation of the Sa'udi Kingdom, 1910–1930*, Leiden, the Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1978; and Joseph Kostiner, *The Making of Saudi Arabia 1916–1936: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State*, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
7. David Holden and Richard Johns, *The House of Saud: The Rise and Rule of the Most Powerful Dynasty in the Arab World*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981, pp. 42, 101.
8. The solution was not always so simple. According to one report, Khalid bin Muhammad bin Abdul Rahman died in a mysterious hunting accident after Abdul Aziz's nephew had repeatedly attempted to have Abdul Aziz's son and the country's next King, Saud, assassinated. See Alexander Bligh, *From Prince to King: Royal Succession in the House of Saud in the Twentieth Century*, New York and London: New York University Press, 1984, pp. 32–33.
9. Abdallah bin Jiluwi ruled the province from 1913 to 1936, at which point his son Saud took over.

10. Holden, *op. cit.*, p. 203.
11. De Gaury, *op. cit.*, p. 95.
12. For a good recent introduction to the subject, see Simon Henderson, *After King Fahd: Succession in Saudi Arabia*, policy paper number 37, 2nd edition, Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1995.
13. The choice of a non-Sudayri, Abdallah, was reported to have been a compromise born of a desire to limit the power faction of the Sudayris within the royal family. See Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Saudi King Issues Decrees to Revise Governing System," *The New York Times*, March 2, 1992, p. 1.
14. Abdallah was largely preoccupied with the internal affairs of the Kingdom until King Fahd's illness in 1996–1997 burdened the Heir Apparent with the monarch's myriad duties.
15. For a definitive study of the Al Rashid, see Madawi Al Rasheed, *Politics in an Arabian Oasis: The Rashidi Tribal Dynasty*, London and New York: I. B. Tauris & Co. Limited, 1991. See also A. Al Uthaymin, *Nashat Imarat al Rashid* [Accomplishments of the Al Rashid Emirate], Riyadh: n.p., 1981; and Bligh, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
16. Although highly critical of the Al Saud, Nasir Al-Said's tome on the family contains rich details on individual members, especially those originating in the Al Sudayri branch. See Nasir Al-Said, *Tarikh Al Saud* [History of the Al Saud], 2 volumes, Beirut: Al-Ittihad Press, 1985.
17. Khaled bin Sultan (with Patrick Seale), *Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander*, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 1995.
18. "Prince Khaled's Departure is Unexplained," *Country Report Saudi Arabia 4–91*, London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1991, p. 12.
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20. F. Gregory Gause III, *Saudi-Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990, pp. 150–162.
21. As was the case in the early 1960s, when the so-called free princes rallied behind King Saud as the fallen monarch struggled to overturn his initial deposition. See De Gaury, *op. cit.*, pp. 130–138, and Bligh, *op. cit.*, pp. 64–70.
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23. Christine Moss Helms, *The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia: Evolution of Saudi Arabia*, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, p. 57. (Helms's discussion of "The Influence of the Tribal Segmentary System upon Political and Social Organization in Central Arabia," pp. 51–70, is extraordinarily analytical and informative.)
24. Noel J. Coulson, *A History of Islamic Law*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964, pp. 9–20.
25. For a thorough discussion of the caliphate from both Sunni and Shia perspectives, see Henri Laoust, *Le Califat Dans La Doctrine de Ras[h]id Rida*, Paris: Librairie d'Amerique et d'Orient, 1986; and Abdulaziz Abdulhussein Sachedina,

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26. M. A. Shaban, *The Abbasid Revolution*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
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30. Bernard Lewis, "Politics and War," in Joseph Schacht with C. E. Bosworth (eds.), *The Legacy of Islam*, 2nd edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974, pp. 156–209.
31. Gary Samuel Samore, *Royal Family Politics in Saudi Arabia (1953–1982)*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, December 1983, pp. 9–10.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
33. *Ibid.* See also Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 597–598.
34. Samore, *op. cit.*, pp. 11–12. See also Al Rasheed, *op. cit.*, especially, pp. 53–66.
35. Al Rasheed, *op. cit.*, p. 59.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 60.
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 63–64.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 64–66.
39. David Howarth, *The Desert King: The Life of Ibn Saud*, London: Quartet Books, 1965, 1980, pp. 42–52.
40. Philby, *op. cit.*, pp. 265–291; see also Kostiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 10, 185–188.
41. On the 1744 alliance between the Al Saud and Al Shaykh families, see Ayman Al-Yassini, *Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 21–37. See also Ahmad Abdul Ghafur, *Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab*, Makkah: Muassasat Makkah Lil-Nashr, 1979; and Helms, *op. cit.*, pp. 76–126. The use of "unitarian," rather than "Wahhabism," throughout this study is not intended to equate the religious creed to its Christian namesake. On the contrary, the preference for "unitarian" is to avoid perpetuating any pejorative connotations associated with Wahhabism in some Western sources.
42. Abdul Saleh Al Uthaymin, *Tarikh al-Mamlakat Al-Arabiyyah al-Sa'udiyah* [History of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia], volume 1, Riyadh: n.p., 1984, 1995, pp. 105–113. See also Samore, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
43. Al Uthaymin, *ibid.*, 151–207.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 219–224.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 232–234.
46. The details of this particular change in leadership are rather complex because Faysal was away campaigning in Bahrain. In the event, his eventual return was "accelerated," perhaps by the British, who by then were fully aware of the need for stability in the area. See *ibid.*, pp. 237–241.

47. *Ibid.*, pp. 242–249.
48. Gary Troeller, *The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Sa'ud*, London: Frank Cass, 1976, pp. 15–19.
49. H. St. John Philby, *Sa'udi Arabia*, London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1955, pp. 160–168.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 253–281; see also Al Rasheed, *op. cit.*, pp. 150–158; and Samore, *op. cit.*, pp. 26–28.
51. This study is based on specific interviews conducted during the past few years to clarify how current and future Saudi leaders perceive authority. Appendix 1 lists interviews conducted for this as well as for the author's companion volume under preparation, *The National Security of Saudi Arabia*.
52. See for example Mordechai Abir, *Saudi Arabia in the Oil Era: Regime and Elites; Conflict and Collaboration*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988, pp. 63–68, 108–120, 178–188; see also F. Gregory Gause III, *Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994, pp. 78–118.
53. Henderson, *op. cit.* Henderson writes frequently on this subject for *The Financial Times* of London, where he covers Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.
54. Majid Khadduri, *Arab Contemporaries: The Role of Personalities in Politics*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1973. See also idem, *Arab Personalities in Politics*, Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1981.
55. Lawrence I. Conrad (ed.), *The Formation and Perception of the Modern Arab World: Studies by Marwan R. Buheiry*, Princeton, New Jersey: The Darwin Press, Inc., 1989.
56. Biographies of key grandsons of King Abdul Aziz bin Saud Al Saud were compiled to separate the wheat from the chaff. Special attention was devoted to education, background, family contacts, marriages (if any), and special skills. In addition, how outsiders saw these key princes was also discussed. To better answer many of the questions raised here, a comprehensive research effort was undertaken to prepare the analytical construct presented throughout this volume. Toward that end, an effort was made to canvass the available literature on a number of Saudi officials, including what family trees, educational records, and specialized newsletters revealed. Moreover, Saudi opposition sources, which compiled a good deal of data on a number of junior officials, were also consulted—but the information was used only when it could be independently corroborated. Compiling biographies was not easy, and few scholars have ventured into the field given logistical difficulties associated with such endeavors. Finally, identifying key young princes' views on secularism, religious questions, and political participation was also difficult, since inferences from such assessments would help clarify the rise of alliances within the family. What were new generation leaders' outlooks on the behavior of the family, and how well did they think they were doing, both as a family as well as individually, proved almost impossible to answer. Still, an effort was made to identify their base of support within the family, associations that revealed the nuclei of specific alliances, and the identity of potential leaders and backers.
57. In analyzing potential leaders' views of intrinsic security issues, the aim was to infer what was the criteria for the family to survive as a family in power. Who was more likely to place the interests of the family above their own? What types

of alliances were most likely to ensure the unity of the ruling family in 2005 and beyond? And how did key young princes see the evolution of family politics? In this instance as well an effort was made to identify key princes' perspectives on working with other family members to form stronger units. This effort proved to be the most difficult in the entire study. Any inferences regarding the survival of the family, for example, necessitated a sound understanding of how senior and junior Saudi officials interacted at present and were likely to interact in the future. More important, the effort required a careful reading of potential alliances that could form within the Al Saud ruling family, to better ascertain how future leaders would ensure their authority.

58. Appendix 1 lists the interviews conducted for this study and, more important, the level of confidence earned throughout the region. While few Gulf officials allow one to take notes, jotting down major points immediately after each interview proved an effective and workable method. In no case did I submit a written list of questions, since I was far more interested in immediate responses than processed answers. Conversely, informal interviews were preferred, to put interlocutors at ease and draw more substance than polite responses.

Chapter 1

1. For a good discussion of the Al Saud ruling family see David Holden and Richard Johns, *The House of Saud: The Rise and Rule of the Most Powerful Dynasty in the Arab World*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981.
2. King Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman fathered at least 36 sons and perhaps an equal number of daughters. He accomplished this feat with 17 known wives, although he was always married to only 4 at any given time, even if several stood out as his "favorites." Given cultural and religious sensitivities regarding wives, and in the absence of a Saudi source clarifying this subject, the most authoritative genealogical reference book is by a former British military attaché in the Kingdom. See Brian Lees, *A Handbook of the Al Saud Family of Saudi Arabia*, London: Royal Genealogies, 1980. An equally useful scholarly source, with several additions and clarifications, is Alexander Bligh, *From Prince to King: Royal Succession in the House of Saud in the Twentieth Century*, New York and London: New York University Press, 1984.
3. The Saud Al-Kabir, Araif, and Jiluwi succession bids around the turn of the century were soundly rejected by Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman, either through battle, marital connections, and/or co-option. When his cousins, the sons of Saud, opposed him—they were responsible for a serious uprising among the Ajman and Hazazina tribes in 1908—Abdul Aziz harnessed the power of his Ikhwan troops to end the revolt. In one episode, he gathered 19 of the captured leaders together at the town of Laila and conducted an impressive public execution. After 18 had fallen under the sword, the victor pardoned the 19th and "bade him to go free and tell what he had seen of the just vengeance of Ibn Saud." This example of stern justice immensely expanded Abdul Aziz's prestige with the tribesmen, who increasingly supported him. See Harold C. Armstrong, *Lord of Arabia: Ibn Saud, An Intimate Study of a King*, London: Arthur Barker, Ltd., 1934, p. 97. By relying on force, the founder established his impeccable credentials, even if his actions crystallized family rivalries. For further details on

- this issue, see Gary Samuel Samore, *Royal Family Politics in Saudi Arabia (1953–1982)*, doctoral dissertation, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, 1983, pp. 36–47.
4. David Howarth, *The Desert King: The Life of Ibn Saud*, London: Quartet Books, 1965, 1980. See also Muhammad Jalal Kishk, *Al-Saudiyyun Wal-Hal Al-Islami* [The Saudis and the Islamic Solution], Jeddah: The Saudi Publishing and Distribution House, 1982, especially, pp. 19–55.
 5. Saud and Faysal were appointed viceroys of Najd and Hijaz, respectively, in 1926. They held these posts until 1933, when Saud was designated Heir Apparent and Faysal was elevated to the presidency of the Hijaz Council of Deputies. See Sarah Yizraeli, *The Remaking of Saudi Arabia: The Struggle Between King Sa'ud and Crown Prince Faysal, 1953–1962*, Tel Aviv, Israel: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1997, pp. 32–33.
 6. The so-called free princes included Talal, Badr, Nawwaf, Majid, and Fawwaz. In addition, both Bandar and Abdul Muhsin would join in, although their support was lukewarm. See Yizraeli, *ibid.*, pp. 85–96; see also Samore, *op. cit.*, pp. 139–154.
 7. Benoist-Mechin, *Le Loup et le Leopard: Ibn-Seoud ou la naissance d'un royaume*, Paris: Albin Michel, 1955, pp. 467–485.
 8. Madawi Al Rasheed, *Politics in an Arabian Oasis: The Rashidi Tribal Dynasty*, London and New York: I. B. Tauris & Co. Limited, 1991. See also A. Al Uthaymin, *Nashat Imarat al Rashid* [Accomplishments of the Al Rashid Emirate], Riyadh: n.p., 1981; Christine Moss Helms, *The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia: Evolution of Saudi Arabia*, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, pp. 127–150; and John S. Habib, *Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors of Islam: The Ikhwan of Najd and Their Role in the Creation of the Sa'udi Kingdom, 1910–1930*, Leiden, the Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1978, pp. 63–78.
 9. These are Saad, Musaid, and Abdul Muhsin, born to Jauhara bint Saad Al Sudayri; and Badr, Abdul Illah, and Abdul Majid, born to Haiya bint Saad Al Sudayri.
 10. Turki was appointed deputy minister of defense in 1969 but resigned in May 1979 after a marital scandal.
 11. See chapter 2.
 12. Another example of the reinforcement of the Fahd-Sultan alliance is the policy of arms purchases from Western sources, especially the United States, although the evidence to confirm this inference is anecdotal.
 13. Abbas R. Kelidar, "The Problem of Succession in Saudi Arabia," *Asian Affairs* 9:1, February 1978, pp. 23–30.
 14. Yizraeli, *op. cit.*, pp. 63–64.
 15. William Powell, *Saudi Arabia and Its Royal Family*, Secaucus, New Jersey: Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1982, pp. 240–245.
 16. This theme is developed in some detail in chapter 2 below. See also appendix 7.
 17. For a more complete list of nominees, see H. St. John Philby, *Sa'udi Arabia*, London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1955, pp. 298–358; and Yizraeli, *op. cit.*, pp. 75–82.
 18. Yizraeli, *op. cit.*, pp. 56–60.
 19. Mordechai Abir, *Saudi Arabia in the Oil Era: Regime and Elites; Conflict and Collaboration*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988, pp. 135–139.
 20. Holden, *op. cit.*, pp. 507, 512–513, 523.

21. The prominent role of Abdul Aziz's grandsons in the various armed forces of Saudi Arabia is striking. In addition to some of the sons of Faysal, Fahd, Abdallah, and Sultan, other grandsons serving in the armed forces include two sons of Nasir (air force officer Turki, army officer Muhammad) and one son of Salman (army officer Ahmad). Many others are unidentified, especially if they take their military careers more seriously than their family politics. Still, all "grandson" military officers represent a substantial power investment for their respective fathers, even if it is difficult to draw clear lines between their alliances.
22. Gerald De Gaury, *Faisal: King of Saudi Arabia*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966, p. 32. An account of the episode is also contained in a cable from J. Rives Childs, U.S. minister Jeddah, titled "Rivalry Between Saudi Arabian Princes," October 29, 1946, in Ibrahim Rashid (ed.), *Documents in the History of Saudi Arabia*, volume 5, Salisbury, North Carolina: Documentary Publications, 1980, p. 47.
23. Some members of the fourth generation (the great-grandsons) are also present as officers in the army and in high administrative posts. For example, Saud bin Abdallah bin Faysal bin Abdul Aziz is an army officer, and Muhammad bin Abdallah bin Faysal bin Abdul Aziz is undersecretary of state at the Ministry of Education. The total size of this group is not clear, but it is certain to grow larger and to increasingly play a more active political role in the future. Ghassan Salameh, *Al-Siyasat al-Kharijiyat al-Sa'udiyat Munzu 'am 1945* [Saudi Foreign Policy Since 1945], Beirut: Ma'had al-Anma' al-Arabi, 1980, pp. 45–50.
24. See appendices 6 and 7. It is, of course, next to impossible to know how many princesses survive.
25. For a detailed study on several of these families, see Philby, *op. cit.* See also Powell, *op. cit.*, pp. 201–221.
26. Samore, *op. cit.*, pp. 17–35.
27. Bligh, *op. cit.*, p. 107.
28. De Gaury, *op. cit.*, pp. 92–93. See also Bligh, *op. cit.*, pp. 29–34.
29. Musaid served as minister of the interior in the so-called reconciliation council from May 1958 to December 1960, and then as finance minister from March 1962 until 1975. See Yizraeli, *op. cit.*, pp. 205, 207.
30. David E. Long, *Saudi Arabia*, Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications (for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, *The Washington Papers* 4:39), 1976, p. 28.
31. Holden, *op. cit.*, pp. 269, 461–462. See also Benoist-Mechin, *op. cit.*, pp. 305–310.
32. When the so-called collateral branches of the family are added to the total number claiming some kind of hereditary right in Saudi Arabia, the estimated total for the Al Saud crosses the 20,000 figure, which, without a doubt, is an unmanageable proposition for succession (as well as every other function). Still, several caveats must be made here to clarify these figures. First, although collateral branch members can and sometimes do describe themselves as princes, with the additional honorific of "His Highness" (HH), only direct male descendants of Abdul Aziz call themselves "His Royal Highness" (HRH). Consequently, there are less than 300 HRHs, but a few thousand HHs. Second, many Saudi tribal leaders can and sometimes do also use the title "prince," even if they

cannot and do not use HH or HRH. Third, and except for a few “senior” collateral branch families, the vast majority of such members are retainees and, naturally, not contenders.

33. Lees, *op. cit.*, p. 64.
34. Kamal Adham was King Faysal’s brother-in-law (Queen Iffat’s younger sibling) and, more than any other member of collateral branches, may be said to have played a disproportionately influential role in family affairs because the monarch trusted him. Although King Faysal relied on him for various “confidential” missions, Adham was not without controversy, as he was involved in various oil concession and arms purchase schemes—probably with the ruler’s full knowledge—which, naturally, drew the ire of puritan members of the family. He was dismissed from his post as royal adviser on January 19, 1979, following the Camp David Accords (Adham was responsible for the entente between Saudi Arabia and Egypt), but remained a close confidant of King Fahd before and after the latter acceded to the throne. He died in 1999. See Holden, *op. cit.*, pp. 203, 217, 228, 364–365, 495.
35. Holden, *op. cit.*, p. 477.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 107. See also Philby, *op. cit.*, pp. 268–269.
37. Holden, *op. cit.*, pp. 525.
38. Philby, *op. cit.*, pp. 228–236.
39. Bligh, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
40. For a discussion of the Al Shaykh, see Ayman Al-Yassini, *Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 22–32.
41. Ulama is the plural of *‘alim*.
42. *The Saudi Arabia Report*, number 33, London: Middle East Economic Digest, 1999, p. 2.
43. Philby, *op. cit.*, pp. 179–200, 213.
44. Lees, *op. cit.*, p. 36.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 43 and 48.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
49. Bligh, *op. cit.*, pp. 106–107.
50. Powell, *op. cit.*, p. 230.
51. *The Saudi Arabia Report*, *op. cit.*, p. 2.
52. Although Prince Faysal was loyal to his King, he nevertheless sharply disagreed with his half brother, especially on financial matters and several foreign policy issues. See De Gaury, *op. cit.*, pp. 103–123; and Vincent Sheean, *Faisal: The King and His Kingdom*, Tavistock, England: University Press of Arabia, 1975, pp. 92–113.
53. Peter W. Wilson and Douglas F. Graham, *Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm*, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994, p. 59.
54. For a masterful analysis of the impact of modernization in the Kingdom, see the trilogy by Abdelrahman Munif: *Cities of Salt*, New York: Vintage International, 1989; *The Trench*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1991; and *Variations on Night and Day*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1993.

55. Little is actually known about the family council, reportedly headed by Prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz, the governor of Riyadh. See Said K. Aburish, *The Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall of the House of Saud*, London: Bloomsbury, 1994, p. 86.
56. King Saud's controversial rule cannot be adequately analyzed because so much of what actually occurred is either unknown or anecdotal. No reliable Saudi sources exist and most Western data are inadequate. This section aims to highlight key developments that emerged from this rule, focusing on succession, to better draw patterns. For a detailed assessment of Saud's rule, see Samore, *op. cit.*, pp. 74–229. See also Alexei Vassiliev, *The History of Saudi Arabia*, London: Saqi Books, 1998, pp. 354–368.
57. Dissatisfaction grew over wasteful expenditures, the lack of development of public projects and educational institutions, as well as the low wages for the growing labor force. See Helen Lackner, *A House Built on Sand: A Political Economy of Saudi Arabia*, London: Ithaca Press, 1978, pp. 57–68.
58. Powell, *op. cit.*, pp. 230–232.
59. Yizraeli, *op. cit.*, pp. 63–64.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 203.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 204.
62. Wilson and Graham, *op. cit.*, pp. 48–51.
63. Talal, thus becoming the first member of the Al Saud family to write a public exposé, later felt that Saud was misrepresenting the country and its people and, eventually, fled to Cairo along with several air force officers. See Talal bin Abdul Aziz, *Risalah ilal-Muwatin* [A Letter to the Citizen], Cairo: n.p., 1962?
64. Although several Al Saud family members urged Faysal to take control of the government and the country, the Heir Apparent at first declined, citing a promise he had made to his father to support Saud. Instead of just taking over, Faysal became prime minister, named Khalid deputy prime minister, and formed a new government. He took command of the armed forces and quickly restored their loyalty and morale. This step proved to be a turning point, as later developments proved. See De Gaury, *op. cit.*, pp. 93–94.
65. Yizraeli, *op. cit.*, p. 207.
66. De Gaury, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
67. For the full text of the ten-point program, see De Gaury, *op. cit.*, pp. 147–151.
68. Importantly, Faysal himself flew to Jeddah on the 14th, to conduct business as usual. His main concern was to let the ulama and the senior princes reach an independent decision. See Samore, *op. cit.*, p. 185.
69. *Ibid.*, pp. 186–187.
70. *Ibid.*, pp. 194–195.
71. Moreover, the interesting part of Faysal, which contributes to the modern-day succession dilemma, was his dedication to religious ideals, which he had learned from his maternal grandfather, a direct descendent of Abdul Wahhab. He was encouraged by his mother to embrace and develop values consistent with tribal leadership. For him, political administration was a religious act that demanded thoughtfulness, dignity, and integrity.
72. Summer Scott Huyette, *Political Adaptation in Saudi Arabia: A Study of the Council of Ministers*, Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 57–77.

73. Prince Fahd, who would later become King, pressed for King Saud's abdication. See Holden, *op. cit.*, p. 201.
74. Aburish, *op. cit.*, p. 68 and *passim*.
75. Holden, *op. cit.*, pp. 249–252.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 237. See also Bligh, *op. cit.*, pp. 86–87.
77. King Faysal provided for his deposed half brother's substantial expenses, although hard data are unavailable. He was quoted to have said: "Saud is our brother and we shall do our best to ensure his comfort." See Holden, *op. cit.*, p. 240.
78. Though many of these reports were clearly hostile to Saudi Arabia—especially in the Egyptian press—the consistency of several rumors was striking. For example, Egyptian sources reported throughout 1966 and 1967 that Interior Minister Fahd, supported by his full brothers Salman (governor of Riyadh) and Sultan (defense minister), intended to replace Abdallah as commander of the National Guard but was opposed by both Faysal and Heir Apparent Khalid. Even if exaggerated, it is interesting to note that factions and tensions currently ascribed to family politics may be traced to the Faysal period.
79. David E. Long, *The United States and Saudi Arabia: Ambivalent Allies*, Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 134–145; see also Parker T. Hart, *Saudi Arabia and the United States: Birth of a Security Partnership*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998, pp. 237–247.
80. Holden, *op. cit.*, pp. 377–379. See also Henderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 12–13.
81. Aburish, *op. cit.*, pp. 51–54. See also Wilson and Graham, *op. cit.*, pp. 60–61.
82. Khalid had open-heart surgery in 1972 while he was Heir Apparent, two operations on his left hip in 1977, and a heart bypass operation in 1978. See Henderson, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
83. Ghassan Salameh, "Political Power and the Saudi State," *MERIP Reports*, number 91, October 1981, p. 8.
84. Samore, *op. cit.*, pp. 367–382.
85. Samore, *op. cit.*, p. 334.
86. Bligh, *op. cit.*, p. 91.
87. Fouad Al-Farsy, *Modernity and Tradition: The Saudi Equation*, London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1999, pp. 145–171.
88. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
89. Samore, *op. cit.*, pp. 347–350.
90. Jeffrey Robinson, *Yamani: The Inside Story*, New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1988, pp. 52–55.
91. Samore, *op. cit.*, p. 348.
92. Huyette, *op. cit.*, pp. 90–102.
93. Samore, *op. cit.*, pp. 351–355.
94. Huyette, *op. cit.*, pp. 92–94.
95. Saud bin Faysal emerged as an independent figure—emphasizing the bipartisan nature of his foreign policy responsibilities—but eventually joined the Khalid/Abdallah political alliance. Although he began as a Fahd protégé, he married into Prince Abdallah bin Abdul Rahman's family. See Colin Legum (ed.), *Middle East Contemporary Survey 1, 1976–1977*, New York and London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1978, p. 569. See also Lees, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

96. Turki bin Abdul Aziz's resignation may have been a consequence of changes in family politics following the Camp David agreements, but other explanations include his alleged implication in a business scandal at the Ministry of Defense, the failure of military intelligence to detect gunrunning into Saudi Arabia, and personal reasons. See Holden, *op. cit.*, p. 497.
97. Holden, *op. cit.*, p. 523. See also Powell, *op. cit.*, pp. 326–327.
98. Samore, *op. cit.*, pp. 461–465.
99. This phenomenon was repeated in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the resulting 1991 war to liberate the shaykhdom that polarized the entire region.
100. Bligh, *op. cit.*, p. 97. See also Geoff Simons, *Saudi Arabia: The Shape of a Client Feudalism*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998, pp. 304–306.
101. Holden, *op. cit.*, pp. 422–424, 506–508.
102. Sandra Mackey, *The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1987, pp. 325–328.
103. Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Undercutting Fahd," *Newsweek*, April 23, 1979, pp. 51–52.
104. Tewfik Mislhawi, "A New Direction," *The Middle East Magazine*, number 55, May 1979, pp. 25–28.
105. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* [FBIS], March 26, 1979.
106. *The Washington Post*, April 8 and 15, 1979.
107. *FBIS*, April 2, 1979.
108. Jacob Golberg, "The Saudi Arabian Kingdom," in Colin Legum (ed.), *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume 3, 1978–1979*, New York and London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1980, p. 738.
109. Samore, *op. cit.*, pp. 469–480.
110. "Fahd Proclaimed King," *FBIS-MEA-V-82-114*, June 14, 1982, p. C1.
111. Steven Rattner, "Khalid is Dead; Fahd Succeeds in Saudi Arabia," *The New York Times*, June 14, 1982, p. A1.
112. For the text of Heir Apparent Abdallah's speech, see *FBIS*, June 15, 1982, pp. C2–C3.
113. Wilson and Graham, *op. cit.*, pp. 102–106.
114. Graham and Wilson report that staffers at the American embassy in Riyadh told them that the recall was likely tied to Horan's meeting with the King concerning the Saudi purchase of Chinese missiles. "When Horan protested, Fahd reportedly told him that every country had a right to defend itself. Later in the conversation, Fahd asked for American assurances that Israel would not attack its rockets. Horan infuriated the King by then repeating Fahd's own words that every country including Israel had a right to defend itself." See Graham and Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 106, 137 (footnote 43).
115. Mark N. Katz, "External Powers and the Yemeni Civil War," in Jamal S. al-Suwaidi (ed.), *The Yemeni War of 1994: Causes and Consequences*, London: Saqi Books for the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1995, pp. 81–93; see also Long, *The United States and Saudi Arabia, op. cit.*, pp. 44–48.
116. *The New York Times*, February 17, 1980. See also R. Hrair Dekmejian, "Saudi Arabia's Consultative Council," *The Middle East Journal* 52:2, spring 1998, pp. 204–218.

117. As later developments would confirm, delays in drafting a Basic Law for the Kingdom indeed centered on this key question. See *FBIS*, May 19, 1981. See also the interview with Prince Talal bin Abdul Aziz in "Change Is Inevitable in Saudi Arabia," *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*, April 16, 1998, reproduced in *Mideast Mirror*, April 17, 1998.
118. The so-called liberal and conservative challenges were manifested in public petitions calling for dramatic changes. See chapter 3 below.
119. Bligh, *op. cit.*, p. 22. See also Powell, *op. cit.*, pp. 60–68; and Al Rasheed, *op. cit.*
120. Although Heir Apparent Abdallah does not have full brothers, his two sisters, Noof and Sita, played important roles behind the scenes. For example, it was Princess Noof who "arranged" the marriage of Jauhara bint Abdallah bin Abdul Rahman to Foreign Minister Saud bin Faysal.
121. Abdallah fathered six sons (Khalid, Mit'ab, Turki, Faysal, Abdul Aziz, and Mish'al) and seven daughters (Fahda, Aliya, Noof, Adilah, Sita, Abiyir, and Sara). Mit'ab, Turki, and Mish'al are in the National Guard.
122. Anwar Abdul Majid Al Jabariti, "Al Amir Abdallah Wal-Suq" [Prince Abdallah and the Market], *Al-Hayat*, number 13378, October 24, 1999, p. 23.
123. Faiza Saleh Ambah, "Crown Prince Popular With Saudis," *The Associated Press*, July 31, 1999.
124. Hassan al-Husseini as quoted in *ibid.*
125. The quote is attributed to Waheed Hashem, associate professor of political science at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, in Ambah, *op. cit.*
126. Richard Engel, "Saudi Succession Unresolved," *The Washington Times*, April 22, 1998.
127. *Ibid.*
128. Hassa bint Ahmad Al Sudayri gave birth to seven sons (Fahd, Sultan, Abdul Rahman, Nayif, Turki, Salman, and Ahmad) and perhaps eight daughters, although the names of only three (Jauhara, Latifa, Lu'lua) appear on the family tree.
129. "And Prince Bandar Calls for Institutional Reform," *Country Report Saudi Arabia 1–1997*, London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1997, p. 12 (hereafter *CR-SA*).
130. Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Saudi Crown Prince to Take Over While King Rests," *The New York Times*, January 2, 1996, p. A3. See also "King Fahd's Poor Health Could Bring Forward the Crown Prince's Accession," *CR-SA 1–97*, p. 6.
131. Anonymous interview source; Washington, D.C.
132. The choice of a non-Sudayri, Abdallah, was reported to have been a compromise born of a desire to limit the power faction of the Sudayri within the ruling family. See Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Saudi King Issues Decrees to Revise Governing System," *The New York Times*, March 2, 1992, p. 1. For a thorough discussion of the decree and its implications, see John Bulloch, *Reforms of the Saudi Arabian Constitution*, London: Gulf Center for Strategic Studies, April 1992. See also chapter 2.
133. See appendix 8.

Chapter 2

1. Quoted in Richard Engel, "Saudi Succession Unresolved," *The Washington Times*, April 22, 1998. Earlier, Prince Talal had called for "real and authentic

- elections” in Saudi Arabia. See “Politics This Week,” *The Economist* 346:8058, March 7, 1998, p. 4.
2. For the texts of the speech, as well as the three documents, see appendices 13–16.
 3. Simon Henderson, *After King Fahd: Succession in Saudi Arabia*, Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1994, 1995, p. 21.
 4. Basic Law of Government, Article 5, section (b). See appendix 14.
 5. Basic Law of Government, Article 5, section (c). See appendix 14.
 6. Henderson, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
 7. *Ibid.*, p. 22, footnote 2.
 8. Of the 19 successions in the Al Saud reign to date, a monarch’s rule has gone to the son seven times, and to a cousin four times. The total for brother-to-brother succession stands at 8.
 9. Gary Samuel Samore, *Royal Family Politics in Saudi Arabia (1953–1982)*, doctoral dissertation, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, 1983, p. 483.
 10. Of course, the process was completed in 1993 when the monarch appointed members of the Majlis al-Shura and, in a fundamental departure from past practices, limited the tenure of most cabinet officers to four-year terms—a decision that was periodically “updated” to allow senior Al Saud members to retain critical portfolios.
 11. Samore, *op. cit.*, p. 486.
 12. *Ibid.*
 13. *Ibid.*, p. 487.
 14. These ten individuals were chosen for two specific reasons: (1) all are encouraged by their powerful fathers to assume leadership responsibilities, and (2) all are ambitious enough to accept the challenges ahead. In addition to the ten listed in Chart 1, the following individuals are also rising stars, although not necessarily in the top list: Faysal bin Bandar (governor of Qasim), Turki bin Nasir (RSAF general); Fahd bin Sultan (governor of Tabuk); Faysal bin Muhammad Al Saud Al-Kabir (RSAF general); Saud bin Fahd (General Intelligence Directorate); Fahd bin Salman (deputy governor of the Eastern Province); Turki bin Sultan (Ministry of Information); Khaled bin Faysal (governor of Abha); Mansour bin Bandar (commander Jeddah Air Base); Saud bin Nayif (vice-governor of Riyadh).
 15. The purpose of these short biographical descriptions is to introduce some of the key princes in the Kingdom. No attempt is made to be exhaustive.
 16. According to Said Aburish, “In May 1981, Muhammad obtained his father’s approval and claimed a share of Petromin Oil on the pretext of selling it to a Japanese company by the name of Petromonde. On the surface, this looked like a straightforward commission transaction similar to what members of the House of Saud do every day and which was meant to produce a huge, one-off profit—like those that Muhammad got from many of the commercial deals in which he had been involved. In reality, the purchaser did not exist and a close investigation by *The Wall Street Journal* revealed that Petromonde was part of Al-Bilad, an international corporation owned by none other than Prince Muhammad himself. His Highness was not content with the commission; he also wanted to control the resale of the oil to make more money, and it was estimated that his income from the deal amounted to \$11 million a month for over a year.” See

- Said Aburish, *The Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall of the House of Saud*, London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1994, p. 298.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 60.
 18. For a full discussion of various military uprisings, see chapter 3, in Joseph A. Kechichian and Theodore W. Karasik, *The National Security of Saudi Arabia*, forthcoming.
 19. Opposition forces in Britain maintain that his dismissal was the result of an unauthorized speech—declaring the doubling of the size of the Saudi armed forces—allegedly delivered without the King’s approval.
 20. *Al-Hayat* was a Lebanese newspaper whose credibility and diligence as protector of the freedom of speech cost its owner, Kamel Mroueh, his life in Beirut in 1966. Khaled first rented the name *Al-Hayat* but soon bought it after realizing it could be a useful tool. He turned the newspaper, a symbol of freedom of the press and democracy, into his personal podium. Along with *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, another London-based Saudi-owned daily, *Al-Hayat* covers the Middle East from the Kingdom’s perspective. Other newspapers, magazines, and television networks complement the Al Saud’s media portfolio.
 21. Khaled bin Sultan (with Patrick Seale), *Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander*, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 1995.
 22. Alexander Bligh, *From Prince to King: Royal Succession in the House of Saud in the Twentieth Century*, New York and London: New York University Press, 1984, p. 90.
 23. Interview with Prince Sultan bin Salman, Riyadh, January 18, 1997. The *New York Times* article was published on November 24, 1990, immediately after Washington announced that it was doubling the size of its Desert Shield deployment.
 24. Interview with Prince Faysal bin Salman, London, March 2, 1997.
 25. Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991, pp. 315–332, 351–365.
 26. Because the province was also home to some of the richest families in Saudi Arabia outside of the country’s own royal family, it became pivotal as a trading center. For the better part of the past century, key entrepreneurs derived their wealth from trade, and, naturally, families endowed with such wealth also constituted a potential counterelite within the Kingdom. This was a haute bourgeoisie that needed to be co-opted if the Al Saud were to continue to rule in an unchallenged manner.
 27. See appendix 8.
 28. The ideological attack would come in the form of a claim that the unitarian school of Abdul Wahhab clearly was not holy enough to prevent the defiling of the holy sites. How then could the Al Saud claim that they were more suited to rule over the area in which these holy sites were located? This argument was further supported by the fact that no Quranic justifications existed for a monarchy to claim that it is an ideal form of government for an Islamic state. It was for this reason that Saudis have been so sensitive to Iranian-instigated disturbances in Makkah and Madinah since the early 1980s.
 29. Judith Miller, *God Has Ninety-Nine Names: Reporting from a Militant Middle East*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996, pp. 84–127, 181, 468.

30. In addition to the favoritism displayed through appointments, as monarch, King Fahd is firstly responsible for the financial well-being of his large family, many of whom draw monthly salaries averaging \$35,000 (senior princes can draw up to \$100 million per year, not counting commissions earned from corporations doing business in the Kingdom). With close to 8,000 royals (both male and female), the financial burden is not negligible, and managing senior portfolios, even more difficult. How much is doled out is directly tied to the level of support that a senior member may garner from hundreds of junior princes whose duty is to praise the generous benefactor.
31. Although Chart 2 attempts to classify key members of the ruling family in first-, second-, and third-line alliances, and despite existing solid support levels, it must be emphasized that these alliances are flexible. Depending on the primary succession issue—that is, after Abdallah assumes the throne—the necessity for alternative alliances may exist as well.
32. David Holden and Richard Johns, *The House of Saud: The Rise and Rule of the Most Powerful Dynasty in the Arab World*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981, pp. 42, 101.
33. The solution was not always so simple. Khalid bin Muhammad bin Abdul Rahman died in a mysterious hunting accident after Abdul Aziz's nephew had repeatedly attempted to have Abdul Aziz's son and the country's next king, Saud, assassinated. See Bligh, *op. cit.*, pp. 32–33.

Chapter 3

1. H. St. John Philby, *Saudi Arabia*, London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1955, p. 297.
2. John S. Habib, *Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors of Islam: The Ikhwan of Najd and Their Role in the Creation of the Sa'udi Kingdom, 1910–1930*, Leiden, the Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1978, pp. 136–142.
3. David Holden and Richard Johns, *The House of Saud: The Rise and Rule of the Most Powerful Dynasty in the Arab World*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981, pp. 55–79.
4. Nadav Safran, *Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security*, Boston: Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 74.
5. The 1962 crisis in Yemen presented yet another dilemma to the ruling family. It forced the leadership to turn over, once again, additional powers to the Heir Apparent. Talal bin Abdul Aziz, certainly influenced by Nasser's Arab nationalist fervor, lambasted the Al Saud in the Beirut press. Prince Talal demanded that the rulers work within a democratic and constitutional framework. Shortly after these vitriolic reports were published, he flew to Cairo, where he was joined by three other princes—Badr bin Abdul Aziz, Fawwaz bin Abdul Aziz, and Saad bin Fahd—forming the Committee of Free Princes. For more on the Talal affair, see William Powell, *Saudi Arabia and Its Royal Family*, Secaucus, New Jersey: Lyle Stuart, 1982, pp. 242–244; see also Avi Plascov, *Security in the Persian Gulf: Modernization, Political Development and Stability*, Totowa, New Jersey: Allanheld, Osmun & Company, 1982, pp. 95–96.
6. This was done over strong objections voiced by the ulama, who had blocked the introduction of television in 1959. See Mordechai Abir, *Saudi Arabia in the Oil*

- Era: Regime and Elites; Conflict and Collaboration*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988, p. 89.
7. Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
 8. Powell, *op. cit.*, p. 249.
 9. Abir, *op. cit.*, p. 136.
 10. David Holden, "A Family Affair," *The New York Times Magazine*, July 6, 1975, pp. 8–9, 26–27.
 11. Abir, *op. cit.*, pp. 143–144.
 12. Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 218.
 13. For two thorough studies on Aramco and the myriad developments associated with the giant company, see Irvine H. Anderson, *Aramco, the United States, and Saudi Arabia: A Study of the Dynamics of Foreign Oil Policy, 1933–1950*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981; and Anthony Cave Brown, *Oil, God, and Gold: The Story of Aramco and the Saudi Kings*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999.
 14. Abir, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
 15. *Al-Dustur* (London), January 29–February 4, 1979, pp. 8–10, in "U.S. Presence Seen Troublesome For Country," *Joint Publications Research Service Report 73157, Near East and North Africa*, number 1937, April 5, 1979, p. 25 (hereafter JPRS). See also Fikri Abd Al-Muttalib, "Clandestine Opposition Movements in Saudi Arabia," *Al-Yaqzah Al-Arabiyyah* (Cairo), December 1987, pp. 27–39, in "Russian Author Traces Opposition in Saudi Arabia," *JPRS-NEA-88-011*, February 26, 1988, p. 15.
 16. Powell, *op. cit.*, p. 340.
 17. Al-Muttalib, *op. cit.*, p. 16.
 18. Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
 19. Holden, *op. cit.*, pp. 271–282. See also Steven Emerson, *The American House of Saud: The Secret Petrodollar Connection*, New York: Franklin Watts, 1985, pp. 223–228 and 233–235.
 20. In January 1979, Muhammad Ahmed Suwayli, commander of the Haradh garrison, rebelled, and 37 soldiers joined him and defected to Iraq. He had rejected orders to fire on striking foreign workers. See *Der Spiegel*, August 20, 1979, pp. 108–121, in "Saudi Strength, Problems Discussed," *JPRS-Near East/North Africa Report*, number 2020, September 20, 1979, p. 46; see also "Crisis in Ruling Family, U.S. Relations Noted," *Al-Safir* (Beirut), February 10, 1979, pp. 1, 12, in *JPRS-Near East and North Africa*, number 1956, May 7, 1979, pp. 50–51.
 21. Abir, *op. cit.*, pp. 156–157.
 22. For instance, in 1988, four Saudi Shias detonated bombs at a petrochemical plant in Jubail. A detailed announcement by the Saudi interior minister after the four were executed suggested that the rebels had been trained in Iran. In addition, an alleged Iranian plan to murder Saudis abroad was uncovered; see "Riyadh and Teheran try to mend fences despite conflicting undercurrents and an assassination in Ankara," *Country Report for Saudi Arabia 4–1988*, London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1988, pp. 6–7 (hereafter *CR-SA*); see also Douglas F. Graham, *Saudi Arabia Unveiled*, Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1991, p. 36.
 23. *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* (London), November 1, 1993, p. 1, in "Government in 'Secret Talks' with Shiites," *FBIS-NES-93-212*, November 4, 1993, pp. 25–26; see also

Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Saudi Officials Reporting Accord with Shiite Foes," *The New York Times*, October 29, 1993, p. 6.

24. Joseph A. Kechichian, "The Role of the Ulama in the Politics of an Islamic State: The Case of Saudi Arabia," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 18:1, February 1986, pp. 53–71.
25. The Al-Mushtarin sect broke away from unitarian doctrine in the late 1920s.
26. Plascov, *ibid.*, p. 20.
27. Fikri Abd Al-Muttalib, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
28. Problems between Prince Abdallah and Prince Sultan came to a confrontation in April 1979, when a clash occurred between units of the National Guard and the army. The most violent exchange of fire between regular soldiers and National Guard units since the creation of the state resulted in 16 dead and about 30 wounded. This incident led Prince Abdallah to strengthen the role of the National Guard and to concentrate its units around the entrances of the city, while the regular army was kept outside Riyadh. See "Differences Still Seen Within Ruling Family," *Al-Nida Al-Ushu* (Beirut), May 27, 1979, p. 1.
29. David Tinnin, "Saudis Recognize Their Vulnerability," *Fortune*, March 10, 1980, p. 48.
30. James Dorsey, "After Mecca, Saudi Rulers Provide a Channel for Dissent," *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 14, 1980, p. 7.
31. Plascov, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
32. Pierre Heim, "After the Shock," *Remarques Arabo-Africaines* (Brussels), number 527, 1980, pp. 10–12; see also Joseph A. Kechichian, "Islamic Revivalism and Change in Saudi Arabia: Juhayman Al Utaybi's 'Letters' to the Saudi People," *The Muslim World* 70:1, January 1990, pp. 1–16.
33. R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*, Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1985, pp. 137–148. See also Plascov, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
34. "Government in 'Secret Talks' with Shiites," *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*, November 1, 1993, *op. cit.*, p. 1.
35. "Crackdown on Opposition Feared After Alleged Attack," *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*, September 17, 1993, p. 1. See also R. Hrair Dekmejian, "The Rise of Political Islamism in Saudi Arabia," *The Middle East Journal* 48:4, autumn 1994, pp. 627–643.
36. "Introduction to CDLR," *CDLR Yearbook '94-'95*, London: The Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights, November 1994, pp. xiii–xv.
37. "Seeds on Stony Ground," *The Economist*, June 12, 1993, p. 53; see also Caryle Murphy, "Saudi Arabia Bans Rights Group," *The Washington Post*, May 14, 1993, p. 35.
38. "Al-Salafiyah Opposition Training Camp Found," *Al-Ahd* (Beirut), October 29, 1993, p. 16.
39. Abir, *op. cit.*, p. 77.
40. Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
41. Safran, *ibid.*, p. 104.
42. Abir, *op. cit.*, pp. 83–84.
43. Gause, *op. cit.*, p. 60.
44. Mordechai Abir, *Oil, Power and Politics*, London: Frank Cass, 1974, pp. 53–54.
45. Powell, *op. cit.*, pp. 247–248.

46. Avi Plascov maintains that about 300 officers were arrested in 1969. See Plascov, *op. cit.*, p. 96. J. B. Kelley, on the other hand, argues that 135 soldiers (officers and enlisted men in the army and air force) were sentenced to death and 305 to life imprisonment. Another 752 officers, soldiers, and civilians received sentences ranging from 10 to 15 years imprisonment. See J. B. Kelley, *Arabia, the Gulf and the West*, New York: Basic Books, 1980, p. 271. Finally, William Powell asserts that the whole plot was uncovered when Saudi special security forces infiltrated the organizations, thereby touching off numerous arrests throughout Saudi Arabia and as far away as England. See Powell, *op. cit.*, pp. 349–350. See also Abir, *op. cit.*, p. 116.
47. Taysir Khalid, “The Situation in Saudi Arabia and the Horizons for Development: Agencies, Political Decision-making, and the Special Role,” *Al-Safir* (Beirut), February 1, 1981, p. 15.
48. Abir, *op. cit.*, p. 119.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 119–120.
50. Kelley, *op. cit.*, p. 271.
51. Abir, *op. cit.*, p. 144.
52. “Saudis Welcome U.S. Troops to Stop Saddam,” *Reuters Library Report*, August 29, 1990.
53. “Saudi King Fahd Shares Bush Peace ‘Instinct’,” *Reuters Library Report*, January 6, 1991.
54. For a thorough analysis, see Fred Frostic, *Air Campaign Against the Iraqi Army in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations*, MR-357-AF, Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1994.
55. “King Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud on the Occasion of Eid Al-Fitr,” April 15, 1991, in “King Fahd Speaks on War Outcome, Government,” *FBIS-NEA-91-073*, April 16, 1991, p. 11.
56. “Conscription ruled out again,” *CR-SA*, no. 3, 1991, pp. 12–13.
57. “Prince Sultan is playing a prominent role—in contrast to Crown Prince Abdallah,” *CR-SA*, no. 1, 1992, p. 9.
58. *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*, September 17, 1993, p. 1, in “Crackdown on Opposition Feared After Alleged Attack,” *FBIS-NES-93-184*, September 24, 1993, p. 10.
59. Geoff Simons, *Saudi Arabia: The Shape of a Client Feudalism*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998, pp. 328–335.
60. Joseph A. Kechichian, “Trends in Saudi National Security,” *The Middle East Journal* 53:2, spring 1999, pp. 232–253.
61. “Memorandum Presented to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia by Religious Scholars, Judges, and University Professors” (in Arabic), n.p., n.d., (in author’s hands). A version of this letter, although not identical, was published by the Egyptian daily *Al-Shab*; see “Intellectuals Demand Reforms in Letter to King,” *FBIS-NES-91-100*, May 23, 1991, pp. 21–22. This letter carried 52 signatures. See appendix 12.
62. “A Memorandum to the King” (in Arabic), n.p., September 1992, four pages (in author’s hands).
63. Dekmejian, “The Rise of Political Islamism,” pp. 638–643.
64. Interview with Shaykh Saleh Al-Lihaydan, president, Higher Justice Council, Riyadh, January 12, 1997. Shaykh Al-Lihaydan was explicit in his remarks. First, he insisted that there was a congruity of political views between the ulama and

the Al Saud. Second, he underlined that al-Awdah and al-Hawali were frauds and could not be taken seriously (a disputed view to say the least). Third, he posited that differences between junior and senior ulama were cosmetic and not substantive. Finally, and in a remarkable twist, the shaykh underlined the influence of the Supreme Council of Ulama. He clarified, for example, that it provided the “authorization” to the government to invite foreign forces into the Kingdom in 1990, further indicating that although the ulama supported the Al Saud, they were the latter’s sole legitimizing force.

65. R. Hrair Dekmejian, “Saudi Arabia’s Consultative Council,” *The Middle East Journal* 52:2, spring 1998, pp. 204–218.
66. One observer of the region concludes that dynastic monarchies survive far better than generally credited. See Michael Herb, *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999.
67. “Communiqué Number 3,” *CDLR Yearbook ‘94-’95*, pp. 9–10.
68. It is important to note that the CDLR never portrayed itself as a “religious” organization, even if its founders were high-ranking religious figures. In fact, the CDLR must be considered a secular group (in the Saudi context), for two reasons: (1) because it presented itself as a nationalist organization bent on political reforms; and (2) because it distanced itself from the Kingdom’s ulama.
69. More radical elements than the CDLR existed in Saudi Arabia. The Advice and Reformation Committee (ARC), for example, was headed by the wealthy businessman Usama bin Laden, who was the first Saudi to be stripped of his citizenship in February 1994. According to ARC director Khaled Al-Fawwaz, for years many Saudis “believed that individual petitions would accomplish desired objectives.” “In the 1970s,” he continued, “it was difficult to organize public gatherings and take collective actions. There was no need for the average Saudi to join an organized group because every Saudi had access to high ranking officials, including the King.” In these public assemblies, an individual could petition the ruler, and even if no immediate action was taken, at least a promise was made to look after the particular grievance. In time, especially after the monarch’s health deteriorated, this access was further curtailed.
70. Interview with Dr. Muhammad Al Masaari, spokesperson of the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights, London, February 6, 1995.
71. Interview with Prince Turki bin Faysal, director, Directorate General of Intelligence, Riyadh, January 20, 1997.
72. Interview with Shaykh Abdulaziz Al-Tuwayjiri, deputy assistant commander, National Guard, Riyadh, January 12, 1997.
73. A palace coup would indeed be possible, especially if senior family members acquiesced. See chapter 4.
74. It was unclear whether Dr. Al Masaari had contacts with senior members of the ruling family to discuss his demands. What was known, however, was that his father—a prominent Islamic jurist—his son, and of course he himself were arrested, tried for sedition, and sentenced to prison terms (varying from three months to one year). Al Masaari served a full year in jail (and, according to his testimony, was tortured), and his son served eight months. His father received a more lenient sentence: six months and a loss of his practice (many of his “rare” books were also confiscated).

75. "The CDLR is a Persistent Critic of Prince Sultan—but is More Favorably Disposed Towards the Crown Prince," *CR-SA*, number 2, 1996, pp. 8–9.
76. See, for example, "Al-wada' al-mali yata'azam ta'wilat al-asrat 'asharat miliarat wa rusum jadidat ala al-hajaj" [The Financial Situation Necessitates Shifting 10 Billion and Imposing New Taxes on Pilgrims], *Al-Huquq*, number 39, March 15, 1995, p. 2. A variety of CDLR products were available for consultation. First, there was the weekly *Al-Huquq* newsletter, which often was published in four typeset pages. Periodically, these were translated into English in the *CDLR Monitor*. In addition, the CDLR published an irregular biographical sheet on its "Prince of the Month," which, not surprisingly, concentrated on the chosen individual's alleged corrupt activities. The CDLR also issued periodic "Bayans" (Communiqués) that were always numbered. Communiqué contents were precise and called for action and follow-up. Starting in early January 1995, their distribution was announced and monitored in the *Al-Huquq*, because of the sudden appearance of "counter-communiqués." These were also available on the CDLR home page on the World Wide Web.
77. Telephone interview with Dr. Al Masaari, February 8, 1997.
78. The most prominent Arab who called on dramatic policy changes toward Iraq was United Arab Emirates president Shaykh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan. See Douglas Jehl, "Sheik Shares His Misgivings Over U.S. Policies," *The New York Times*, May 31, 1998, p. 5.
79. The British government was infuriated by the coverage that the London-based CDLR received throughout the 1990s. When Dr. Muhammad Al Masaari and Said Aburish, a Palestinian author who published a scathing volume on the Kingdom, attacked British Treasury Secretary Jonathan Aitken's business links with the Saudi ruling family on a television program, London was furious. This episode did not endear the CDLR to the British government, which faced its own scandals. To their credit, however, the British resisted the temptation to crack down on several opposition movements, for fear of exposing themselves to charges of violating human rights or, even worse, of not supporting "democratically inclined" alternatives to authoritarian rule. In late 1994, Muhammad Al Masaari was served with a deportation notice after the home office rejected his request for asylum, but this was quietly allowed to slide.
80. CDLR, "Nida' min-al qiyadat al-shar'iat li-tajdid Yawm al-tadamun ma' ulama al-Jazirat" [A Call From the Legitimate Leaders to Renew the Day of Solidarity with the Scholars of the Peninsula], *Bayan*, number 34, April 26, 1995, p. 1; see also CDLR, "Yawm al-tadamun ma' ulama al-Jazirat" [The Day of Solidarity with the Scholars of the Peninsula], *Bayan*, number 33, April 12, 1995, p. 1.
81. The cities and mosques identified in Communiqués numbers 33 and 34 were:

Riyadh	Abdul Wahhab Al Tuwayri Mosque
Jeddah	Shaykh Safar Al Hawaly Mosque
Al Qasim	Al Thiyab Mosque (in the suburb of Burayda)
Al Juf	Shaykh Faysal al-Mubarak Mosque
Al Ahsa	Al-Khalidiyyah Mosque
Eastern Province	Shaykh Ahmad Al-Ajmi'i Mosque
Khamis Mushayt	Al-Kabir Mosque
Al-Baha	Al-Kabir Mosque

- It was important to note that these were very large mosques, each capable of handling several hundred worshippers simultaneously. The communiqués specifically called for sit-in protests for one hour after Friday prayers.
82. Interview with a high-ranking Al Saud family member conducted on a nonattribution basis.
 83. *The Washington Post* reported in early May 1995 that 80 individuals had been sentenced to death in the Kingdom since the beginning of that year. Although most of these were for drug-related offenses, several were indeed CDLR sympathizers. This pattern has continued for the period since then, with over 100 annual executions, which, of course, draws the ire of international human rights organizations. See "Saudi Arabia Executes Man for Murder," *Reuters*, January 26, 2000.
 84. Whether alleged supporters of Al Masaari and the CDLR turned the money spigot off is difficult to determine. Riyadh rumor mills posited that the Al Saud were taking credit for muzzling Dr. Al Masaari.
 85. Khaled bin Sultan, *Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander*. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1995, p. 173.
 86. George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1998, p. 320.
 87. *Ukaz*, August 29, 1990, pp. 6–7, in "News Conference by Saudi Joint Forces Commander," *FBIS-NES-90-174*, September 7, 1990, p. 13.
 88. *Ibid.*
 89. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
 90. *Al-Madinah*, August 23, 1990, p. 6, in "Crown Prince Visits Front, Addresses Troops," *FBIS-NES-90-184*, September 21, 1990, p. 15.
 91. *Ibid.*
 92. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
 93. "Foreign Minister Comments on Gulf Crisis," *FBIS-NES-90-174*, September 7, 1990, pp. 15–16.
 94. "Defense Minister Addresses Peninsula Shield," *ibid.*, pp. 14–15.
 95. *Ibid.*
 96. *Der Spiegel*, October 15, 1990, pp. 190–191 in "Foreign Minister Discusses Gulf Crisis, Saddam," *FBIS-NES-90-201*, October 17, 1990, p. 25.
 97. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
 98. *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, October 25, 1990, p. 5, in "National Guard Leader Stresses War Readiness," *FBIS-NES-90-210*, October 30, 1990, p. 18.
 99. "Commander Views Gulf Crisis," *FBIS-NES-90-211*, October 31, 1990, p. 28. See also "Prince Bandar Not Optimistic Saddam to Respond," *FBIS-NES-91-025*, February 6, 1991, p. 10.
 100. "King Criticizes Saddam in Ramadan Address," *FBIS-NES-91-052*, March 18, 1991, p. 23.
 101. Interview with Fahad bin Abdallah bin Mohammed Al Saud, assistant to the minister of defense and aviation, chairman of the Economic Offset Committee, Ministry of Defense and Aviation (in Jeddah), June 12, 1996.
 102. "MEI's 53rd Annual Conference: Leadership for a New Century," *The Middle East Institute Newsletter* 50:6, November 1999, pp. 9, 11.
 103. Importantly, Prince Faysal bin Salman noted that Saudi Arabia was aware of the suffering of the Iraqi people but feared that lifting sanctions would allow the

Iraqi strongman to rearm. He concluded his remarks to the Washington audience by clarifying that “a senior Saudi official once compared the dilemma facing Saudi Arabia to a plane being hijacked, and from the ground Saudi Arabia is attempting to rescue the people and capture the hijacker, Saddam Hussein.” It should be noted that Prince Faysal spoke in his personal capacity, not as a Saudi official. *Ibid.*

104. Al-Khilewi made his comments to the *London Sunday Times*, July 31, 1994.
105. Khaled bin Sultan, *op. cit.*, pp. 142–145; 172–178.
106. Khaled bin Sultan, *op. cit.*, p. 109. See also “QNA: Saudi Foreign Minister Urges Shah to Remain in Iran,” *FBIS-MEA-78-224*, November 20, 1978, p. C3.
107. “Crown Prince Expresses Support for Shah,” *FBIS-MEA-79-005*, January 8, 1979, p. C1.
108. “Prince Abdallah Grants Interview to Gulf News Agency,” *FBIS-MEA-79-081*, April 25, 1979, p. C2. See also “Further Interview,” *FBIS-MEA-79-221*, November 14, 1979, p. C8.
109. “Defense Minister Grants Interview on Military Issues,” *FBIS-MEA-79-218*, November 8, 1979, p. C2.
110. *Ar-Riyadh*, February 23, 1980, p. 3, in “Amir Fahd Discusses Domestic Situation, Mideast Events,” *FBIS-MEA-80-041*, February 28, 1980, p. C7.
111. “King Khaled, Prince Fahd Congratulate Bani-Sadr,” *FBIS-MEA-80-027*, p. C4.
112. Khaled bin Sultan, *op. cit.*, p. 143.
113. “Text of Foreign Minister’s Speech to UN General Assembly,” *FBIS-MEA-80-201*, October 15, 1980, p. C5.
114. “Prince Fahd on Gulf Security, Call for Jihad,” *FBIS-MEA-81-015*, January 23, 1981, p. C1. In February 1992, or a decade after repeatedly calling for a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq, King Fahd revealed that he had warned President Saddam Hussein about fighting, but in the event, the Iraqi insisted that Iran be attacked while it was—allegedly—weakened by the revolution. See “King Fahd Cited on Foreign, Domestic Policy,” *FBIS-NES-92-031*, February 14, 1992, p. 21.
115. “Kuwait’s *As-Siyasah* Interviews Defense Minister,” *FBIS-MEA-81-024*, November 5, 1981, p. C7.
116. The monarch provided the following details for the \$25.7 billion: \$5.84 billion in grant aid, \$9.25 billion in concessional loans, \$6.75 billion in oil aid, \$3.74 billion in military and transport equipment, \$95 million in development loans, \$21.3 million in payment for asphalt-spreading tractors, \$20.2 million in SABIC (Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation) credits, and \$16.7 million in industrial products to reconstruct Basra. See “King Fahd Sends Reply Letter to Saddam,” *FBIS-NES-91-011*, January 16, 1991, pp. 11–13.
117. “Deputy Premier Interviewed on Arab Issues,” *FBIS-MEA-81-242*, December 17, 1981, p. C6.
118. “Fahd on Iran-Iraq War, Iranian-Pilgrims,” *FBIS-MEA-82-215*, November 5, 1982, p. C2.
119. “Crown Prince on Major Mideast Issues,” *FBIS-MEA-83-199*, p. C4.
120. “King Fahd Discusses Arab Regional Issues,” *FBIS-MEA-81-026*, February 7, 1984, p. C5.

121. "Prince Sultan Interviewed on Syria, Gulf War," *FBIS-MEA-83-093*, May 12, 1983, p. C2.
122. Khaled bin Sultan, *op. cit.*, p. 145.
123. "King Fahd on Arab Unity, OPEC, Gulf Market," *FBIS-MEA-87-097*, May 20, 1987, p. C3.
124. *Al-Abram*, January 15, 1988, pp. 3, 7, in "King Fahd Interviewed on GCC, Arab Affairs," *FBIS-NES-88-012*, January 20, 1988, p. 22.
125. "King Fahd on Iran Ties, Hajj, Missiles, Hijack," *FBIS-NES-88-084*, May 2, 1988, p. 18.
126. *Ibid.*
127. *Ibid.*
128. "Foreign Minister Interviewed on Regional Problems," *FBIS-NES-88-214*, November 4, 1988, p. 21.
129. "Paper Cites Foreign Minister on Ties with Iran," *FBIS-NES-88-216*, November 8, 1988, p. 26.
130. "Kuwaiti Editors Interview King Fahd on Issues: On GCC, Iran," *FBIS-NES-88-219*, November 14, 1988, p. 24.
131. "Prince Sultan on Ties with Iran, Defense Spending," *FBIS-NES-88-222*, November 17, 1988, p. 16.
132. "Text of Agreement," *FBIS-NES-89-058*, March 28, 1989, p. 22.
133. "King Interviewed on Iraq, Arab Solidarity," *FBIS-NES-94-205*, October 24, 1994, p. 32. See also "King Fahd on Iraq, Boycott, Detainees, Egypt," *FBIS-NES-94-204*, October 21, 1994, p. 28.
134. "Prince Sultan Speaks at UN Session," *FBIS-NES-95-205*, October 24, 1995, p. 24.
135. "Prince Saud al-Faisal Addresses UN," *FBIS-NES-95-198*, October 13, 1995, p. 27.
136. *Ibid.*, pp. 28–29.
137. "Saudi Minister Sees Healthy Sign for Arab-Iran Relations," *FBIS—FTS1997121200044*, December 12, 1997.
138. *Ibid.*
139. Saeed Barzin, "Iran: Evolving New Axis?," *Middle East International*, number 600, May 21, 1999, pp. 13–14.
140. Jubin Goodarzi, "Behind Iran's Middle East Diplomacy," *Middle East International*, number 608, September 17, 1999, pp. 21–23.
141. Harvey Morris, "Saudi Arabia/Iran: Partnership," *Arabies Trends*, number 22, July-August 1999, pp. 14–15.
142. "Iran's Rafsanjani Visits HQ of Saudi National Guard," *FBIS—FTS19980-222000537*, February 22, 1998.
143. "Saudi Defense Minister Speaks in Tehran," *FBIS—FTS19990502000136*, May 2, 1999.
144. From a UAE perspective, President Khatami's charm necessitated skillful Arab persuasion to help settle the disputes over the occupied Abu Musa and Tunb islands. In the event, Riyadh accepted Teheran's pledge to help solve the conflict—but no more—further disappointing Shaykh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan and distancing Saudi Arabia from one of its staunch GCC allies.

Chapter 4

1. Without implying similarities between that case and the current situation, the fact of the matter is that “corrective moves” are not new to the Kingdom and, under certain circumstances, could well occur again. Historically, intrafamily changes have been routine, often with sanguinary consequences. In King Saud’s case, senior members of the ruling family agreed that the monarch was unfit to rule and, to save the day, called on Prince Faysal to assume the reigns of authority.
2. Given the supersensitive nature of this subject, any discussions that Al Saud family members entertained on its various permutations were strictly confidential. Few would venture to entertain the possibility that a member of the family would attempt a coup, although several honestly acknowledged that the Kingdom was not immune to such a threat. Most raised the theoretical possibility of a military coup in the United States in defending their views. While the comparison is theoretical (given the vast bureaucracy and myriad checks and balances in place in the United States), there is an element of truth to this interpretation. Where several erred was in comparing Saudi Arabia with the United States, two entirely different societies, where the loci of power are diametrically opposed: a parliamentary democracy versus an absolute monarchy. Still, such remarks could be interpreted as follows: first, a military coup can occur in Saudi Arabia (after all, several past attempts were well known to have occurred), and second, a successful military coup would require a member (or members) of the Al Saud family participating in it.
3. Arbitrarily choosing 3 million barrels per day, for example, would introduce a dramatic factor on price stability. The 3 mbpd figure was long believed the minimum level needed to sustain Riyadh’s expenditures. Such an action would remove an estimated 5 million to 6 million barrels of oil per day from the world market, precipitating a worldwide financial mini-crisis.

Chapter 5

1. Majid Khadduri, *Arab Personalities in Politics*, Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1981, p. 9. Khadduri’s seminal work on Arab leaders emphasizes the role of personalities in Middle Eastern political life. Saudi leaders took into account the governance of a population but also of a large and complex family with multifaceted interests.

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