

***HISTORY
OF THE
UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC COMMAND***



June 1, 1992 — October 1, 2002

Prepared by: HQ USSTRATCOM/CSH

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PREFACE

This history began as a project to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the US Strategic Command. As June 2002 approached, it became apparent that the command would be altered fundamentally by proposed modifications to the Unified Command Plan. We learned that a new command would be established that combined the missions of the United States Strategic Command and the United States Space Command. Names were proposed for the new command, but none of them seemed to fit. Then on July 11, 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld gave the new command the same name as its predecessor. This unclassified history is of the US Strategic Command that was established on June 1, 1992, and disestablished on October 1, 2002.

This history was written by Lieutenant Colonel Rita Clark (USAFR), Dr. Vincent A. Giroux, Jr., and Dr. Todd White; and edited by Lieutenant Colonel Candia Lahowetz (USAFR), Major Stuart Roberts (USAFR), and Major Maria White (USAFR).

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*General Curtis E. LeMay, CINCSAC, and
Cadet George L. Butler, ca 1960*

CHAPTER ONE

PROLOGUE

The original United States Strategic Command was established on the first of June 1992. It owed its existence to the end of the Cold War and a new view of the place of nuclear warfare in overall US defense policy. While the circumstances were changed, the idea of a unified command with responsibility for the employment of nuclear weapons was not new.

When General George L. Butler was establishing US Strategic Command, he found it useful for cultural reasons to anchor the need for a STRATCOM in the past, and particularly to identify it with General Curtis E. LeMay, the widely acknowledged founding father of the Strategic Air Command.

LeMay was an unapologetic advocate of a national defense strong enough to overwhelm any potential enemy, especially the Soviet Union, which he deeply distrusted. He was committed to a belief in air power's exclusive preeminence in achieving victory and, as a subtext to that, the possession of significant numbers of nuclear weapons and the airframes capable of delivering them to their intended targets.

LeMay, who was not alone in this opinion, was successful in his argument and the emphasis in the post-Korean Conflict military build-up was in the production of nuclear weapons, the bombers to carry those weapons, and support structure for both.

Another significant thread in the development of

the early idea of a strategic command to control nuclear forces and targeting was interservice rivalry, particularly between the Air Force and the Navy. Until 1947, there were two services, the Army and the Navy. Air forces were part of the Army, and the US Marine Corps was under the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were cabinet positions that had direct access to the President. Serious rivalries had existed between the two services as they competed for resources and during World War II friction had developed between the Army and Navy over coordination.



*General Curtis E. LeMay, CINCSAC
Oct 1948 — Jun 1957*

Following the Second World War, the President and Congress sought to mitigate this rivalry through passage of the National Security Act of 1947. That act established the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the independent Air Force with its own Chief of Staff. The rivalry between the newly separate Air Force and the Navy was even more intense than that between the Army and the Navy.


The Navy's right to an air arm, and nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, lay at the heart of a bitter division between the Navy and the newly independent Air Force. The first attempt to resolve the dispute came out of a meeting in Key West, Florida. The Key West Agreement, April 21, 1948, dealt with a number of issues, among which were apparent agreements that the Air Force was responsible for "the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations in the air." The responsibilities specifically included "strategic air warfare." The Navy was responsible for "combat operations at sea, and for air and land operations inci-

dent thereto." Combat operations at sea explicitly included "operations of sea-based aircraft and their land-based naval air components." The Navy's concern over maintaining its air arm heavily influenced many parts of the Key West Agreement, and in it the Navy was directed to "be prepared to participate in the over-all air effort as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

The Key West Agreement did not address the question of nuclear weapons. Though they had only been used twice—to end the war with Japan—nuclear weapons were widely believed to be the key to future warfare. The Air Force held that nuclear weapons—and there still were not many of them in 1948—should be part of the strategic air war. The Navy, with some support from the Army, resisted the idea that the Air Force should have military control of nuclear weapons. The Newport Conference, held in August 1948, attempted to resolve issues associated with the "control and direction of atomic operations," but again, interservice rivalry, the question of



Keel for the first Supercarrier, USS United States, 1949



The B-36 "Peacemaker," mainstay of USAF's long-range strategic bombers

civilian control, and rapidly developing technology left important issues unresolved.

Interservice animosity became so great that an event occurred known as "the revolt of the admirals." The Navy had proposed to build a new aircraft carrier, dubbed the supercarrier, capable of launching much heavier aircraft than traditional designs. Air Force leaders opposed the carrier because they believed it would infringe on the strategic air mission, and an all-out battle ensued in a competition for defense funding.


Initially, the Navy was allowed to continue planning for the carrier, but the Air Force persisted in its opposition. Eventually, the Air Force succeeded in getting its B-36 Peacemaker bomber approved, and the carrier was canceled. The Navy complained bitterly, and publicly labeled the airplane a "billion dollar blunder." The dispute was so acrimonious that Navy leaders collected "evidence" suggesting that Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and Secretary of the



"Little Boy," first nuclear weapon detonated, 1945

Air Force Stuart Symington were involved in corruption with regard to B-36 contracts. Cedric Worth, a civilian assistant to the Under Secretary of the Navy, who later admitted that the charges were fabricated, then leaked the information. Captain Arleigh Burke, who would become the Chief of Naval Operations, was implicated in these events, because he was the head of the unit in which Cedric Worth compiled the false information. For a time, Burke had his promotion to flag rank blocked by order of the Secretary of the Navy.

Concurrent with this disagreement between the Navy and the Air Force, the Soviet Union ended the United States' monopoly of nuclear weapons. The Soviets exploded their first nuclear device in 1949.



Sputnik readied for launch


This was followed in 1953 by detonation of a thermonuclear device, or H-Bomb. In addition to the Soviet development of atomic and then thermonuclear weapons, the decade of the 1950s saw successful Soviet placement of the Sputnik satellite in earth orbit and development of the land-based intercontinental ballistic missile.

Soviet nuclear weapons and the spectacular technical feat of Sputnik fed the fear of surprise nuclear attack which, when combined with the forcefulness of General LeMay and other leaders, led increasingly to the Air Force getting the lion's share of military appropriations. Both the Navy and the Army argued that the Air Force was "bootstrapping"—claiming that

more and more targets required the delivery of nuclear weapons, thereby justifying the need for more bomber airplanes.

Strategic Air Command's control of nuclear operations was confirmed by policy and administrative decisions during the 1950s. Still, while SAC was the dominant player at the nuclear table, the process of nuclear targeting was dispersed and confused. Both the Navy and the Air Force had targeting responsibilities, but prior to development of the ballistic missile submarine, naval aircraft were of limited range, and there was little conflict. Theater unified commanders also had their own target lists, which gave rise to situations where some targets were identified to be struck two and three times. There also existed significant differences over the theory of nuclear targeting. The Air Force favored a massive and potentially preemptive use of nuclear weapons to quickly destroy the Soviet Union's war fighting capability, while the Army and the Navy favored a policy that would later come to be known as limited deterrence.

The impact of the pace of technological development in the fifteen years following the end of World War II can not be underestimated. World War II had been fought with improved versions of the weapons used in World War I. The change that occurred following the war—nuclear bombs, long-range jet-propelled bomber aircraft, ballistic missiles, satellites, and submarines that could stay submerged indefinitely and launch ballistic missiles—was profound. The United



Third graders practice "duck and cover" nuclear drill, ca 1950



*President Dwight D. Eisenhower
Jan 1953 - Jan 1961*

States evolved from a country largely secure in a belief that it was protected from major attack by its land mass and the two oceans to a country in which school children practiced—unnecessarily, in retrospect—"duck and cover" drills in preparation for a surprise nuclear attack. Interservice rivalry, competition for



Polaris Missile readied for test launch, Cape Canaveral, ca 1958

resources, differences in targeting philosophy, and uncoordinated targeting could be tolerated during the early years of nuclear weapons. As the 1960s approached, however, technology and the rapid expansion of the nuclear arsenals on both sides demanded a resolution of what President Dwight Eisenhower referred to as a “monstrosity” of uncoordinated forces.

In this context, President Eisenhower decided that separation of land, sea, and air forces could no longer be permitted to continue. The result was the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, which amended the 1947 law and became the basis for the current system of unified and specified commands. It established an unambiguous chain of command starting with the President through the Secretary of Defense, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff being responsible to the Secretary of Defense. The commanders of the unified and specified commands were responsible to the President through this structure and exercised full operational control over forces, which could only be shifted to another command upon presidential approval.

By 1958 all the pieces—the increasingly complex

dangers of large numbers of nuclear weapons, the lack of coordination in targeting, and the President’s interest in more integrated use of the nation’s military forces—were in place for the first attempt to develop a unified strategic command. The catalyst was the Navy’s development of the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine.

At first, the importance of the underwater platform as a deterrent was neither fully understood nor appreciated as a survivable asset, but its potential importance was at least anticipated. Bernard Brodie, the acknowledged founding father of US nuclear strategy, understood that a submarine fleet capable of launching missiles would in time provide a retaliatory force of low vulnerability. But in 1959, Brodie still thought this would be a limited capability when compared to the SAC bomber fleet. If strategic implications of the sea-launched ballistic missile were still in the formative stages, institutional implications for the Navy and the Air Force were well understood.

The bitterness that arose out of the supercarrier vs. B-36 controversy continued to influence relation-



USS George Washington (SSBN 598), the world’s first nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine



*General Thomas S. Power, CINCSAC
Jul 1957 – Nov 1964*

ships between the Navy and the Air Force. As the reality of the sea-launched ballistic missile submarine became apparent, the question arose as to who would control it. It is tempting to scoff, especially in retrospect, at Air Force General Thomas Power's assertion that it should be an Air Force asset, but the issue and its resolution was not so simple. True, the submarine was a naval vessel, but the weapons that it launched were long-range nuclear missiles. While it may now seem ludicrous to think of Air Force personnel commanding a submarine, it is equally challenging to think, in the context that existed in the late 1950s, of the Navy deciding independently how to employ the air assets that the submarine carried.

Personalities were important. General Power replaced Curtis LeMay as CINCSAC in 1957, when LeMay moved to Washington to become Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Power was at least LeMay's equal in his fierce belief in the importance of strategic air power, and should share in the credit given to LeMay as the father of Strategic Air Command. Arleigh Burke, Power's equal in his belief in naval primacy, had been promoted to Admiral and was Chief of Naval Operations. Power and Burke were formi-

dable contenders who came out of the combat of the Second World War prepared to give no quarter in battle or in defense of their respective services. Power addressed the sea-launched ballistic missile question in a letter to General Thomas White, the Air Force Chief of Staff, on the subject of the World-Wide Coordinating Conferences. These conferences were an attempt to integrate nuclear targeting, and Power wrote that SAC had made a "sincere attempt" to gain acceptance of a planning approach that would enhance deterrence. He believed that little had been accomplished other than to "encourage the other services to expand their strategic offensive capable forces and to make further encroachments upon the Air Force mission to conduct strategic air warfare." The Polaris submarine, Power believed, demonstrated the trend. Power presumed that the Air Force would continue to have control over strategic air power and that Polaris should "logically be assigned to SAC." He believed that CINCSAC had to control planning, target assignment, timing, and readiness of all elements of the strategic nuclear force, including command and control of the Polaris weapon system.



*Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, CNO
Aug 1955 – Aug 1961*



*General Thomas D. White, CSAF
Jul 1957 – Jun 1961*

Power accepted that the SAC staff would have to be “augmented by qualified Navy staff personnel,” and that might “possibly involve the appointment of a Naval Deputy CINCSAC.” The organization would “comprise a unified command as classically defined in the present Unified Command Plan.” This would assure “centralized control of all strategic offensive systems in one integrated and functional offensive command,” something Power held to be “essential for maximum national benefit.”

Countering Power, Admiral Burke argued that fleet commands would be operating in conjunction with other naval vessels. Furthermore, the CNO contended that after the ballistic missile submarines had fired their missiles, they would operate as other submarines did. By the late 1950s, nuclear warfare was understood to be catastrophic, a challenge to Burke’s implication that war would continue in some normal fashion following a nuclear exchange. Also, an understanding of submarines as survivable platforms—while still in the early stages—was growing. However even if Burke’s logic appears questionable in retrospect, it is difficult to fault his central tenet that the Navy had the experience to

operate the submarine within the context of general fleet operations.

General White appreciated Power’s point of view, but doubted that CINCSAC’s suggestion of using SAC’s existing specified command responsibilities and augmenting it with Navy expertise was politically feasible. White saw something more like the present-day unified command, with SAC being a part of it. Establishment of a unified command would take time and be politically intricate. As an interim measure, White decided to recommend to Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy that SAC be given targeting authority, to include timing and force application.

As deployment of the Polaris submarine became imminent and White’s proposal to include integrated targeting under the Air Force continued to be unresolved, Navy and Army leaders argued that the JCS needed to exercise this responsibility. In order to resolve the uncompromising positions among the chiefs, General Nathan Twining, the chairman, proposed a compromise that allowed the Navy to operate its Polaris submarine, but designated SAC as the integrated targeting authority for the JCS.

Thomas Gates, who became Secretary of Defense in January 1960, championed the proposal. With Eisenhower’s concurrence, which was qualified by his insistence on the importance of involving all services, Gates proposed creation of a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff. This gave SAC the principal role: CINCSAC was to be “dual-hatted” as the Director of Strategic Target Planning, but the day-to-day work



SIOP 62

of the targeting staff was to be overseen by a Navy Vice Admiral. SAC's influence was further tempered by the Joint Staff organization that required reporting to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Burke was unwilling to accept this compromise, but President Eisenhower rejected his arguments, insisting instead on the centrality of integrated target planning and execution. The result was the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy, or NSTAP. It was approved on August 19, 1960, and established the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff. The NSTAP also established the requirement for a national strategic target list and the first Single Integrated Opera-

tional Plan, or SIOP, as it is more commonly known. The first SIOP, SIOP 62, was approved on December 2, 1960, went into effect on the April 1, 1961, and remained in effect until July 31, 1962.

Made necessary by the realities of a nuclear world, and conditioned by bitter interservice rivalry, the JSTPS compromise made a lot of people unhappy and forestalled the establishment of a unified strategic command for three decades. The compromise provided a workable solution to the need for deterrence during the Cold War. As the Cold War began to wane, the need to review the compromise became apparent.



President John F. Kennedy; General Curtis LeMay, CSAF; and General Thomas Power, CINCSAC, 1963



SAC patch



JSTPS Emblem

“Peace ... is Our Profession”



The US Strategic Command emblem depicts strategic triad

CHAPTER TWO

STANDUP

The compromise that brought about the establishment of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff was not perfect, but it was good enough to last for over three decades. Not only did the compromise work, when centralization of forces was suggested during the 1982-1983 Unified Command Plan review, the services resisted. The collective position was that nuclear forces remain distributed among the Atlantic, Pacific, and European unified commands and the specified Strategic Air Command, each of which “committed” forces to the Single Integrated Operational Plan. The JSTPS was the central point for integrated target planning, and that was the only thing that required centralization.

The Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff existed for thirty-two years. During that time, its morale was high and its personnel understood that their work was critical to the security of the free world. By all accounts, they performed the task of developing the highly complex SIOP superbly. General Russell E. Dougherty, former Commander in Chief of Strategic Air Command and Director of Strategic Target Planning, stated, “Many observers say, without serious dispute, that the JSTPS is probably the most reliable and efficient staff in all of government; certainly that has been my observation.” There were, however, systemic and institutional problems that could not be overcome by the professionalism, skill, and commitment of the staff. The compromise that established the JSTPS isolated the planning function from require-

ments. Consequently, not only was the JSTPS not involved in force structure issues, it was actually held to be above them. That the JSTPS needed to maintain that purity became a matter of organizational dogma. General Dougherty remarked, for example, that the JSTPS was “successful in resisting attempts to draw it into the controversial future force planning areas.”

Gradually, especially during the 1980s, knowl-



*General Russell E. Dougherty, CINCSAC
Aug 1974 – Jul 1977*



*The Berlin Wall comes crashing down in Nov 1989
after twenty-eight years of existence*

edgeable officials came to the conclusion that the nuclear war plan drove force structure requirements. Ironically, the target planning staff's separation from future force structure planning contributed to an essentially unchallenged growth in the target base and the number of weapons and delivery vehicles to cover it. As Cold War tensions began to recede, interest in reducing the size of nuclear arsenal grew inside the Department of Defense.

Following the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and renunciation by East Germany of its political system, one-by-one Soviet Republics overthrew their communist regimes and replaced them with democratic governments. The Warsaw Pact virtually ceased to function as a military alliance. Finally, the Soviet Union collapsed as Russia cast off communism. These events dramatically altered the threat the United States and its allies had faced since shortly

after World War II. At the time of Eastern Europe's upheaval, Air Force General John Loh, the commander of Tactical Air Command, drew an analogy between the international scene and the world portrayed in Washington Irving's *Rip Van Winkle*. Loh noted, "a modern-day strategist who only nodded off for two years between 1987 and 1989 would have awoken to a similarly changed world."

Transition to this new post-Soviet world marked a defining period in the history of the defense of the United States. Most military leaders held that both the organization and forces had to be different, not simply smaller to meet new security challenges. At the Joint Staff, for example, Lieutenant General George Lee Butler, who soon would become the last CINCSAC and the first CINCSTRAT, managed a review of the unified command structure. By November 1990, his group proposed to reduce the number of unified commands from ten to six, one of which was to be a joint strategic command that included responsibility for the three legs of the nuclear Triad, plus the antisatellite mission.

This type of thinking at the Joint Staff level, com-



*General John T. Chain, Jr., CINCSAC
Jun 1986 – Jan 1991*

bined with calls for a “peace dividend”, chipped away at the old interservice rivalry—which had been changing over the years anyway—that had thwarted the original call for a unified strategic command. During a conference in 1990, General John T. Chain, CINCSAC and Director of Strategic Target Planning, proffered in his “If I were King” speech, his vision of a unified strategic command that would include the Air Force’s strategic bombers, the Navy’s sea-launched ballistic missile submarines, responsibility for implementation of the Space Defense Initiative, and some elements of United States Space Command.

Chain’s idea and the work of Joint Staff Plans and Policy were significant parts in the move toward establishment of United States Strategic Command. The recommendation for six unified commands did not last long, and Chain modified his original idea in response to discussions with the Joint Staff. The Navy offered an alternative that looked at a strategic command through incorporation of existing organizations, both Air Force and Navy. Air Force General Donald J. Kutyna, the commander of US Space Command, successfully opposed these early proposals for a unified strategic command with elements of the space mission.

By the beginning of the 1990s, the building materials for a unified strategic command were in place. The dramatically changed international situation had reduced the Cold War superpower tensions, there



Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev and President George H.W. Bush sign START I Treaty, Jun 1990



*General Colin L. Powell, CJCS
Oct 1989 – Sep 1993*

were new ideas within the military with regard to organization of forces, and Congress had already committed itself to making the military more efficient. This efficiency was to be accomplished through the Defense Reorganization Act of October 1, 1986, which is frequently referred to as the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The Act essentially completed the shift begun with the National Security Act of 1947. The unified commands increased in importance, service in joint billets became part of the critical path to promotion to high rank, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was recognized as the preeminent military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense.

Goldwater-Nichols also contained a specific recommendation—not a requirement—for a joint command responsible for strategic missions. The compromise of 1960 that resulted in the establishment of the JSTPS had worked, and in 1986 the military leadership again chose not to modify what it saw as a satisfactory system. Within the next few years, though, Goldwater-Nichols and geopolitical changes, combined with a new generation of military leaders,



*Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, CNO
Jul 1990 – Apr 1994*


which included Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell, and one of his principal subordinates, Lieutenant General George Lee Butler, led to a fresh look at new military challenges and how to meet them. Butler in particular believed that the international situation and the decline of the Soviet Union required a restructuring of strategic nuclear forces.

It is a true sign of an “idea whose time has come” that the move to establish a joint command for strategic missions was accomplished smoothly and with virtually no resistance beyond the heartfelt concern among some Strategic Air Command personnel that what they saw as the first line of Cold War deterrence needed to be retained. Senior military leadership supported the idea of a unified strategic command.

Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, the Chief of Naval Operations, was concerned over the manpower requirements the reorganization would impose on the US Navy, but he did not dissent. With Kelso’s concurrence, manning for the new command would consist of approximately sixty-five percent Air Force and

thirty-five percent Navy, with a small Army contingent and a smattering of Marines. A joint service agreement that the commander in chief of the new unified command would alternate between a Navy Admiral and an Air Force General was reached easily.

President George H.W. Bush publicly authorized establishment of the United States Strategic Command during a speech in the evening of September 27, 1991. The President discussed a number of historic changes in the nation’s nuclear defenses, including that all bombers and ballistic missiles scheduled for destruction under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty would immediately be taken off alert. He announced creation of the new Strategic Command as a way to more effectively manage command and control of strategic systems. “As the system works now,” President Bush stated, “the Navy commands the submarine part of our strategic deterrent while the Air Force commands the bomber and land based element.” But with future strategic force reductions, “the operational command must be as direct as possible.” Then he authorized the new Strategic Command in these words: “I, therefore, approve the recommen-



*President George H. W. Bush
Jan 1989 - Jan 1993*



Richard B. Cheney, SECDEF
Mar 1989 – Jan 1993

dation of Secretary Cheney and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consolidate operational command of these [strategic] forces into a US Strategic Command under one command, with participation by both [Air Force and Navy] services.” Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney underscored the significance of the speech the following day, stressing that creating US Strategic Command was one of the more important of the President’s initiatives because it emphasized the Department of Defense’s commitment to unified military commands and joint service.

The August 1991 CINCs’ conference at which concurrence was reached on a unified strategic command also agreed that General Butler, in his role as the head of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, should develop an implementation plan for establishment of the new command. The goal was to have a functioning organization by June 1992. This course of action was officially approved in October, following the President’s speech, when General Powell formally directed General Butler to lead development of the STRATCOM implementation plan. At the same

time, General Powell submitted a revised Unified Command Plan to the Secretary of Defense.

Following the official announcement, events began to move rapidly. Within a few days, a transition team was established under the co-chairmanship of Brigadier General Robert E. Linhard, the Strategic Air Command Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Resources, and Brigadier General Albert D. Jensen, the JSTPS Deputy Director for Analysis, Concepts and Systems. By early November, the implementation plan was released for service coordination, and by the end of the month, the charter to establish a provisional headquarters was approved. In mid-January 1992, the US Strategic Command Provisional headquarters was activated at Offutt AFB, and Brigadier General Linhard was named its commander. In February, President Bush nominated General Butler to be the first commander of United States Strategic Command.

By May, all requirements for establishing the new command were complete. The STRATCOM implementation plan had been published in March, and on April 7, President Bush had approved and directed implementation of a revised Unified Command Plan. Senate confirmation of General Butler as CINC on May 22 set the stage for the most visible signs of the change, the ceremonies.

At the same time that changes were taking place



General John T. Chain, Jr., and President George H.W. Bush, senior battle staff, Feb 1990



KC-135 refuels B-52

in the unified command structure, the USAF was also undergoing a major reorganization. Clearly, reorganization of the Air Force and the establishment of STRATCOM were connected. Strategic Air Command, from its early days when it was the only deliverer of US long-range nuclear weapons, had been a specified command under the Unified Command Plan. A specified command acts as a unified command with regard to its specific mission or portion of its mission, which in SAC's case meant that command and control of strategic airplanes and missiles was exercised by the SAC commander acting as CINCSAC. That responsibility would pass to the new unified command.

It would have been possible to retain a Strategic Air Command with Air Force major command responsibilities, but that did not fit in the post-Cold War Air Force. The same historical trends that created an environment conducive to the establishment of a unified strategic command also contributed to the disestablishment of SAC and the reorganization of the Air Force. The decisions themselves were not linked, but the needs of the Air Force and decreased tension between the United States and the Soviet Union were influencing both force structure and organizational decisions that would have resulted in a significantly altered SAC.

Those changes resulted in a proposal in July 1991 that the Air Force be reorganized. In June 1990, Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice had issued a bellwether white paper entitled *The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reach—Glo-*

bal Power, which stated as one of its major premises a philosophy of deterrence that held that the United States needed to “maintain constant awareness in potential adversaries that they are always within our reach . . .” The Air Force of the future was one that would put an “increased emphasis on force projection” and the flexible, precise global projection of lethal forces. Those forces, the paper stated, had to be able to “provide a rapid, tailored response with a capability to intervene against a well equipped foe, hit hard, and terminate quickly.” A major theme of Rice's paper was the lack of any distinction between tactical and strategic systems.

Fifty years of Air Force history had led to cultural differences between the strategic and tactical air forces. In the summer of 1991, at the same time that the decisions were made that would lead to establishment of Strategic Command, General Butler proposed to General Merrill McPeak, the Air Force Chief of Staff, that SAC bombers, tankers, and reconnaissance aircraft be combined with Tactical Air Command's forces in a single operational command. “Why,” Butler rhetorically asked McPeak, have “two Air Force force providers been doing essentially the same thing—putting *air power* at the disposal of a theater/JTF war fighter?” This was in keeping with



*General Merrill A. McPeak, CSAF
Jul 1990 – Apr 1994*

Secretary Rice's position and made sense to McPeak.

Separately, but in parallel with the decision-making that led to the new Strategic Command, the Air Force leadership agreed to reorganize the service along the lines proposed by Butler. Secretary Rice announced the reorganization on September 17, at the Air Force Association's national convention. Beginning in early October, parallel actions were launched to establish US Strategic Command and effect the SAC portion of the Air Force reorganization: the reassignment of SAC's forces to the newly established Air Combat and Air Mobility commands. An important leadership goal was to prevent as much



KC-135 conducts aerial refueling with B-1B

disruption as possible. Wherever possible, personnel would be retained in place. In some cases, people would be doing jobs that were similar or even the same as those they had done under SAC. In other cases, men and women who did not wish to move with their functions to Scott or Langley Air Force bases were, wherever possible, given the opportunity to stay at Offutt. Necessary personnel and equipment transfers went smoothly, visible evidence of the coordination between Headquarters SAC and the STRATCOM implementation team.



Peacekeeper missile launch

While the SAC drawdown was taking place, the new unified command was taking shape. Starting in January 1992, Brigadier General Robert E. Linhard and his STRATCOM Provisional staff proceeded efficiently to establish the headquarters using traditional Joint Staff structure. Initially, the command section was established in accordance with standard procedures. The second position in the structure, below the four-star commander in chief, and, as with the CINC to rotate between the Air Force and the Navy, would be a three-star flag billet that would serve as both deputy commander in chief and chief of staff. This was changed later, during the tenure of General Eugene Habiger, when the chief of staff responsibilities were separated and placed in an Air Force colo-



B-1 takes off as B-52 taxis to runway



A KC-10 conducts aerial refueling with a B-2

nel position.

The rest of the staff was established along traditional lines. There were the normal staff support agencies, such as the Judge Advocate and the Public Affairs offices, which were given numerical designations in accordance with unified command practice. Initially, the Chief of Staff supervised five major Joint Staff directorates: Manpower and Personnel (J1); Intelligence (J2); Operations and Logistics (J3/J4) in a combined office; Plans and Policy (J5); and Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (J6). Intentionally absent were the Operations and Interoperability and Force Structure, Resources and Assessment directorates often found in combatant commands. The Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff was disestablished at the same time as SAC, but unlike SAC, its mission—the development of the SIOP—was incorporated into USSTRATCOM virtually unchanged and formed the core of the plans and policy directorate. While Generals Butler and Linhard envisioned a Strategic Command that included a merger with US Space Command and the integration of offense and defense,

as well as a Strategic Command that would grow into much wider planning responsibilities, the initial mission was development of the nuclear war plan. They believed that a plans and policy directorate that encompassed the functions of the JSTPS and related responsibilities would be more efficient than additional directorates.

Concurrent with the standup of STRATCOM and the reorganization of the Air Force, the Strategic Joint Intelligence Center was formed at Offutt, from the Strategic Air Command's 544th Intelligence Wing. Initially a separate “below-the-line” unit, the STRATJIC, with its approximately one thousand personnel, was under the operational control of the STRATCOM Director of Intelligence.

By June 1, 1992, all of the necessary work had been accomplished to implement a significant reordering of the US defense establishment. Perhaps as much for symbolism as for chain of command purposes, reorganization of the Air Force and establishment of United States Strategic Command were done on the same day. The reorganization of the Air Force involved not only the inactivation of SAC, but the Military Airlift and Tactical Air commands as well. In place of the three commands, two new ones were established—Air Mobility Command (AMC), headquartered at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois; and Air Combat Command, (ACC) headquartered at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.

The days leading up to the momentous activities of June 1 were a time for memories and reflection on



Air Mobility Command and Air Combat Command, established Jun 1992



The USAF Colorguard marches at the SAC Tattoo, May 1992

past glories. Events began on May 29, a Friday, with a SAC victory party for all ranks held outside the Officers Club. While officially supported, the victory party, centered on the theme that SAC had won the Cold War, was a time for fun and celebration of the long and illustrious history of Strategic Air Command. A golf tournament on May 30th rounded out the festivities. On Sunday May 31, the more serious activities began.

The first major ceremony of the day was the interfaith worship service, entitled *The Torch of Faith*. In addition to the main theme of service to country, the observance paid tribute to “sacrificial service” by recognizing Air Force Cross recipients, SAC former prisoners of war and detainees, and the 2,583 crewmembers who had died in the line of duty. There was also a prayer of rededication for the SAC Memorial Window in the Chapel. Chaplain Harold M. Jensen, the last SAC and first STRATCOM chaplain, delivered the address. He concluded, “What a privilege we have to stand on the threshold of new beginnings, new commands, a new world order. May our commitment be stronger than ever to pass on the torch of faith and carry on the values we cherish and hold dear. God bless us all toward that end.” During the day of May 31 there were special brunches, and following the interfaith service, there was a special reception and banquet for approximately 350 invited guests at the Offutt Officers’ Open Mess. That evening, the theme of a torch passed was celebrated

with a SAC Tattoo. The tattoo, a three hundred year old military tradition, was a ceremonial salute in words, music, and military formation, to the nearly five decades of service by SAC men and women to the peace and security of the United States. Despite persistent rain, the crowd remained for the impressive ceremony that celebrated military tradition and the history of the country.

June 1 was a long and busy day for the major participants in the series of inactivation and establishment ceremonies. The Air Force reorganization activities began at 8:30 am at Langley AFB, where TAC stood down and the new Air Combat Command, which took over responsibility for SAC’s bomber, missile, and reconnaissance assets, was activated. From there Donald B. Rice, Secretary of the Air Force; General Merrill A. McPeak, Chief of Staff of the Air Force; General Hansford T. Johnson, commander in chief US Transportation Command and commander Military Airlift Command; and General John T. Loh, immediate past commander of TAC and now the new commander of ACC, flew with General Butler and others to Scott AFB, where a similar ceremony marked the inactivation of MAC and the activation of the new Air Mobility Command, which now assumed responsibility for SAC’s KC-135 and KC-10 air refueling aircraft.

Following those festivities, the official party finally moved on to Offutt Air Force Base for ceremonies



The Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff is disestablished

inactivating SAC, disestablishing the JSTPS, and formally establishing United States Strategic Command. The inclement weather that had dampened the Tattoo continued into June 1, necessitating relocation of the change of command ceremonies from the newly restored parade ground to the Allman Maintenance Facility, a large hangar that accommodated the E-4B, a modified Boeing 747 used for national airborne operations. In addition to the military leaders mentioned previously, Senator J. James Exon and Representative Peter Hoagland, both of Nebraska, were joined at Offutt by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell, who presided at the ceremonies. Inactivation of Strategic Air Command and disestablishment of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff were marked by traditional ceremonies, which culminated in a presentation of the commands to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, rendering of the national anthem, and a gun battery salute. Generals Powell and McPeak gave brief speeches honoring the two commands and their contributions to

nuclear deterrence. The Secretary of the Air Force declared the Strategic Air Command inactive and its colors were retired. Similar respects were paid to the shield of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff and the organization was disestablished by order of the Secretary of Defense.

In the final event of the day, United States Strategic Command was activated at Offutt by order of the President of the United States. The new command's colors were uncased and unfurled and presented to General Butler by General Powell. General Butler gave a short speech of appreciation to the command and his staff, units passed in review, and the official party departed. A long and eventful day concluded with a reception. Silently and without fanfare, Single Integrated Operational Plan 93 went into effect that same gray day and a new era of deterrence began.



Standup ceremony formally establishes the United States Strategic Command. From left, Donald B. Rice, General Colin L. Powell, General Merrill A. McPeak, and General George L. Butler



*General George Lee Butler, CINCSTRAT
June 1992 - February 1994*

CHAPTER THREE

GENERAL GEORGE L. BUTLER

Only weeks after establishment of STRATCOM, on June 17, 1992, President George Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the Washington Summit Agreement, a joint understanding on elimination of MIRVed ICBMs and decreases in strategic offensive arms below those agreed to in the US-USSR Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of July 31, 1991. Even before standup of the command on June 1, USSTRATCOM Provisional had been looking at pre-

sessing nuclear weapons.

Immediately following the Washington Summit Agreement, USSTRATCOM turned its attention to development of a triad force structure to implement terms of the accord. During July and August 1992, USSTRATCOM hosted three conferences, with representatives from Navy, Air Force, and the Joint Staff joining command planners to produce a force structure projection that would satisfy war fighting requirements through 2003 and fall within warhead ceilings contained in the Washington Summit Agreement. With inputs from the services and Joint Staff, but primarily through its own detailed force and target projections, Strategic Command built a ten-year program in line



Presidents George H.W. Bush & Boris Yeltsin signing START II Agreement, Jan 93

liminary force structure options that would fit within the parameters contained in the Washington Summit Agreement—a total deployed warhead limit forty percent smaller than the 6,000 agreed to less than a year earlier. That earlier agreement, START I, would be ratified by the US Senate on October 1, 1992, and the Russian Duma a month later, but would not enter into full force until December 5, 1994, following agreement to the treaty by all former Soviet states still pos-



Minuteman III reentry vehicles



*B-52s dismantled as required
by START I Treaty*

with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell's philosophy of a versatile force "based on capabilities and not just on threats," which would meet original START requirements, adhere to the spirit and letter of the Washington Summit Agreement, and fall within fiscal guidance as it was understood and projected in mid-1992. A resultant November 23, 1992, briefing to Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and Chairman Powell on strategic nuclear forces in the year 2000 was the first unanimously agreed to position on strategic nuclear force projections in American defense history.

A formidable and effective deterrent force able to meet strategic nuclear targeting requirements with the constrained warhead limits and phase points contained in the Washington Summit Agreement-based second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, signed by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in Moscow on January 3, 1993, had to be flexible. Emphasis throughout STRATCOM's



*B-2 "Spirit" multi-role bomber uses stealth
technology*

planning process was on maintaining this needed flexibility through minimum MIRVing and maximum delivery platforms, a force structure that would allow warhead loads to be tailored for efficiency and effectiveness. The end of the Cold War and two sets of Presidential Nuclear Initiatives had already greatly reduced all three legs of the Triad and eliminated new forces projected for the future. General George Lee Butler, Strategic Command's commander in chief, felt that with a reduced but more geographically widespread target base, more platforms made more sense than did more warheads. Proven capabilities against the range of target types dictated retention of the stra-



Trident II missile launched from USS Henry L. Stinson

tegic Triad of bombers, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, and ballistic missile-equipped submarines. Because of caps on submarine launched ballistic missiles during both START II phases, mandated elimination of all MIRVed ICBMs, and provisions contained in START I, the US was limited in the number of ICBMs it would be allowed to retain. In addition, President Bush, in his 1992 State of the Union Address, had promised to reorient a substantial number of bombers to a conventional role, effectively removing the Air Force's ninety-five B-1s from the current strategic force mix. The assumption for planning purposes was that the B-2, a bomber not yet in the active inventory, would be available for the nuclear



USS Nebraska ballistic missile submarine

mission, as would a number of still-to-be-built Trident II submarines.

By the end of 1992, after analyzing a wide range of possible configurations, Strategic Command determined a preferred solution that maximized SLBMs and provided an acceptable mix of ICBM and bomber weapons. The proposed force and a command-developed tentative drawdown schedule would meet treaty limits for both delivery systems and deployed warheads. General Butler was pleased with the outcome of the force projection effort, testifying before Congress that the command had done “landmark analysis on alternative force structures to satisfy the terms and conditions of the START I and START II agreements.” USSTRATCOM had constructed a proposed force that would comply with weapons limitations “within a balanced, stabilizing, flexible, survivable, efficiently targetable posture,” while also providing “a sound conceptual basis from which to pursue further reductions, should the opportunity emerge through future arms control advances; or to achieve a more robust posture, should political outcomes in the former

Soviet Union so dictate.” Butler was convinced that the preferred force structure built by USSTRATCOM was the correct one, both in ability to deter and to meet targeting needs, and in terms of budgetary and arms control limitations.

Even as the ink was drying on the Washington Summit Agreement, however, austerity in future year defense budgets had already set in. Simultaneous with strategic program reductions and decreased funding tied directly to the diminished nuclear threat, a government-wide mandate to trim spending dramatically and an emphasis on shrinking the national debt resulted in both an immediate loss of money for strategic weapon systems and a certain decline in that part of the defense budget available for long-range Strategic Command concerns. Although the command had analyzed an extensive array of potential force structure options in the wake of the Washington Summit Agreement to determine not only the end strength but also the means to draw down the weapons commitment within START II-mandated milestones, and had briefed its preferred force structure at the highest levels and received generally favorable acceptance, approval of USSTRATCOM’s proposal was far from automatic. Service budget woes were already impacting major strategic program decisions.

Faced with almost certain budget restrictions, Strategic Command force structure planners and target analysts, aided by intelligence, operations, programming, and budget specialists, embarked on further detailed evaluation of potential post-START II force structures and Single Integrated Operational Plan targeting needs. Looking at affordability and military sufficiency against widely divergent shrinking hypothetical target bases for the year 2003 and beyond, the command analyzed dozens of potential triad and non-triad weapon system configurations for force structure balance and the ability to efficiently deliver as close to the maximum allowable warheads as possible. Although no new warheads or delivery systems were planned or desired, minimum modernization of weapons figured prominently in the command’s analysis. Capabilities analysis reaffirmed that the preferred force

identified by the command in late 1992 remained the one affording the greatest flexibility for planning, reconstitution, and regional conflict. Detailed cost analysis indicated that even under rather austere negative real growth rates for future strategic budgets, the command's preferred force structure was affordable. While other force configurations could be operated and sustained for fewer dollars, the savings would result in erosion of war fighting options and, in some cases, inability to meet minimum targeting requirements. If cost were to become the determining factor, however, command planners in 1993 identified a slightly more affordable option that provided an acceptable level of flexibility.

Strategic Command was interested not only in planning for the employment of nuclear weapons, but also for the lessening of international tensions through the drawdown and eventual destruction of strategic offensive arms. In response to isolated, incomplete, and contradictory studies being conducted for the Department of Defense by national laboratories and defense contractors, USSTRATCOM Provisional had begun developing a methodological approach to identifying and evaluating a range of nuclear deposing actions outside of the START I and START II framework that would be possible at various stages of a maturing relationship with the former Soviet Union. Criteria for formulating and evaluating specific options included not only Russian political and military actions, but also US political and military objectives vis-à-vis world conditions.

The command's thorough disengagement strategies study, which began in Spring 1992 and underwent considerable refinement in 1993 and 1994, posited more than fifty potential deposing options the command felt might be appropriate as the US-Russian relationship proceeded from agreement in principle and early positive movement on strategic arms reductions through actual implementation of arms control agreements to a tier where political and military cooperation resulted in concern with other nations and non-state threats, rather than with each other. Depending on Washington's political objectives at any stage of what

was hoped to be growing trust and friendship with its former adversary, Strategic Command's suggested actions for each tier would balance military sufficiency in each leg of the Triad with incentive for further deposing.

As both a sign of an improving relationship and a gesture to build further confidence, USSTRATCOM in April 1993, briefed the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the White House that it would have no problem meeting a challenge by Boris Yeltsin to detarget strategic missiles on a day-to-day basis. This would be an easy-to-reverse action with significant



STRATCOM Air Room war planners deal with targeting issues

political potential but no deterrent or war fighting impact, an action Strategic Command's disengagement study deemed appropriate for the first stage of the yet unproven US-Russian relationship. Targeting ICBMs and SLBMs to broad ocean areas instead of toward land would mitigate consequences of accidental launch and further disengage from confrontational postures of the Cold War, and would provide a favorable response to Yeltsin's call for mutual detargeting. Detargeting was not only the appropriate first tier option according to USSTRATCOM's model, it was an action that the command could implement rapidly. Missile systems would remain on alert, with the ability to return to SIOP targets within minutes, but for the first time since the 1950s, no landmasses would be targeted by either Russia or the United States.

At the end of April 1993, before making a decision to implement detargeting, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin requested a broader OSD-Joint Staff study




*Les Aspin, SECDEF
Jan 1993 – Feb 1994*

of disengagement options and additional recommendations for mutual US-Russia deoposturing. USSTRATCOM again played a prominent role, with the director for Plans and Policy, Major General Bob Linhard, forwarding to the Joint Staff both the command's deoposturing options worksheets and a caveat that "the list contains many options we do not consider wise to implement." While USSTRATCOM considered detargeting and other suggested measures with no military impact to be appropriate as a starting point for building confidence, caution needed to be exercised when it came to some of the listed dealerting options. On September 8, 1993, Secretary Aspin and Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev agreed to establish a strategic stability working group to discuss a range of disengagement initiatives, most of which were in the first two tiers of the STRATCOM model. The group met during fall 1993 in preparation for the January 1994 Moscow Summit. Ultimately, at the Moscow Summit Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin "announced that they would direct the detargeting of strategic nuclear missiles under their respective commands so that by no later than May 30, 1994, those missiles will not be targeted." USSTRATCOM implemented the policy, working through its task forces.

In response to an amendment to the 1993 Energy

and Water Development Appropriations Act that called for a possible temporary lifting of the existing nuclear testing moratorium before enactment of a permanent ban on underground nuclear testing, USSTRATCOM proposed what it viewed as a responsible testing program that could be completed in the time specified preparatory to a comprehensive testing ban. Strategic Command, as DOD's nuclear planning and execution arm, had a vested interest in formulation of the nation's nuclear testing policy, but the plan it devised at Nuclear Weapons Council request met considerable opposition at the Joint Staff and OSD, which decided not to present it as an alternative for consideration by the Nuclear Weapons Council.

Frustration over not having its views heard on the proposal and other testing and nuclear stockpile concerns resulted in USSTRATCOM requesting full membership in the Nuclear Weapons Council Standing Committee, the joint DOD-DOE decision-making body on nuclear matters and the forum responsible for drafting most of the Hatfield Amendment response. The request for membership was denied, but the command was granted observer status on February 11, 1993. As an observer, USSTRATCOM was allowed representation at monthly committee meetings and was permitted to provide input to the standing committee and its action officer group, but it did not have a vote. A mid-1993 reorganization scheme resulted in combining NWC committees into a single standing and safety committee, with an organizational structure that



Underground nuclear test facility in Nevada

included USSTRATCOM as a full member on the combined committee. Later iterations of the membership roster listed the command as only an observer, leading to a October 26, 1993, petition for full membership on the grounds that “USSTRATCOM must have a more substantial role in managing our nation’s nuclear arsenal.” There was no support for full command membership among the existing committee members, so the command’s request was not approved. Strategic Command continued to act as an official



The last Minuteman II is removed from its silo, Malmstrom AFB, Aug 1995

observer to the combined NWC Standing and Safety Committee until November 14, 1995, when it was finally accepted as a full voting member.

USSTRATCOM inherited Giant Lance from Strategic Air Command on June 1, 1992, and almost immediately the final airborne alert program for nuclear bombers became subject to internal command questioning as to its viability in the post-Cold War world. The program had grown out of the larger Selective Employment of Air and Ground Alert concept in 1968, was the successor to other air and ground alert programs, and had been intended as a visible demonstra-

tion to the Soviet Union of US national resolve. Over time, the scope of the program changed from a robust posture with substantial committed assets worldwide to a part-time force with few bombers that rarely conducted training for an airborne alert mission that had become passé. Particularly in light of dissolution of the Soviet Union and President Bush’s removal of bombers from alert, the limited program had become anachronistic and, in USSTRATCOM’s view, served little purpose. The command canceled the program on October 1, 1993.

Establishment of Strategic Command followed closely on the heels of President Bush’s unilateral nuclear initiatives to begin the long haul of drawing down from the Cold War. Although the aging weapon systems had been tagged for reduction before June 1, 1992, nuclear warhead-equipped *Poseidon* submarines and Minuteman II ICBMs remained in the strategic inventory until 1994. The last Minuteman II in South Dakota was removed from its silo in April 1994, the same month that the final three *Poseidon*’s left the ballistic missile fleet. Retirement of the Minuteman II force was completed in August 1995 with removal of the final missile from its silo at Malmstrom AFB, Montana. Other significant force changes occurred during the first ten years of the command. In 1997, at about the same time as the first of twenty B-2 bombers became a nuclear-capable asset, the fleet of ninety-five B-1s transferred from the nuclear to the conventional bomber fleet. The venerable B-52H remained the mainstay of the air breathing leg of the nuclear Triad, although the numbers of aircraft and assigned crews



Alert crew running towards B-52



B-52, B-1, and B-2 in flight

varied under congressional and Air Force programming.

The survivable leg of the Triad continued its modernization during and after retirement of the last *Poseidon* submarines, with Trident II Ohio class SSBNs entering service on a schedule determined before the command was established. Peacekeeper was sustained during the entire period and 150 Minuteman III missiles were retired. The remaining Minuteman IIIs began a lengthy modernization program that would increase their capability while preparing them for the single reentry vehicle carriage required under START II.

Reinvention of the command's Strategic War Planning System, the process by which USSTRATCOM creates the nation's nuclear war plan, was a long-term initiative announced by General Butler only months after standup of the command. Computer hardware and software changes that would occur over the rest of the decade would be necessary to meet future needs



USS Ohio, Trident II SSBN

far different than had been required during the Cold War, including a shorter and more flexible Single Integrated Operational Plan development and maintenance schedule, application tools and practices more responsive to crisis planning situations, and enhancement of USSTRATCOM's interoperability with regional CINCs. The ongoing infrastructure upgrade process to meet challenges of the twenty-first century began in November 1992.

A two-day conference on strategic options assessment, hosted at Offutt by Strategic Command in October 1993, proved to be a significant command arms control initiative. As a major participant in arms control policy and planning, not only concerning nuclear



Minuteman III ICBM

weapons issues, but with a growing emphasis on all weapons of mass destruction, USSTRATCOM saw the conference as a means for imparting its views on critical issues with ramifications for the command and as a forum for discussing possible arms control influences on its own policies. Strategic Command could not merely stay abreast of the issues, it had to forge ahead in its thinking and planning because of the effects of arms control negotiations on force structure and strategic policy. Less than a year after the Washington Summit Agreement, the command was delving into policy regarding acceleration of START I and



Soviet bombers destroyed under Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, 1996

START II, as well as the wisdom of post-START II arms control.

While progress toward ratification of the existing treaty documents was stymied by constitutional and economic problems in Russia and other Eastern European concerns, Washington was already looking beyond START II and surveying possibilities for even greater strategic arms reductions. Although USSTRATCOM believed that the post-Cold War security environment and Russia's economic ills could eventually result in lucrative negotiations toward even lower warhead limits than were imposed in existing arms control proposals, it also felt that summer 1993 was too early for serious study of significantly greater bilateral nuclear warhead reductions. It cautioned against moving too quickly in the arms control arena. While the command urged confidence building measures and disengagement options which could promote mutual trust and the less threatening environment in which greater reductions could be negotiated, it felt that substantial progress on weapons withdrawal and dismantling in the remaining nuclear states of the former Soviet Union needed to precede further reductions. Until domestic problems in Russia were solved and progress made on existing agreements, the command was adamant that negotiations or overtures toward additional reductions were not only premature, but also imprudent, and should not be initiated by the United States.

In light of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end to the immediate threat and arms buildup that had

characterized forty years of American history, Congress and DoD saw a need to reexamine America's nuclear policy and posture, beginning with the question of the role of nuclear weapons within the nation's overall national security strategy. Even though Russia was drawing down its strategic forces with considerable financial help from the United States, it remained a formidable nuclear power. In addition, the growing threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by rogue nations and terrorist organizations posed new challenges. In August 1993, the Secretary of Defense chartered a Nuclear Posture Review, to begin in October, to identify strategy and force structure concerns and make recommendations on policy, planning, and acquisition for the future.

The Nuclear Posture Review turned out to be lengthy and complex, an involved process with specialized working groups and administrative and deliberative and decision-making committees. STRATCOM took the NPR seriously and gave it top priority, even though the process at times frustrated the command. As the command charged with implementing US nuclear policy through force structure, support, and target planning, and also the command with responsibility for executing the nation's nuclear



B-2 being refueled at sunset

war plans should deterrence fail, Strategic Command had particular concerns it felt needed to be addressed, but all attempts to gain a seat on the NPR's steering command failed. In addition, STRATCOM's NPR members were concerned that command presentations advocating a force it believed to be capable and sufficient from a war fighting perspective were not taken seriously.

During the NPR, Strategic Command argued for approval of the force it had put together in 1992 and revalidated the following year. The force was START II-compliant, provided the balance and operational flexibility desired for both deterrence and war fighting, and was only slightly more expensive than other force structures under consideration. But it turned out that affordability was more important to the service and DoD leadership than USSTRATCOM had been led to believe. Neither the initial recommendation nor subsequent revisions included Strategic Command's preferred force. Admiral Hank Chiles, General Butler's successor and USCINSTRAT during much of the NPR, took his views on the size of the future strategic force to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, presenting a strong case for

the command's preferred force, but acquiescing in an alternative that contained fewer bombers and SSBNs. On September 22, 1994, Secretary of Defense William Perry announced the results of the NPR, validating the fundamental role of nuclear weapons in US security strategy and reaffirming the continuing importance of nuclear deterrence using a Triad force structure. The strategic nuclear force structure for the post-START II environment would be the option Admiral Chiles had informed Secretary Perry would be minimally acceptable: fourteen D-5 missile-equipped Trident II submarines, twenty B-2 and sixty-six B-52H bombers, and 450 or 500 Minuteman III ICBMs.

A significant result of the easing of strategic nuclear tension in the wake of the breakup of the former Soviet Union was high-level military-to-military contact, a program with USSTRATCOM involvement before and following passage of the Nunn-Lugar Act in 1991, which provided funding for military exchange programs as well as for nuclear weapon disablement and destruction in former Soviet republics. Exchanges with dignitaries from Cold War adversary nations actually predated establishment of the command, with



General George L. Butler, CINCSTRAT, honors General Colonel Igor Sergeev, Commander in Chief for Strategic Rocket Forces, Dec 1993

General Butler visiting Russia before becoming CINCSTRAT. During September 1993, he hosted both Russian Defense Minister Pavel S. Grachev and Ambassador Li Daoyu, ambassador to the United States from the People's Republic of China, and discussed with them nuclear command and control and facilities. The first of what would become continuing reciprocal exchanges between US and foreign operational military occurred in December 1993, when the command hosted General Colonel Igor D. Sergeev, Commander in Chief of Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, and a delegation of SRF officers. Because of the novelty of such a high-ranking military official from a former enemy visiting the United States, and particularly Strategic Command, the television feature program "60 Minutes" filmed the visit. Both Butler and Sergeev saw the visit as an opportunity for the United States and Russia, and individual military leaders from both nations, to build warmer relations and disengage from the Cold War, and lay the groundwork for many official visits to follow.

The Butler years at Offutt not only saw significant change, but also laid the groundwork for further transformation. As the final commander of Strategic Air Command, Butler supervised disestablishment of the Air Force major command whose bombers and missiles had played an important and well-known role in Cold War nuclear deterrence. He also oversaw the

shrouding of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff emblem, an event marking an end to that JCS agency's thirty years of responsibility for strategic nuclear target planning. Disestablishment of two long-standing symbols of the Cold War ended an era fraught with the danger inherent in superpower competition. The United States Strategic Command that Butler was instrumental in planning and getting up to speed was a new entity with a new mission for a new security environment. While it assumed JSTPS targeting responsibility, its mission was significantly greater and included strategic nuclear advocacy, arms control planning, force structure issues, and nuclear policy concerns, as well as the responsibility to wage nuclear war if deterrence failed. Butler made sure that the command started its existence with a bang. An activist for responsible stewardship of the strategic nuclear complex entrusted to him, Butler made USSTRATCOM the center for strategic nuclear planning from the beginning, while simultaneously maintaining a credible deterrent against an array of threats far different than those faced during the Cold War. While he symbolized the end of the US-Soviet confrontation in his zeal to draw down the well-known vestiges of the Cold War, more important were his contributions in establishing the tenor for the single unified command that would guide the strategic nuclear establishment in the post-Cold War world.



General John Shalikashvili, General George Butler, and Admiral Henry Chiles at change of command ceremony, Feb 1994



*Admiral Henry G. Chiles, Jr., CINCSOUTH
February 1994 - February 1996*

CHAPTER FOUR

ADMIRAL HENRY G. CHILES, JR.

Admiral Henry G. “Hank” Chiles, Jr., made history when he became the second Commander in Chief, United States Strategic Command on February 14, 1994. He became the first Navy admiral to command all of the nation’s strategic nuclear forces. Before June 1, 1992, the Strategic Air Command controlled the intercontinental ballistic missiles, bombers, and tankers, while the Navy controlled the fleet ballistic submarines. Activating USSTRATCOM assembled all of the nation’s strategic weapons under one commander whose responsibility was to support the national objective of strategic deterrence.

The primary mission of the United States Strategic Command remained the same under Admiral Chiles’ leadership: “deter a major military attack, especially nuclear attack, on the United States and its allies; and if deterrence fails, employ nuclear forces.” To successfully deter a nuclear attack on the United States, Admiral Chiles stressed readiness through daily training and safe operating procedures; changing the command’s mission to meet the changing challenges of the post-Cold War world; and expanding the military exchange visits with Russia to develop a trust and understanding of our military counterparts.

When Admiral Chiles took command of STRATCOM, America’s strategic policy was to use nuclear weapons as a deterrent against weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as a hedge against aggression by Third World Countries, and as a deterrent

against Russia’s extensive nuclear arsenal. STRATCOM’s mission radically changed with the issuance of Change 4 to Annex C of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) in May 1994. Under the new JSCP, USSTRATCOM became responsible for developing nuclear options for theater unified command war plans. Adding this one mission completely changed USSTRATCOM’s planning style because it forced the command to be more flexible when it developed war plans for theater nuclear support. Command planners began to see the target as strategic, not the war plan. Assigning USSTRATCOM the mission of theater nuclear planning met a lot of opposition, especially from the United States Atlantic Command. USSTRATCOM leaders gave briefings justifying the new mission to the Joint Staff and theater CINCs from November 1993 through spring 1994. Military downsizing strengthened USSTRATCOM’s attempts to assume theater nuclear planning, since consolidat-



USS Ohio with missile doors open, and no missiles



CJCS, General John M. Shalikashvili addresses STRATCOM audience, Aug 1995

ing theater nuclear support under USSTRATCOM resolved the loss of theater nuclear expertise. The issue was concluded in May 1994 when Change 4 to JSCP Annex C assigned theater nuclear support to USSTRATCOM. Command personnel accelerated production of theater nuclear support plans so they would be available for use during the September 1994 exercise Global Archer 94-3. At the direction of General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USSTRATCOM planners continued developing and improving a document that allowed the Chairman or theater CINC's to plan real missions. Prototype documents were reviewed and modified by theater CINC's during the spring of 1995. Admiral Chiles presented the final support plans to the Chairman in August 1995. Thus, Admiral Chiles successfully achieved his goal of improving and expanding STRATCOM's theater nuclear support mission.

A second mission USSTRATCOM and Admiral Chiles acquired during his tenure was counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Planning against WMD was similar to theater nuclear

planning, but included planning for conventional and nuclear attacks against high risk targets or possible WMD facilities. Work to attain this mission began before Admiral Chiles arrived as Deputy Commander in Chief (DCINC) in September 1993. There was so much opposition from the Joint Staff and the theater CINC's that Admiral Chiles felt USSTRATCOM would never overcome all the obstacles and be assigned the mission. A conceptual plan was briefed at the Counterproliferation Conference hosted by USSTRATCOM in September 1993. After a positive response, STRATCOM action officers continued developing their arguments while Admiral Chiles took every opportunity to stress that USSTRATCOM was the ideal command to assist the theater CINC's with this mission. In the fall of 1994, discussions continued with the Joint Staff at the Counterproliferation Working Group meetings involving all CINC staffs. These meetings were convened by the Secretary of Defense to develop the Department of Defense organizational plan for overall counterproliferation policy. The Working Group decided to assign the counterproliferation mission to the theater CINC's, with support from USSTRATCOM similar to the theater nuclear support USSTRATCOM already provided. Admiral Chiles felt it was the right decision and that it acknowledged STRATCOM's expertise and its ability to support the regional CINC's in WMD counterproliferation.

Admiral Chiles' attempts to earn USSTRATCOM a seat on the Nuclear Weapons Council Standing and Safety Committee (NWCSSC) were rewarded on



Peacekeeper missile launch facility



Weapons storage bunkers, Amarillo, TX

November 14, 1995, when USSTRATCOM was designated a voting member of the committee. STRATCOM's attempts to become a voting member began in early 1993, when STRATCOM became involved in the DOD and DOE response to the Hatfield Amendment of the fiscal 1993 Energy and Water Appropriations Act. Command senior leaders opposed the Hatfield Amendment because it included restrictions that in effect banned nuclear testing by the United States before an international ban on nuclear tests was even considered. Even though STRATCOM had valid objections to the Hatfield Amendment, USSTRATCOM had no representation on the NWCSSC board and the members virtually ignored STRATCOM's arguments concerning the Hatfield Amendment. USSTRATCOM representatives believed they were a victim of "legislation without representation," especially considering STRATCOM was the principal warfighter involved with the systems being considered. To correct the committee's apparent lack of response to the command's concerns and to give the warfighters a voice in the committee's decisions, USSTRATCOM requested full membership status. The request for voting membership was denied, but on March 5, 1993, STRATCOM was granted observer status to the standing committee.

STRATCOM continued its efforts to become a voting member of the committee, but again failed in its efforts to gain support from a majority of the committee members. Admiral Chiles again requested membership in April 1994, using the downsizing of nuclear platforms, President Clinton's ban on nuclear testing, and the removal of tactical warheads from their weapon systems as justification for his membership request. These arguments, as well as the United States' announcement that it was actively pursuing approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, finally persuaded the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a majority of committee members to support STRATCOM's membership request. As a voting member of the committee, STRATCOM expected to be an integral voice in decisions concerning America's nuclear weapon systems. Even though becoming a voting member of the Nuclear Weapons Council was a high priority to Admiral Chiles, he also believed it was essential to ensure nuclear weapons remained reliable in a "no test" world. To achieve this goal, command officials worked closely with the Department of Energy to develop processes that retained reliability without sacrificing safety.

Another important mission assigned to USSTRATCOM during Admiral Chiles' tenure was

stockpile stewardship. To support this mission, USSTRATCOM's responsibilities included ensuring the United States maintained a safe, reliable stockpile of nuclear weapons that was a credible deterrent and competent strike force. Assuring the reliability and safety of America's nuclear stockpile became a serious problem during the 1990s because there was no nuclear munitions research and development, no new weapons being assembled, and the possibility that President William Clinton would ban all underground testing. STRATCOM personnel believed a ban on nuclear testing allowed no scientific method of guaranteeing weapon reliability after normal service life. On August 11, 1995, President Clinton announced his decision to impose a "zero-yield" nuclear testing policy. A Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Board was formed to support "zero-yield" testing. Admiral Chiles viewed the nuclear stockpile as his "most troubling readiness issue." His concerns centered on the need to be confident that the weapons were safe, reliable, and retained their performance characteristics in a non-testing environment. He stressed that America's nuclear arsenal was safe and reliable, but he could not guarantee how long they would remain so in a non-testing environment. Also,



Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) personnel inspecting nuclear warheads



Admiral Chiles and SECDEF William Perry in the senior battle staff, Apr 1995

the existing weapons might have to remain in the inventory past their normal service life. Even though many of the weapons had been modified to extend their service life, Admiral Chiles stressed that a number of weapons did not have all of the modern safety features. Also, any additional modifications to weapon design could not be certified without conducting nuclear tests. Lack of nuclear testing and the age of the nuclear arsenal raised concern for the "long-term health of our nuclear stockpile." Admiral Chiles stressed that measures needed to be taken to ensure confidence in the nuclear stockpile before the weapons showed signs of degradation. He believed the Department of Energy should institute a plan to ensure the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in a no-test environment. Admiral Chiles relied on three sources for information concerning nuclear weapon reliability, safety, and performance data: the Director of the Defense Nuclear Agency, the STRATCOM Advisory Group, and the STRATCOM staff.

Another innovative tool developed during Admiral Chiles' tenure was the readiness model used to evaluate the readiness and availability of strategic forces. Readiness model development began in June 1994 in response to an Operations and Logistics Directorate initiative to improve inadequacies in the model developed after the standup of Strategic Command. That original model was extremely labor intensive, requiring over forty people and fourteen person-years to update annually. It became very difficult for senior command leaders to determine which forces were

available on any given day because of the increasing demand for tanker and bomber support for humanitarian or contingency operations. Brigadier General Phillip Ford, Director of Operations and Logistics, spearheaded development of a readiness tool that allowed the decision maker to determine current readiness and project future trends. The command hired a contractor to help develop a system to meet the command's requirements. The computer model took less than one million dollars and a year to develop. The resulting color-coded computer graphic not only displayed the current location of forces, but determined how long it would take to recall and generate them to support USSTRATCOM's mission. With this information available, senior command leaders could then determine which forces were not available and potential degrades before readiness was significantly affected. The readiness model was tested in Bulwark Bronze '95, and eventually was used to provide daily force assessment and to provide status during command center exercises. Admiral Chiles was impressed that the model not only provided more information than was previously available, but was easy to use and displayed the information in quickly interpreted graphs. He hoped the model would become completely automatic, since

data would be entered from the source of the information. Besides saving the command a minimum of seven people and a million dollars a year, the readiness model could be used by the Joint Staff and other unified commands as a management tool for evaluating force readiness, determining impacts, and suggesting alternatives.

Admiral Chiles significantly expanded STRATCOM's participation in the Department of Defense sponsored military-to-military contact program during his tenure. Established in 1992 as part of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the mil-to-mil program's goal was to dispel myths and increase stability by promoting trust and understanding between strategic forces of the United States and the newly developed democracies in Northern, Central, and Southern Europe. Admiral Chiles was a strong proponent of the mil-to-mil program while he was deputy commander of USSTRATCOM. He saw the importance of Russian and American military leaders developing a working relationship based on personal experience and impressions, rather than on rumors and innuendoes. He became an even more avid supporter after his visit to Russia during August



General Colonel Igor Sergeyev, Commander in Chief of Strategic Rocket Forces, and Admiral Henry Chiles, Russia, Aug 1994

1994. He saw firsthand how important it was to learn more about the living and working conditions of USSTRATCOM's counterparts, as well as appreciating their intelligence and military professionalism. He developed an effective personal relationship with General Colonel Igor Dmitriyevich Sergeyev, Commander in Chief of Strategic Rocket Forces, which resulted in an agreement to increase the number of mil-to-mil visits and to expand the program to include colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors on the exchange visits. The two military leaders frequently exchanged letters as a means of maintaining their personal relationship and as a vehicle for advocating the importance of the mil-to-mil program. General Sergeyev even envisioned the two commands participating in Joint Command-Staff exercises as a way of developing joint responses to attacks on either country involving the use weapons of mass destruction. Even though political realities temporarily reduced the number of

military exchange visits, the two officers continued to exchange information and ideas that emphasized the importance of these visits to mutual understanding and stability.

When Admiral Chiles became commander in chief of USSTRATCOM, he was determined to maintain the safety and security of the commands' forces and weapon systems. His goal was to have a professional, well-trained force ready to respond "whenever and wherever they're needed." According to General Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Chiles exceeded that goal. He credited Admiral Chiles with developing a strategy that ensured the protection and safety of America's nuclear weapons while establishing trust between the US and Russian militaries; he kept America safe and strong. More importantly, he won the respect of his peers, the local community, and the men and women of his command.



*General Colonel Igor Sergeyev, Admiral Henry Chiles,
and senior Russian officers, Russia, Aug 1994*



*General Eugene E. Habiger, CINCSTRAT
February 1996 - June 1998*

CHAPTER FIVE

GENERAL EUGENE E. HABIGER

When Air Force General Eugene E. Habiger left Washington, DC, to assume the helm of United States Strategic Command in February 1996, it did not take long for him to appreciate that his new responsibilities were a far cry from those of the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel position he had held for less than one year. He had no radical agendas to pursue when he took the reins of a command in good shape under Admiral Hank Chiles, hoping instead to make only slight changes, particularly with operational aspects of the command's mission. He inherited some unfinished business regarding aircraft, aircrews, and training for the nuclear mission, and complexities with the Department of Energy's new stockpile stewardship program to assure sufficient safe and effective nuclear warheads to meet Strategic Command's needs for a future with no nuclear testing. A B-52 pilot with wartime experience, who also had held nuclear planning and SIOP-related positions with SAC and the JSTPS, his career had been in both the operational and planning arenas. Little did he realize when he assumed command that within months he would be thrust into a major planning role for future strategic warfare and a prominent position in US-Russian military relations.

On March 21, 1997, at the presidential summit in Helsinki, Finland, William Clinton and Boris Yeltsin issued a "Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces," a document without legal standing, but one designed to prepare the way



Presidents Clinton, Ahtisaari (of Finland) and Yeltsin at Helsinki Summit, Mar 1997

for arms reductions greater than those called for in START II. Noting that implementation of the START I Treaty was ahead of schedule, the American and Russian presidents "reached an understanding on further reductions in and limitations on strategic offensive arms that will substantially reduce the roles and risks of nuclear weapons as we move forward into the next century." The leaders of the former Cold War adversary nations reaffirmed a statement from their previous summit committing themselves to "further concrete



Soviet aircraft destroyed under Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

steps to reduce the nuclear danger and strengthen strategic stability and nuclear security,” primary of which would be negotiations for a START III agreement. Talks toward establishing a ceiling of 2,000- to 2,500-strategic nuclear warheads by the end of 2007 would begin immediately following START II entry into force, a milestone attainable with Russian Duma ratification of the treaty. Both Clinton and Yeltsin envisioned START III to be more encompassing than either of the already agreed upon START treaties, going beyond numbers to include transparency measures relative to nuclear stockpiles, warhead destruction, and technical and organizational measures. In addition, the joint statement promised discussion about making the deep reductions irreversible and the current START treaties unlimited in duration. The scope of the START III negotiations would include the separate issues of



Soviet inspectors on START heavy bomber inspection

long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear weapons, a particular arms control concern because of the large Russian stockpile of nonstrategic warheads.

Since shortly after United States Strategic Command’s establishment, its force structure, targeting, and nuclear stockpile planning had been geared to a December 31, 2003, START II completion date, a goal less attainable every day the Duma put off ratification. The March 1997 joint statement recognized the almost impossible task of destroying all excess launchers within seven years, particularly since the Russian legislature had not shown an inclination to tackle START II ratification, and extended the deadline for elimination of the strategic nuclear delivery vehicles under the treaty an additional four years. In the interim, both sides would deactivate the delivery ve-



Soviet Oscar class submarine destroyed under Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

hicles to be eliminated under START II “by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other jointly agreed steps” before the end of 2003. To ensure Russia’s ability to meet the goals, the United States would continue to provide financial and technical assistance through the Nunn-Lugar program to facilitate early nuclear weapons deactivation.

The Helsinki Summit statement seemed to fly in the face of the cautionary note USSTRATCOM had sounded every time mention was made of going beyond START II to negotiate further strategic weapon reductions or even broach the topic of possible future

cuts. In keeping with mission responsibilities, the command had steadfastly opposed unilateral actions that would degrade war fighting capability or negotiations toward greater bilateral reductions before START II was ratified and entered into force. Ratification and progress toward meeting the spirit and letter of the treaty needed to precede any dialogue about deeper reductions. However, by summer 1996 continuing economic problems in the Russian republic were such as to cause General Habiger to believe deeper and more rapid warhead reductions might be in the best interest of both nations. High-level Russian defense officials had commented that maintaining parity with the US by adhering to ceilings and timelines for START II constituted a tremendous financial burden for a struggling nation, a burden Russia could not afford. While still optimistic about START II ratification, and having that optimism reinforced by the generally favorable disposition to the treaty expressed by Russian military leaders with whom he dealt, USCINCSTRAT turned toward evaluating from the war fighter's perspective the direction nuclear arms control should take after

START II.

During summer 1996, even before he accompanied Secretary of Defense William Perry and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John M. Shalikashvili on an official visit to Russia designed to bolster prospects for START II ratification, Habiger was already thinking ahead past that treaty's 3,000- to 3,500-deployed strategic warhead ceiling. The future he envisioned would have at least a START III and a START IV, arms control measures that would see further reductions in both strategic and tactical nuclear warheads, with arms control negotiations eventually expanded to include nations other than Russia. Although START II still languished in the Russian legislature and had not been presented for a vote, Habiger was certain that future US-Russian relations would lead to fewer weapons and greater threat reduction. During his fall 1996 visit to Russia, USCINCSTRAT's optimism was reinforced through firsthand recognition that within the Russian military leadership and Ministry of Defense, START II made political, economic,



SECDEF William Perry attends a tree planting ceremony during June 1996 visit to Russia. With him is Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev.



General Habiger at Las Alamos National Laboratory briefing on stockpile stewardship

and military sense. Optimistic about the future of US-Russian arms control and shared strategic interests, Habiger was convinced “START II’s going to be a done deal,” with a subsequent initiative to further reduce strategic offensive arms rapidly. While believing that the United States should not reduce below START II levels until Russia ratified the treaty, he also felt that the time was right to conduct an in-depth analysis of targeting and weapons requirements for a post-START II world. He wanted to make sure that any further reductions be based on analysis of long range needs and provide sufficient capability to meet yet-to-be-determined future national targeting guidance. Key was looking ahead, “not only of the next move, which is START III, but the next four or five moves,” so irreversible force structure decisions did not back the US into an untenable military position.

Toward the end of the October 1996 visit to Russia, Secretary Perry commented to reporters that a possible follow-up step to START II would be a ceiling of 2,000 warheads, a statement that rapidly resulted in USCINCSTRAT putting his thoughts on future targeting needs to detailed scrutiny. Upon returning from Russia, Habiger commissioned an in-house study of war fighting implications of reductions to the 2,000- to 3,000-strategic nuclear weapon level, an analysis of targeting needs and the weapons to meet them in a

potential START III era. The study was conducted in accordance with presidential policy on further arms control, with Joint Staff and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy participation. Analysis was based on existing targeting guidance; the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review-approved START II force structure was the logical starting point for looking at further reductions, with force structure evaluations based on the force to be in place at the end of the START II drawdown.

With START III “coming down the pike,” Habiger had command planning and targeting specialists look at policy, deterrent, and war fighting ramifications of reduced levels of strategic offensive arms at selected points and scenarios in the future, with a series of reviews by outside experts as a “sanity check” to ensure all bases were covered and nothing of even slight importance was missed. Habiger provided guidance and insight throughout the process, including a personal review of each target. Analysis of weapon needs against hypothetical target bases that reflected divergent future world conditions produced a range of numbers by that November. It also provided a red line for future arms control, a numerical floor below which national war fighting guidance could not be met.



Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton at Helsinki Summit, Mar 1997



General Habiger's first flight on the E-6B TACAMO

It turned out that Habiger and command analysts were about a half year ahead of Washington. When, in December 1996, Habiger was asked by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to start thinking about arms control beyond START II, USSTRATCOM's analysis was already complete. Strategic Command's range of 2,000- to 2,500-deployed warheads envisioned for the post-START II environment met Administration political objectives while providing CINCSTRAT the weapons he needed to meet targeting guidance. Habiger personally briefed President Clinton on the results of Strategic Command's analysis and averred how comfortable he was with the range of 2,000- to 2,500, the number of warheads he felt should be the START III limit. The command's projected START III figures made their way through the Pentagon in early 1997, with the 2,000- to 2,500-strategic nuclear warhead figure eventually receiving approval by the Secretary of Defense for inclusion in



General Habiger as AEAO on EC-135, Apr 1996

the Clinton-Yeltsin summit at Helsinki, Finland, in March 1997, where the range became the stated goal to be achieved by December 31, 2007.

During General Habiger's two and one-half year tenure as USCINCSTRAT, the command maintained a safe and effective deterrent posture and war fighting capability. While modernization efforts were planned or underway, no significant changes in ICBM or SSBN force postures took place. Nuclear command and control and the air breathing leg of the Triad did experience alteration. In April 1998, General Habiger flew as Airborne Emergency Action Officer during the first operational flight of the Navy's E-6B, the "Take Charge and Move Out" TACAMO aircraft scheduled to inherit the "Looking Glass" nuclear command post mis-



Flash X-Ray used to certify nuclear weapons in stockpile without testing

sion later that year from the Air Force's EC-135s. Advance capabilities in the bomber leg of the Triad, which included incorporation of the B-2 and the ability to arm each B-52 with 20 cruise missiles, permitted all B-1s to transition to the conventional role. In addition, a comment by Habiger to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Shalikashvili concerning the age of the nuclear policy guidance used by the command to construct the nation's strategic targeting plan, "got the ball rolling" for revised presidential guidance, a document with integral USSTRATCOM involvement. Habiger also certified that the nuclear weapons stockpile was safe in both 1996 and 1997, the results of data collection and questioning at DOE's national labo-

ratories conducted by the USSTRATCOM Strategic Advisory Group's Weapons Subcommittee.

While STRATCOM was a center of targeting and force planning excellence, it was also charged with actually conducting nuclear operations, if necessary. The command honed its internal command and control expertise through Global Archer exercises, as it had on a regular basis since its establishment, and conducted an annual exercise to evaluate connectivity and procedures with its strategic forces. Beginning in fall 1996 with its newly named Global Guardian command post and field training exercise, a renewed em-



MCCC deploying

phasis on war fighting saw intense exercise play within the headquarters and from all of its task forces, field units, and outside organizations. Global Guardian exercised the nation's strategic forces and evaluated how well they could generate and execute their war fighting missions. In addition to generation of STRATCOM-committed bombers and tankers, and phases of continuous alert for its command and control aircraft and Mobile Consolidated Command Center (MCCC), Global Guardian exercises permitted validation of plans, policies, strategies, and decision-making processes that implement actions in a stressed environment. Global Guardian '97 provided the first opportunity for testing of command information warfare protection, detection, and reaction capabilities, as well as the first time the USSTRATCOM MCCC exercised in concert with all of the command's strategic assets.

As a result of the June 25, 1996, Khobar Towers

bombing in Saudi Arabia and other terrorist activities, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Shalikashvili told USCINCSTRAT and the other unified commanders in chief that they "need to get serious about force protection." The Unified Command Plan signed by President Clinton in June 1997 made USCINCSTRAT responsible for protecting not only the headquarters,



Force protection security barriers, LeMay Building

but all forces under him as combatant commander, including SSBNs, ICBMs, and command and control aircraft. The initial phase of headquarters force protection was designed to increase security in and around the headquarters and included controlled access to parking lots and the LeMay Building. Upgrades in 1998 included distinctive color coded badges for all personnel authorized unescorted LeMay Building access and a card reader system to control entry into the facility.

Strategic warfare in the late twentieth century had grown to encompass not only military hardware, but also information operations. USSTRATCOM placed considerable emphasis on solving existing or potential information security problems that could affect its own computer networks or those to which it connected for nuclear command and control. Command reliance on information made it an attractive target for the nation's enemies, and protection of its information systems against illegal access or other unauthorized use took on a high priority. USSTRATCOM's comprehensive

goal of addressing the total security environment surrounding information technologies met success and recognition, with the command's information assurance program selected as a recipient of the 1997 Government Technology Leadership Award, sponsored by *Government Executive* magazine.

In addition to spending “a heck of a lot of time on the road speaking to various groups,” including other commanders in chief and students and faculty at war colleges, General Habiger took his advocacy and education role to Capitol Hill to reassure Congress “that we’re still the cornerstone of our national security strategy and deterrence.” He also used the podium to instill in both advocates and opponents of nuclear weapons an appreciation of what the Command was doing and why it was doing it. Habiger brought a diverse cross section of visiting scholars and opinion molders, including Frank Gaffney, director of the Center for Security Policy; Jeremy Stone, head of the Federation of American Scientists; and de-alerting advocate Bruce Blair, to the headquarters to discuss security strategy and deterrence.

A significant achievement and personal enjoyment during General Habiger's tenure at USSTRATCOM, and one that still pays dividends for the command and the country, was expansion of the military-to-military program between Strategic Command and its counterparts in Russia. The program, started by General Butler in conjunction with the 1992 Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction agreement, had group and individual objectives of evaluating and learning about items of interest to each nation's strategic forces and building and strengthening friendships and mutual understanding. Professional and personal value was evident in official visits with high-level officials and strategic decision makers. Both Admiral Chiles and DCINCSTRAT Lieutenant General Arlen D. Jameson held discussions in Russia with Marshal General Igor D. Sergeyev, Strategic Rocket Forces commander—talks paving the way for reciprocal visits by Russian military officers.

Even before his October 1996 trip with Secretary

of Defense William J. Perry to meet Defense Minister Igor Rodionov and General Colonel Igor D. Sergeyev, Habiger and members of the Strategic Command staff



General Habiger visits Russian ICBM launch facility, 1996

cultivated friendships with a number of high ranking Russian military officials, relationships that contributed to a lessening of tensions and greater understanding between Russian and American strategic leaders. USSTRATCOM's director of Operations and Logistics, Brigadier General Thomas H. Neary, and nine officers involved in various aspects of the strategic mission were guests of the Strategic Rocket Forces in Russia from June 28 to July 7, 1996, touring a large training base, a rocket army headquarters command center, an SS-18 silo and launch control facility, and a mobile SS-25 ICBM division. From November 3-5, USCINCSTRAT hosted General Colonel Nikolay Solovtsov, first deputy to the Strategic Rocket Forces chief of staff, and fifteen SRF generals and colonels on the final stop of a Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program tour that included a visit to the Montana missile fields and discussions with their US counterparts. Habiger picked up the pace of reciprocal visits to command and operational head-

quarters, hosting high- and mid-level delegations to study nuclear operations and engage in dialog with American officers. Sergeyev visited Habiger in late March and early April 1997, a six-day trip which included a visit to a weapons storage area and inspection of operational Minuteman III missiles. Following Sergeyev's elevation to be minister of defense, Habiger paid him a visit and became the first non-Russian allowed in a nuclear weapon storage area. Although he only glimpsed Strategic Rocket Forces weapon security and did not see comparable naval storage areas, the procedures and level of security at the weapon storage area at Kostroma convinced Habiger that Russia's nuclear weapons were secure, although the facilities were lacking in technological sophistication. In return, Habiger hosted a group of Russian security experts, who visited weapon storage sites at Malmstrom AFB, Montana, and Bangor, Washington. He also had the commanders of Russia's bomber and rocket forces visit, trips that included bomber, submarine, and weapon storage area security demonstrations.

General Habiger's final whirlwind visit to five operational bases in June 1998 and candid discussions with the leadership of the Russian defense establishment and its strategic nuclear components permitted him rare opportunities to inspect nuclear security of both deployed and stored weapons and to see at close range the various types of delivery systems in the Russian inventory. What he saw and heard validated his



EC-135 Airborne Command Post (ABNCP)



General Colonel Vladimir Yakovlev and General Habiger, Mar 1998

belief that Russian missiles and warheads were secure and safe, well protected from theft or unauthorized use, and under the control of competent leadership. At the same time, he witnessed conditions that emphasized the effects on the military of an economy in shambles. From tattered uniforms to bald tires on bombers and decaying infrastructure, the Russian military complex had declined considerably in the fewer than ten years since General Butler had noted that the then Soviet Union was in steep economic decline.

Because of its huge arsenal of nuclear weapons, Russia remained a formidable foe. As Habiger reminded policy makers and visitors to USSTRATCOM headquarters, it was the only nation with the ability to destroy the American way of life. But the conditions he saw and discussions he had with military leaders reinforced his belief that not only was START II right for Russia, the Russian military also knew it was right. He greatly valued what he viewed as open and frank discussions with Defense Minister Sergeyev and, especially, General Colonel Vladimir N. Yakovlev, Russian rocket forces commander. He realized that political and military views on START II were not always the same, but remained optimistic that the treaty would receive Russian ratification and lead to even greater threat reduction within the framework of a START III that he and USSTRATCOM had already deemed would work.

During one of the mil-to-mil visits, in February 1998,



Russian mobile SS-24 ICBM rail launcher

General Habiger asked General Colonel Yakovlev what the Strategic Rocket Forces were doing to take care of Y2K issues, potentially significant computer problems if computers misinterpreted the date as they rolled over to the start of the year 2000. Because of well-founded apprehension that ran the gamut from potential for accidental launch to a shut down of strategic weapon systems or their command and control apparatuses, USCINCPAC was eager to discuss this topic of mutual interest with his counterpart. Yakovlev, however, indicated that he had not heard of potential computer problems. A year and a half earlier, in order to establish a methodology for identifying and solving potential problems, Strategic Command had formed a Y2K working group to look at hardware and software date-related vulnerabilities. Beginning as early as mid-1996 to evaluate and fix computer problems turned out to be a wise decision. As General Habiger and his successor, Admiral Richard Mies, discovered, potential problems were found throughout thousands of individual and networked command and Department of Defense computer systems and software, and the long lead time was neces-

sary to ensure their safe and continued operation.

Dealerting was another subject identified with arms control that concerned General Habiger and his predecessors. The deposing and disengagement model constructed by the command under General Butler contained a range of potential measures that could be taken to lengthen the time needed to launch a warhead—from the minutes required to reverse the detargeting initiative of 1994 to the weeks it could take to remate warheads with missiles. When the command devised its disengagement model in 1992-1993, it had posited actions it felt might be appropriate for successive stages of a maturing US-Russian friendship, with meaningful and difficult-to-reverse dealerting actions suggested for an era yet to come. Even with his cordial relationships with military leaders and discussions that convinced him that they no longer considered the US to be an enemy, Habiger did not think the time had come for deposing measures that could in any way even remotely disadvantage the US against any foe.


Strategic Command continued to caution that START II ratification and entry into force needed to precede meaningful dealerting activities, a view unchanged from the first year of the command's existence. Russian failure to ratify the START II agreement and a congressional mandate to maintain forces at START I levels pending Duma consent to the terms agreed upon by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in 1993, bolstered the command's belief that the US should



*General Eugene Habiger at banquet,
Russia, Jun 1998*

not initiate further arms control and confidence building measures that could result in lost negotiating leverage, create war fighting vulnerabilities, or reduce the deterrent value of US strategic forces. STRATCOM felt it was “in the unique position to reflect on both sides of the issue and make realistic recommendations when and where appropriate,” but remained certain that positive Russian action needed to precede additional US initiatives. Strategic Command believed that “in view of the Russian intransigence” on agreements that had already been negotiated, additional dealerting activities “would likely prove counterproductive to the overarching goal of stability.” It had articulated the results of its studies and thoughts on disengagement to the Joint Staff, Air Force, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which, during fall 1997, conducted its own critical evaluation of suggestions for dealerting made by Bruce Blair, of the Brookings Institution, and former Senator Sam Nunn in a June 22nd *Washington Post* article.

Blair, Nunn, and other influential individuals and non-governmental organizations had long put forward a wide range of proposals to dealert strategic nuclear systems or otherwise alter nuclear force postures, contending that deterioration of Russian command and control, early warning, and physical security systems had increased chances for inadvertent, accidental, or unauthorized launch. According to Blair, Harold Feiveson, and Frank von Hippel, in the November 1997 issue of *Scientific American*, President Yeltsin



Peacekeeper missile launch facility



Last Minuteman II launch facility imploded, Dec 1997

had come precariously close to responding to what Russian military technicians erroneously believed to be a hostile missile launch, a situation attributed to warning system and nuclear command and control system inadequacies. With strategic nuclear missiles on “hair-trigger alert,” the authors averred, it was only a matter of time until an actual launch would follow mistaken indications of an attack.

US analysis of the general state of Russian weapon security and specific events showed that these and other sensational allegations were alarmist and greatly exaggerated. Strategic Command was not worried about unauthorized launch. President Yeltsin was firmly in control of nuclear forces, and following his trip to Russian nuclear facilities, General Habiger reported satisfaction with Strategic Rocket Forces’ safety and security practices. He was convinced that “the nature of the weapons are safe and secure.” However, starting in October 1997, in response to a Secretary of Defense charge to evaluate a variety of dealerting measures for a possible presidential initiative to step back from the perceived nuclear threshold, a DoD-chartered team devised a range of bomber, ICBM, and SSBN options the Administration could consider. Within the wide range of alternatives analyzed, the only options that USSTRATCOM saw as having potential merit involved weapons already tagged for elimination under the treaty. If the President wanted a dramatic action that would signal greater denuclearization without materially degrading US deterrent capability, dealerting measures relative to systems required to be removed under START II made the most sense.

While USCINCSTRAT reluctantly submitted a

dealtering proposal that would not jeopardize the nation or the command's war fighting ability, General Habiger could not endorse any action dealing with weapon systems within its purview until Russia took the initial step of ratifying the treaty. Habiger saw additional meaningful confidence building approaches with great potential for lessening tensions and the nuclear threat to either the US or Russia, particularly his proposal for a shared warning center, but, again, urged that START II ratification and entry into force be a precondition for further arms control measures or negotiations. Concern about jumping the gun before Russia ratified START II was shared by policy analysts in Washington. Although General Habiger believed that there was a good chance for an initiative that would dealert a portion of the strategic force, it did not come during his tenure as USCINCSTRAT.

During General Habiger's tour at Strategic Command, changes in Department of Defense transportation procedures resulted in the loss of Casey 01, the venerable KC-135 inherited from Strategic Air Command, as the CINC's personal airplane. Following a retirement ceremony at Offutt's Bennie Davis Maintenance Facility, the aircraft was flown to Hawaii to serve the needs of a larger retinue of military leaders. While

CINCSTRAT's final flight in Casey 01 was seen by General Habiger as the end of an era, it was not necessarily without merit. The aircraft was a symbol of Strategic Air Command, one of the last remaining vestiges of the Air Force major command that had occupied the LeMay Building before establishment of USSTRATCOM.

At the close of his tour as USSTRATCOM's commander in chief, General Habiger reflected on achievements during the previous two and one-half years and felt the command continued to make significant contributions to national defense. Command initiatives ranging from certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile to START III weapon requirement analysis ensured current and future military sufficiency. Habiger believed the command had been responsive to its charter to provide unqualified deterrence for the country, while searching for ways to make the future more stable. As he left the reins of the command on June 26, 1998, further action on the future warhead numbers verified as militarily sufficient at USSTRATCOM and enunciated by the Russian and US presidents as the goal for START III still awaited START II implementation.



*CINCSTRAT's Casey 01 ends its final flight,
Offutt AFB, May 1998*



*Admiral Richard W. Mies, CINCSTRAT
June 1998 - November 2001*

CHAPTER SIX

ADMIRAL RICHARD W. MIES

Unlike General Habiger, Admiral Richard W. Mies was a returning USSTRATCOM alumnus, having served as deputy director for plans and programs and director of strategic target plans from the command's inception until 1994, when he left to assume command of Submarine Group Eight and Allied Submarines Mediterranean. With academic and military experience in international relations and strategic planning, he was a logical choice to lead Strategic Command. Mies' background and experience with the 1993-1994 Nuclear Posture Review prepared him for challenges the command would confront during his tenure, including recurring calls for dealerting and a relaxing of America's deterrent posture. In addition, he would preside over the second nuclear posture review in the command's ten-year history, an arms control study looking toward a world far different than Habiger had envisioned fewer than four years earlier.

As had been the case with Habiger, Chiles, and Butler, much of Mies' almost three and one-half year tenure as USCINCSTRAT was spent in future nuclear force planning. In the wake of STRATCOM's START III analysis and the 1997 Clinton-Yeltsin Helsinki agreement to pursue a 2,000- to 2,500-deployed warhead ceiling immediately following START II ratification, it looked as if a significant portion of his duties would be to plan reduction schedules. When he assumed the reins of Strategic Command in June 1998, six years after the Washington Summit Agreement had formed the basis for the START II treaty with Russia and a

draw down by 2003 to no more than 3,500 deployed warheads for either country, the treaty was still not ratified. The optimism expressed by General Habiger slowly gave way to a growing belief that the Duma would never accede to the terms of START II. Although the promise of further significant reductions had already been made, reductions that could only help the Russian economy, the treaty remained stalled in the Russian legislature, victim of a belief by many in the Duma that it was detrimental to Russia's economic and military interests. When Russian ratification of START II finally took place in May 2000, the Duma made entry into force contingent on amendments that materially changed the treaty to such an extent that it would require new ratification by the Senate. The terms



Admiral Mies accepts command, Jun 1998



Admiral Mies greets President Clinton at Offutt AFB, Dec 2000

mandated by the Duma were unacceptable to the Clinton Administration, which did not send the revised treaty to the Senate for consideration. Since the other arms control measures and significant further reductions enunciated by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin at Helsinki required START II entry into force, the future of US-Russian arms control remained in limbo.

The main stated stumbling block to START II turned out not to be strategic nuclear weapons or their delivery platforms, but, the means to defend against incoming missiles. The Clinton Administration endorsed deployment of a limited ballistic missile defense capability aimed at defeating small numbers of missiles from terrorists or rogue states. The National Missile Defense system envisioned would not be designed to stop an overwhelming barrage of incoming missiles, as would be expected in an attack by Russia or a developed nuclear weapons state. Amid considerable international controversy about the possibility or probability of a new nuclear arms race because of the US defensive shield, Russia sternly objected to NMD deployment as a violation of the 1971 Treaty on Ballistic Missile Defense. The United States disagreed, arguing that the treaty was no longer valid because the circumstances under which it was signed were no longer valid. Not only had the treaty been agreed upon during a time of considerable tension and military adventurism, but a principal signatory to the treaty, the Soviet Union, no longer existed. Cooperative threat

reduction and American economic aid to modernize Russia and defray costs associated with dismantling much of its nuclear arsenal in accordance with START I, and the promise of continuing aid to accompany START II nuclear infrastructure reductions, were accomplishments with a country trying to reorient itself toward the future. A national missile defense of the proportions envisioned would be a key to the new deterrence, the means to forestall attack or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missile technology by adversaries with aims quite different than those of the old Soviet Union. Deterrence was transitioning to a multifaceted system that included ballistic missile defense as well as an effective strategic offensive punch.

All of this was within Strategic Command's area of interest. Admiral Mies assumed command at a time of considerable optimism and potential disengagement activity, a friendlier post-START II relationship with Russia that would allow the command to focus on aspects of strategic deterrence and warfare other than US-Russian numerical reductions in strategic nuclear systems. Change and considerable uncertainty in the post-Soviet world presented new challenges and new questions about deterrence. General Habiger had worried aloud about how to respond to a terrorist unleashing a briefcase full of biological agents or a nuclear device in the center of a crowded urban area, a scenario he felt was quite possible sometime in the future. Nuclear weapons had long served as an effective restraint against Soviet adventurism and remained a potent deterrent against major states. The question



Missile defense test launch from Kwajalein Atoll



Terrorist attack on World Trade Center Twin Towers, Sep 11, 2001

of what shape deterrence should take in the emerging multipolar world of ethnic, religious, political, and military rivalries needed to be addressed. Massive nuclear arsenals had curbed significant military threats to the US and its allies because both Washington and Moscow knew that the consequences of aggression with nuclear weapons could include mutually assured destruction. But new threats from rogue states and non-state terrorists went beyond nuclear warheads to include a wide spectrum of weapons of mass destruction. The question of how to deter terrorists willing to die themselves while causing significant destruction with weapons of mass destruction was high on the list of Admiral Mies' and Strategic Command's concerns well before the Nuclear Posture Review or the Al Qaeda attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001.

As deputy director for plans and programs during his first tour at STRATCOM, Admiral Mies had addressed the concept of "no first use" in conjunction with the 1993-1994 Nuclear Posture Review. While he lauded the public and private stance of considering nuclear weapons to be primarily weapons of last resort, and believed that honoring existing national policy pledges restraining use of nuclear weapons in certain situations was proper, he was opposed to any US agreement to a "no first use" policy. The command's primary mission was to deter, and deterrence was served by ambiguity regarding how the United States

would respond to aggression; extended deterrence required a willingness on the part of the US to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear threats to its allies' survival. In a nutshell, Mies saw as having profound policy implications any constraints on the President's ability to wage war.

While Mies foresaw no specific scenario in which the US would be the first to use nuclear weapons, he did not want national policy to render the military helpless in an unforeseen situation. Strategic nuclear warheads were effective assets against biological, chemical and nuclear weapons of mass destruction, an evolution in their deterrent role, and had potential value against states and groups with aims inimical to those of the US and its allies. The concept of deterrence had changed and was still evolving in the post-Cold War world to meet non-traditional threats from non-traditional enemies, challenges not present during the US-Soviet standoff. The world had become less stable following the collapse of the Soviet Union as rogue nations, such as Iraq, and large, well-organized, and dedicated terrorist organizations thumbed their noses at nuclear, chemical, and biological weapon nonproliferation conventions, bent on large-scale destruction to gain their seemingly irrational gains. As has been mentioned, USSTRATCOM had long been concerned



USSTRATCOM support battle staff

about WMD proliferation challenges and had adapted targeting strategy and procedures to meet new challenges. It was a leading force behind an evolution in national policy and strategic guidance to permit flexibility in addressing new threats and challenges. Mies was concerned about any policy change that would limit the war fighter's ability to challenge any threat, including changes to declaratory policy.

An area of successful innovation and activity during the Mies years as CINCSTRAT was theater nuclear support, with the command emphasizing deliberate planning contributions it could make to support warfighting commanders in regional contingencies. The concept was not new, but had been ineffectively marketed and misunderstood in the earlier years of the command, and had been met with some apprehension at other unified commands. Mies made it a priority to stress USSTRATCOM's assistive role in areas in which it had unique expertise, including planning, specialized operations, and intelligence.

Particularly in an era when theater commanders were increasingly in danger of WMD attacks on US troops, USSTRATCOM's ability to identify and plan response options ranging from special operations forces to nuclear weapons—planning and execution assistance against chemical and biological warfare, in addition to the traditional nuclear threat—was invaluable.

Mies touted the command's readiness to render



USPACOM participants during Exercise Ulchi Focus Lens '98



Admiral Richard Mies and President George W. Bush in VTC, Sep 11, 2001

both theater nuclear planning support and WMD counterproliferation support in advance of a contingency, as well as the ability to target and provide intelligence during hostilities. In the planning arena, Mies made great strides in gaining varying degrees of acceptance for the proffered support from regional CINCs, including the dovetailing of USSTRATCOM's Global Guardian exercise with United States Pacific Command's Korea-based Ulchi Focus Lens. The concept proved to be of value to both commands and exhibited for the theater the types of adaptive planning and operational support Strategic Command could provide. In non-exercise theater support, Strategic Command provided substantial real world federated intelligence, planning, and targeting support to United States European Command for Kosovo and Northern Iraq. In the current war on terrorism, federated intelligence and specialized conventional targeting support to United States Central Command has been significant.

While it quickly assembled senior leaders and support personnel to monitor civil and military activities and offer assistance if needed, United States Strategic Command was not directly involved in events immediately surrounding the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001, other than to host President Bush and his official party for a secure teleconference in the USSTRATCOM command center. However, Admiral Mies' offer of command intelligence and planning support was quickly accepted by United States Central Command, the

unified command charged with military operations in Afghanistan, assistance that drew on resident expertise in locating and targeting tunneling and underground complexes. Command support to the war on terrorism continues to this day.

A significant accomplishment integral to conduct of Strategic Command's mission was involvement in the Nuclear Mission Management Plan, a Department of Defense-directed roadmap for near- and long-term capability and plans to support the nuclear mission. The program grew out of a recommendation by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Deterrence, and included USSTRATCOM as a key player. The first edition of the Nuclear Mission Management Plan was published in March 2000 and paralleled the Department of Energy's Stockpile Stewardship Plan, a management scheme for planning and executing DOE's responsibilities for maintaining the nuclear deterrent. Future renditions of the NMMP saw incorporation of detailed planning and

budget information, important issues, and milestones for managing systems and plans. In conjunction with long-range weapon planning and surveillance, USSTRATCOM hosted NMMP Executive Level Reviews, high-level discussions of all aspects of nuclear systems and infrastructure ranging from policy and strategy to modernization and sustainment.

One of the key achievements of the Mies administration at Strategic Command was substantial support for the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, a thorough analysis of the strategic nuclear program and plans for its future. Following the end of any hope for START II, and with it previously enunciated presidential goals for subsequent arms control measures, the command's earlier plans for the 2,000- to 2,500-weapon START III were held in abeyance. With new presidential leadership in both countries would come new ways of looking at strategic nuclear needs. During the fall 2000 presidential campaign, candidate George W. Bush, son of the president who in 1992 had signed the Washing-



President George W. Bush speaking on ballistic missile defense policy, Fort McNair, 2001



Russian President Vladimir Putin

ton Summit Agreement upon which the START II treaty was based, called for not only a limited ballistic missile defense, but also a reduction in strategic nuclear arms to the lowest level consistent with national defense requirements. He spoke in general terms, never proffering a figure for the number of weapons the US should retain. Following his election and inauguration, Bush made scant mention of plans for the nuclear arsenal, preferring to wait until completion of a review of strategic requirements. In a spring 2001 speech on ballistic missile defense, he broached the subject of strategic arms reductions, tying them to defensive capabilities against incoming missiles, but presented no details. Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to oppose abrogation or modification of the 1971 treaty to allow a ballistic missile defense, although he echoed Bush's calls for significant reductions in both the US and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals.

Well before George W. Bush took the oath of office as President in January 2001, Admiral Mies and USSTRATCOM were already preparing for the congressionally mandated study of the nation's nuclear requirements for the following five to ten years, a comprehensive analysis directed by the fiscal 2001 Defense Authorization Act to be conducted by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of Energy. USSTRATCOM had been a key player in the 1993-1994 Nuclear Posture Review, a

complex examination that reaffirmed the central role of nuclear weapons in American defense policy and substantiated the Triad concept and most of the command's force structure projections for a START II environment. As the center for strategic nuclear planning and a significant advisor on national guidance, the command felt it could and should again play an important role in determining nuclear strategy and policy for the foreseeable future. More than a year before the actual start of the NPR, Mies had written Secretary of Defense William Cohen that he would "fully support a strategy-driven nuclear policy review...to help formulate clear and compelling justifications of deterrence policies to enhance our national and allied security." Along the same lines, STRATCOM hosted a series of conferences to encourage academics and policy makers "to think beyond classical bipolar Cold War deterrence and adapt our deterrent policies and forces for more diverse, less predictable threats in a multipolar world." During November 2000, looking ahead to the review, USCINSTRAT suggested that the national security concepts of "shape, respond, prepare" be changed to "shape, respond, adapt," explaining to the Secretary of Defense his belief that the "ability to adapt to an uncertain future and changing environments will be far more important than our ability to prepare for what we can't predict."

Toward the end of 2000, well before anyone at Strategic Command had an inkling of who the DoD principals would be under the incoming Bush Admin-



Admiral Richard Mies and Donald Rumsfeld, SECDEF, with senior battle staff, Jun 2001

istration, planning for the Nuclear Posture Review began to take shape at Offutt and the Joint Staff. Little was done in the waning days of the Clinton Administration, but USSTRATCOM was eager to be involved when the nuclear posture review began informally in February 2001, with Dr. Steve Cambone, principal deputy under secretary of defense for policy, establishing a core working group to formulate options for near-term decisions on nuclear issues.

Although not a member of the core working group, USSTRATCOM participated and made recommendations on NPR terms of reference and potential nuclear strategy alternatives. A significant amount of the command's comments were incorporated, including a strong suggestion by Admiral Mies that the core working group shift emphasis from targeting recommendations to overall strategy. In agreement with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Mies argued that a clear strategy must be established before any targeting or force structure decisions could be made. After the core working group presented OSD with its draft terms of reference in mid-June 2001, the process transitioned to a formal Nuclear Posture Review

with a wider membership. USSTRATCOM played key roles on numerous task forces established to analyze and make recommendations on different aspects of the NPR, and in late August hosted Dr. J. D. Crouch, assistant secretary of defense for international security policy, for what became the basis for the adaptive strategy concept, with capabilities-based force structure sizing.

By fall 2001, Admiral Mies was in accord with basic numerical ranges agreed to by JCS, but still was concerned with risks he felt were not being taken into account in the 3,000- to 3,500-force sizing band for the years 2007 or the 2,000- to 2,500-weapon range for 2012. He was concerned that the low end of ranges under consideration might be too low, that tactical stockpiles had not been taken into account, and that there were not specific dates for complementary capabilities tied to strategic force reductions. Using OSD-determined criteria, USSTRATCOM also analyzed warhead levels put forth for consideration by the National Security Council, looking at them from the perspective of the war fighter—the yardstick used for all command weapon projections. In addition to its advisory role, USSTRATCOM was asked to write major sections of the final NPR report dealing with current and future capabilities and command, control, intelligence, and planning. By mid-December, shortly after Mies relinquished command to Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr., Secretary Rumsfeld approved the number of operational warheads and associated force structure reductions for the first phase, tentatively set to end in 2007. Admiral Ellis concurred on the final draft of the NPR Report to Congress on January 2, 2002.

The 2001 NPR differed from the one conducted in 1993-1994. It was not organized around an arms control framework focused on specific adversaries and threats, but, rather, was designed to define capabilities required of strategic nuclear forces in an increasingly complex security environment far different than the Cold War. In a letter to Congress announcing completion of his Nuclear Posture Review, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated that “terrorists or rogue



Dr. J.D. Crouch, Assistant SECDEF for International Security Policy, Jan 2001



Trident II D-5 missile

states armed with weapons of mass destruction will likely test America's security commitments to its allies and friends. In response," he noted, "we will need a range of capabilities to assure friend and foe alike of U.S. resolve." The strategic nuclear force would evolve over the next ten years to one ready and able to confront unexpected crises and conflicts involving a wide spectrum of adversaries and capabilities, with strategic planning expecting and adapting to surprise quickly and decisively. Flexible pre-planned nuclear and non-nuclear options would complement the increasingly important emphasis on adaptive planning. To achieve the desired responsiveness to adaptive planning scenarios, Admiral Mies initiated a comprehensive Strategic Warfare Planning System Transformation Study. The Nuclear Posture Review established a New Triad composed of nuclear and non-nuclear offensive systems, active and passive defenses, and a modern, responsive nuclear infrastructure with new capabilities against emerging threats. With the New Triad's combination of new capabilities, including advanced conventional weapons, offensive information

operations, and an antiballistic missile defense system, OSD believed the US could reduce its dependence on nuclear weapons, drawing down its strategic forces to 1,700- to 2,200- operationally deployed nuclear warheads, the range announced by President Bush. The strategic nuclear force structure envisioned for 2012 would provide the carriage and flexibility that Admiral Mies and Strategic Command deemed necessary. Strategic nuclear reductions were to be completed in phases, with 50 Peacekeeper ICBM warheads and four Trident submarines to be removed from active service by fiscal 2006. After the initial reduction phase, the United States planned to download ICBM warheads and SLBM warheads and reduce the number of operationally deployed nuclear weapons at bomber bases. The offensive leg of the New Triad will consist of both nuclear and non-nuclear strategic capabilities; the second leg promises development and deployment of a range of defensive capabilities that can discourage attacks, manage crises, and provide insurance against the failure of traditional deterrence; and the third leg constitutes a responsive infrastructure with new capabilities, a long-term investment that will increase confidence in deployed forces, eliminate unneeded weapons, and mitigate the risks of technological surprise.

In the non-force planning realm, one of the major concerns, and one of the major successes, was Year 2000 computer compliance. Identification of potential problems had begun under General Habiger, but the pace picked up significantly shortly after Admiral Mies assumed command. The multi-year Y2K mitigation effort included thorough assessments and complex operational evaluations of all mission critical systems, including intelligence, integrated tactical warning and attack assessment, planning, targeting, command and control, and strategic force direction. In addition, headquarters administrative computers underwent evaluation, as did the ability to integrate with task forces, other unified commands, and the Department of Defense. Where potential problems were identified, the command spared no effort to make certain all systems were compliant. Systems were tested and retested until there were no observable problems;



*E-6B TACAMO takes off
at Offutt AFB*

each nuclear weapon system underwent simulated execution to ensure readiness of mission-critical systems for the next millennium.

With minor exceptions, all USSTRATCOM Y2K operational evaluations were completed by the middle of 1999, and the command shifted emphasis to contingency planning to mitigate risks of system failure during the millennium transition. As a military-to-military confidence building measure and to allay fears of a missile launch or inaccurate warning occurring because of a Year 2000 issue, a USSTRATCOM member joined eleven US military officers and observers from Russia's strategic forces at the Center for Y2K Strategic Stability, established at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, to monitor worldwide communications, navigation, and early warning data at critical periods when anomalies could occur. Mies' continued involvement and the command's considerable efforts to alleviate potential Y2K problems proved to be a resounding success, with no anomalies or outages among Strategic Command's 198 mission critical systems. Evaluations to assess missile warning data from NORAD, to conduct conferences with other CINCs and the Pentagon, and to transmit force direction messages to deployed forces, were equally successful. At USSTRATCOM, a small ceremony among the duty crew in the Command Center celebrated the non-eventful transition to calendar year 2000.

A significant operational enhancement that reached fruition under Admiral Mies was retirement of the venerable EC-135 Looking Glass aircraft in favor of the quieter and more capable Navy E-6B. The decision to consolidate survivable command and control op-

erations onboard the modified E-6 was based on a Department of Defense 1991 study and a 1992 proposal by General Butler to combine the capabilities of E-6 and EC-135 aircraft. While the first STRATCOM E-6B operational flight had taken place in April 1998, it was not until 25 September that the 37-year old mission of command, control, and communications of the nation's strategic nuclear forces transferred to the new platforms. While the aircraft changed, the Looking Glass nuclear command post mission remained, but with enhanced capabilities. In July 1998, in a test preparatory to the fall transfer of the Looking Glass mission, a TACAMO battle staff crew test-launched a Minuteman III ICBM, the first time such a launch had been controlled from an E-6B. Not only were the E-6Bs quieter and more fuel efficient, they could communicate with all three legs of the Triad. Additional connectivity improvements made the Navy aircraft the preferred platform to mirror the STRATCOM Command Center's command and control capabilities in the post-Cold War world. While addition of the E-6Bs permitted enhancements to the existing Looking Glass mission, transfer of the National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) organization from the Joint Staff to United States Strategic Command on October 1, 1999, was a budgetary decision that resulted in no change to mission or level of support.

Military-to-military contacts continued to bear fruit in the early months of Mies' tenure, but soon fell victim to international politics. Shortly before becoming CINC, Admiral Mies accompanied General Habiger



NAOC at Offutt AFB

on an official visit to Russia, an orientation during which he established some strong relationships. A September 1998 exchange visit by US ICBM officers to a Russian Strategic Rocket Forces base was similar to a Russian visit to the US earlier in the year and was successful in fostering improved relations at lower echelons of command. When General Colonel Vladimir N. Yakovlev, Russian Rocket Forces commander in chief, visited Offutt in March 1998 it marked the tenth exchange by a member of Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces. Overall, however, cost and events in Russia hindered the mil-to-mil program, with disagreement over expansion of NATO, military operations in Kosovo, and a pending presidential election contributing to Russian diminishing of the program.

The program did exhibit success following President Putin's election and an end to the Kosovo conflict, however, with General Mikhail Oparin, head of strategic long range aviation, visiting US bomber bases and flying in a variety of US aircraft. A month later, in August 2000, USSTRATCOM hosted General Colonel Igor Valynkin, commander of the Russian 12th Main Directorate, a visit Admiral Mies felt was successful and achieved "desired goals of enhancing mutual trust and confidence building." This was followed by an official visit to Russia by the commander of STRATCOM's Bomber Task Force and some bomb wing commanders. Convinced that the military-to-military contacts were valuable measures for building confidence as the US-Russian relationship improved, Admiral Mies hoped the program could be expanded to other nations with which the United States had strategic concerns, particularly China. To reenergize and expand Russian mil-to-mil exchanges and to develop a broader program of command interaction with the militaries of foreign nations, particularly those with



RC-135 Rivet Joint takes off from deployed location



General Lieutenant Oparin and Lieutenant General Keck, Bomber Task Force Commander, Jul 2000

nuclear weapons, Mies established the STRATCOM Office of Engagement in November 1999.

In the force protection arena, Admiral Mies reported to the Secretary of Defense in early fall 1998 that security upgrades to the headquarters complex totaling \$1.6 million were nearing completion, as were enhancements at the component commands. The force protection improvements underwent successful testing during Global Guardian '99. Upgrades at the headquarters complex included vehicle barriers in parking lots and select roads, and a system of cameras to continuously monitor LeMay Building access points and hallways. In addition, Strategic Command conducted a weapons of mass destruction vulnerability assessment on all assigned national military command and control facilities, aircraft, and equipment. Considerable attention was paid to force protection initiatives, with significant antiterrorism upgrades to protect all strategic weapon systems and facilities. Because of continued command interest and the high level of force protection already in place at USSTRATCOM, disruption to normal headquarters routine was minimal following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001.

Within Headquarters USSTRATCOM, significant work force changes took place in the computer services sector when a yearlong comparison study determined that outsourcing nearly 350 positions to a contractor would be more cost efficient than retaining military or civil service personnel for selected com-

mand, control, communications, computer and intelligence system support functions. The competition, known as an A-76 study for the contracting rule that governed it, was initiated in 1997 by General Habiger. On October 27, 1998, Admiral Mies announced results of the study to a group of command employees affected by the outcome. The October decision awarded the contract for computer services to TRW, the contractor with the most cost-efficient proposal. The process was accomplished with minimum disruption to the military and civilian incumbents of the positions to be outsourced and provided the command a way to meet Pentagon-mandated personnel reductions.

The nature of much of the USSTRATCOM mission precludes discussion because of security classification and sensitivity. Of the many program areas that fall into this category, Admiral Mies saw development of the nation's strategic deterrent war plans and balanced policy recommendations to national leadership as significant command contributions, as were important initiatives to counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, deep underground facilities, and time critical targets through the command's unique intelligence analysis and planning expertise. He also counted resourceful stewardship to ensure the continued safety, surety, and reliability of the nation's strategic nuclear forces, and the harnessing of information technologies

to both exploit offensively and protect critical information resources, among Strategic Command's long-term and valuable accomplishments. Over the course of several years, the command had tested a next-generation intrusion detection system designed to provide early warning of computer attacks against Department of Defense networks. With assistance from the Strategic Advisory Group, USCINCSTRAT continued the command mission of surveillance and annual certification of the nation's nuclear weapons arsenal, assuring the safety, reliability, and surety of the stockpile.

Admiral Mies recognized that the wide range of adversaries in the post-Cold War world presented many and far different challenges than during the major power standoff, but felt the command was more than prepared to meet the challenges. USSTRATCOM remained a technological and war fighting innovator, developing programs ranging from specific bombing support in Afghanistan to a deliberate planning process for information operations, particularly computer network attack. Mies saw adaptability, the highly sought ability to adapt weapons, delivery systems, and plans designed for a large-scale US-Russian nuclear exchange to meet the needs of an evolving strategic environment far different than during the Cold War, to be a singular strength of Strategic Command.



*General Myers, Admiral Mies, and Admiral Ellis,
change of command ceremony, Nov 2001*



*Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr., CINCSTRAT and CDRUSSTRATCOM
November 2001 - October 2002*

CHAPTER SEVEN

ADMIRAL JAMES O. ELLIS, JR.

On November 30, 2001, when Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr. assumed command of USSTRATCOM, several leadership traditions came to an abrupt end. In the spirit of creating a truly unified command on the heels of the Air Force's large and powerful Strategic Air Command, General Butler and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell in 1992 had agreed to alternating Air Force and Navy commanders, a tradition followed until Admiral Ellis succeeded Admiral Mies. Also, after four CINCSTRATs with strategic bomber or ballistic missile submarine experience, Ellis, a career naval aviator, assumed command with no appreciable nuclear weapons background. In retrospect, deviation from leadership tradition at the end of Admiral Mies' term as USCINCSTRAT portended significant alterations to the command and its mission, although nothing had occurred by November 30, 2001, that would indicate

a radically changed future. The man who would carry USSTRATCOM into its second decade epitomized both subtle and less subtle changes that had gradually reoriented both the national and command strategic missions. His non-nuclear background and international command experience fit in well with what USSTRATCOM had already become and, although not known when he assumed command, what it would further evolve toward during his tenure.

The Strategic Command Admiral Ellis presided over on its tenth anniversary had matured considerably since 1992, the decade-long evolution resulting in a broader strategic mission and a considerably widened sphere of responsibility. The Nuclear Posture Review nearing completion as Ellis took the reins of command had as a core assumption that rogue nations and terrorist regimes possessing or acquiring weapons of mass de-



Admiral Ellis on TACAMO aircraft



NBC team demonstrates chem/bio attack decontamination procedures

struction constituted the greatest danger to US national and international interests at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Russia was seen not as an enemy, but as a potential partner for peace—a far cry from the view ten years earlier that still maintained Cold War vestiges of former Soviet republics as dangerous world competitors with aims inimical to those of the United States. The first NPR, in 1994, confirmed the need for a greatly reduced but still substantial strategic nuclear arsenal to thwart a possible reawakening of the Russian giant, with a corollary that national policy would include the potential employment of strategic nuclear weapons against emerging nontraditional threats. The second NPR, concluded at the end of 2001, was almost a reversal in terms of who and what needed to be deterred. Concerned more about terrorists and third-world states developing, acquiring, or actively supporting chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld questioned how many strategic nuclear weapons the United States needed if Russia were not considered a threat.

The shift in emphasis during the relatively short life of United States Strategic Command was dramatic—from a Cold War footing with an implacable enemy to a new strategic framework based on mutual cooperation, common responsibilities, and shared interests, and with it, a greatly reduced need for traditional offensive strategic nuclear weapons. A significant outcome of the Nuclear Posture Review, announced by the Pentagon shortly after Admiral Ellis took command, was a draw down by 2012 to fewer than 25 percent of the strategic nuclear warheads deployed at the time



Russian SS-25 mobile missile system



TU-95 Bear H's visiting Barksdale AFB

USSTRATCOM was established, with a concomitant increase in advanced offensive conventional capabilities, information operations, and defensive measures. While the NPR report emphasized the ability to resize and retool strategic programs if assumptions about the future strategic environment changed, it clearly reoriented strategic direction toward nations and non-state actors condoning and supporting terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, with little said about traditional Cold War threats.

While most of the Nuclear Posture Review took place during Admiral Mies' tenure as CINCSTRAT, the Secretary of Defense's report to Congress, public announcement, and explanation of unilateral steps the Bush Administration would take to substantially reduce the US strategic arsenal came within months after Ellis became CINC. The command had worked closely with DoD and the Joint Staff throughout the NPR's analytical and developmental phases, and following completion of the report to Congress, continued to collaborate with the Pentagon on implementation details for weapons draw down and force modernization, and for target planning for the first SIOP that would incorporate NPR and yet-to-be issued presidential guidance. Command planners also contributed to negotiations toward what would become an agreement to bind Russia and the United States to no more than 2,200 deployed strategic nuclear warheads each.

The NPR also positioned the United States and



President Putin and President Bush sign historic arms treaty, Moscow, May 2002

USSTRATCOM for a dramatically changed strategic triad, one relying on active and passive defenses and yet-to-be-fielded advanced intelligence and conventional capabilities to complement the deterrent and offensive nuclear weaponry available to the command.

Admiral Mies had emphasized shortly before passing the baton to Admiral Ellis that the command with headquarters at Offutt was “Strategic” Command, not “Nuclear” Command, a statement with which Ellis agreed. When Mies started in USSTRATCOM’s Plans and Policy Directorate in 1992, JCS intent had been to establish a war fighting command devoted to strategic nuclear concerns; by the time he left the helm, the command’s “strategic” interests had expanded. Nuclear weapons had become only one arrow in a quiver that contained a considerably wider range of tools to employ against a considerably wider range of threats. And, as Ellis moved into the commander’s suite in the LeMay Building, even more change was in the offing. Presidential direction to deploy the lowest number of nuclear weapons consistent with the security requirements of the US and its allies, develop and field active and passive missile defenses, and place greater emphasis on advanced conventional weapons, would have far reaching consequences for United States Strategic Command.

Looking back over the end of 2001 and the first half of 2002, it becomes easy to see that what appeared to be minor modifications in the way business had been conducted actually laid the groundwork for

significant change for United States Strategic Command. Following the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush vowed to establish a unified military organization dedicated to defending the United States from domestic attack and to coordinate with and assist civilian agencies in the event of further terrorism. Shortly after Bush’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow in May 2002, a summit during which both leaders signed a treaty promising bilateral reductions that would result in a total of 1,700- to 2,200-deployed strategic nuclear warheads for each country by the year 2012, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld announced that a new unified command responsible for defense of North America and up to 500 miles offshore, would begin functioning at Colorado Springs in October. In announcing Northern Command, Rumsfeld also mentioned publicly the possibility of merging US Strategic Command and US Space Command sometime in the future.

The notion of a combined USSTRATCOM-USSPACECOM was almost as old as Strategic Command itself. As early as the year following establishment of the Strategic Command, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell had commissioned a study of the feasibility of merging the two commands at Offutt, an effort that, after several months of scrutiny, concluded that such a move would result in insignificant cost savings. Additional studies during the decade found no compelling reason to pursue merger. By early 2002, however, as Strategic Command was in early preparation for its tenth anniversary celebration, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld resurrected the STRAT-SPACE idea in tandem with plan-



USSPACECOM and USSTRATCOM emblems

ning for establishment of the homeland defense headquarters that would become US Northern Command. Beginning in February, USSTRATCOM established working groups to weigh all options, provide insight into the impacts of a merger on the Strategic mission, and lay the groundwork for coordination with a related Joint Staff study. The command was interested in ferreting out meaningful reasons for such a merger, if there were any, and concentrated on resource conservation, including reductions and the elimination of redundancies in manpower and costs; increased operational effectiveness, efficiency, and interoperability; streamlined command structure; and improved support to other combatant commands. With the NPR's



The emblem of the new USSTRATCOM depicts the New Triad

already-determined blueprint for significant change in the strategic mission, assumptions from the 1993 merger study did not necessarily pertain. The combination of the space mission and the NPR's inclusion of strategic defenses as one leg of the New Triad raised the possibility that a new merged command, if it were approved, might eventually gain the national missile defense mission.

As United States Strategic Command's tenth anniversary approached, analysis of the merits of a STRAT-SPACE merger continued in Washington, a process that Secretary Rumsfeld indicated in his Northern Command announcement could take some time. As part of his and the President's transformation of the military, any new or enhanced command



Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) drawing

would need to provide substantial benefit and fit into a larger organizational scheme, the details of which were not known outside of Rumsfeld's office. Speculation that US Space Command would join Strategic Command at Offutt as a trade-off for Northern Command being sited at Colorado Springs was discouraged, since cost and mission needs could still dictate no merger or co-location in Colorado. Admiral Ellis agreed that any new or merged command assuming STRATCOM and SPACECOM missions would need to do a better job performing the existing tasks and exercising any new responsibilities. While not expecting a study conclusion and announcement of the fate of USSTRATCOM by the time of the command's tenth anniversary ball, Ellis would have liked to have been able to add more about future prospects in his June 1, 2002, speech. He had been personally active in discussions of future directions for the command and the



MILSTAR satellite drawing



B-2 departs Diego Garcia while B-52s await their taskings during Operation Enduring Freedom

Unified Command Plan, and felt that a STRATCOM-SPACECOM consolidation and expansion fit in well with the Secretary of Defense's vision. The admiral gave an inkling of the larger mission he felt the command could perform by discussing how it had already expanded beyond its traditional roles to see recognized success in theater planning, counterproliferation of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction, and federated intelligence operations. He did not know what changes, if any, the Pentagon would include in the UCP, but stated, "I am absolutely cer-



USS Alabama

tain of one thing: new occasions present new truths and new opportunities."

As United States Strategic Command approached the start of its second decade of service, Admiral Ellis was well aware that the future posed challenges both different and greater than those present on June 1, 1992, when USSTRATCOM had been established to encourage stability in the post-Cold War world. While President George H. W. Bush had proclaimed his vision of "a new world order" in 1990 and 1991, Ellis noted that ten years later, events of September



General Richard B. Myers, CJCS, passes the new STRATCOM flag to Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr.

11, 2001, vividly proved that "the world order is, in fact, not so orderly." The command had already become a key partner in the war against terrorism through cooperative intelligence efforts and rigorous planning, and possessed considerable human talent and analytic

tools for continued service. On June 1, 2002, in remarks closing out what he called a “Decade of Deterrence,” Ellis noted, “Our mission will endure for as long as there are threats in the world.” During his address to command personnel at the tenth anniversary ball, USCINSTRAT predicted “a tremendously exciting and vibrant future” for the command, and added, “I look forward to living it fully alongside each of you.”

Less than a month later, the outline of future strategic direction began to take shape. Continuing what he had promised as a transformation of the military to position it for the challenges of the twenty-first century, and building on lessons already learned from President Bush’s war on terrorism and the New Triad of enhanced intelligence, advanced conventional weapons, and nuclear capabilities planned to effect strategic policy in the future, Secretary Rumsfeld announced on June 26, 2002, that United States Space Command would merge with USSTRATCOM. The Presi-

dent nominated Admiral Ellis to be commander of the new unified command, which would be named United States Strategic Command and be headquartered at Offutt. The effective date of the merger was to be October 1, 2002, with full operational capability expected by October 1, 2003. While the new command would incorporate the space and nuclear missions already performed by the existing commands, what Washington envisioned for the new STRATCOM was both bold and far-reaching, and included creation of a truly strategic command that would encompass America’s missile warning capabilities, both nuclear and conventional long-range force projections, non-traditional offensive and defensive warfare capabilities, including information operations, and, potentially, the national missile defense system planned for the future.

According to Admiral Ellis, much of the overall future direction for the new USSTRATCOM could be found in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the De-



Trident II missile reentry vehicles

fense Department's extensive look into future nuclear and non-nuclear strategic requirements. The NPR called for transforming the traditional Nuclear Triad to a capabilities-based New Triad designed to give the President and military commanders a broad array of options to address a diverse range of possible contingencies. The New Triad would consist of nuclear and non-nuclear strike capabilities, passive and active defenses, and the research, development, and industrial infrastructure to develop, build, and maintain offensive forces and defensive systems. Enhanced intelligence, communications, and adaptive planning capabilities would support the New Triad. It would take time to transition to the New Triad, and mission development would evolve after standup of the new command.

Envisioned for the new command, however, was a capabilities-based force responsive to multiple and unexpected contingencies and new threats in a changing environment. Rather than being primarily an offensive nuclear force geared to specific threats, the strategic thrust for the future would be mainly conven-

tional strike forces and information operations, capabilities that would reduce dependence on nuclear forces to provide an offensive deterrent. Included in the non-nuclear strike would be improved capabilities against hard and deeply buried targets, including conventional earth penetrating weapons, and conversion of four SSBNs to carry cruise missiles.

Admiral Ellis was a proponent of both the strategic direction enunciated in the Nuclear Posture Review and what had become known as Global Strike. Appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 14, 2002, USSTRATCOM's commander had asserted that long-range conventional strike was vital to current and future strategic requirements. "Integrating non-nuclear capabilities into strategic forces strengthens our joint approach to developing and operating military forces. With technological advances," he testified, "we have the potential to seamlessly integrate existing or projected enhancements to non-nuclear capabilities such as precision strike to improve our strategic capabilities." On September 9, 2002, following lengthy study at the Joint



General Richard Myers, CJCS, and Admiral James Ellis, CDRUSSTRATCOM

Staff, Admiral Ellis set up a Global Strike division at Strategic Command. Although the mission was unassigned at the time, establishment of the division would permit finalization of the concept of operations for the initial Global Strike capability, which was expected to become a command responsibility on October 1. While only the broad outline of the emerging mission would be present at initial operational capability, Ellis envisioned post-stand up mission expansion through incorporation of additional kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities spanning the entire spectrum of force employment. He saw Global Strike as a mission of immediate and growing importance to the command and nation, a mission that would combine USSTRATCOM's unique, rigorous planning disciplines with a wide range of employment capabilities.

On October 1, 2002, both the original commands, USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM, stood down, and were replaced immediately by the new United

States Strategic Command, a truly global command with worldwide responsibilities for a new strategic environment. In addition to the inherited strategic nuclear and space tasking, the new command acquired what Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers claimed amounted to "an entirely new mission focus, greatly expanded forces and...several infinite areas of responsibility." The original Strategic Command served the nation well, superbly executing its intelligence, planning, and operational missions, contributing to the success of global operations for more than ten years. The new United States Strategic Command is built on that successful foundation. Just as adaptive nuclear planning was a recognized command strength of the last decade, flexibility in meeting global space, land, and sea challenges with a wide range of options will facilitate transformation of strategic deterrence and war fighting to meet and defeat new and ever changing strategic challenges.



The new USSTRATCOM flag unfurled, October 1, 2002



Admiral James Ellis, CDRUSSTRATCOM and General (ret.) George Butler, former USCINCSTRAT



General George Butler takes the original USSTRATCOM flag from General Colin Powell, CJCS, June 1, 1992

APPENDIX A

**USSTRATCOM
COMMANDER IN CHIEF
BIOGRAPHIES**

General George L. Butler

General George Lee Butler served as Commander in Chief, United States Strategic Command, from June 1, 1992, to February 14, 1994. A native of Fort Benning, Georgia, he graduated from the Air Force Academy with a Bachelor of Science degree in 1961. He attended the University of Paris as an Olmstead Scholar, earning a master's degree in international affairs in 1967.

After receiving his commission and attending pilot training, General Butler's first assignment was at Craig Air Force Base, where he served as an instructor pilot. After completing combat flight training, he was assigned in March 1968, to the 12th Tactical Fighter Wing, Cam Ranh Bay Air Base, Republic of Vietnam. From August 1968 to March 1969 he was aide to the commander of 7th Air Force, Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Republic of Vietnam. After a brief instructor tour at the Air Force Academy, General Butler was assigned in July 1971 to the Office of Emergency Preparedness, Executive Office of the President, in Washington, DC. After another brief instructor tour at the Air Force Academy in 1972, he was assigned as chief pilot of the 53rd Military Airlift Squadron, 63rd Airlift Wing, Norton Air Force Base, California.

Following graduation from Armed Forces Staff College in 1974, he was assigned to the Pentagon, and remained there for almost four years. His positions there included air operations officer, International Relations Branch, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; executive officer for the special assistant for strategic initiatives, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations; plans and programs officer, Development and Analysis, Directorate of Plans; executive director, Air Force Budget Issues Team; executive director, Airborne Warning and Control System task force; and chief, Congressional and Joint Matters Division, Directorate of Concepts.

In May 1977, General Butler left the Pentagon and completed B-52 combat crew training. He was then assigned as assistant deputy commander for operations with the 416th Bombardment Wing, Griffiss Air Force Base, New York. He moved up to wing deputy commander for operations and in June 1979, he returned to Headquarters Air Force as chief of a policy analysis group serving the Air Force Chief of Staff. From March 1981 to June 1983 General Butler was assigned as vice commander of the 320th Bombardment Wing, Mather Air Force Base, California, and subsequently became commander. He followed with command of the 96th Bombardment Wing, Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, and in July 1984 became inspector general at Headquarters Strategic Air Command. In August 1986, General Butler returned to Air Force headquarters where he served as deputy director, and ultimately director of operations. After promotion to general on January 25, 1991, he became the last commander of Strategic Air Command. On its disestablishment on June 1, 1992, he became the first commander in chief of United States Strategic Command, and retained the position until February 14, 1994.

General Butler retired from the Air Force on March 1, 1994. He is married to the former Dorene Nunley of San Antonio.

Admiral Henry G. Chiles, Jr.



Admiral Henry G. Chiles, Jr., served as Commander in Chief, United States Strategic Command, from February 14, 1994, to February 21, 1996. A native of Baltimore, Maryland, he attended the United States Naval Academy, graduating in 1960 with a Bachelor of Science degree. In 1973, he studied at Oxford University, earning a Master of Arts degree in foreign affairs.

Admiral Chiles began his naval service aboard a destroyer, the *USS Borie* (DD 704). In September 1961 he began submarine training at the Naval Submarine School, Groton, Connecticut, followed by nuclear propulsion training. He reported aboard his first nuclear-powered vessel, the attack submarine *USS Triton* (SSN 586), in April 1963. He was next assigned to the *USS Tecumseh* (SSBN 628), a Polaris A-3-equipped fleet ballistic missile submarine, where he served as engineer. Between March 1968 and June 1970, he was material officer on the staff of Commander, Submarine Squadron Fifteen, Guam.

In 1970 Admiral Chiles rejoined the nuclear fast attack fleet as the executive officer aboard precommissioning unit *Drum* (SSN 677), and

remained with the ship after commissioning. In 1973, he attained his master's degree at Oxford University, and in 1976, returned to the fleet serving aboard the *USS Gurnard* (SSN 662). After an under-ice Arctic Ocean deployment, Admiral Chiles assumed command of *Gurnard* in May 1976, holding that position until March 1980.

From April 1980 until July 1983, Admiral Chiles was Special Assistant to the Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, US Department of Energy, conducting fleet liaison and directing the Prospective Commanding Officer's Course. Admiral Chiles then returned to the fleet in August 1983 to command Submarine Squadron Three, and remained its commander until July 1985. He became commander of Naval Training Center, San Diego, in July 1985, and commanded the facility until June 1986, when he was again summoned to Washington. During his two-year tour, Admiral Chiles served as director of the Strategic Submarine Division and deputy assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare).

In July 1988 he moved to Naples, Italy, and assumed the duties of Commander, Submarine Group Eight, and Commander, Submarines Mediterranean. He held both positions until December 1990, when he returned to the United States to command Submarine Force US Atlantic Fleet and Submarines Allied Command Atlantic, a NATO organization. On September 24, 1993, then Vice Admiral Chiles was assigned to Offutt Air Force Base as United States Strategic Command's deputy commander in chief and chief of staff. Coincident with promotion to admiral, he assumed command of United States Strategic Command on February 14, 1994. He retired from the Navy following USSTRATCOM service.

Admiral Chiles' awards and decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit with four gold stars, and Meritorious Service Medal, amongst many others. Admiral Chiles is married to the former Katherine (Katy) Pearson of Newtown, Pennsylvania.

General Eugene E. Habiger

General Eugene E. Habiger assumed command of United States Strategic Command on February 21, 1996 and served until his retirement on June 26, 1998. General Habiger began his military career in the Army, enlisting in March 1959 and serving in the infantry at Fort Benning, Georgia. Following Army active duty, he attended the University of Georgia, graduating in 1963. In September 1963 he graduated from Officer Training School with honors and was commissioned in the Air Force. Upon graduation from the Air Intelligence Officer course in May 1964, he taught at the Air Force's Survival School.

General Habiger completed pilot training in July 1965 and B-52 combat crew training at Castle Air Force Base, California, in January 1967. He joined the 524th Bombardment Squadron, and served as a B-52 pilot and aircraft commander at Wurtsmith Air Force Base, until October 1969, when he began to fly Arc Light combat missions in Southeast Asia.

General Habiger's next assignments took him to Dyess Air Force Base, then to South Vietnam in January 1971 to serve as a C-7A aircraft commander and instructor pilot with the 457th Tactical Airlift

Wing. From September 1971 through August 1974, he was an intelligence support project officer at Headquarters, Tactical Air Command.

In 1974 General Habiger received a Master of Science degree from George Washington University and attended Air Command and Staff College. Upon graduation, he was assigned as the 644th Bombardment Squadron operations officer at K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base. In September 1977, he began his first tour at Offutt Air Force Base and the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff.

General Habiger assumed command of the 325th Bombardment Squadron in January 1980, and later became the 92nd Bombardment Wing's assistant deputy commander for operations, both at Fairchild Air Force Base. After National War College, he served as chief of the Strategic Offensive Forces Division in the deputy directorate for force development, and later, as deputy assistant director for Joint and National Security Council matters, both at Headquarters Air Force. He spent his last nine months at the Pentagon as the Air Force vice Chief of Staff's executive officer. During the next 32 months he held four positions at four locations, serving respectively as 5th Bombardment Wing vice commander, 379th Bombardment Wing commander, 2nd Bombardment Wing commander, and Strategic Air Command inspector general.

In January 1988 General Habiger returned to the Pentagon, where he ultimately became director of Programs and Evaluations in Programs and Resources, Headquarters Air Force. In August 1991 he became Air Education and Training Command vice commander, and in April 1995 returned to the Pentagon, where he was deputy Chief of Staff for personnel at Headquarters Air Force. He was promoted to the rank of general on February 21, 1996, the day he took command of STRATCOM.

General Habiger is a command pilot with more than 5,000 flying hours. General Habiger and his wife, Barbara, have two sons, Karl and Kurt.

Admiral Richard W. Mies

Admiral Richard W. Mies became United States Strategic Command's fourth commander in chief from June 26, 1998, to November 30, 2001. A native of Chicago, Illinois, he received his Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering and mathematics from the United States Naval Academy in 1967. He holds a masters degree in government administration and international relations. His professional education includes the Flag Officers' Capstone course, Harvard University's program for Senior Executives in National and International Security, and the Joint Warfighter course. Admiral Mies completed his post-graduate education at Oxford University, England.

In August 1968, Admiral Mies began one and a half years of submarine and nuclear power training. He reported to *USS Sunfish* (SSN 649) in March 1970 and served as weapons officer, reactor controls assistant, and main propulsion assistant on the nuclear fast attack submarine. In May 1973 he was assigned to the *USS L. Mendel Rivers* (SSN 686) pre-commissioning unit, and remained as engineering officer through commissioning. He

left sea duty in June 1976 to join the staff of Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Fleet, where he was a member of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Examining Board. He returned to sea with the blue crew of the *USS Nathan Hale* (SSBN 623), serving as executive officer on the nuclear fleet ballistic submarine. After two and a half years of study at Harvard University, he returned to sea in January 1984 to command the *USS Sea Devil* (SSN 664). On this tour he accomplished three major deployments, numerous fleet operations, and a surfacing at the North Pole.

In November 1986, Admiral Mies was assigned as executive assistant to the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare). He left the position in February 1989 to assume command of Submarine Development Squadron Twelve, a nuclear attack submarine squadron with primary responsibility for the development of submarine tactical guidance. He served as chief of staff to Commander Submarine Force US Pacific Fleet from July 1990 to April 1992. Following selection for flag rank, Admiral Mies attended the Flag and General Officers' Capstone course in February 1992. He moved to Offutt AFB and the United States Strategic Command Provisional Staff in April 1992, and with USSTRATCOM's establishment on June 1, 1992, became deputy director for Plans and Policy and director of Strategic Target Planning. He commanded Submarine Group Eight and Allied Submarines Mediterranean, and served as Commander Submarine Force US Atlantic Fleet and Commander Allied Command Atlantic immediately before assuming command at USSTRATCOM.

Admiral Mies is a qualified submariner and naval aviation observer. He has been awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal (two awards), Legion of Merit (four awards), Meritorious Service Medal (two awards), amongst many others. Admiral Mies is married to the former Sheila McCann of Chicago, Illinois.

Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr.



Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr., is Commander, United States Strategic Command. A native of Spartanburg, South Carolina, he graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1969. He holds Master of Science degrees in Aerospace Engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology, and Aeronautical Systems from the University of West Florida. Admiral Ellis is a graduate of the Senior Officer Program in National Security at Harvard University. He was designated a Naval Aviator in 1971 and has held a variety of sea and shore assignments since 1972.

Admiral Ellis' sea duty billets as a Navy fighter pilot included tours with Fighter Squadron 92 aboard the *USS Constellation* (CV 64) and Fighter Squadron 1 aboard the *USS Ranger* (CV 61). In 1975, Admiral Ellis graduated from the US Naval Test Pilot School.

Admiral Ellis was the first commanding officer of Strike/Fighter Squadron 131, deploying in 1985 with new F/A-18 Hornets aboard the *USS Coral Sea* (CV 43). In 1987 Admiral Ellis completed US Navy nuclear power training. He served as executive officer of the nuclear-powered aircraft

carrier *USS Carl Vinson* (CVN 70) and as commanding officer of the *USS LaSalle* (AGF 3), the Arabian Gulf flagship of the Commander, Joint Task Force, Middle East. In 1991, he assumed command of the *USS Abraham Lincoln* (CVN 72) and participated in Operation Desert Storm while deployed during her maiden voyage in the western Pacific and Arabian Gulf. In June 1995, Admiral Ellis assumed command of Carrier Group Five/Battle Force Seventh Fleet, breaking his flag aboard the *USS Independence* (CV 62), forward deployed to the western Pacific and homeported in Yokosuka, Japan. As Carrier Battle Group Commander he led contingency response operations to both the Arabian Gulf and Taiwan Straits.

Admiral Ellis' shore and staff assignments include tours as an experimental/operational test pilot, service in the Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, and duty as an F/A-18 Program Coordinator, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare). He has also served as Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, Joint Task Force Five, the counter-narcotics force for US Commander in Chief Pacific. In November 1993, he reported as Inspector General, US Atlantic Fleet, and subsequently served as director for Operations, Plans, and Policy on the staff of the Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Fleet. He assumed duties as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations in November 1996. In October 1998, Admiral Ellis became Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Europe headquartered in London, England, and Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe headquartered in Naples, Italy. Admiral Ellis assumed his position as Commander in Chief, United States Strategic Command, on November 30, 2001, and subsequently, Commander, United States Strategic Command on October 1, 2002.

Admiral Ellis' awards and decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Navy Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit (four awards), Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal (two awards), and the Navy Commendation Medal amongst many others.



USSTRATCOM Command Center

APPENDIX B

**USSTRATCOM
DEPUTY COMMANDER IN CHIEF
BIOGRAPHIES**

Vice Admiral Michael C. Colley

Vice Admiral Michael C. Colley served as deputy commander in chief, and chief of staff, United States Strategic Command, from June 1, 1992, to September 23, 1993. A native of Wheaton, Min-

nesota, he graduated from the US Naval Academy in 1960. In 1970 he earned a master of science degree from the Naval Postgraduate School.

Immediately after his commissioning he reported to the USS Pritchett (DD 561), followed by submarine training in 1963. From 1963 to 1971, Admiral Colley served aboard the James Madison (SSBN 627), the Casimir Pulaski (SSBN 633) and the Sunfish (SSN 649), holding the positions of engineer and executive officer. Between 1975 and 1984 Admiral Colley commanded the Narwhal (SSN 671), Proteus (AS 19) and Submarine Squadron Two at Groton, Connecticut. His shore tours included serving on the staff of Admiral H.G. Rickover at the Atomic Energy Commission and Naval Academy. He also served on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations and in 1985 commanded Navy Recruiting Command. In 1988 he became Deputy Assistant Chief of Naval Operations followed by Commander Submarine Force, US Pacific Fleet. Admiral Colley was assigned as vice director, Strategic Target Planning, Offutt Air Force Base, before becoming deputy commander in chief and chief of staff.

Vice Admiral Colley's awards and decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal and Legion of Merit.

Lieutenant General Arlen D. Jameson

Lieutenant General Arlen D. Jameson served as deputy commander in chief, and chief of staff, United States Strategic Command, from June 24, 1994, to February 29, 1996. A native of Vernon, Texas,

he holds a bachelor of arts and masters degrees. He earned his commission from the Reserve Officer Training Corps program at the University of Puget Sound.

General Jameson's early career included serving three assignments as a personnel officer and missile combat crew instructor. From 1967 to 1974, he held a variety of staff positions in Southeast Asia, the Pacific and Lajes Field, Azores. Returning to the United States in 1974, he served on the Headquarters US Air Force staff. In 1981, the general became deputy commander and subsequently wing vice commander for operations, 341st Strategic Missile Wing, Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana. In 1984 the general commanded the 90th Strategic Missile Wing, F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming. From 1986 to 1991, General Jameson served at Headquarters Strategic Air Command, was a Strategic Missile Center commander, and air division commander. In February 1991, he became chief of staff, Headquarters Strategic Air Command. In July 1992 he commanded the 20th Air Force at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, before returning to Offutt to assume his position as deputy commander in chief and chief of staff, USSTRATCOM.

The general's awards and decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, and the Bronze Star.

Vice Admiral Dennis A. Jones

Vice Admiral Dennis A. Jones served as deputy commander in chief, and chief of staff, United States Strategic Command, from March 10, 1996, to August 13, 1998. A native of Fairbury, Nebraska, he is a graduate of the US Naval Academy and the Harvard University program for Senior Executives.

Admiral Jones' early assignments include the USS Hammerhead (SSN 663) and the USS Henry L. Stimson (SSBN 655), where he served as Engineer Officer. From 1974 to 1981, Admiral Jones was a member of the Nuclear Propulsion Examining Board, executive officer of the USS Spadefish (SSN 668), and served with the Staff of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC. In 1981 he commanded the USS Birmingham (SSN 695) Between 1984 to 1989, he served as Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Naval Reactors, Department of Energy, Washington, DC, and commanded Submarine Development Squadron Twelve in Groton, Connecticut. From 1989 to 1992 he served with the Joint Staff and the office of the Under Secretary of Defense. He commanded Submarine Group eight and Allied Submarines Mediterranean from 1992 to 1994. He became Director, Submarine Warfare Division (N87) before assuming his position with USSTRATCOM.

Vice Admiral Jones' awards and decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal and Legion of Merit.

Lieutenant General Phillip J. Ford

Lieutenant General Phillip J. Ford served as deputy commander in chief, United States Strategic Command, from August 17, 1998, to June 2, 2000. He graduated from the University of Texas with a Bachelor of Science degree in 1965, enlisted in the Air Force in 1966 and was commissioned in 1967. In 1993, he attended the Harvard University Program for Senior Executives in National and International Security.

General Ford became an instructor pilot (RC-135, B-52), was assigned to the 15th Air Force Spotlight Officer Program, and served as an executive officer with the Air Force Manpower Personnel Center, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas. In 1984 he was assigned to Headquarters, US Air Force, and went on to command a bomb squadron and two bomb wings. In 1989, he was assigned as inspector general and subsequently assistant deputy chief of staff for operations, Headquarters Strategic Air Command. In May 1990, General Ford served as commandant, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, and returned to Offutt to become deputy chief of staff for operations, Headquarters Strategic Air Command. He was assigned to Headquarters Air Mobility Command in 1992, and returned to Offutt to become director, operations and logistics, Headquarters USSTRATCOM. General Ford served as commander, 8th Air Force, Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, before becoming deputy commander in chief, USSTRATCOM.

The general's awards and decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, and the Legion of Merit.

Lieutenant General Robert C. Hinson

Lieutenant General Robert C. Hinson served as the deputy commander in chief, United States Strategic Command from June 11, 2000, to April 16, 2002. In 1970 he earned his Bachelor of

Science degree from University of Tennessee and a master's degree in 1977. He is a graduate of Harvard University's Security Program for Senior Officials in National Security.

In his early assignments, General Hinson commanded a bomb squadron, operations group, and tactics and training wing, as well as being assigned to the Joint Staff, where he served with the directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy. He commanded a space wing and bomb wing, and in June 1993 served as deputy director of plans and programs, Headquarters Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. In March 1997 he became director of operations at Headquarters Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. He followed as commander, 14th Air Force, and component commander, US Air Force Space Operations, US Space Command, Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. In June 2000 he assumed the position of deputy commander in chief, US Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.

The general is a command pilot with more than 3,000 flying hours. Aircraft flown include the B-52, FB-111 and B-1B. His major awards and decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, and Legion of Merit.

Lieutenant General Thomas B. Goslin, Jr.

Lieutenant General Thomas B. Goslin, Jr., began his tour as the deputy commander in chief of United States Strategic Command on April 17, 2002. He received his Bachelor of Arts degree in 1970 from

Louisiana State University, and a Master of Arts degree in 1975. He is a graduate of Harvard University's Program for Senior Executives in National and International Security.

General Goslin was commissioned through Officer Training School in 1970. He has served as commander of the Space Warfare Center, Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado; as director of operations for US Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado; as the Air Force's deputy programmer at the Pentagon; and as wing commander, 509th Bomb Wing, Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri. General Goslin has commanded the 351st Combat Support Group and 5th Operations Group, and has been assigned to the 5th Bomb Wing as Vice Commander. His operational experience includes bombers, fighters, tankers, and combat time in Southeast Asia as a forward air controller. General Goslin's staff experience covers assignments in intelligence, plans and classified programs with the Air Staff, and an acquisition tour in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. Other assignments included a political-military tour as Chief of Nuclear Policy at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and duties as an Executive Officer to the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff.

Lieutenant General Goslin's decorations include Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit and the Distinguished Flying Cross.



*Headquarters USSTRATCOM,
Curtis E. LeMay Building*

APPENDIX C

**USSTRATCOM
KEY PERSONNEL
CHRONOLOGY**

*Air Force Mobilization Assistants to
USCINCPAC*



*Major General Thomas L. Nuebert
June 1992 - October 1998*



*Brigadier General Patrick J. Gallagher
October 1998 - September 2001*



*Brigadier General Mark A. Pillar
September 2001 - October 2002*

*Navy Mobilization Assistants to
USCINCPAC*



*Rear Admiral Ronald R. Morgan
September 1994 - May 1998*



*Rear Admiral John E. Till
May 1998 - February 1999*



*Rear Admiral Mark A. Feichtinger
February 1999 - October 2002*

Director, Manpower and Personnel



*Colonel Jeffery M. Harrington
June 1992 - December 1994*



*Lieutenant Colonel William H. Booth (Acting)
December 1994 - February 1995*



*Colonel Charles M. Robards
February 1995 - June 1998*



*Colonel Jan D. Eakle
July 1998 - August 1998*

Photo not available

*Colonel Rick W. Rogers (Acting)
August 1998 - November 1998*



*Colonel Aaron B. Rogers, Jr.
November 1998 - March 2001*



*Colonel Suzanna L. Bell
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Director, Intelligence

*Major General Frank B. Horton
June 1992 - July 1993*



*Brigadier General Glenn C. Waltman
November 1998 - June 2000*



*Major General Gary L. Curtin
July 1993 - August 1995*



*Brigadier General Kelvin R. Coppock
June 2000 - July 2002*



*Brigadier General Tiiu Kera
August 1995 - October 1998*



*Brigadier General Kimber L. McKenzie
July 2002 - October 2002*

Director, Operations and Logistics



*Rear Admiral Ralph L. Tindal
June 1992 - December 1993*



*Rear Admiral Richard A. Buchanan
February 1997 - May 1999*



*Major General Phillip J. Ford
February 1994 - February 1996*



*Rear Admiral Paul F. Sullivan
July 1999 - August 2000*



*Brigadier General Thomas H. Neary
March 1996 - February 1997*



*Brigadier General Thomas A. O'Riordan
August 2000 - July 2001*

Director, Operations and Logistics (continued)

*Major General Paul L. Bielowicz
July 2001 - October 2002*

***Deputy Director, Operations and Logistics, and
Director, Command and Control***

*Brigadier General Orin L. Godsey
June 1992 - July 1994*

*Deputy Director, Operations and Logistics, and
Director, Combat Operations*



*Captain John B. Padgett III
August 1994 - July 1996*



*Alfred A. Buckles, SES-2 (Acting)
December 1998 - July 1999*



*Captain Joseph E. Enright
August 1996 - February 1997*



*Brigadier General Thomas A. O'Riordan
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*Brigadier General Timothy J. McMahon
February 1997 - September 1998*



*Rear Admiral John J. Donnelly
August 2000 - October 2002*

Director, Plans and Policy



*Major General Robert E. Linhard
June 1992 - April 1994*



*Major General Charles R. Henderson
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*Rear Admiral David M. Goebel
April 1994 - August 1996*



*Rear Admiral Paul F. Sullivan
August 2000 - April 2001*



*Major General Ronald C. Marcotte
August 1996 - August 1998*



*Rear Admiral John T. Byrd
April 2001 - October 2002*

Director, Combat Plans



*Rear Admiral Richard W. Mies
June 1992 - October 1994*



*Rear Admiral Richard A. Buchanan
September 1996 - February 1997*



*Brigadier General Thomas H. Neary
October 1994 - March 1996*



*Captain Joseph E. Enright
February 1997 - December 1998*



*Brigadier General Ronald C. Marcotte
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*Rear Admiral Charles H. Griffiths, Jr.
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Director, Combat Plans (continued)

*Rear Admiral John J. Donnelly
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*Brigadier General Roger W. Burg
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*Director, Command, Control, Communications
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*Rear Admiral Henry F. Herrera
June 1992 - July 1994*



*Brigadier General Robert F. Behler
April 1997 - July 1999*



*Rear Admiral Patrick D. Moneymaker
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*Alfred A. Buckles, SES-2 (Acting)
February 1997 - April 1997*



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Deputy Chief of Staff



*Colonel George R. Warner
June 1992 - May 1995*



*Colonel Michael J. Varner
May 1995 - July 1996*

Chief of Staff



*Colonel M. E. Callendar, Jr.
July 1996 - June 1998*



*Colonel Jan D. Eakle
April 2000 - September 2000*



*Colonel William M. Fraser, III
June 1998 - May 1999*



*Colonel Stephen D. Schmidt
October 2000 - July 2002*



*Colonel David E. Clary
July 1999 - April 2000*



*Colonel Thomas K. Andersen
July 2002 - October 2002*



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