# Backdooring MS Office documents with secret master keys

Yoshinori Takesako (SECCON), Shigeo Mitsunari (Cybozu Labs)



### Yoshinori Takesako (SECCON)


- Twitter: @takesako
- chairperson of the SECCON (largest CTF in Japan)
- advisory board of the OWASP Japan
- review board for the CODE BLUE security conference
- leader of the Shibuya Perl Mongers group
- Microsoft MVP award of Developer Security in 2008





## Shigeo Mitsunari (Cybozu Labs)

- Twitter: @herumi
- software developer and researcher
- pairing-based cryptography and its implementation
- x86/x64 JIT assembler Xbyak
- Best paper award by IEICE in 2010
- Microsoft MVP award of Developer Security in 2015





#### Agenda

- Microsoft Office 2010 and 2013 employ "**Agile Encryption**" algorithm in their Office Open XML documents.
- There is a vulnerability in the file format specification that can allow an **attacker** to later **decrypt** strongly encrypted documents **without the password** as long as the attacker has access to the originating MS Office program.
- This is possible by tricking MS Office into creating a nearly undetectable **secret master key** when it creates encrypted documents.



### MS Office 2007~ (supports OOX file formats)

- MS Word
  - .doc  $\rightarrow$  .docx



- MS Excel
  - .xls  $\rightarrow$  xlsx



- MS PowerPoint
  - .ppt  $\rightarrow$  .pptx



[1] http://www.ecma-international.org/publications/standards/Ecma-376.htm

#### **Standard ECMA-376** Office Open XML File Formats

1<sup>st</sup> edition (December 2006), 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (December 2008), 3<sup>rd</sup> edition (June 2011) and 4<sup>th</sup> edition (December 2012)

This Standard defines Office Open XML's vocabularies and document representation and packaging. It also specifies requirements for consumers and producers of Office Open XML.

An Office Open XML overview is available on the Ecma website.

The following files can be freely downloaded:

File name	Size (Bytes)	Content
ECMA-376 4th edition Part 1	43 631 768	zipped folder
ECMA-376 th edition Part 2	1 578 124	zipped folder
ECMA-376 4 dition Part 3	948 269	zipped folder
ECMA-376 4th pPart 4	8 485 360	zipped folder
Over 5,000 p	ages!	



#### Protect Document > Encrypt with Password





#### SaveAs > Tools > GeneralOptions > Password

$\bigcirc$		
$(\leftarrow)$	Save As	×
Info		General Options ? × General Options
New	整理 ▼ 新しいフォルダー	File encryption options for this document         Password to open:         File sharing options for this document
Open		:42 Password to modify:
Save	レートロンシー       し Custom Office Templates       2015/07/15 1         レートロンシー       し Visual Studio 2013       2015/07/14 1	
Save As		Adjust the security level for opening files that might contain macro viruses and specify Macro Security
Print	□ ーカル ディスク (( 裂 SDXC (D:)	
Share	File name: Doc1.docx	
Export	Save as type: Word Document (*.docx)	
Close	作成者: takesako タグ: タグの追加	OK Cancel
	Save Thumbnail	
Account		Cancel
Options	Map Network Drive Save Options General Options	
	Web Options Compress Pictures	encrypted.docx



#### Important: do not forget the password !!!

• Microsoft **cannot retrieve** lost or forgotten passwords, so keep a list of your passwords and corresponding file names in a safe place.




#### Compare the password cracking times

• DOCX files are very strong against Brute-force attack.

File format number of trials 4,500,000,000 times/sec ZIP ZIP(256bitAES) 1,050,000 times/sec 12,000,000 times/sec )( )( ] **23,000 times/sec** 



#### Passcovery - powerful password recovery tools



#### [1] http://passcovery.com/



#### Passcovery > Password Recovery Wizard (GUI)

	Passcovery Suite
Password Recovery Wizard	File Recovery Options Tools Help
Brute-force settings	
All latin capitals  All latin smalls  All digits  All specials  User defined	File: D:¥oox¥files¥xlsx¥demo1.xlsx Type: Microsoft® Excel 2013 Protection: MS Office 2013, SHA512, 256-bit AES Total passwords to process: 351,520 Password range is defined and attack has been started. If password belongs to this range it'll found otherwise you'll need to extend password range taking into consideration practical limits based on password recovery speed. Attack time limited to 30 minutes. Please consider <u>purchasing a license</u> to get rid of this limitation. Total passwords processed: 13,312.
abcdefghijklmnopgrstuvwxyz	Attack was interrupted by user.
Minimum length 1 Maximum length 4 Mask Mask symbol ?	Total passwords to process: 186,843,979 Password range is defined and attack has been started. If password belongs to this range it'll found otherwise you'll need to extend password range taking into consideration practical limits based on password recovery speed. Total passwords processed: 34,048. Passwords skipped due to length limitations: 3.
Passwords to process: 475,254	Attack was interrupted by user.
Estimated time: 17m 17s @ speed: 458	Total passwords to process: 456,976 Password range is defined and attack has been started. If password belongs to this range it'll found otherwise you'll need to extend password range taking into consideration practical limits based on password recovery speed. Attack time limited to 30 minutes. Please consider <u>purchasing a license</u> to get rid of this limitation.
完了(F) キャンセル	Current password: btoa Estimated time: 14m 40s
	Current speed: 431 Average speed: 484
	© 2011-2015 Passcovery Co. Ltd. Demo Version



### Latin small (26 letters) [a-z]\*

Password length	4	6	8	10
ZIP	(1 sec)	(1 sec)	46 sec	9 hours
ZIP(256bitAES)	(1 sec)	5 min	2 days	4 years
DOC	(1 sec)	26 sec	5 hours	136 days
DOCX	20 sec	44 min	105 days	195 years

[1] http://www.dit.co.jp/service/report/security-threat\_v3.html



# Latin small + capital[A-Z] + digits[0-9] (62 letters)

Password length	4	6	8	10
ZIP	(1 sec)	13 sec	13.5 hours	6 years
ZIP(256bitAES)	14 sec	15 hours	7 years	26,000 years
DOC	(1 sec)	1.3 hours	211 days	2218 yers
DOCX	10.7 min	29 days	301 years	1,158,000 years
			••••••	

[1] http://www.dit.co.jp/service/report/security-threat\_v3.html



# Latin[a-zA-Z] + digits[0-9] + specials (93 letters)

Password length	4	6	8	10
ZIP	(1 sec)	2.4 sec	14 days	341 years
ZIP(256bitAES)	1.2 sec	7 days	169 years	1,462,000 years
DOC	6 sec	15 hours	15 years	128,000 years
DOCX	55 min	326 days	7800 years	66,726,000 years

[1] http://www.dit.co.jp/service/report/security-threat\_v3.html



#### Microsoft opened this Cryptography Structure

#### [MS-OFFCRYPTO]: Office Document Cryptography Structure


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[1] http://download.microsoft.com/download/2/4/8/24862317-78F0-4C4B-B355-C7B2C1D997DB/[MS-OFFCRYPTO].pdf



#### "D0 CF 11 E0" is DOCFILE's leet!





#### oclHashcat - advanced password recovery



Forum

Wiki

Trac

Tools

Events

#### Download latest version

Name	Version	md5svm	Date
oclHashcat for AMD	<u>v 1. 36</u>	4b541784b247a275a187d3bd64f791de	2015.04.25
oclHashcat for NVidia	<u>v 1. 36</u>	1afb1a2bad14c706ce60dc3f8d5dd2bc	2015.04.25

GPU Driver requirements:

NV users require ForceWare 346.x or later
 AMD users require Catalyst 14.9 exactly

#### Features

- Worlds fastest password cracker
- Worlds first and only GPGPU based rule engine

Free

- Multi-GPU (up to 128 gpus)
- Multi-Hash (up to 100 million hashes)
- Multi-OS (Linux & Windows native binaries)
- Multi-Platform (OpenCL & CUDA support)
- Multi-Algo (see below)
- Low resource utilization, you can still watch movies or play games while cracking
- Focuses highly iterated modern hashes
- Focuses dictionary based attacks
- Supports distributed cracking
- Supports pause / resume while cracking

Supported new .docx's hash (Office 2010/2013)

[1] http://hashcat.net/oclhashcat/



#### oclHashcat - How to use

Cracking password protected Office documents

> cudaHashcat64.exe -a 0 -m 9600 --username demo1.docx:\$office\$\*
2013\*10000\*256\*16\*fa383e06ac8c7cf12e55a9921c6a44ff\*b85e024368acc
b51fdfc8e63bc9cb68d\*b4b7a16d577e3e541f8aba367cd428d1fae1ce8c2c40
be5eab5a7e88977e4536 rockyou.txt

- cudaHashcat64.exe (It works on GPU)
  - -a 0 (dictionary attack mode)
  - -m 9600 (Office 2013)
  - --username demo1.xlsx:\$office\$\*2013\*10000\*256\*16\*hash...



### oclHashcat v1.36 (It works on Nvidia GeForce)

Hash-Mode (-m)	Hash-Name	Example (username)
9400	Office 2007	\$office\$*2007*20*128*16*411a51284e0d0200b131a8949aaaa5cc*11 7d532441c63968bee7647d9b7df7d6*df1d601ccf905b375575108f42 ef838fb88e1cde
9500	Office 2010	\$office\$*2010*100000*128*16*772332010172777882672210147572 62*b2d0ca4854ba19cf95a2647d5eee906c*e30cbbb189575cafb6f1 42a90c2622fa9e78d293c5b0c001517b3f5b82993557
9600	Office 2013	\$office\$*2013*100000*256*16*7dd611d7eb4c899f74816d1dec817 b3b*948dc0b2c2c6c32f14b5995a543ad037*0b7ee0e48e935f93719 2a59de48a7d561ef2691d5c8a3ba87ec2d04402a94895
9710	Office 97-03 (MD5+RC4, collider-mode#1)	\$oldoffice\$1*04477077758555626246182730342136*b1b72ff351e41 a7c68f6b45c4e938bd6*0d95331895e99f73ef8b6fbc4a78ac1a
9720	Office 97-03 (MD5+RC4, collider-mode#2)	\$oldoffice\$1*04477077758555626246182730342136*b1b72ff351e41 a7c68f6b45c4e938bd6*0d95331895e99f73ef8b6fbc4a78ac1a



### office2john.py (extract hash from encrypted file)

- demo1.docx (Password="pass")
- > office2john.py demo1.docx demo1.docx:\$office\$\*2013\*10000\*256\*16\*fa383e06ac8c7cf12e55a9921c6a44ff\*b85e024368accb5 1fdfc8e63bc9cb68d\*b4b7a16d577e3e541f8aba367cd428d1fae1ce8c2c40be5eab5a7e88977e4536
- demo2.docx (Password="pass1234")
- > office2john.py demo2.docx

demo2.docx:\$office\$\*2013\*10000\*256\*16\*fa383e06ac8c7cf12e55a9921c6a44ff\*dfa7792d177ed66
f79369e4a38f1de74\*b506ad79ce02ab18bb04e98d01484412e43503f405b7008fde7e5c639866c970



### [MS-CFB] Compound File Binary File Format


#### [MS-CFB]: Compound File Binary File Format

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#### Yes, I can read this..!





#### [MS-OFFCRYPTO] is very interesting file format

#### [MS-OFFCRYPTO]: Office Document Cryptography Structure

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[MS-OFFCRYPTO] — v20141019 Office Document Cryptography Structure

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Release: October 30, 2014

Date	Revision History	Revision Class	Comments
04/04/2008	0.1		Initial Availability
06/27/2008	1.0	Major	Revised and edited the technical content
10/06/2008	1.01	Editorial	Revised and edited the technical content
12/12/2008	1.02	Editorial	Revised and edited the technical content
03/18/2009	1.03	Editorial	Revised and edited the technical content
07/13/2009	1.04	Major	Revised and edited the technical content
08/28/2009	1.05	Major	Updated and revised the technical content
11/06/2009	1.06	Editorial	Revised and edited the technical content
02/19/2010	2.0	Editorial	Revised and edited the technical content
03/31/2010	2.01	Editorial	Revised and edited the technical content
04/30/2010	2.02	Editorial	Revised and edited the technical content
06/07/2010	2.03	Editorial	Revised and edited the technical content
06/29/2010	2.04	Editorial	Changed language and formatting in the technical content.
07/23/2010	2.05	Minor	Clarified the meaning of the technical content.
09/27/2010	2.05	No change	No changes to the meaning, language, or formatting of the technical content.
11/15/2010	2.05	No change	No changes to the meaning, language, or formatting of the technical content.
12/17/2010	2.05	No change	No changes to the meaning, language, or formatting of the technical content.
03/18/2011	2.05	No change	No changes to the meaning, language, or formatting of the technical content.
06/10/2011	2.05	No change	No changes to the meaning, language, or formatting of the technical content.
01/20/2012	2.6	Minor	Clarified the meaning of the technical content.
04/11/2012	2.6	No change	No changes to the meaning, language, or formatting of the technical content.
07/16/2012	2.7	Minor	Clarified the meaning of the technical content.
10/08/2012	2.8	Minor	Clarified the meaning of the technical content.

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Release: October 30, 2014

[1] http://download.microsoft.com/download/2/4/8/24862317-78F0-4C4B-B355-C7B2C1D997DB/[MS-OFFCRYPTO].pdf

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#### PasswordKeyEncryptor Generation algorithm

A m https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us	//ibrary/dd950165(v=office.12).asp> ♀ ♀ ♀ ♂ [MS-OFFCRYPTO]: Pass × 6 ☆ 🔅
Microsoft   Developer Network	Sign in MSDN subscriptions Get tools f 😏 🖇
Technologies 🗸 Downloads 🗸	Programs ~ Community ~ Documentation ~ Samples
Was this page helpful? Your feedback a	bout this content is important. Let us know what you think. Yes No
	Export (0) Print
<ul> <li>MSDN Library</li> <li>Open Specifications</li> </ul>	2.3.4.13 PasswordKeyEncryptor Generation (Agile
<ul> <li>Data Portability</li> <li>Office File Formats</li> </ul>	Encryption)
<ul> <li>Technical Documents</li> <li>[MS-OFFCRYPTO]: Office Document</li> </ul>	Office
Cryptography Structure	For agile encryption, the password key encryptor XML element specified in section 2.3.4.10 MUST be created as follows:
2.3 Encryption	saltSize: Set this attribute to the number of bytes used by the binary form of the saltValue attribute. It MUST conform to a SaltSize type.
<ul> <li>2.3.4 ECMA-376 Document Encryption</li> <li>2.3.4.1</li> </ul>	<b>blockSize:</b> Set this attribute to the number of bytes needed to contain an encrypted block of data, as defined by the <b>cipherAlgorithm</b> used. It MUST conform to a <b>BlockSize</b> type.
\0x06DataSpaces\DataSpaceMa Stream	keyBits: Set this attribute to the number of bits needed to contain an encryption key, as defined by the cipherAlgorithm used. It MUST conform to a KeyBits type.
2.3.4.2 \0x06DataSpaces\DataSpaceInfo Storage	hashSize: Set this attribute to the number of bytes needed to contain the output of the hashing algorithm defined by the hashAlgorithm element. It MUST conform to a HashSize type.
2.3.4.3 \0x06DataSpaces\TransformInfc	cipherAlgorithm: Set this attribute to a string containing the cipher algorithm used to encrypt the encryptedVerifierHashInput, encryptedVerifierHashValue, and encryptedKeyValue. It MUST conform to a CipherAlgorithm type.



### Data Encryption (Agile Encryption)

- 1. The EncryptedPackagestream (1) MUST be encrypted in 4096-byte segments to facilitate nearly random access while allowing CBC modes to be used in the encryption process.
- 2. The initialization vector for the encryption process MUST be obtained by using the zero-based segment number as a blockKey and the binary form of the KeyData.saltValue as specified in section 2.3.4.12. The block number MUST be represented as a 32-bit unsigned integer.
- 3. Data blocks MUST then be encrypted by using the initialization vector and the intermediate key obtained by decrypting the encryptedKeyValue from a KeyEncryptor contained within the KeyEncryptors sequence as specified in section 2.3.4.10. The final data block MUST be padded to the next integral multiple of the KeyData.blockSize value. Any padding bytes can be used. Note that the StreamSize field of the EncryptedPackage stream (1) specifies the number of bytes of unencrypted data as specified in section 2.3.4.4.



### Agile Encryption has the following attributes

- 1. encryptedVerifierHashInput
- 2. encryptedVerifierHashValue
- 3. encryptedKeyValue
- 4. saltValue
- 5. spinCount



This attribute MUST be generated by using the following steps:

- 1. Generate a random array of bytes with the number of bytes used specified by the **saltSize** attribute.
- 2. Generate an encryption key as specified in section 2.3.4.11 by using the user-supplied password, the binary byte array used to create the **saltValue** attribute, and a blockKey byte array consisting of the following bytes: **0xfe, 0xa7, 0xd2, 0x76, 0x3b, 0x4b, 0x9e, and 0x79**.
- 3. Encrypt the random array of bytes generated in step 1 by using the binary form of the **saltValue** attribute as an initialization vector as specified in section 2.3.4.12. If the array of bytes is not an integral multiple of blockSize bytes, pad the array with 0x00 to the next integral multiple of blockSize bytes.
- 4. Use base64 to encode the result of step 3.



This attribute MUST be generated by using the following steps:

- 1. Obtain the hash value of the random array of bytes generated in step 1 of the steps for **encryptedVerifierHashInput**.
- 2. Generate an encryption key as specified in section 2.3.4.11 by using the user-supplied password, the binary byte array used to create the **saltValue** attribute, and a blockKey byte array consisting of the following bytes: **0xd7**, **0xaa**, **0x0f**, **0x6d**, **0x30**, **0x61**, **0x34**, **and 0x4e**.
- 3. Encrypt the hash value obtained in step 1 by using the binary form of the **saltValue** attribute as an initialization vector as specified in section 2.3.4.12. If hashSize is not an integral multiple of blockSize bytes, pad the hash value with 0x00 to an integral multiple of blockSize bytes.
- 4. Use base64 to encode the result of step 3.



This attribute MUST be generated by using the following steps:

- 1. Generate a random array of bytes that is the same size as specified by the Encryptor.KeyData.keyBits attribute of the parent element.
- 2. Generate an encryption key as specified in section 2.3.4.11, using the usersupplied password, the binary byte array used to create the saltValue attribute, and a blockKey byte array consisting of the following bytes: 0x14, 0x6e, 0x0b, 0xe7, 0xab, 0xac, 0xd0, and 0xd6.
- 3. Encrypt the random array of bytes generated in step 1 by using the binary form of the saltValue attribute as an initialization vector as specified in section 2.3.4.12. If the array of bytes is not an integral multiple of blockSize bytes, pad the array with 0x00 to an integral multiple of blockSize bytes.
- 4. Use base64 to encode the result of step 3.



#### saltValue

- 1. Set this attribute to a base64-encoded, randomly generated array of bytes.
- 2. It MUST conform to a SaltValue type.
- 3. The number of bytes required by the decoded form of this element MUST be saltSize.



### spinCount

- 1. Set this attribute to the number of times to iterate the password hash when creating the key used to encrypt the encryptedVerifierHashInput, encryptedVerifierHashValue, and encryptedKeyValue.
- 2. It MUST conform to a SpinCount type.



#### password checking and decoding algorithms

- pwHash = hashPassword(salt, pass, spinCount); skey1 = generateKey(pwHash, imm\_VerifierHashInput);
- skey2 = generateKey(pwHash, imm\_encryptedVerifierHashValue);

```
verifier1 = decode(encryptedVerifierHashInput, skey1, salt);
verifier2 = decode(encryptedVerifierHashValue, skey2, salt);
if (digest(verifier1) != verifier2) {
  return false;
```

skey3 = generateKey(pwHash, imm\_encryptedKeyValue);
secretKey = decode(encryptedKeyValue, skey3, salt);
decData = DecContent(encData, secretKey, keyDataSalt);

}



### how the integrity of the content is verified

salt1 = generateIv(keyData, imm\_dataIntegrity1, saltValue); salt2 = generateIv(keyData, imm\_dataIntegrity2, saltValue);

salt = decode(encryptedHmacKey, secretKey, salt1); expected = decode(encryptedHmacValue, secretKey, salt2);

return Hmac(salt, encryptedPackage) == expected;



#### problem with generating the secretKey

- 1. The secretKey used in AES encryption needs to create an unique key with random data.
- 2. If the key is long enough and was created with truly random data then it is thought to be extremely difficult to crack.
- 3. However, if the secretKey was chosen in a predictable manner then it will be easy to crack.
- 4. The integrity of secure random generators (both software and hardware based) are imperative for strong encryption.



### msoffice-crypt.exe (Cybozu Labs)

usage: msoffice-crypt.exe [opt] input output

- -h : show this message
- -p password in only ascii
- -k master key in hex. ex. 0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF
- -encMode 0:use AES128(default), 1: use AES256 for encoding
- -ph8 password in utf8 hex. ex. 68656C6C6F for 'hello'
- -ph16 password in utf16 hex. ex. u3042 for 'a' in hiragana
- -e encode
- -d decode
- -v print debug info
- -vv print debug info and save binary data



#### -d decode / -p password (in ascii)

demo1.xlsx (Password="pass")

msoffice-crypt.exe -d -p pass demo1.xlsx [demo1\_d.xlsx]

demo2.xlsx (Password="pass1234")

msoffice-crypt.exe -d -p pass1234 demo2.xlsx [demo2.\_d.xlsx]



# -d decode / -k master key (in hex)

demo1.xlsx (Password="pass")

msoffice-crypt.exe -d -k 00112233...FF demo1.xlsx [demo1\_d.xlsx]

msoffice-crypt.exe -d -k 00112233...FF demo1.xlsx [demo1\_d.xlsx]




### -e encode / -k master key / -p password

Encrypt demo1.xlsx (Password="pass")


msoffice-crypt -e -k 00...FF -p pass demo1\_d.xlsx demo1.xlsx

Encrypt demo2.xlsx (Password="pass1234")





#### **Proof of Concept**






- 1. In this demo, demo1.xlsx is encrypted with the password "pass". The target software is MS Excel 2013 (Office 365).
- 2. demo2.xlsx is encrypted with another password "pass1234".
- 3. However, MS Office was manipulated to implant a hidden master key when these files were created.
- 4. Therefore, these files can be easily decrypted by the same master key without any need to brute-force the password.
- 5. In this example, the master key is set to "001122...FF0011...FF".



# [demo] http://youtu.be/aROLv7T9k\_M





# Microsoft Office 2013 DocRecrypt Tool (official)

• IT admin can "unlock" the password-protected OOXML Word, Excel and PowerPoint files for a user and then either leave the file without password protection! (it is official)

Microsoft	Microsoft
Download Center	Download Center
Shop • Products • Categories • Support • Security •	Shop
Microsoft Office 2013 DocRecrypt Tool	Office 2013 Administrative Template files (ADMX/ADML) and Office Customization Tool
Language: English Download	Language: English Download
This tool allows admins to unprotect or change the password on password protected OOXML Word, Excel and PowerPoint files.	This download includes Group Policy Administrative Template (ADMX/ADML) and Office Customization Tool (OPAX/OPAL) files for Microsoft Office 2013.

[1] https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=36443



# By using Office 2013 and an escrow key

- 1. You the IT admin, are the keeper of the **escrow key** which is generated from your company or organization's **private key** certificate store.
- 2. You can silently push the **public key** information to client computers one time through a registry key setting.
- 3. When a user later creates password-protected Office 2013 files, this public key is included in the file header.
- 4. IT admin can use the Office **DocRecrypt** tool to remove the password that is attached to the file by using your company's **private key**.

# An attacker can exploit this IT admin's function

#### **Office** Ο Search Office with Bing Downloads & Updates Support Forums Library Products Collapse All Export (0) Print TechNet Library Remove or reset file passwords in Office 2013 Office Products Office Office 2013 7 out of 42 rated this helpful - Rate this topic Office 2013 Office 2013 Resource Kit Applies to: Office 365 ProPlus, Office 2013 Plan and deploy Identity, authentication, and Topic Last Modified: 2014-09-04 authorization Summary: Explains how to use the Office 2013 DocRecrypt tool to unlock password protected OOXML formatted Word, Excel, and PowerPoint files. Roadmap: Identity, authentication, and Audience: IT Professionals authorization Use Group Policy to push registry changes that associate a certificate with password-protected documents. This certificate information is embedded in the file header. Later, if the password is Overview: Identity, forgotten or lost, use the DocRecrypt command line tool and the private key to unlock the file and, optionally, assign a new password. authentication, and authorization Plan Information Rights Management Configure Information Rights If you want information about passwords in a personal copy of Office 2013, see protect your documents with passwords and permissions instead. Management See remove a password from a document for an additional example. Plan password complexity settings If you are an IT Professional looking to remove or reset passwords in Office 2013 files within your organization, for example if an employee has left the organization and you do Remove or reset file not know the password, you're at the right place, keep reading. passwords [1] https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/library/jj923033.aspx



## attack vectors

- 1. An attacker can replace the random generator function by Win32 API hooking.
- 2. An attacker can replace the random generator in embeded hardware chips.
- 3. An attacker can use the predictable number generator secretly in cloud environments.



# Win32 API hooking

#### • IAT

- Import Address Table function hooking.
- WinAPIOverride
  - Advanced API Monitor, spy or override API supporting x86 and x64.
- EasyHook
  - open source hooking engine supporting x86 and x64 in Windows in both user and kernel land.
- Detours
  - general purpose function hooking library created by Microsoft Research (C/C++).



## WinAPIOverride32 / WinAPIOverride64

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2 3 4 5	Automatically resume application after having loaded the following files list       Image: Files         Run as       Administrator       Password	• com			·		
6 7 8 9 10	Inject before statically linked dll execution       Inject Only after :       100 ms         Stop logging and kill application after :       5000 ms         Attach to all new processes       Filters       Inject into new processes only after :       100 ms						
1 2 3	Modules Filters       Modules Filters       Use list       Image: Exclusion list       NotHookedModuleList.txt         Apply to Overriding       Image: Comparison of the second sec			-	📝 🛐		
4 5							
6 7 8 9 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28	Id         Dir         Call           64         CryptStringToBinaryA ("AmDxckfg9zX9SVVQvZ8O+A==Q&>F", 0x00000018, 0x00000001, 0x000000000000000000000000	Ret Value 0x000000 0x000000 0x000000 0x000000 0x000000 0x000000 0x000000 0x000000 0x000000 0x000000	Caller Addr 0x00000 0x00000 0x00000 0x00000 0x00000 0x00000 0x00000 0x00000 0x00000 0x00000 0x00000 0x00000	Caller Relative Addr CRYPT32.dll + 0x304BD mso.dll + 0x1495863 CRYPT32.dll + 0x304BD mso.dll + 0x1495830 CRYPT32.dll + 0x304BD mso.dll + 0x1495863 CRYPT32.dll + 0x304BD mso.dll + 0x1495863 CRYPT32.dll + 0x304BD mso.dll + 0x1495863 CRYPT32.dll + 0x304BD mso.dll + 0x1495830	ProcessID 0x00000874 0x00000874 0x00000874 0x00000874 0x00000874 0x00000874 0x00000874 0x00000874 0x00000874 0x00000874 0x00000874 0x00000874 0x00000874		
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[1] http://jacquelin.potier.free.fr/winapioverride32/



# Microsoft Research Detours (Win32 API hooking)

- Detours Express 3.0
  - available for immediate download under a no-fee, click-through license for research, non-commercial, and non-production use.
    Detours Express is limited to 32-bit processes on x86 processors.
- Detours Professional 3.0 (Buy now!)
  - available for immediate purchase at the online Microsoft Store.
    - Support for **64-bit** code on **x64** and **IA64** processors (Professional Edition only).
    - Support for all Windows processors (Professional Edition only).



### **Microsoft Research Detours v3 Professional**

← → http://www.microsoftstore.com/store/mskr/ko_KR/pdp/Micros Microsoft 제품 구매 → 학생들을 위한 제품 고객센터	sofi 오 ~ ◎ C ■ Microsoft Research Det × ① ☆ ۞ 고객센터 로그인 장바구니(0) <i>키워드, SKU 번호 또는 품목 번호로 검색</i> 오 ^
홈 > Microsoft Research Detours v3 Professional	Microsoft Research Detours v3 Professional ₩12,000,000 (부가가치세 포함)
Research Detours V3.0 Professional	₩12,000,000 (구가가지제 오염) Microsoft Research Detours v3 Professional은 x86, x64, IA64 컴퓨터 에서 임의 Win32 함수를 이용하기 위한 라이브러리입니다. 이제 대상 함수에 대한 내부 메모리 코드를 다시 작성하여 Win32 함수를 인터 셉트할 수 있습니다.
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[1] http://www.microsoftstore.com/store/mskr/ko\_KR/pdp/Microsoft-Research-Detours-v3-Professional/productID.280904700



# Detours ("Advapi32.dll", "CryptGenRandom")

#include "detours.h"

static BOOL (WINAPI \* TrueCryptGenRandom)(HCRYPTPROV hProv, DWORD dwLen, BYTE \*pbBuffer) = NULL;

BOOL WINAPI HookCryptGenRandom(HCRYPTPROV hProv, DWORD dwLen, BYTE \*pbBuffer)

```
for (DWORD i = 0; i < dwLen; i++) {
    pbBuffer[i] = 0x33; // return fixed value
}
return TRUE;</pre>
```



# Detours ("rsaenh.dll", "CPGenRandom")

#include "detours.h"

static BOOL (WINAPI \* TrueCPGenRandom)(HCRYPTPROV hProv, DWORD
dwLen, BYTE \*pbBuffer) = NULL;

BOOL WINAPI HookCPGenRandom(HCRYPTPROV hProv, DWORD dwLen, BYTE \*pbBuffer)

```
for (DWORD i = 0; i < dwLen; i++) {
    pbBuffer[i] = 0x33; // return fixed value
}
return TRUE;</pre>
```



# Detours ("sal3.dll", "rtl\_random\_getBytes")

#### #include "detours.h"

```
static int (__cdecl *True_rtl_random_getBytes)(void*, void*,
size_t) = NULL;
int __cdecl Hook_rtl_random_getBytes(void* pool, void* buf,
size_t size)
```

```
if (pool == 0 || buf == 0) return 1;
char *p = (char*)buf;
for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) {
        p[i] = 0x33; // return fixed value
}
return 0;
```



# Intel RdRand instruction (2011-)

Instruction	Opcode	Op encoding	Description
RDRAND r16	0F C7 /6	ModRM:r/m(w)	Read a 16-bit random number and store in the destination register.
RDRAND r32	0F C7 /6	ModRM:r/m(w)	Read a 32-bit random number and store in the destination register.
RDRAND r64	REX.W + 0F C7 /6	ModRM:r/m(w)	Read a 64-bit random number and store in the destination register.

[1] https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/m/d/4/1/d/8/441\_Intel\_R\_DRNG\_Software\_Implementation\_Guide\_final\_Aug7.pdf



# 'Remove RdRand from /dev/random' (2013)

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#### Torvalds shoots down call to yank 'backdoored' Intel RdRand in Linux crypto

'We actually know what we are doing. You don't' says kernel boss



10 Sep 2013 at 17:03, Gavin Clarke

[1] http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/09/10/torvalds\_on\_rrrand\_nsa\_gchq/



# /dev/random seems like a safety

- Linus Torvalds's answer (2013.09.09):
- we use rdrand as \_one\_ of many inputs into the random pool, and we use it as a way to \_improve\_ that random pool.
- So even if rdrand were to be back-doored by the NSA, our use of rdrand actually improves the quality of the random numbers you get from /dev/random.



# **Office Online (Office 2016 Preview)**

← → https://office.live.com/start/default.aspx?omkt=ko-KR# $\rho - = c$	□ ■ 王 Microsoft Office Online ×
iii Office Online	제품 서식 파일 스토어 지원 내계정 로그인
Office Online	
으로 공동 작업	Word Online Outlook.com 피플
OneDrive에서 문서, 스프레드시트, 프레젠 테이션을 온라인으로 저장합니다. 다른 사 용자들과 공유하고 동시에 작업할 수 있 습니다. 지금 시작해 보세요. 무료입니다.	NE     PowerPoint Online     캘린더
모든 Office 옵션 보기 Office 2016 Preview 받기	Image: State of the state of
() 언어 변경	접근성 개인 정보 및 쿠키 법적 고지 상표 © 2015 Microsoft



# Conclusion

- 1. Recent MS Office 2010/2013 Open Office XML documents are normally encrypted very strongly, making them difficult to brute force attacks.
- 2. However, there are techniques an attacker can use to secretly backdoor these encrypted documents to make them trivial to decrypt.
- 3. Cloud environments may be more dangerous than thought as it is not possible for users to confirm the security of their encryption. And it would be easy for cloud providers (or advanced attackers with access to those cloud providers) to backdoor encryption in undetectable ways.



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