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Author(s): Yaacov Lev

Source: *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Aug., 1987), pp. 337-365

Published by: Cambridge University Press

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/163658>

Accessed: 21/06/2010 14:59

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Yaacov Lev

ARMY, REGIME, AND SOCIETY IN FATIMID EGYPT, 358–487/968–1094

INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM

Tensions between the regime and the army are a crucial component for the understanding of Fatimid history and, as will be shown, they had a mostly destabilizing impact on society and the economy. A host of factors shaped the relationship between the regime, the army, and society. Among these factors, the socio-military composition of the army was especially important. The composition of the army was partly an outcome of deliberate policies of the regime, partly a consequence of local conditions, and partly a reflection of wider Islamic practices. In the case of the Fatimids, the local conditions of Ifrīqiya (Tunisia) and Egypt and the military traditions of the deposed regimes of the Aghlabids and the Ikhshidids must be taken into consideration. Fatimid reliance on the Berbers of Kutāma was not much a matter of a choice; they were the first adherents of the Fatimids and had helped bring them to power in Ifrīqiya. However, from the earliest years of Fatimid rule the Aghlabid military traditions and local conditions were reflected in the composition of the Fatimid army and had an influence on Fatimid policies. Conditions in Egypt played a smaller role in shaping the Fatimid army. Certain elements of the defeated Egyptian army (the Ikhshīdiyya and the Kāfūriyya) were incorporated into the Fatimid army while others were disbanded. The Fatimid drive into Palestine and Syria, whose ultimate goal was Baghdad, confronted the Fatimids with militarily superior armies built on the model of the Buyid-^cAbbasid and the Byzantines. As a result, the Fatimid imam al-^cAzīz (365–386/975–996) and his vizier, Ya^cqūb ibn Killis, reformed the Fatimid army. The most important feature of their reform was the inclusion of Turkish military manpower (slaves and freedmen). The Turkish warriors served as cavalry and archers—military specializations not common among the Berbers. Al-^cAzīz made use of the system of patronage (*iṣṭinā^c*) as a vehicle for the implementation of his reform. The outcome was the emergence of a multi-ethnic army with a very marked congruence of military specialization and ethnic origin on the one hand, but no overall coherence and identification with the dynasty on the other.¹

The first section of this article is devoted to a detailed examination of the different socio-military groups which made up the Fatimid army. The information on these groups is of an uneven character. On some groups, such as the Ṣaqāliba, Zuwayla, and Qayṣariyya, the information is scarce and frequently

terse. On the other hand, the data on the Kutāma, Turks, and *ʿabīd* are abundant and informative. My aim is twofold: to collect and present all the available data (for the possible use of other scholars also), and to discuss the socio-military role played by these groups in the Fatimid state. In section two, the findings of this discussion are used to demonstrate the interplay between the army, the regime, and society in the reign of al-Mustaʿṣir (427–487/1036–1094). In sections three, four, and five more technical military aspects (which are, nonetheless, pertinent to the topics discussed earlier) are examined. In the conclusion, the different aspects are integrated and it will be demonstrated how closely related Fatimid military and socio-economic problems were.

THE COMPOSITION OF THE ARMY

The Rūm

When al-Mahdī, the first Fatimid imam (297–324/909–934) took over the remnants of the Aghlabid state in Ifrīqiya, he seized black slaves (*al-sūdān*) and Rūm.² The Rūm went to Egypt with Jawhar’s army and had a quarter of their own in Cairo. Rūm are also mentioned as being among the troops of ninth and tenth century Egyptian rulers. Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn had Rūm troops and Kāfūr had Rūm *ghilmān*.³ Judging from the case of Abū Shujāʿ Fātik al-Rūmī, a well-known military figure of the Ikhshidid period, the Rūm found in Egypt were probably Anatolian Greeks. Abū Shujāʿ was captured as a young child along with his sister and brother in the area of the north Syrian frontier (*al-thughūr wa-l-ʿawāṣim*) and hence the nisba al-Rūmī.⁴ The origin of the Rūm found in Ifrīqiya is obscure, but European origin must not be excluded. Slaves from Europe were abundantly available in Aghlabid Ifrīqiya, especially following the conquest of Sicily. The Fatimids also acquired many European slaves by raiding the Italian coast. For the period of Fatimid rule in Egypt, the Rūm are mentioned only twice in the sources, both references being from the period of the reign of al-Ḥākīm (386–411/996–1021). The Egyptian Christian chronicler Yaḥyā al-Anṭākī says that al-Ḥākīm ceased the persecution of the *dhimmīs* because of the adverse effect it had on his slaves (*mamālīk*) who were described as *abnāʾ al-Rūm*. They converted to Islam during al-Ḥākīm’s persecutions but intended to flee to Byzantium. Al-Anṭākī’s remark is vague but perhaps not entirely groundless.⁵ In a list of military units from 395/1004–1005, there is a reference to mercenaries (*Rūm al-murtaziqa*).⁶ Al-Anṭākī probably had them in mind when speaking of *abnāʾ al-Rūm*. *Ghilmān al-Rūm* are mentioned in a non-military context, however. In an obituary note (Dhū ʿl-qaʿda 415/January–February 1025) for a person named al-ʿAdanī and described as Muslimānī (i.e., a Christian who converted to Islam) it is stated that he left many slaves of Rūm origin (*ghilmān al-Rūm*).⁷

The Ṣaqāliba

The ethnic origin of the Ṣaqāliba is enigmatic and the land of the Ṣaqāliba unidentified. However, their presence in the medieval Islamic world is very conspicuous. From their homelands, the Ṣaqāliba reached Spain, North Africa,

and the eastern lands of Islam. Spain was the main source of supply for Ṣaḡālība eunuchs.⁸ In Ifrīqiya, Ṣaḡālība eunuchs were abundantly available. For example, Ziyādat Allāh, the last Aghlabid emir, fled from Ifrīqiya to Egypt with 1,000 Ṣaḡālība eunuchs, all of which carried 1,000 dinar.⁹ The Ṣaḡālība eunuchs were used by the Fatimids from the inception of their rule in Ifrīqiya. They were intimate courtiers of the Fatimid imams during the North African and Egyptian periods. Among the eunuchs of the North African period, the most renowned was Jawdhar, a high-ranking administrator entrusted with an extensive range of authority.¹⁰ Other Ṣaḡālība served as commanders of both naval¹¹ and land forces.¹² In 362/973, with the transfer of the Fatimid state from Ifrīqiya to Egypt by al-Mu^cizz, the Ṣaḡālība went with him. A lane (*darb*) in Cairo was named after them. Ṣaḡālība were not unknown in Egypt prior to the Fatimids. Ṣaḡālība were in the service of the Ikhshids¹³ and others were in the possession of private owners. In 364/974–975, al-Mu^cizz bought all of the Ṣaḡālība owned privately.¹⁴ The motives for this deed remain unknown. The references do not indicate employment of Ṣaḡālība as soldiers.¹⁵ Maqrīzī, however, on two occasions refers to them as a military group: (1) when enumerating the different ethnic groups which comprised Jawhar's army, he mentions the Ṣaḡālība¹⁶; and (2) when speaking of the *darb* of the Ṣaḡālība which was part of the *ḥāra* of the Zuwayla, Maqrīzī explains that the Ṣaḡālība were one of the groups (*ṭawā'if*) of the Fatimid army.¹⁷ Maqrīzī's information is echoed by Ibn Iyās.¹⁸ Both accounts are brief and no further information on Ṣaḡālība as a military group, or in a military role, is to be found in the sources. Individual Ṣaḡālība eunuchs are mentioned in the sources as carrying out military assignments. However, the vast majority of the references to Ṣaḡālība are associated with service in the court and administrative tasks.

The Zuwayla (or Zawīla)

The origin of the Zuwayla is problematic. The town of Zuwayla (in the region of Fezzan, south of Tripoli in the direction of Lake Chad) was known to geographers of the ninth and tenth centuries.¹⁹ Its population comprised Arabs, Berbers, and Blacks,²⁰ and it was a thriving center of both slave raiding and slave trading.²¹ In the tenth century, the town was ruled by Banū 'l-Khattāb of the Berber tribe al-Hawwāra.²² Zuwayla are mentioned in the service of the Fatimids already during the Ifrīqiya period of their state, but who they were exactly—whether Arabs, Berbers, or Blacks—is not specified.²³ A suburb of al-Mahdiyya was called Zuwayla, but it did not have a military character.²⁴

Al-Mahdī recruited the Zuwayla for a naval expedition against Egypt, the fate of which is known from several sources.²⁵ In Shawwāl, 307/February 920, a Fatimid fleet was destroyed off Rosetta (Rashīd) by the navy of Tarsus. Many prisoners were taken among the survivors and were separated into three groups. Naval officers or captains (*ru'asā' al-marākib*) were paraded in Fustat, prisoners from the town of Barqa, Tripoli (Libya), and Sicily were released, while the captured Kutāma and Zuwayla were slain.²⁶ The behavior of the Egyptian authorities suggests that the Kutāma and Zuwayla were particularly hated and identified with the Fatimids. Zuwayla are mentioned as having fought in Fatimid service against the rebels of Abū Yazīd (332–336/943–947).²⁷ They arrived in

Egypt with Jawhar's army and had a quarter of their own, and one of Cairo's gates was named after them. The Zuwayla also appear in a list of military units from 395/1004–1005.²⁸ Further information regarding them is unavailable. How the disappearance of the references to the Zuwayla from the sources should be understood poses a difficult question. One way of interpretation is to regard the lack of references as an indication of the disbandment or even liquidation of the Zuwayla troops. There is, however, no direct or indirect evidence for this. A more plausible explanation might be that the numbers of Zuwayla troops dwindled because of difficulties in supply and therefore their activity and importance were much reduced.

The Barqiyya and Bāṭiliyya

Both these groups were of North African origin. They arrived in Egypt with Jawhar's army and established quarters of their own in Cairo. From that time on they are referred to as military groups. In 387/997, the Bāṭiliyya were very active in looting the properties of the defeated Kutāmī leader Ibn ʿAmmār.²⁹ In Rajab 415/September–October 1024, units of Barqiyya and Bāṭiliyya were dispatched to Upper Egypt (Saʿīd) to reinforce the governor who was faced with a rebellion.³⁰ The sources contain two additional but non-informative references to Bāṭiliyya for the same year.³¹ Nāṣir-i Khusrau, the Persian Shiʿi missionary (*dāʿī*) who visited Egypt in the fourth decade of the eleventh century, reports that he observed 15,000 Bāṭilī horsemen taking part in a military review in Cairo.³²

The ʿAbid

Black slave troops were used by the Aghlabids as well as by the Tulunids and the Ikhshidids.³³ The Fatimids used ʿabid from the inception of their state in Ifriqiya.³⁴ The ʿabid, along with the Kutāma, bore the brunt of the fighting against Abū Yazīd.³⁵ Although ʿabid are not mentioned among the units of Jawhar's army, they were part of the Fatimid army during the reign of al-ʿAzīz. In 388/998, two years after al-ʿAzīz's death, we find purchased black slaves (*ʿabīd al-shirāʾ*) fighting against the rebel ʿAllāqa in Tyre.³⁶ From the context, it seems that they were part of the Fatimid garrisons in Syria. The great expansion of ʿabid occurred during the reign of al-Ḥākīm. The sources say that al-Ḥākīm bought black slaves (al-sudan) on a large scale, many of whom he set free, conferring patronage upon them.³⁷ The massive inclusion of blacks in the Fatimid army had a destabilizing effect on relations with the civilian population as well as other military groups. Maqrīzī tells of killings and depredations suffered by the population (*al-nās*) at the hands of the ʿabid.³⁸ Nuwayrī says that al-Ḥākīm felt strong indignation against the Turks who rioted against the foreign daʿīs when they became frequent visitors in Cairo during the last years of his reign. Al-Ḥākīm decided to take revenge by putting black officers (*muqaddim al-sūdān*) and their foot soldiers (*al-rajjāla*) in positions of command over the Turks. The Turks resented this action by al-Ḥākīm and a massive fight took place in Fustat (Dhū l-qacda 410/February–March 1020).³⁹ On another occasion, purchased slave

troops cooperated with other military corps (*Qayṣariyya* and the elite of the Berbers [*al-khāṣṣa min al-Maghāriba*]) in looting the markets in the capital.⁴⁰ However, on another occasion, the blacks (*al-sūdān wa-l-ʿabīd*) joined the population (*raʿīyya*) and rabble (*raʿāʿ*) against the dhimmis.⁴¹ Clashes between ʿabid, the population of Fustat, and other military groups took place during the reign of al-Zāhir (411–427/1021–1036) as well. The picture of al-Zāhir’s reign is somewhat distorted. Due to the surviving parts of Musabbiḥī’s *Akhbār Miṣr*, we have detailed information regarding the years 414–415/1024–1025, which were marked by a severe economic crisis.⁴² All of the references to disorderly behavior of black slave troops come from these two years. The army as a whole was in very poor condition and its fighting capability reduced. Nevertheless, the frequent involvement of the ʿabid in disorderly behavior suggests that they were worse off than other socio-military groups. A few examples will demonstrate this point. The population of Fustat lived in constant fear of the ʿabid and panicked easily.⁴³ The ʿabid were unpaid and their hunger reduced them to eating dogs. The worst riots involving ʿabid erupted on Wednesday, 23 Dhū l-ḥijja 415/25 February 1025. ʿAbīd al-Jawwāla (a corp composed of blacks, see below) and robbers (*nahhāba*), which totaled more than 1,000 men, marched in the direction of Fuṣṭāt threatening to plunder the town. Al-Zāhir sent ghilman and infantry (*rajjāla*) to defend the town and authorized the population (*al-raʿīyya*) to kill ʿabid in self-defense. Miʿḍād, a black eunuch, freedman of al-Zāhir, and the leading personage in the court, promised the ʿabid that they would be paid the next day. On Thursday, however, the ʿabid attacked the area of the grain port (*al-sawāḥil*) of the capital looting wheat (*qamḥ*), barley (*shaʿīr*), and other available grains (*ḥubūb*), while also setting houses on fire. The armed mob (*ʿamma*) of Fustat fought them with the help of *al-ʿattālūn* (police force?) and naphtha-hurlers (*al-naḥḥātūn*). Eventually, Miʿḍād himself arrived with the Ṣaḳāliba of the palace (*Ṣaḳāliba al-qaṣr*) to assist in repelling the ʿabid.⁴⁴ Other disturbances caused by the ʿabid occurred in the provinces. *Rijāl al-Sūdān*, which were dispatched to protect Tinnis, rioted in demand of a pay raise and looted the city.⁴⁵ Ashmūnayn was looted by the *Jawwāla* and the bedouins.⁴⁶ The *Jawwāla* who were stationed in the rural areas (*aryāf*) of Lower Egypt (Asfal al-Arḍ) were subjected to harsh punitive action taken against them by the military commander (*mutawallī l-sayyārāt*) of the province.⁴⁷

Occasionally, black slave troops also performed military duties in the provinces and the capital: ʿAbid, for example, were dispatched to Upper Egypt to quell a rebellion there (415/1025).⁴⁸ At a time of a severe crisis in grain supplies, *al-Rajjāla* and *al-Saʿdiyya* were used by the supervisor of the markets (*mutawallī l-ḥisba*) of Fustat to control the grain trade in the town.⁴⁹ Apparently, the force that usually was at his disposal was inadequate to deal with the situation.

Some military formations, such as the *Jawwāla*, can be identified as having been composed of ʿabid.⁵⁰ *Al-Farahīyya* and *Aṭūfiyya* were corps made up of black slave troops.⁵¹ Al-Ḥākim’s escort (*rikābiyya*, suite of riders) was manned by a unit of black slaves called *al-Saʿdiyya*, who, while armed with swords, became his henchmen. They were in close contact with al-Ḥākim who bestowed patronage on them.⁵² Byzantine emissaries who arrived at al-Ḥākim’s court

regarded them as being sufficiently important to distribute presents among them.⁵³ In Jumādā II 395/March–April 1005, for unknown reasons, al-Ḥākīm purged the unit killing 50 men (the total strength of the rikabiyya is put at 100) including their commander (*ṣāhib al-rikāb*).⁵⁴ Additional information on the blacks can be gained from Nāṣir-i Khusrau who mentions 30,000 ‘*abid al-shira*’ together with 20,000 black Maṣāmida troops and 30,000 Zanj, who always fought with the sword. References to Zanj (East African) infantry cannot be found in other sources.⁵⁵ Maṣāmida were Berbers from the Western Maghreb. Nāṣir-i Khusrau, however, says that they were blacks and characterized them as infantry who used lances and swords. In 415/1024, Maṣāmida troops were stationed in Aleppo.⁵⁶ Other references to them are rare.⁵⁷

The Turks

The Turks arrived in Cairo following al-‘Azīz’s victory (368/978) over Alptakīn and his allies in Palestine. Alptakīn, who was of Turkish slave extraction, had fled from Baghdad as a result of internal struggles among the Buyids. In 364/975, he was invited to Damascus with his cavalry of 300 or 400 ghilman by the local leader of the *aḥdāth*, who sought independence from the Fatimids. Alptakīn’s rule in Damascus posed a threat to the Fatimids. There are two main versions of the battle between al-‘Azīz and Alptakīn. Maqrīzī says that Alptakīn led a combined force made up of Qarmatians and members of the Buyid clan who fled from Baghdad with their Daylam and Persian troops. Shortly after the fighting had erupted the Daylams asked for *amān*, which was granted to the Buyid chiefs along with their officers and troops, and Alptakīn was later captured. Alptakīn’s army was 12,000 strong and al-‘Azīz’s numbered 70,000.⁵⁸ Ibn al-Qalānīsī says that Alptakīn and the Qarmatians faced al-‘Azīz alone, and claims that Alptakīn’s losses were as high as 20,000.⁵⁹ The discrepancy between these two accounts is significant. Maqrīzī’s description gives the impression that entire units of the enemy surrendered intact while Ibn al-Qalānīsī’s account precludes this possibility, pointing to the heavy losses which Alptakīn’s army suffered. Ibn al-Qalānīsī’s figure seems highly inflated. Moreover, any unnecessary carnage of the defeated enemy would have been contrary to al-‘Azīz’s intentions and interests, which were to attract Alptakīn and his men into his service. Maqrīzī’s text seems more plausible, indicating that a few thousand Turks were absorbed into the Fatimid army as a result of the battle. The plausibility of Maqrīzī’s account regarding the numbers of the Turks and other Eastern troops in the service of the Fatimids is enhanced by Nāṣir-i Khusrau’s description of the military review he attended in Cairo in the fourth decade of the eleventh century. He saw 10,000 Eastern troops (Turks and Persians) parading in that review.⁶⁰ Al-‘Azīz bestowed patronage upon Alptakīn and used him as a vehicle for including Eastern elements in his army. The status the Turks enjoyed in the Fatimid state is reflected in al-Ḥākīm’s speech (390/1000). Addressing the Turks he says, “You are those whom al-‘Azīz fostered (*tarbiya*) and you have the status (*maqām*) of offsprings.” In contrast, the Kutāma were merely assured of their position and al-Ḥākīm’s goodwill toward them.⁶¹ The Turks were given a privileged position and special bonds of patronage tied them to the regime.

The Turks absorbed by al-^ʿAzīz were freedmen; they established a quarter of their own in Fustat and mingled and intermarried with the local population. In 410/1020, the Turks protected Fustat against the ^ʿabid.⁶² By contrast, in 420/1029, during factional clashes between the Turks and the Berbers (*al-Maghārība*), the ^ʿamma of Fustat supported the Berbers. Maqrīzī says that the Turks were driven from Fustat, but this is improbable.⁶³

The Daylams

The quarter of the Daylams was established some time after al-^ʿAzīz's victory over Alptakīn (368/978). From that time on they are frequently mentioned as fighting in the ranks of the Fatimid army in Syria and Egypt. In 382/992–993 and in 387/997, Daylams fought against the Byzantines in Syria⁶⁴ and a Daylamī emir is mentioned in Damascus (c. 391/1000). In 387/996, Daylam troops were involved in factional clashes in Cairo.⁶⁵ Other references are made to Daylams performing ceremonial duties in Cairo.⁶⁶ Nāṣir-i Khusrau, for example, reports seeing 300 Daylam infantry escorting al-Mustansīr, carrying their typical weapon—the javelin (*ẓūpīn*).⁶⁷

The Ḥamdāniyya and Bakjūriyya

In 371/981–982, several military chiefs who deserted from the Hamdanids arrived in Cairo with their troops. They were nominated as governors in Palestine. Small groups of Hamdanid prisoners were released by al-^ʿAzīz and incorporated into the Fatimid army. Troops of the Hamdanid corps were stationed in Ramla, Syria, and Cairo.⁶⁸

The origin of the Bakjūriyya is similar to that of the Ḥamdāniyya. Bakjūr was a defector from the Hamdanids whom al-^ʿAzīz appointed governor of Damascus (373–378/983–988). Bakjūr's high-handed rule was a constant source of irritation to the Fatimids. Eventually he was expelled by the Fatimid general Munīr. The Fatimids enlisted into their service 300 of Bakjūr's men who remained in Damascus.⁶⁹ In 395/1004–1005, Bakjūriyya is listed as a military unit.⁷⁰ Because of the similar origins of these two units, a Bakjūrī officer could rise to a high rank in the Hamdanid corps.⁷¹

The Ghilman

Parallel to the absorption of free Eastern manpower into their army, the Fatimids made use of Turkish military slaves (ghilman). Both al-^ʿAzīz and his vizier, Ya^ʿqūb ibn Killis, cultivated them. Ibn Killis had 4,000 ^ʿabid and ghilman-mamluks. Upon Ibn Killis' death al-^ʿAzīz took over his ghilman-mamluks. Al-^ʿAzīz also had his own regiment called al-^ʿAzīziyya⁷² and al-Zāhir followed al-^ʿAzīz's example by establishing al-Zāhiriyya.⁷³ Some units of ghilman are mentioned in a list from 395/1004–1005.⁷⁴ In 387/997, the ghilman are mentioned on two occasions; 700 mounted ghilman were sent with an expeditionary force to Syria, and *ghilmān al-Atrāk* were involved in clashes with other military corps following al-^ʿAzīz's death.⁷⁵ The da^ʿi Darzī was killed by one of the ghilman

al-Atrak following his appeal to the *mutawallī 'l-Atrāk* to join his circle (*madhhab*). Many *Mashāriqa*, as well as *Maghāriiba*, heeded his appeal.⁷⁶ In Musabbiḥī's *Akhbār Miṣr*, there are several references to ghilman. Ghilman archers are mentioned as protecting a *hajj* caravan threatened by the ^ᶜabīd.⁷⁷ Other units of ghilman are mentioned as performing ceremonial duties.

The Qayṣariyya

The ethnic composition of the palace corps (the Qayṣariyya) is unknown. The unit was established by al-^ᶜAzīz when he built a palace for his daughter, Sitt al-Mulk, and installed a military unit—the Qayṣariyya—as her bodyguard.⁷⁸ In 386/996, they were in her service and their strength is given as 1,000 horsemen.⁷⁹ In 410/1019–1020, for unknown reasons, Qayṣariyya and other corps, for example the ^ᶜabīd al-shirā^ᶜ, wa-'l-khāṣṣa min, al-Maghāriiba, rioted in the capital, looting markets and setting houses on fire.⁸⁰ Additional references to the Qayṣariyya are from the period of the economic crisis of 414–415/1024–1025. They clashed with the Turks, attempted to rob a hajj caravan, but also performed military duties in the capital and Asfal al-Arḍ, where they were dispatched to fight the Jawwāla.⁸¹ The *Ṣarayī* in Nāṣir-i Khusrau's description are the Qayṣariyya. He describes them as a multi-ethnic force of foot soldiers—10,000 strong—each ethnic group fighting with its characteristic weapons and each having its own commander to supervise them.⁸² The post of the intermediary (*zimām*, a go-between a military group and the ruler, see below) is hinted at in the last sentence of this description, but other points are difficult to accept. According to the Arabic sources, the Qayṣariyya were cavalry, and the number of 10,000 troops is highly exaggerated.⁸³ A multi-ethnic military formation is unheard of in the period under study, and there is no indication that the Qayṣariyya was such a force.

The Kutāma

The vicissitudes of the Kutāma in the Fatimid state are described in a short passage of Maqrīzī's *Khiṭaṭ*. However, Maqrīzī's interpretation of the internal struggle during the reign of al-Mustaṣṣir is superficial. He says: "During the Caliphate of al-Mahdī ^ᶜUbayd Allāh, his son al-Qāsim bi-Amr Allāh, al-Manṣūr bi-Naṣr Allāh Ismā'īl ibn al-Qāsim and al-Mu^ᶜizz li-Dīn Allāh ibn al-Manṣūr, the Kutāma remained the elite group of the dynasty (*ahl al-dawla*). They conquered Egypt in 358 [969] when [al-Mu^ᶜizz] dispatched them with the general (*al-qā'id*) Jawhar. Also, in 362 [973] the Kutāma were the elite among those who came with al-Mu^ᶜizz to Egypt from the Maghreb. During his reign, al-^ᶜAzīz bi-'llāh Nizār (al-Mu^ᶜizz's son) bestowed patronage (*istinaᶜ*) upon the Daylams and Turks. He promoted them and made them his elite (*khāṣṣa*). They and the Kutāma competed against each other and until the death of al-^ᶜAzīz, mutual envy developed between them and Kutāma. Al-^ᶜAzīz was succeeded by Abū ^ᶜAlī 'l-Manṣūr whose reigning title (*mulaqqab*) was al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allāh. He promoted Ibn ^ᶜAmmār al-Kutāmī, appointing him to the post of *wasāṭa*, which was similar to the rank of vizier (*wasata*, mediation, a rank lower than that of

full vizier, or a vizier of second class⁸⁴). Ibn ʿAmmār ruled tyrannically, advancing the Kutāma and paying them salaries while decreasing the salaries of the ghilman, Turks, and Daylams upon whom al-ʿAzīz had bestowed patronage. Therefore, they joined forces with Barjawān, a Ṣaqlabī who was struggling for power. He incited those who were under patronage to move to undermine Ibn ʿAmmār's position. They did this and he was dismissed from his post. Barjawān was appointed to the post of wasata. He employed the ghilman who were under patronage in the palace, increasing their salaries and strengthening their power. Eventually, al-Ḥākīm killed Ibn ʿAmmār and many of the elite (*rijāl al-dawla*) of his father and grandfather. The Kutāma became weaker and the ghilman stronger. Following the death of al-Ḥākīm, his son al-Zāhir li-Iʿzāz Dīn Allāh ascended to the throne. He indulged in pleasures and inclined toward the Turks and Easterners (*Mashāriqa*). Until al-Mustaṣfir succeeded his father, al-Zāhir systematically decreased the power of the Kutāma, reducing their might and ruining their position. Al-Mustaṣfir's mother increased the number of the black slaves (ʿabid) substantially. It was said that their number was in the region of 50,000. For his part, al-Mustaṣfir increased the number of the Turks substantially. The two groups competed against each other. Eventually, a war erupted which brought about the ruin of Fustat and the waning of its splendor. [The war continued] until the arrival of Amīr al-Juyūsh Badr al-Jamālī from Acre. He purged the elite (*wa-qatala rijāl al-dawla*) and established for himself an army of Armenians. From that time on most of the army was made up of Armenians. The Kutāma were swept away and became part of the population (al-raʿiyya). This occurred after forming the elite and the senior echelon [in the service] of the dynasty."⁸⁵

The contribution of the Kutāma to the establishment and survival of the Fatimid state in Ifrīqiya is clearly demonstrated by Ismaʿili sources. The writings of Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān reflect the special relationship between the Kutāma and the dynasty, which originated in their initial response to the Fatimid *daʿwa*.⁸⁶ From the inception of the Fatimid state, the Kutāma enjoyed a privileged position,⁸⁷ which was solidified by their continuous military backing of the Fatimids.⁸⁸ Their military role entitled the Kutāma to privileges, such as exemption from taxation.⁸⁹ The Kutāma were the elite (*awlīyāʾ*, friends, adherents), an expression assigned in the Ifrīqiya period to Kutāma only.⁹⁰ The frequent praise of Kutāma in the writings of Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān describes the pivotal place the Kutāma occupied in the Fatimid state. Al-Muʿizz's behavior toward them was very tolerant, especially with the young generation of Kutāma (*aḥdāth, shubbān*). These were the scions of families who had served the Fatimid dynasty for some time and enjoyed the status of protégés (*ṣanāʾiʿ*, literally creatures [of their masters]).⁹¹

The vast majority of Jawhar's army was made up of Kutāma. Kutāma were included, apparently, among the reinforcements dispatched to Egypt in 360/971 and 361/972, and additional Kutāma troops arrived with al-Muʿizz.⁹² The Kutāma bore the brunt of the two Qarmatian invasions of Egypt in 361/971 and 363/973–974. Campaigns in Syria (launched from 358/968) revealed the military shortcomings of the Fatimid Berber army. The first cracks in the

steadfastness of the Kutāma appeared during the siege of Ascalon in 366/977.⁹³ From 368/978, Eastern military groups were incorporated into the Fatimid army. In 377/987–988, the Fatimids tried unsuccessfully to recruit fresh Kutāma soldiers from their homelands in North Africa.⁹⁴ Both events contributed to the decline of Kutāma predominance in the Fatimid state. This is not to say that they were relegated to a position of unimportance; the Kutāma participated in every Fatimid military undertaking in Egypt, as well as in Syria. Al-^ʿAzīz appreciated the continuing centrality of the Kutāma. In order to ensure a smooth transition of rule to his son, the future al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allāh, then only an eleven and a half year old boy, he entrusted the management (*tadbīr*) of al-Ḥākim's affairs to Muḥammad Ḥasan ibn ^ʿAmmār, an important Kutāmī chief. Ibn ^ʿAmmār arrived in Egypt shortly after the conquest of the country by Jawhar and was involved in military affairs. Under al-^ʿAzīz, Ibn ^ʿAmmār performed administrative tasks.⁹⁵ Following the coronation of al-Ḥākim, Ibn ^ʿAmmār ruled the state for a short period. His rule was characterized by an attempt to restore the preeminent position of the Kutāma. As a result, the Turks and other Eastern groups felt themselves relegated to the position of *ahl al-dhimma*.⁹⁶ The bitter struggle for supremacy in the Fatimid state deteriorated into violent clashes eventually leading to the downfall of Ibn ^ʿAmmār. The effort to avert the social consequences of al-^ʿAzīz's military reforms failed but was not followed by a bloody vendetta.⁹⁷ Barjawān, a white eunuch of al-^ʿAzīz, succeeded Ibn ^ʿAmmār and even though he fulfilled the expectations of the ghilman and Easterners (*kāna yaṣṭani^ʿū al-ghilmān wa-l-Mashāriqa*), he also provided for the defeated Kutāma. The safety of Ibn ^ʿAmmār was guaranteed and his salary of 500 dinar per month was renewed.⁹⁸ On 16 Rabī^ʿ II 309/26 March 1,000, Barjawān was murdered, and al-Ḥākim began to rule independently. His rule was marked by religious ferment and terror: it was a difficult period for the administrative and court personnel of the army as well as that of the population. The fighting capability of the army degenerated. The Kutāma suffered especially; their chiefs (including Ibn ^ʿAmmār) were executed and their *iqṭā^ʿāt* confiscated.⁹⁹ During the rebellion of Abū Rukwa (395–396/1005–1006), the bitterness of the Kutāma toward al-Ḥākim was the reason for the defeat of the first Fatimid armies which were dispatched to fight the rebels.¹⁰⁰ When Sitt al-Mulk staged the coup against her brother, she enlisted the support of Ibn Dawwās, a Kutāmī chief. Her choice was not an attempt to ensure the support of the Kutāma as a group in the conspiracy, rather it was because of his strained relations with al-Ḥākim. Ibn Dawwās was merely a tool in Sitt al-Mulk's hands. Following the success of the coup, she quickly liquidated him without any adverse consequences to her rule.¹⁰¹

As for al-Zāhir's reign, Musabbiḥī supplies information showing the difficult situation of the Kutāma. On 29 Sha^ʿbān 415/5 November 1025, the Kutāma, Turks, and other military groups were ordered to present themselves for an inspection conducted by al-Zāhir himself. Troops without arms were given weapons from the royal arsenal. The Kutāma, however, demanded bread saying that they were going hungry. Instead, their foot soldiers (*mutarajjala*) were given 70 horses and the rest, like other soldiers, were equipped with arms.¹⁰² These

measures were of no avail; slightly later, when the need arose, the Kutāma were unable to mobilize 100 horsemen for an expedition.¹⁰³ Maqrīzī, in his overview of the Kutāma history in the Fatimid state, sees al-Zāhir's reign as a period of continuous decline of the Kutāma's position. However, as previously mentioned, *Akhbār Miṣr* covers only a short period of time marked by economic calamities and further information is not available.

THE REIGN OF AL-MUSTAṢİR (427–487/1036–1094)

Al-Mustaṣir ascended to the throne at the age of seven. According to Maqrīzī, the vizier, Abū 'l-Qāsim al-Jarjarā'ī (Jarjarā'ī is a patronymic deriving from the locality of Jarjarāya in Iraq, on the Tigris south of Baghdad) ensured a smooth transfer of power by paying the troops a regular installment of their salary and an extraordinary bonus. The Mamluk chronicler, Nuwayrī, however, tells about a long squabble between the various socio-military groups regarding their pay which continued for the whole of 427/1035–1036.¹⁰⁴ More alarming signs of instability appeared following the death of the vizier al-Jarjarā'ī (Ramaḍān 436/March 1054), who held the post for almost 18 years.¹⁰⁵ The situation at court was complicated by the unusual origins, in the Fatimid context, of al-Mustaṣir's mother al-Sayyida Raṣad. She was a black slave girl bought by the Karaite Jew Abū Sa'īd (Maqrīzī: Sa'īd) al-Tustarī who was a purveyor to al-Zāhir. The Tustarī brothers, Abū Sa'īd and Abū Naṣr, were merchants and bankers with dealings at the court. Abū Sa'īd's position was further strengthened with the rise of al-Mustaṣir to the throne. His mother appointed Abū Sa'īd as the head of the bureau (*dīwān*) responsible for the management of her affairs. The newly appointed vizier, al-Ḥasan ibn al-Anbārī, hurt the feelings of the Tustarī brothers who brought about his downfall. According to their advice, al-Mustaṣir nominated as vizier a Jewish convert to Islam, Yūsūf al-Fallāḥī.¹⁰⁶ This was the second time a converted Jew became a Fatimid vizier, the first having been Ya'qūb ibn Killis.

Al-Fallāḥī found himself in an awkward position, unable to fully exercise his authority. Abū Sa'īd encroached upon his domain and undermined his position in the court.¹⁰⁷ Al-Fallāḥī decided on his part to dispose of Abū Sa'īd and chose the army as a means for carrying out his aim. The exact details of his machinations against Abū Sa'īd are vague. Abū Sa'īd cooperated with the eunuch 'Azīz al-Dawla Rayḥān, who had become influential in the court following his successful campaign (439/1047–1048) against the bedouins of Banū Qurra.¹⁰⁸ Rayḥān gained the favor of the Berbers (*Maghāribā*) by increasing their pay at the expense of the Turks. The man behind the scenes was apparently al-Fallāḥī, who had begun his career with the Fatimid administration in the bureau responsible for the affairs of the Kutāma (*dīwān al-Kutāmiyyin*), and thus could use his old connections with them.¹⁰⁹ The unavoidable outcome of the divisive methods of Rayḥān and al-Fallāḥī was an eruption of clashes between the Turks and the Berbers in Cairo at the Zuwayla gate. Rayḥān became ill and died shortly afterwards. How al-Fallāḥī succeeded in making Abū Sa'īd the scapegoat for the strife in the army and the circumstances surrounding Rayḥān's death are unclear.

In any case, the Turks held Abū Sa^cd responsible and murdered him hideously. Following his murder, 20,000 troops gathered before al-Mustanşir's palace in a silent demonstration of strength. Al-Mustanşir proved himself a weak ruler; he was terrified and left the culprits unpunished.¹¹⁰ His mother displayed more determination, ordering the dismissal and execution of al-Fallāhī (6 Muḥarram 440/21 June 1048).¹¹¹

These events epitomize manipulative techniques—the deliberate withholding of pay and the fomenting of latent ethnic antagonism in order to set socio-military groups against each other. It also demonstrates that a multi-ethnic army provided fertile ground for the sowing of dissension in its rank. In a broader Islamic context, the events in Cairo recall the more or less standard practices of the ^cAbbasid court at Baghdad and Samarra where such methods were widely used. The inherent weakness of multi-ethnic armies, their susceptibility to such divisive methods came, paradoxically, to be regarded by the political thinkers of medieval Islam as an advantage to a regime which by use of divisive methods was able to enhance its position vis-à-vis the army.¹¹² Also in the Fatimid context, the events of 439/1047–1048, were not unprecedented. From the time of al-Mu^cizz's rule in Ifrīqiya, there are indications of strained relations among the different ethnic groups of the army.¹¹³

For Fatimid foreign policy, the fourth and the beginning of the fifth decade of the eleventh century was a period of setbacks and missed opportunities. The rupture between the Fatimids and their former vassal state in Ifrīqiya was final (440/1048–1049).¹¹⁴ Fatimid involvement in Syria did not yield any great achievements but required considerable military and financial effort. In 437/1045–1046 and 440/1048–1049, the Fatimid army was dispatched to Syria. The second force was especially large (30,000 strong) and costly (400,000 dinar).¹¹⁵ Above all, events which had taken place in Baghdad could not leave the Fatimids indifferent. In 451/1059, al-Basāsīrī, one of the military chiefs in Baghdad at that time, proclaimed the *khuṭba* in the name of al-Mustanşir. The Fatimid imperial dream, the overthrow of the Abbasid usurpation, was seen as on the brink of fulfillment. The Fatimids were unable to send an army to back al-Basāsīrī, but other ways of assisting him were open to them. The presence in Cairo of the Persian da^ci al-Mu^yyyad fī Dīn al-Shirāzī was instrumental for their purposes. Al-Shirāzī was dispatched with a shipment of arms and other supplies for al-Basāsīrī. The Fatimid expenditure was estimated at between one and two million dinar.¹¹⁶ Later historians say that the funding of al-Basāsīrī left the Fatimids penniless.¹¹⁷ They exaggerate, of course, but the drain on the state's resources must have been considerable especially as the period was marked by enormous economic difficulties. In 442–443/1050–1051/1052, the province of Buḥayra was again endangered by bedouins and military intervention was necessary. In 444/1052–1053, and again in 446/1054–1055 and 447/1055–1056, an insufficient rise of the Nile caused severe famine.¹¹⁸ The Fatimids hoped for relief shipments of grain from the Byzantines. The Emperor Constantine IX Monomachus (1042–1055) agreed to supply the Fatimids with wheat, but the Empress Theodora (ruled January 1055–September 1056) revoked his promises.¹¹⁹ In Egypt, the famine had taken a heavy toll in human life and disrupted collection

of state revenues.¹²⁰ Furthermore, in 450/1058–1059, the vizier al-Yāzūrī was executed. Al-Mustaṣir suspected him of unauthorized contacts with the Seljukid Sultan Tughrilbeg in Baghdad. He had held the post since 442/1050–1051, together with the posts of chief qadi and supreme propagandist (*dāʿī ʿl-duʿā*) of the Fatimid state. The state apparatus was thrown into confusion. The turnover in the posts of viziers and qadis was rapid and the central administration was losing control over the impoverished provinces where strong men assumed power (*wa-kharibat al-aʿmāl wa-qalla irtifāʿuhā wa-taghallaba al-rijāl ʿalā muʿzamiḥā*).¹²¹ The slipping of the provinces from the control of the state as a result of instability in the central administration was of grave consequences for the treasury; the flow of taxes diminished.

In Jumādā II 454/June–July 1062, black slaves (ʿabid al-shiraʿ) killed a Turkish soldier. The Turks asked al-Mustaṣir whether he had authorized the killing of the Turk by the ʿabid. Al-Mustaṣir denied this and the Turks proceeded to take revenge on the ʿabid. In the ensuing battle, the ʿabid were defeated. The Turks complained to al-Mustaṣir that his mother was assisting the ʿabid but the truth of their accusations is difficult to ascertain. One outcome of the events of 439/1047–1048 was the strengthening of the position of the Turkish generals (*umarāʿ al-Atrāk*) at the court. Their approval was needed for the appointment of a new chief administrator of the diwan dealing with the affairs of al-Mustaṣir’s mother.¹²² At this initial stage the vizier successfully contained the fighting. Nevertheless, many ʿabid left for Damanhūr (south of Alexandria).¹²³

Medieval historians blame al-Mustaṣir’s mother for these events, maintaining that she increased the number of black slave troops and favored them, especially after the murder of Saʿd al-Tustarī. She sought an opportunity to destroy the Turks. The vizier, al-Yāzūrī, refused to cooperate with her, but in the period of disarray following his execution her will prevailed. According to this line of explanation, the Dowager was motivated by her racial affiliation to the blacks.¹²⁴ This is, at best, a very superficial explanation. My argument is structured differently: I see the crux of the problem in the dynamics of the competitive relations between the different socio-military groups within the multi-ethnic army, and the relations of each group with the regime. This mechanism played a crucial role in the events which followed.

During the period 455–458/1063–1066, the central administration was unable to regain its stability; the rapid turnover in the posts of vizier and chief qadi continued.¹²⁵ Nevertheless, the state was not completely paralyzed. The Fatimids displayed a keen interest in Syria and could afford to spend millions of dinar in support of their allies there.¹²⁶ In 459/1066–1067, a new round of fighting between Turks and black slaves took place, apparently for no obvious reason. The position of the Turks improved and they asked for extra payments above their regular salary. The liquid resources of the state were completely depleted however. The position of the ʿabid deteriorated and Sayyida Raṣad incited the commanders of the ʿabid to fight the Turks. The ʿabid were a very powerful military element. In the capital, Cairo-Fustat, and the villages in its vicinity, there were 50,000 ʿabid consisting of infantry and cavalry units. A battle in the outskirts of the capital was fought which ended in the defeat of the ʿabid who

fled to Upper Egypt.¹²⁷ As for the reasons behind the new round of hostilities, the sources explain them in terms of racial strife between the different socio-military groups. In fact, from 454/1062, a new situation developed and the sources reflect it clearly. The Turks who gained an upper hand in the struggle of 454/1062 tilted the balance between the different ethnic groups in their favor. They emerged as the strongest group, demanding and receiving a disproportionately large share of the state's resources.¹²⁸

Sayyida Raṣād's incitement of the ʿabid against the Turks was not a result of a personal whim or racial affinity with the blacks, but a policy of despair created for the moment. The competition between the different ethnic groups of the army was influenced by such factors as long service and association with the regime, military specialization, and race. Each of these factors was also important in determining the relative position of the socio-military group vis-à-vis the regime. The Turks through brute force gained supremacy, with adverse effects on the other groups, as well as on the regime itself. These groups tried to reduce the privileged position the Turks had gained and maintained by violence. The regime also had every interest in restoring the equilibrium between the various military groups and in freeing itself from the predominance of any one of these groups. Thus, as long as no side gained a decisive victory or the equilibrium was not re-established, the struggle continued.

Regarding the military aspects of the fighting, the most important observation was made by Jere L. Bacharach, who emphasizes the fact that the ʿabid regiments were made up of infantry and cavalry. The main role of blacks in Islamic medieval armies was of infantry. Traditionally, a man fighting from horseback carried more prestige and was better paid than one fighting on foot.¹²⁹ Black cavalry thus endangered the primary military specialization of the Turks and their superior position, thereby intensifying the struggle between them.

Two further rounds of fighting had to take place before a clear outcome emerged. The Turks, under the leadership of Nāṣir al-Dawla ibn Ḥamdān, were the victors. The sources speak of the heavy losses the ʿabid suffered in the capital, but other regiments of ʿabid were in Alexandria and Upper Egypt. Nāṣir al-Dawla fought against the ʿabid in Alexandria until they agreed to the appointment of a man of his choice as the governor of the city. The neutralization of the ʿabid in Alexandria weakened further the position of the regime vis-à-vis the Turks. Al-Mustanṣir's monthly expenditure on the Turks had been 280,000 dinar, but it rose to 400,000 dinar.¹³⁰ The whole system of paying the army collapsed. The Turks became unrestrained in their demands and behavior. They seized the treasures of al-Mustanṣir and divided the income from the provinces of Egypt and Syria among themselves.¹³¹ In 460/1067–1068, Nāṣir al-Dawla concentrated his efforts against the ʿabid in Upper Egypt. The first army left the capital in Ramadan/June–July 1068 and was defeated. The Turks blamed al-Mustanṣir's mother for helping the ʿabid secretly and forced him to make further concessions. A second force dispatched to Upper Egypt was more successful but no clear-cut outcome in the fighting emerged. Despite the losses the ʿabid suffered, the Turks were unable to dislodge them from the province.¹³² In 461/1068–1069, following the second expedition against the ʿabid, Nāṣir al-Dawla

was at the pinnacle of his power, and the Fatimid regime was at its lowest ebb. More treasures were looted from the palace and sold in the markets of the capital. The Turkish military chiefs appropriated for themselves additional sources of state revenue such as income from illegal taxes (*mukūs*) and income from the provinces.¹³³ However, the desire for the spoils of the declining Fatimid state created cracks in the cohesion of the Turks.

A small group of Nāṣir al-Dawla's relatives and confidants aggrandized themselves at the expense of the others, who sought the help of the vizier and al-Mustanṣir. Encouraged by the split in the ranks of the Turks, al-Mustanṣir demanded that Nāṣir al-Dawla leave the capital. Nāṣir al-Dawla, who apparently felt the ground sinking under his feet, left for Giza (on the west bank of the Nile). His house in the capital and the houses of his followers were sacked, but Nāṣir al-Dawla was not a man who gave up easily.¹³⁴ He sought the cooperation of Tāj al-Mulūk Shārī against Ildekuz, who led the dissension against him. Eventually, a mass battle erupted in which Ildekuz and his men, augmented by the Kutāma and other North African groups, and with the support of the population (ᶜamma), expelled Nāṣir al-Dawla from the capital. He sought asylum with Banū Sanīn, the bedouins of the Buḥayra province.¹³⁵ For al-Mustanṣir, the change was only for the worst. The new men in power, whose share in the spoils had been withheld by Nāṣir al-Dawla, rushed madly for the treasures stored at the palace. Everything was looted and sold in the markets or burnt in an orgy of destruction. The country was plunged into the depths of misery from which even the royal family was not exempt. Al-Mustanṣir's womenfolk died of starvation and members of his closest family fled to Syria.¹³⁶ Control over the provinces was completely lost. The Berbers of Lawāta and other unidentified North African elements (*al-Maghāriba*) seized the Mediterranean coast and the ᶜabid stayed in Upper Egypt. Disorder was widespread and much land was left uncultivated. A situation of military stalemate developed.¹³⁷ Nāṣir al-Dawla searched for allies beyond the Fatimid realm. Al-Mustanṣir became alarmed and made an effort to destroy him, but the armies he dispatched failed.¹³⁸ Al-Mustanṣir's failure was offset by Nāṣir al-Dawla's failure to attract the military intervention of the Seljukid Sultan Alp Arsalan in Egypt.¹³⁹ Nevertheless, al-Mustanṣir's manifested inability to defeat Nāṣir al-Dawla tilted the balance in the latter's favor and he successfully interrupted the flow of supplies to the capital. Eventually, a kind of agreement was reached between al-Mustanṣir and Nāṣir al-Dawla; Taj al-Mulūk was nominated as Nāṣir al-Dawla's deputy in the capital, and al-Mustanṣir agreed to pay Nāṣir al-Dawla. The agreement did not hold for long. In 463/1070–1071, Nāṣir al-Dawla's troops burned the area of the grain port in the capital, and in 464/1071–1072, after much fighting, he re-established himself in the capital. Al-Mustanṣir became dependent on the subsidies Nāṣir al-Dawla paid him.¹⁴⁰ Nonetheless, the latter was not yet master of the situation. His opponents, Ildekuz and the emir Yaldakūz, plotted against him. Finally, in Rajab 465/March–April 1073, Nāṣir al-Dawla and members of his family and close aides were murdered. The conspiracy against Nāṣir al-Dawla was a reaction to his ceaseless efforts to seek allies outside the borders of the Fatimid state in order to bring about the extinction of the Fatimid dynasty. His opponents

became alarmed, arriving at the conclusion that they would be the certain losers should Nāṣir al-Dawla's plans be realized.¹⁴¹

In the abyss in which the Fatimid state found itself, only two diametrically opposite alternatives existed: disintegration or recovery. Al-Mustanṣir was successful where Nāṣir al-Dawla failed; he found a strong ally outside Egypt. It seems that because of the havoc in the capital, al-Mustanṣir, left to his own devices, was able to regain some freedom of action. He contacted the strongest Fatimid governor in Syria, Badr al-Jamālī, and invited him to restore order in Egypt. In contrast to Nāṣir al-Dawla, who sought outside allies in order to put an end to the Fatimid rule in Egypt, al-Mustanṣir's aim was to re-establish his rule by overcoming the anarchy in the country. His success, more precisely Badr al-Jamālī's success, was an outcome of two factors: (1) Many groups in Egypt had an interest in the continuation of Fatimid rule, or at least in the re-establishment of law and order in the country. These attitudes are reflected in the welcoming reception given to Badr al-Jamālī by the merchants of Tinnis (on the Mediterranean coast) when he landed in Egypt. Thus, in addition to the support of al-Mustanṣir, Badr al-Jamālī could count on some degree of cooperation from local elements. (2) The military force that Badr al-Jamālī had at his disposal proved to be stronger than the forces of his opponents. After all, the re-establishment of law and order in Egypt and, concomitantly, the survival of the Fatimid regime, were achieved by brute force.

In 466/1073–1074, Badr al-Jamālī arrived in Egypt accompanied by his private army about which, however, we have almost no information. It is said that it was composed mostly of Armenians.¹⁴² Badr al-Jamālī was ruthless and efficient. He purged the Fatimid army and the administration in the capital, leaving a long trail of blood behind.¹⁴³ Many fled to Syria and further north and east. Badr fought against the elements who had seized power in the provinces; he repelled the ʿabid south of Aswan and vigorously fought bedouins, Berbers of Lawāta, and brigands.¹⁴⁴ Moreover, the restoration of order in the provinces had an immediate positive outcome on agricultural output.

There is no better illustration of the magnitude of Badr's success than the defeat of the Seljukid invasion of Egypt (469/1076–1077) three years after his arrival. The people who fled Egypt from Badr's reign of terror induced Atsiz ibn Uvak, a Turkish chieftain active in Syria, to conquer Egypt. In Jumādā I 469/December 1076, Atsiz arrived in Egypt. His local collaborators advised him not to bother with the capital, but instead to conquer the rural districts (*aryāf*) first. Badr was campaigning with the main part of the army in Upper Egypt and only in Rajab/January–February 1077 moved against Atsiz with a 30,000 strong army accompanied by supply ships which sailed along the Nile. The aimless wandering through the rural areas caused widespread desertion from Atsiz's army which shrank to only 5,000. Atsiz showed little inclination to fight Badr. His advisors, however, convinced him that Badr's army was an unorganized force which would disperse at the first trial of arms (*wa-innamā hum sūqa wa-akhlāṭ law samiʿū ṣayha lafarrū ʿan akhirihi*). In the ensuing battle Atsiz was defeated by a combination of Badr's army and bedouins, who looted his camp while he was engaged in the fighting.¹⁴⁵ The repulsion of the Seljukid

invasion marks the turning point in the vicissitudes of Fatimid Egypt under al-Mustansir.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE ARMY

Some military aspects, such as the organization of the army, are not mentioned in the sources, not even *en passant*. Terms such as *qā'id* (pl. *quwwād*), *arīf* (pl. *urafā'*), and *amīr* (pl. *umarā'*) appear quite frequently.¹⁴⁶ Nevertheless, their exact meaning never becomes clear nor is the structure of command elucidated. The information that can be extracted is scanty and general. For example, the Kutāma were organized in cohorts (*irāfa*) under their respective commanders (*urafā'*).¹⁴⁷ The question whether the cohorts were organized along tribal lines or in terms of military needs remains unanswered.

Administrative organs of a military nature are occasionally mentioned. Usually they bear the names of certain ethnic-military groups such as *dīwān al-Kutāmiyyin*, *dīwān al-Farahī*, or *dīwān al-jaysh bi-l-Ramlā*.¹⁴⁸ However, the way they functioned is obscure. On the other hand, we have ample information regarding the post of the auditor and his position in the administrative system dealing with the army.

The post of auditor (*zimām*) and the office of the audit (*dīwān al-zimām*) are well known features of the ʿAbbasid administration.¹⁴⁹ In the case of the Fatimid administration, the earliest reference to *dīwān al-zimām* is from 402/1011–1012, and the holder of the post (*nāzir dīwān al-zimām*) was a person of Iraqi origin with previous experience in ʿAbbasid administration.¹⁵⁰ In the context of the administration of the army, the function of the zimam is not that of an auditor but of an intermediary between the ethnic-military group to which he is attached and the sovereign. The most explicit statement is that of Ibn al-Ṣayrafī. He speaks about the head of the Chancery (*dīwān al-inshā'*) who was also the zimam of the Mashāriqa and the Turks.¹⁵¹ In a list of military units from 395/1004–1005, the zimam of *al-ghilmān al-Atrāk al-khāssa* is mentioned.¹⁵² Zimams of the ʿabid and the Maṣāmida are also referred to.¹⁵³

The responsibility for paying the troops rested in the hands of a paymaster who is designated by a variety of general expressions such as *nāzir fī l-amwāl wa-nafaqāt al-rijāl* or *kāna ʿalā tadbīr al-māl wa-ʿaṭāʾ al-arzāq* or simply *kātib al-jaysh*. When difficulties with regard to paying the army occurred, the troops addressed their demands to the paymaster rather than to the military commander or the local governor.¹⁵⁴

Ibn al-Qalānīsī mentions the Quartermaster-General or Muster-Master (*ʿarīd*, pl. *urrād*) as being responsible for paying and preparing the troops for a campaign.¹⁵⁵ The ʿarid is a well known military administrative post in the ʿAbbasid Caliphate and in the eastern Islamic world.¹⁵⁶ The post of the ʿarid and the institution of review and inspection of troops (*ʿarḍ*) by the ʿarid have parallels in the Fatimid military organization as well. Al-Muʿizz conducted an ʿard before a battle against the Qarmatians.¹⁵⁷ Under al-ʿAzīz, ʿard took place regularly every year.¹⁵⁸ Al-Ḥākim did not maintain that practice.¹⁵⁹ Occasional military parades are also designated by the term ʿard.¹⁶⁰ However, Musabbiḥī,

the eleventh century Fatimid court historian, does not use this term in his description of the review and inspection of troops under al-Zāhir.¹⁶¹ How this should be interpreted is not clear.

THE PROVISIONING OF THE ARMY

The sovereign, the Fatimid imam, was responsible for the equipping and provisioning of the army.¹⁶² Arms were divided among the soldiers on the eve of a battle and when troops were mustered for a campaign.¹⁶³ This does not necessarily mean that troops were without arms during peace time, and they kept weapons in their homes.¹⁶⁴ However, these were apparently inadequate for battle. In fact, arms were freely available in Cairo's arms market (*sūq al-ṣilāḥ*), to which the general population had access. In 403/1012–1013, in response to policies of al-Ḥākim which caused unrest in the capital, the population armed itself. Maqrīzī says that even riffraff (*al-ʿawāmm*) and craftsmen (*al-ṣunnāʿ*), who normally went unarmed, acquired knives and swords.¹⁶⁵ In 415/1024–1025, when al-Zāhir was unable to provide the usual military escort for the caravan of the North African hajj, the Berbers of Maṣāmida, who accompanied the caravan, had purchased plenty of arms in Cairo and had successfully protected the caravan from attack by the ʿabīd and Qayṣariyya.¹⁶⁶ The state itself actually bought weapons on the Cairo market. In 402/1011–1012, for example, arms were bought from merchants (*tujjār*) to replenish the state's armory.¹⁶⁷ Al-Zāhir is credited with establishing the state's armory (*khizāna al-bunūd*), which was an arsenal and a workshop employing 3,000 craftsmen for producing arms.¹⁶⁸

The state was also responsible for the army's riding and pack animals. Accounts of al-ʿAzīz's preparations for war against the Byzantines (386/996) hint at the size of the royal stables. Al-ʿAzīz had 12,000 horses and 30,000 camels to carry his, and his close aides', provisions. The Kutāma were given 4,000 horses and provided with money to buy 1,000 more.¹⁶⁹ The troops usually kept their horses during peace time. In 415/1025, for example, the Kutāma complained of a lack of riding animals.¹⁷⁰ To maintain stables of the size that al-ʿAzīz had maintained must have been a considerable drain on state resources. Riding animals were sent as gifts and tributes from vassals and friendly states. The sources list many examples of consignments including hundreds of horses, camels, she camels, mules, and she mules, with and without saddles and bridles. This indicates the value and importance of riding animals to the state.¹⁷¹ In contrast, weapons are rarely mentioned among the presents and tributes sent to Cairo.¹⁷² Stores (*khazāʾin*) of saddles and bridles were usually kept in the palace. Al-Muʿizz brought stores with him from North Africa. High-ranking dignitaries of the state who had their own military personnel also kept stores of provisions and stables. Details on the so-called *khazāʾin al-wujūh wa-l-khāṣṣa* are not contained in the sources.¹⁷³

The loss of weapons and military equipment during the period of civil war under al-Mustaṣfir was immense. For example, precious items such as Kāfūr's sword, al-Muʿizz's personal weapons, and even the Prophet's sword—the famous Dhū ʿl-Faqār—were looted. The *khazāʾin* were completely depleted.¹⁷⁴

PAYMENT OF THE ARMY AND THE QUESTION OF *IQTĀ*^c

In section three, the functions of the administrative personnel responsible for the administration and paying of the army are discussed. In this section, the system of payment is reviewed.

As can be expected, the expenses for the army and for military campaigns were enormous. No systematic data are available, but scattered information reveals the huge sums involved.¹⁷⁵ The economic consequences are obvious: paying the army under the best of conditions constituted a considerable drain on state resources. Repercussions from an inability to meet the financial demands of the army were discussed in section two.

The Fatimid army was paid in cash, apparently in several installments over the year. My information is derived from a single account describing the arrangement reached between the Kutāma and Ibn ^cAmmār at the time of al-Ḥākim's coronation ceremony. It was agreed that the Kutāma would receive their pay in eight installments (*iṣṭākāt*) of eight dinar per person. In addition, they received an extraordinary payment (*faḍl*, excess) of 20 dinar per person.¹⁷⁶ Thus, the payment of the *faḍl*, at the time of the coronation of the new imam, became institutionalized in the Fatimid state.¹⁷⁷ The system of paying the army in cash on a regular basis collapsed in the period of civil war under al-Mustaṣṣir.

The prevailing view is that during the tenth and eleventh centuries the system of military *iqtā*^c was not common in Fatimid Egypt. Kosei Marimoto, for example, sees the Fatimid institutions as belonging to the early Islamic period and different from the Ayyubid period in which the militarization of the *iqtā*^c took place.¹⁷⁸ Claude Cahen sees the period of internal disarray during al-Mustaṣṣir's reign as the point of change in the nature of the Fatimid system of *iqtā*^c.¹⁷⁹ In the period prior to al-Mustaṣṣir, qadis, administrative personnel, and members of the royal family received grants of *iqtā*^c in lieu of their salaries or as a part of their remuneration.¹⁸⁰ In a previous study, I presented a few examples showing that during al-Ḥākim's reign the circle of those receiving *iqtā*^c was enlarged to include soldiers (*junūd*) and ^cabid al-shira^ḡ.¹⁸¹ Since then, I have gathered these further examples:

1. ^cAlī ibn Ja^cfar al-Falāḥ, a general and a chief administrator, had an *iqtā*^c.¹⁸²
2. Faḍl ibn Ṣāliḥ, the general who defeated the rebel Abū Rukwa, received many *iqtā*^cat.¹⁸³
3. When Sitt al-Mulk persuaded the Kutāmī chief Ibn Dawwās to kill her brother, she promised him *iqtā*^cat yielding income of over 100,000 dinar per year.¹⁸⁴
4. The Berbers of Kutāma had *iqtā*^cat which included estates (*ḍiyā*^c) and urban properties (*ribā*^c). Their *iqtā*^cat were seized by al-Ḥākim.¹⁸⁵
5. Al-Ḥākim distributed churches and monasteries among his soldiers (^c*askariyya*) as *iqtā*^c.¹⁸⁶

From the above examples some conclusions can be drawn. The Kutāma had *iqtā*^cat in addition to their regular pay. How widespread the system was among them remains unknown. Other troops received *iqtā*^c from properties made available for distribution following the persecution of dhimmis. Not surprisingly, generals were among the recipients of *iqtā*^c. The fact that grants of *iqtā*^c were

common among the high-ranking members of the elite is illustrated by the promises of Sitt al-Muluk to Ibn Dawwās. However, it must be remembered that all of the examples are from the years of al-Ḥākim's reign. It was quite a prolonged period of internal turmoil, rebellions, and economic difficulties. The ability to maintain the system of paying the army in cash on a regular basis was affected. The question is: Was the militarization of the system of *iqta*^c maintained when the circumstances had changed, when the internal stability was regained and the economic difficulties ended? The economic crisis under al-Zāhir was quite severe but short and therefore of transient importance. The civil war under al-Mustanşir created propitious conditions for the militarization of the system of *iqta*^c. Not surprisingly, Claude Cahen's evidence that this occurred comes from this period. An additional example can be given. Badr al-Jamālī divided among his men the wealth (money, houses, and slave girls) and the *iqta*^c of the Egyptian amirs whom he had liquidated.¹⁸⁷ Both the extent and the militarization of the system of *iqta*^c (prior to Badr al-Jamālī) is illustrated here. Moreover, it indicates the perpetuation of the system.

CONCLUSION: THE WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF AL-MUSTANŞIR'S REIGN

The Seljukid invasion of 469/1076–1077 exemplifies once again that Egypt is easily accessible from the west and the east. This geographical exposure imposes constant danger on a weak regime in Egypt, as was the case with the successors of Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn and Muḥammad ibn Ṭughj. It also illustrates two different military approaches to the problem of conquering Egypt.

In 301/914 and again in 306/919, the Fatimids launched large scale campaigns to conquer Egypt. In both cases, in spite of the fact that large parts of Lower and Upper Egypt were overrun, as long as Fustat held its ground the conquest of Egypt was not accomplished. The two Qarmatian invasions (361/971–972 and 363/973–974) and the Seljukid invasion further illustrate this point. On the other hand, the campaigns of Muḥammad ibn Ṭughj (323/935) and Jawhar (358/968) showed that the conquest of the center determined the fate of the whole country, although in both cases the provinces were not fully subjugated. The Qarmatian invasions of Egypt were above all the result of the Fatimid–Qarmatian relationship. The Qarmatians also enjoyed the support of the Buyids, who, unable to fight the Fatimids themselves, were happy to wage war by proxy. The defeated elements of the deposed Ikhshidid regime also joined the Qarmatians. From the repulsion of those invasions until the Seljukid invasion, Egypt was secure from threat by hostile forces originating in the Islamic East. In the context of Fatimid Egypt, the Seljukid invasion was an early precedent to a pattern which emerged in the twelfth century when contenders for power in Fatimid Egypt sought and invited in outside allies, both Muslim and Crusader. The Seljukid invasion was not, however, the “major event” in the period under study. In fact, this period was not characterized by any “major event,” but rather by the culmination of processes which had begun earlier.

Recent studies have emphasized the uniqueness of the Islamic system of military slavery.¹⁸⁸ Daniel Pipes gives 17 examples of Islamic dynasties that

employed military slaves. His examples span the years 661–1858 and geographically cover the Middle East, North Africa, Iran, and India. About the Fatimids, he writes: “Fatimids (297–567/909–1171). Like Buyids, from an initial tribal army, they quickly depended on military slaves, though the Fatimids employed slaves of diverse origin, including Turks, Berbers, Blacks and Slavs.”¹⁸⁹ Along broad lines, Pipes’s analysis is correct. What is lacking is the perspective of historical development. Already during the North African period of the Fatimid state, when their army indeed was largely a “tribal army,” elements of slave troops existed. The origin of these troops was twofold: remnants of the Aghlabid slave contingents and the abundant availability of black slaves due to trans-Sahara trade. One of the more important features of al-^ʿAzīz’s military reform was the minor role military slaves played in it. The Turks and other Eastern military manpower absorbed into the Fatimid army were freeborn, although al-^ʿAzīz and his vizier Ibn Killis established units of Turkish military slaves. The great upsurge of black military slaves occurred under al-Ḥākīm. Some idea of the size of black slave units can be gained from Nāṣir-i Khusrau’s account. The total number of troops given by him is 215,000, of which 60,000 were definitely blacks. The number rises to 80,000 when the Maṣāmīda, whom Nāṣir-i Khusrau regarded as black, are added. Thus, the blacks comprised 28%–37% of the army. The total percentage of slave troops was even higher when Turkish slaves, not mentioned by Nāṣir-i Khusrau, are added. The figure of 215,000 troops is, of course, an unrealistic one; but the proportions of the black slave troops, and the slave troops in general, are not necessarily wrong. The main question arising from Pipes’s analysis is the meaning of the regime’s dependency on slave troops. If by this we mean that the vast majority of the army was composed of slave troops or that they comprised the crack units, then this hardly applies to the Fatimids for the period under study.

The issue which casts its shadow over much of the period is the political and social consequences of the shift from a tribal army as the main buttress of the regime to a multi-ethnic army with a considerable (over 30%) proportion of slave troops. This shift was the main outcome of al-^ʿAzīz’s military reform. The Berbers of Kutāma, because of their early and long association with the Fatimid dynasty, enjoyed concomitantly a privileged socio-military position in the state. The military reform of al-^ʿAzīz endangered their position. The rest of al-^ʿAzīz’s reign and the years of al-Ḥākīm and al-Ẓāhir’s rule saw a bitter struggle by the Kutāma to maintain their position, a struggle which they slowly but continuously lost. The increasing incorporation of black slaves into the army complicated the situation further. During al-Mustaṣṣir’s reign, the precarious balance between the various military groups and between each group and the regime was shaken. It had happened in the past, but never with such unleashed violence and severe, widespread consequences. The worsening economic situation in the years preceding the outbreak of the internal struggle within the army had a direct and immediate relevance for both the struggle itself and the ability of the regime in controlling, mitigating, or manipulating it. The economic crisis served as a powerful catalyst. Once under way, the prolonged struggle precluded a recovery of the economy. The medieval historians made a clear distinction between

natural disasters (for example, the low rise of the Nile) and man-made calamities. The latter were the worst. Even when the Nile rose sufficiently, no land could be cultivated when there was a lack of security. Christian sources tell about the destruction that the Lawāta inflicted on the cultivated lands of Lower Egypt which they had overrun. Their very presence (40,000 horsemen with their families, *atbāʿ*) imposed a heavy burden upon the population on which they preyed. The Lawāta, who cultivated the land, neglected the irrigation works and paid no taxes to the government. The re-establishment of order under Badr al-Jamālī, and his exemption of the peasants from taxes for a period of three years, paved the way for the country's economic recovery.¹⁹⁰

Although economic recovery was achieved, the period of internal anarchy resulted in a profound military weakness in the Fatimid state which was much more difficult to overcome than the economic crisis. Many units suffered heavy losses in the internal fighting during the period of anarchy and Badr's purge of the army also contributed.¹⁹¹ It seems that the restoration of the army's morale and cohesion was a difficult task, if it was achieved at all. The ethnic diversity of the Fatimid army was further complicated by the arrival of Badr's private contingent of Armenians. The two main antagonistic groups, the blacks and the Easterners, continued to serve in the Fatimid army. Badr's drive against the ʿabid in Upper Egypt came to a halt because of Atsiz's invasion. Apparently, Badr arrived at some sort of accommodation with them, inasmuch as they (al-sudan) fought alongside him against Atsiz. In fact, their attack crushed Atsiz's center (*qalb*). The final elimination of the blacks took place only under Saladin.

The restoration of the military power of the Fatimid army was also hampered by the material losses during the period of anarchy. Much of the military equipment, weapons, riding and pack animals was lost. The sources provide plenty of detail on the huge quantities of arms which were looted from the storehouses at the royal palace and either sold on the market or simply destroyed.¹⁹² The royal stables, which contained tens of thousands of animals, were completely depleted.¹⁹³

The scholarly discussion of Fatimid foreign policy under Badr and his son, al-Afḍal, focuses on their intentions, whether they continued with an aggressive foreign policy toward both the Islamic and non-Islamic worlds (originating from the fundamental Fatimid doctrinal tenets) or whether they abandoned the Fatimid imperial dream in favor of a policy focusing more on Egypt.¹⁹⁴ What is lacking in this discussion is a consideration of the weakness of the Fatimid state and its inability to pursue an active foreign policy backed by military force.¹⁹⁵ Judging from the policy followed by Badr and his son, one can suggest that they had a desire to conduct a foreign policy drawn on a grand scale, in Syria and elsewhere, but that state resources were no longer able to sustain this desire.

NOTES

Author's note: I would like to thank my friend and colleague Dr. R. Talmon of the Department of Arabic (University of Haifa) for his valuable suggestions and criticism.

¹On Fatimid army see B. J. Beshir, "Fatimid Military Organization," *Der Islam*, 55 (1978), 37–56; S. I. Assaad, *The Reign of al-Hākim bi-Amr Allah (386/996–411/1021): A Political Study* (Beirut, 1974), pp. 44–49; Y. Lev, "The Fatimid Army, A.H. 358–427/968–1036 C.E.: Military and Social Aspects," *Asian and African Studies*, 14 (1980), 165–92.

²Idrīs ʿImād al-Dīn, *ʿUyūn al-akhbār*, M. Ghālīb, ed. (Beirut, 1975), vol. V, p. 114; and al-Qādī al-Nuʿmān, *Risālat iftitāh al-daʿwa*, Wadād al-Qādī, ed. (Beirut, 1970), p. 257.

³Y. Lev, "Fatimid Policy Towards Damascus (358/968–386/996)—Military, Political and Social Aspects," *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam*, 3 (1981–1982), 170; J. L. Bacharach, "African Military Slaves in the Medieval Middle East: The Cases of Iraq (869–955) and Egypt (868–1171)," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 13 (1981), 477–78.

⁴Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-aʿyān*, I. ʿAbbās, ed. (Beirut, 1968–1971), vol. IV, pp. 21–22; Dhahabī, *Kitāb al-ʿibar*, F. Sayyid, ed. (Kuwait, 1960–1965), vol. II, pp. 287–88; Abū ʿl-Fidāʿ, *Abulfedae annales Muslemici*, J. J. Riskius, ed. (Hafniae, 1789–1794), vol. II, p. 472. Fātik al-Rūmī became widely known through panegyric and elegies written about him by Mutanabbī, see M. Winter, "Content and Form in the Elegies of al-Mutanabbī," in *Studia orientalia memoriae D. H. Baneth dedicata* (Jerusalem, 1979), pp. 327–65, esp. pp. 328, 334–40. See also C. Issawi, "Al-Mutanabbī in Egypt (957–962)," in S. Hanna, ed., *Medieval and Middle Eastern Studies in Honor of Aziz Suryal Atiya* (Leiden, 1972), pp. 236–39. For the North Syrian frontier see: P. von Sivers, "Taxes and Trade in the ʿAbbāsīd Thughūr, 750–962," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 25 (1982), 71–99.

⁵Al-Anṭākī (Yaḥyā ibn Saʿīd), *Tārīkh*, L. Shaykhū, ed. (Beirut, 1909), p. 221.

⁶Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz al-hunafāʿ*, M. H. M. Aḥmad, ed. (Cairo, 1971), vol. II, p. 56.

⁷Musabbiḥī, *Akhbār Miṣr*, A. F. Sayyid and Th. Bianquis, eds. (Cairo, 1978), p. 109. Another edition is by W. G. Millward (Cairo, 1980). Hereafter all references are to Cairo, 1978 edition.

⁸D. Ayalon, "On the Eunuchs in Islam," *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam*, 1 (1979), 92–124.

⁹ʿImād al-Dīn, *ʿUyūn*, p. 84; al-Nuʿmān, *Ifitāh*, p. 207.

¹⁰On him see: *Sirat al-Ustādh Jawdhar*, M. K. al-Ḥusayn and M. A. H. Shaʿīra, eds. (n.d., n.p.). The text was translated by M. Canard, *Vie de l'ustādh Jaudhar* (Algiers, 1958).

¹¹ʿImād al-Dīn, *ʿUyūn*, pp. 150, 151, 328; Ibn ʿIdhārī, A. Amari, ed., in his *Biblioteca Arabo-Sicula*, reprint (Baghdad, n.d.), pp. 366–67, 378; Nuwayrī, A. Amari, ed., *Arabo-Sicula*, p. 436; A. Vasiliev and M. Canard, *Byzance et les Arabes* (Bruxelles, 1950), vol. II, pp. 223, 231.

¹²On them see respectively ʿImād al-Dīn, *ʿUyūn*, pp. 171–72, 184, 186, 195–96, 242, 244–45, 263, 267. See also *Sirat al-Ustādh Jawdhar*, 96, 147, 242, 244, 280.

¹³Ibn Saʿīd al-Maghribī, *al-Maghrib fī ḥulā al-Maghrib*, Z. M. Ḥasan, M. Dayq and I. Kāshif, eds. (Cairo, 1953), pp. 165, 184–85.

¹⁴Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz al-hunafāʿ*, J. D. al-Shayyāl, ed. (Cairo, 1967), vol. I, p. 223.

¹⁵For Ṣāqāliba in the service of the Fatimids see I. Hrbek, "Die Slawen im Dienste der Fatimiden," *Archiv Orientalny*, 21 (1953), 543–81. He covers the North African and the Egyptian period until al-Mustanṣir's reign.

¹⁶Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-mawāʿiz wa-l-ʿtibār bi-dhikr al-khiṭaʿ wa-l-athār*, G. Wiet, ed., in *Mémoires de l'Institut français d'archéologie orientale du Caire*, 46 (1922), 44.

¹⁷Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaʿ* (Bulaq, 1323), vol. III, p. 68.

¹⁸Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ al-zuhūr fī waqāʾiʿ al-duhūr* (Bulaq, 1311–1312), vol. I, p. 57; cf. however vol. I, p. 48.

¹⁹B. G. Martin, "Kanem, Bornu and Fazzān: Notes on the Political History of a Trade Route," *Journal of African History*, 10 (1969), 15–27; J. S. Trimingham, *A History of Islam in West Africa* (London, 1968), p. 107; *Corpus of Early Arabic Sources for West African History*, J. F. P. Hopkins, trans., N. Levtzion and J. F. P. Hopkins, eds. (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 22, 41, 46.

²⁰Martin, "Kanem," p. 18.

²¹Trimingham, *A History*, p. 107; *Corpus*, pp. 24, 42, 64. Ayalon, "On Eunuchs," p. 76, section Va.

²²H. T. Norris, *The Berbers in Arabic Literature* (London, 1982), pp. 8, 37, 76–77; J. Despois, “Fazzān,” *El²*, vol. II, p. 875.

²³M. Canard considers them as blacks: see *Vie*, p. 104. In the text they are referred to as ʿabid. M. Brett remarks however: “*ʿabid* at this period was a technical military term without color connotation” and gives the following examples: *ʿabid al-ṣaqāliba* and *ʿabid wa-ajṅād* (“Ifriqiya as a Market for Saharan Trade from the Tenth to the Twelfth Century A.D.,” *Journal of African History*, 10 [1969], 354, n. 31). However, the term had a technical military meaning indicating black slave troops, usually infantry. (See M. Brett, “The Military Interest of the Battle of Ḥaydarān,” in V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp, eds., *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East* [London, 1975], pp. 78–89.) Sometimes, as the first of Brett’s examples show (the second does not support his claim), the meaning can be ascertained only from the context. Regarding Canard’s translation, it must be taken into consideration that in Fatimid sources (such as the *Vie*) the term has a well defined military meaning but also the meaning of “loyal servants.” The most striking example is Musabbiḥī’s passage (p. 54) where both meanings appear in the same account.

²⁴Abou Obeid al-Bekri, *Déscription de l’Afrique septentrionale*, D. Slane, ed. (Algier, 1857, rep. Baghdad, n.d.), pp. 29–30.

²⁵H. R. Idris, *Contribution à l’histoire de l’Ifrikiya*, reprint of *Revue des Études islamiques 1935–1936* (n.p., n.d.), pp. 169–70.

²⁶Al-Kindī, *The Governors and Judges of Egypt*, R. Guest, ed. (Leiden-London, 1912), p. 276; Eutychius Patriarch of Alexandria (Saʿīd ibn al-Baṭṭīq), *Annales*, L. Cheiko, et al., eds. (Beirut, 1906–1909), vol. II, pp. 80–81.

²⁷Imād al-Dīn, *ʿUyūn*, pp. 185, 210, 224.

²⁸Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, p. 56.

²⁹Lev, “The Fatimid Army,” p. 179.

³⁰Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, p. 137; Musabbiḥī, *Akḥbār*, p. 21.

³¹Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, p. 155; Musabbiḥī, *Akḥbār*, pp. 54, 61.

³²Nāṣir-i Khusrau, *Relation du voyage*, C. Shefer, ed. (Paris, 1881), pp. 138, 145.

³³For the Aghlabids see M. Talbī, *L’émirat aghlabide* (Paris, 1966), index “*ʿabid*,” esp. 136. For the Tulunids and the Ikshidids see: Z. M. Ḥasan, *Les Ṭūlūnides* (Paris, 1933), pp. 165–73, esp. p. 167; Y. F. Hasan, *The Arabs and the Sudan* (Edinburgh, 1967), pp. 44, 47; Bacharach, “African Military Slaves,” pp. 477–80; Lev, “Fatimid Policy Toward Damascus,” p. 170.

³⁴See the sources quoted in note 2. However, other *al-sūdān min mawālī Banī Aghlab* were massacred following the fall of Raqqāda. See Ibn Ḥammād, *Akḥbār mulūk banī ʿUbayd*, M. Vonderheyden, ed. and trans. (Paris-Algier, 1927), p. 8. For opposite version see al-Nuʿmān, *Ifṭitāḥ*, pp. 214–15.

³⁵Imād al-Dīn, *ʿUyūn*, pp. 114, 118, 128, 184, 194, 195, 202, 214, 233, 258, 276, 311.

³⁶Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-ʿarab fī funūn al-adāb*, ms. Leiden, Leiden University Library, Or. 2k, f. 178A; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl tāʾriḥ Dimashq*, H. F. Amedroz, ed. (Leyden, 1908), p. 50; al-Anṭākī, *Tāʾriḥ*, p. 181.

³⁷Ibn Saʿīd al-Maghribī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira fī ḥulā ḥaḍra al-Qāhira*, H. Naṣār, ed. (Cairo, 1969), p. 67; Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, p. 100.

³⁸Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, p. 121; Ibn Saʿīd, *Nujūm*, p. 58.

³⁹Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat*, Or. 2k, ff. 184B–85B, esp. 185B; see also f. 183A; al-Anṭākī, *Tāʾriḥ*, pp. 225–26. On the activity of foreign daʿīs see: D. Bryer, “The Origin of the Druze Religion,” *Der Islam*, 52 (1975), 66–76; J. van Ess, *Chiliasmische Erwartungen und die Versuchung der Göttlichkeit. Der Kalif al-Hākim (386–411 H.)* (Heidelberg, 1977), pp. 63–85.

⁴⁰Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar wa-jāmiʿ al-ghurar*, Ṣ. al-Dīn al-Munajjid, ed. (Cairo, 1961), vol. VI, p. 298; Ibn Saʿīd, *Nujūm*, p. 54.

⁴¹Al-Anṭākī, *Tāʾriḥ*, pp. 195, 197.

⁴²T. Bianquis, “Une crise frumentaire dans l’Égypte Fatimide,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 23 (1980), 67–101.

⁴³Musabbiḥī, *Akḥbār*, p. 80.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 87–88; Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat*, Or. 2k, f. 187A.

⁴⁵Musabbiḥī, *Akḥbār*, p. 57.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p. 82.

- ⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 20, 22, 50.
- ⁴⁸Ibid., p. 21.
- ⁴⁹Ibid., p. 74. See also: B. Shoshan, "Fatimid Grain Policy and the Post of the Muḥtasib," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 13 (1981), 181–89.
- ⁵⁰Lev, "Fatimid Army," p. 180. See in addition to sources given there (n. 60) also Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ* (Bulaq), vol. III, pp. 20–21.
- ⁵¹Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ* (Bulaq), vol. III, pp. 21–22, 32–33.
- ⁵²Sibṭ ibn Jawzī, *Mirʿat al-zamān*, ms. Oxford, Bodleian Library, Poc. 370, f. 144A; Maqrīzī, *Iṭiʿāz*, vol. II, pp. 121, 127; Ibn Saʿīd, *Nujūm*, p. 67; al-Anṭākī, *Tāʾriḫh*, pp. 205, 217.
- ⁵³Maqrīzī, *Iṭiʿāz*, vol. II, pp. 107–8.
- ⁵⁴Ibid., p. 57; al-Anṭākī, *Tāʾriḫh*, pp. 208, 209; Ibn Saʿīd, *Nujūm*, pp. 58, 59, 61, 67; Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ*, Wiet, ed., (see n. 16).
- ⁵⁵Nāṣir-i Khusrau, *Relation*, p. 138.
- ⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 124, 138; al-Anṭākī, *Tāʾriḫh*, pp. 247, 248.
- ⁵⁷Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, vol. I, pp. 48, 57; al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā* (Cairo, 1913–1919), vol. III, p. 478; Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ* (Bulaq), vol. III, pp. 30–31.
- ⁵⁸Maqrīzī, *Iṭiʿāz*, vol. I, pp. 242–43.
- ⁵⁹Ibn al-Qalānisī, *Dhayl*, p. 31.
- ⁶⁰Nāṣir-i Khusrau, *Relation*, p. 138.
- ⁶¹Maqrīzī, *Iṭiʿāz*, vol. II, p. 27.
- ⁶²Lev, "Fatimid Army," pp. 168–69.
- ⁶³Maqrīzī, *Iṭiʿāz*, vol. II, p. 177.
- ⁶⁴Ibn al-Qalānisī, *Dhayl*, p. 51; Lev, "Fatimid Army," p. 174, n. 32.
- ⁶⁵Ibn al-Qalānisī, *Dhayl*, pp. 45, 49, 51, 71.
- ⁶⁶Maqrīzī, *Iṭiʿāz*, vol. II, pp. 55, 150; Musabbiḥī, *Akhbār*, p. 61.
- ⁶⁷C. E. Bosworth, "Military Organization under the Būyids of Persia and Iraq," *Oriens*, 18–19 (1965–1966), 158–59.
- ⁶⁸Maqrīzī, *Iṭiʿāz*, vol. II, pp. 9, 154; Musabbiḥī, *Akhbār*, p. 51; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Nujūm al-zāhira fī mulūk Miṣr wa-l-Qāhira* (Cairo, 1932–1950), vol. IV, p. 216.
- ⁶⁹Maqrīzī, *Iṭiʿāz*, vol. I, p. 260; Ibn al-Qalānisī, *Dhayl*, p. 31.
- ⁷⁰Maqrīzī, *Iṭiʿāz*, vol. II, p. 55.
- ⁷¹Musabbiḥī, *Akhbār*, p. 104.
- ⁷²Y. Lev, "The Fatimid vizier Yaʿqūb ibn Killis and the Beginning of the Fatimid Administration in Egypt," *Der Islam*, 58 (1981), 242, 248.
- ⁷³Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ* (Bulaq), vol. II, 278; cf. Beshir, "Fatimid Military Organization," p. 47. See also S. M. Stern, *Fatimid Decrees* (London, 1964), pp. 17, 170.
- ⁷⁴Maqrīzī, *Iṭiʿāz*, vol. II, pp. 55–56; Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ* (Būlāq), vol. III, pp. 32–33.
- ⁷⁵Maqrīzī, *Iṭiʿāz*, vol. II, pp. 9, 13; Ibn al-Qalānisī, *Dhayl*, p. 49.
- ⁷⁶Al-Anṭākī, *Tāʾriḫh*, pp. 222, 223; Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat*, Or. 2k, ff. 184B–185A, says that *shabāb min muwalladī l-Atrāk* were Ḥamza ibn ʿAlī's followers.
- ⁷⁷Musabbiḥī, *Akhbār*, p. 36.
- ⁷⁸Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ* (Bulaq), vol. II, p. 332.
- ⁷⁹Maqrīzī, *Iṭiʿāz*, vol. I, p. 291; Ibn Saʿīd, *Nujūm*, p. 54.
- ⁸⁰Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz*, vol. VI, 298; Ibn Saʿīd, *Nujūm*, p. 54.
- ⁸¹Musabbiḥī, *Akhbār*, pp. 20, 43, 46, 53, 74, 92, 96; Maqrīzī, *Iṭiʿāz*, vol. II, p. 165.
- ⁸²Nāṣir-i Khusrau, *Relation*, p. 138.
- ⁸³Musabbiḥī, *Akhbār*, p. 53; Maqrīzī, *Iṭiʿāz*, vol. II, p. 154.
- ⁸⁴E. Tyan, *Institutions du droit public musulman* (Paris, 1956), vol. II, p. 529. Stern, *Fatimid Decrees*, p. 128.
- ⁸⁵Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ* (Bulaq), vol. III, pp. 17–18.
- ⁸⁶Al-Qāḍī Al-Nuʿmān, *Kitāb al-majālis wa-l-musāyārāt*, Ḥ. al-Faqī, I. Mashabūḥ and M. al-Yaʿlāwī, eds. (Tunis, 1978), p. 246.
- ⁸⁷Al-Nuʿmān, *Iftiḥāh*, pp. 257–58.
- ⁸⁸Al-Nuʿmān, *Majālis*, pp. 245, 322; ʿImād al-Dīn, *ʿUyūn*, pp. 53, 65, 66, 70, 130, 194, 209, 223.
- ⁸⁹Maqrīzī, *Iṭiʿāz*, vol. I, pp. 97–98.

⁹⁰Al-Nuḥmān, *Majālis*, pp. 321, 486. In al-ʿAzīz's period the term was also applied to the Turks and blacks: *awlīyāʿ al-dawla min al-Aṭrāk wa-l-ʿabīd*. See Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, p. 12. Cf. Stern, *Fatimid Decrees*, pp. 16, 20, 21, 169.

⁹¹Al-Nuḥmān, *Majālis*, pp. 239, 245, 321, 526. On the term *ṣanāʿīʿ* see D. Sourdél, *Le vizirat abbasside* (Damascus, 1956–1960), vol. II, pp. 520, 651. P. G. Forand, "The Relation of the Slave and the Client to the Master or Patron in Medieval Islam," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 2 (1971), 63–64. On the institution of patronage (*iṣṭinā*) see R. P. Mottahedeh, *Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society* (Princeton, 1980), index; Lev, "Fatimid Army," passim; J. Lassner, *Shaping of ʿAbbāsīd Rule* (Princeton, 1980), index *mawālī*. For earlier periods see P. Crone, *Slaves on Horses* (Cambridge, 1981), index "clientage," "clients"; and D. Pipes, "Mawlas: Freed Slaves and Converts in Early Islam," *Slavery and Abolition*, 1 (1980), 132–77.

⁹²Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. I, pp. 128, 130.

⁹³Lev, "Fatimid Army," pp. 169–73; idem, "Fatimid Policy Toward Damascus," pp. 172–73.

⁹⁴Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. I, p. 263; Ibn ʿIdhārī, *Kitāb al-bayān al-Mughrib*, G. S. Colin and E. Lévi-Provençal (Leiden, 1948), vol. I, pp. 241–43.

⁹⁵Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. I, pp. 132, 133, 146, 229, 277; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl*, p. 44.

⁹⁶Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, p. 12; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl*, pp. 44–46; Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār Miṣr*, H. Massé, ed. (Cairo, 1919), p. 55.

⁹⁷Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, pp. 12–13; Ibn Saʿīd, *Nujūm*, pp. 54, 55.

⁹⁸Ibn Saʿīd, *Nujūm*, p. 55; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl*, pp. 49–50, 54, 59; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz*, vol. VI, p. 257; Ibn al-Ṣayrafī, *al-Ishāra man nāla al-wizāra*, ʿAbd Allāh Mukhlis, ed. (Cairo, 1924–1925), pp. 86–87.

⁹⁹Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, 47; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, vol. IV, p. 216.

¹⁰⁰Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, vol. IV, p. 216; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fī l-tārīkh*, C. J. Tornberg, ed. (Leyden, 1863), vol. IX, p. 141.

¹⁰¹Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, pp. 115–17; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, vol. IV, pp. 185–92, 194–95, 248; Ibn ʿIdhārī, *al-Bayān*, vol. I, p. 271; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl*, pp. 79–80; Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, vol. IX, pp. 222–23, 235; Ibn Zāfir, *Kitāb akhbār al-duwal al-munqaṭiʿa*, A. Ferré, ed. (Cairo, 1972), pp. 57–60. Cf. Tyan, *Institutions*, vol. II, pp. 544–45; M. ʿAbd Allāh ʿInān, *Al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allāh wa-asrār al-daʿwa al-Fāṭimiyya* (Cairo, 1959), pp. 223–27.

¹⁰²Musabbiḥī, *Akhbār*, pp. 60–61.

¹⁰³*Ibid.*, p. 76.

¹⁰⁴D. Sourdél, "Al-Djardjarāʿī," *EI*², vol. II, pp. 461–62; Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, pp. 184–85; Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat*, Or. 2k, anno 427 and the beginning of anno 428; Ibn Jawzī, *Mirʿat*, Poc. 370, anno 427. For the political history of al-Mustansīr's reign see M. Quatremère, "Mémoire historique sur la vie du Khalife fatimite Mostanser-Billah" in idem, *Mémoires géographiques et historiques sur l'Égypte et sur quelques contrées voisines* (Paris, 1811), vol. II, pp. 296–485; F. Wüstenfeld, *Geschichte der Fatimiden-Chalifen nach dem arabischen Quellen* (Göttingen, 1881; reprint, 1976), Part 3, pp. 2–45; S. Lane-Pool, *A History of Egypt in the Middle Ages* (reprint, London, 1968), pp. 136–54; De Lacy O'Leary, *A Short History of the Fatimid Khalifate* (London, 1932), pp. 193–211; G. Wiet, *L'Égypte arabe de la conquête arabe à la conquête ottomane, 642–1517 de l'ère chrétienne*, vol. IV of *Histoire de la nation égyptienne*, G. Hanotaux, ed. (Paris, n.d.), pp. 219–54; H. A. R. Gibb and P. Kraus, "Al-Mustansīr Biʿllāh," *EI*¹, vol. III, pp. 768–71; A. Hamdani, *The Fatimids* (Karachi, 1962), was not available to me.

¹⁰⁵Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, p. 190.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*, p. 191; Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār*, pp. 1–2. On the Tustarī brothers see W. J. Fischel, *Jews in the Economic and Political Life of Medieval Islam* (London, 1937), pp. 68–89; M. Gil, *The Tustaris, Family and Sect* (Tel-Aviv, 1981) (in Hebrew).

¹⁰⁷Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, pp. 191, 195; Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār*, p. 1.

¹⁰⁸Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, p. 195; Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār*, pp. 1–2.

¹⁰⁹Musabbiḥī, *Akhbār*, pp. 29–30; Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, p. 152; cf. Gil, *The Tustaris*, p. 39, n. 52. See also Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl*, p. 73.

¹¹⁰Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat*, Or. 2k, anno 439; Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, p. 195; Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār*, pp. 1–2; Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil* (Beirut, 1966), vol. X, p. 81; Nāṣir-i Khusrau, *Relation*, p. 159.

¹¹¹Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, p. 196.

¹¹²Nizām al-Mulk, *The Book of Government*, H. Darke, trans. (London, 1960), pp. 103–4; cf. C. E. Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids: Their Empire in Afghanistan and Eastern Iran, 994–1040* (Edinburgh, 1963), pp. 98–99, 107–9.

¹¹³Al-Nuʿmān, *Majālis*, pp. 256–57, 258.

¹¹⁴Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, pp. 214, 216, 223. Cf. H. R. Idris, *La Berbérie orientale sous les Zirides (X–XII siècles)* (Paris, 1962), vol. I, pp. 181–203; M. Brett, “Fatimid Historiography: A Case Study—The Quarrel with the Zirids, 1048–58,” in D. O. Morgan, ed., *Medieval Historical Writing in the Christian and Islamic Worlds* (London, 1982), pp. 47–59.

¹¹⁵Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, vol. V, p. 40; Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, p. 202. For the situation in Syria see S. Zakkār, *The Emirate of Aleppo 1004–1096* (Beirut, 1971), pp. 134–38; and K. S. Salibi, *Syria under Islam* (New York, 1977), pp. 84–122.

¹¹⁶Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, vol. V, pp. 11–20; Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, p. 232.

¹¹⁷Ibn Zāfir, *Akhbār*, p. 69; Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār*, p. 8; Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, p. 233.

¹¹⁸Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat*, Or. 2k, anno 443; Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār*, p. 8. Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, pp. 218, 220, 224, 240; Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ* (Būlāq), vol. II, p. 170; Maqrīzī, *Ighāthat al-umma bi-kashf al-ghumma* (n.p., n.d.), pp. 17, 19–20, translated into French by G. Wiet, “Le traité des famines de Maqrīzī,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 5 (1962), 18–24. For the economic crisis under al-Mustaʿshir see M. Cohen, *Jewish Self-Government in Medieval Egypt* (Princeton, 1980), pp. 54–60.

¹¹⁹Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, pp. 227–29, 230–31; Maqrīzī, *Muqaffā*, S. Zakkār, ed., in idem, *Madkhal ilā tāʾrīkh al-ḥurūb al-ṣalībiyya* (Beirut, 1973), pp. 374–75. See also W. Felix, *Byzanz und die islamische Welt im frühen 11. Jarhundert* (Vienna, 1981), pp. 119–23.

¹²⁰Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, vol. V, p. 59; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz*, vol. VI, pp. 369, 371.

¹²¹Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ* (Bulaq), vol. II, p. 171; Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, pp. 236, 247, 251.

¹²²Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, pp. 199–200.

¹²³Ibid., pp. 265–67; Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār*, pp. 13–14; Ibn Zāfir, *Akhbār*, pp. 73–74.

¹²⁴Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, pp. 226–27.

¹²⁵Ibid., pp. 268–69, 270, 271, 272.

¹²⁶Ibid., p. 272.

¹²⁷Ibid., p. 273; Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār*, pp. 16–17.

¹²⁸Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, p. 273; Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār*, p. 17; Ibn Athīr *Kāmil* (Beirut, 1966), vol. X, p. 81.

¹²⁹Bacharach, “African Military Slaves,” pp. 471, 484–85, 490.

¹³⁰Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, p. 275; Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār*, p. 17; Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil* (Beirut, 1966), vol. X, p. 83.

¹³¹Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, pp. 275–76; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, vol. V, p. 81; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl*, p. 95.

¹³²Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, p. 276; Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār*, p. 18.

¹³³Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, p. 278.

¹³⁴Ibid., p. 279.

¹³⁵Ibid.; Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār*, p. 19; Sawīrus ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, *History of the Patriarchs of the Egyptian Church*, A. Z. ʿAtiya, Y. ʿAbd al-Masīḥ and O. H. E. K. Burmester, eds. and trans. (Cairo, 1959), vol. II, p. 182; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, vol. V, pp. 13–14; Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil* (Beirut, 1966), vol. X, p. 84.

¹³⁶Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, pp. 279, 280–300, esp. 296–98.

¹³⁷Ibid., pp. 299–300.

¹³⁸Sawīrus ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, *History*, p. 183; Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil* (Beirut, 1966), vol. X, p. 85; Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār*, p. 20.

¹³⁹Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, p. 302; Maqrīzī, *Muqaffā*, pp. 265–66, see also p. 281; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, vol. V, pp. 13–14.

¹⁴⁰Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, pp. 305–7; Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār*, p. 21; Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil* (Beirut, 1966), vol. X, p. 85.

¹⁴¹Maqrīzī, *Ittiʿāz*, vol. II, pp. 309–10; Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār*, p. 22; Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil* (Beirut, 1966), vol. X, p. 85; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, vol. V, pp. 9, 21.

¹⁴²Maqrīzī, *Muqaffā*, pp. 299, 301; and Sawīrus ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, *History*, pp. 218–19.

¹⁴³Maqrīzī, *Muqaffā*, pp. 300, 301, 302, esp. 303–4.

¹⁴⁴Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, vol. II, pp. 311–16; Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ* (Bulaq), vol. II, pp. 211–12; Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār*, pp. 22–23; Ibn al-Ṣayrafī, *Ishāra*, pp. 57–58; Ibn Zāfir, *Akhbār*, p. 76; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl*, p. 109; and Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz*, vol. VI, pp. 399–400.

¹⁴⁵Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, vol. II, pp. 317–18; Maqrīzī, *Muqaffā*, pp. 267–68; Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār*, p. 25; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl*, pp. 109, 110–11; Sibṭ ibn Jawzī on the margin of Ibn al-Qalānīsī, pp. 109–10; idem, Ali Sevim, ed. (Ankara, 1968), pp. 182–83; and Sawīrus ibn al-Muqaffā^c, *History*, pp. 218, 219. A laudatory Hebrew poem composed to celebrate the Fatimid victory describes Atsiz's army as made up of Armenians, Bedouins, Turks, Greeks, and European mercenaries is not supported by other sources (J. Greenstone, "The Turkoman Defeat at Cairo by Solomon ben Joseph Ha-Kohen," *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures*, 22 [1905–1906], 160, 164). Sibṭ ibn Jawzī's account saying that Atsiz's army was composed of Bedouins, Kurds, and Turkomen, i.e., elements to be found in Syria, is more reliable (Sibṭ, op. cit.), cf. Y. Fraenkel, "The Seljuks in Palestine, 1071–1098," *Cathedra*, 21 (1981), 63–72 (in Hebrew).

¹⁴⁶Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, vol. II, pp. 13, 30, 65, 167, 170, 172. Musabbiḥī, *Akhbār*, pp. 82–89; Ibn Jawzī, *Mir'at*, Poc. 370, anno 411; Dhahabī, *Tā'riḫ al-Islām*, ms. London, British Library, Or. 49, f. 8A; Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat*, Or. 2k, f. 177A.

¹⁴⁷Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār*, p. 53. This applies to other groups as well; see Musabbiḥī, *Akhbār*, p. 80; Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, vol. II, p. 167.

¹⁴⁸Musabbiḥī, *Akhbār*, index; Stern, *Fatimid Decrees*, index.

¹⁴⁹Sourdel, *Le vizirat abbasside*, vol. II, p. 661.

¹⁵⁰Dhahabī, *Tā'riḫ*, Or. 49, f. 2B; idem, on the margin of Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl*, p. 64.

¹⁵¹Ibn al-Ṣayrafī, *Ishāra*, p. 180; Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, vol. II, p. 128, see also p. 93.

¹⁵²Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, vol. II, p. 55.

¹⁵³Musabbiḥī, *Akhbār*, p. 87; Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, vol. II, pp. 167, 170; and al-Anṭākī, *Tā'riḫ*, pp. 247, 248. Cf. Lev, "Fatimid Army," p. 183. What is said there must be modified in light of the remarks of Ibn al-Ṣayrafī and Maqrīzī (n. 151, above). The distinction between the military and the non-military function of the zimam is blurred in Lev, op. cit.

¹⁵⁴Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl*, pp. 25, 28, 30, 40, 41, esp. 58, 61–64 and 73. Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, vol. I, p. 256; vol. II, p. 8, 46, 76, 157; and Musabbiḥī, *Akhbār*, p. 57.

¹⁵⁵Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl*, pp. 46, 59.

¹⁵⁶C. E. Bosworth, "Recruitment, Muster and Review in Medieval Islamic Armies," in Parry and Yapp, eds., *War*, pp. 59–78. Idem, "Isti'rād, 'Arḍ," *EI²*, vol. IV, pp. 265–69.

¹⁵⁷Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, vol. I, p. 202.

¹⁵⁸*Ibid.*, p. 279.

¹⁵⁹*Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 117.

¹⁶⁰*Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 279, 283.

¹⁶¹Musabbiḥī, *Akhbār*, pp. 60–61, 83. See also Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, vol. II, p. 117.

¹⁶²Musabbiḥī, *Akhbār*, pp. 60–61; Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, vol. II, pp. 158–59.

¹⁶³Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, vol. I, pp. 202, 239, 269; and vol. II, p. 63.

¹⁶⁴Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl*, p. 56.

¹⁶⁵Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, vol. II, p. 93.

¹⁶⁶Musabbiḥī, *Akhbār*, p. 74.

¹⁶⁷Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, vol. II, p. 90.

¹⁶⁸Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ* (Bulaq), vol. II, p. 278; vol. III, p. 305.

¹⁶⁹*Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 152; Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, vol. I, pp. 287–88; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl*, p. 44; Ibn al-Zubayr, *Kitāb al-dhakhā'ir wa-'l-tuhaf*, M. Ḥamid Allāh and Ṣ. al-Dīn al-Munajjid, eds. (Kuwait, 1959), p. 232.

¹⁷⁰Musabbiḥī, *Akhbār*, p. 86.

¹⁷¹Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, vol. I, pp. 252, 278, 281, 282, 283, 290; vol. II, p. 43, 134, 141, 177; Musabbiḥī, *Akhbār*, p. 12; Ibn al-Zubayr, *K. al-dhakhā'ir*, p. 75.

¹⁷²Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, vol. II, p. 177; Ibn al-Zubayr, *K. al-dhakhā'ir*, pp. 69, 70–71.

¹⁷³Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, vol. I, pp. 135, 287–88; Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ* (Bulaq), vol. I, p. 152.

¹⁷⁴Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ* (Bulaq), vol. II, pp. 236, 268–69, 270–71. On the Dhū 'l-Faqār sword see A. R. Zaky, "Medieval Arab Arms," in R. Elgood, ed., *Islamic Arms and Armour* (London, 1979), p. 202.

¹⁷⁵A million dinar were spent on the army in Syria (Lev, "Fatimid Policy Toward Damascus," p. 172). 400,000 dinar and 700,000 dirham were spent on the army prepared to be transferred to Syria (Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, vol. II, p. 9). For lower sums see Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, vol. I, pp. 245, 287. Only 5,000 dinar were given to a general dispatched to Syria (Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl*, p. 73). Payments of tens of dinar to soldiers mustered for campaigns are mentioned in the sources; for example, 40 dinar to each horseman (Musabbihī, *Akhbār*, p. 49; Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, vol. II, p. 52), but only 5–10 dinar on other occasions (Lev, "Fatimid Army," p. 189) and 24 or 50 dinar to each soldier on the eve of a battle (Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, vol. II, pp. 62, 63). The data are too scanty to justify the effort of correlating it with prices, incomes, and monetary fluctuations.

¹⁷⁶Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār*, p. 53; cf. Lev, "Fatimid Army," pp. 177–78. My description of the arrangement between Ibn Ḥammār and the Kutāma there must be modified. It should not be 80 dinar in 8 installments but 8 dinar. The payment of 20 dinar was not the first installment but an extraordinary bonus (*fadl*) (for references see n. 177).

¹⁷⁷Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, vol. II, pp. 125, 284–85.

¹⁷⁸K. Morimoto, *The Fiscal Administration of Egypt in the Early Islamic Period* (Kyoto, 1981), pp. 255–57, 260, 261–63.

¹⁷⁹C. Cahen, "L'évolution de l'iqtā' du IX^e au XIII^e siècle," *Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, 8 (1953), 37–38, see also 45–48. For the system of iqtā' in late Fatimid period see idem, "L'administration financière de l'armée fatimide d'après al-Makhzūmī," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 15 (1972), 163–82, reprinted in idem, *Makhzūmiyyāt* (Leiden, 1977).

¹⁸⁰H. Rabie, *The Financial System of Egypt A.H. 564–741/A.D. 1169–1341* (London, 1972), pp. 26–27.

¹⁸¹Lev, "Fatimid Army," pp. 184–88.

¹⁸²Ibn Sa'īd, *Nujūm*, p. 68.

¹⁸³Dhahabī, *Tārīkh*, Or. 48, f. 23B; Ibn al-Ṣayrafī, *Ishāra*, p. 48; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, vol. IV, p. 217.

¹⁸⁴Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil* (Leiden, 1865), vol. IX, pp. 222, 225.

¹⁸⁵Ibn Sa'īd, *Nujūm*, p. 68.

¹⁸⁶Al-Anṭākī, *Tārīkh*, p. 204.

¹⁸⁷Maqrīzī, *Muqaffā*, p. 300.

¹⁸⁸D. Ayalon, "Aspects of the Mamlūk Phenomenon," *Der Islam*, 53 (1976), 196–97; Crone, *Slaves on Horses*, pp. 74–81, esp. 78–80; and D. Pipes, *Slave Soldiers and Islam* (New Haven and London, 1981), pp. XIII–XV, esp. XV.

¹⁸⁹Pipes, *Slave Soldiers*, pp. 46–50, esp. 47.

¹⁹⁰Sawirus ibn al-Muqaffā', *History*, pp. 203–4; Morimoto, *The Fiscal Administration*, pp. 252–53; and Cohen, *Jewish Self-Government*, pp. 58, 61–63.

¹⁹¹Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, vol. II, pp. 312, 314, 330; Ibn Muyassar, *Akhbār*, pp. 23–24.

¹⁹²Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, vol. II, pp. 280–81, 282, 296; Ibn Zāfir, *Akhbār*, p. 75 (cf. editor's note 374); Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, vol. V, p. 17; Ibn al-Zubayr, *K. al-dhakhā'ir*, pp. 251–52. Maqrīzī's description of the looting of al-Mustanṣir's treasures (in *Khiṭaṭ*) is translated into German by P. Kahle, "Die Schätze der Fatimiden," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 89 (1935), 329–62, esp. 338–62.

¹⁹³Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, vol. V, p. 16; Ibn Zubayr, *K. al-dhakhā'ir*, p. 257.

¹⁹⁴H. A. R. Gibb, "The Caliphate and the Arab States," in M. W. Baldwin, ed., *History of the Crusades* (Philadelphia, 1955), vol. I, p. 95; Cohen, *Jewish Self-Government*, pp. 64–65.

¹⁹⁵Gibb admits that the Fatimid weakness was the reason for the failure to assist al-Basāsīrī effectively (Gibb, "The Caliphate," p. 91), but does not see its wider implications.