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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (28 May 69) FOR OT UT 691018

3 June 1969

**SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Cavalry  
Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)**

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**1st Cavalry Division Artillery**

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS  
1ST CAVALRY DIVISION ARTILLERY (AIRMOBILE)  
APO 96490

AVDAAR-CO

7 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AM) for  
Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR (RI)

Commanding General  
1st Cavalry Division (AM)  
APO 96490

## 1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

### SYNOPSIS

At the beginning of the period the 1st ACD had begun to deploy from the I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ) to the III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ). The 2nd Brigade in the ICTZ and its supporting artillery remained engaged in Operation Comanche Falls II (destroy the enemy and his installations in Base Area 101) followed by Comanche Falls III (oriented on the VC infrastructure in the My Chon Valley). Operation Liberty Canyon (the phased move of all elements of the 1st ACD from ICTZ to III CTZ) was conducted concurrently with the brigades committed to combat immediately upon arrival in the III CTZ. Upon closing of the tactical elements in III CTZ, the 1st ACD began Operation Sheridan Sabre (a screening operation to deny infiltration to the NVA Divisions massed in Cambodia). Sheridan Sabre continued through the end of the reporting period. Navajo Warhorse (a brigade sized operation in the III & IV CTZ's) was conducted concurrently.

#### a. Organization.

(1) Direct Support Artillery. In the I CTZ the month of November began with the 2nd Battalion, 19th Artillery (-) DS of the 1st Brigade with B/2/19 and C/2/19 on LZ Sharon (YD 340495) making preparations for airlift to the III CTZ while still providing fire support to infantry battalions in the AO. The 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery (-) was DS of the 2nd Brigade engaged in Operation Comanche Falls II with A/1/77 and B/1/77 on LZ Nancy (YD 400440), and A/1/40 (105) reinforcing 1/77 on LZ Hardcore (YD 460512). The 1st Bn, 30th Arty (-) with the following units OPCON; B/1/21 and A/2/319 on Camp Evans (YD 540320), C/1/21 on LZ Jack (YD 549309), C/6/33 on LZ Jeannie (YD 549309) and C/2/319 on LZ Miguel (YD 484206), was DS of the 3rd Brigade (-), relieving the 1st Bn, 21st Arty (-) which deployed with the 3rd Brigade Task Force on Operation

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Liberty Canyon. In the III CTZ, 1st Bn, 21st Arty (-) was DS of the 3rd Brigade Task Force with OPCON of A/2/19, C/1/77 and A/1/21. 1/21 Arty was located at Quan Loi (XT 819908).

(2) General Support Artillery. At the beginning of the reporting period the 2nd Battalion, 20th Artillery (ARA) was GS to 1 ACD with batteries located in both CTZ's. A/2/20 was located at LZ Sharon and B/2/20 was at LZ Nancy. In the III CTZ, C/2/20 with the 3rd Brigade Task Force at Quan Loi was already credited as the first unit with kills in the new AO. The 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery continued in general support of the 1 ACD while maintaining operational control of the artillery in DS of the 3rd Brigade (-) in I CTZ. On 1 Nov 68, A/1/30 was GSR 1/77 Arty (-) at LZ Nancy, B/1/30 was GSR 2/19 Arty (-) at LZ Sharon and C/1/30 was moving by sea aboard IST's to the III CTZ under OPCON of the 1st Bn, 21st Arty. E/82 Arty (Avn) at Camp Evans was providing aviation support to elements of Division Artillery. In addition, C Battery, 2nd Battalion, 94th Artillery (8" howitzer SP) located on LZ Nancy provided General Support to the Division in I CTZ.

(3) ADA and Searchlights. The period began with four M42 "dusters" from C/4/60 and two M55 quad 50's from E/41 Arty (-) reinforcing 2/19 Arty on LZ Sharon. D/1/44 Arty with four M42's and one platoon from E/41 Arty with two M55's were reinforcing 1/77 Arty on LZ Nancy. In addition, B/29 and G/29 OPCON 1 ACD Arty provided a total of six searchlights which were divided between 1/30, 1/77 and 2/19 Arty. With the initiation of Operation Liberty Canyon, C/4/60, E/41, G/29 and B/29 deployed with their supported artillery battalions to III CTZ.

### b. Operation Comanche Falls II and III.

As the reporting period began, Operation Comanche Falls II was nearing completion as elements of the 2nd Brigade, supported by 1st Bn, 77th Arty uncovered large caches of enemy equipment and supplies in the western half of the 1st & 2nd Brigade AO's. On 031200 Nov, Comanche Falls II ended and Comanche Falls III began. This Operation was a combined US and ARVN effort to eliminate Viet Cong infrastructures along the My Chon River from Than My Chon to the coast. Artillery units supporting Comanche Falls III were concentrated at LZ Nancy and included A/1/77 (105) DS, A/1/30 (155) GSR, B/2/20 (-) (ARA) GSR and C/2/94 (8" SP) in general support. ARVN artillery was integrated with US artillery for the operation and included A/1/11 (105) and A/34 (-) (155). The operation was of short duration as joint US and ARVN forces under control of the 2nd Brigade, 1 ACD met light enemy resistance in their sweep to the coast. Artillery elements under control of 1/77 Arty fired a total of 2803 rounds in support of the operation which terminated on 6 Nov 68.

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### c. Operation Liberty Canyon.

In what was the fastest and largest move of the Vietnam War, the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) was ordered to move from northern I Corps Tactical Zone to the III CTZ northwest of Saigon near the Cambodian border. The 3rd Brigade Task Force with 1st Bn, 21st Arty (-) in DS was the lead element of the Division and was air-lifted to Quan Loi to begin operations. 1st Brigade with 2nd Bn, 19th Arty in direct support established a base of operations at Tay Ninh, while 2nd Brigade with 1st Bn, 77th Arty in direct support concluded Operation Comanche Falls III and began moving to its base of operations at Tonle Cham (XT 630820). An advance party from HQ, Division Artillery arrived at the 1 ACD forward base at Long Binh to effect coordination with artillery agencies and support activities, recon sites for location of Division Artillery at Phuoc Vinh (XT 960500), and establish an operations center. Division Artillery Headquarters became operational in III CTZ at 021200 Nov 68. By 18 Nov 68, 1 ACD had closed the combat & combat support elements in the III CTZ and had begun operation Sheridan Sabre.

### d. Operation Sheridan Sabre.

(1) General. This operation was part of II FF Vietnam Operation Toan Thang II and began on 8 Nov 68, as 1 ACD closed into III CTZ. The mission of the 1 ACD during this operation was to conduct offensive operations in an assigned TAOR, interdict movement of major enemy forces south into critical areas of III CTZ, locate and destroy enemy forces, facilities, and material, and be prepared to deploy all or part of the Division throughout III/IV CTZ's.

(2) Planning. Elements of Div Arty were positioned throughout the TAOR to provide close and continuous fire support to the three maneuver brigades. The 1st Brigade was supported by 2nd Bn, 19th Arty (-) with C/2/19 on LZ Mustang (XT 371820) and one OPCON battery, B/1/21 on LZ Beverly with a mission of GSR 2/19 Arty. A/2/20 (ARA) was on Tay Ninh (XT 155511) with a mission of GSR 2/19 Arty. 1st Bde was to conduct offensive operations against enemy forces and installations in north-eastern Tay Ninh Province with one battalion making a reconnaissance in force north and west of Thien Nhon (XT 087815). The 2nd Brigade supported by 1st Bn, 77th Arty (-) was disposed with A/2/19 on LZ Rita (XT 502795) and A/1/21 on LZ Billy (XT 437845). D/1/5 (105) OPCON from 1st Inf Div on LZ Dot (XT 527847), A/2/11 (155) OPCON from 23rd Arty Gp on LZ Jake (XT 623815), and B/2/20 (-) (ARA) on Quan Loi were GSR 1/21 Arty. The 2nd Brigade was to conduct offensive operations in the Fish Hook area (vic XT 60008000) and Saigon River infiltration routes to destroy enemy forces and installations and secure Hwy Q1 13 in zone.



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The 3rd Brigade was supported by 1st Bn, 21st Arty (-) composed of C/1/21 and C/1/77 on Quan Loi and B/2/19 on LZ Buttons (YU 143078). B/6/15 (105) on LZ Shirley (XT 773897) and C/1/30 and C/2/20 (ARA) on Quan Loi were GSR 1/21 Arty. The 3rd Brigade was to conduct offensive operations vicinity Serges Road to interdict enemy infiltration routes and to locate and destroy enemy caches in that area. One battalion based vicinity Song Be (YU 170105) was to conduct recon-in-force operations vicinity Adams Road. The 1 ACD Arty became the 4th command and control element of the Division with operational control of A/1/77 (105), A/6/15 (105) and E/8/6 (4.2" mortar) on Phuoc Vinh. Initially, the 1st Bn, 18th Inf, 1st Inf Div was placed OPCON to Division Artillery on 7 Nov 68 with the mission of defending Phuoc Vinh and the Song Be bridge (XT 925442), and conducting operations in AO COBRA. However, on 15 Nov 68 the 2nd Bn, 5th Cav replaced 1st Bn, 18th Inf (-) which returned to the 1st Inf Div. At this time Division Artillery was assigned an area of operations (AO WOLFE) surrounding Phuoc Vinh and responsibility for the remainder of AO COBRA was assumed by the 1st Inf Div. Designation of Div Arty as a maneuver headquarters was necessary because the division base camp was located outside of the Division AO.

(3) Execution. The first and most significant contact during operation Sheridan Sabre occurred in the 2nd Bde AO during the late evening of 13 Nov 68 and extended into the early morning of 14 Nov 68. At 2330 hrs, LZ Dot occupied by 3/5 ARVN Rangers and D/1/5 Artillery came under heavy ground attack from all sides and received intense mortar and rocket fire as enemy forces attempted to overrun the fire base. The attacking force was a regimental size unit, believed to have been the 95 C Regiment, 1st NVA Division. Artillery support from A/2/19, B/1/30, A/2/11, D/1/5 and Aerial Rocket Artillery from B and C batteries 2/20 Arty along with TAC air strikes engaged the enemy forces surrounding LZ Dot. Over 3,000 artillery rounds and 1,500 rockets were expended during the contact which ended at 1030 hrs 14 Nov 68, with successful defense of LZ Dot and a total of 287 NVA KIA. On 15 November, B/1/21 moved from LZ St. Barbara to LZ Ann (XT 987815) to support a recon-in-force operation being conducted by one battalion in coordination with the 5th VN Marine battalion and local USSF/CIDG forces. On 25 November, a coordinated attack by the NVA was directed at LZ Ann. At 0640 elements of 1/7 Cavalry came under ground attack southwest of LZ Ann which was followed by a mortar attack on LZ Ann. Counter-mortar fires stopped the mortar attack, and the combined fire support from tube and aerial rocket artillery repulsed the ground attack resulting in 130 NVA KIA, 30 of which were credited to ARA. From mid-November to mid-January several enemy operations centered in the 3rd Brigade AO. B/2/19 moved 4 howitzers to LZ C-Rations (YU 180098) on 13 Nov to provide artillery support for infantry elements extending operations north of Song Be (YU 1710). During the same period reconnaissance operations by supporting elements of 1/9 Cav Sqdn found enemy forces

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infiltrating south from Cambodia along Hwy QL 13. C/1/77 moved from Quan Loi (LZ Andy) to LZ Kelly (XU 734088) on 12 November to support interdiction operations to the north. By late November operations north of Song Be had shifted to the northwest as B/2/19 consolidated and moved to LZ Janett (YU 094104). On 6 Dec, a plt from C/1/30 moved to LZ Ellen (YU 038067) to interdict enemy infiltration routes along Serges Jungle Hwy. As the month of December began, recon elements spotted enemy concentrations infiltrating down the Song Be River Valley north of Hwy QL 13. Hqs, 2nd Bn, 5th Cav and three companies, A, B, and E were released from Division Artillery control and proceeded to Dong Xoai (YT 059758) where they became OPCON to 3rd Bde. The two remaining companies in AO WOLFE were joined by D Troop, 1st Bn, 9th Cav and became Task Force VALENCE. Elements of the 3rd Brigade established blocking positions along Hwy QL 13 from LZ Eleanor (XT 095739) to LZ Odessa (YT 059739) to halt enemy movement south. A/1/77 was placed OPCON to 1/21 Arty and moved from Phuoc Vinh to LZ Odessa on 1 Dec 68. B/1/77 moved from LZ Andy to LZ Eleanor on 4 Dec 68. The same day, A/1/30 joined B/1/77 on LZ Eleanor to support the blocking force and destroy the enemy in zone. Throughout the operation, massive artillery concentrations pounded the enemy infiltration routes. Thick jungle terrain prevented immediate casualty assessment. However, the operation was considered successful in halting the enemy movement south. On 22 Dec 68, HQ, 2nd Bn, 5th Cav and B Company returned to Phuoc Vinh and control of the units with Task Force VALENCE passed to HQ, 2nd Bn, 5th Cav. The Christmas Cease Fire went into effect at 241800 December, and extended until 251800 December. During this period, two significant actions occurred in the 2nd Brigade Area of Operations. On 251100 December, surveillance helicopters received approximately 300 rounds of automatic weapons fire. Artillery and air strikes were placed on several suspect enemy locations. On 27 December, approximately 60 NVA were spotted at grid XT 575885. Artillery and air strikes were called in which resulted in 41 NVA killed. On 27 December, two Co's of 2/2 Mech Infantry (1st Inf Div) which were OPCON 2nd Brigade received intense automatic weapons fire from three sides. The contact lasted for approximately 4 hours during which fire support from artillery, ARA, and air strikes resulted in 41 NVA killed and 3 NVA captured. During January, enemy activity increased throughout the 2d Bde AO. The most significant contacts occurred on 11 and 12 January, when an estimated company size enemy force ambushed a convoy of elements from 1st Sqdn, 11th AC Regt and 2nd Bn, 2nd Mech Inf, on Hwy QL 13 eight kilometers south of An Loc (XT 764805). There were two armored personnel carriers destroyed, 15 US WIA, and 3 US KIA. The convoy overran the ambush elements killing 31 of the enemy. Artillery from 23rd Arty Gp supporting the 2nd and 3rd Brigade together with ARA and TAC Air supported the contact in which an additional 106 NVA were killed. On 11 Jan 69, D Troop, 1st Bn, 9th Cav returned to OPCON 3rd Bde. At 291200 Jan 69, the 2nd Bn, 5th Cav was released from Div Arty control and the 1st Bn, 7th Cav (- Co's D & E) was placed OPCON to Div Arty. Throughout the

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reporting period, LZ's in the 2nd Bde area came under mortar and rocket attack. LZ Rita received 735 incoming rds during the period, including 671 X 82mm mortar rds, 52 X 107mm rockets, 2 X 122mm rockets and 3 over-caliber "Trashcan" rockets. Casualties and damage on LZ Rita, however, remained light during the period.

### e. Operation NAVAJO WARHORSE.

(1) General. As the month of December approached, intelligence sources revealed a major enemy threat in western Hau Nghia Province. Contingency plans were put into effect as the 1st Brigade supported by 2nd Battalion, 19th Artillery composed of C/2/19 and B/1/21 with A/1/30 GSR deployed to AO NAVAJO WARHORSE to interdict movement of major enemy forces from Cambodia into critical areas of III CTZ.

(2) Planning. The 2nd Bn, 19th Arty was to provide direct support to maneuver elements of the 1st Brigade, as they deployed along the most likely infiltration routes. Small unit airmobile and NAVCAV (cavalry troops operating from naval rivercraft) operations supported by artillery were to locate enemy forces and destroy them with concentrated fire power.

(3) Execution. During the week of 8-14 December, 2nd Bn, 19th Arty Headquarters moved with 1st Brigade Headquarters to Chu Chi. C/2/19 moved during the same period to LZ Tracy (XT 440072) to support the 1st Bn, 8th Cav. On 19 December, B/1/21 moved from LZ Ann to LZ Clara (XS 414971) and C/1/77 moved to LZ Ray (XT 415242), becoming OPCON to 2/19 Arty on 26 December. LZ Clara received an 82mm mortar stand-off attack on 29 December resulting in 10 casualties, including the battery commander and 5 other artillerymen from B/1/21. On 30 December, A/1/30 moved to LZ Tracy and assumed the mission of GSR to 2nd Battalion, 19th Artillery. The new year began with elements of the 1/7 Cavalry departing LZ Clara while B/1/21 Arty remained on LZ Clara to support elements from the 50th ARVN Regiment who arrived in the AO on 5 January. Operations within AO NAVAJO WARHOUSE have been characterized by light enemy contact and discovery of sizeable ammunition caches along Song Vam Co Dong during joint operations with naval forces. On 19-21 Jan 69, the 1st Bde and the 2nd Bn, 19th Arty returned to the Sheridan Sabre AO, leaving a reinforced company Task Force supported by B/1/21 on LZ Elrod (XS 338846) in NAVAJO WARHORSE that was conducting operations there at the end of the reporting period.

## 2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

### a. Personnel.

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### (1) AH-1G Pilots.

(a) OBSERVATION: There is a shortage of commissioned officer pilots qualified in the AH-1G helicopter in the Aerial Rocket Artillery battalion.

(b) EVALUATION: The Aerial Rocket Artillery Battalion is authorized 36 AH-1G aircraft. There are 39 commissioned and 48 warrant officer pilots qualified in AH-1G aircraft authorized. At the present time 27 commissioned pilots are assigned but only 14 are qualified in the AH-1G. There are 61 warrant officer pilots assigned of whom 57 are qualified in AH-1G aircraft. Although pilots who are not qualified in the AH-1G can be utilized in the front or gunner's seat and experienced warrant officers can be utilized to function as section leaders, the unit's operational capability is degraded by the lack of qualified platoon leaders. An AH-1G New Equipment Training Team is operational in country but lacks the capacity to train pilots in the numbers that are required.

### (c) RECOMMENDATION:

(1) AH-1G pilots equal in number to the authorized spaces must be made available to units equipped with this aircraft or the unit must be furnished with the training quotas sufficient to qualify their available pilots.

(2) Every reasonable attempt should be made to achieve the authorized balance between commissioned and warrant officer pilots.

### b. Operations.

#### (1) Enemy Movement.

(a) OBSERVATION: The loss of surprise inherent in the adjustment of tube artillery fires frequently degrades the effectiveness of those fires on transient targets of opportunity.

(b) EVALUATION: Artillery aerial observers on night surveillance missions are frequently able to detect enemy movement by the observation of the small lights which are employed by the enemy either on bicycles or hand carried. Since these targets can only rarely be located with sufficient accuracy to permit tube artillery to be effectively fired for effect without adjustment, an adjustment is initiated. Consequently, personnel in the target area are alerted enabling them to disperse and seek cover. Conversely, the employment of Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA) on such targets does not require accurate location by map coordinates, since the gunner acquires the target visually. The attack of such targets

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by ARA has proven to be very remunerative, particularly in open areas where the flechette warhead can be employed.

### (c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1 That ARA be utilized to attack transient targets of opportunity when visibility or other complications preclude accurate terrestrial locations.

2 That developmental efforts be accelerated to make available in the field a system such as the Visual Airborne Target Location System (VATIS) which would allow the profitable attack of transient targets by tube artillery.

### (2) Artillery Preparation of Landing Zones.

(a) OBSERVATION: Artillery should not be adjusted on intended landing zones (LZ's) in advance of the preparation of the LZ.

(b) EVALUATION: On occasion, artillery has been adjusted on intended LZ's as much as several hours prior to the intended insertion. When this has occurred the intended LZ's have been prematurely identified to the enemy. The enemy has been able to position his forces so as to minimize their damage from the actual LZ preparation and strike the landing forces during the critical period immediately after insertion.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Landing zone preparation should be initiated as close to the landing time as possible in consideration of the means available and the targets to be attacked. Once neutralization is achieved, it should be maintained continuously until the time when it must be lifted for the safety of lift helicopters. The most accurate gunnery techniques available should be utilized and the fire for effect shifted as necessary to achieve the desired neutralization.

### (3) Artillery Position Area Survey.

(a) OBSERVATION: Isolated fire bases located in relatively flat, dense, jungle terrain often can not be located by conventional survey methods which are dependent upon line of sight.

(b) EVALUATION: Usually fire bases are established on LZ's where there is no survey control. Normally identifiable map locations from which a traverse could be initiated are separated from the LZ by insecure areas and dense jungles which preclude traverse. The lack of an optical line of sight, precludes the use of triangulation in most cases. A three

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point resection utilizing a light observation helicopter (LOH) hovering over the resection points (for example road or stream junctions) has been found to be marginally effective. The inherent inaccuracies involved in this procedure and the risks to the helicopter and crew are obvious; however it represents the most effective technique currently available. Direction is customarily established by sun shot.

(c) RECOMMENDATION:

1 The Air Cavalry Division Artillery should be provided an airborne survey system such as the autotape system which was tested by the 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery in 1968.

2 As an interim solution, the helicopter resection described above should be utilized.

(4) Requirement for Long Distance Communication.

(a) OBSERVATION: The large area of operations (AO) which is habitually assigned to the Air Cavalry Division requires FM radio communications over distances which exceed the capability of equipment currently available to the ARA battalion.

(b) EVALUATION: The current AO of the 1st Air Cav Division is approximately 85 X 120 km in size. The availability of facilities has dictated that the ARA battalion headquarters and one battery be located outside of the AO. The other two batteries are located at two airfields within the area of operations. Additionally, aircraft are habitually laagered at dispersed locations throughout the AO to facilitate quick response to fire missions. Thus the range of the current family of FM radios when used with the RC-292 antenna is inadequate to control all fire units and relays must be used. The establishment of relays is complicated by the relatively flat terrain and the lack of suitably located secure areas. The AB/577 antenna when available has proven to be satisfactory in meeting most of the communications requirements. No AB/577 antenna masts are authorized in the ARA battalion.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That MTOE 6-725T be modified to include one AB/577 antenna per firing battery and one in the battalion communications section of ARA battalions in Vietnam.

(5) Employment of flechette warheads for 2.75 folding fin rockets.

(a) OBSERVATION: The flechette warhead has proven to be extremely effective in the suppression of ground to air fire directed against helicopters.

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(b) EVALUATION: It is common practice for NVA and VC to employ automatic weapons and small arms fired from trees and or ground positions against low flying helicopters. This fire is particularly effective when employed against helicopters used to deliver CS gas and lift ships on approach and departure from the LZ. On each occasion where the flechette warhead rocket has been employed against the source of this type of ground to air fire, the fire has been silenced.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Flechette warhead aerial rockets be employed to suppress ground to air fire when it is necessary for helicopters to traverse ground fire areas at low altitude.

### (6) Loss of CS Gas capability in ARA Battalion.

(a) OBSERVATION: With the replacement of the UH-1B/C aircraft by the AH-1G Cobra the ARA battalion has lost the capability to deliver CS gas.

(b) EVALUATION: The range and responsiveness of the ARA make this a desirable weapons system for the delivery of non-persistent incapacitating agents. A CS warhead for the 2.75" rocket is under development. Information available to this organization at this time indicates that the warhead will be available in Vietnam in 13 months. The standoff delivery capability which the CS warhead will provide is much to be desired. Existing delivery systems which require overflying the target area subject the aircraft to the hazard of ground fire.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Every effort should be made to expedite the delivery of a non-persistent incapacitating agent warhead for the 2.75" folding fin rocket to Vietnam.

### (7) Organic lift capability in the ARA batteries.

(a) OBSERVATION: Replacement of the UH-1B/C aircraft in the ARA firing battery by the AH-1G aircraft has resulted in the loss of an organic capability to transport essential personnel and equipment to establish forward operational bases.

(b) EVALUATION: When the ARA battery was equipped with UH-1B/C helicopters the firing battery had the capability to transport essential personnel & equipment to a forward operations base with organic aircraft. For example when the ARA battalion was redeployed from I Corps Tactical Zone to III Corps Tactical Zone they were able to establish forward operations and maintenance facilities immediately upon arrival in the new AO utilizing personnel and equipment transported with organic lift.

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7 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AM) for  
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Presently there are three UH1B/C helicopters in the Headquarters Battery. However these aircraft lack the capacity in terms of weight and volume lift to adequately fulfill the requirement generated by the loss of the lift capability formerly possessed by the 36 UH1B/C rocket ships. The essential lift requirement generated by local displacement of batteries and on the establishment of temporary forward laager points can adequately be met by the replacement of the 3 UH1B/C aircraft in Headquarters Battery with UH1-H aircraft.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The UH-1B/C aircraft in Headquarters Battery of the ARA battalion should be replaced with UH1-H helicopters.

c. Training.

(1) Helicopter Sling rigging training.

(a) OBSERVATION: Graduates of the Ft Sill Combat Leaders Course lack basic knowledge of the procedures for rigging the M102 105mm and the M114 155mm howitzers.

(b) EVALUATION: Conditions in Vietnam are such that artillery moves are frequent, rapid, and in the 1st Cavalry Division normally made by helicopter. This applies not only to divisional light and medium artillery but equally to light and medium artillery supporting the Division Artillery. The continuing shortage of experienced Artillery section chiefs frequently requires that graduates of the Combat Leaders Course be appointed section chief's upon assignment to the unit. Additional emphasis must be placed upon this aspect of their training if they are to be capable of adequately discharging their duties upon assignment to the 1st Air Cavalry Division.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Additional emphasis should be placed upon air mobility training in the Combat Leaders Course.

(2) Aviation Training Standardization.

(a) OBSERVATION: Training received by students qualifying to fly the AH-1G helicopter differs at the two major training agencies (i.e., AH-1G New Equipment Training (NETT) Team Vietnam and USAAVNS).

(b) EVALUATION: Graduates of the AH-1G training course conducted by the NETT in RVN are better qualified in emergency procedures applicable to the AH-1G than are their counter parts trained by USAAVNS. This difference is particularly pronounced in the area of touchdown auto-rotations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: USAAVNS should evaluate its training standards and objectives regarding emergency procedures in the AH-1G.



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### (3) Aviator Training.

(a) OBSERVATION: Newly assigned aviators on their first tours in RVN are not proficient in the use of more than one radio at a time.

(b) EVALUATION: Newly assigned aviators have difficulty maintaining concurrent communication with all of the necessary agencies while flying. Missions flown by the ARA normally require the concurrent monitoring of at least two and frequently three radio channels.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: USAAVNS should place additional emphasis on concurrent operation of multiple radios while in flight.

d. Intelligence: None

e. Logistics:

#### (1) Logistical support of AH-1G armament systems.

(a) OBSERVATION: Test equipment and replacement parts for the XM28 and TAT-102 armament systems are in short supply.

(b) EVALUATION: This unit has experienced frequent equipment failures in the XM-28 and TAT-102 armament systems installed on the AH-1G helicopters assigned to the unit. The unit does not have appropriate test equipment to "trouble shoot" the system systematically. When the defective part is located by trial and error methods correction is further delayed by a critical shortage of replacement parts.

(c) RECOMMENDATION:

1 That the XM-28 and TAT-102 turret system be test fired prior to issue to using units.

2 That organizational test set be issued on the basis of one set per four systems.

3 That sufficient parts be made available for DX to reduce the down time on these systems substantially.

4 That two M-134 guns and two M129 launchers be issued with each AH-1G helicopter equipped with the XM-28 turret system to improve the system availability.

f. Organization.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AM) for  
Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR (RI)

(1) Armament repairmen.

(a) OBSERVATION: There are insufficient numbers of armament repairmen available to maintain the armament systems on the AH-1G Cobra helicopter.

(b) EVALUATION: The present authorization of four armament repairmen per battery is based upon the UH1B/C aircraft armed with the relatively simple XM-3 rocket system. The more sophisticated AH-1G aircraft has a much more complicated armament system and requires a larger number of highly trained armament repairmen. At the present time the aircraft crew chiefs are attempting to maintain these systems. However, they lack the requisite training and test equipment to do the job adequately. The utilization of aircraft crew chiefs to maintain the armament system is detracting from the aircraft maintenance capability.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That aircraft armament repairmen be authorized at the rate of eight per twelve aircraft plus an armament repairman supervisor.

  
WILLIAM R. WOLFE JR.  
Colonel, Field Artillery  
Commanding

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AVDASH (1 Feb 69) 1st Ind


SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery  
(AM) for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

HEADQUARTERS, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), APO San Francisco 96490  
9 February 1969

TO: CG, II FFORCEV, ATTN: G-3 D&F, APO 96266

1. (U) Enclosed is the Operational Report of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Division Artillery for period ending 31 January 1969.
2. (U) Distribution is being made in accordance with USARV Reg 525-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
C. E. DOYLE  
CPT, AGC  
ASST AG

AVFBC-RE-H (7 Feb 69) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AI) for  
Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR (RI)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 4 MAR 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (AI) for the period ending 31 January 1969.
2. (U) Reference Section 2, para 2b (1)(2)(3). This will be included in a compilation of Artillery Lessons Learned being prepared by this headquarters for distribution to all artillery headquarters.
3. (U) Reference Section 2, para 2b(4) and (7), para 2f(1). Concur. The unit has been instructed to initiate appropriate LTCE action.
4. (U) Reference Section 2, para 2e(1), Logistical support of AH-1G armament systems. Concur. Unit has been instructed to initiate appropriate LTCE action on recommendations 2 and 4 and to coordinate with appropriate support commands concerning recommendations 1 and 3.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
B. G. MACDONALD  
1LT, AGC  
Asst AG

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AVHGC-DST (7 Feb 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (Airmobile)  
for Period Ending 31 January 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (RI)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 963751 9 APR 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969 from 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (Airmobile).

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning AH-1G pilots, page 7, paragraph 2a(1); concur. The 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (Airmobile) is authorized 170 AH-1G aviators, based on assignment of two aviators per aircraft. The DA input to RVN is at a ratio of 40 officers to 60 warrant officers. The current ratio of USARV aviators assigned is 39.6 officers to 60.4 warrant officers. Applying the DA ratio of 40:60 to the 170 AH-1G aviators authorized in the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (Airmobile), results in an authorization of 68 officers and 102 warrant officers. The 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (Airmobile) currently has 63 officers and 125 warrant officers assigned, which is five officers short, and 23 warrant officers over that authorized. Readjustments within the division would narrow the imbalance between commissioned and warrant officers in the ARA Battalion. Unit will be notified.

b. (U) Reference item concerning Enemy Movement, page 7, paragraph 2b(1); concur. An evaluation of the Visual Airborne Target Locator System (VATLS), was completed in Vietnam on 1 December 1968. Considerable research and development is required to perfect this system for practical application in combat. Recommend action by higher headquarters.

c. (C) Reference item concerning Artillery Position Area Survey, page 8, paragraph 2b(3); concur. Until such time as an autotape system is developed for combat use, the procedure of helicopter resection is considered valid. DA has cancelled ENSURE 53, Survey System Long Range, because of extensive modifications required to make the system suitable for use in RVN. The US Army Combat Development Command (USACDC) has been requested to review the Army's overall requirement for an aerial survey system, and redirect the developmental effort through normal research and development channels.

d. (C) Reference item concerning loss of CS Gas Capability in ARA Battalion, page 10, paragraph 2b(6); concur. On 26 December 1968, USARV submitted an ENSURE request, which has been designated by DA as ENSURE 295 for operational test quantities of a 2.75" FFAR (XM-80) CS filled round. The US Army Materiel Command is developing the CS round, and USARV will be advised on developmental progress.

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10**

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AVHGC-DST (7 Feb 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Cavalry Division Artillery(Airmobile)  
for Period Ending 31 January 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (RI)

e. (U) Reference item concerning Organic Lift Capability in ARA Batteries, page 10, paragraph 2b(7) and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 3; concur with the recommendation and 2d Indorsement.

f. (U) Reference item concerning Aviation Training Standardization, page 11, paragraph 2c(2); concur. USARV Standardization Pilot comments indorse the evaluation and recommend that USAAVNS should include more training in emergency procedures, with particular emphasis on touchdown autorotations. Recommend action by higher headquarters.

g. (U) Reference item concerning Aviator Training, page 12, paragraph 2c(3); nonconcur. Although concurrent operation of multiple radios while conducting tactical flight operations is frequently required, training in this capability can be more effectively accomplished at unit level.

h. (C) Reference item concerning Armament Repairmen, page 13, paragraph 2f(1), and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 3; concur. However, MTOE action is not necessary. When the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (Airmobile) reorganizes its direct support maintenance using the decentralized concept, the problem will be solved. The aircraft maintenance team (KE), MTOE 55-570G, has seven armament personnel assigned. One of these teams will be attached to each ARA Battery, providing a total of 11 armament personnel per battery. No further action is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:  
1st Cav Div Arty (AM)  
HQ, II FFORCEV

C. D. WILSON  
1LT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

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GPOP-DT (7 Feb 69) 4th Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Cav Div Arty (Airmobile) for  
Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 13 MAY 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report, as indorsed, except as indicated below.
2. (C) Reference paragraph 2b(6) basic and 3d Indorsement, paragraph 2d. Department of the Army has indicated that approximately 9 months will be required to perform engineering and testing of subject rockets. US Army, Vietnam, will be provided 10,540 items for evaluation when testing and engineering is completed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

Cy furn:  
CG USARV

*Fred E. Hansard*  
FRED E. HANSARD *Maj AGC*  
Colonel, AGC  
Adjutant General

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